RESTRICTED
FM IRAQREP
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 332
OF 290707Z DECEMBER 03
INFO ROUTINE
, ALL CLASSIFIED POSTS, CABINET OFFICE, DFID
INFO ROUTINE DTI, HM TREASURY
INFO ROUTINE MODUK/MODUK NAVY/MODUK AIR/MODUK ARMY/MODUK PE
INFO ROUTINE
• ADMINISTRATOR ASCENSION
SIC
SUBJECT: POST-CONFLICT IRAQ: 2003 REVIEW
SUMMARY
1. The British contribution to the running of Iraq in the
post-conflict period in 2003 is an extraordinary story. The
post-conflict administration started badly, but Bremer has picked
it up. Security remains the main determining factor, now that the
policy and timelines are clear. The courage and determination of
UK civil servants and soldiers on the ground have been exemplary.
This has tested our relationship as much with the US as with Iraq
and the region.
DETAIL
2. I write this brief synopsis of the UK's civilian presence in
million people in a region we finally stopped trying to rule in
1958. We may or may not be right to be here. But here we are
until Iraq's condition represents an honorable improvement.
3. The post-conflict era started on 9 April, and started badly.
The Pentagon listened to the wrong pre-war advice, and then
implemented it poorly. ORHA under Jay Garner was a pale shadow of
what was required. Looting and disorder did more damage to Iragi
material and psychological well-being than the conflict itself.
The image of an all-powerful America has still not recovered
4. L. Paul(Jerry) Bremer has restored some credibility to the
Coalition's authority. He started with too aggressive an
approach. He had no real choice but to outlaw the senior residue
of the Ba'ath Partv. and the Iragi Army had melted away before he
DECLASSIFIED
Ques

emnanis
or the old regime were bound to supply recruits for
targeted violence if given no alternative means of livelihood
And the failure to close borders and ammunition dumps widened the
opportunity for foreign-born terrorists. The opposition is
growing in sophistication and effectiveness. Only Iraqis can in
the end deal with it.
But it will take a long time before Iraqi
security institutions can operate effectively and independently.
6. The insecurity is concentrated in the centre of the country.
The Kurds in the North have learnt to look after themselves, and
are determined to continue to do so. In the South-East, the
homogeneous Shi'a community have gained from the fall of Saddam
and will invest more in a free democratic Iraq. The cunning Brits
selected this region to manage for the Coalition and have done so
effectively and with understanding for the local culture. I pay
tribute to Sir Hilary Synnott, Head of CPA (South), to
Major-Generals Robin Brind and Graeme Lamb and to the whole UK
staff in the South-East, including DfID's secondees, for their
outstanding work over this recent period. That London think so
readily that the South is ours and the rest is America's is a
further compliment to their achievement.
7. If many things have gone well, the prize for CPA ineptness in
this mixed picture has to go to the Iraq Media Network, now
re-christened Al-Iraqiya. With billions to spend and the world's
most powerful media industry to draw from, the CPA has over the
past few months produced a mouse, then another mouse and finally,
at end-year, a mouse. Subservience to Washington's spin
requirements and sheer dysfunctionality seem to have been the
causes. The few exceptions in terms of canny media handling have
mainly been British.
8. The political framework for the next period has, after some
deviations down side-tracks, developed reasonably well. The
formation of the Governing Council in July, ably co-managed by the
first IraqRep, John Sawers, was a bold and necessary step which.
with the subsequent creation of twenty-five Ministries, has done
much to satisfy the requirement that Iragis recommence the
handling of their own affairs. International acceptance of the
new institutions has been especially encouraging.
9. Nevertheless, Iraqi systems are not yet capable of standing
on their own feet.
The need for a massive injection of US and
other international resources alone demonstrates that. Neither is
there yet sufficient strength behind the concept of a unified Irag
DECLASSIFIED

terratorie
community as a whole. But the UN will return at their own pace,
by which time the main work will have been done, security
allowing. Other allies, notably Australia, Poland, Italy and
increasingly Japan and South Korea, are making their mark. But it
is the co-occupiers who bear the brunt. The British part of this,
from my highly effective Deputy, David Richmond, onwards, has been
played by civil service volunteers from a wide range of
departments and origins.
Their adaptability, resourcefulness,
hard work and sheer courage demonstrate that crown servants
overseas retain the capacity, whatever the anachronisms, to run
whatever the British taxpayer wants them to do.
GREENSTOCK
YYYY
13.
MAIN
IRAQ/KUWAIT
13
IRAQ POLICY UNIT
CONSULAR D
0
0
PROTOCOL D//PALACE
0
PS MR OBRIEN
0
PS MR RAMMELL
0
ADDITIONAL 1
IRAQ/KUWAIT
(IRA),
0
1
ATT GEN//C ADAMS
BANKE
CAOFF1
CAOFF2
DFID1
DFID2
ECGD
FSA
HMT
MOD
NO 10
UKTI1
UKTI2
ZILNAN 7881
DECLASSIFIED