DIT
MA1/DCDS(C)
MA/DCDS(EC)
MAIDCDS(Pers)
MA/CJO
MA/DCDS(Health)
PS/Policy Director
MA/DCJO(Ops)
MA/ACDS(Ops)
PS/DG Op Pol
PS/DGCC
PS/DTIO
Hd Sec (Iraq)
PS/DNO
PS/DAO
PS/DMO
Di Ops
SPC/CDS (fao FE5) APS2/SofS
Cabinet Office (fao Desmond Bowen)
FCO (fao William Ehrman)
GCHQ (fao Leo Doyle)
OP COS PAPER
SUBJECT - IRAQ: OFFICE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (ORHA)
The attached paper by the FCO is circulated to COS for information
only, no action is required. The paper will inform the verbal ORHA update
scheduled to take place during the Ministerial Briefing on 1 Apr 03.
SECCOS
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administration, in co-operation with our military and where possible with the Iraqis.
2. Without this, these tasks will fall on the military, who have other priorities and
limited resources. The options are as follows:
! • We task and resource 1 Div to do this autonomously in those areas of Iraq for
which they are responsible;
• We work through ORHA and do what we can to increase ORHA's institutional
capacity, while accepting that UK-US differences about the legality of some
activities ORHA will undertake is likely to impact at some stage on our ability to
do so;
We find other ways to fulfil these tasks, e.g. through NGOs or international
agencies.
3. The first option is not viable. ORHA will administer the whole of Iraq as part of an
integrated US-led coalition approach to Phase IV and has large resources at its
disposal. We may wish to support 1 Div's capacity to carry out specific actions (e. g.
repairing the water supply) in areas where we are responsible for maintaining
security. But the logic of ORHA - a nation-wide approach to Phase IV - limits the
UK's responsibilities and exposure. Carving out a separate approach in a UK sector
would make no sense.
4. The third option is not incompatible with this or with the second option. Indeed,
DID may well wish to go down this route as the primary means of delivering
humanitarian and, in due course, reconstruction assistance. We shall need to keep
under review where the balance of our overall effort lies.
5. But ORHA remains the coalition's transitional civil administration in waiting and is
iencies a miN are presen humanitarian, sis are. A cod at len st until the be in
a position to do this. This paper therefore focuses exclusively on ORHA as the means
for adding value and exerting UK influence in the immediate post-conflict
environment.
Current Situation
6. ORHA was set up by the Department of Defence to provide the transitional civilian
authority for post-conflict Iraq, under coalition military control. It has now relocated
from Washington to Kuwait. On current plans, once Baghdad falls and the security
situation permits, ORHA will deploy to Baghdad and evolve into the civil
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drawn in part from those Iraqi exiles currently working alongside ORHA. As
circumstances permit, ORHA plans to conduct a phased transfer of civilian authority
from ORHA to the ILA.
8. ORHA's current staffing level is about 200. This is expected to rise to over 1000
by the time ORHA deploys into Iraq. The UK now has six officers seconded to
ORHA in theatre, with 5-6 more in the pipeline, and one working full time in
ORHA's reach-back office in the Pentagon. Their role is to influence and shape
ORHA's thinking on the key Phase IV issues, and to ensure that information flows
effectively from theatre to HMG - including information about commercial
opportunities likely to arise in Phase IV. Our secondees are fully integrated and are
adding significant value. At ORHA's request we are considering whether to
strengthen our representation. The Australians also have six secondees in ORHA,
and the Japanese will shortly have one.
9. There is considerable tension between the US State Department and the
Department of Defence for control over ORHA. There remain also deep differences
of view within the Administration over the desirability and need for UN authorisation
for Phase IV reconstruction work, and over the relationship between ORHA, the IIA,
and a possible future UN Special Coordinator.
The Legal Position
10. The Attorney General has set out his advice on the limitations of the authority of
an occupying power (letter of 26 March attached). He highlighted the fact that the
provisions of the Hague Regulations 1907 and Geneva Convention IV need to be
considered against specific proposals in order to give detailed advice on the precise
limits of what is lawful. We are putting together such information about the intended
activities of ORHA as we have so that that detailed legal analysis can be done.
11. The views given in paragraphs 12-15 about the lawfulness of possible future
actions by ORHA are provisional and subject to this detailed analysis.
Likely Sequence of Events in Phase IV
12. Jay Garner sees ORHA acting as the transitional administration for perhaps 30-90
days. The priority for the first 30 days are likely to be to deal with immediate
humanitarian needs. These will include: the restoration of food supplies as far as
possible through the existing ration system; the payment of public sector salaries; the
re-establishment and rehabilitation of essential public services such as
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abolition or iraqi government restrictions on private business; significant changes to
the exchange or trade regimes; significant changes to the structure of the state budget;
reform of the police, prisons, security sector. Whether they would be addressed by
ORHA (i.e. without a covering UNSCR) or by an Iraqi Interim Authority (potentially
under UNSCR cover) remains to be seen, and will depend both on progress in setting
up a functional IIA and on progress in New York on the "fourth" resolution.
14. Finally, there continues to be a view in DoD that the absence of a UNSCR need
not be an impediment to thorough-going political and economic reform, including in
areas that the UK would consider to be clearly outside the scope of an occupying
power's rights and responsibilities. These could include significant changes to the
country's political or economic governance such as constitutional reform; substantive
decisions on oil market strategy and the attraction of foreign investment in the oil
sector; or introduction of a new currency.
15. There is also a political dimension to this. There is no agreed US inter-agency
view, still less an agreed UK-US view, on how to handle key political issues such as
the composition of the IIA, the nature of its relationship with the coalition through
ORHA, or the timing or remit of a "Baghdad Conference". We are preparing a
separate paper on this.
Implications for UK Involvement
16. ORHA is in many ways a sub-optimal organisation for delivering the UK's Phase
IV objectives on the ground in Iraq. But it is at present the only game in town, and
will remain so until negotiations over an authorising UNSCR and UN involvement in
the administration of Iraq are completed or until there is large-scale NGO activity in
Iraq.
17. On the positive side, there is ample scope to use our secondees to exert leverage
over both US Phase IV planning and over practical implementation on the ground.
We therefore recommend that the UK should continue to commit resources to
ORHA where we can add real value and exert influence over emerging US
perspectives and plans. We should consider fielding additional expertise that can
help the Iraqis re-establish essential public services, i.e. working at the humanitarian
end of the spectrum.
18. But there remain a number of risks:
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that it nad parachuted iraqi exiles into positions of influence.
Serious differences between current or future coalition members could arise about
ORHA's role, in particular with regard to:
Legality
• In the absence of an authorising UNSCR a situation could arise where ORHA was
acting illegally. This would have implications for both our secondees inside
ORHA and ORHA's activities within any part of Iraq in which British forces were
responsible for maintaining security.
19. The resource and political risks are strong arguments for our engagement with
ORHA: only by full, constructive engagement can we hope to shape the outcomes in
ways that stay within UK red lines. The political risks are in any case inseparable
from our prominent role in the coalition.
20. The legal risks are at present hypothetical but potentially serious. Although they
are not - yet - a determining factor in our commitment to ORHA, it is possible to
imagine a situation where the position of UK secondees to ORHA could become
legally unsustainable. This would be a major blow to the coalition's cohesion and to
our ability to deliver UK objectives in Iraq. They can be managed only by applying
the Attorney General's advice to specific ORHA plans and policies as they emerge,
and seeking to shape them in accordance with the Attorney General's advice.
21. As and when we have this further detailed legal advice, we will need to consider
the position of our secondees within ORHA in the event that the US proposes action
that we consider to be unlawful. We will also need to give careful thought to the
position of UK forces in Iraq, in particular those that will occupy an area of Iraq in the
south east, and the action that they should take if asked by ORHA to undertake
activities that we consider unlawful.
22. Recommendations:
• In continuing discussions about Phase IV, we make clear to the US the limits
within which the UK, including UK personnel in ORHA, will have to operate.
• But we want ORHA to succeed. We therefore need close consultation on
ORHA's plans, to ensure they stay within UK red lines.
• Subject to the above, we would be content to confirm General Cross' position
as Deputy to Garner, and other UK support for ORHA's work.
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Legality/legitimacy
Time
Iraq Planning Unit
28 March 2003
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