CONFIDENTIAL
FM IRAQREP
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 109
OF 261048Z MARCH 04
INFO PRIORITY
, ALL CLASSIFIED POSTS, CABINET OFFICE
INFO PRIORITY DEFENCE COMMEN LONDON, DFID, DTI, HM TREASURY
INFO PRIORITY MODUK/MODUK NAVY/MODUK AIR/MODUK ARMY/MODUK PE
ADMINISTRATOR ASCENSION
INFO PRIORITY
SUBJECT: IRAQ VALEDICTORY: SIX MONTHS IN THE CAULDRON
SUMMARY
1. This often chaotic and hazardous process of building the new
Iraq has produced some surprisingly solid results, and stimulated
some alarmingly nasty enemies. The outcome will not be finally
determined for a long time to come, and we do not yet know in
whose hands it may lie. The political lines of battle are
beginning to be drawn, and the competition could become ugly. The
only way to ensure success in UK/US terms is to keep slogging on,
and bear the costs. Indications of what is coming up over the
next stage. A tribute to the British Team in Iraq.
DETAIL
The People of Iraq
2. A year on from the start of military action against Iraq,
eleven months from Bremer's arrival and nearly seven months from
the beginning of my own direct involvement, the cardinal fact to
report is that the majority of the Iraqi people are still with us,
just. They do not want their country to be occupied by
foreigners; they feel humiliated both by Saddam and by the manner
of Saddam's removal; they are suspicious of American motives; they
fear each other and some scenarios for the future. But they can
see an opportunity and they do not wish to lose it.
3. The poll conducted earlier this month by the Oxford Research
Institute for the BBC confirms our impression in the Iraq Rep
office: a majority of Iraqis believe that, on baiance, life is
improving and foreign assistance must be tolerated for a while
longer. They have put up with an awful lot over the past few
months: as many have died as might have been the case under
DECLASSIFIED

understood early enough the full potential for brutality and
mindless destruction in this repressed and traumatised population.
And the volume of resources required on the ground, especially in
military terms, was and continues to be misjudged. The full
disbandment of Saddam's security forces; the intensity of the
de-Ba'athification programme; the neglect of the borders and the
ammunition stores - perhaps the greatest security lacunae of all;
the failure of the CPA to create a public impact; the complacency
and the constant overselling of the true picture; all these
mistakes have cost lives and made the final outcome more doubtful.
5. Bremer's vigorous marshalling of the instruments at his
disposal and his increasingly sensible adjustment to the evolving
realities have to a large degree compensated for these
deficiencies, even if he has to take responsibility, as do 1, for
some of them. His relentless driving pressure through endless 18
hour days and his direct motivation of all the productive parts of
the machine have been an indispensable factor in holding the CPA
on course. He does not like to hear alternative views and the
Americans here have tended to suppress them in front of him.
Hence the occasional scratchiness when 1 and my team have filled
that gap. But his skill in changing course in response to the
realities as though nothing untoward had happened has eased us
through a number of narrow gates.
6. The compartmentalisation of US activity grates with the British
habit and has caused real setbacks. US military and US civilian
arms have struggled to work with each other.
The Brits in the machine
have often had to supply the links. But the power delivered when
plug meets socket is impressive. And the American tolerance for
losses has far exceeded our early, pessimistic assumptions. I
really believe that the US will see this through to the end.
The Iraqi Governing Council
7. No committee of 25 has ever run anything smoothly. The IGC
without an Administrator would quickly fall apart. They have
often been lazy, indecisive, long-winded and disunited. A few of
them are downright untrustworthy. In none of them do I see a
natural prospect for leader of a United iraq. Yet when marshalled
and prodded, and asked to do something which does not defy
gravity, they can see sense; and their results sheet presents a
DECLASSIFIED

the CPA's objectives are not so very different from his. His
isolation from active politics and from the Americans and us have
led him to misinterpret what the TAL is all about. We have won a
few skirmishes with him recently and we should stick to our guns
on this one. The Americans are again trying to strike up a
discreet channel to him; and I have been encouraging centre-ground
members of the IGC (eg Allawi) to get through to him. But he or
his immediate circle could so easily drop a match into the
flammable pool of Shi'a heartland perceptions. It might well be
an uncomfortable ride.
The Future
9. The hard bit - casting the Iraqi State loose-on its own
responsibility - is still to come. The democrats are
disorganised; and the best organised are not the most democratic.
There are widespread fears that Iran is stepping up its
interference and its anti-Coalition activity. The religious Shi'a
parties are beginning to show their muscle. There is an
do the be stra
increasing amount of wary focus being placed on the Group of Five:
Hakim (Sciri), Bahr al Uloom, Jaafar (Da'wa), Rubaie and, of
course, Chalabi, whom we never expected to see in this company.
If effective political parties do not come into being soon to
represent other mainstream views, particularly secular and liberal
ones, the Islamists' momentum might attract a majority, even if
this is not a true reflection of where Iraqis want to go. This is
Chalabi's calculation: join the biggest organised group and
undermine or buy off the rest. There is a real power struggle
looming, and it will come to a climax with the elections at the
turn of the year.
10. The security threat will, alas, not go away when the
occupation ends. The evil-doers, as Bremer persists in calling
them in public addresses, are small in number but lethal in
effect. Recent events have made them boider, and recruitment may
have become easier for them. They have weaponry and planning
capability in considerable depth and will continue to operate
until and unless the whole of Iraqi society turns against them.
We have to work hard to prevent this capacity from changing the
overall political balance. And we have to pian to protect our
people on the ground for some time to come.
11. Nonetheless the Iraqi people want this experiment to work. If
we lose that strength of determination, we have no way out. It
will hang on perceptions, the dilution of sectarianism; and the
DECLASSIFIED

from our home departments. And, whatever the occasional
sideswipes in one direction or the other, the development of our
twinned relationship with the Americans has turned into something
unprecedentedly close and immensely valuable. Finally, we have
had to sustain, and be sustained by, the support and understanding
of our families at home, who in many ways have had the harder
task. In all of this, the Prime Minister and you, Sir, should
know that your CPA team out here have been delivering, and will
I pay tribute to them
continue to deliver, something remarkable.
all and leave my excellent predecessor and successor, David
Richmond, my warmest good wishes for the three months remaining.
GREENSTOCK
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MAIN
DESPATCHES/REVIEWS
IRAQ POLICY UNIT
0
MENAD
BCP
CCD
ECPOL
0
EU(I)
PAND UNIT
0
PD
0
RHD
0
RHD HSP
0
0
1
MENARG
5
PS
0
PS MR OBRIEN
PS B SYMONS
0
PS MR RAMMELL
PS PUS
1
0
DG CORPORATE AFFAIRS
DG POLITICAL
1
DG ECONOMIC
0
DIR INFORMATION
0
DIR HR
DSI//DIRECTOR
MENAD//DIR MIDDLE EAST
ADDITIONAL 0
DECLASSIFIED