seculty. The bad news is that i am not sure we yet have a fully-worked out
strategy to tackle it. But we can get one.
Essentially what is happening is this. The place is awash with weapons.
The borders are porous. The culture is violent. What the FRE and assorted
terrorists are doing has a strategy behind it: it is to inhibit any progress -
killing construction workers, sabotaging improvements, creating an air of
menace and chaos; and then provoking the CF to retaliate, using publicity to
generate anger about the retaliation. Security therefore is the shadow over
everything. The oil refineries can't be repaired so production may fall; the
infrastructure work halts; the aid workers withdraw; the students stay away
from school; the police take fright; the political system becomes warped and
politicians in Iraqthink they have to be anti-coalition in order to win
support.
Underneath all this, however, is one reassuring truth: Iraqis ultimately want
what we want: a stable Iraq in which the CF leave. But we are dealing with
a people unused to proper political debate, without proper leadership and in
conflict about their country's occupation. The Afghans felt their country
was occupied for decades; the Taleban was felt to be an occupying force.
The Iraqis are different.
DECLASSIFIER

me tonomo ways.
(1) Do whatever it takes to get the Civil Defence and police in shape.
The Coalition should hire who we need; pay what it takes; create an
officer class that can lead and knows that it has a huge vested interest
in success. Bremer's speech on de-baathification etc was well
received. But I'm not sure we really have our entire system focused
on this; and it needs to be. Every main road has to be guarded; the oil
refineries have to be rebuilt, to hit the 3m barrels per day target; the
power has to reach the 6000 MW goal etc etc. This is worth
mobilizing the entire energies of our coalition. "Doing our best" will
not be enough.
(2) Fifty pericent of the population has access to satellite TV. The Iraqi
station is now up and running. But its reporters are in fear of their
lives, whereas Al Jazeera were in Fallujah before the insurrection
Day in day out there is a huge
wave of propaganda hitting us (eg the bombs in Basra were at first
attributed to British missiles until we got local leaders out telling it as
it is). At the least we need: to provide top security for al-Iraqiya
reporters and staff; to ensure that al-Iraqiya has top quality
entertainment and sports programmes to attract viewers; to strengthen
DECLASSIFIET

avocate anemplo prevent tray people getting te benent or wnat
we are doing. Eg every time terrorists stop work at a hospital or blow
up repairs to electricity, the Government should be out there,
explaining and campaigning.
I would like to send a couple of people I really trust to give us a
proper sense of what could be done.
(3)
The real story of the reconstruction work is the difference between
spending that is "obligated" and spending actually happening. Of
course security is the central issue. But again, it needs a "whatever it
takes" attitude to get this out and done and any suspension of major
projects (eg Baghdad sewage and power stations) needs to be
temporary. We also desperately need agreement on what will replace
CPA outside Baghdad after 30*h June.
(4)
The courts: very few cases can be tried at present; judges are subject
to real intimidation. We need to ensure that trials of criminals and
sentencing begins again. An independent judiciary will be a big step
forward
DECLASSIFIER

In conclusion, there is no doubt we can get there. But I just think in some of
these areas, especially the first three, we need to satisfy ourselves that
literally everything possible is being done to succeed. This is a race against
time.
DEULASSIFIER