Existing policy
Security Sector Reform (SSR)
A new Iraqi state will require high quality, civilian-controlled armed forces. We have
been contributing to the US-led SSR process, divided between two main elements
under separate CPA Ministries:
- 3 Divisions of the New Iraqi Army (NIA) totalling around 40,000 men are to be
trained within one year. A first battalion has already been trained. A second and
third are in training.
- The aim is to put 70,000 Iraqi police in place by mid-2004. 30,000 are available
now. We contributed to the CPA policing needs assessment and have provided
some training. We are in the process of selecting police officers, from a pool of
volunteers, to serve in Iraq. In addition to the senior UK police officers already in
Iraq, 15 UK trainers can be deployed within two weeks and another 60 by the end
of October. Our target is 100 UK trainers deployed by end 2003 (of a planned
CPA total of 600);
Other security forces
In addition to these plans for long term reform, the CPA has overseen the
development of interim forces:
- An Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC) is being trained to operate under the
command of the US military. The plan is to produce 18 battalions, one for each
governorate. Nine will have been trained by the end of September. The force will
be able to guard electricity and oil pipeline facilities.
- The key ministries (oil, electricity, railways etc) have established their own
forces, collectively totalling 14,000 and known as the Facilities Protection
Service (FPS) to guard infrastructure.
What can be done?
The key principles should be:
- for the Coalition to work through, not against, existing local leadership and
customs. Iraqis must take increasing responsibility for their own security. The
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Security Sector Reform needs to be faster:
New Iraqi Army
- Bremer has already ordered NIA training to be expanded and accelerated. We
should expedite the additional contributions (principally NCOs) we have already
been asked for.
- The NIA is to have responsibility for external security. An obvious first task
would be for them to take over border patrol duties, relieving Coalition forces.
Iraqi Police
- Training of the police should be accelerated and given a proper strategy. We are
looking at ways to expedite our own contribution (eg speeding up training);
- The US have suspended plans to train Iraqi police in Hungary: we should press
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again on this, and in parallel work to establish secure police training facilities in
regional countries (eg Jordan, Bahrain) or inside Iraq;
- Capacity and expertise in the CPA Interior Ministry team urgently need to be
increased: current staff is twelve; the outgoing senior adviser (Kerik) has not yet
been replaced;
- Certainty is needed on funding (2003 CPA police budget has been cut from
$120m to $90m; there is an estimated requirement of $1.6bn for 2004-5);
- The US already agree that we need to bring the UN, the EU and the OSCE into
police training under a new UNSCR. We should pursue in capitals now.
'Quick fixes' must be made more effective:
Iraqi Civil Defence Corps
- The US are already considering doubling the size of the ICDC to 36 battalions. (ie
two per Governorate). We should encourage them to train maximum numbers
with maximum speed
- If additional UK troops are deployed we could offer to train ICDC battalions
ourselves (perhaps one in each of the four governorates in our AO).
- We should consider re-recruiting from the pre-conflict regular army into the ICDC
on à unit basis.
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Informal capability
We should find more informal ways to engage Iraqis in providing their own
security. The Coalition/ the Governing Council should encourage neighbourhood
security committees (already coming into existence spontaneously) and empower
community leaders to create their own guard forces.
On a temporary basis we could pay tribal leaders by results to ensure the
protection of infrastructure in their areas.
And we should look for other sources of help with security:
- We should consider hiring in commercially provided intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance assets to watch key infrastructure assets and ensure quick reaction
to sabotage and looting (a model used by the US in Colombia, now being
considered by CENTCOM);
We should press on with the additional UNSCR needed to allow deployment of
more international troops and police, including possibly from the region (eg
Jordan, which would be a positive sign of Arab engagement). We should lobby
potential contributors now.
- We and the US should apply firm diplomatic pressure to neighbouring states to
tighten their border controls.
In the meantime, we must hold the ring:
All these measures will take time to implement. While we develop Iraqi capability
and broaden the international security presence, we must keep the threats under
control. This means more Coalition forces are needed in the short term:
- To enable quick reaction and demonstrate resolve both to the Iraqis and to other
coalition partners in a deteriorating situation;
To enable the emergency reconstruction programme to move forward with the
necessary security.
Iraq Policy Unit
3 September 2003
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