Dear David,
SECURITY IN BAGHDAD
Security in Baghdad is crucial to coalition success. The security
situation in Baghdad Is poor, and
This is now recognised by the US
who expect the situation to improve following the arrival of a fresh US
Division with peacekeeping experience. It would be possible to deploy 16
Air Assault Brigade (16 AA Bde) into Baghdad to support the training and
use of the Baghdad police for the short term. But set against the scale of
the problem and of the US forces deployed, the Chiefs of Staff judge that
deployment of 16 AA Bde is likely to have only a marginal effett. It would
carry significant risks - of our forces being tied down in Baghdad and of
an adverse impact on our exemplary approach in the South.
has decided not to request the deployment. The Defence Secretary
considers therefore that the withdrawal of 16 AA Bde should proceed as
planned, with the next significant movement on Tuesday 27 May 2003.
Situation
Security in Baghdad is clearly crucial to overall success in Iraq; if the Coalition
fails there, we fail completely. The security situation in Baghdad is poor. There
is therefore a strategic dilemma. To some degree, the poor security could be
seen
in the manner that is proving successful for us in
Basrah - and for US forces elsewhere in Iraq
Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid are seized of this problem.
Their expectation is that the arrivatin June of the 1st Armoured
Division (1 AD), which will be fresh to theatre and has Balkans experence, will
Sir David Manning KCMG
DECLASSIFIED
10 Downing Street
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come mercan commended mee, weeds palcans experience, is likely to
be receptive to UK views on how to deal with the situation in Baghdad. At lower
levels, we continue to provide specialist advice and assistance; for example, we
are providing Information Operations personnel to boost
operations capacity in Baghdad.
It was against this background that you and Major General Richards discussed
with Bremer the possibility of the short-term deployment of 16 Air Assault
Brigade to assist US forces in Baghdad. The specific purpose of this
deployment would be to support the developing Baghdad police force until the
replacement of the current US forces in Baghdad in mid to late June. A possible
spin-off of such a deployment would be to demonstrate
• successful modus
what we would hope would be a
operandi. There is a very narrow window of opportunity to pursue the option of
such a deployment. In accordance with existing plans, the Brigade has already
started its withdrawal from theatre. Once withdrawn it would be very difficult for
the UK to support the US in the way proposed - although, crucially, it does not
remove the option for the Coalition.
The Chiefs of Staff have concluded that for such a deployment to be justified
we would have to believe:
That the US lack the will and capacity to take action to deal with this
Time factor
problem;
whadduned.
And that the deployment of what would be a relatively small force could
have a strategic effect that would make the difference between coalition
success and failure.
US Intent
We have been discussing the security situation in Baghdad with the US at all
levels, including the
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desired effect. In baldly numerical terms, what is being considered is the
deployment of some 1,200 personnel into a very large city where the US
But mi"
already have in excess of 25.000 troops (and with the arrival of 1. AD will have
4D,000). It is quite likely that such a deployment would have only a tactical,
a gain in
local effect within the city. Baghdad is a uniquely difficult environment
sheer scale, the presence of large slum areas and the lack of the sort of local
political structures that are developing elsewhere all contribute to the difficulty
of rapidly achieving results similar to those in Basrah or Mosul.
The Chiefs of Staff have thus concluded that deployment of 16 AA Bde would,
0р спин л
at best, not ensure Coalition success, but would rather provide only temporary
and limited assistance, the gains from which are likely to be similarly limited.
ensue succe
but beth thether not
Risks
Wy at all?
The Chiefs of Staff concluded that the deployment would carry considerable
risks. First, there is no clear concept of operations for such a deployment.
Establishing both this and, in particular, the vital command and control links
with a force that is in the process of, and focussed on, withdrawing from
10
Baghdad would be difficult and potentially risky (and not necessarily quick).
Secondly, and paradoxically, tactical success for the deployment would bring its
own problems - principally pressure to remain. We would thus run the risk of
fixing a significant component of our forces in Iraq in Baghdad. Not only would
this have longer term implications for our forces, but the UK could consequently
tani mu
face pressure to take ownership of numerous other problems in Baghdad by
virtue of being effectively in occupation there; this could have serious
oVS
implications for the rest of our reconstruction effort in Iraq.
Implications for the UK effort elsewhere in Irag
The deployment as proposed would require us to denude 1 UK Division of a
number of
capabilities - particularly among
shee ma
personnel. This would come at some cost to operations in
se a real
the UK's primary area of responsibility around Basrah. A deployment to
Baghdad could, ironically, weaken the exemplary effect that we are aiming to
of how
demonstrate
ingriment,
and which is serving as our most eloquent argument with
her.
This success is built on a nexus of activities that go beyond the 'boots on the
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nome. There is a pressing need to retur these personnel to the UK so that
they can recover and re-train. There is a clear expectation on the part of the
personnel and their families that the Brigade will be withdrawn from theatre
soon; a further deployment to Baghdad would have a negative effect on them.
To make a deployment to Baghdad work, a significant number of personnel
(potentially as many as 500) who are already in the UK would have to return to
Iraq.
Conclusion
Any deployment of 16 AA Bde is thus most likely to have only an uncertain,
limited and temporary ameliorative effect in the short period until 1 AD take
over, and will not, in the view of the Chiefs of Staff, have strategic impact. The
NOT
United States does not view such as deployment as necessary
Вете
ren.
Viewed in these terms, and against the significant risks and
difficulties associated with a deployment to Baghdad, the Defence Secretary
believes that we should continue to withdraw 16 Air Assault Brigade, as
planned, with the next significant planned movement of personnel on Tuesday
27 May 03.
This does not mean that we shall not continue to do our best to influence the
developing situation in Baghdad; success there is crucial. Through our
personnel embedded in key positions in both the US military headquarters and
ORHA we shall continue to influence and guide American operations in
Baghdad. With the arrival of 1 AD and Sanchez, who will be predisposed to
taking a new approach, that influence is likely to be increasingly effective and
fruitful.
I am copying this letter to Simon McDonald (FCO), Anna Bewes (DfID), and
Desmond Bowen (Cabinet Office)
P D WATKINS
Private Secretary
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