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D/CGS/51/9,4
13 May 03
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CNS
CGS VISIT TO OP TELIC 7-10 MAY 2003
GENERAL
1.
1 visited British troops deployed on Op TELIC between 7-10 May 03. 1 was
trial noted Air Go ek as we as he site brad, is in is from?
Baghdad i aiso mer CFLCC. Li Gen Dave McKiernan: Comd ORHA. Lt Gen
(Retd) Jay Garner, and his Deputy. Maj Gen Tim Cross: HM Representative
Christopher Segar: and the British Government's Special Representative to Iraq.
John Sawers. Whilst at the British Embassy I took part in a press conference which
included Mr Sawers. Mr Segar and Gen Cross. In Qatar, I visited DCINCCENT.
Lt Gen John Abizaid.
PHASE 3
2.
Without wishing to circumvent the lessons learnt process, there are a number
of important issues worthy of note that have been reinforced at every level during
the visit. These lessons must contribute to the shaping of the Army's Force
Structure work prior to it reaching DMB later this year and contribute to the wider
deveiopment of Defence in the joint arena:
CHALLENGER 2 (95% - availability).
•
Battie Winning Equipments.
WARRIOR. AS90 and PHOENIX have proved to be remarkable battle-
ET-UK EYESO
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winning equipments, able to prosecute dynamic and rapid manoeuvre with
seriously capable protection and firepower. They were invaluable in both the
open and the more complex urban environments, applying combat power in a
manner that continuously out-manoeuvred the enemy.
Training. Land Command's training mechanisms work well and delivered.
We must continue to train in an integrated all-arms and joint manner, down
to the lowest tactical level and across a range of environments. However. we
must look at the inclusion ot more urban training, particularly for our
armoured battle groups, and focus on closer interoperability with air and AH.
• Land/Air integration. This is an area that requires more work, and one that 1
believe we must and can improve on. Firstly, due to the complexity of the
campaign. the interface between ground manoeuvre elements and air tasking
was not always sufficiently refined to exploit ground targets in a timely way.
However, my discussions did lead to consideration of the way in which the
national air contribution is organised within the overall coalition air
component, notwithstanding the acknowledged requirement for the principle
of centralised control, decentralised execution. I was struck by comments
concerning the merits of the practice employed in support of SF in the
western desert; it has been suggested that UK assets should. if at all possibie.
be used in support of UK ground forces. with attendant benefits for the moral
component, and regular training opportunities to develop better integrated
procedures. The area merits further consideration.
• Attack Helicopters. It is essential that we draw on both the positive and
negative uses of AH. AH is an imporant manoeuvre element in its own
right and whether employed en masse or as a smaller packet, it will often
require an enemy to be fixed in order to set the conditions to strike it
effectively. Gen Whitley illuminated the failure of 2 major Apache attacks
and highlighted the successful integration of Cobra across the Coalition.
SECURITY AND TRANSITION TO PHASE 4
The situation in the UK AOR is dramatically
3.
Secunty in the South.
difterent from that further north and in particular in Baghdad for understandable
reasons. 1 (UK) Armd Div fought an exemplary tactical battle, displaying first-
class decision making and courage at all levels. Indeed, I am now entirely
contident that the decision-point to push into Basra could not have been better
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timed. They have effectively transitioned to Phase 4 activities creating a
permissive environment, winning consent, reducing any antagonistic presence and
engaging the Iraqis at every level, encouraging them to take an active lead in
reconstruction. Most significantly they have made excellent progress on the
development of an active police force and a subordinate militia. I was delighted
that both Lt Gen Abizaid and Lt Gen McKiernan acknowledged and praised this
situation and 1 (UK) Armd Div's part in it. The ethnic and political environment in
southern Iraq has facilitated our role in this satisfactory state of affairs. These
almost exclusively Shia provinces have been persecuted for almost 20 years, driven
to living in miserabie conditions, repressed by the regime, let-down by the US in
the past and contain an almost exclusively Shia population. However. the consent
that our Armed Forces have won will not hold out forever if we cannot deliver that
which we have promised (more later on reconstruction). Gen McKiernan is happy
with our rotation plan. but is still keen for us to take on the 5' province of Wasit
and asked us to keep this in the back of our mind. I remarked that it would depend
on how the force generation work progressed.
Security in Baghdad. Despite the temporal difference in the taking of
Baghdad a security vacuum still exists. particularly at night. Looting, revenge
killing and subversive activities are rife; why? There is a much higher proportion
of Baathist members and a more pro-Saddam. significantly Sunni population.
uneventy distributed wealth and hence vulnerabilities and exploitation, combined
with an all-pervasive gun culture. Most significantly, in my view, and tacitly
recognised by both Gens Abizaid and McKiernan, 3ID's approach remains
unnecessarily heavy handed: they are tired and are clearly not focussed on Phase 4
activities.
There appears no engagement of the local population and a lack of
understanding of the 'hearts and minds' dimension. The population's tolerance
(rather than consent) of the US presence in Baghdad seems fragile. As roulement
with a fresh US force. un-blooded and possibly nervous, approaches, as well as the
heat of the summer. a continued failure to deliver coalition promises of
reconstruction may forfeit strategic success. Should a bloody and protracted
insurgency establish itself in Baghdad, then a ripple effect is likely to occur. Gen
Abizaid recognised that US forces should change their profile in Baghdad and there
are pians in place for 101 (AB) Div. who are perceived to be winning hearts and
minds in Mosul, to conduct familiarisation training with 3ID's replacement:
regardless. I fear it just is not in their culture. Gen McKiernan did concede that
1* (USt Armd Div.
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there was a power vacuum in Baghdad developing and that ORHA would not or. or
could not. take a lead.
Iranian intluence. I was questioned by Gens Abizaid and McKiernan on
whether we had any concerns regarding Iranian influences, a topic I had discussed
with GOC 1 (UK) Armd Div. Gen McKiernan expressed the view that Iran wanted
to establish long-term influence in Iraq. I acknowledged that this was a certainty
but it might actually improve security in the region, and there was no clear
evidence of them stirring things up. This begs the question of how to handle the
Badr Corps, and integrating them into the new Iraqi Army may make them part of
the solution and not the problem.
6.
)
MEK. The MEK were in the process of conceding during my visit and were
in negotiations with one of the US Div Comds. Interestingly, Gen McKiernan
commented that they would accept any terms less the use of the word surrender.
He stated that there would be a process of filtering out those on the World Terrorist
List.
Law and Order. 1 (UK) Ard Div have made a good start in reforming the
police and are actively involved in combined patrolling, allowing them to take a
more acrive lead. The RMP are conducting some very constructive police training
during this reformation phase. However, there remain neither judicial experts nor
externai support from outside our own military to develop a viable and practical
judicial system, and there appears to be no release of financial support to pay the
public sector. although we may be able to sustain the police for about 3 months
with some of the limited cash available to i (UK) Armd Div. In Baghdad, despite
similar efforts and progress by the US military in terms of police reformation there
is a tess effective police force. largely as a result of the lack of security and their
style of patrolling. We need to get a viable system of law and order up and running
at a much quicker pace - this will require resourcing (see my comments on
reconstruction).
PHASE 4 AND RECONSTRUCTION
8.
Despite recovering some of the essential public utilities to pre-war standards.
it is startlingly apparent that we are not delivering that which was deemed to be
promised and is expected. Although it is only about 30 days since combat
operations ceased. public perception and expectation is critical in maintaining
security. i (UK) Arnd Div have formuiated a sound pian involving all the lines of
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operation and effect that are required to create a viable state. However, they have
reached the limit of their technical capabilities and desperately need subject matter
experts - judicial experts, civil engineers, power workers, water workers. public
health specialists including additional doctors and nurses. comms experts including
IntoUps TV/Radio providers. interpreters, medical supplies, etc. They have had an
embedded DFID representative since initial deployment who has made all the right
requests for some time, but no action follows: there is considerable disappointment
with DFID. This situation is compounded by comprehensive stripping of the public
sector intrastructure. an inability to pay public sector employees. a lack of NGO
support and pianning, and a complete lack of direction and effective action from
ORHA.
1 9.
ORHA. My time with Gen Tim Cross illuminated the extent of the probiem
in ORHA. They are poorly organised, lack a unified intent or strategic plan, are
disjointed, appear unduly obsessed with their media image, and have limited
connectivity with the military. Not surprisingly there is much infighting and many
have already left disillusioned. There appears to be an enormous pull-back to
Washington. where all contractual and financial control reportedly remains vested
In short, process and not delivery/effect is the driver. Gen Tim Cross is battling in
an admirable way against a torrent of unnecessary process. Many see Bremer as
the great hope, but I suspect a dramatic change in attitude in Washington is
required. Gen McKiernan is clear that ORHA have been charged with paying
public sector wages, yet there appears no mechanism to access the cash despite
$750million dollars sitting in Kuwait, which was never even in the original budger
for reconstruction. (I was told that their cash is being sent back to the US for
forgery checking). That said, we should not underestimate the complexity of the
The ORHA
1
probiem. and we have only been in Baghdad for 30 days.
Representative in the south working with 1 (UK) Armd Div. Ambassador Olsen
from Denmark, is, in the view of the GOC. a man we can do business with and is
already making an impact. But he will be severely hampered by the bureaucratic
process of ORHA and Washington. We may need some serious UK/Danish
impetus to ensure he gets the support he needs.
COALITION BUILDING
10. Gen McKiernan was unaware of the progress of coalition building, so I
outlined the tall-out from the initial ICCM held on 30 Apr 03. He remarked that he
Gen Abizaid voiced his
was still very keen for an additional non-US division.
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continued desire to see the ARRC engaged after V Corps. who are due to come
home in about 45 days.
THE WAY FORWARD
11. Reconstruction. We must release the financial, personnel and infrastructure
resources to effect a quicker delivery of reconstruction. If not we will lose the
consent we have so successtully achieved. Oil is one of the keys to kick-starting
the public sector and we need to get it flowing in order to generate money.
employment. investment and energy. Power, electricity and water suppiy are in
need of urgent attention.
Security. If we start to deliver in weeks rather than months then we should
12.
be abie to hold onto the consent in the south and develop a coherent and effective
path to a self-governing Iraq. But this will only be possible if Baghdad remains
secure and stable. Baghdad is key to the Centre of Gravity, where we may be close
to iosing iraqi tolerance. As with the south, they also require taster investment for
reconstruction, but this will be ineffective without greater security. The US
military may yet deliver, particularly with the roulement of 3ID with | (US) Armd
Dis. However. this critical moment may require a bold adjustment and we should
at least look at direct UK military involvement in order to win 'hearts and minds'
and create a more secure environment. Militarily. I believe we could achieve this
and 1 am aware that John Sawers' immediate sitrep "What's Going Wrong' has
started some focus on the key questions:
• We need to rest his assumptions that the current US approach is wrong
and that it will not improve sufficiently to maintain security.
• We need to ensure that we can guarantee security in the south were we to
engage in the north.
• We need to be confident that we can improve the situation in Baghdad.
I du not believe we can influence the situation in Baghdad without engagement.
Nor do I believe that committal of HQ ARRC alone will address what is essentially
a tactical problem, albeit one with strategic overtones. If we make the decision to
become tactically engaged in Baghdad then this may well provide much greater
strategic focus for the rest of government to support, more strongly, efforts on
reconstruction. We must also ensure that we have the support of our coalition
partners. The bottom line is that if we choose not to influence Baghdad we must be
confident of the US ability to improve before tolerance is lost and insurgency sets
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in. If we choose to influence it we must be contident of improving the situation
and not become over-engaged in both the south and the north.
SUMMARY
13. This was a timely visit that allowed me to engage in the key issues at almost
every levei. Our forces have. without question. achieved much. their courage in
conflict. stoic resolve and ability to transit through conflict termination into Phase 4
We must not throw away these substantial
activities has been remarkable.
achievements by processes that are failing to deliver, and we must ensure a secure
environment throughout the theatre - not least in Baghdad - to enable successful
reconstruction. A bold correction may be required.
(Original Signed on Chors)
CGS
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