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READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Phone Call to Tariq al Hashimi, Vice President, Republic of Iraq
Addressed as: Mr. Vice President
Thursday, January 4, 2006 at 8:30 AM
From: Pere W. Rolan, Asiat Secretary of Defense (ISAAN 3 2000
Background:
• Seve>You most recently met Vice President al Hashimi at the dinner hosted by
Ambassador Khalilzad on 20 Dec 06. Your previous meeting was the Iraq Study
Group's interview of al Hashimi on 01 Sep 06. In Nov 06 he sent you a letter
congratulating you on your designation to be Secretary. We have prepared a draft
response (Tab D).
• (.0be) During your Dec 06 visit to Baghdad, President Talabani's cancellation of
the Presidency Council's meeting with you had the effect of removing an opportunity
for al Hashimi to present his views to you. You then scheduled a separate meeting for
the morning of 22 Dec 06, but he was not able to make it. Weather may have been a
factor.
_ (0X3 10 USC 9130c
Recent meetings: (POUC>Al Hashimi met with DepSecDef 13 Dec 06 (MFR at Tab
C). His main points in that meeting and in his 12 Dec 06 meeting with Secretary Rice are
as follows.
• Security:
- (seve) Iran has penetrated Iragi politics and Iraqi security forces (ISF).
(D)(3). 10 USC §130c
-
The U.S. should:
(b)(6)
OUSDP/ISA/ME (©X6)
Prepared by:
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 07 December 2031
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(B)(3): 10 USC §130c
• Politics:
- (CoW,Maliki is well-intentioned but weak. The U.S. should force him to honor
his commitments to the other partners in the unity government.
- dove) The Sunnis, including the "resistance," understand that they need the
Coalition forces in Iraq for the present. The U.S. should:
0(3) TO USC g130c
Moderate front: (Fete) In his conversation with DepSecDef, al Hashimi stated his
low expectations of the potential effectiveness of the moderate front which several major
party leaders are trying to form.
Saddam's execution: (FeUe> Al Hashimi may express concern about its timing and
indignity.
Desired Outcome:
• FUe) Al Hashimi should be reassured that he, his views, and his role in the unity
government are taken seriously by the U.S.
• or He should understand that while we welcome dialogue with him and other
Iraqi leaders, Iraq's future rests on the relationships between Iraqis.
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(b)(5)
• Feue) He should be inspired to play a greater role in uniting Iraqi factions and
leading Sunni Arabs to compromise.
COORDINATION: Tab E
Attachments:
Tab A: Talking Points
Tab B: Biography
Tab C: MFR DSD-Hashimi Meeting
Tab D: Hashimi letter and draft response

TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Telephone Call with Iraqi Vice President Tariq al Hashimi
Addressed as: Mir. Vice President
Wednesday, January 4, 2006 at 8:30 AM
• I regret that our schedules did not mesh during my recent visit. I am interested in
learning your views and keeping in contact with you.
- I will probably visit Iraq again in the next several months and would place a high
priority on meeting with you.
Iraqi Government Unity
• Our dialogue is of mutual benefit, but the most important conversations are those you
have with your partners in the Iraqi government, especially with Prime Minister
Maliki.
Al Ambar
• What in your view is the single most important thing that Iraq and the U.S. could do
to improve security in Al Anbar Province?
(b)(5)
Saddam's execution (if al Hashemi raises it):
• The lack of dignity was inexcusable. Nonetheless, the important fact is that Iraq's
democratic government used its own judicial process to bring a mass murderer to
ustice. Saddam brutalized iraqis of every sect and group. The false impression the
nost Sunni Arab Iraqis revere Saddam's memory can only hurt the Sunni community
It is time for all Iraqis to confront the future together.
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Inspiration:
• Your courage in serving your country is admirable. You have a great responsibility to
the people of Iraq to help them heal sectarian divisions and build a peaceful and
prosperous democracy.
• This will require that you and your colleagues in the government work together and
trust each other.
• With the respect to the Arab Sunni population in particular, you are well-placed to
help them understand the opportunities that a well-ordered democratic system would
provide to a population that has so much to contribute to Iraq in terms of education,
professional and technical expertise, and contacts in the region.
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