WASH INGTON , D.C. 20301-2500
SPEC IAL OPERATI ONS/
LOW- INTENSI TY CONFLI C T
In Reply Refer to:
I-03/015830
NOV I 8 2003
FOR: ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEAR EAST AND
SOUTH ASIA
SUBJECT: Request for Coordination in Support of the Iraq History Project
I request your coordination on the attached memorandum to the Secretary of Defense
regarding the Iraq History Project.
Please provide your coordination no later than close of business November 21, 2003 to
my action officer, 116)(6) l SO/LIC Stability Operations atl<6X 8l ' ·
Thomas W. O'Connell
FOR OFFIOIAL tJSE ONLY

FOR OFFIOhtcl YSE. ONLY
USD/P
ACTION MEMO
1-03/015830
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action
_ _
FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict
SUBJECT: Iraq History Project
BACKGROUND
(b)(5)
FOR OFFIOl>'cl USE ONLY
Preoared bv:J (b)(G) DASD Stabil it~ Operations
]l._l(b_l( 6_l --~

FOR OFFICbtcL tl9E 8NLV
(b)(5)
RECOMMENDATION: Sign memo at Tab A.
AGREE DISAGREE OTHER
- - ---- - ----- -----
COORDINATION: Tab C
Attachments:
As stated
FOR OFFICbtcL tJSE ONLY

THficMie~ML~ ONffNSE
1000 D EFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. DC 20301·1000
CO MBA TANT COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND
SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project
(b)(5)
--- ,....,_,_,'WJ/r I I 1.-- -• •• ....
I ....,.. I - • • ,_..,
· - ---- •-•

IRAQ SURVEY GROUP POSITION
ON
ALLOWING COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ACCESS TO CAPTURED IRAQI
DOCUMENTS
j<bl(S) The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) strongly disagrees with the proposal to allow the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) access to ISG documents for its Iraq History Project prior to
the documents being fully processed and exploited. The ISG believes allowing CPA
this access will be severely detrimental to three distinct but equally critical areas:
A. The National Security of the United States
B. The internationally-vital ISG WMD mission
C. The DoD's and CPA's Iraq History Project itself
A. The National Security of the United States
• Intelligence documents will be lost. ISG is continually discovering documents
of high intelligence value from captured Iraq documents. Most of these docu-
ments are found in the initial review, or 'triage' of the documents. Many are also
found later in the exploitation process, to include during the latter ISG analyst
and subject matter expert review process. Access and review of documents
during any stage of this exploitation outside ISG will negatively impact the ability
to properly identify and classify these highly sensitive documents.
• Intelligence documents will be compromised. Building on the reasoning
above, access and review of documents during any stage of ISG exploitation
outside ISG will raise the risk of documents being inadvertently released to the
public or others without a need to know. This will severely damage U.S. national
security. Nothing outweighs taking all measures to ensure this does not occur.
• Counter Intelligence (Cl) documents will be compromised. Any release of Cl
documents, which the ISG also continually discovers throughout its exp~oitation
process, would be extremely detrimental to the securit of the United States ~l! : -8?-~-H
(b )(A),(b
~ Once
a Cl document is publicly released, at best it can completely lose its intelligence
value; at worse it could compromise the investigative process.
B. The ISG mission
• An already stressed DOCEX mission will be overwhelmed. Document
access for the Iraq History Project will considerably disrupt the already taxed ISG
DOCEX mission. ISG DOCEX physical space and expertise are limited. ISG
uses specific priority intelligence requirements {PIRs) to guide the DOCEX
mission. Additional Iraq History Project search requirements, regardless if more
people are added to the process, will slow down the ISG DOCEX operational
process. A parallel review of already exploited documents will also be required
for the Iraq History Project, further upsetting the current ISG DOCEX mission.
• Original documents needed for follow-on exploitation will be lost. Although
ISG has digital copies of documents, this does not mean exploitation is complete.
~t Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03

ISG often must use original captured documents for interviews with high value
targets and other detainees. For effective operations, it needs immediate access
to these documents; losing possession of them and retrieving them from CPA is
not a viable alternative to current operations. Original documents are also sent
for forensic analysis in the US and are used to confront High Value Detainees
and other Iraqis suspected of involvement in Iraq's WMD programs.
• CPA document review will be taken out of context. ISG experts, and ISG
experts alone need to focus on Iraqi DOCEX during its WMD mission execution.
CPA review and reporting of documents will result in efforts to assist the ISG in
this mission. Although well intentioned, this will result in incorrect, incomplete,
and/or inadvertently inaccurate conclusions.
C. The Iraq History Project
• A CPA review as new documents arrive degrades the Iraq History Project.
ISG receives a constant flow of new captured documents every day. These are
reviewed and appropriately prioritized relative to other documents. The, rush to
review and obtain ISG documents for the Iraq History Project does not outweigh
the increase in efficiency the CPA will have if it waits until after the ISG has
completed its mission. Without waiting, the Iraq History Project will continually be
reviewing, re-reviewing, and correlating new information with existing information
until ISG document capture mission is complete.
• A concurrent ISG WMD DOCEX and CPA Iraq History Project review dilutes
ISG capability to fully assist in the Iraq History Project. ISG resources for its
WMD mission are already at a premium. Sharing these with the Iraq History
Project will be inefficient and cause undue competition among the two missions:
ISG will be unable to assist CPA with the full capabilities it has to bear. On the
other hand, if the Iraq History Project waits until after ISG mission completion,
CPA will potentially have available more dedicated, expert resources to execute
its mission.
Based upon these basic reasons, the ISG highly recommends the CPA wait until after it
completes its document exploitation mission before reviewing the documents
~Lt Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03

COORDINATION
Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Under Secretary of Defense Camptro!ler
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
General Counsel
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia
Director, Joint Staff
President, National Defense University copy provided