THE UNO ER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2000 0~ PENTAGON WASH1NGTON, DC 2.0301·2000 AcrJONMEMO January 16,2003, 3:00 PM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action. __ _ FROM: Douglas J. Fei~ Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy X\) •I"'\·~ SUBJECT: Enabling Execution of Contingency Plans for Iraqi Oil InfrastrUcture~ DECLASSIFIED BY:USDP 05/19/2015 • ~The OSD-led interagency group dealing with Iraqi oil iuuet recommends that you designate the Anny as Executive Agent for this program. You directed CENTCOM and my office to develop contingency planJ for continuity of oil production and salu. If these p\ans are to be executed there needs to be an overall eucutive agent that will be responsible for planning, coordinating and administering the execution. If you approve the recommendation, General Franks will retain overall responsibility to develop and execute plana in the context of a US military occupation of Iraq. The Army will have respon1ibility for planuing, coordination and execution of the operation for the Iraq oil industry including but not limited to the folJowing tasks: - Establish and coordinate program requirements with the Joint Staff and USD(P); - Budget for program execution in coordination witb USD (Comptroller); - Establish a program office as soon as possible; - Coordinate acquisition strategy with USD(A T &L); - Negotiate, but not award, a contract for execution with the developer of the plan that can be awarded as soon as the Army receives ditection to execute the plan; "') Sb ' la..lc1 C d. m.: 'th USD(P) and 11\" ofC:t.£ «~e.d - oar mate poncy matters W1 ; 11 . ' .u ~.{ ~. \.oo ••"' 'f't\· . ~ \)«.~ '* .:Q (4.~~ . 1\_ &~~~-~~ ,) ··I~AIO&Gt FOIA 09-826 CPA 000265 BBLidlt!IJriNl • Plan for competition for the execution effort at the earliest teasonable opportUnity consistent with the needs of the mission. • ~The plan assumes that any execution would be immediately after hostilities, during a U .S. military occupation under the control of the Central Command. • ~The OSD-Ied interagency group is now refining a draft Contingency Support Plan for repairing and operating the Iraqi petroleum industry. We expect the plan will be ready for your review by mid-January 2003. To be poised to execute the plan immediately if directed to do so, we need to engage the right organizations to budget for and manage the execution phase of the plan. As a new program, this effort has no owner and no funding. Best to worst case estimates for the execution phase range from $0.8 billion to more than S3.S billion. RECOMMENDATION: SeeDef designates the Anny as Executive Agent for this program. Approve _ _ _ ;.....__ Disapprove ----- Other ___ _ _ COORDINATION: USD(AT&L), Joint Staff, OGC (Tab B) Attachments: Tab A is the previous draft ofXOOJ54/03, changes made on 1/16/03. Tab B is the coordination page. Prepared by: '-fb_x6_~ __ __,1BIPG, P .... _~'> __ _. 2 ···-·· ..... , FOIA 09-826 CPA 000266 81!Cil£ I h£f8P81lff t I PLANNING FOR THE IRAQI PETROLEUM INFRASTRUCTURE: Briefing for the Secretary of Defense 11 January 2003 1/11/03 12:33 Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (b)(6) FOIA 09-826 CPA 000267 8ft ERE I H F f8P8itf 4 Outline of Presentation • Guiding Principles • Public Diplomacy • Contingency Planning for Repair, Production and Sales • Legal Considerations • Organization and Management (Issue for Decision: Chairman/CEO Appointment,Reporting, Removal • Use of Petroleum Proceeds • Funding Enhancement: Borrow Against Future Oil Revenues? • Production Targets • Existing and New Contracts • Iraq-Syria Pipeline 1/11/03 12:33 Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (b)(6) FOIA 09-826 CPA 000268 I ' • ·~ . .. - Guiding Principles • f 1 1 • Certain principles should guide any ten1porary US/coalition administration of Iraqi petroleum resources, including: • Iraq's oil resources are an asset that belongs to all thelraqipeople. • Any tenJ.porary administration of Iraqi oil production and marketing: - Will seek to 1ninbnize disruptions and prottlote confidence and stability in world markets; - Should involve existing Iraqi personnel and organizations whellever possible to ease future tran..~ition.· - Should work with I he international community to build support for our policies; - Will respect Iraqi contracts previously approved by the United Nations (NB: Just service contracts, 110 development contracts); - Will be conducted h·tlnsparently and accountably, in accordance with applicable lega/noJ.,,s and prudent industry practices, for the benefit of the Iraqi people; - Will prepare for the return qf production and marketing responsibility to a stable lraqi authority as soon as practicable. The initial goal should be to bring Iraqi petroleum production up to pre-hostility capacity of about 3.1 million barrels/day, consistent with sound business considerations. Any increase in production levels and capacity should serve the interest of maximizing revenues or the le o Ira . 1/11/03 12:33 up • • 0'> CO C\1 0 0 0 < a. () <0 C\1 CX) I 0> 0 < 0 LL 86fJM'JZt\l fAFQIItf Public Diplomacy---Main Themes • Iraqi petrolewn resources are a national asset of all the Iraqi people, i.e.~ the nation as a whole, and not of any regional entity. • We want to work with the Iraqis themselves and the international community in administering petroleum proceeds for the benefit of the Iraqi people. • Interim administration decisions will be based on prudent, accountable, best practices to prepare for the return of the sector and its management to responsible Iraqi authorities. • We will act, through our administration, so as not to prejudice Iraq's future decisions regarding: - Its oil development policies. - Its relations with international organizations. - The future ownership structure of the its oil industry. • US/Coalition will fulfil I its responsibility to the Iraqi people to create conditions of stability and well-being for the people of Iraq, but we will not administer oil assets on a long-tenn basis. • Petroleum proceeds will be handled transparently and used for the benefit of the Iraqi people. • We will respect the legitimate interests of all countries in the reconstruction period. • We will respect Iraqi contracts previously approved by the United Nations. l I I 1/03 12:3 3 Prepared by Ener Infrastructure Planning Group (bX6) 0 ,..... C'\1 0 0 0 <( a.. u <0 C'\1 CO t (J) 0 <( 0 LL SECitE.hl f8F8RPJ Contingency Plans for Repair • OUSD(P)/Energy Infrastructure Planning Group ("EIPG") manages planning. • EIPG guidance to the Army contractor: - Plan for full range of damage scenarios: Little or no dan1age, to major disabling damage by Iraqi forces to key choke points (e.g., gas and oil separation plants, marine tenninals, pumping stations). ~ - Fight over 1,000 well fires, if necessary. > '~/· ,_1,-..J" . Repair priorities: a/ - First, restore current production of about 2.4 million barrels per day as soon as conditions permit. - Second, restore current capacity of about 3.1 million barrels per day. • Plan (draft) calls for modular components for major facilities (e.g., gas-oil :.Q '• v• ,... ,. separators, pumping stations) wherever needed, to restore production ASAP. • "Best case" = No infrastructure damage, just safety repairs needed. - 6 mos. to 2.4 million b/d, 9 mos. to 3.1 million b/d. - Cost: appro. $0.8 Billion. • "Worst case"= Major, disabling damage throughout infrastructure. - 20 mos. to 2.4, 30+ n1os. to 3.1. · ·· · , - Cost: $7 to $8 Billion (oil only). Refineries and gas plants add another $4-$5 Billion. ./' ... · 1./11/03 12:33 Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group {bX6) FOIA 09-826 CPA 000271 2JI!S@Ill51 Ill 4 8P8Rff Contingency Plans for Production and Sale ~~~-"·~··ction priorities: - First, crude oil. - Second, natural gas to support electrica] grid. - Third, refined products (import during interim if necessary). • Build on "modular" approach. - Pre-conflict: Profile all fields and facilities. - Post -conflict: • Rapid1y assess production level achievable with whatever stiJI works. • Assemble building-blocks of a functioning system with whatever still works. • Use a.Jl functioning production facilities to extent safe and cost effective. • Produce first where damage is least, to maximize early output. • S l ,1, . • ~ : a es: ..-~cJ ~ ;..·: ~ . ... .:.., · p.d .. !i ... j. · ~ •• , .. .·· . .. ~ .•. . •• ... , {,. .· ., • . h • .A.•.: ·· ··./' • -• .• _ , . ' • . , • , !'t' · V • I :.o:">K,I '\ , (<, · • · ro' .• • •,. • - New USG-created organization to manage Ir~qi oil assets . ( acronym: "IOTA'') uses personnel from Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organization {SOMO) to extent available and reliable .... supplement with other nationals as needed. - lOT A approves tern1s and conditions of sales, within policies set by higher authority. - "Good Title": SOMO and Iraqi Central Bank currently eo-sign all oil sales contracts. • Standard terms include warranty of title. • Suggests need to maintain existence and operations of Iraqi Central Bank and SOMO. 1./11/03 12:33 6 N ,..._ N 0 0 0 <( a. () CO N CO I 0) 0 <( 0 u. JJ!I@IEE I 11 lC 0.1 OM\ Legal Considerations: Consensus USG consensus that: • Under applicable international legal norms, permissible to: - Secure, repair and operate petroleum assets at pre-hostility capacity. - Use petroleum proceeds for humanitarian needs, reconstruction, oil operating costs, costs of occupation, and military operations within Iraq. - Increase oil production beyond pre-hostility levels, including development of new . fields, if necessary for needs of Iraqi people (and possibly others, e.g., for needs of occupation). • . Executive Branch has authority to remove some impediments posed by U.S. domestic sanctions. To ensure availability of full range of options, we should be ready to seek legislative relief. 1/11/03 12:33 Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (bX6) FOIA 09-826 CPA 000273 3ECitl!1 /r P f8P8ft)f Legal Considerations: Lack of Consensus At present no USG consensus on: • Applicability of existing UN sanctions and the Oil-for-Food Program. - DOD and DOJ: Persuasive argument that they will not apply. - State*: Still apply, would require UNSC action to liftln1odify. • Using petroleum proceeds to pay for military operations outside Iraq (e.g., activity elsewhere than in Iraq but related to Iraq campaign). - DOD and DOJ: Permitted, as long as related to war effort in Iraq. - State*: Problematic. *Provisional view. l/11/0312:33 FOIA 09-826 CPA 000274 SI!J@Jfi!Jfhl QOPtJMf Organization and Management • Deputies agreed to recommend establishing an organization dedicated solely to managing Iraqi petroleum industcy. - Corporate organizational model ("Iraqi Oil Temporary Administration~ ' -- "IOTA"') drawing on current Iraqi Oil Ministry structure. • To ''i11temationalize," appoint: - Chairman • American. • Current or fonner statesman. - Chief Executive Officer. • British or other international. 1 Former chairman or CEO of oil company. - Vice Presidents for each functional sector within current Ministry. • Preferably Iraqis. Board of Advisors. • Advisory only, non-binding on management. 1 Half composed of Iraqis, the rest could be international figures. Issues for Decision: Appointment, Reporting, Remol'al of Chairman, CEO. - Candidates .vetted by PCC will go to Deputies/Principals for consideration (see Back Up Slide). Chairman, CEO will recommend to USG the candidates for Board of Advisors. - Recommend: SecDef appoints and removes Chairman, CEO (with White House coordination). - Recommend: Chairman reports to top civil administrator; CEO reports to Chairman. l/11/03 12:33 9 FOIA 09-826 CPA 000275 OM @RMl\'JT J 8P8 RP f Petroleum Proceeds: Possible Uses and Availability • Figures below exclude high end range of humanitarian needs and unaddressed Gulf War claims. When possible, (average) annual numbers are provided. • Humanitarian aid, military can1paign and occupation costs -- about I year; others vary from about 2 to 10 years or more. • Bottom Line: Demands on petroleum revenue will likely exceed available funds for foreseeable future. : . J 1 ' · · fRANGE oF . POTENTIAL.FfNANCIAL-oeMAN"os · on$ btillons) ,. ~ ~ .... ~ -- ,. l · · · 0~ ~J-.,..,.Lowl High i i HliniaiiitBrlai-1 Atd (n1Ii1tinum) .:..: HUinarlitarian Plariiiing· GrouP . ~ .w' v. 16T --- · · 16_j : Rec:OrlstruCu- ot1 oi' Wiai-..08mag8d eCO~ - (ar!nu8f8vg) -~ CIA-· - ~ Y;/ 3: 4 i ! - ~~ - ~~~ P!.~_C)I! . ~f~~U~I1 . ~8J:)~~!~_Qh~a1J.::. f!AIIndu_ ~ -- .~ / · ·-----1 i ... .. ? .i ~ E'!~~~-~~~ ~. ~P~~~. t~ -.~·~ fl!!l~~~. l?.~d (~~~~~~. ~~}_ _:- - _ _giN.In_ ~f:JS!'Y_ _ ____ _ _ _ L_ . ~L . Si } g~p~~- oi~ c~~c-~ . . ~~ 6~ ~~.H~ .~~ ... I?LC! . . (~~~- ~~ - ~~SI) -- . GIAB~Q~stry · ~ - ---- ... 1 f . . 41 L~ ~_reign, .. ~~b~ ~~~'-!~ . (ann~.~~). -- CIA . . . . . . . ! 7 f.- . . . . . .. . . .1? j ~ GulfWarCialms (annual)-- C1A1State Si 7! f g~~~~t~·g~t;~~~~~~soJHou - sesuciget· comm .. De - m · stair! - ~~ f - !TOTAL DEMAND · -· .. ... . · -- - - .. f 114! 167! · -- --·· - · ·" ·· - -· --· . . · - i iTOTAL ANNUAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTION REVENUE" r s.AL.ANce· · - · · ~ · · · -· · · · · · ·-· · · · · ·- ---· · · ·· · ·· · ---- · -··-·- · - ·· -·· ... · i . ···j 16, - . - · ··· · -- ~8 1 25 ! -· · . . . - ~ -142! ~ . - · . .. - - ···- · - . ....... ~ ., . · ----· · . . . . - ··- ....... . .. .. -· . . .. i - .• • . . .. " . . . . - - ... ; • ~~sed o~ 2. 4 '!!.~~ b't! . '?~ . oi~ p~tion a~ a_n $18-2f¥bbl ave~~ ~e 0 . •• ~ . ; · · -·· -··· - ~ .. • ! . . ..... .. .i. ... 0 • ~~ l/11/03 12:33 Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (bX6) FOIA 09-826 CPA 000276 • • ' . • • Sltkli))IQOFUMQ Funding Enhancement: Borrow Against Future Oil Revenues? Could use future oil revenues as collateral for loans . Precedents: Russia, Iran, Ecuador have borrowed using oil revenues as security . Iranian practice could be a model; Iranian Central Bank has borrowed billions of dollars: - As direct bank loans secured by future oil sales. - By treating developer capital "invested" under exploration and development contracts as :'loans," repaid with future oil produced (developer gets oil as loan payment, no "ownership', m reserves). lraq's existing major claimants-- France, Japan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia--would be urged to postpone claims in favor of mese loans. 1 - Current UN sanctions regime already takes precedence over these claimants. Major issues: - Recent Iraqi oil revenues may not support major loans (i.e., billions of dollars) without new development contracts in place to back them up. ~o would borrower be during temporary administration? Iraqi Central Bank? Would it still extst and function? - New lender(s) like]~ to demand subordination of pre-existing debt and third-party guarantors (other governments .). 0 0 - Likely. to r~u~e reschedu. ling Iraq's existing foreign debt (about $82 billion at end 2002 assumtng 6o/o tnterest rate). - Iraq also owes $27 billion in unpaid clain1s awarded by UN Compensation Commission for GuffWar damages .. 1/ll/03 12:33 Russi~ - FOIA 09-826 CPA 000277 0M@MlJJJf8FORI4 Iraqi Production Goals: Initial Objective Bring production up to prewar capacity level of about 3.1 million barrels/day (bid). We have contingency plans to do this (see Slides 5 and 6). • CUrrent actual production: 2.4 million b/d. - Annual revenue with $18-28/barrel average price range: $16-25 B. • Current production capacity: 3.1 million b/d (CIA). Some in private sector say sustainable capacity closer to 2.8 million barrels/day (b/d), with significant rehabilitation needed to reach 3.1. - Investment needed to sustain: $1 -8 B over 6-20 months, depending on damage level (based on CIA and industry estimate). • Iraq a n1ember of OPEC but has not been in quota system since Gulf War. 1/ll/03 12:33 FOIA 09-826 CPA 000278 SiCK£ I 111401' Oiti c Iraqi Production: Mid-Term Objective Enable Iraq to regain its historical capacity. • 3.6 million b/d. - Likely to require high repair, maintenance and upgrade of existing fields, possible development of new fields. - Reachable about one year after obtaining 3.1 million b/d. - Cost: additional $3-5 billion over 3.1 million b/d level (industry estimate). 1/11/03 12:33 Prepared by Ener Infrastructure Planning Group (b 6) FOIA 09-826 CPA 000279 SECiti!!Ttl I t8P8ftff Iraqi Production: Long-Term Objective Allow Iraq to achieve economically reasonable increase in capacity. • Would exceed 5 million b/d. - Requires development of new fields. - About 5 million b/d reachable within 3-5 years with investments of around $30 B (CIA and industry estimate). I/11103 12:33 FO lA 09-826 CPA 000280 JI!ICJtE . I hi 4 51' URiC Increasing Iraqi Production: Considerations Advantages • Speeds Iraqi rehabilitation and stability. • Supported by many in Iraqi opposition. • Puts long-tenn downward pressure on price. • Helps consumers. • Diversifies/increases global oil supply and spare production capacity in long-term, if no price war. Strengthens global economic security. - Only 3.7 million b/d of global spare capacity (CIA), or 5% of demand. - Saudis have 2/3 of global spare capacity. Disadvantages · • Politically controversial, especially if new fields are developed. • Might trigger a price war, which would likely decrease Iraqi oil revenues and could drive out higher-cost producers, thus reducing diversity of supply. • Some would argue that new Iraqi government should decide. 111 1/03 12:33 Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group <0X6) FOIA 09-826 CPA 000281 SECRbiH.l48P81tH Contract Policy • Existing deals: IOTA shoultLilbtirve contracts previously approved by UN. Query whether should observe tlloie made in hopes sanctions eventually would be lifted? - Four "fee-for-service" maintenance contracts (three Russian companies, one Turkish) currently approved by UN under OFF. (See Back Up Slide). - Iraq has sigl)ed about four Ca(>acity expansion contracts (Chinese CNPC, Petro Vietnam, Tunisian ETAP~ maybe Syrian Oil Co.J, wliicb await lifting ofUN sanctions. • French Total Fina Elf initiated but reportedly not yet signed • Iraq recently abrogated Russia's LukoiJ contract. - Over 60 foreign companies pursued various stages of oil negotiations since sanctions were imposed. - . Iraqi opposition opposed to honoring deals made by Saddam unless clearly in Iraqi interests. • Better to defer these for new Iraqi government to decide. - US and British companies were not allowed to do this. • New deals: As a rule, should be based only on economic return, open competition, and sound business practices. - lOT A wilJ likely need to contract with foreign companies - ... whether to expand production capacity or to maintain existing capacity. · • Repairs from war damage, safety upgrades, nonnal operations and maintenance. - Should be governed by sound business decisions unless compelling reasons otherwise. 1/11/03 12:33 FOIA 09-826 CPA 000282 ----------------------------- ---------- 3ECREIBI f8f8Rff Iraq--Syria Pipeline: Use As Leverage • Background. Largest outlet for illegal Iraqi oil exports, 200-250 thousand barrels/ day, despite Syrian denials of use. - Syria resells discounted Iraqi oil at estimated $0.6 B to $1.2 B in annual net profits. - Though Syria would not get discounted Iraqi oil during US/Coalition administration, it could still earn transit fees from pipeline. • Keep pipeline open only if Syria cooperates on issues of interest to US/Coalition. l/ll/03 12:33 FOIA 09-826 CPA 000283 SEtAE I IJ 14 51 61li4 Next Steps • Brief DC next week, PC soon thereafter. • Promptly appoint management of IOTA. • Proposal early next week that you appoint Army as Executive Agent. • Proposal to you next week for pre-positioning assessment teams, fire-fighting and other critical equipment. • Within 2 weeks present final draft of detailed continuity-of-oil operations plans for your review. 1/11/03 12:33 Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (bX6) ~ C'\1 0 0 0 0: u CO C'\1 CO ' 0'> 0 <( 0 LL SECRRIJJNOI Ukl4 Back Up 1111/03 12:33 FOIA 09-826 CPA 000285 JI!J@Ili'JTJlT I 8 1'8RF f Candidates Proposed by Various Sources for FOTA Chairman • High public recognition. - lames Schlesinger, former SECDEF and Secretary of Energy. - James Baker, former Secretary of State. - Frank Carlucci, Carlyle Group leader. - George Shultz, former Secretary of State. - Sam Nunn, former Senator. - General H. Nc:>rman Schwarzkopf, retired CENTCOM Commander. • Lower public recognition. - Tom Pickering, former ambassador and Undersecretary of State. - William Ramsey, deputy director of lEA. - Frank Wisner, former USD(P), etc. - Gordon Sullivan, former Army CSA and Shell Oil Director. - Norman Augustine, retired CEO of defense contractor and Asst Sec De f. l/11/0312;33 Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (b)(6) FOIA 09-826 CPA 000286 SECJt.EIJJI401 URiC Candidates Proposed by Various Sources for IOTA CEO • Mark Moody-Stuart (British), former CEO of Royal Dutch Shell. • Lou Noto (American), former CEO ofMobil Oil. • Philip Carroll (American), former CEO of Shell Oil, US . . • H. Laurance Fuller (American), former CEO of Amoco. • Vick Begini (American), former CEO of Marathon Oil. • Ken Derr (American), fonner CEO of Chevron. • Robert McKee (American), former Chairman ofConoco (U.K.). • Louis Gerstner (American), former CEO of IBM. • Franco Bernabe (Italian), former CEO- ofENI. 1./1 1103 12:33 FOIA 09-826 CPA 000287 SELkliJiiCOI 8ftlt Prep Task: Pre-position Contractor Equipment and . Personnel, Sustain Planning , £.?'..- Costs of Prep Task Item Firefighting (4 sets) & Well Testing Equipment Planning Sustainmentl Advance Party Assessment Teams (Hire, Train & Move) Fireftghtjng Teams Movement Firefighting & Oil SpiJJ LNO's with CENTCOM Engineering of long lead items (GOSP's & pipeline pumps} Freight/Insurance Total ;{ .JJ' // \~ ~ •. / /,"""" $Millions / 23.3 3.3 4.1 0.4 0.6 2.0 3.8 37.5 • Pre-position firefighting and well testing equipn1ent. • Rapid damage assessment from maritime and river oil spills and remediation plan development. • Rapid deployment of facility assessment teams. • Rapid deployment of wellhead assessment equipment. • Sustain ongoing planning effort. • Pre-position personnel and equipment to support rapid deployment t/l 1/03 12:33 Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group 6 FOIA 09-826 CPA 000288 SELl& I ;; re SI 61th Iraq's Share of OPEC Production IRAQ'S SHARE OF «> C'\1 0 0 0 < a. (.) <0 C'\1 «> I en 0 <( 0 LL OPEC Production OPEC PRODUCTION OCT. 2002 OPEC PRODUCTION JULY 1990 joPEC PROoucffON 2oo2 Vs 1990 (thOUSands barrel-day) i ! ---·· - · · - - - - ---·-· - .. - -··- ··-. ' .. ----- . • · ----- ·- · · -- - - . ·- 1 !(Excludes _ Equador Clld ~a_ bon, which are no tonger members) : f --- - .... - ---- - .1. . · ---~-- - -- . .. L . · - ~----- - ~--:~---·· . . ! · ·--- . -~-- . i~. '!!P~ ~:_.02 _J Oute~~- ~ur - ~ l~ ~j jAigeria i 1,000 l 760 I 240 I 1 -- •. •• - · - - --- ; ... · · - . ~ _ _ _ ____ .1. I - I !Indonesia i 1,100 ~ 1.2aor· · · (180}1 f ~ _ : ·- - - - ------- r 3,oocrr· 3,000 , - -- -- ~- J ;Kuwait i 2,000 ! 1,900 1 100 ! !Gtiya . . , 1,400 1 f,25o ! 1so i ;·Nigeria 1 2,ooo i 1 7SJ j 200 -; laatai ·j· 7txi l - --~ aro J -- 330 ; l : saUciA~a -- l - - ~'seX_) [" 5,610 I ~890 f !UAE ______ _ ·- --- r·- · · · 2000 ; 1,950--l .. 50·f fveneluela .... ----- - i - -- 3~1oo ·1 1' 950-+ · · · 11so· 1 : o;ec..roroiai - --1 --·· · - -- ---- _ , _ ___ .. ~---1 -~ --- r 1-- -- .... . - ~ - - -~·~ L -. . - !~~~ - I - ------- . J ilraq 1 2,400 1 3,500 ; (t 100)1 ! OPEC Total !' 27~800 ! 23,320 ! 4,980 I 1/1 J/03 12:33 Prepared by Ener Infrastructure Planning Group (b)(6) 0 0') C'\1 0 0 0 <( a.. () <0 C'\1 CO I 0') 0 <( 0 L1. 3 EL ltlfJiJt? TQOOP¥ Awarded Contracts Country ' O!lfield(s) ~potP n t al Tyoe of St.a~us Det C'\1 0 0 0 0