6
"Unofficial Prep Sheet" for 8:30 AM meeting with (bX6)
Sunday Feb 15,
2004
What he said he needed from the senior advisor to the MoE:
figurative "carrots" that he could dangle before militia men to entice them to
disarm and join civilian society through job training, placement, and general
education for both the men and their families
Militia Transition and Reintegration Strategy
Draft doc. Dated Feb 13, 2004
Highlights that could explain where the Ministry of Education may fit into this
program:
"Diplomatic" approaches must be employed as part of a
1.
multidimensional strategy to transition armed and independent militia
groups into regular people with regular jobs
a. many of these groups are hostile to US forces because they felt
cheated by the US after the Gulf War when "perceived
commitments" by the US to assist them in rebellion against Hussein
were not honored
b. the "character" of the new gov't is unknown, Coalition forces will not
have time to monitor the character development of this new gov't,
and the militias really must be disarmed ASAP
c. current efforts to register former members of the Iraqi Army
continue as over 300,000 former soldiers require some kind of
vocational training and job placement assistance
II.
Job creation and coordination (via PMO, et al) will drive militia
reintegration along both "macro and micro public information" levels
a. screenings to determine job skills, aptitudes, health, etc.
b. identify and coordinate FUNDING organizations with 10s, NGOs,
A HAN A MAN WIN
02820
Documat #6
08-F-0245

c. plan and execute efforts with cooperation of local and militia
leaders to "diffuse suspicions"
What to offer??? This last section of the paper looks like it needs input
Ill.
from "education people" who have a good handle on adult education,
vocational training, literacy, etc.... and this is most likely what Mr. (b)(6)
is looking for...
Suggestions??
a.
C.
IV.
Kurdistan as a peculiar concern (see Annex E Governance report)p. 27
a. Strategy in this area is to make Transition and Reintegration the
best way for Kurds to get what they want ...
"he prospect of an autonomous, well-resourced Kurdistan with its own armies is
something the United States will strongly oppose"
b. Kurds must be convinced TR is the right thing to do (CPA must hold
their "guns" before their hearts and minds follow)

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Transition and Reintegration Strategy
13 February 2004

Table of Contents
.............. S
Introduction:
......5
Background:
0000000-8
Assumptions:.
.........8
Strategy Framework: ....
......9
Strategy:
.. 10
Track 1 - Transfer into Security Services.........
.... 12
Track 2 - Retirements:
............ 14
Track 3 - Reintegration:
....16
Timeline:...
..... 16
Funding:.....
Deleted: 17
... 12.
Annex A: Status of IAF Recruiting.
Deleted: 19
Annex B: Status of ICDC Recruiting....
•..21.
Deleted: 21
...w..23
Annex C: Status of Mol Recruiting....
Deleted: 23
... 25,
Annex D: Militia Status Need IC help to update, verify, modify, etc.
Deleted: 25
....27
Annex E: Governance Report (to be discussed w/ Governance ASAP)...
Deleted: 27
... 29
Annex F: Pension Policy - Finance insert here, along with numbers...
Deleted: 29
...31
Annex G: Reintegration Overvie.......
Deleted: 31
Annex H: Financial Options .
.... 33.

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Introduction:
The security situation in Iraq can be briefly characterized as containing three critical
1. Defeat armed enemies;
2. Establish Iraqi military and security services capable of maintaining Iraq's
national and domestic security; and
3. Eliminate armed organizations outside of central government control, through
negotiations as well as force when needed.
account the needs and progress of the other two.
To adequately address militia transition and reintegration challenge, a multidimensional
approach is needed. These dimensions are:
Determine which militia can be reached by political or other diplomatic effort
ONSA, Intelligence Community and CJTF-7). To date, we have had significar
success in developing political commitments for the need to eliminate armed
bodies outside of central government control. The leadership of the KDP, PUK,
Badr Organization and INA have all agreed in principle that this is necessary.
• Get TR commitments from the leaders of major militia factions with whom
negotiations are possible (CPA Political level leadership)
• Coordinate with CJTF-7 of militia groups with whom negotiations are not
possible
• Develop TR roadmaps for militias who agree, according to this strategy, that
includes active participation from all involved parties (ONSA will engage the
militia leadership to develop the commitments identified in the second bullet into
roadmaps for action).
Background:
Security: No state can exist and prosper if it contains armed organizations outside of
central government control. They necessarily create alternate power centers that compete
with the established government, and pose the constant threat of civil unrest or war, and
must be disbanded.
However, in Iraq many of these groups came into being to resist an evil regime that
outside of Iraq (e.g., the Badr Corps), while still others were created more recently for
other reasons, such as the Iraqi National Congress militia which grew out of the Iraqi
reedom Fighters. While the ideologies of these groups are not all equally palatable to
he Coalition and their experiences are not all the same, they all share the no
5

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insignificant positive characteristic of being the "enemy of my enemy." While that factor
is likely to become less compelling as we move further away from the overthrow of the
Baathist regime, it remains an important element in the logical and ethical determination
of how these groups should be treated in the future Iraq, the ideological foundation of
which has not yet been settled.
The sacrifices of groups that stayed in Iraq and fought Saddam and of those who left the
country but returned to join the fight pose significant policy considerations. Oppression
that spanned several generations created a situation in which the leaders of these
oppressed groups will be very reluctant to rely on the central government or the Coalition
to ensure their security. Indeed, for some groups the central government was the most
signiticant, if not the only, enemy they have ever known. At least two major groups
suffered mightily when what they perceived as commitments by the U.S. to assist them if
they rebelled against Saddam after the Gulf War were not honored. We should be frank
in acknowledging these facts, and that
• The character of the new central government will not be known for some time ye
nd will not be determinable by the Coalition unless it commits to staying in Ira
for several years to come;
• The Coalition is not likely to remain in Iraq for the amount of time it will take to
determine with a high degree of certainty the character of the central government;
• The ethnic, theological and tribal divisions upon which oppression was
historically based, and that could be the root of future oppression or retribution,
still exist and will play a significant role in perceptions and actions.
These facts are not lost on local leaders (indeed, some are certainly counting on the
opportunity to gain power because of these) and will be foremost in the minds of many of
these ethnic and religious communities as we discuss transition and reintegration with
them. Counterbalancing these, at least for the short-term, is the fact that the CJTF-7 and
evolving Iraqi security organizations are filling a significant part of that security vacuum,
and will continue to do more as the Iraqi security services expand and become more
effective. Appreciating these perceptions and working with these facts will be necessary
for the implementation of any successful transition and reintegration effort.
Yet, despite the perceptions of militia leaders, all of these armed organizations must be
disarmed if Iraq is to succeed as a single, prosperous state
Transition and Reintegration: Many Demilitarization, Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR) efforts have taken place in various locations around the globe over the past 15
years. These include operations in Africa, Central America, East Timor, Cambodia, and
Haiti. Most of these have been undertaken by the UN, other international organizations
(IOs), or the World Bank.' A general rule of thumb is that they are long-term, taking at
least five years to be effective. In Iraq, the terms "demilitarization" and "demobilization"
have important political implications that are generally negative due to the real need for
'A literature search of UN, World Bank and US documents has been conducted in preparation for this
effort.
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local leaders to maintain domestic security. Additionally, in the Iraqi security situation
many former militiamen will enter one of the new Iraqi security forces and not
demilitarize or demobilize in the strictest sense. For these reasons, the Office of National
Security Affairs designated this DDR-like effort for the Iraqi militias as "Transition and
Reintegration."
In addition to the militia TR efforts, there is the problem of the former Iraqi Army that
must be addressed. The demobilization and demilitarization components of the
traditional approach were for all intents and purposes handled by the complete
destruction of the former Army as a fighting organization by CJTF-7. However, some
300,000+ disaffected former Iraqi soldiers remained to be dealt with. The short-term
concerns for how to handle these soldiers has been addressed by the payment of stipends
o these soldiers, and MOLSA has hired the International Organization of Migration, ar
O, to conduct a piece of the DDR process by registering former soldiers. This effort is
proceeding on schedule, with most officers screened and the enlisted ranks beginning the
process. Furthermore, for former soldiers who were neither senior members of the Baath
party, nor committed atrocities, entry into the IAF is an option for them, as is
participation in vocational training and job placement programs being stood up by
MOLSA. Nonetheless, it will be necessary in the mid- to long-term to keep an eye on
these former soldiers and to consider programs to address their needs. There are no
short-term actions required, other than planning which will be conducted over the final
Comment: Non-concur on this since it
months of the CPA's existence.
has been the lack of any real attempts to
reintegrate these personnel that has led to
some of the security problems we face.
Efforts to Date: The CPA is not starting from scratch. Most of the militiamen who leave
Why not expand the reintegration
their organizations as part to the TR process will be absorbed by programs already in
programs for these personnel?
place. Those entering one of the emerging security services fall into this category, and
CJTF-7 and CMATT are contributing mightily to make this happen. Vocational training,
technical training, business training and job placement programs for the country are
omment: Are you confident th
included in the Supplemental, and will soon be in place. While these are designed for the
ill be rimely, effective and sufficie
country in general, the TR process can use these programs and the infrastructure they will
build to help significantly. Additionally, the PMO will be the engine for job creation in
the near- to mid-term in Iraq, and the TR process will work with the PMO to develop
opportunities for militiamen who want to rejoin civilian society.
Some efforts, however, will need to be created or coordinated. In particular, the
reintegration component, which seeks to help militiamen rejoin civilian society, currently
is not coordinated and will require some assistance. In particular, militiamen who are not
joining one of the new Iraqi security services should be screened to determine their skills,
aptitudes, health status and other characteristics, and matching them up with job training
and placement opportunities needs to be managed. To do this, the efforts of all civilian
ministries must be inventoried to identify opportunities for fermer militiamen to receive
training and jobs, and this process should be managed. Finally, this effort should not fall
to the U.S. for the mid- to long-term. International organizations and financial
organizations that have significant expertise in these tasks must be engaged to help
identify funds for reintegration, and take the reigns of this process once the security
situation permits their entry into the country.
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Assumptions:
Tastie i vil rial de is langed, fraid and execute a fart 2005 or
• The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) will outlaw armed organizations outside
of central government control;
The Coalition will not remain in being and in Iraq for five or more years, th
case studies of post-conflict reconstruction efforts);
Sovereignty will pass to the Iraqi people on 1 July 2004;
To wear core years, hours providing din hea andan, olinemain engaged
military support; and
• International Organizations (IOs), Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and
International Financial Institutes (IFls) will engage in Iraq to fill the vacuum created
by the exit of the Coalition, but not until the security situation has stabilized.
Strategy Framework:
Concepts: To achieve the security end articulated at the beginning of this document, two
steps are needed.
1. Develop the domestic political consensus needed for transition and reintegration.
Realistically, this will require both getting the leaders of the various political
bodies that control militias to publicly accept TR in concept, and effectively using
this fact to make the implementation of TR possible. Successful implementation
will rely heavily on a public information campaign that leverages these political
agreements on two levels. The first, the "macro public information" effort, will
address the national and international audience, and is designed to create a
political situation in which leaders feel bound to fulfill their obligations and
foreign nations and international bodies (IOs, IFIs, NGOs) are inclined to be
helpful either diplomatically, with resources, or as participants. The second
"micro pubic information" effort is addressed below.?
2. The second step translates political agreement into implementation. This, too,
contains two concepts for implementation, both of which require a shift in the
way Iraqis think about the respective roles of political leaders and individuals. If
successful, these two ways of achieving our goals will create a shift from a
society in which leaders make decisions for groups, to one in which individuals
make decisions about what is best for themselves and their families. These two
concepts are to
a. Break the chains of command of the various militias, primarily by shifting the
loyalties of individual soldiers to their new employers; and
* See the Public Information Annex for more detailed information on the macro and micro public
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b. Take care of soldiers and their families by providing benefits, services and
opportunities for a better life, thus decreasing the chances of them taking up
arms in the future.
The "micro public information" effort will be to get the word out to individual
soldiers about the opportunities offered by the TR programs.
In conjunction with these efforts, efforts on the part of the CJTF-7 and the emerging Iraqi
security organizations will be critical in filling the security vacuum that the dissolution of
these militias will cause. Close coordination between ONSA, Mol and CJTF-7 will be
needed, and mechanisms are developing to ensure this.
The following sections will articulate components of the strategy. Implementation details
are contained in the annexes, and the plans of the implementing organizations which are
not reproduced here.
Strategy:
This section will lay out the broad themes upon which the transition and reintegration
effort is built. Implementation details of the specific components are contained in
annexes or separate plans maintained by other CPA or CJTF-7 organizations, and
Of the 30 or so militias in Iraq, three are pivotal owing to their strength and connection to
important Iraqi political leaders: PUK, KDP, and Badr Organization. All other militias
are either small but politically important and therefore worth engaging for political
reasons (primarily those whose leaders are on the Iraqi Governing Council), relatively
large but unreachable by political means (e.g., Mahdi's Army, Sadr's militia), or small
and politically less important? Furthermore, some militias will be dealt with forcefully as
they oppose or threaten coalition forces, and some will of their own volition follow the
course the three major militias take. The use of force against the three major militias by
either coalition or Iraqi security services could lead to large-scale hostilities and possibly
unmanageable consequences for Iraq and the region. Therefore, while the leaders of the
PUK, KDP, and Badr Organization should have no doubt that the existence of their
militias is incompatible with the new Iraq, the threat of force must be muted. And
because a muted threat of force will not induce compliance, a broader, 3-track strategy is
1. Attracting militiamen to join one or another of Irag's national security services by the
prospect of better compensation, conditions, and long-term employment. In some
cases this may include small unit transfers into the ICDC.
2. Provide the opportunity for individuals whose militia service can be characterized and
who would qualify for retirement had they worked for a civil agency to retire with a
pension.
3. Reintegrate militia personnel that do not enter iraq's national security services or
retire into civil society through job training and placement programs.
* See Militia matrix at Annex XXXX
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Reintegration has the clear advantage of resulting in fewer people bearing arms, but it
will not be attractive enough to the militiamen or their leaders to obviate the need for the
first two tracks. The first two components of this strategy are short-term efforts (should
be completed by the end of 2005). The last component is typically a process that takes a
minimum of five years.
Track 1 - Transfer into Security Services
Concept: The security situation in many parts of the country is so volatile that local
political leaders will want to ensure they can protect their people should the need arise.
No efforts of the CPA or CJTF-7 short of open and significant hostilities will cause them
to ignore this need, which grew out of the brutality of the previous government's security
forces and external threats posed by groups such as Ansar al Islam, al Qaeda, Turkish
Special Forces and others. One solution to this security situation, suggested by some
local leaders, is to permit them to keep their militias. However, this is not an option if
Iraq is to develop into a moder, stable state.
Strategy for Militia Leadership: While the concerns of local political leaders are real and
must be addressed, they can be mitigated by two aspects of the transfer of militiamen into
the developing security services. The first is to provide a sufficient number of billets in
each security force to each major group so that each group's leaders will view the threat
irom the state as less than it previously was - i.e., through proportional representation.*
This is in fact an explicit demand of the leadership of the Badr Organization and others.'
This will be most effective with the three large militias, though having most security
services populated with local men from each area may be helpful in general. Secondly,
the presence of a significant number of local men in the local security forces (i.e., all but
he IAF) provides local leaders with a semblance of control over their security, should the
community be threatened by the emergence of an oppressive central government in the
future, or forces from outside of the country. In a worst case scenario, we need to
recognize that local leaders might wrest control of local units away from the central
government. However, enlisting local militiamen is not simply legitimizing militia units
by moving local men into security services. In these services, local men will be paid by
the central government, rely on the systems of the central government for advancement
and eventually retirement, and develop as members of professional organizations with all
of the implications for loyalty that this entails. Of critical importance, care should be
taken to ensure that the chain of command for these security organizations is not that of
former militia forces. It may be generations before a comolete transfer of lovalty to a
central government takes root, but arrangements such as these are the most likely path to
lead Irag to this end
* Note here that by group we are not specifying whether these groups are militias or communities formed
by religious affiliation, tribal membership, ethnicity or some other grouping. The point is the threat to the
people is mitigated by proportional representation in the security forces.
Note that some security forces have already filled all of their quotas, and this may not be possible.
Examples include the IPS and ICDC, should more units not be fielded
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Strategy for Individuals: In addition the above reasons for leaders to encourage
militiamen to go into security services, there are also economic incentives that will affect
individuals without regard to their political leaders. The current compensation structure
for Iraqi soldiers and police may attract some recruits, especially if the benefits of joining
a legitimate state security service are well advertised (the micro-public information
campaign). Work in one of the security services is currently one of the few paying jobs in
the country. While these economic incentives will be helpful in many instances, these
incentives will not be uniformly effective. Our information suggests that the Badr Corps
pays some of its members as much as twice what the IAF pays, while PUK and KDP
militiamen receive only a small fraction of government pay.
be made and the results carefully tracked to refine our analysis and recruitment effort.
Also working against this aspect of the strategy, is the fact that strong non-economic
forces hold individuals to the Pesh Merga, while the Badr Organization's ties to Iran are
problematic and their pay could be hard to match.
Small Unit Transfers: While individual recruitment into state security services is
optimal, it may become necessary in the course of political discussions to permit a
limited number of small unit transfers. An important assumption of this aspect of the
strategy is that the ICDC will eventually become the reserve component of the IAF,
making it well-suited as the state security service to absorb small militia units if
necessary. While the ICDC is envisioned to assist in providing domestic security in the
near term, its eventual status as an IAF reserve would not permit militia units that transfer
into it a permanent, active role in Iraq's internal security or external defense - playing
long-term important roles only under emergency conditions when activated by the
national government. Under such conditions, the reserves would function in support of
regular forces and under strict control of the national command authority (per the
principles we will be advising the Iraqis to set in their interim constitution). At the same
ime, LAF reserves would remain mostly in their repion and close to their ethnic base,
though as a matter of principle they must be available for active service anywhere in the
country (whether to deal with internal or external security).'
While allegiance to former leaders and causes (reconstitution risks) would persist, several
measures can be taken to mitigate this effect: (is it worth also encouraging MoD to plan
for temporary deployments - eg for training - in other parts of the country of ICDC
Comment: In practice above the Green
Transfers should be in small units (not larger than companies);
Line, we shall end up with 2-3 KDP bns,
2. Reserve units should be structurally aligned with IAF regular units;
2-3 PUK bis and a ?? bde HQ - we
should be realistic about this
3.
Transfers should be supplemented by selection and integration of militia
*The Badr personnel who undertake targets of opportunity for the Iranian Government receive between
$300-400 USD a month. Not all Badr are on paid this well.
" Small-unit that wish to transfers to any of the state security services other than the ICDC should be
dissolved and dispersed as individuals throughout the force. The ICDC, of all the services, has the
advantage of moving former militia units into a reserve status and under tight central goverment control.
As it becomes obvious to former militiamen in ICDC units that they will be moving to a reserve status, they
will need to find full-time employment, and will be motivated to go through tracks 2 and 3.
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Comment And perbaps make it career
individual officers into the national security services.
enhancing for officers and NCOs to
4. Because, in principle, individuals and units could be reassigned anywhere in the
spend some time with units in other parts
of the country
country, the militias could over time melt into a national service under national
political and command authority, as part of a larger structure dominated by the
regular army, and in any case with roles, capabilities and political significance
limited by their reserve status.
Another important aspect of this approach is the fact that the TAL will make armed
organizations outside of government control illegal. If political leaders know that their
militias cannot survive in their current form, they may be anxious to secure them a place
in the ICDC. However, if it becomes clear to them that the goal is elimination through
absorption into a relatively passive service, their cooperation cannot be assumed. Without
some inducement other than threat of force, they are likely to resist or to insist on large-
unit transfers, local control, and no rotation out of their region. Taken together, these
actions would amount to retaining militias in a different form. In particular, plans must
be in place to reintegrate ICDC members into civil society after these units revert to
reserve status (see track three description below).
Implementation: A serious obstacle to implementing this track is our own success at
standing up these security services.
Recruiting for the Mol managed security services
and the ICDC is all but complete, and short of an increase in the number of units in each,
there is little or no room for militiamen in these services. This aspect of the strategy will
be examined in the section on finances.
omment: DBE may have space; n
.......
lear how many IPS will be retired ar
need to be replaced....
Key risk to this program is political decision by militia leaders NOT to allow their men to
be integrated as they want to hold onto them for the power struggles; do we have an IC
assessment on their intentions and the likelihood that thev may pay lip-service but not
really abide by the TAL?
Policy planning issue for CPA is who will euforce the TAL provision banning militias?
Will it be CJTF-7 or IPS?
Specific approaches to negotiating with the three major militias is contained in the
subsequent section on "Specific Approaches."
Details on the implementation of this track are contained in Annex A - E.
Track 2 - Retirements:
During the long, often loosing fight against Saddam Hussein, many of these militias
fought for their lives and the lives of their families every day for years. In the end, those
who survived were on the right side of history - the Coalition came to their assistance
and Saddam and his henchmen were deposed. Some of these militias trained and fought
as military units, observed recognized rules of combat, and can truly be called allies.
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Others fall along a spectrum that includes groups trained, equipped and paid for by the
mullahs of Iran, fundamentalist zealots, and criminal and terrorist organizations.
As such, some militiamen should rightly be viewed as soldiers who fought for their
county against a brutal oppressor, and so have access to the benefits that come from loyal
service. Others, sought and seek only to impose another repressive regime on the people
of Iraq and should not be viewed as such.
From the perspective of simple justice, then, it is right to recognize that those who took
up arms for the cause of freedom and against Saddam served not only their own families
1. Not engaged in terrorist or criminal activities;
2. Not in the employment of a foreign states or organizations; and
3. That come into compliance with the TAL, STIPULATE THE PROPER PARA
by the Coalition Provisional Authority,
should be recognized as soldiers, and have a right to all the same rights and privileges of
soldiers, to include pensions and benefits, if eligible according to the policies established
for soldiers; and preferences available to soldiers under any government program or
contract.
Comment: I do not see how this is
mplementable. The criteria here are ver
ubjective and would be mel by few, i
ny, of the militias in question. Al
Their eligibility should be based on the same criteria as all soldiers, as determined by the
cample I can think of risks falling fo
characterization of their service in these resistance groups, according to the records
organization or individual? If we want to
supplied by the leadership of these groups and verified by the CPA and/or Ministry of
ffer pensions, we will have to be les.
Defense or Interior.® This includes benefits for the widows and orphans of resistance
restrictive - perbaps only screening out
those we/MOl can identify as terrorists
fighters whose status can be verified by the government.
(as with MEK).
Lump sum payments to militia organizations so that they can pay pensions should not be
considered under any circumstance. It is critical that all armed factions, to include
retirees from them, fall under central government oversight. Lump sum payments to
militia leaders are more likely to perpetuate these organizations than to eliminate them
All armed organizations that do not come into compliance with the TAL by signing a
formal agreement to transition and reintegrate their members, with clearly defined
milestones for completion of this process, should be designated an illegal organization
ny Iraqi citizens affiliated with the armed c
and considered a heat to the security of the Tragi people and the central goe miten
TAL, as designated above, will forfeit the benefits outlined above. In addition, those
of service of some militiamen, but this should be done on a case by case basis, according to a procedure to
be developed.
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determined to be eligible for these benefits or who are receiving these benefits and who
are subsequently convicted of being active members of outlawed armed groups should
forfeit these benefits.
Implementation: Pension programs are attractive to many militia leaders, as some
understand that their militia should be made smaller even if they do not want them to be
eliminated, and out of concern for their older members. The policy advocated above
requires securing the documentation needed to characterize the service of individuals, and
this will be difficult and in some cases impossible. Some of these groups will not have
kept such documentation, and all will be reluctant to share it. Militias that refuse to help
characterize the service of their members will necessarily cause their members to be
ineligible, as a process without some fiscal controls could and most likely will spin out
of control and end up paying pensions to anyone old enough to have spent a specified
number of years in a militia. See track three for the structure of a registration and
screening process that would also apply to those applying for pensions.
That said, this policy must be implemented wisely, with the full understanding that
requiring comprehensive documentation before any pensions are granted will defeat the
program, and that some fraud is unavoidable. A process will need to be developed to vet
pension applications, and a policy and process developed to determine how to translate
militia service into government service. Paying some pensions that have not been earned
may be the price for retiring a significant number of militiamen.
The current policy for pensions for Iraqi government employees, to include soldiers, is at
Annex G
Track 3 - Reintegration:
Those militiamen not destined for one of the new security services through track 1, or to
receive pensions through track 2, should be offered a reintegration program designed to
help them back into civil society. This program should contain the following elements:
• Screening and registration process (not yet established, but in place for the old
Iraqi Army and paid for by MOLSA - applies to Track 2 applicants as well)
• Medical screening and determination of needs and benefits if available (Track 2
• Education on basic human rights and responsibilities (Track 2 as well)
• Identification of skills and aptitude for training and job placement
• Screening of each militiaman and family to determine other needs (e.g., education
needs of, and opportunities for, wife and children
• Job training and placement if needed
.
A limited stipend program to get militiamen through retraining (contained in
some retraining programs)
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• A tracking mechanism tied to the provision of benefits®
Implementation: Because of the great differences in culture, outlook and expectations in
necessary. These efforts should be planned and executed in conjunction with local an
nilitia leaders to defuse suspicions on the part of these leaders, and to ensure that th
various programs run as smoothly as possible. However, local leaders should not be
permitted to participate in the execution of these programs. Programs must be targeted a
he individual, and militia leadership involvement in execution will hurt that individua
focus and potentially intimidate participants.
Large components of this effort are already in place under the various ministries and the
PMO." The successful leveraging of these ongoing programs by the TR effort will
unless this operational office actively facilitates connecting militiamen with these
opportunities, and actively works with the PMO and the ministries to identify and
develop opportunities.
To make this happen, reintegration councils should be established by the operating office
that contains CPA, PMO, ministry and militia representatives. There should be one
council for each major militia group, and one for all remaining smaller militias. These
councils should have a very narrow focus - to establish processes by which militiamen
who want to be reintegrated into civilian life can access appropriate services, training and
opportunities. These activities themselves should be carried out by the operating agency
as it sees fit (i.e., either with internal resources or by contracting components out), and
later by an IO, IFI or contractor.
In general, it appears that there is sufficient funding in the short-term to provide these
opportunities, less the functions of a coordinating office and a screening and placement
capability. In particular,
• MOLSA is in the process of standing up a S9SM vocational training and
placement program for FY 04-05. This program is for the country in general, but
contains preferences for former soldiers. Under the policy presented in Track 2, if
adopted, former militiamen from qualifying groups would qualify for these
• MOLSA is in the process of standing up a banking and business skills training
program. Once again, this is for the population in general, but some participation
on the part of former militia is possible, and options for expanding this program
° It is essential that all in the reintegration process understand that a relapse into militia activity will cause
them and their families to forfeit their benefits. Families should be briefed on this as well.
1o Note that these programs are primarily for FY 04, and most militia members will only just be starting the
reintegration process this year. Continuing efforts to link into these and similar programs will be
15

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
should be considered (see section on funding WORK OUT DETAILS WITH
Office of Private Sector Development has established a Micro and Small Business
Enterprise Lending program that militia can have access to.
PMO is committed to assisting in the identification of skills that will be needed
it of the rebuilding process. This information needs to be linked to ti
vocational and higher level skills programs.
• PMO is looking into the possibility of writing preferences for contractors who
hire former militiamen into their contracts.
Timeline:
Implementation timelines will depend on the agreements made with each militia.
However, the following timelines are matters of policy or at the discretion of the CPA:
TAL goes into effect
: 28 Feb 2004:
28 Feb 2004:
Order on TR process issued by CPA
• I May 2004:
Reintegration operating agency completes plan for Reintegration
Coordination.
• 15 May 2004:
All militia not in compliance with CPA Order become illegal and
subject to sanctions
In addition to these close-in timelines, it is clear that the American taxpayer will not be
willing to bear the burden of reintegration alone for the long-term. ONSA will work with
the CIC, as well as directly with IOs, IFIs and other potential donors to develop a plan to
hand off responsibility for the reintegration component of this plan.
Funding:
Develop funding deltas for multiple variables. Present three representative options. If
these don't make sense, fix the ones that do for your programs in the annexes - I'll use
them to fix this up. Variables will include:
• # Additional ICDC Bns, from 0 to 9 (0,4,9) ($5.9M per ICDC Bn) Need to
include ?? Bde HQs?
• # Additional Border Guards, MOl will help develop meaningful numbers when
Level of R support provided in terms of
- Level of staffing of the operational activity ($4M in FY04, $6M in FYOS)
- Additional job training, placement activities- work with MOLSA to determine
programmatics
- Job creation activities - work with PMO, Private Sector Dev, MoOil. (Numbers
ange from 0 to ?)
- Stipends - Yes or No for 50K for 6 month in FY04 and 6 months in FYO5
(b)(6)
16

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DRAFT
Annex D: Militia Status Need IC help to update, verify, modify, etc.
IAF
Political
IPS
Civ
Retire
ICDC
Border
Approx
Affiliation/Leader
KDP
pollice
11,000
4,000
Barsani
7,000
31,000
Talibani
PUK
13,000
850
SCIRI/Hakim (IGC)
12,000
Badr Corps
Mahdi's
2,000
Shiite/Sadr - anti
coaltion
Army
Da'wa
500+
Dr. al Jafri/Shiite (IGC)
200+
INA
Dr. Tyad Alawi (IGC)
250+
INC
Challabi - personal
group, hired
bodyguards
0
Mohsen Abdal Hamid
Iraqi Islamic
(IGC)
Party
0
0
250+
Abdul Karim
Iraqi
Muhamadawai, Abu
Hizbullah
Hatem (IGC) (Marsh
Arabs)
200+
Hamid Majid Musa
Iraqi Comm
15ah Shaban
Local group WHERE?? 200+
Turkish sponsored
200+
Iraqi Turko
Front
0
0
0
0
0
Ansar al
Islam
0
0
0
MEK
KADEK
25

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DRAFT
Red = terrorist or enemy of the coalition organizations
Blue = the ability to offer this many slots to militia
26

Page 1 of 1
Arsht, Leslye (OTHER)
(b)(6)
From:
Sent:
Sunday, January 25, 2004 7:33 AM
To:
Arsht, Leslye (OTHER)
(b)(6)
Agresto, John (SES-1)
Cc:
Subject: Secondary Education cooperative with new Iraqi Armed Forces
Ms. Arsht:
Appreciate any follow-up information you could provide regarding our discussion yesterday. We are interested in
any cooperation between the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Defense regarding:
• Literacy testing for recruits to determine need for:
• Arab as second language training (primarily for Kurds)
• Basic literacy training for any requiring it
• Also, any general literacy data that might exist, understanding recent widespread records loss
• Continuing education opportunities for soldiers to advance them to 12*h grade equivalency
Particularly on-post / in-barracks classes
We will investigate background of, and possibilities of, military-sponsored "prep schools", understanding
potential negative connotations
We have also discussed higher education opportunities with John Agresto of Ministry of Higher Education. We
have as yet not talked to Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor.
Thank-you your time and attention on this matter. While a previously contentious aspect of the social fabric of
Iraq, the military is perhaps one of the key opportunities for an ethnically and religiously diverse, unifying nationa
institution. Education is critical to that goal.
V/R,
(b)(6)
Foreign Language
USAF
Lt Col (b)(6)
CMATT/C5
(b)(6)
problem
1/25/2004