I., I .. :~, I I .· ,----------------_£~41Jn EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT COALITION PROVJSJON;\l AUTllOlUTY INFO f\JEMO FOR: Amb. Bremer ORfGINATION: PSEC- Tom Foley RE: Iraq's Oil Trust Fund \.1)$ -~;;;:. Ex~:~ .... ·-- -~- i·~ . - i'1 Attached is Foley's paper on the Oil Trust Fund as promised in his memo lhis moming . . Also allachcd for your reference arc: I. Govcmance, August 24 memo to the GC on Iraqi Oil Trust (TAB A) 2. McPherson, August 18 memo on Oil Heritage Trusl (TAB 13) ;-...., AUachmcnl(s): As slated \C.~ i_a. ~ [ (Prepared by: Jeb Mason) ~ \,r.g......,W · 1'-~ Cv"_Sf ~ . ~"](co ~i/V\ v-t.·> v ~-~ x..<..:;} -'--·-······----~ . 'l\ll\\1 \\1\liiiiiiiiii~J!! --------- ---------- UNCLASSIFIED COALITION I'ROVlSlONAL AUTHORITY UAGHDAD ;;r?Fo MEMO September 8, 2003 1600L FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR .. , FROM: Tom Foley, Director of Private Sector Development SUBJECT: Iraq's Oil Trust Fund Introduction Iraq's oil wealth belongs to its people and this wealth should be equitably, pcnnanently and directly heltl by them. The establishment of an Oil Trust for the People oflraq ("OTPI") that serves this purpose should be a high priority for the CPA. An oil fund that permanently anti broadly tlisLrilJutes Iraq's oil wealth among its citizens will help prevent inappropriate expansion of the stale or the opportunity for a tyrant to seize and concentrate the wcallh of Iraq as Saddam did. Furthermore, an oil fund shouhl build a capital <1sset to replace the oil resources as they arc consumed, in order to provide a perpetual source of income to the Il·aqi people. l\1 a jor Ob jcctivcs The Office of Private Sector Development recommends that the structure of an Iraqi oil fund, satisfy the following objectives: \ I) Irrevocably put Iraq's oil wealth directly in the hamls of the fraqi people; 2) _Cap !he amount of oil income available directly to !he governn]S!_ut at a I~!J;-~g!_!Lficautly below the government's total need, thus requiring the government lo collect !axes from the people to fund a major portion oflheir expenditures; 3) Create an enicicnt antlproJcss.iuwlllpuauagc_d_oiLoncralion; 4) Provitle for a high level of lrapsparency; and 5) Operate indcpcnllcnlly from tlirccl control oftr1c government. --·---- Proposed Structure 0~raq's oil production assets, including its oil reserves, should bc...donated to the OTPI. All other oil-related businesses, including refining and oil field services, should be privatized. An operating subsidiary ofthe OTPI should manage oil production operations with a management lt:arn appoinlcd by the OTPI Uoard of Directors. The OTPt Uuard of Dircc_~?~ sho~Ju incluuc al l~af;l-~cn-di.rccturs ami he elccteu by the public or app6iiitcul)flTlc-Prili1cMinistcr or Presiucnl. In either case, directors should have staggered seven year terms. All of !ray's operating income from oi 1 (revenues net of production costs, including uppropriale reserves for exploration and UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED other development costs) should be captured directly by the OTPI without any ability for the government to intercept funds or pad the oil production company with patronage jobs. The OTPI should distribute annually lhc following percentages of average annual operating income over the previous five years: I I) 2) l 0 percent to the government as general revenue; I 0 percent in the form of a dividend distributed to all Iraqi citizens over the age of 18 who have liveuin the country for at least five years; and 3) The remainder into a reconstruction fund for the first five years of the OTI'I and thereafter into a capital fund to be invested in perpetuity for the benefit of future generations of Iraqis. Lessons Learned This proposal has features that have proven successful in other venues. First, it is generally accepted that reprcsentati ve govc~nments arc _!:1]9~~~a_Q_~~~~~~~!.~!~~-sl..\-!.!".<.!.9..!.~ .. :Y.!~~~!.._~~~-~tj_sm' s \Vcalth is broadly held and difficult to l"G.G..OJlC.<;;ntrale. Second, a govcrntucnt's size and po\vcr is llcl~l in balance \~hen it must directly tax its citizens for its funding needs. Third, we recommcm.l the cnpilal fund have a struciurc sJmtmniouor much needed soda! benefit);. In the ncar lcrm, due to the massive demands for rccollSlruclion expenditure not Jllltcll oil revenue will be routed through the Trust. The only l'casiblc payments io the trusl will be pension's paymcnls. But sourcing oil revenue into the Tru:;t, which will produce ckar hclll.'f"il:; (o lrnqis ill IL'r!IIS of t!irccl Jlr translation. Please sec below. Thi:; dtlCIIIIICIII lll;tin:; llHI(ksl rcvi:;iuus CtliiiJltll\.'d loa vcn:i«.lll f:uhntillnlla~:l mo11llt. ······-- ·----- ---- --------------·----------------··--·--- --·--··- ---·-··-····-----. ··----- ----·-··-· -~---~- --·-----------------------~------ H]i llc1·itagy_Trust- Executive Summary Vcrsiu11 • Iraq is ;111 oi·l-dolllina!cd ccottullty ;md tnusllltilllagc its oil resources carclirlly. Tile early cs!ahlisluucnl of au "Iraqi llcri!agc Tr11st"' is un i111porlanl s!cp low;ml cn:;urilllj !hallhc entire country hcnelils lh.1111 ils oil rc~:ourcc:; -·a 111ajor break r1on1 p;,~;lpcdicics, wh~:11 only the 1\aa!lt Patty largely bcnclilnlli·om lr;~q'~ oil re:;«lllln.::;. • Fi11ancing for the Trust willue provided through foreign oil sales. Iraq's tmlional hudgcl will be paid rrotll !he Tru:;l,lhcrcby assming long-lcnn liscal discipline :11111 providing lran:;pan.:ncy lo I he pcopk tlr I he rounlry. In add ilion, !ltc Trw;! would !Jill tC\'CiltiCS rrom oil sales in!O three li.111ll:; 1\c:;cri\Jcplllar am\ sot:ial support :1111\.lllg lmq'~; (fl>Jllllalion. · r :;\rong linaneial pcrl'l,rm:mcc. The 1\tlllls will invest in dilfcn.:n\ types or as:;dS {dclint:tl {Jy law) ;\11\l will :tl!al h;IVC :1 ltislingui:>hul inh:tllillioll;J! ;Hivisory board. . • The atnounl of linanciug provitlcu lo each fund is an important decision for Iraq. 1\ laq,;c mnnbcr of co111hin:~lions arc possible lkpcmling on llw priority assigned to m:ar .. [CIIll \'l:r:;w; hmg-lcnu pdurilics. • llowcvcr, lo ensure Lhal each of the funds receives some r,uppurl, a clearly de lined lllillilllal amount of linancinL~. or "floor," for cnch oflhc [umls should be kgally c!;tahli:;hcd. In adtlilion, the amotllll paid into the f'unds should hc.tll-\•:nnincll in part hy oil revenues liming a calcmlar period. • Changes in allocalions among the rumls should be permissible only lhwuglt a kgislalivc "super-majority" (e.g., lhrcc-fourlhs) :md l'rcsidcnlhtl cm1cuncncc in -·- . ···~-· . . ·.:-·~-~-- ~······:·." order In lirnil !he roo111 a\·ailablc lontauipulalc the li111ds ror sli(lfl-kmt l"llitical Jill I pn:;c::. Ckar CXjii:IHiilurc t 1 u\cs ami guidelines ror CCich or lhc runtls shtlllld he eslahli::hcd .'.clearly dcfi11i11g lite cdmlilin11:; IIIH!t.:r which :"fH~ndillg is lo he pl"lllliflnl, the ;"1111111111( or:;pnulilll_~ thai is lo he pcnnitlcd.