, ..... .... . • • December 19, 2003 J r 1 r ' wt JOI }\thl'ie Rt:~ea~e t'e. l\ erPICEM:: USE 6l4LY Dec 19 2003 . \ ................................. ~ ... -· ... ·~·ft·· .... . ··- • UNCLASSIFiED - FOR OFI'l(IP concentrate on building Iraqi capacity to deliver honest and effective governance. Our assumption is that multilateral and bilateral arrangements witt be made to ensure that Iraq continues to be provided with assistance after July 1 in most areas covered by this plan. In revising the plan, some actions planned for later in 2004 or in 2005 have been brought forward (e.g. development of ministries' capacity for management a:n.d policy-making). In some cases, decisions and implementation actions would be left to a future Iraqi government (e.g. on certain economic policy issues). WtfQisA98lflEB F8R OPFl€InL \::J'Sf 6HLY 4 • • • • • • Dec 19 2003 Setting Priorities and Anticipating Risks A new planning process has begun. The accelerated timetable mandates an adjustment of priorities. Three categories of priorities will be the focus of atte. ntion: 1) the action areas organized around governance, security, essential services and economic reform, 2) the capacity-building areas of training, civil service development and anti-corruption institution-building, and, 3) joint transition planning among CPA and Iraqi officials. The three are inter-related. As progress continues and results become evident in the reconstruction and essential services domain, what was a priority area during CPA's initial phase will become more routine. Instead, the requirement to accomplish certain security and economic policy objectives becomes more acute as a result of the shorter political schedule. A stable, democratic Iraq will not occur automatically with the transfer of authority. The new timetable dramatically increases the need for effe. ctive capacity-building and transition planning. Prioritising what mu.st be accomplished prior to CPA dissolution vs. what actions we can leave to the latter period has begun but issues remain. Examples include: • How to ensure the quality of the Iraqi management structures and staff in the security sector (defense. , interior, and justice). • Which economic poHcy reforms are to be embarked upon, e.g., monetization of the food basket, energy price 1iberali7..ation, and SOE privatization policy? • How to establish an effective and lasting anti-corruption program. • Which financial management laws and procedures can be established, e.g., budget laws, procurement regulations, 'transparent accounting procedures, and independent audit offices? Flexibility in the funding available to CPA from the U.S. Supplemental and donor resources will be critical. A transition period is fragile, and opportunities to achieve gains must be seized and problem areas addressed decisively. Increased coordination among CPA and Iraqis at all levels - GC, ministries; govemoratcs, religious institutions, tribal structures - is vital, and will benefit from good joint planning. One common occurrence in past post·conflict interventions has been the tendency for timelincs to slip. Making major policy decisions is difficult, and due consideration must be given to all of the consequences of the optjons available. It is important, however, that critical policy decisions not be postponed. Because of the long implementation times required, and the constraints on funding flexibility, undue delay may result in a de facto choice . 5 f!:Rt@b'tSBIFIEB f'8R 8FFJOIAb ~E 8U&Y Dec 19 2003 Action Issues In addition to individual ministry plans, the plan review process enabled CPA and CJTF-7 staff to identify key policy and operational issues that require action iftbe • plan is to be implemented successfully. Governance • Manage the Transitional Administrotive Law process to ensure that a fair and durable fundamental law is completed on schedule; • Clearly communicate the political process to lraqi citi7.ens of all backgrounds to ensure broad participation and support for the process; • Ensure Governorate Teams have adequate capacity to build local government institutions and manage the political process; • Engage Sunni constituencies to provide reassurance and promote stability • Accelerate the development of indigenous civil society organizations so that they can hold government authorities accountable and responsible; • Establi!ih the groundwork for a professional Iraqi civil senrice (institutions and people)j including anti-corruption and vetting mechanisms; • Ensure a coordinated, smooth and efficient transition from the senior advisor led process to bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programs; • Establish Iraqi civil society conOict mitigation institutions. Security • Development of a holistic approach to the Iraqi security sector, including clarification ofiCDC missions and interface with other security clements; • Decisions on the integration of former militias into security forces and on militia demobi1i1..ation; • Arresting/confining the large numbers of criminals released prior to the ground campaign~ • Securing the borders. An important step will be for MFA and MOl to complete cross·border agreements, including visa regimes; • Accelerating the removal of ammunition dumps; • The coordination of logistics fOT the 01F2 force rotation with the TOA of border posts to MOI and with civil transport needs; • Building senior leadership capacity in the security ministries and developing political oversight mechanisms: • Negotiation of the Security Agreement with appropriate involvement in the process of responsible lraqis; • Detennination and implementation of policy on population and movement control measwes such as ID cards; • Integrated planning for TOA from Coalition Forces to IPS to ensure smooth lransitions; 6 • • _____ ,_.,,,.,_,,, .. _ ONCLASSf:Pl~D POlt e'JPP!ClJ! it will be important to have a 100% functional alternative to the PDS, to avoid civil unrest. • Civil Service Capacity. Identifying, training and establishing civil service capacity is vital to the transfer of authority. • Budgeting and Ministry of Pinan. ce. Ministries require an improvement in the MoF's overly-centralised financial management procedures in order to be able to implement their plans. • Airports. A functional commercial airport is key to th. e advancement of Iraqi economic development. • Oil and Electricity. Stock levels are not up to those necessary to prevent fuel shortages in the winter cold snaps. • Privatization. We need to determine our policy on p· rivatization of SOEs and how this will impact unemployment rates in Iraq . • UNCb/tSBiffEB F9A: 8FFI€1s"z:e YiJS QHb¥ 7 ·----·----- . ~i€I:Jr88H'' IEEl FOR OPFlClAE USE 8HLY Dec 19 2003 A2 THE VISION After decades of ruthless dictatorship, the Iraqi people now control their destiny and are establishing the conditions for a tree and stable future. With the international community, the CPA is helping the Iraqi people achieve a free ltuq governed by a representative government chosen through democratic elections. At the core of this now Iraq is the development of a democratic, accountable, and self-governing civil society respectful of human rights and freedom of expression. The future prosperity of Iraq's citizens will be assured by the use of Iraqi resources to foster the development of a market-based economy. This needs to be done in a manner that is economical1y, socially and environmenta1ly sustainable for the long term benefit of all lraqi people. Fu.rthennore. our goal is an lraq at peace with itself and its neighbors, once again able to play a responsible role in the international community. Our Mission The CPA will work with the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Interim Administration to establish the conditions for a free, sovereign, democratically-elected representative government. We want to work with Iraqis to establish an Iraq that uses its resources for the benefit of its people. It should be an Iraq that is stable, united, prosperous, at peace with its neighbors and able to take its rightful ·place as a responsible membet of the region and the international community. This Iraq must be free of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists. The Gool The ultimate goal is n unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective and representative governm,ent for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms for all Iraqis and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses a th:reat to its neighbors or iutemational security. Next Steps Once ndopted, the CPA revised plan should be used to drive forward implementation both of cross-cutting priorities and those identified by individual ministries. Detailed plans need to be developed to progress the cross-cutting issues, notably govemment capacity building, anti-corruption and post-CPA planning. At the same time. the issues raised in the course of the plan 1·eview need to be addressed at the executive level. UNCbP! Dec 19 2003 • The focus of this revised plan is on the new plans of the ministries and organjzations that support the CPA mission. At the same time, CPA has recognized that a nutnber of initiatives are needed that cut acros. s ministerial lines. These initiatives are concerned with putting into place the fundamental building blocks for n sustainable, democratic, just and well~ managed Iraqi state. The international community, CPA advisors and their Iraqi counterparts are already working ou these issues. The next step is for CPA to form cross~cutting workjng groups that will develop pla11S and coordinate implementation in these four areas: • Developing a professional civil service • Civil Service ;md ministry capacity building • Anti~corruption • Planning past the CPA This section summarises the issues to be: addressed. outlines the approach that will be taken and provides some "ground~truth" feedback from CPA RCs and GCs. • • DNCLASSirteD Fe5R OPP:tef51tL tJ~e OHbY 24 • • • Dec 19 2003 C1: DEVELOPING A PROFESSIONAL CIVIL SERVICE An urgent task that cuts across all Iraqi ministries is the development of a professional civil service. This will involve systemic reform and development over a lo.ng period of time. Whilst most ministries wit! devote resources to this task in the period before transition, much further work will be required and much of it will need to be coordinated from the center. Key tasks are likely to incluoe: • Review of the role of the civil service (including 'political appointees-' - may link to constitutional development) to d~termine revisions needed to civil service code; • Development of a merit ~ based 'equal opportunities' personnel system (including any organizational changes needed to implement and safeguard); • Review of arrangements for professional development, exchanges between ministries and between center and regions, nnd introducing new talent; • Introduction of transparent planning, policy-making and budgetary and financial management systems, and mechanisms for co-ordination between ministries; • improving communications systems with the public, and public representatives; • Assistance in reorganization, both internal to ministries (structures, job descriptions etc) and possible wider government changes (e.g. Office of PersonneJ Management, central government co~ ordination/secretari at mechanisms). These tasks will need to be pursued with full Iraqi buy·in if permanent foundations are to be \aid for the future. They will be considered further in the light of an initial scoping. mission by DflD in the first week or December. From that wiU be derived an outline plan for consideration by the Administrator in mid- December. A Capacity Building Working Group including ministry 'f'epresentatives is bein. g established to help to develop the plan and co-ordinate activity . 25 Dec 19 2003 C2: CIVIL SERVICE AND MINISTRY CAPACITY BUILDING • In order to make the governmental systems work, it will be necessary to develop Jraq"s human resources at all levels, from senior leadership to administn1tive personneJ. Some ministries have developed ambitious plans for staff development and training but systematic, long-term programs remain in their infancy. A cross- cutting priority in the ¢Oming months is to accclemtc training programs and to put down the foundations of a long tenn human resource development strategy. Needs and priorities for capacity-building derive logica11y from the systemic civil service reforms outlined in Cl above, but some require more urgent action. The capacity building pJan needs to encompass: 1 Training needs analysis on appropriate scale; • Development of existing Iraqi training facilities; 1 Local governance training currently being provided by RTI (funded by USAID)- and the relationship with central government training; • Extant proposals developed with Iraqis for Washington-based training in budgetary management; • Focus for training that may be provided by DflD in 1raq, regionally or in the UK (Senior civil service? Future leadership? Particular ministries?); • Scope for mentoring within ministries to increase capacity for planning, • policy analysis, organization design~ submission writing etci • Scope for other CIC donor assistanc~• • More specialized ministry training and technical assistance requirements. The Capacity Building Working Group will develop plans and coordinate activities. • ONCLASSJFIED- FOR OFFICiAL USE ONE t 26 Dec 19 2003 • C3: ANTI-CORRUPTION An anti-corruption program is being developed by Judgej(b)(6) I Ministry of Justice, who is leading a working group for that purpose, This program has two major elements: • An Office of Pub he Integrity will be stood up before transition • Each Ministry ·has been requested to stand up an Inspector General by the end ofFebruary2004 To help inform the development of CPA and Iraqi policy on anti-corruption, we asked GCs and RCs whether the anti-corruption effort would have a. cbieved substantial success by July 1. Replies were generally skeptical. The general view was that there are 'no quick fixes' and too little time to make structural or cultural chnnges in a society that is used to patronage, tribalism and bribery . • • UNCbt'tSSWffiB f6R 6fflCtl*eL ~E; 6HLY 27 Dec 19 2003 C4: PLANNING PAST 'THE CPA Although the revised plan focuses on CPA's priorities out to July 2004, many of the ministries have plans that stretch beyond the life oflhe CPA. Jndeed, many of the ministri. es make clear that the execution of their plans requires not just the devdopment of Iraqi capacity but also the establishment of arrangements for bilateral or multilateral assistance. Several of the ministries are &ctively engaged in such planning, for instance scoping technical and advisory requirements. In addition, our cross·cutting priorities of capacity building, human resource development and anti-corruption an depend up<>n sustained international support. The JleXt stage in planning is for the CPA, working with the Iraqi leadership and the international community, to develop comprehensive plans that will ensure a seamless transition of authority and continued development of 1raq into a democratic, stable and _prosperous nation. The plan for transition beyond CPA needs ro address the following issues: lrrUnlotiot~al political frame ... •ork multilateral framework (if any} role of the UN & lFls bilateml relationships Economic and technical aS$iSilmce administration of supplemental and of other donor funds aid agreements - capacity building and professionalization role of technical advisors o logistic, contractual & security arrangements Security relationyhips seturity agreement role ofMNF in Iraqi internal security assistance programs (e.g. police, military h11.ining teams) force deployments and basing Trmu ·ition ofbilllterallmiitutions from CPA to US, UK. Australian, etc embassies Plar~rri11g tile lrausl/ioll to lr11qi let~dersl1ip role ofMOPDC ensuring continuity of government during the transition period '<:JNO!::AS6WIBB F91\: 9ff1€Vtl5 Wife 9.U!Y 28 • • • Dec 19 2003 • We propose to take forward this planning process with a coordinating committee, supported by specialist working groups. Membership .of the committee and working groups needs to be wide, including CPA and Coalition Forces, Iraqi officials and thought leaders, as well as international organizations. Local governance after transitiob A particularly challenging question will be the role of international assistance to local government after the transition. CPA Governorate Teams are being staffed up at present; they will face a heavy burden in supporting the refonn of local government institutions that is proposed; and will not have completed their capacity building plans by the end of June. We a. sked for GC and RC views on the way ahead. Some of the responses included: • An aid co-ordination ro. le will probably be required in each Province. • If the new Iraqi Government would acquiesce to the RCs and GCs providing some sort of effective monitoring/enforcement role, with an honest corps of civil serv~nts and law enforcement officers to resort us to when necessary, this could be useful. We could definitely continue to play an important mentoring role. • No, we do not need RCs and GCs beyond July 1, 2004. The Iraqis might ask for ''advisors" to stay on at the local level and we will need them in any case for monitoring the US aid program. We not-e, however, that in a truly sovereign Iraq, such vestiges of a foreign occupation will be hard to swallow for the Iraqis. • There will certainly be a role for advisors to the local Governor/government and for supervision of aid projects. • Absolutely, need some kind of advisory capacity. If this were a nonnal UN mission there would be something that would continue for several years, transitioning along with the host country political transition. • We reconm1end a new UNSC resolution to create a legal basis fo.r a continued civilian role following tbe end of the occupation until the election of a new govemment. • We need to consider whether or not we want a civilian presence in Iraq to engage in the following activities: monitoring implementation of the oew "}lolitical plan; serving in an advisory capacity; adopting traditional diplomatic functions; engaging in project management, donor coordination; providjng political udvice to the military; ensuring civllian contracting activities meet coalition politi<:al objective:> . • ONCLASS!PIED FOR OFP'ICIXL eJ!e eNLY 29