- -
----~
Pagel of 1
Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
From: [~ ---...,_--"
Sent: Monday, September 01, 2003 6:05 PM
To: Slocombe. Walt B. (SES)
Subject: Saddam's Services: numbers
You asked on Friday whether 1 could give you any idea of the size of Saddam's Services.
I have retrieved the foJl text of the document I previously drew on for the "Close Hold" paper,
and can give you a partial answer, based on information known in - I should say- about 2001.
Directorate General of Intelligence: reliable reporting (and more dependable, I suppose, than
the yellowcake tosh) suggests around 2,000 employed in Baghdad, and another 2,000 in
provincial stations and abroad.
Special Security Organizatio. n (Saddam's Gestapo): unhelpfully quotes variolls reports
placing the number of those employed at between 1;500 and 35,000
The Special Emergency Forces: Up to eight battalions.
Directorate General of Security and Director.ate of Military Intelligence: The paper is mute.
____ .,.may provide an answer on the latter, in the augmented statis tics I have now asked
him for.
Special Republican Guard: also nothing in the paper.r ~--_,!{or, of course, the INC), may help
on this, too.
I hope that the INC may also be able to cough up some Ba'ath Party records, as I have the
feeling, without being certain, that the ISG may not have much in this vital area.
1f you ever wanted to peer further into this murky area - into, for instance, the position within
the apparatus of the MJC - you would be welcome to the document. Alternatively, I couJd try
to extract from it answers to any further questions you may have.
[
Deputy Director lntell\geJice Conversion
Office of Secu rity Affairs
Mobile:r' I
I IHI 1111~11 IJ Ill I
02395
9/4/2003

CLOSEIIOLD
IRAQ'S INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES:
A DIGEST
I. DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE ('-..lall~l~l.Ml\~~)
Mission:
To monitor and suppress dissident activities at home and abroad
To collect foreign political, economic and scientific intelligence
To penetrate foreign intelligence and security services
To provide operational intelligence and support for weapons procurement
To disrupt and collect intelligence on foreign diplomats and intelligence officers,
and United Nations personnel
DGI Directorates (broadly, I suspect on the KGB model):
The main offending Directorates seem to be:
Directorate I.: Responsible for over-all management. Officers assigned to the
Special Projects and Tasks section may have been instructed by their Director to
carry out highly sensitive operations (or investigations) unknown to their
colleagues working in other parts of the Service. Based in Al Mansur
headquarters building.
Directorate IV: Foreign Operations. Included supervision of Illegals operating
under natural cover. Based at Al Mansur Headquarters.
Directorate V: Counter Intelligence/Espionage. This involved inter alia the
investigation of haqis suspected of collaborating with foreign intelligence
services. Office in Karradat Sharqiyah/Masbah.
Directorate VII: Investigations and judicial matters. Interrogation of Iraqis
suspected of working for a foreign intelligence service. Known to have used
physical torture in its attempts to extract information. Cooperated with
Psychological Department which ran courses on the psychological techniques
used for interrogation.
Department IX: Scientific and Technical Support. Originally part of the
Directorate General of Security and known as the Al Hasan ibn al Haitham
Institute, transferred to the DGS in the 1980s. Probably in late 1980s appears to
have been re-transferred to MIMI under Husain Kamil, to assist CB weapons
programs. Part of the Directorate remained with MIC's Salam factory after the
1

CLOSEIIOLD
Gulf War, and was responsible for work on clandestine communications devices,
timing devices, radio transmitters and cipher equipment. This part continued to
work closely with the residual Department IX. HQ in Palestine Street.
Laboratories at Salman Pak. (destroyed by coalition bombing in 1991).
Department XIV: Responsible for planning and mounting Special Operations
(assassinations, assaults, kidnaps, bombings, break-ins etc) against oppositionists
living in Iraq and abroad. Also tasked with planting and detecting
eavesdropping devices, intercepting phone calls and conducting clandestine
photography. Possessed a military-style training camp at Salman Pak.
Directorate XL: Responsible for monitoring the activities abroad of groups and
individuals opposed to the Iraqi Government. Divided into four sections:
• Religious parties, such as Da'wa
• Reactionary parties, such as the INA
• Leftist parties, such as the Iraqi Conununist Party and the International
Command of the Ba'ath Party (pro-Syrian).
• Kurdish section
Regional Directorates: Northern (Mosul), Eastern (Kirkuk), Southern (Basra)
and Western (Ramadi). Broadly divided up into sections including commercial
companies and hotels, counter-intelligence (eg political parties, Kurds, Turkey,
Iran,Gulf States, Palestine and Syria), security (arrests, disruption, industrial
plants), surveillance, technical operations.
Activities; a note
These included forcing Iraqi expatriates in Kuwait to act as cooptees and
informants (1980s), efforts against opposition/exile communities in Europe.
State enterprises such as Iraqi airways, Iraqi News agency and the Rafidain Bank
were used as well as embassies abroad to provide cover. Eavesdropping
equipment was reportedly installed in the Novotel, Rashid, Baghdad, Ishtar
Sheraton and the Meridien hotels.
2

CLOSE IIOLD
II. DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF SECURITY (r\al\u.-l\~~)
Responsible for countering threats to Iraq's internal security from the civil
population. Investigated and acted against any individual or group suspected of
anti-state activity. Maintained paramilitary forces for quelling civil unrest,
though these were under the control of the Special Security Organisation.
Political Directorate: The principal operational part of the DGS. Branches
cdedicated to monitoring foreigners and embassy personnel (Branch I), Shi'a
oppositionists (Branch II), Kurds (Branch Ill), Political Parties (?Branch IV), and
Religious Organisations, such as Da'wa (Branch V). Also monitored families
belonging to Iraqis who lived abroad, and Iraqis who travelled abroad
frequently, and businesses in Iraq dealing with foreign firms and individuals.
Include the Prisons Security Department, cooperating with the Interior Ministry,
the Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs and the DGS Security Directorate in
running prisons. Recruited prisoners who might prove useful on release.
III.DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (~~l.;~\'ll\~~)
The activities of the DMI, generally characteristic of most military intelligence
services, included maintaining links with Iraqi students abroad who had access
to overt specialized military and military-industrial information. Interrogated
civilians arrested by the army in prohibited areas. Supervised the areas holding
detainees.
IV. SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANISATION (uaWl<J.d.!Ulf+)
Primarily involved in overseeing the security of the Saddam Husain, and
monitoring and investigating the loyalty to the regime of other intelligence and
security services - and of military units integral to the regime's survival
(including the Special Republican Guard (SRG) and the Republican Guard (RG).
Maintained records on all VIPs and senior commanders of the two Guards, and
posted liaison officers into the other services. Also responsible for controlling the
operational activity of the SRG and RG. Involved in monitoring UNSCOM and
IAEA activity in Iraq and controlled pre-war efforts to hide proscribed material
from both agencies. Controlled by Qusay Saddam Husain.
One of the principal Departments within the SSO was the Department of Special
Conspiracies. It was formed in 1992 to conduct a wide range of intelligence-
gathering and security operations in Northern Iraq aimed at combating threats to
3

CLOSE HOLD
the regime posed by Kurdish and Iraqi opposition groups. It recruited elite
officers from the other services. It was actively engaged in mounting offensive
operations in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, many involving assassinations,
bomb attacks, break-ins and kidnaps. These probably included attacks on
humanitarian relief efforts in northern Iraq.
Subordinate to the SSO was the Special Republican Guard, of which Qusay
Saddam Husain was also Commander. Its primary function was to protect
Saddam Husain. It sought to achieve this, in part, by providing a security cordon
around Baghdad and Tikrit to prevent any other Iraqi military units from
entering the two cities. It also provided personal bodyguards for Saddam Husain
and VIPs, and protected Presidential and sensitive military-related sites.
The Special Emergency Force was reportedly made up of units from the SRG,
the DGI and the DGS, all subordinated to the SSO. It consisted of up to eight
battalions, primarily infantry, though there was some evidence that one or more
battalions were equipped with armoured vehicles, used primarily to quell
popular and prison unrest.
4

... .,,.... .
.., ... ~ ....
__ ..
• •
2ND.L fST.L CAPT , MA.I l.T.COi COL BG MG LG M.LG MAR 'TOTAL B4THDEGREE
' 1 2 1 8
10 7 40 7 1 65 ~_,,:.:.
10 2 1 3 12 16 100 4 1 1•9 ~J~.
3 ! 22 72 26 78 265 193 31 5 695 ~.,.:...
32 82 298 487 1019 ' 1302 1749 436 12 2 5429 .ijj,~
32 91 3-22 560 I 1058 1.402 2037 773 SS 11 1 83-46
~'J;i~
'.~·
'·.,. , ............ ,

.·
OTHER FRKA SHUBA FAREE MKTB QEADA TOTAL GROUP
5006 652 137 26 5821 -
.... u.<1uu•
997 262 20 , 4 1 1284
·'31 41 4 476
566 101 1 668
170 1 1 172
22 9 16 7 . 38 8 100 I
48 , 9 1 1 59 I I
u,,34 5429 696 1'9 81 a U80 I - '
r • • r,~ . r

Udw Firqa
• Window of opportunity to co-opt their
support
- They promise to obey all laws of the CPA
- They pledge to fully cooperate in serving Iraqi
people and in building new Iraqi government
• They represent a significant "swing" group
- 6200 people mostly between L TC and BG
- Acknowledged and respected as leaders
• Can be very helpful to CPA's security
goals in the future

Public Affairs and media campaign
• Shows that the CPA is humanitarian
oriented
- Recognizes needs of the family
• Shieks at Conference in Babil supported
the idea of humanitarian assistance to
families of Udw Firqa members
- Would receive wide acceptance among Iraqis

Procedures
• Wife or other family member picks-up
check
- Must present military and civilian ID cads of
Udw Firqa member
- Family member must also present his/her own
civilian ID card to prove family relationship
- Must present food ration (Ministry of Trade) ID
card
• List of Udw Firqa personnel affected by
this decision provided to each site
- Only families of those on list are eligible

Pay Scale
Rank Stipend Amt ($)/month Family Gets ($)/month
BG-MG 120 100
LTC-COL 100 80
2LT-MAJ 80 60
WO/NCO 50 40
Only families of those Udw Firqa who did not commit crimes would
receive money
• Those in the intelligence organizations, Fedayeen Saddam,
Special Republican Guard, senior advisors, and personal guard
would be excluded

.-..........
We should give their issue attention, or else it could escalate to the point where they feel
that no one listening and they feel talking will not get them anywhere. In their culture,
raking care o:f their family is paramount. Without work, they cannot provide for their
families.
This morning at 0900 I had a meeting with fonner lr:aqi military officers to discuss the
stipend payments process. The men were all members of the Udw Firqa level in the
Ba'ath Party. Tbe following is a summary ofthc meeting:
• Pay these people or they will swing over to the side of those who oppose the
--~------------'
USA.
• If someone bas no money, they arc easy targets to be swayed by those who are
working against the USA.
• The needy people will accept this propaganda because they need the money.
• Udw Firqa and below in the Ministry of Education can keep their jobs,
• Udw Sbu'ba can get their retirement
• Deputy Minister ofHeaJth Dr. Ali Shanon (former military MG- Ba'athist?)
• The military did not fight against the USA
• They want to be friends
• They have not been involved in the vio1ence.
• They want to meet with Mr. Slocombe and/or Mr. Bremer
• Families of Udw Firqa are without money
• In Ambassador Brcmer's order, there is a provision for exceptions on a case by
case basis
• Human right means that you should not withhold from a family its ability for
subsistence
• Many of these officers were highly respected within their neighborhoods and
communities and earned a good living.
• They cannot accept the disgrace and insult of being forced to work, for example,
as a laborer. This would disho11or them.
• Officers cannot take a, cheap job because people know who they were and the
responsibiHties and respect they commanded previously. To do so now would
dishonor them. Tuey would lose face. and in their culture they would rather die
than lose face. If they get to this point in their despair they will not care whether
they take some Americans with them.
• These men are used to fighting, while civilians are not.
• Udw Firqa around the country are in a bad way because of no money.
• Schools are opening, but they have no money to purchase their kids school
supplies.
• After the Najaf explosion, people blamed tbe CPA for lack of security
• Lf you pay the Udw Firqa, security will be improved
• Paying people money is needed to counter influence of opposition groups
• Need to do it before start of Ramadan

------------
- ---
------·--
FW: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Senior Advisors Page I of3
From: f jCIV
To: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) ;r~----~ k0-6 MoNSD)
Cc: r I
Subject: FW: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Senior Advisors ~
Attachments: -
Sent: Wed 912412003 3:20 PM
This is a topic of consternation today, and I'll bet for a while. It's pretty clear what it all means (there's a
contest of wills) except the end of Meghan's memo makes it sound like ~once we get this sorted out, we
won't have to worry about de-Baathification anymore.•
Riiiiiiggghhhhttttt!!
--Ori~-From:~FS01)
Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2003 9:33 PM
To: CPA Ministries
Cc: Executive Secretary
Subject: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA senior Advisors
Governance has provi~e following update and interim guidance
on De-Baathification. ----advises that CPA is meeting with the
Governing Council tomorrow and she will update us afterwards, but Governance
does not expect to resolve all outstanding issues.
https://webmail.orha.centcom.mil/exchang~box/FW:%20De-Ba'ath%20Upda... 09/24/2003

FW: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Senior Advisors Page 2of3
•
To AH CPA Ministry Teams,
The Governing Council recently established the Higher National De-Ba'athification
Commission to assume responsibility for the formulation and implementation of de-
ba' athification. This act was in response to pointed urging from Ambassador Bremer for
the GC to take responsibility in this area. Iraqis, not foreigners, are best positioned to
complete or refine the de-ba' athification process that CPA started.
This Commission issued two "decisions" on September 14. In summary, the
commission advanced:
1) The immediate dismissal from public positions anyone of the rank of "firqa" and
above. All exemptions issued previous to this date were rendered immediately null and
void. Those affected by this decision have the right to appeal.
2) A ban on people of the rank of"firqa" and above - as well as others who have
committed crimes and plundered the country's wealth - "attaining special positions or
responsibility in public positions or political activities or institutions of civil society, and
the press and media."
The word "decisions" is in quotation marks because the Commission's decisions cannot
have the force of law unless and until CPA issues an order formerly transferring
authority to the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission and ratifies these two
decisions. Ambassador Bremer intends to do this, but has first asked for clarification on
questions such as: guarantees of due process (particularly mechanisms for appeal),
further definition of parameters of de-ba 'athification of politics, civil society and the
media, and a request to consider the revocation of exemptions on a case-by-case basis,
rather than a blanket one.
Once we resolve these outstanding issues, Ambassador Bremer will issue an order
https://webmail.orha.centcom.mil/exchange~nbox/FW:%20De-Ba'ath%20Upda... 09/24/2003

.-------
-
FW: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Senior Advisors Page 3 of3
.. .
•
transferring authority and ratifying the Commission's decisions. This will undoubtedly
have implications for the ministries, although the exact nature of these consequences is
difficult to predict given the number of unanswered questions. For example, it is still
unclear whether the Commission intends to revoke all temporary exceptions, or only the
ones that have been applied to people who are firqa and above.
When the transfer of the power to enforce de-ba'athification occurs in the very near
future, the Coalition will be relieved of the responsibility of identifying and removing
Ba 'athists, although CPA ministry people are expected to be fully supportive in helping
the Iraqis implement the policy as necessary.
We will provide you with more details as soon as they are available.
I
https://webmail.orha.centcom.miVexcbang~box/FW:%20De-Ba'ath%20Upda... 09/24/2003

,
•
TO: Ambassador Bremer
FROM:
RE: Assessing De-Ba'athification
DATE: 7 July 2003
Nearly two months have passed since you issued the May
16th De-Ba'athification order. The principle behind the
policy - purging Saddam's supporters from positions of
power and influence - has won wide-spread support within
Iraq and abroad. Yet the implementation of the policy has
been uneven at best. Moreover, it has generated
considerable confusion among both Iraqis and military and
civilian members of the coalition.
We should not seek to amend the policy issued on May
16th. Doing so would be counterproductive, because it would
both undermine our continued efforts to root out the worst
Ba'athists and damage our broader credibility in Iraq. We
should, however, identify the factors that have contributed
to the confusion surrounding the policy and mitigate them
where possible.
Why the Confusion?
There are five inter-related reasons why our de-
ba' athification policy has generated confusion:
1. Complex Nature of the Policy and Revolving Door of
Coalition Advisors. The policy involves various tiers
of the Ba'ath Party and several layers of management in
the ministries. Even ~ftP.r reading the policy closely,
many of our implementers have questions about who is
affected. The steady arrival of new advisors means that
at any given time, there is a group unfamiliar with the
basic parameters of the policy.
2. Uneven Application of Policy. No two ministry or
municipal advisors or military corrnnanders have
implemented the de-ba'athification policy in exactly the
same way. For example, some of those requesting
exceptions have allowed employees to continue working
while their applications were pending; others have
removed those requesting exceptions until further

notice. Such inconsistencies between ministries and
between governorates fuels confusion and the perception
of injustice.
3. Difficulty in Squaring Competing Objectives.
Particularly in the governorates where there is little
policy guidance from Baghdad, local commanders have seen
the de-ba'athification policy to be in conflict with
their other responsibilities, such as maintaining law
and order. In weighing these competing objectives,
commanders have often chosen to soften the deb-
ba' athification policy in its implementation,
exacerbating confusion by adding to the uneven
application of the policy nationwide.
4. Disconnect between the Stated Objectives of the Policy
and the Reality of its Implementation. Our stated
policy aim is to remove the worst Ba'athists, the
supporters of Saddam, from positions of influence and
power. In r.ea1ity, the policy has affected a
significant number of Iraqis who were not active Ba'ath
Party members or defenders of the former regime. Our
ministry advisors report that either a majority or large
minority of those who have lost their jobs (and
pensions) under this policy were "average, hard-working
Iraqisn who had joined the party either to avoid
harassment of their families or maintain their jobs.
5. Slowness of Exception Procedures. The wait for the
approval or disapproval of exception applications
perpetuates uncertainty. This impedes operations of the
ministries and creates the perception that the coalition
is ambivalent about de-ba'athification procedures.
Mitigating the Confusion
We can and should take several steps to address the
current confusion surrounding our de-ba'athification
policy.
1 . Clarify the Policy and Guidelines for its
Implementation. Attached is a draft memo which
clarifies our objectives, spells out the parameters of
the policy, and addresses common questions concerning
its implementation. It should be distributed to all
coalition ministry personnel and local commanders, as
2

well as translated for broader dissemination. This
document will serve the dual purpose of providing
guidance to those implementing the policy and
squashing rumors that the coalition has reversed the
de-ba'athification policy or no longer requires its
full implementation.
2. Appoint a Person to Have Formal Responsibility for
Overseeing the Implementation of De-Ba'athification.
To date, I (and others no doubt) have sought to
explain the policy to ministry advisors and answer
their questions surrounding it on a fairly ad hoc
basis. Neither I nor anyone else at a working level
has had any formal responsibility for monitoring the
implementation of the policy, has had the ability to
hold people accountable for it, or has had any
visibility over the de-ba'athification processes
occurring in the governorates. Empowering a person to
serve these functions would centralize our de-
ba' athification efforts, facilitate the flow of
information in both directions, and diminish current
confusion. This person will play a key role in
ensuring that the transition of responsibility for de-
ba' athification from the coalition to Iraqis is a
smooth one.
3 . Create an Expedited Mechanism for th~ Consideration of
Exception Applications. It was important for you to
be directly involved in the first round of exceptions
in order to set the standard for approval. However,
it is now possible to delegate this responsibility to
someone else, preferably the de-ba'athification guru
described above. You may wish to make small changes
to the implementation guidance laid out below <*~and
# ~- in particular) in order to both simplify
exception procedures and ease some of the unintended
consequences of the policy.
4. Facilitate the Creation of Iraqi Institutions to Deal
with De-Ba'athification. While it is neither
desirable nor politically palpable for us to make
changes to the May 16th policy, Iraqis themselves are
in a position to do so. While cracking down harder on
criminal Ba'athists, Iraqis may wish to take steps to
soften the impact on those largely innocent people
caught in the net of de-ba'athification. They could,
for instance, decide to offer pensions to those
3

dismissed from their job on account of full party
membership. We should brief the Governing Council on
our de-ba'athification efforts thus far and facilitate
the establishment of the Iraqi De-Ba'thification
Council in any way possible.
Attachment: Clarifying De-Ba'athification Policy
4

The Dayton Accords Jeft Bosnia with two annies - a Bosnian Serb and Federation
(Muslim-Croat) force. 11'1 reality there were three rnilitaries, since the Croats had
independent formations within the Federation anny.
Dayton also provided for a state-level Standing Committee on Military Matters to
coordinate defense planning and work with international military presence (IFOR/SFOR).
It was a powerless institution. Dayton provided for no state-level Ministry of Defense or
General Staff; and the Serb and Federation entities (sub-national units in Bosnian
parlance) retained theirs.
Dayton was intentionally ambiguous on who had supreme military authority and
command and control. The Bosnian Serbs asserted Dayton gave their Serb Republic
President this authority. The High Representative (Amb. Bremer's equivalent) decreed
later that Dayton placed this authority in the state level Tri-Presidency. but this had little
impact on actual operations.
The SCMM has a Serb, Croat and Bosniak member, and the chairmanship rotates and
reports to the Tri-Presidency.
Initially, the U.S. provided military assistance only to the FC{)eration, in an effort to
redress the military balance. We more than did that to Serb distress. In the early years
we were also pre-occupied with bringing down troop numbers and weapons stockpiles.
Over the past two years we focused on building up a state dimension for defense. To
overcome Serb resistance we opened our military cooperation to both annies, but
channeled all programs through the SCMM. We have encouraged other NATO
countries to do the same. Similarly, Bosnian participation in NATO's PfP program has
been conditioned on a clear state-level command and control structure and these
discussions have been worked through the SCMM.
The Serbs recently accepted the principle of state-level C2. This will translate into a new
state-level general staff and the removal of all war planning/ making powers from the
entities. The Tri-presidency will have direct operational control over all military units
throughout Bosnia. The entities retain administration (staffing, supply, etc.) of these
units. The SCMM will function as an MOD for the state in all but name. Once Bosnia's
in PfP we hope to further integrate the militaries.
The Bosnian lesson: you can get where you want to go without imposing fonnal
structures, by offering the right incentives to the politicians and military professionals.

Page 1 of2
Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
From:
Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2003 11 :52 AM
To: Slocombe. Walt B. (SES)
Cc: -Col
Subject: "Growing" the MOD/Things to Consider
If you agree with these points, I'd like to disseminate them to the rest of the team to start generating more
specific ideas, ultimately to form an action plan. Also, if we are convinced this is the direction we want to take.
the CMA n planning team can begin to integrate some of these concepts into their deployment and
sustainment planning for the NIA.
vlr,
TillNKING ABOUT
MOD ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM AND MANAGEMENT' (MORM)
l. Our task is qualitatively different from the other ministry advisory teams. Iraq had no Ministry of
Defense, nor even a tradition of a Ministry of Defense, of the nature required to support a
representative, participatory government. Where the other ministries' advisory teams may think in
terms of "reconstruction" ond "reform" we need to think in terms of .. growth" and "development".
2. Traditional force development is an external top-down process. It requires a mature, disciplined
bureaucracy to conduct the required analysis and implement the outcomes. lbat is exactly what we
don't have. Our approach should be envisioned as working from the bottom-up and, in some
respects, inside--0ut.
a. As the New Iraqi Anny force is deployed. initial command and control and sustairunent
support will be provided through CJTF-7. Over time, we will transition these command and control
linkages to "Iraqi Owned and Operated". As we make these transitions, the Iraqi systems we put in
place will grow to become the infrastructure of the new MOD. We should start thinking about them
as the embryonic nerve-endings of a yet-to-be-born MOD as we develop them.
b. We can build infrastructure from the bottom-up but where will we get top-level
management? One approach may be to cultivated it from among the personal networks we are
developing among the various Iraqi stakeholders in national security. An approach we may consider
is to begin forming informal task/advisory groups among those we identify with common interests.
For example, we could probably use a "Manning" advisory group to help us with recruiting and
vetting and or a "Services" group to begin thinking through how we will support the NIA.
3. The Iraqi armed forces will not be expeditionary armed forces. Accordingly, there may be real
advantages, and real efficiencies, in designing the future Iraqi armed forces to draw much of its
logistical support from the other ministries. This would significantly change the nature of the
infrastructure we would normally associate with the Ministry of Defense. As an example, in the area
of health care, the new Iraqi defense force may develop an organic capability for emergency
battlefield medicine but rely on Ministry of Health facilities for its in-garrison, readiness and
treatment requirements (inoculations, physical exams, trelitment of disease and injury. We may need
to work out some sort of HMO or other reimbursement scheme to pay the Ministry of Health for
these services. Similarly, we should consider whether we are better served to obtain much of our
mobility capability from the Ministry of Transportation and our commwiications capability from the
6125/2003

Page 2 of2
Ministry of Communications, etc.
6/25/2003

AQL.COM I Message View Page I of3
Subj: From:
To:
Cc:
Fi1e:
What political scientists have learned about demobilizing armed groups after internal wars
Date: 7/7/2003 8:29:37 PM Eastern Standard Time
Dear Walt:
When I saw in the news that you were in charge of disarming groups in Iraq I took the initiative to ask my
colleague, Barbara Walter, who has done serious research based on a large number of the previous cases of
disarming groups after internal war, to summarize what she learned. I thought that her conclusions might be
useful to you as you figure out how best to achieve this difficult objective in Iraq. I hope you find it useful. Let us
know. Barbara's email address is above if you wish to communicate directly with her.
The document is attached but also is copied below.
Please· take good care of yourself.
Warm regards,
Susan
July 7, 2003
Dear Mr. Slocombe:
I am writing at Susan Shirk's suggestion. I am her faculty colleague at the UCSD Graduate School of
International Relations and Pacific Studies, and Susan thought the findings. of my research on
demobilizing armed. groups after inte.mal wars might be of some interest to you as you tackle this
challenge in post-war Iraq. I should admit that I'm not an expert on Iraq. What I do know, however, are
http://webmaiJ.aol.com/fmsgview.adp?folder=SU5CTlg=&uid=5711320 7110/2003

AOL.COM I Message View Page 2 of3
the problems that other countries have encountered demobilizing anned factions, and the policies that
have worked and not worked in inducing factions to disarm.
In a study of all demobilizations that occurred after civil wars oveT the last sixty years, this is what I
found:
• Across cases, ,enlisted soldiers and officers almost always refused to disann and demobilize unless a
third party agreed to enforce or verify demobilizati9n. This was not because the soldiers wished to ·
re-new The war, or had malignant intentions. Disarmament in the absence of third party enforcement
rarely occurred because soldiers had very real concerns about their own security and well-being once
they disarmed.
• Faction leaders almost always demanded some form of guaranteed representation in government in
exchange for disannament. Leaders-were extremely reluctant to hanaovel'lhmweapons nnt-e!S-tney·
knew that they would n..Qt be pennanently shut out of pnwer and possibly imprisoned as a result.
Disarmament was intricately tied to the issue of Power-sharing, both in government and in the new
national military.
• Finally, there was an interesting relationship ~etw~!!_power-sharing gu~antees and the size of the
intervening security force tnat was necessary to keep the peace. If you loOJC afilr c1vtl war seltleif2nts
th'af'Jiave attempted to demobilize forces and reintegrate them into a new (usually smaller) military, you
find an inverse relationship between how inclusivc;_~I)~ goy~ent_ ""..~and the number of
peacekeepers ffiat were _nee~ -foranewgovemment to succeed . .!'he lessl.nc1U.Slveago'vernment -
s0,-the Tewer power-sharing guarantees that were offered to key faction leaders - the more peacekeepers
were required to ensure peace while this goverrunent got off the ground. Narrower power-sharing
guarantees required larger peacekeeping forces.
So what lessons can we take for Iraq?
The first is that the decision to disarm and the degree to which factions will disann, will depend on how
much confidence the disarming group has regarding its own securitr.!!i_!h~~_!>rt-tef!D, and its own
political survival m the fong-term. For factions to willingly give up their arms, two conditiQllS...Dlust
hold. An outside p~~~r must be ~11i.!!.g_ t.Q...8!J~t~~JMir..~ as they demobilize and prepare for
peace.--aearfy;thls is wiiattlie U.S. has in mind with the 140,000 American and British troops that will
serve as security guarantors in the region. American and British soldiers must also stay as long as it
takes for the new government to grow strong enough to assert its own authonty and Wi.fiTrt can build '!.fld
tram an effective non-partisan national ann~. J_(!}ley leave too earjy, competing factions within !rag will
simply retrie~ea~ns or purchase new ones, and seek complete control over the country.
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AOL.COM I Message View Page 3of3
The .second lesson is that the disannament process will be made significantly more difficult if
disannament is not tied to specific guarantees of political and military representation for key leaders. If
the U.S. wants to exclude powerful E!_embers of the Baath e..m::tY as well as IDiltranking officers in the
former Iraqi mi I itary, then 1t must also to be willing to provide a stronger mili!_~ presence of its own.
Ifttie-U.'S. Isn't willing to mcorporate "bad-guys" into an interim and then a permanent government,
then it must be willing and capable of containing thctm. Ifit does not contain them, and does not include
them (which is exactly what has occurred in Afghanistan) renewed war between the competing factions
is likely as soon as the opportunity presents itself.
History teaches us one final lesson. Uncertainty is the enemy of disannament. Right now it is unclear
to all those involved what type ofpOTitical instttuttons will be established and what checks l!Ild balances
wilJ be in place to prevent backsliding into a one-party slate. What we do know is that whatever
government is established will almost certainly be h.iased against the Baath party_. a fact that hasn't peen
lost on mfluential and powerful members of that group. As long as the outlines of the new permanent
govenunent remain unclear, and.as long as one particular group is likely to be excluded, th9se
inQJ_viduals have strong incentives to refilse to disaan. Right now the U.S. has committed the soldiers
necessary to address short-term security concerns. What still needs to be done is for the U.S. to commit
to the more difficult and longer-term issues of political power-sharing.
Sincerely,
Professor Barbara F. Walter
http://webmai1.aol.com/fin sgview .adp?folder=SU5CT1g=&uid=57113 20 7/10/2003

r
kGBR CIV)
From:
Sent:
To:
.M::rut~mber 15, 2003 7:33 PM
._c_:_ __ ~ __ _.GBR CIV)
Subject: RE: Confernce on Iraq
Dea rr '----="-------'
We are working on the new project outline, and you will get it by the end of the week.
What we sho· uld know is h.ow many Iraqi and how many CPA re::esent.atives you would like to
attend the seminar (minimum, maxiroUJtl each). Best regards.C: J
-----Original Message-----
From: L l<GBR crv1 (mailto r ,_~-~~ ~~-~ = ~~-~~-__J
Sen -~ 6L 0 9:11 AM
To: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES )
Cc .
Sub _J_ e _ c ~ t ,...-~-:!R~ E ~ :---. C ~ o - n -f~e ~ r- n_c _ e _ o _ n _I ~r - a_ q ________ ___,
I have just received a message from Walt Slocombe regretting that he will not be
able to meet you Washington, since he has to be in Maine during the days you are there.
Kind regards,
Deputy
Director. Military Organisational
Reform and Management
Office
of Security Affairs
r J
---- - Original Messa:-----
From: r ~
Sent: Friday, Septe er 05, 2003 3:2S-PM
To: Slocombe, Walt 8 . (SES): Slocombe, Walt B. (SES ) i
Cc :r l<GBR CIV);
Subject: RE: Confernce on Iraq Importance: High
L--------'
Dear Wa.lt,
Thank you very much for your most valuable comments and suggestions re. conference
on Iraq to be held on 3-4 November 2003 in Geneva . We will immediately startw orking on
the issues you raised in your message. In this context. it would be most helpful if we
could briefly meet next week in Washington {in case you are available); Arriving from New
York, 'l'eddy and .r will be in town from • ruesday (9/9) evening thru Friday { 1 2) noon, and
then be attending the IISS GSR conference at Lansdowne Resort until Sunday (14).
In the meantime, please copy your reply message to
who is coordinating our programme in the US.
With best regards,
-·
Assistant Director I Head of Think Tank
Geneva Ce. ntre for the Democratic
Control o f Armed Forces lDCAF)
Tei. ~r = ·....-s-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~"-~~~~~~~~~
E-mai. l: Lt--------------~~~~~~~~~~~~~-------l
-----Original Message-----
From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) [mailto._l _______________ <ll_)(e_.)[

Sent : September 04,
To :111111111111
Cc:
........ (0-6 MoNSDJ
Policy; Slocombe, wa
Subject: Confernce on Iraq
Please see attached note.
2003 5:24 PM
2
CIV
any files transmitted with it are
the use of the individual
received this e
are
the
This ema use of the indivi email in error please noti any files transmitted with it are
entity to whom they are
stern manager.
This footnote also confirms
presence of compute~.-li..,.!""a:Se

Agenda
Over view
International order and concept of comprehensive security
Concept of security sector~ and various organs/institutions/for<:es,
including intcragency cooperation)
Security Sector Governance
Meaning of"civilian control" - law based/recognitjon of military
expertise not civilian ··commissars''
Constitutional/legal frameworks
Civilian governmental oversight (C'.l(ecutive branch institutions)
Parliamentary oversight
Judicial oversight
Popular oversight
Specific topics - options available within. democratic framework
National strategy - national interests, threats (external, external operating
intema1ly, internal, transnational)
National security/national defense policies - models for security ("nation
in arms," "regional security," "alliance with great power."), role of
anns control and other agreernents
Organs, processes, and legal/institutional frameworks for national security
decision-making and leadership, to include resource allocation
Defense strategy options
Missions/doctrine for armed forces
Shape, size, components, structure, organization of armed forces, to
include senior (general) staff
Ministry of Defense organization issues
Resource allocation/management issues
I am very grateful that DCAF is willlng to contribute so generously to the Iraqi
reconstruction effort. , and I look forward to working with you on the project.
Walt Slocombe
cc.),__ __ :___.j

Message
Page 1 of2
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject: I rtance: High
CIV
Friday, October 10, 2003 4:23 PM
Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
(0-6 MoNSD);
_ fW: Conference on Iraq
(GBR CIV)
Do you have particular comments you want to insert in reply?
I have annotated my reactions. Pis just annotate whether you agree/disagree or want to amplify and I esponse and send it.
I draft up
ober 02, 2003 5:58 PM
To: GBR CIV)
Cc: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); SUbject: RE: Conference on Iraq
Importance: High
CV
Dea-
Many thanks for your reply. In the meantime, I have incorporated your suggestions/reactions into the project
outline (see attachment). Before we finalize it and embark on the tasking of speakers and inviting the other
participants, we would appreciate your comments on the following points in particular:
• Do you agree with adding two more topics/papers: (1) "internal control" of armed forces (such as the German
"lnnere FOhrung" model) and (2) defense planning (being a intermediary step between defense strategy and
mission/doctrine of armed forces)? Do you want us to include an additional paper - on 'all volunteer vs. conscript
force'? I think (1) sounds useful - we need these guys to think hard about "the role of the military in a
democratic society" (they'll get another dose in the DllLS program). However, (2) sounds redundant, and
too theoretical -we need as much "reality" In this agenda as possible.
• Inviting is a good Idea - but what is he supposed to talk about: defense strategy (as
suggested in th outline)? What about Inviting Academic Chair of the Near East-South Asia
Center for Strategic Studies at NDU; he recently wrote an interestinQ.e2!jcy brief on "Building an Iraqi Defense
Force"? Either of these would be excellent - personally, I prate~- ha has more '"vision" of the
Implications of what has happened for the future of Iraq security strategy - we could give either of them
more direct Insight Into what we've been doing, why, what we think we've accomplished and where we
think this Is leading.
• Do you agree that we should invite the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Iraq, Ramiro Lopes
da Silva? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or DCAF? This is your call, Walt - personally, I think we should do
It In the interest of transparency but I frankly don't expect much from this guy In terms of substance.
• Do you agree that we should invite the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States in Geneva,
Ambassador Saad Al-Faragi? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or DCAF? Same as for the SecGen Special Rep
10/1112003

Message Page 2 of2
_:I am inclined to say yes, for sake of transparency plus, in the case of the Arab League, It contributes to
the legitimacy of the GC and the NSAC to have this gentleman attend - however, the substantive
contribution wlll be marginal.
• Should we invite representatives from the capitals of selected Coalition member states, namely Poland? I
think this rapidly becomes unbounded and we should not go there. We should include coalition reps
among the CPA reps but not go outside - the theme should be "NSAC Offsite" and, as much as possible,
all the people there should be present to act as resources and 'thought-provokers' for the NSAC - not as
'national reps' - and, this Is not a 'donors conference' •
I look forward to hearing from you.
All the best,
Assistant Director I Head of Think Tank
Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Con
• I !. ..
6
• I ~ I .!.
Tel.
E-m
10/1112003

--- - -------
Message Page J of 1
•
Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
From:
Sent:
Thursday, October 02 .. 2003 5:58 PM
To:
r J(GBR CIV)
Cc: Slocombe, Walt a. (SES);-r~-----~ J c1v
Subject: RE: Conference on Iraq
Importance: High
Dear
Many thanks for your reply. In the meantime. I have incorporated your suggestions/reactions into the project
outline (see attachment). Before we finalize it and embark on the tasking of speakers and inviting the other
participants, we would appreciate your comments on the following points in particular:
• Do you agree with adding two more topics/papers: (1) "internal control" of armed forces (such as the German
"lnnere Fuhrung" model) and (2) defense planning (being a intermediary step between defense strategy and
mission/doctrine of armed forces)? Do you want us to include an additional paper - on 'all volunteer vs. conscript
force'? ( u...c..A ") ~ oltC • ( t:.\ ~~ ~ ~ ~J
t 1..~ ,~-
• Inviting f* lis a good idea - but what is he supposed to talk about: ~se strategy~s
suggested in th outline)? What about inviting ~ : J kademic Chair of the1 East-~out Asia
Center for Strategic Studies at NDU; he receny wrote an Interesting policy brief on "Building an Iraqi Defense
Force"? o IC ......., ~
-
• '?o you agree that':"'~ s~oul~ invite the ~tary-General's Special Representative in Iraq, Ramiro Lopes
da Silva? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or~
• Do you agree that we should invjte the Permanent Observer ~eague of Arab States in Geneva,
Ambassador Saad AJ-Faragi? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or~
• Should we invite representatives from the capitals of selected Coalllion member states, namer~
" ~· ~·
I look forward to hearing from you. C-u..... .............. ~ <J\-.f ~
..P~ cu1 !
All the best. tJ'
Assistant Director I Head of Think Tank
Geneva Centre for th.e Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Tel. -~----------------1
E-mail:.__ __ ..._.....,=-.......... ----------1
10/2/2003

[
IRAQ CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE (ICDC) FUTURE
OPTIONS
The current IC.DC charter (CPA Order 28) expires io September 2004. A decision has
been made to renew the current ICDC charter for an additional l2 months. There are also
plans for the ICDC to be increased from 20k-40k includiDg-e:guipment up to heavy machine gun, and to include battalion and/or brigade leadership. The objective of this
·expansion iS to engage more Iraqi security forces rapidly- the same objective which led
to the accelerated force development concept fur the NJA.
V""
For this extension and expansion of the ICDC to be successful issues of integrated
command and control of I.raqi forces and the impact on the concept for developing the
NIA - will need to be assessed.
However looming over the horizon is the future withdrawal of the MSC's, the TCDC is
tied. and intimately connected to the MSC' s and CJTF-7 - it cannot sustain itself therefore
a decision has to be made on tb.e future force structure-and o:rganizati. on of the JCOC
sooner rather than later to allow the necessary planning to take place to ensure viable
force stmcture. organization and accountability whe:n · transition to a new sovereign Iraqi
government takes place . _ .Y-~ c-t IV1'I. ~ c.:J ...
M, . ~
- dul •~;t ~1A,~~ ............
- Mlv'•4•J
, < We know that the MSC' s will leave the countrV'fbe transitionofi~ CDC units under s,c •. ..,.__
' ~ \V \'-~ J lhe command of the 101 51
w . hich.is due to leave fi .· f'St wiH more than Hkely act as a model •
\'"''<,.., 'l..,/ for the Transfer of Authority (TOA) of other MSC's around the country. To have an I "'..,.""_. ..
,o.., ~ .. ~ agreed upon plan will greatly aid the transitional points across the country .
. -..' . .J
..,,.,. ..?/. Severa~ options for the future_ of the IC~C ~xist ~hich ~e not all. necessarily mutually
~ v exclusJVe. lnde
_
ed there may be a combmatlon of the opt1ons suggested. Ambassador
~~'-, Bremer.will need to ~v~ a vision of wlra! is possible and favorable toCP A ~ates.
~'<. \(" ,.J- Underpmrung alJ oftb1s is the need for a legal framework (A Defence Force Ald to the
Ciivil Authority legislation) in the form of a CPA order in the transitional period -whic~
delineates when/how/what the New lraqi Army (NIA) can be · called and used for by the
dviJ authority in internal security and intemaJ defence roles and leg, al guidance for irs
relationship with other security services.
Most anned forces around the world are used by their governments for some internal
security roles (e.g Atlanta/Sydney Olympics. some counter terrorism, humanitarian
emergency assistance etc) but democracies usually have a solid legislative underpinning
regulating these roles and ensuring accountability to the parliament and the people. There
will be s.om.e ne.ed in the future fi r · · al fr ks for all the security forces~
but a er event farmfo th. e basis of future Ir i legislation) e eatmg
NIA ai · to e civil authority is a priority. -

- - ·
~----
ICDC FUTURE OPTIONS
1. FEDERAL POLICE FORCE/GENDARMERIE.
Duties . and functions
A separate Gendarmerie/Federal Police type force established and trained for
operations to fulfill the-specific internal security needs of [raq: coWlter terrorism,
transnational crime, major narcotics/trafficking, interdiction of smuggling (oil and natural
resources), interdiction of illegal aliens (i.e foreign fighters), riot control, and an
emergency response capability. They will effectively be the first responders in internal
security sjtuations. Tuey will necessarily be trained to operate effectively and
accountably in urban areas and will mitigate the proposed use of the NlA in such areas.
Orga11izational structure
An important principle of its organiz.ation is that it be structured on a functional basis.
that is. national divisional commands based on the above functions with regional
commands at a level below and answerable to the national divisional commands. This
will allay the force developing along geographic/religious/ethnic or political party lines.
This essentially follows the sound principles behind the NlA - that is a professional
volunteer force representative of all sectors of Iraqi. society operating with
religiously/ethnically mixed units that are not tied to any political part y or regional
alliance and are answerable to divisional/regjonal comm. anders. Their mandate is to
protect the people and the nascent democratically elected government. There is an option
of whether they are ultimately under the portfolio of MOD or MOI and this will be
contingent upon the shape of command and conl(rol of the ICDC in its proposed
expansion. This model has the advantage of aJJowing the CPA to be. proactive in
planning viable security organizations to fill internal security needs and p. rovide a
politicalJy sustainable security servic~ in the face of proposals such as the ''political party
force" put forward by interim MOl Nouri Badran.
Capability, recruitment, training and size
Capability should be decided once again upon functionality - dependjng upon the
division - but as a baseline light arms . soft skin vehicles and a basic light infantry
capability (in times of emergency) will be necessary.
Recruitment should include a mix of the best of the ICDC units, possible political party
and tribal participation with the caveat that those militias wilJ be spread across the force,
and general recruitment. Once again the NlA recruitment is an exceUent model.

Training: There will be a need to begin specialized training courses to augment the !CDC
training and field experience already achieved. Specialized training may be sought from
coalition countries national police services - possibly FBI/Australian Federal Police.
Training can be integrated into CPA MOI planning for these national type internal
security functions
The Size of the force will depend upon recruitment and training cycles however 40- 50k
with the bulk flowing from ICDC units is a realistic estimate.
Relationship with other security stl"Qctures
There needs to be delineation of internal security operations between the NIA and such a
f ederaJ type force. The proposed DF ACA CPA Order/ legislation will go some way to
clearing this process.
Govemance
A policy detennining the relationship between regional command and the governors will
need to be integrated into Governance's proposed interim politic.al chatter to go to
Ambassador Bremer. For example, the determinations on the procedures allowing
governors to call on both the national divisional command and the regional commanders
to request assistance in times of national emergency, disaster relief or humanitarian
assistance. needs to be robust enough so as also not to permit the national command to
withhold assistance/forces when they are reasonably required by the governors.
2. NATIONAL GUARD
Duties and Function
Operating under the control of the governors they would provide a backup or "ORF''
capability to support local police and a capability to reinforce local emergency services
when reguired. To the extent that the future Iraqi government may retain an authoritv to
mobilize them for national-level missions. they could provide a light force to augment the
national defense forces.
Given the regional conunand and control, the role of the National Guard (NG) may be
similar to cwrent ICDC operations- performance of duties as a constabulary, patrol in
urban are.as, conducting search and seizure for illegal weapons, fixed point security/route
convoy security, disaster relief. search and rescue and hwnanitarian assistance and
disaster recovery. A NG capacity to fulfill counter terrorism, (counter-insurgencies),
transnational crime, counter intelligence, narcotics trafficking/counter smuggling (oil and
national resources), emergency response, intelligence gathering is limited by the
structural organization i.e no national command. This will Jessen NG capability in
effectively combating transnational crime or larger organized national crime.

Organ il'..ational Structure:
Under this model the MSC's would hand over command of the (expanded) ICDC units
to the Govemates with some administrative oversight from MOD and with the requisite
call up powers in times of emergency by the Commander in Chief. There will necessarily
need to be some central command in place for the NG. At the ,1wvernorate level. wider
this concept. they would be provided facilities and sustained by funds allocated from the
centraJ government in tl1e govemorate,s operating budget. The NG will he paid by the:
National govememnl and regional Governors will only be able to mobilize the NO with
the approval of the National government.
Capability, recruitment, training and size
Drawn from current ICDC - the units will be more homogenous - there is a. real risk of
reconstituting local militias if couimand and oontrol at the govemate level is ineffective.
Further training to supplement the initial 2 weeks completed by ICDC recruits will be
needed. The size of the. forc. e will equate with the current expansion plans for the ICDC.
Relationship with other security stnictures
LegisJatiou/CP A ord. ers will need to be drafted to determine the NG relationship with the
national government, the NIA and the local police forces and the requisite call up powers
of the Commander in chief.
Governorates
Several issues with gov.emates may iropede tbe band over ofICDC to them when lhc
MSC's withdraw. Lack of quality and vetting of appointed g~veroors, imprecise
relationships between these regional political structures, the central ministries and the
OC. a lack of participatory democracy and the subsequent illegitimacy of 'appointed
officials and the as yet undetermined funding distribution decis. ions based on a
Centtal/Govemate forlhula all point to the conclusion that the Governates will not be
capable to take on responsibility of ICDC. /NG units. If the ICDC were to become a NG
force handed over to the Govemates to continue the operations TCDC have been used for
in the regions, it would necessitate at the minimum the Govemates be legitimately
established and durable enough to take on this civilian administrative control.
There is a question mark from Governance as to whether the govemates will have the
required capacity and legitimacy to allow a seamless transition. Governance is preparing
for Ambassador Bremer a legal charter consolidating the interim (until a constitution

makes a final determination on political structures) political structure of the Governors
and Provisional councils (PC's)
The success of the NG mod.el is dependent upon the relative success of Governance's
proposed provisional politkal structure consistent across all Gover:nates pending
constitutional decisions on Federation.
Several interconnected issues indude the fact different ICDC units are used , differently by
different MSC's and whether this practice would continue after handover. An example of
the problems that such a transition ma~ face is the lack of consistency in lPS connection
and reporting to these regional administrations. Thei.r current lack oflegitimacy means
that CJTF-7 is effectively the authority local police report to. This raises real questions
on whether Governates will be rea4y to take this on with ICDC when MSC' s withdraw.
An analysis of the timelines for transition points suggests that the governates will not be
sufficiently ready to accept this responsibilitY. As a result there exists a high risk of the
lCDC units beQoming ethnic/political or religious militias.
This NG option would be integrated. with the overall TOA as coalition units draw down
their presence in Iraq,_ This will require the govemorates provide facilities, command and
control and sustainment services. which are currently being provide bv the coalition units.
It mav wel I . be true tbar tfil:re are no addili!>nal costs in transferrin2 the lCDC to the
governorates, as long as the central government continues to allocate funds for their
support as the CPA has. through CJTF. White this may be a viable option for future
employment ofICDC. in the present securitv environment. s u. cb a TOA to the
governora.tes is not feasible because, even if thev were given access to the funds, the
governorates are completely unable to provide the sort of leadership and supervision the
ICDC requires and recieves from the CJTF.
3. POLICE RESERVES
'·Police Reserves~· are generally · equipped and. trained ideutieaJ to regular local pollo.e.
They usually a.re iss11ed or reimbursed for the cost of purchasing their own individual
weapons. When called into service. they use regular police vehicles and weapons and the.
facilities and logistical. assets of the regular pobce, In most cases, the additional as~ets
(vehicles, weapons, commurrications) are held as the moperty oftbe regular police, for
use by ; the auxiliary when thev are called to service. Their operational use of supplies
and consumables all has t() be paid for.
Thus tbc "cost"' of '·police reserves''. roan-for-man is almost exactly the same as regular
police whenever they are caJled to dutv. When thev are in an inactive .status. they are not
drawing their wages. so this can be seen as a cost savings in that cootext {U.S.A.). We
would. not , intend police auxiliaries to be inactive in our current contex· r (Iraq). There(Q!·~
as "Iraqi po.lice reserves", we must expect their cost to be very nearlv the same as regular
police.

Savings that we may achieve bv limiting their training or by reducing t11e distribution of
tJ)<l'ir equipment must be seen as a proportiooal reduction in capabilhv. TI1e farther we
go in limiting training and in reducing equipment distribution. the more this tvpe of
ooLicc auxiliarv becomes indjstinguishable from FPS.
INTEGRATION OF ICDC INTO "4c'IA
The ICDC units would eventually be indistinguishabl~ from the NIA.
Prior to the TOA points their wilt be a need to run ICDC personnel through a
combination of training and cenification that would raise up ICDC to NIA standards
which would then aHow their integration into NIA.
DISBANDING ROLLOVER. OF ICDC INTO OTHER SECURITY SERVICES
This will essentially ensure that ICDC personnel have employment after their enlistments
ex:pire. Rollover into other security services may include the FPS e.g lCDC already
doing FPS roles he~"Use there are not enough FPS and/or lhe fPSIBorder/customs Quards.
• IGDC personnel with training and experience they have gained working with coalition
forces and performing security missions woul.d provide a much needed personnel
capability addition to the [PS /Border customs Guards.
CONCl .. VSION
The future options outlined above are not all mutually exclusive and an admixture of the
proposed force structures and organizationaJ frameworks can be combined to suit the
circumstances. However an option needs to be chosen so that the planning cycle begins
well before the withdrawal of the MSC's.

Roles of Iraqi Security forces [
I
ISecur:fty Endstate
There is a secure environment for people and property that enables citi~ns to participate fully in political
and economic life. The Iraqi government has the means, includi.n. g its own defense and police forces, to
assume it's responsibility for external and intern.al security, includjng policing of its borders. Relationships
with regional stales and. with the international oommunity have been establisbed. The roles and
acc-0untabilities of otganization.s p. rovid.ing security are clearly defined within a legal framework. The legal
ITamcwork also regulates the private possession alld use of weapons.
Coalition forces will belp Iraqis to eliminate the threats 10 their security and wi U remain in country for as
Jong as they are needed. Over time the tra.rr.s{er of s.ecu.rity respoosi. bilities to local military and police
forces will determine the speed with which we can adnnce reconstruction and build up institutions
of good gqvernance.
The Iraqi people are already contributing to that effort but must acquire the al:Jifity to assume full
responsibility for meeting the country's security needs as soon as practicable - thus enabling the draw-
down of coalition forces. Our priorities cherefore include:
• Development and training of Iraqi security forces, including a new fraqi army, new civil defense
corps and an effective police force
• Development of civilian national security oversight mechanisms
• Measures to ensure border s~uriry
• Measures to build the justice system and improve che penal system
• Ensuring that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction.)
Role of Security Forces.
An important element in the planning for seeu. rUy forc;es is achieving the . rig. ht. balance between the
local, regional and nstional security forces and instituffons to ensure dear lines of authority, a
delineation or duties and functions and planning for a legal kamework. tbat underpins security
sery. i£eS around the country ensuring they ultimately . function account.abty and imp,art . ia.IJy in a
ruture democratic !lta'te.
Understanding and shaprnc the relationshi'ps between tbe security services and the link~ges with
the$esecurity s~rvi£es and tbe.curre:n.t and provisional oolltical structures i s a kev ingr.edie.nt in
successfoltv fulfillihg the §ecurUy endstate. 'Beyond the rapid o~rational Cemoo of nisiog and
tndnh>g .security sen'lces, is the imeortaot task. of demarcating, their relatioosbios and linkages
consistently and applying a workable and effectin security sector strudure duri .. ng the transitional
phase. bot which at the same time does not impinge u,oon the pr. erogatives of a .fu. ture Iraqi
2-0vernme.nt to ddnmine the final compositions. functions and organizational. stroc• u ~ or. secllriry
s.ervic . e.s ..
The . following numbers are planned1 for:
Pre•Supplemental Post SupplemeniaJ
1 Check for outcome of Supplemental Appropriation:

Iraqi -Police Servic~:
Facilities Protection Service;
Burdcr Protcctioo Se · rvfce:
(conslsti.ng of20,000 Border Guards
and I 0,000 Customs Officers)
Iraqi Correctional Service
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps:
New lt!lq Army
75,000
31,000
11,500
1S,OOO by January 2005
.50,000
30,000
10.000
22,000
40.000
10.000
40,000
~(?·)
Total
189,500
245,000
Jragi Police Service
Under the ministry of· the interior, the Iraqi Police Ser.tice is responsible for law enforcement. Lightly
armed (pisto'ls, shotguns, AK 47), the intention is to increase JPS !Tom a planned strength of 58;800 in
early December to a full strength of some 75,000 by January 05, through a (Tc)training program beginning
in November 03 that should progressively increase the quality of dt e police force over the I . 5 mont.h period.
No decisions have bee .a taken about the final command structure of the Iraqi Po lie~ Serv. ice - at whai level
control of J:PS forces w.ouJd be exercised - partly because de~isions on the powers of the Goveroates bave
ytt 10 be t'aken.
facilities Protection Service
£st,abJisb . ed u. nder Ord.et no 37 as an organization of anned, unifomre.d ·l'ntiti~ : to provide security for
ministry and govemale offices, gove .mment infrastnlcture, and fixed sires under I.he direction and coottol of
governmental ministries · and govemate administrations. Untii now, planned to be ca 24000 strong.
lncludes Oil. electricity police and port security. Anned with AK47. Vehicles as supplied by Ministries.
Initially. the majority off PS guards -were employed and pajd by the various mnitary commands.
Ministries are progressing with taking over responsibility f<>r employing and paying FPS guards on their
respective sites. Final TOA is planned for mid.·lanuary 2004. Ministries are free . to c-0ntmct the provision
of FPS guurd$ to priVare firms. lndividoal Ministries arc responsible for arranging training of their FPS.
This can be condocted by the Ministry of Interior inStrUctors, lhtough coordination with Coalition units for
'rr.1in-the~traioer' programs. by the Ministries themselves, or cont:tacteli out fQ private finns. 1fl all cases
the standard oftraU:iing is regulated and monitored by the Ministry of Interior (M<.>l).
The current proposal is for FPS funding in 2004 · to~ ~nO"a llzc<I and included in Ministry of Interior's
b'Qdget. . This provides for salaries, Mo! approved training, administration~ uniforms, equipment, vehicles,
oonrmunlcations 1111d badging as weU as the establishment of Regional Opcrati'ons Centers in each
Govemate. This 'figure also ac.0011nts for payments to tribes along the oil pipelines and electricicy lines.
Bonier Proteet: ion Service
Under the DepanrneJ:it of Border Enforcement, enfot.ces cu.st0ms and immigration laws.
Lightly anncd, Extra Rorder Police trainfo ,g starts in December, with the a. im of progressively transf erring
MSCs r~spo nsib ilities for border po~ of entry to tht B'P'S in February ( 101 '· ' A BN). March (MND SE),
.1tnd April (MND SC)) concluding finally in May when the BPS should have rea .cbed its planned strength of
some· 10,500.
Iraqi Corrc-01jonal Service
Under the Ministry of Justice, responsible for prison .security. welfare and security of prisoners and
detainees.

Conceived as a constabulary force, lCDC i.s authorized under the terms of Coalition Provi_sional AuihOrity
(CPA) Order 28 lo carry out constabulary duties including patrolling urban and rural areas; conductrng
operations 10 search for and seize illegal weapons and other contraband; providing fixed site, check point,
area, route and convoy security; prov.iding crowd and riot contr-ol; disaster response services; search and
rescue serv · ices; prioviding support to humanitarian missions and disaster recove. ry operations including
tl:ansportation services: conducting joint patrols with Coalition forces; and panfoipating in other actMtle.s
designed to build posit. Ive relationships between the Iraqi people and coaUtion authorities including
community liaison. Jn practice, ICDC are deploying at individual, team, squad level, and tasks includ. e
· fixed site security, convoy/ route protection, crowd and riot conr:rol, HUMlNT and linguistic support as
well as humanitarian assistanee and disaster relief
lnitial planned strength is 8 battalions of 846 personn. el eac:b, increastng to 18 battalions ( 15,000) by Jan 04.
The current plan envisions each Govemate being allocated one !CDC battalion. Training is conducted by
coalition units witbin their respective regions. The content of the training is determined by the unit's
requirements; but certain mi. nimum training objectives have 'been laid down by CJTF-7. These minimum
training requirements cover we11pon b.andljng, first aid, the, law of land warfare and rules on the use of
foree. lCDC personnel ate armed. with KaJas'hnikovs, provided with body armor (jke the soldiers they
inte. rpret for and serve, as well as some additional support., such as trucks for ope.rational mobility and to
pick them up and return them to their l(>Cal homes each ev~ning.
The main distinctions from other security forces are that ICDC:
• Are intended. dir~tly to supj:>Qrt Coalition forces' operations. They are currently dependent ofi
Coalition forces for training, openitional planning, command and conlToJ, mentoring, facilities.
and operational support. They are very helpful in te.nns of"placing an lr.tqi face" on coatition
forces' operations 'bul are· incapable as currently «~onsl i tuted of assuming coalition forces'
missions.
• Ace local and, 8l 18 battalions, originally siz.ed tp provide a battalion-sized force for each of the
18 provinces, conb'olled in detail at the company/squadron level or lower.
• Have minimal training
End-state: the cllJl'eot intention is to effect a rapid expansion of the !CDC so that, under the executive
authority ofCJTF7, ICDC uoits fulfill the following requirements:
• To provide a lrmited.number of provinces with a brigade-sized force each ofberweeo 4 and 6
battalioos, totaling 6 brigades with 36 battal. ions by March 2004
• To accefenite ICDC recruiunent artd training accordingly from the 12 battalions currently in
service to 26 by January/February , and tl'lcm J6 by March
• To provide a command structure of Iraqi officers t(l command battalions and brigades so that, in.
doe course. ICOC units are capable of being self -:supporting, assuming the missions of Coalition
forces In selected areas
• And being equipped with heavier weapons (eg heavy m!!chine-gun)
In other words, instead of being a force protection service for coalition units, they would become a series of
local militia forces ha'lling some - depending on the degree of investment in training, equipment and
infrastructure - of the characteristics of the NlA.
Order No 22 sets out the NlA's purpose os providing the first step towards the creation of the national
defense force of the fl'ew Iraq. Operating to a code of military discipline set oot in Order No 23, its mission
is th.e m.ilitary defense of dle naiion, including defense Qfthe national territory and the milit<UY protection
of the security of critical insta!Iations, facilities, infrastructure, tines of com
_
municafioo and supply, and
population. Jn an effort to distinguish it from Saddam's military apparatus (and the coup-'prone army of the
monarch before him), the Order specifies that the NIA may not have, or, exercise. domesric law

enforcement functions, nor intervene in the domestic political affairs of lhe country. lts tasks will also
include par1icipation in domcsaic relief operarions associated with nalunLI or man-made disasters and
humanitarian relief missions.
The 40,000 New Iraqi army soldiers is planned lo be deployed in 27 battalions, orpniz.ed inro l divisions
with a command and conttol structure, mobility, and minimal light armor and airlift capability to enable
them to assume missions currently home by coalition forces. As the battalions complete training. they are
being deployed as an Iraqi coalition component under the operational conttol of one of the major
subordinate commands of the CJTF. When large enough, the NIA will be deployed as a coalition force
component reponing directly lo CJTF HQs. As a coalition component, the NIA would be available, subject
lo bitining and within their operational capabilities, to IWWne any mission c\lmlndy assigned to other
coalition forces, which includes a wide 1'81\ge ofwks relating ro internal security.

.----. -
November 1, 2003
Calls to Jihad . Are Said to Lure Hundreds of
· Militants Into Iraq
: By DON VAN NA TTA Jr. and DESMOND BUTLER
ONDON, Oct. 31 -Across Europe and the Middle East, young militant Muslim
men are answering a call issued by Osama bin Laden and other extremists, and
leaving home to join the fight against the American-led occupation in Iraq,
according to senior counterterrorism officiaJ s based in six countries.
The intelligence officiats say· that since late summer they have detected a
growing stream of itinerant Muslim militants headed for Iraq. They estimate that
hundreds of young men from an array of countries have now arrived in . Iraq by
crossing the Syrian or Iranian borders.
But the officials say this influx is not necessarily evidence of coordination by Al
Qaeda or other terrori.st groups, since it remains unclear if the· men are under the
control of any one leader or what1 if any, role they have had in the kind of deadly
attacks that shook Baghdad on Monday. A European intelligence official called
the foreign recruits ''foot soldiers with limited or no training."
A senior British official, who was in Iraq in September, said most of the foreign
men captured there were from the Middle East - Syria, Lebanon and Yemen -
or North Africa. He. described them as "young, angry men" motivated by the ''anti-
British, anti-American rhetoric that fills their ears every day.11
Signs of a movement to lraq have also been detected in Europe. Jean-Louis
Bruguiere, France's top investigaUve judge on terrorism, said dozens of poor and
middle-class Muslim men had left France for Iraq since the summer. He said
some of them appeared to have been inspired by exhortations of Qaeda leaders,
even if they were not trained by Al Qaeda.
Mr. Bruguiere. who earlier this year opened. an investigation of young men
leaving France to fight on the side of Muslims in Chechnya, said the traffic to Iraq
was now a similar problem. He called the changing pattern "a new threat."
The rising agitation in parts of the Muslim world over the American-led
occupation in Iraq was· clear at Friday Prayers at Al Nur Mosque in a working-
class . section of Berlin. Or. lzzeldin Hamad, the director of the Saudi-financed
mosque, said political discussion was. banned there.
But outside, a 21-year-old man who . identified himself as Akmed said that while
Saddam Hussein was unpopular, now ''there are peopl' e who are angry about the
American occupation." He and others said that inside the mosque, co!Jections
usuaUy requested for Muslims in Palestine and Chechnya were now being
offered for Iraq as well.
An initial hint that Iraq would become a magnet for foreign recruits came just
before the war began in March, with the ar:rest in Syria of four Algerian men, who
had been living in Hamburg and attending a mosque frequented by three of the
Sept. 11 hijackers. The authorities believed that the men jntended to fight in Iraq.

--
-- ---· - -------------
One of them. Abderazak Mahdjoub, whom German investigators have linked to a
Spanish-based terror network, is under investigation for alleged involvement in a
planned terror strike on a tourist location on the Costa del Bravo in Spain. Syria
deported the men to Germany, but none of the four men is in custody, since
there is no German law against going to Iraq.
A senior German intelligence . official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said
the authorities had detected other cases of immigrants in Germany trying to go to
Iraq. 'We know that in Germany there are people in the militant Muslim scene
who are willing to go other places to participate in jihad, including fraq," the
official said.
There are scattered reports from other places, including Saudi Arabia, where a
senior Saudi · official said two Saudi militants, be1ieved ta have ties to Al Qaeda,
were missing from the kingdom and believed by the authorities to have gone to
Iraq.
lntefltg. ence officials, who base their assessment of the traffic into Iraq on
surveillance of mosques and Islamic centers and on interrogations of terrorist
suspects captured inside Iraq, say they have found no connect1ons between the
recruits. "Nobody is organizing this move fwm Europe to Iraq," a senior
European counterterrorism official said. "At least it is difficult to analyze and know
who is organizing this. lihis may be just the beginning of a new phenomenon."
United states troops patrolling the long Iraq-Syria border have said they have not
detained any foreign recruits entering Iraq, but officials investigating attacks on
allied targets say they have little question that militant Muslims are being drawn
to the country. "It's pretty clear their number is increasing," a senior American
offidal said.
The number of attacks is also increasing. In the last wee. k, the average number
of attacks against a flied or international relief targets exceeded two dozen a day.
from 12 attacks daily in July.
This week's attacks produced some evidence of the role of foreigners in Jraq.
One would-be suicide bomber who was shot and wounded by Iraqi policemen
was later identified as a man of Yemeni descent who was holding a Syrian
passport.
In addition, Monday's multipfe, coordinated suicide bombings were a s· ign to
some investigators that foreign terrorists may have added a level of
sophistication to the attacks.
Military officials say they suspect that a senior official in Mr. Hussein's
government is recruiting foreign fighters to Iraq. They said lzzat Ibrahim, the "kjng
of clubs" in the deck of cards of · the most-wanted members of the deposed
government, was believed to be .a leading organizer and financier of recent
attacks.
But allied forces are still struggling to figure out the dimensions and composition
of the opponent they now face in Iraq.
1 We are quite blind there," said the head
of an intelligence agency in Europe. He added: "The Americans and Brtts know
very little about this enemy. They are trying to fight an enemy they cannot see."

As a result. alUed forces assume that the, y are fighting a loose conglomerate of
like-minded opponents. Counterterrorism officials estimated that as many as 15
militant groups. , some with · 1oose ties to AJ Qaeda, might now be operating . in Iraq.
"Al Qaeda, Ansar at-Islam. loyalists, disgruntled former army personnel-they
are alf suspects, but there is no focus on a specific . group," said a senior
American . counterterrorism official; Ansar is a terror g. ml:lp that had been
operating in northern Iraq and is suspected to have had a ro· te in the attacks in
recent months.
Mr. Bruguiere, the French investigative judg. e, said there we.re signs of Al
Qaeda's influence in Iraq. "Since we had no evidence of an Al Qaeda connection
in Iraq before the war, this is worrying,'' he said.
American officials closest ta the intelligence from Iraq say the definition of the
enemy is blurry. "Iraq is a magnet for jihadists just as Afghanistan was/ ' a senior
official said. "But the bigger question is whether leadership is evolving or
coordination. So far we haven't seen it."
For months, the role in Iraq of "foreign fighters" - particutarfy those of Al Qaeda
- has been a matter of sharp debate among American officials and intelligence
officials in Europe and the Middle· East.
Before the American~ led invasion .in March, counterterrorism officials and
terrorism experts warned that the military '. action would be used by militant
Muslims to recruit a new gener~tion of terrorists, and that Iraq would draw them
into the fray.
Al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly invoked the struggle in Iraq. In an audiotape
broadcast by AJ Jazeera satellite. network earlier this month, Mr. bin Laden cited
Iraq as the newest'front in the ten:or networi<'s internaUonal jihad.
~·1 say to our brothers. the mujahedeen in Iraq, I share your concerns and feel
your pain," Mr. bin Laden said in the 31-minute audiotape. He called on young
Muslims to 90 to Iraq to fight, saying, "You have to go wage jihad and show your
muscles."
A day later, President Bush sought to draw a parallel between Mr. bin Laden's
call to arms and the effort against terrorism. "The bin Laden tape should say to
everybody the war on terror goes on, that there's still a danger to free nations.''
he said.
But a senior European intelligence official said he doubted that Al Qaeda had
established a strong enough organizatlon in Baghdad to pull off attacks, given
how fractured Mr. bin Laden's network appears to be.
"AJ · Qaeda would need a level of organization and sophistication that I don't think
it currently has," he said. But he said he dki believe that some Qaeda members
were now in Iraq ''trying to stir up trouble.''
There rs little debate that more and more people are stirring trouble in , Baghdad.
Just who they are and where · they are from remains a matter of speculation. In
September, the authorities in Iraq arrested nine men they suspected of having
ties to Al Qaeda. But officials have teamed' little about them or their connectiOns
through interrogations.
'They are not saying much," said one official knowledgeable about the arrests.
"But they may just be foot sok:iiers who don't know that much.
"'

Don Van Natta Jr. reported for this article from London and Desmond Butler from
Berlin. AddiUonal reporting was provided by Lowell Bergman and David Johnston
in Washington.

-----------
-- -- -- -- -
Page l of 2
ES
From: .... C _____ _.] (0-6 MoNSD)
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2003 12:02 AM
To: r I Es
Subject: BookFW: !CDC
To: ,L......~--~~~......1--=-"---~-~---~..,_------~~------,
;~-~~Cna1 Message-~-- lo-6 MoNSD)
: Sen :Jbursday. A1JgusL21, 2003 11:58 PM
CC!
Walt B. (SES); (OV)
Subject: ICD; ------'
Fred,
Traffic below from Mr Slocombe
VR
=============== ========;=========
r ~ -We h. ave a report (quoted below) that Special Plans in NESA is circulating a briefing that shows
ICDC tn much heavier form {i.e. organized units with mortars, light artillery, light armor, etc.) than any one wants,
plans, or Intends to train or plan or pay for. Can you track down the paper and send us a copy. FYI, I believe the
following accurately describes the ICDC:
Coalition military are in the process of recruiting an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, to work with, and
under the close control of, coalition forces. The .ICDC will be locall.y recn1ited, receive a one- or
two-week training course from coalition units in their area, ancl bebrin to serve with lhos1: units,
receiving on the job training and mentoring from those units. They will be armed with AK-47s,
not heavier weapons. As the system develops and funds become available, they may have non-
tactical vehicles and basic comms. Initially they will work as individuals attached to coalition
units. As such they will provide a source of infonnation about the local community, help
conduct searches and man check points, and serve as interpreters for the coalition units. As they
gain experience, the ICDC will gradually become able to operate at the squad level with coalition
forces, doing convoy and route secur.ity a11d guarding fixed points, as well as continuing to serve
in these individual capacities. Higher level unit organization will be for administrative purposes
only. ICDC personnel will live at home and operate o:oJy in their immediate areas. Enlistment
will be for one year only. Recruiting and training has begun, with some 1400 signed up as of 19
Aug. Eighteen battalions, one io each Iraqi province, totaling about 15,000 individuals, are
scheduled to be on duty with ooalitjon units by October 2003. At tba( point, the program will be
evaluated for decision on its longer term future, in.eluding whether to continue to add units.
Thanks, Walt
The report we monitored, KSir - I was having an interesting conversation the other day - I heard that OSO(P) -
specifically NESA special plans was circulating a brief showing ICDC in much heavier form (i.e. organized units
with mortars, tight artillery, light armor, etc.). This is not built into the budget numbers we're working now.
8/22/2003

- -------
-
- -
Page 2 of2
Thought you might find this interesting - I'll try to get a copy of the briefing."
[
8/22/2003

.. .,,-
,.
Date of
Name of Reqvestcr:
co~ - - ~~~~~-
CPA OfficefUait: MGNSD A'lbOwlt ol Request: 19.6M
P'f"-Oject Lo<:atlon: MoNSD (Region)
POCIPenoa Co111pleUag Fonn:
t. 'Project Ca.tegory (cbeck aU that apply):
Reconstruction
Humanitarian
Food Oisttibtrtion
Wate:r l' Sewer
Elccericity t Rule of ~w JGovem.
Div. ConunanderoS
fund
Health
Tra:n.<;p<>nation
.£COtl<>Jl1ic Progl'AD\$
cdncarion.
Mfoistry
Pol:icc.' Securily
Brig. Commanders 0
Fund
Salaries
Pen$iON
B'udget'Ops. Support
Other Public Services
Social Programs
Cultural Programs
R,qional Dir,
.Fund
Olostn>c:tioa lniti.ati\'-C D
Z:. Pro~ Ftuldlng Source: (?RB Staff Ooly)
Vested AssetS
Sc:izedAsseu
f ... ~fuods
l Iraqi Dcvelopmc:nt Fund
3. FDDdia1 Data:
§
D
Bank Account Details: or
N:amc /Tit.lc.oflraqi ~iviog Disbursement:
CP.~ Repflfnil RC$p0nnl>lc for Oversight
Engi.necri~ Oversrgbt Assigned to;
Name oi C-ertlf< · Ofrlcial:
4,. ClealllDCes! Please lDdkate yoa laave obtaf11ed appropi1ate cleanutea, as applkable.
(Xoic If~t ooordl.JUldoa eaaaot be doae at the ;r~Qal lev I, lt I~ done by f'ltC.)
.Regional C.oordinator: Yes D. No 0 Name :
Ministry Senior Ach.i:sor: Yes. f8l No 0 Name: Wal ' l....ili)~iM'
OfficeDircc\'OtfUnit Com~r. Yes 0 No 0 ~« ·
kecon..~ttuction!USAID: Yes 0 No 0 Na.me:
1ntemationaJ Cooroination ~ik Yes 0 NoiO N&me:
Proe•m Staff Use Only
~
No 0
l ~te Jt~uest Submil*l 10 Program Review C<Jmmittec: mm/dd/Y'l'fY
. DtspOSlbon:
=

------------
---
j Disposition:
Date ~ Retumcd to Requesla1Submined tO Comptroller: mrn/dd/yyyY
pi ition (including expenditure authorized :
.A!!lbassador Bremer agm=d 011 It Joly to a CJTF-7 amoept to establish an ha.qi Civil Defense
Carps o-fup to 18 Battalions. The per:sonoel assigned co this outfit Will operare as indi.,-idaa ls~
teams md . sqllads; Chey will pt"O\.'ide liaguisl support. conmbolc ro rebuildiftg in~ and
communities. provide ~ty and drivt>rs foe Coalition Forces-. humanitarian a.ssl$t11nce teams • and
international NG()s, co.ftduet li1nited cro)Vd and riot roatrol fixed site roate and con'"W security ,
disaster rapori~~eesiand ~h andn::s;reue.
Jn fragme~ .. Otders 1u~μcnt to 11 J\lly. CJTF~ 7 bas directed its subordinate units 10 establish
lhese. baitialions ia ~ following pa1ldll: 9 bettaliom by September, 1 m<n'by l Oct. S more by 1
Nov, Z more by 1 Dec. and the fioal bertalion by l Jan 04.
The ~J in dae bettatiom must be pmd. feet, clocbcd, provided ~ith 1 minimum of field gear
and amied with an rifle.
Salary: S70K/monlh , for each.,.. on the establishment: To1al Salary (Aug ro Dec 03): S4,R30K
Food Stipend: Subsisi-ence costs (0 oovtr 1 meat per man per duty day .. . $7 .95 taSt per MRE
. -mon.lh1 .y ~18JK: Tolal Food Stipend (Aug to Dec 03): ' SJ2> 627K
l>nifomis. : l5aob member rccdvcs ~ 2 hlou3CS, 2 tmu11ers, 2 i shirt&, 3 soob, and a pair of
· boots> .. ,$90 ... and 2-00/. overage: Total U'nifonn Cost Sl650K(to beP11rchued from Jn.qi vendors)
Webbing; Each member~ web belt. snspe!Dders, 2 can1eebS wl cov;cr, fu$1 a.id pouch w/
dtessln.g...$23 •
. and 15% ovE:tage: Total Webbing Cost S438K. {to be puthcased from h:aqi ~)
Weapon C leaning Kit and Sp.l:res: SIOOO pet bn ~ TQtal Cost SISK
The touaJ cost of providing this level of support. based on the diroc:ttd sequence ofbui.b:ling 10 18
batallioa.s is S l9.$6JM for the remainder o(CY' 03.
CJTF .. tJ (BG Hahn) and CPA (Mr Slooom~) agree ro this levd of suppon., which will be provided
m CJTF - 7 &om the CPA. There will logically.be additional O&M costs to Coalition units as.they
~. mmsport md opcrale with ICT>C elements.
(The CY~~.,. will be wodted into the National ~ri'Y and Dden.se budget)
fotm P.RB-OJ \'er. 6119/QJ

Who
New recruits eligible, no previous military
experience required.
Screen out Former Iraqi Army (FIA) officers and
soldiers.
1 f 'IA officers Colonel or higher are excluded.
Reflective, of local Governorate Demogr. aphics.
Recruited with assistance of local Iraqi leaders
(linkage to CJTf .. 7 Iraqi leader engagement
plan.
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
What
Cooperative initiative between CPA &CJff .. 7.
A Security force designed to augment coalition
forces individually thru platoon level with
language and cultural knowledge, timely and
actionable HUMINT, and contractor support
(driver & security)
Collective tasks: Joint patrolling, fixed site
security, area security, convoy security, and
natural disaster assistance.
-
Where
Eight battalion equivalents initially
1x1AD (ME), 2x101AAD, 3 x 410,
1 x 1 MEF x 1 MND(SE).
Goal: 18 Total: 1 per Governorate
Why- Put an Iraqi face 011 daily
coalition internal security operations
When
CJTF-7 Execution FRAGO 493 published 24
Jul03
25 Jul 03 Be in Recruitin & Re istration
Jul - Individual train ng egins.
01 Aug - Eight Battalions stood up
07 Aug • First ICDC soldiers patrol, with
coalition.
01 Sep - Fiv, e more Battalions stand up
01 Nov 03 - Las,t , Five Battalions stand up
18 Battalions by Jan 04.
30

• •
Page 1 of 1
(0-8 MoNSD)
From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
Sent: Sa'turday, July 26, 2003 10:12 PM
To: ~r----~~0-6 MoNSD)
Subject: CDC memo
This is to remind me more than you, but I undertook. to provide Feith w/ a one-page summary of the CDC. The
only source is thel 10X 0> lbrief (and ils direct derivative used at the Commanders Conf a day or so later). I don't
think there is anything authoritative since then.but I am not at all sure that remains the, lodestone for the effort any
more. Walt
7/27/2003

Bremer, Paul
From: RSS - SecDef CablesESO
Sent: Wednesday. July 09, 2003 2:23 AM
To: Bremer, Paul;
Cc: __ r ______ ic1v. oso
Subject: Analysis of Recent Events in Iraq
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From:
To: I l))xi;i l
(CC) Amb Bremer
(CC) Pat Kennedy
(CC) Walt Slocombe
Gentlemen,
Please provide copies of the attachment from Mr.C receipt Thank you_ ~--~
Rerttuuv
MA ]
ESO, Cables
11912003
Page 1 of l
I as listed in the distribution above. Please confirm

r POJNT P.APER
---- L--·~ m s ~ ~ ·
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Su: bj: ANALYSIS OF RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ
. . ~- wtiif s~I
1. PROBLEM.. The recent attacks on coalition troops in BagMad and lhc Sunni @
Triangle are likely the results , of an alliance between Baalh Party .remnants and
lslamic extremist.\. The oature of this p.toto-insurgency and its ultimate o.bje<..1ive s
remain a m~mer of <:onj~turc. Ilowc.vcr , it can be assumed. th-at it is a temporary
alliance, as the ultimate goals of the Baathists and ls' lamic extremists. arc
uftimatcly C-Ofltradictory. It is a fact that this marriage of convenience . aimed at the
coalition. but psu ti r.nl~rl)I the Americans.
2. .DISCUSSION
a. There are three types. of insurg¢ncies: (a) coups (2) classic Maoist three
, phase insJJrgencies (3) Attempts t. o foment a mass upri$iog such as the
"People Power opnsing 1n U)C Pbllippines and the 1979 uprishlg tb,.t
oYe.rthrew ~ Shah of lran.
b. A coup is oot an option in this case. One would e_11.pcct that the best
!Utc.mative for the Baathists would be a classfr: guerilla campa.i. ifl. Such
operations are ~us tom made for l>arties ,such u - the. Baatbists because they
can qu i ~Uy eliminate u:oubJesome partnen such as che Islamic extremisr:s
over the course a long campaigrt. Fomenting mass. uprisjngs is a dangerous
course because the ultimate results of such events cannot be oontroUed.
The Iranian communisu were liquidated in the wue of the 1979
revolution despite participating in it
c. The current pro.to-ins.urgent activity ap~ar,s to be attempting to move
from the early stage of a cJassic three-· phase: suge ins~ncy to the
popular uprising stage. When the Cbinese and Vietnamese attempted to
prematllrely move &om one stage to the other debacles resulted. It would
be easy to write this off to mere Baathist incompetence. but we would be
wise to consider orher motives.
d Th~R< are two ~en. arios that would explain I.he pre.sent activities beyond
fldversary incompetence. Both scenarios cont.am ex.plotlablc opponun.ltle;i.
DetM)'lin,i.n_g the feCl1 motivation of the currem situation should be
identified a Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) if it is
not one already. The two ~narios ~ J'lot ~es sarily mutu.ally eJ1.clusiv~:
(I) We sh. ouJd consider the , possibllity that the jns !lf gent'i realit.e
that they have a narrow windOw of oppmtunity . It is possible that
they feel that a combination. of forei;gn presence and slow rate of
infrastructure :repair' under the occupation reprcse. nt a flee-ting
window of opportunity Chat will close if they do not act quickly.
In this scenario, they WO Did ac-cept the danger of loss . of control
jn order to exploir the opponunhy.

•
(2) The second pogsibiHty, and equally plausible scenario, ii that of
compctitiu.11. Th~y may be vying for pixstigc: in lhc ''n11tiurwl
msistance" leadenJh.ip"
e. The Shiia should not be forgotten. A11 indication& m: th.at they are bidding
their time. If they think they ce.n mate demOCl"BC)' work to lhefr advantaee,
they will do '°· But we should not a&SWne benign jnleDl on their pan.
1beir view of democracy is decidedJy non-Jeffersonian. The Shiia are
prickly and very honor oonstious. lncident4 lib the one last we.et with lhe
l:lntish should be fo11owed up with good faith negoliatione to find out what
wertr wrong and how lo prevent reocc:wrmces. Offering a nominal swn of
money or a sheep as a condolence fee is comudered an act of good faith; it
ia not conslnlad Ba en admiasion of c::ulpability. If !hey offer aomething in
retum for d'le death of a coalition member, it should likewise be aooepced.
f. We need to remember that we are an alien presence in a very old cultural
landscape. No aood wm come of lhe cerception that our presence lhere is
open ended,
l. RECOMMENDATIONS
a. 1be military should be encourngcd to give all possible assistance to
ut:cupation 11.uthotity efforts to restore infnWructure and n:move the
complaint thet things are wane chan they were under Hussein.
b. The previously recommended establishment of a Provis.ional lraqi
Constabu181')' and a road map for tnm11.ition to Traqi control and C"'.aalitinn
disengagement should be implemented and widely advertised..
c. When an attack on a coaJition member occurs in a locality, all fmmer
Baath Party members above the rank of m::cptionist should be rounded up
and intemd.1bey should be given access to phor'IC8 with the following
rneasage &o friends and family:
(a) If no further attack.a occur within eight week&. we wiD be
releued
(b) lf attacks reoccur after we are ~Leased. we will be~intencd.

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Agreed Intent
• Primary purpose of ICDF is to relieve
coalition troops of point defense and
• •
presence m1ss1ons
• Focus of effort is Sunni Triangle
• Ink Blot strategy will be employed
beginning in West Baghdad, and
spreading north-west

DOD Support Issues
• Weapons: 650 available; delta of about 3,500
• Interpreters: a mix of Sunni and Shia to match
the neighborhoods they will be assigned to
• Human Rights and ROE lessons plans in Arabic
• Uniforms distinct from NIA, police, and coalition
forces
• Associated funding issues

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Remaining Local Issue; Who
Provides Civilian Oversight?
• Defense does not think it appropriate have
defense set the precedent of getting defense
involved in internal security
• Interior does not want to militarize police
functions
• Both views are valid
• One possible solution is to appoint a Minister
Without Portfolio/Special Projects, and assign
the ICDF to him as a first project

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Recommendations From
Constabulary Study
• General rule of thumb is one platoon per
neighborhood of 10,000
• Platoon is primary unit of action; companies and
battalions are admin entities
• Platoon Leaders should not be pre-ordained;
should be selected from training cadre
• Company and battalion commanders selected
from best platoon leaders

Recommendations (Cont.)
• Platoons should undertake civic action
projects ASAP
• Companies should maintain civic action
cadre of skill specialists in general support
of platoons:
- Carpenter
- Electrician
- Plumber/water sanitation specialist
- Practical nurse (female)

Key Points of Proposed Press
Release (CPA/DOD/CENTCOM
Coordinated)
• ICDF is a transition mechanism for areas with
security threats beyond normal police
capabilities
• Purpose is to free coalition troops from point
defense and presence patrolling missions
• It is designed a temporary fix to be replaced by
police as the security situation allows
• Training will include a heavy dose of human
rights indoctrination and stress on civilian control

I'.
,,
,.
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•

,.
THE PROBLEM
• The current security situation requires a
paramilitary capability something beyond
the police in some areas
• The New Iraqi Army will not be capable of
taking over security responsibilities in the
near future and internal security is probably
not a good precedent for them to set as a
first mission.

PROBLEM (Cont.)
• The reduction of the American military
profile on Iraqi streets would be helpful for
improving the attitude of the Iraqi
population if a replacement for their
security contribution can be found
• US military personnel need to know the OIF
commitment isn't open ended

THE PROPOSAL
• Build a temporary Iraqi constabulary militia
mentored by US forces in most troubled areas.
• Until it is ready to assume urban patrol duties, the
Iraqi constabulary militia will be accompanied by
a US mentor force
• Training for the force will include a heavy dose of
democracy and human rights education
• As the constabulary matures, US forces will
withdraw to a reaction force mode
• Constabulary platoons will conduct civic action
projects

DESIRED END-STATE
• US forces in a supporting role and off the
streets on a day-to-day basis
• Once security situation allows, the
constabulary militia platoons will be
disbanded and their functions taken over by
regular forces

ADVANTAGES
• A short run fix for the security problem
• US forces can see their ''ticket out''
• A potential democratizing influence at the
neighborhood level
• US military can train militia type forces;
cannot train police ·

..
DISADVANTAGES/
CHALLENGES
• Question of who pays
• Ensuring that these militia platoo· ns do not
become a repressive political tool; a strong
inspectorate system is required

•
RESOURCES
• US Iraqi expatriates want to help as
interpreters
• Former members of USMC Combined
Action program and retired SOF trainers are
a potential source of training cadre

•
•
RECOMMENDATION
• Conduct a feasibility experiment in a
troubled area (Fallujah is a good candidate)
• Figuring the need for a fifty man platoon
for every 10,000 residents. Fallujah would
need a thousand recruits (Fallujah's
population is 200,000)

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Agenda
• Purpose
• Needs Statement
• Organization
• C2 Relationships
• Task List (Individual and Collective)
• Concept
• Milestones
• CAP Policy Modifications
• Approval/Decision
717/2003 2

Purpose
• Obtain approval for the immediate establishment of
five new Iraqi Militia Battalions with a short term
goal of eighteen battalions (one per govemorate in
one year) comprising three(+) Brigade
organizations. Our long term strategic goal is five
Iraqi Militia Divisions.
• Resolve CPA policy that must either be developed or
amended to support Iraqi Militia Battalion (IMF)
concept.
• Obtain approval for 60,000 force cap for IMF
authorized manning.
717/2003 3

References
• Verbal Guidance CJTF CDR- 4 July 03
• Draft CENTCOM PLANORD
• FM 7-7J
• FM 7-8
• FM 7-10
• FM 7-20
• FM 7-30
717/2003 4

Requirements Statement
CJTF-7 requests CPA approval to
immediately establish five Iraqi Militia
Battalions. Approval of this initiative
expedites the transition to a new Iraqi
government, fosters a sense of Iraqi national
pride, stimulates Iraqi economic recovery
and creates the foundation for future U .S-
lraq i military relations.
7/7/2003 5

Commander's Guidance
• Prepare Concept/COA briefing for Mr. Solcombe ~
• Mr. Solcombe's briefing must include CAP IMF policy
issues/IMF organization structure/IMF task list and
Milestones.
- TM/SQD/PLT/COMPANY
- Battalion
• CDR's intent for the IMF is to get former Iraqi officers and
soldiers under coalition control and executing productive
projects supporting the establishment of a safe and secure
environment in Iraq.
• Each coalition division immediately hires a battalion of IMF
soldiers.
• Five Iraqi IMF battalions form one IMF Brigade.
7/7/2003 6

Commander's Guidance (con't)
• CG accepts IMF qualitative risk IOT expedite stand up of
IMF Do not assume that SOF forces are unavailable for
FID. Establish requirements document.
• Coalition Divisions will assume responsibility for training
IMF.
• Consolidate and cross walk task list with division
commanders.- LNOs received consolidated task list at
OPT/WG 061500 July 03.
• Define duration of individual service- one year enlisted,
three year officers, with the caveat that exception officers
and soldiers can be considered for service in NIA.
• Publish FRAGO NLT 9 July.
7/7/2003 7

Organization Talking Points
• IMF organization very similar to NIA
organization IOT facilitate future compatibility
with NIA.
- NIA organization adheres to a modified American
motorized/airborne/air assault TO&E.
- IMF is a pure rifle infantry organization with four
squad rifle platoons and four squad rifle companies.
- All squad soldiers are equipped with AK-47's, no
grenadiers or automatic riflemen, machine guns,
mortars or anti-tank systems.
7/7/2003 8

IMF Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon
Organization
IMF Rifle Squad
IMF Rifle Platoon
•••
IMF Rifle t
Squad= 9 men
t 9QO t I.DA
880
TM TM
LDfll Left
SGT SGT
ft ft ft ft ft ft
Fire Team A Fire TeamB
3 x Rifleman AK-4 7 3 x Rifleman AK-4 7
~
HQ Section
Platoon Leader
Platoon Sergeant
Radio Telephone
Operator
4 x Rifle Squads
IMF Rifle Platoon= 1/38 men
7/7/2003
9

IMF Rifle Company Organization
Company Headquarters
Commander
First Sergeant
Company Executive Officer
Supply Sergeant
Armorer
Total Soldiers= 2/4
Rifle Squads
4 x 39 soldiers.
Total Soldiers=
4/152
IMF Rifle Company Total Strength=
61156
7/7/2003
10

Notional NIA Battalion
CDR
XO
CSM
II
154
(6/148)
38
(1/37)
38
(1/37)
38
(1/37)
26
(1/25
..
..
-
• Each Line Company:
• 3 Line PLT, 1x MG PLT
• 154 personnel w/ AKa
• 7 medium trucks (2 Ya T)
• Four utllltv vehlcl•
154
(6/148
38
(1/37
38
(1/37
38
(1137)
28
(1125)
..
..
..
(1/5) (1/5) (2/10) (1/5)
154
(8/148
154
(8/148
125
(8/117)
..
..
38
(1/37
38
(1/37)
15 20
(1/14) (1/19
..
..
38
(1/37
38
(1/37
30 20
(1/29) (1/19
-
-
38
(1/37)
38
(1/37
20 20
(1/19) (1/19)
28
(1/25)
26
(1/25
·NIA Battalion: 774
• 39 Officers
• Each MG platoon:
• 735 Enlisted
• 6 Machine Guna (3 SQDa of 2 MGs)
• 6 Utlllty vehJcles
• Co has 2 utlllty vehicles and 2
medium trucks 11

C2 Relationships
• The initial five battalions are TACON to coalition
divisions currently serving in the Iraqi area of
responsibility (AOR).
- 1 AD MND- Central - 1 X IMF Battalion
- 1 MEF MND- South Central - 1 X IMF Battalion
- 1 U .K. MND- South - 1 X IMF Battalion
- 4th ID MND- North-Central- 1 X IMF Battalion
- 101 st MND-North- 1 X IMF Battalion
• CJTF-7 assumes responsibility for the manning and
training of the first IMF Brigade headquarters.
• CJTF-7 Plan for C2 and training of Division structure-
TBD. Anticipate habitual relationship with the Ministry of
Internal Security and Defense.
717/2003 12

Task List
• Individual Tasks:
- Linguists
-HUMINT
- Civil Affairs Duties
• Collective Tasks: Big Picture
- Military Specific Fixed Site Security (i.e. Ammo Supply
Points (ASP), military compounds)
- Natural Disaster Assistance
- Humanitarian and reconstruction work (Many of these
projects may transition to the National Jobs Program).
-
~oute Security
- Convoy Security
- Territorial Security/Border Security (Expect this task to
111Wlllsition to appropriate Ministry). 13

Small Unit Collective Tasks
Squad Battle Drills
Battle Drill 2 React to Contact
Battle Drill 3 Break Contact
Battle Drill 4 React to Ambush
Def end Fixed Site
Guard Military Govemorate Assets
Conduct Presence Patrols
717/2003
14

Concept
Coalitio, n divisional units execute immediate
recruitment of soldiers and officers to man a light infantry
Iraqi Militia (IMF) Battalion. Individual training begins
immediately with in. dividual IMF soldiers integrated into
coalition fire teams within 48 bo· urs (KA TUSA concept).
Individual IMF soldiers initially augment coalition forces
with lin. guistic, HUMINT and civil affairs skills. At the
discretio, n of coalition division commanders IMF u. nits
begin executing fire team, squad, platoon and company
level missions. See milestones for proposed concept for
adva, ncing to collective tasks.
717/2003 15

Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
+ t t •
A-Day A+2 A+7
Iraqi Militia Force First IMF Fire Teams
soldiers (IMF) begin execute fire team
patrolling with level fixed site
coalition forces. security and fire
Primary functions team patrols.
include linguists,
HUMINT and civil
affairs duties.
71712003 16

Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
+ t + ..
A+14 A+21 A+28
First IMF units begin IMF units begin First IMF units
squad level operations. platoon level begin company
Collective tasks operations. In level operations.
include fixed site addition to squad First squad
security border check level tasks IMF units external
point manning and conduct convoy evaluations by
squad size patrols. security and route •
sponsonng
security operations. coalition division.
7/7/2003 17

Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
+
A+42
First IMF units begin
battalion level
operations. First
platoon level external
evaluations by
sponsoring coalition
division.
+
A+56
CJTF-7 validates first IMF Brigade
Headquarters. Coalition Divisions
begin second training iteration of five
new IMF Battalions. First company
level external evaluations of initial five
IMF battalions by sponsoring coalition
divisions.
71712003
18

Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
+
A+84
Second group of five
IMF battalions begin
battalion level
operations. Third
Group of five IMF
Battalions formed.
First five IMF
battalions receive
external evaluation by
soonsoring coalition
di~fs<>f6n.
A+106
Last three IMF battalions begin
training. (18 total/one per govemorate).
CJTF .. 7 validates first IMF Brigade
Headquarters. IMF Brigade level
operations begin. 2nd Group of five
IMF Battalions receive battalion level
external evaluation from parent
coalition division. CJTF-7 mans &
trains 2°d IMF Brigade Headquarters.
19

Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
+
A+148
All 18 IMF battalions
trained and operating.
Second Brigade
Headquarters validated
by CJTF-7. CJTF-7
mans and trains 3rd
IMF Brigade
Headquarters.
A+l90
IMF is fully functional and established
as a viable institution for the new Iraqi
government.
7/7/2003
20

CPA Policy Implications
• IMF adheres to all policies established for the
New Iraqi Army (NIA).
• Request concurrence with proposed task list.
• Request guidance on authorized entitlements
for IMF officers and soldiers.
• Request that IMF units be allowed to be multi-
ethnic organizations with demographics
reflective of local Govemorate.
717/2003 21

Recommended IMF Policy
Implementation
• IMF Pay is IA W NIA pay tables. IMF soldiers
will be in full time militia status. $50/week?
• one year enlisted, three year officers, with the
caveat that exception officers and soldiers can be
considered for service in NIA.
• Uniform, rank structure IA W NIA. IMF proposed
transitional uniform is engineer tape around each
upper arm.
717/2003 22

From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Sub)ect:
G3 FUOPS
Monday, July 07, 2003 3:45 PM
•1 • 1 M AJ CJ:iilT·F7···C·5 .PLANS
MAJ•
-----
- -- -
OL CJTF7·C3COL;
RE: Notional NIA Battalion.ppt
!lllJJll!lllCOL·--·
OL C5CMG3FUOPS
-~
ALCON .. ~is a new CS Planner. His project is working out the
details for implementing the New Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF). More like the
IMPOSSIBLE MISSION FORCE.
1111111.No. All I have is the pay tables for the monthly stipend payments. What
you require is a policy decision from CPA that I think they have not made
yet.
. One more item for your laundry list when you see COLllllllllll
-----Original Message-----
From: MAJ CJTF7-C5 PLANS
Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 3:32 PM
To:...._---~-_.~ G3 FUOPS
Subject: RE: Notional NIA Battalion.ppt
-
Do you have a pay table for the NIA? The IMF pay tables need to correspond
with the NIA tables and at this time I do not have a copy of the NIA pay
charts.
Thanks,
-
-----Ori inal Message-----
....._ _____ _. G3 FUOPS
-..-"=.;.;..;;""""-.._""""'-...,....;;.,07"-I 2003 10:10 AM
To: MAJ CJTF7-C5 PLANS
Subject: Notional NIA Battalion.ppt
1

Page 1of1
Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
From: Eaton, Paul
Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 6:53 AM
To: Slocombe, Walt B. {SES)
Subject: Briefing: Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF)
Sir
Reviewed the CJTF 7 brief on IMF dated 5 July. This appears to be a CJTF 7 initiative, but can't confirm without
review of stated reference-Draft CENTCOM PLANORD.
Points Pro:
Immediate - 48 hours - Increase In security personnel available to tf'le five division commanders
Provides robust combined arms force with eventual brigade level structure
Provides for embedded trainer or advisory role proven effective in previous cases (Vietnam) and what we
went to see with the NIA
Puts "an Iraqi face" quickly on military visibilitylpatrolling
Points Con:
Competes with NIA for scarce resources - weapons, transportation, communicalions, money
Competes with NIA for CJTF7 support - embedded trainers, logistics
Sends a "OIC'.1 Iraqi Army" message by hiring back the same men who brought you the fil'St two defeats
and regime support
Brief makes no mention of "psychological or leadership retraining" period
Provides yet another initiative for security service, defusing tha NIA focus, and still does not address the
concept of a Gendarmerie
Seems to challenge an ear1ier policy issue on application of combined arms - anti-tank and mortars
Recommend a formal briefing with policy issues addressed up front and the support details second. The policy
issues should address the leadership aspects of this proposal and how to shift from the previous approach to
fighter management. Hire back without retrain and you get the old system. The latter specifically addressing
current challenges on recruiting methodology, weapons procurement, funding.
I vote no or delay until NIA has at least two cycles graduated and fully resourced.
VR/MG Eaton.
71712003

..
UTqCLA$Sff'reDffFOR: OFFICIAL USE
ONLY
Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF)
Concept Brief
5 July 2003
Agenda
• Purpose
• Needs Statement
• Organization
• C2 Relationships
• Task List (Individual and Collective)
• Concept
• M. ilestones
• CAP Policy Modifications
• Approval/Decision
lft4CLA~fFfEDli'FOR: OFFICJAL USE
Q~JLY

UMCLA:SSff'tEDHFOR OFFICIAL USE
ONf?l
Purpose
• Obtain approval for the immediate
establishment of five new Iraqi National
Guard Battalions with a long term goal of
eighteen battalions (one per govemorate)
comprising 3 ( +) Brigade organizations.
• Resolve CPA policy that must either be
developed or amended to support Iraqi
National Guard (ING) concept.
References
• Verbal Guidance CJTF CDR- 4 July 03
• Draft CENTCOM PLANORD
• FM 7-8
• FM 7-10
• FM 7-20
• FM 7-30
ill<iCLA:SSIFI:EDffli'OR OFFICIAL USE
-eNL¥
2

UMCLASSIFIEDtff10it Of'f'ICIAL USE
O?H:l
Requirements Statement
CJTF-7 requests CPA approval to
initiate fielding of five new Iraqi National
Guard Battalions. Approval of this initiative
expedites the transition to a new Iraqi
government, fosters a sense of Iraqi national
pride, stimulates Iraqi economic recovery
and creates the foundation for future U .S-
Iraqi military relations.
Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon
Organization
Rifle Squad
••
Rifle Platoon
Rifle Squad=
9men
t
TM
-
-
ft ft ft
t
""" UIOI
- t
TM
-
llOT
ft ftft
Fire Team A
FireTeamB
Rifleman
Rifleman
Grenadier
Grenadier
Automatic; Rifleman Automatic Rifleman
~
_,_
=ts' ·-- ·-- -
Rifle Platoon= 34 men
ONCLASSIFIED//FOR: OPPICIAL USE
ON.l.Y
3

UNCLASSff'IBf>tlf'Olt OFFICIAL USE
Rifle Company Organization
--
• ta
--
--
& •
II -
....... .........._ ·-- ·---
#"&..
• •
Flgur• 1-1. Light lntantryf'ltle company.
Total Strength= 130
Rifle Battalion Organization
~
~ lZSJ [!]81mmbd
3 x Rifle Company
Strength: 390 men
UNCLASSIFHID//f'OR OFFICIAL USE
ONL'l
4

UNCLASSlrffiDf/f'OR OFFICfAL USE
QlqL·1·
Light Division Organization
OivHQ
I
I
3.x Bde HO.a
I
9 x light
lnfBN
I I
Div Arty Cbt Avn Bde
I I
HQ Coy HQCoy
I I
Tgt Ade.Hat Bn
AcqutsitK>n I
Coy Sp HelBn
I I
3 x Fd Arty 2 )C CAC Coy
Bns(106mm) I
I AHC Cot
1 x FdAzty
Bn (166mm)
I I
Div Sp Comd 1 x Engr Bn
I
HQ/Met
Management
Centre
I
AMCCoy
I
Sup&TptBn
I
MaintBn
I
Medical Sn
I I I I I I I
OW HQ Cqy Sig Bn ~r Def Bn NBC Coy Int Bn Div Band MP Coy
C2 Relationships
• The initial five battalions are T ACON to coalition
divisions currently serving in the Iraqi area of
responsibility (AOR).
- 10151 MND-North
- 4th ID MND- Central
- l AD MND- CentraJ
- 1 MEF MND- South Central
- 1 U.K. MND- South
• CJTF· 7 assumes responsibility for the manning and
training of the first ING Brigade headquarters.
UNCLASSIFIEOffliOR OFFICIAL USE
Ot4IN
5

UNCLA:3Sff'l:ED//t'OR OFFICIAL USE
-OtqLY
Task List
• Individual Tasks:
- Linguists
- Human Collectors
- Civil Affairs Duties
• Collective Tasks:
- Fixed Site Security
- Natural Disaster Assistance
- Humanitarian and reconstruction work
- Route Security
- Convoy Security
- Territorial Security/Border S~curity
•
Concept
CoaHtion divisiona, J units execute immediate
recruitment of soldiers and office. rs to man a light infantry
Iraqi National Guard Battalion. Individual training begins
immediately with individual Iraqi National Guard soldiers
integrated into coalition fire teams within 48 hours (Katusa
concept). Individual Iraqi National Guard soldiers initially
augment coalition forces wi. th linguistic, human collection
and civil affairs skills. At the discretion of coalition
division commanders Iraqi National Guard units begin
executing fire. team, squad, platoon and company level
missions. See milestones for proposed. concept for
advancing to collective tasks.
UNCLASSIF:teDt!FOlt OFFICJA L USB
0NLY
6

UMCLASSfFffiDl'/FOR OFFICIAL USE
OMLY
Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
+ + + Ill
A-Day A+2 A+7
Iraqi National Guard First Iraqi National
soldiers begin Guard Infantry Fire
patrolling with Teams execute fire
coalition forces. team level fixed site
Primary functions security and fire
include linguists, team patrols.
human collectors and
civil affairs duties.
Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
! ! !
' ' '
A+14 A+21 A+28
First Iraqi National Iraqi National Guard First Iraqi
Guard units begin units begin platoon National Guard
squad level operations. level operations. In units begin
Collective tasks addition to squad company level
include fixed site level tasks Iraqi NG operations. First
security border check units conduct convoy squad external
point manning and security and route evaluations by
squad size patrols. security operations. sponsoring
coalition division.
-
-
~:bASS!fHIDl/¥0R OFFICIAL USE
OMLY
7

UNCLASSIFIBDHFOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY
Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
'
A+42
First Iraqi National
Guard units begin
battalion level
operations. First
platoon level external
evaluations by
sponsoring coalition
division.
' A+S6
CJTF-7 validates first Iraqi National
Guard Brigade Headquarters. Coalition
Divisions begin second training
iteration of five new Iraqi National
Guard Battalions. First company level
external evaluations of initial five ING
battalions by sponsoring coalition
divisions.
Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
' ' A+84
Second group of five
ING battalions begin
battalion level
operations. Third
Group of five ING
Battalions formed.
First five ING
battalions receive
external evaluation by
sponsoring coalition
division.
i
' A+106
Last three ING battalions begin
training. ( 18 total/one per governorate ).
CJTF-7 validates first Iraqi National
Guard Brigade Headquarters. ING
Brigade level operations begin. 2nd
Group of five ING BN's receive
battalion level external evaluation from
parent coalition division. CJTF-7 mans
& trains 2nd Iraqi NG Brigade
Headquarters.
.
~
UNCLASSFFIEDHFOR OFFICIAL USB
ffllfLY
8

•
UMCLASSJFfED//FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY
Milestones
A day= CPA approval date
' .l
T '
A+I48 A+l90
All 18 ING battalions Iraqi national Guard is fully functional
trained and operating. and established as a viable institution
Second BDE for the new Iraqi government.
headquarters validated
by CJTF-7. CITF-7
mans and trains 3rc1
ING Brigade
Headquarters.
-
~
CPA Policy Implications
• ING adheres to all polices established for the New
Iraqi Anny (NIA).
• Request immediate policy letter approving proposed
task list.
• Request immediate guidance on authorized
entitlements for ING officers and soldiers.
• Initial period of service for soldiers will be one year,
officers three years. Exceptional soldiers and otlicers
will be considered for service irt the NIA.
• Request exception to policy for NIA requirement to
ethnically mix units. ING units may be ethnically
homogenous up to company echelon.
l:J+lCL\SSfFIED/fFOR OffiCtAL USE
O~a..Y
9

-

Agenda
• Purpose
• Needs Statement
• Organization
• C2 Relationships
• Task List (Individual and Collective)
• Concept
• Milestones
• CAP Policy Modifications
• Approval/Decision
7/10/2003 2

Purpose
• Obtain approval for the immediate establishment of
·ti\'C new Iraqi Militia Battalions with a short tern1
goal of eighteen battalions (one per Govemorate in
one year) comprising three(+) Brigade
organizations. Our long term strategic goal is ti ve
Iraqi Militia 01 visi<-)JlS.
• Res<-)lve CPA policy· that must either be developed or
amended to support Iraqi Militia Battalion (IMF)
concept.
• Obtain approval for 60~000 personnel authorization
to support five Division IMF force structure as called
for in CENTCOM draft PLANORD.
7/10/2003 3

References
• Verbal Guidance CJTF CDR- 4 July 03
• Draft CENTCOM PLANORD
• FM 7-7J
• FM 7-8
• FM 7-10
• FM 7-20
• FM 7-30
7/10/2003 4

Requirements Statement
CJTF-7 requests CPA approval to
immediately establish tive Iraqi Militia Battalions.
Approval of this initiative expedites the
establishment of a safe and secure environment in
Iraqi, facilitates the transition to a new Iraqi
government, fosters a sense of Iraqi natit)nal pride,
stimulates Iraqi econon1ic recovery and creates the
foundation for future LJ.S-lraqi 1nilitary relations.
711012003 5

Commander's Guidance .I'
...
• Prepare Concept/COA briefing for Mr. Solcombe ~ ".
• Mr. Solc. ombe's briefing must includ· e CPA IMF policy
issues/IMF organization structure/IMF task list and
Mil es tones.
- Fire Team/Squad /Platoon/COMP ANY •
- Battalion •
• Commanders intent for the IMF is to get former Iraqi
officers and soldiers under coalition control and executing
productive projects supporting the establishment of a safe
and secure environment in Iraq.
• Each coalition division immediately hires a battalion of IMF
soldiers.
• ' Five Iraqi IMF battalions form the initial IMF Brigade.
7/10/2003 6

Commander's Guidance (continued)
• CG accepts IMF qualitative risk IOT expedite stand up of
IMF Do not assume that Special Operations Forces are
unavailable for FID. Establish requirements document.
• Coalition Divisions will assume responsibility for training
IMF.
• Consolidate and cross walk task list with division
commanders.- L,Nl)s rec~i\'L~d const)lidatcd task list at
()Pl)WG 061500 Julv 03 .
.,,
• Define duration of individual service- one year enlisted.
three year t)tlicers'I \Vi th the c'1veat that exceptional officers
and solciiers can be Ct)nsidered for service in NIA.
• Publish FRAGO no later then (NL T) 9 July.
i/10/2003 1

Organization Talking Points
• CJTF-7 designs IMF organization to match NIA
organization IOT facilitate future compatibility.
- NIA organization adheres to a modified American
motorized/airborne/air assault TO&E.
- IMF is a pure rifle infantry organization with four squad rifle
platoons and four platoon rifle companies.
- All squad soldiers are equipped with AK-47's, no grenadiers
or automatic riflemen, machine guns, mortars or anti-tank
systems.
- Long tenn goal (6-9) months is for IMF battalions to be self-
sufficient. Hence HHC assets.
- Brigade and Division IMF structures to be detennined
(TBD).
7/10/2003 8

IMF Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon
Organization
IMF Rifle Squad
IMF Rifle Platoon
IMF Rifle t
Squad= 11 men
SSG
t sao t llJf1
TM TM
LOii LDll
scrr sar
ftftftft ftft ft ft
Fire Team A 4 x Rifleman AK-4 7 Fire Team B
4 x Rifleman AK-4 7
• • • HO Section
~ Platoon Leader
~ Platoon Sergeant
Radio Telephone Operator
4 x Rifle Squads
IMF Rifle Platoon= 1/46 men
7/10/2003
9

IMF Rifle Company Organization
1-
i Company Headquarters
1 Commander
j First Sergeant 1
\ Company Executive Officer
I
: Supply Sergeant
!
1 Armorer
Total Soldiers= 2/4
--------
--· --- - ·1
Rifle Squads
4 x 4 7 soldiers.
Total Soldiers= i
'4/184 J
~-
·-~----·----- ·---------·--]
IMF Rifle Company Total Strength=
192 (6/186)
·------·-
··----
.. ~-- __ .., ___ .. ____ ... _,..
---~--~·-·-
7/10/2003
10

IMF Rifle Battalion Organization
f-B~ ttalio~ Command Grou-;J'
I Battalion Commander
j Battalion Sergeant Major
Battalion Executive Officer
Special Staff
I Chaplain
i Total 4 Soldier (3/ I ) _J _________ ,.
CT-~ IM r-f{itk C~ompany ( 192) -1
Total Strength: 768 men (241744) I
---- ----·----
... ----~
~MC Total St-;:;;~= 74 Soldiers l
0_ 9165) ·----
__ J
IMF Rifle Battalion Total Strength= 846 soldiers (36/810)
7/10/2003 11

IMF Battalion Headquarters &
Headquarters Company (HHC)
! Il !C TPtal Sui:ng.tlr: 7.+ 'il)ldi~E
••• B
Long Term Goal
6-9 Months
12 x Trucks
2 x Jeeps
7 x Water Carriers
Platoon Leader
Platoon Sergeant
3 x Squad Leaders
15 Soldiers
· 1 \ital 2 l ~t1ldii:r-;
( J.'20t
7/10/2003
~--------
! Company Headguarters I
· ( Commander
llliC First Sergeant
Company Executive Officer
! Supply Sergeant
. .
l Armorer
l lPlal 'i\)JdiL'r:-; 6 (2/-l l
L-.--- --- - ------'
. . --- -------- - ·--·- -· ----
Long Tenn Goal
. Personnel Officer
6-9 Months
6 x ambulances
01 Personnel Sergeant i
Personnel Clerk ·101al· :' S11Jdicr...; i I '-1-l
Platoon Leader
Awards Clerk
Platoon Sergeant
Reenlistment Sergeant
Physicians Assistant
4 x medics battalion aid station
12 x medics company aid station
16 x platoon medics
I dal J:' '-;ll\dicr~.
(2/JJ}
• • f .. Tr~i~i~~ Officer ·---- ·--
Assistant Training Officer I
Training Sergeant I ntal -1 ~1\IJ1crs ( 2: 2) I
f Training Clerk
•• r ·-- ------
-
·-
--~~=-~~·-- .. ----~
---=-~
I Supply Sergeant 1 nrnl S1lld11.'I"' 3 (1 ·2)
0 1 Supply Officer !
·-
L~up~yC~rk _ .. _ __ _ _
_ · 12
({}/()~)

C2 Relationships
• The initial five battalions are ·r:\C,lJN to coalition
divisions currently serving in the Iraqi area of
responsibility (AOR).
- 1 AD MND- Central - 1 X IMF Battalion
- 1 MEF MND- South Central - 1 X IMF Battalion
- 1 U .K. MND- South - 1 X IMF Battalion
- 4th ID MND- North-Central- 1 X IMF Battalion
- I 01 st MND-North- I X IMF Battalion
• On or about I January 04 CJTF-7 mans and trains the first
IMF Brigade Headquarters.
• CJTF-7 Plan for C2 and training of Division structure-
TBD. Anticipate habitual relationship with the Ministry of
Internal Security and Defense.
7/10/2003 13

IMF Task List
• Individual Tasks:
- Contractor Security
- Linguists
-HUMINT
- Drivers Contractor Vehicles
• Collective Tasks:
- Military Specific Fixed Site Security (i.e. Ammo Supply
Points (ASP), military compounds)
- Natural Disaster Assistance
- Humanitarian and reconstruction work (Many of these
projects may transition to the National Jobs Program).
- Route Security
- Convoy Security
... 111~itorial Security/Border Security (Expect this task ttt
tr:=tn~ition to annronri:=ttP. Mini~trv)

Minimal Individual Proficiency
• Weapons familiarization
• Basic First Aid (Common Soldier Task List)
• Human Rights Training
• Rules of Engagement Training
• Introduction to English
• Basic Physical Fitness Level
• Civics Training
7/10/2003 15

Minimal Small Unit Collective
Task Proficiency
Squad Battle Drills
Battle Drill 2 React to Contact
Defend Fixed Site
Guard Military Govemorate Assets
Conduct Presence Patrols
Advanced Collective Training (Recommended not required)
Battle Drill 3 Break Contact
Battle Drill 4 React to Ambush
7/1012003 16

Concept
Coalition divisional units execute immediate
recruitment of soldiers and officers to man a light
infantry Iraqi Militia (IMF) Battalion. Individual
training begins immediately. Individual IMF
soldiers initially augment coalition forces with
linguistic, HUMINT and security skills. At the
discretion of coalition division commanders IMF
units can execute fire team, squad, platoon and
company level missions. See milestones for
example training concept.
7/10/2003 17

In processing Checklist
• Vetting for used by NIA.
• Registration of IMF soldier.
• Registration of personal weapon.
• Basic Medical Screening (IIlV, screening by
coalition platoon medic).
• English Language Proficiency Assessment.
• Human Rights Class.
• Rules of Engagement Class.
• Assignment to sponsoring coalition squad.
7/10/2003 18

Example Training Concept/Milestones
A Possible "Way Forward"
I A day= Concept approval date I
t t
A-Day
A+2
Iraqi Militia Force soldiers
(IMF) begin patrolling.
ROE & human rights
Training n1andatory before
accompanying coalition
forces. Primary functions
include linguists, HUMINT
and security. assistance.
A+7
In processing
complete. IMF
soldiers begin
expanded individual
task training.
7/10/2003
19

Example Training Concept/Milestones
A Possible "Way Forward"
I A day= Concept approval date
•
- l
A+14 j
First IMF units begin j
l
1 first rifle team level
operations. Collective
1
' I tasks .include fixed site
I security and fire team
• patrols. ____ _ ___ _J
7/10/2003
I -·· --·-·· A+2·t--·----·· ·-·-··--·-
!IMF units begin squad level
I
1 operations. C. ollective tasks
expand to squad size fixed site
i security, border check point
1
• d d . 1
j manning an· squa - size patro s.
In addition to squad level tasks
. IMF units conduct convoy
I
I security and route security
l_ ope~~!io~ _ s_ . ~-~--- .. ____ _____ __ _ 20

Example Training Concept/Milestones
A Possible "Way Forward"
I A day= Concept approval date
------------·-------
! r-·- ·---
A+28
First IMF units begin
platoon level
operations. First IMF
squad external
evaluations by
sponsoring coalition
division
-- A -+- 35 - -----
First IMF units begin
company level
operations. First IMF
platoon external
evaluations by
sponsoring coalition
division
----
7/10/2003
21

Example Training Concept/Milestones
A Possible "Way Forward"
I A day= Concept approval date
+ ,
A+50 I
First IMF units begin !
battalion level
operations. First
. platoon level external
· evaluations by I
sponsoring coalition i
division. I
-·---
_______ __J
,--- ----
A ·- + - 60 -·----------·--~---
I Coalition Divisions begin second
training iteration of five new IMF
Battalions. First company level
external evaluations of initial five IMF
battalions by sponsoring coalition
divisions._____ _ ________ J
7110/2003
22

Example Training Concept/Milestones
A Possible "Way Forward"
A day= Concept approval date
r
,~- ----· ----··1
. A. +100
[ ----- --A+tso---·--
Second. group of five
I
La~t ~ee IMF battalions begin
IMF battalions begin
l tra1n1ng. (18 total/one per
1 battalion level
I Governorate). 2nd Group of five IMF
l operations. Third
Battalions receive battalion level
Group of five IMF
external evaluation from parent
Battalions fonned.
j coalition division.
"'------- -- -
First five IMF
battalions receive
1
external evaluation by
SPfi1tW63ring coalition
23
division.
---~--
, .
~-

Example Training Concept/Milestones
A Possible "Way Forward"
I A day= Concept approval date
r. ----·----··---
+
.
---- - . ---
A+ 200
All 18 IMF battalions
I trained and operating.
_______ ,. ___ --~
+
---- --·--· -
, ---~-----
A+210
CJTF-7 begins
training first Brigade
·Headquarters. j
L --·--------·····--· ------
7/10/2003
24

CPA Policy Implications
• IMF adheres to all policies established for the
New Iraqi Army (NIA).
• Request guidance on authorized entitlements
for IMF officers and soldiers.
• IMF units will be multi-ethnic organizations
with demographics reflective of local
Govemorate.
7/10/2003 25

Recommended IMF Policy
Implementation
• IMF Pay is IAW NIA pay tables. IMF soldiers will be in full time.
militia status. NIA pay tables are still under review, therefore IMF
soldiers will initially receive $501 111011th stipend until publication of
INA, pay tables.
• Duration of service is one \·ear l()r enlisted. thr~~ \'Cars f(H· offi~crs.
w •
Reenlistment criteria TBD. Fxccptional officers l111d soldiers can he
considered - l()r serYicc in NL'\.
• Uniform, rank structure IAW NIA. IM' F proposed transitional unifonn
is w: hite engineer tape around each upper arm.
• Request additional CJTF-7 discretionary funding totally $423,000 to
cover two month's stipend payments.
• Ptioritization of resource allocation to support national programs,
in.eluding the Facility Protection Security Force (FPSF), the National
Jobs Program, and the Border Patrol.
7/10/2003 . 26

...------
I
I
I r1:c a t-J _s, P "-
lllmlllllml<~o~ __ M_o_o_> ______________________________________________ ._.
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
... st 31, 2003 9:17 PM
••111•••[0-6 MOD)
FW· ICDC Weblink
~- fyi. we ultimate:y go~ to the right guy on this. I thinK his response below
answered if not satisfied most the questions from the other day. WR
MAJ
Webl1nk.
11111111 .. See my commenLs below. I am a bit wordy but I want to make sure my points are
~r9lood correctly, I hope that my words do not have an opposite eftect and ''muddy the
waters.··-
f'rom:
Sent:
To:····· Subject:
Thanks for the info, you've been very helpful.
on a couple points yet, however:
1 need to see if l can qct clarification
1. I think. some confusion may still exist over what "stood up" means wrt Battalions.
A: 0 Stood up" means that a division recruits, trains, and equips a battalion's worth of
people. Essentially, the divisions are starting with no~hing, gatherinq resources (men and
equipment) and then making them into something, in this case small units.
Q: I take it that it means that the decision point has been reached and we've decided to
proceed?
A: The original plan had a much more orderly implementation over the course of several
months, CJT~-7 would recruit, train, and equip eiqht battalions. The time in between the
initial eiqht and the follow-on battalions was to see if Lhe concept was a good idea and
work out Lhe kinks. Over the past month, the leadership, (civilian and military) have made
the decision to accelerate the implementation of the battalions. Moving the time forward
via orders aud fraqos does not necessarily mean that we can physically do it. It does give
commanders the latitude to do it faster if they can.
2. is it fair or proper to say that some battalions have been organized, say?
A: As we get more people into the program the answer will be yes. At the stage of
implementation we dre at right now the answer is no. Please understand that this past week
was th~ fir~t w~ek the divisions rea:ly started to train ICDC. Training really takes about
two to three weeks depending on the methods used by each division. You might be tempted to
think. that they all do it the same way but this is not the case.
Q: Or are being organi,ed? The excel spreadsheet/update continues to make reference to
battalions.
A: Yes, 1 would say battalions are being organized but this is more for administrative
reasons than for employment.
Q: J c~n ~e~ thNt tot~: trained and operating add up to less th~n-- but almost-- one
battalion, however, I don't think its right to say Lhat only one battalion has been
1

organi~ed. Are these squads, even conceptually, being organized into battalions?
A: You are correct. The !CDC on the ground are split up into small units. One coalition
placoon may have a squad of its own rcnc. One of the intents of the ICDC is to help our
soldiers communicate with the people in the communities that they operate. Here are some
examples that I have used tor demonstration. Please note that these are some ways ! see
the ICDC being employed. The division commander is ultimately the man who determines how
his division will utilize his people.
1. A squad is going on patrol downtown in Mosul. The ~quad takes some of their ICDC with
them to use as translators. The ICDC should have been hired from the local area and be
able to help guide the squad, know or figure out who doesn't belong in a neighborhood, and
start ~o give the Iraqis some confidence in the security environment. Like Bosnia, if the
squad leader handles the situation right it can appear that the ICDC is taking the lead,
mainly because of his language skills and give local people confidence.
2. Another situation is ICOC conducting convoy security with our troops. If ICDC are
riding in convoys with coalition troops the Improvised ~xplosive Devices (IEDs) that the
enemy is using against us will start to injure or kill Iraqis. This will change the
attitude of the people. Instead of foreigners getting ~illed, they will have to face the
reality of their own people being killed. If an ICOC is h1red from that area and he gets
hurt the local people will really feel the impact. Who knows, they might get the courage
to turn in the bad actors or foreign fighlers entering the country.
Q: I need a way to link what's been briefed to An'lb. Bremer to what is actually going on
now. Even if it no longer is an appropriate way to describe the situation, then what did
we mean when w~ Sn1d B Battalions stood up?
A: What was really meant was eight battalion "equivalents" recruited, trained and
equipped. The divisions are striving toward this. They are simply using a building block
method. For the ICDC, four squads form a platoon. Four platoons make up a company. Four
companies and one HHC company form a battalion.
Q: How do we know it we're hitting our targets, or how behind we are?
A: Wow, this is a tough one that I have been struggling Lo figure out the ~hole time that
I have had this project. J don't have an answer for you except that we will know as time
goes on. rerhaps in as little as u month or so now th~t the division~ have started their
training programs. I can speculate further but I do not have the expertise to give you a
better answer.
I can tell you this, the divisions are moving along as fast as they can with what chey
have while maintaining all of the other commitments that they are obligated to fulfill as
well as the new ones that they get tasked with daily.
Originally, the ICDC were supposed to be an outfit with minimal training, seven days
maximum, and then go out Lo work with our forces. Whal actually is happening is that
divisions are realizing that you can't just give a guy a uniform and a gun and then expect
him t:O know what to do. You have to train h1m. This is part of what makes uur Army gn~a L.
The divisions know the endstate and they are making the necessary adjustments to make the
plan successful.
Q: If you can take a stab, or know so~eone who can, I'd appreciate it.
A: I am the action officer for the !CDC so I am the one to answer your questions .. 1111111111111
WR
-----Oriqinal Message-----
~rorn: • G3 fUOPS
Sent~. Saturda A.u ust 30, 2~
To: MAJ;~
SubJect: RE: We ink
Sorry about that, try this. I gave you the link to the internal LAN by mistake ..
2

http:/
- -- ' sections/g3/NIA_Briefingsllllllllll
-
nothing attached
-----Original Messagc-----
From: r.~ fUOPS
Saturday, August 30, 2003 5:46 PM
MAJ; COL; COL CJTF7-C3COL;-
Mr.~. I have attached the two documents that I lhink wlll be most beneficial for
you. The !lpread!lheeL l!l tin: meLho<.i I use Lu track. Lhe stat.us of t:.he ICDC .. MAJ -
\\c5maincpweb\NIABRIEFINGSWEB
MAJ
CJTF-7 fUOPS Officer
"Support 'til your nose bleeds"

UNCLASSIFIED
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD
ACTION MEMO
August 28, 2003
FOR: THE ADMJNISTRA TOR
FROM: Office of Genera] Counsel
SUBJECT: Order Establishing the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
The enclosed Order establishes the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) as a force in
support of Coalition operations to assist in providing security and stability to the people
oflraq. As a result of coordination through the interagency process, the Order is silent on
two key policy issues:
• Garrisoning and Employment. The Order does not address the garrisoning or
regional employment of the force. Language limiting the utility of the force was
removed to preserve flexibility. CJTF-7 envisions the force as being employed
locally and adding value through their local relationships. OSD Policy has
concerns with this approach, fearing that this force may not develop to provide a
needed larger force capability and also may lead to the creation of regional
militias.
• Heavy Weapons. The Order authorizes the ICDC to possess Heavy Weapons in
accordance with Order 3, Weapons Control. Language limiting the possession of
Heavy Weapons was removed at the request of OSD Policy and JCS to preserve
flexibility. Under Order 3, the ICDC are pennitted to possess Heavy Weapons
under Coalition Forces supervision. The limitation language was originally
included because the ICDC will undergo very limited training and there is concern
about their ability to exercise judgment when using Heavy Weapons.
RECOMMENUATlON: That the Administrator sign the proposed Order
COORDINATION: Director, Security Affairs; CJTF-7
UNCLASSIFIED

Iraqi Civil Defense Corns
Status: Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) has been established to provide tactical support
to Coalition ground forces, whilst putting an Iraqi face on daily internal security
operations. Currently deploying at individual, team. squad level~ tasks include fixed site
security, convoy I route protection, crowd and riot control, HUMINT and linguistic
support as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Initial planned strength is 8
battalions of 846 personnel each, increasing to 18 battalions by Jan 04. The current plan
envisions each Governate being allocated one ICDC battalion.
Update: Recruiting for the ICDC continues. To date 648 ICDC personnel have been
trained and are operating with coalition troops. A further 3518 are undergoing training.
Currently, ICDC personnel are only being used for joint missions with coalition troops.
Training is conducted by coalition units within their respective regions. The content of
the training is detennined by the unit's requirements; however, certain minimum training
objectives have been laid down by CJTF-7. These minimum training requirements cover
weapon handling, first aid, the law of land warfare and rules on the use of force.
ICDC personnel are currently paid at the same rate as members of the New Iraqi Anny.
Once the new rates have been set by the CPA, the ICDC wil1 continue to be paid at the
same rate as the Anny.
Original funding of $60.95M has been increased to $75.584M and included in the FY 04
Supplemental. Additional funding purchases vehicles, communications equipment,
personal protective equipment and basic infrastructure. These purchases greatly improve
the responsiveness and flexibility of ICDC units and also enable them to fulfill a wider
range of mission requirements.
Next Steps: Continue to recruit and train ICDC personnel in accordance with stated aim
of 18 battalions by Jan 04. For the near term, ICDC salaries will continue to use the same
scales as the Anny. Elements within CPA and CJTF-7 are establishing guidelines on
salaries for ICDC and Anny that correlate to Police and other agencies of the MOI and
FPS that adequately reflects and compensates for the element of risk inherent in the job,
without contributing to wage inflation. The intent is to put these salary scales in place by
1 October.

01 MAY03
27 MAY03
06JUN 03
07 JUL03
05AUG03
10 AUG 03
15AUG03
06 SEP 03
18 SEP 03
23 SEP - 09 OCT 03
02Nov-UTC
08 Nov - 25 NOV 03
ICDC Timeline
First Peshmerga soldiers arrive to AO Glory to
assist with security of ASP
FIFF/ NISF/ KDP combine to form the Joint Iraqi
Security Company
A Co. JISC begins basic training
A Co. JISC graduate basic training and begin
ASP security mission
B Co. and C Co JISC graduate basic training
CJTF-7/Dlvlslon establish Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
A Co. and B Co. merge and C Co. and D Co. merge
B Co. ICDC graduate basic training
D Co. Graduation (1~ Bn Training Complete)
3n1 Bn ICDC (lrbll) MTT
/CDC - PLDC begins
4111 Bn /CDC (As Su/aymanlyah) MTT

ICDC Endstate & Troop to Task
lrbl
-lnMoaul
-·
2

Camp Allied Training Center
------
Permanent Cadre
Classrooms
KB&RDFAC
Billeting Facilities
Medical suppo: rt
Graduated over 1000 ICDC soldiers
From a looted camp to quality facillty
TRAINING
•Modeled after US Army training
•ROE, values, and standards
•Focus on security ops
•Weapons training
•Physical Fitness
3

i.
I
Cadre
OIC: CPTD
NCOIC: MSG
ICDC Cadre (8):
MAJ Akram
CPT Ahmed
1LTSophy
1LT Faris
1SG Zyad
SFC Kazi
SSG Radhwan
SSG Sabah
A/1 flCDC LNO
MSG1 -
SFC
PFC
US: 12
ICDC:S
Total: 20
~!' ~··_........ ~ ',..
--~'--- .
-
.
~(; I i . ·--,,i '!';j.
"!ie ~ ._~.
--
~ -" "--
1st Battalion {Ninawa) Missions
• Security ol Mosul ASP/AO Glory
• Security of Pipeline
• Security of DMAIN/DREAR
-. • Security of Jaguar ASP
• Patrols In Mosul
4

ICDC MTT
"
• 3n:1 Battalion MTT {lrbil) ., < ' , •
- 854 Soldiers·· •· ~~ ~·. ; .-. • · -.. ' . · • -P
. #-; 404th ~A B~. 4't ·the c'Opc!ft1o~.;..for MT-r at_Kani~rJkii f t,·
as&' begtri ~3 S&ent 03 •· ~ ~ "'\ ;a... ) ' r:
~ ...,....... . • 'F ·"' r-.:.e. . I
ng .~!BPI~ 9 Oct dSi,ty,, ·'1... _ ~ ~ '14'1& ·'.~',.
'
· ~ ~ . 11·· ' ~ _,.. ·~.r·
• 4th Battalion MTr (AJ ~waymamyaY'I) , ·. ..i •. · .. )..
- 854 Soldier.s "" ~ __.: ~...&. ""1
~r r
- 404th CA/PUK providing As ~h ~ninQ'facility .... t <f
- First class begins 08 Nov 03 &~ ~~
- Graduation 25 Nov 03 in As SulaymaniYfth. ~ i , ,. ~ •
l !.. ..
• Endstate: 2:44 ADA trained and graduated 3 ICDCCtions r· 1 1
with an endstrength of nearly 3,000 Arab, PUK, and °K~1
personnel ready to assume security operations In support ~
coalition missions ~
-·
Camp Kan/-Karshal
3nt Battalion ICDC
Begins 23 Sep 03
Complete 09 Oct 03
Graduation 05 Nov 03
Week 1 - 479 Soldiers \
'Week 2 - 375 Soldiers
Total 854 Soldiers
5

ICDC - PLDC
• Objective. Provide ICDC NCOs with a basic
leadership foundation ..
• 7 Day Instruction includes:
·~ Laa~u...
~-If ""'1iJI~~ I
. .....:comrntlnlcatton skills
~. *"1\en~nce
~ P~iQp,al S1<ins
-:- Training ·
.--'Military Studies
• Cedre is US and Iraqi
• First Course to begin 02 Nov 03 at Allied
Camp
6

ICDC Issues
./Uniforms
- Acquisition of new BOU, winter clothing.
- Require 7000 uniforms for 151
- 4th Battalions
• Equipment
- Units still lack basic equipment for operations, ie.,
• military vehicles, commo, computers, etc •
./ Pay
- Remains an issue, but no longer a show stopper.
- Mitigated effects of initial pay cut
• Promoted 54 soldiers in A Co (JAW the ICDC MTOE and
approval from G3) IOT get soldiers better pay.
- Big boost In morale - Trust reinforced
• Payment for weapons
• Former Iraqi Military Pay IS
~ .. \
Comments ?
7

As of 301600d JUL 03 UNIT WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT
REQUIREMENTS
EQUIPMENT TOTAL RB:QUIRB:D CORREN'l' llIRIMUX REMARKS
RBOUIRZD HLT v 30 JUL 03
~VAILAB~E
RPK LIGHT 30 66 0 35 issued to ~
MACHINEGUNS KMTB /
AK-47 RIFLES 1000 0 1000-93-30- 671 issuec.'16i.11
100-671=106 retrieve when
1000 from Jordan
arrive.
9MM PISTOLS 80 2+1+1+1=5 80-26=54 26 delivered to
KMTB '/'
9MM PISTOL 4000 4000 2000 RDS OF 9x1Bmm= (2000)
AMMUNITION 9MMX18MM; 9xl9mm-514,000
2000RDS OF Available
9MMX19MM
AK-47 400,000 400,000 400,000 Almost ?million
AMMUNITION rds of 7.62x39mrn. I
7.62 X 39MM Available
AK-47 BAYONETS REMOVED AS A REQUIREMENT (18 JUL 03)

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
As of 301600d JUL 03 REQUIREMENTS
EOO'IPMl'nT TOTAL REQUIRED CtJRRENT II DJ I MUM
Anl'LABLE REQUIRED NLT
30 JUL 03
lUl!MABKS
HELMET WITH 1000 7334 800
ACCESSORIES
RUCKSACK (PACK) 1000 7837 800
BELT (PISTOL) 1000 7837 800
CANTEENS (2} 2000 35274 0
CANTEEN CUP 2000 0 0
CANTEEN CUP 2000 7902 2000
POUCH (2EA)
AK-47 MAGAZINES 4000 8994 4000
9MM MAGAZINES 160 0 200
RPK MG, 40 /75FD 60 0 100
MAGAZINES (2EA)
9MM HOLSTERS 100 5818 50
2200 delivered
2200 delivered
Zero 9mm mags
Zero RPK mags
No longer on
report?
SUSPENDERS 7837
HARNESS 1000 9620 0
(AK-47 VESTS)
1000 delivered

CJTF-7 BPT EQUIPMENT
As of 301600d JUL 03 AVAILABLE
EQUIPMENT TOTAL CURRENT MINI MOM
REQUIRED AVAJ:LABLE REQUIRED NLT
30 JUL 03
REMARKS
DUFFLE BAGS 9264
IZ UNIFORM 4329
BELTS
IZ UNIFORM 0
SHIRTS
IZ UNIFORM 31
TROUSERS
LBE 671
LT WT UNIFORM 100
Taking off
report
Taking off
report
WOOL UNIFORM 100
UTILITY 100
UNIFORM
Taking off
report
Taking off
report
Taking off
report

CPA FUNDING REQUEST
PRBNo: (PRB Staff t. o AssiJ?n) Project Name: AKs
Date of Rec1uest: 7/2712020 Date Required:. 8/15/2003
Name of Requester: COL r I Signature:
CPA0f6ce/Unit: MNSD POC/Persoo Completing Form: COL?
Amount of Request: S6. ll5M DSN/Cell Phone:~ - l
Project Location: Baghdad (Region) Email Address~
l. Project Category (check all that apply):
0 Health § Salaries 0
Reconstruction
Humanitarian
Food Distribution
Water/Sewer
Electricity
Rule of Law/Govern.
Div. Commanders
Fund
0 Transportation
Pensions 0
0 Economic Programs
BudgetlOps. Support 0
0 Education 0
Other Pul>I ic Services 0
0 Ministry 0
Social Programs 0
0 Po1ice/ Security [81
Cultural Programs 0
0 Brig. Commanders 0
Regional Dir. 0
Fund
Fund
Construction Initiative 0
2. Proposed Fondi.ng Source: 3. Funding Data:
(P. RB Sta: ff Only)
Vested Assets § Baok Account Details: or
Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:
Appropriated Funds
CPA Rcp/O nit Responsible for Oversight:
Iraqi Development Fund D
Engineering Oversight Assigned to:
Name of Certifying Official:
4. Clearances: Please lndic-ate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable.
(Note: lf t.hat coordination cannot be done at tb.e regional level, it wiU be done by PRC.)
Regional Coordinator: Yes 0 No 0 Name: ·
Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes 0 No D Name· :
Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes 0 No D Name:
Reconstruction!USAID: Yes D No 0 Name:
lntemational Coordination Council: Yes 0 No 0 Name:
Others:
Pro2t"am Staff Use Only
Form Complete: Yes D No D
Date Request Received: rnm/dd/yyyy Disposition:
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy
Disposition:
Date Request Submitted to Progmm Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy
Dis osition:
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller. mm/dd/yyyy
Disposition (including expenditure authorized):
Form PRB-01 ver. 6/19/03
L
L

----------
-
.
Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions
Ministries and Military units have identified an immediate need for just over 35,000 AK
weapons.
Contracting office will let open bid for 3 5 ,000 weapons at $17 5 ($6. l 25M) for delivery NL T 15
August to 3 COSCOM at Taji Airbase. The weapons will be distributed from there to units.
Form PRB--01ver.6/19/03

---------~~~~~
Request the following items from your list:
Ammunition:
0 7.62 x 39mm ball- 13,160,300
o 7.62 x 39mm tracer- 1,052,800
o 9mm x 19mm Hydra Shock - 10,000
o 9mm x 19mm Ball - 40,000
o Mortar Bomb, 120mm HE - 5,328
o Mortar Bomb, l 20mm Smoke - J96
o Mortar Bomb, 120mm WP - 1,. 000
o Monar Bomb, 60mm HE - 4,824
o Mortar Bomb, 60mm Ulu'm, - 660
o Mortar Bomb, 60mm WP - 7 ,973
Weapons and accessories:
o Machine G~ RPK., 7 .62x39mm 1,425
o Machine Gun Took Kit - 3
o Magazine, AK.-47 30 rd - 26.100
o Magazine, AK.SU - 74 30 rd - 6,440
o Magazine, RPK 40 rd - l • .SOO
o Magazine, RPK 75 rd - 67
o Mortar, l20mm-31
o Mortar. 120 barrel w/ access - 6
o Mortar, 60 mm 4-barrel assy w / accessory - 9
o Mortar, 60mm Commando - 2
o Mortar tube, 60nun Commando - 150
o Pistol, PPK - 2
o Rifle, AK-47 - 13.272
o Rifle, AK-74 - 1,926
o Rifle, AKS-74U - 936
Thanks!

CPA FUNDING REQUEST
PRBNo: (PRB Staff to Assign) Project Name: NIA Weapons
Date of Request: 7 /24/2003 Date Required :· 7/31/2003
Name of Requester: COLr I Signature:
CJ>A OfficefUni. t: NSD POC!Person Complettn2 Form: COU
Amount of Request: 10.72 DSN/Cell Ph()ne:r .. I
Project Location: Klr Kush (Region) EmaU Address:1
l. Project Category (check all that apply):
Health § Salades 0
Recnns lruc lion
Humanitarian
Food Distribution
Water/Sewer
Electricity
Rule of Law/Govern.
Div. Commanders
Fund
Transportation
Pensions D
Economic Programs
Budget/Ops. Support 0
Education 0
Other 'Public Services 0
Ministty ~
Social Programs D
Police/ Security
Cultural Programs 0
Brig. Commanders
Regional Dir. 0
Fund
Fund
Construction Initiative 0
l
I
2. Proposed Funding Source:
3. Funding Data:
(PRB Starr Only)
Vested Assets D Bank Account Details: or
Seized Assets 0
Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:
Appropriated Funds 0
CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight:
Iraqi Development Fund 0
Engineering Oversight Assigned to:
Name of Certifying Official.:
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clcara11ces. as applicable.
(Note: rr that coordination cannot be do11e at the regjonal lent, it · will be done by PRC.)
Regional Coordinator: Yes 0 No D Name:
Ministry Senio. r Advisor: Yes 0 No 0 Name:
Office Oirector/Unit Command.er: Yes 0 No 0 Name:
Recon. struc.tion/USAID: Yes 0 No 0 Name:
International Coordination Council: Yes 0 No 0 Name:
Others:
Program Staff Use Only
Form Complete: Yes D No 0
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mmlddlyyyy
Disposition:
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/ddlyyyy
Dis osition:
Date Request Ret1.1med to Requestcr/Submhted to Comptroller: mmldd/yyyy
Disposition (including · expenditure authorized):
Forni PRB-01 ver. 6119103

Descriotton of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions
39,000 new AK weapons are needed to equip the soliders of the New lraq1 Anny.
(1,000 are needed by 1 August; 4, 000 by I Oct· and the remainder every training program over
lhe next 2 years to a total of 39,000)
Jordan has offered to sell up to 65,000 new AKs for $275 ea.
At that rate, the NIA requirement costs $10.72SM.
Recommend this money be advanced against the NSD budget for the New Iraqi Anny.
Form PRB--0 l ver. 6/19/03

I July. 26, 2003
Saturday . - PR8 Seml"ar 0930.1630
t_• SEC0!1 ~ lofo ,... ID Ex,..."-" bv 1 CIVI
-
7 00 I V CJTF-71,,...,,._ I
9 00 t..• 5e'1klr AdvlSIO<S MeeUno I "'1>ib Ofll<f!l
I J~ly 27, 2003 ' ·'
Sunday
6 !.!!
700 V OTF · 1U"""'~ I
\..~ Senio'< A<Mso<$ ........._,<Ami> Ol!lc:e'
--
9.2!-
10$
9~ Ga. t'dntf: 011 Security lloilrd f
1100
121!'
- ""'
1.Q.\!
2_!12
] .!l2
10.!!!>
11..QJ!
12· 11!! 0 Wffk/y a Fvslon loleWilg (window Ind n .... 1 U/Te - IU'I$ 12·2)
(VICtllry 14111!1)
1- C!!
-w · 2-
3 00
U l'n)gritm ~ Goerd (Mlnt<trie CR)
4 !0
500
t
5.!ll!
500 t..• Staffs~ HeeUnn <C<JS <>l!lce' I
6~
--
7 00 "J"° Dinner tho Amb Saw<ers (R!NP by COB ID -....r -
brCJ
(Al Anjon R~Mt
- Time T80)
I• 8..Qq 8 00
9 -22 9~
~
~
- ~
~
Slocombe, Walt 8. (SES) 3 7/24/2003 6:39 AM Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) 4 7/24/2003 6:39 AM

From: v J{l
Sent:
To:
~ "'Nednesdav.July2 _ 3_ .2 ~ 0 -----:--:--- :-::~.,...~~~~~-=--:-~--~-:--.:r'=;.;.;;;.;;.;;.;.;.;.=. ~ ~ · ----.
L _ .- locombe
Walt B. (SES}; US Embassy Jordan DCM US Embassy Jordan
e ' ---.,-- ----------
Subject:
Re: RE: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military 2.£ ( 0 MM r-..JJ IN A--4/
~/wifr-i./U. ~> TO /V\c.~~··/
I"\ _ ?f2. '"'""' n'l A•1'1*... l n - t>rr -,
All v~ ....:-. ...,-~ L.£1.1££.... ro . .,J-
, ft}\.; l c. "1 ~ c...Mi>~~\ So vv € c,,,.,.., /-...A ,,_'
We just got a call from the JAF Chairman. He indicated the following weapons were i--'~
available for delivery:
65,000 AK47 rifles with complete kits- $275 ea. Avail. for transfer by l August. 200 M60
MG with kits- 2,750 ea. 9,960 Beretta folding stock rifles {5.56I!Ull)- $350 ea. l,000 Ml6Al
rifles- FREE
Just to reiterate the below message. All of this should be viewed as negotiable if
elevated to a higher level.
Regards,
A liC:: 118. 121 M
[
M'D -:: ~ •S'S" M
Original Message -----
From:L I
Date: .__W_e_dn_e_s_d~a-y-,-J-u~l~y--2.,.3-. -2~0-0~3-1_:_2_,7 pm
Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
g-c e.£ rrA- ": f .3 . s-"""'
f Z'Z 7 5"'7 ti .:;-o
J I
> Gentlemen,
>
> I'd like to reflect back on a couple of the discussions from this
> side on this subject:
>
> First off: . il there is no money in the till at CPA for these
> weapons and equipment, we need t6 escalate this to a political
> l evel and request they be "donat~d·. The Jordanians want to get
> i.nvolved here ana holding these we· apons in their current state is
> of negative value. U we pnli'A, ln!'il c01.1) g get th'i>PR gg, Q\ol.1"" t'ilnns
> Of course, nothing is ever free so assurances from senior DoS and
> ooo leaders that it will strengthen the relat ionship, or of other
> compensation {TBD) would need to be given. This is outside the
> influence of the DoD team here and needs to be addressed by more
> senior Dos, OSD, CPA, an<l CENTCOM staff in thl:! c oming dayl::l.
>
>Secondly: t he AK-47's and other light weapons are only a small
> portion of the potential assistance that the JA"F can provide. We
> arf.! woA"Jd .. ng wi t h the JAF on a more substantial invencory o · f their
> stocks in relation to vehicles and other equipment that they rnay
> be willing to transfer in the medium (1- 3 month,s) to lopg {3 - 18
> mont.hs) term. In addition, the t . raining and personnel assistance
> will most likely become a part of the equation. Our view is that
>there needs ta hp a POC for managing the logistics and details of
> this rapidly expanding program that is outside of t D
> of t as to be someone from CPA,
> dl' we will c ontinue to ru.n in circles to solve problems. We're
> f i lling the gap for now, but this resourcing issue needs addressed
> to get this all done properly.
>
IC~ c0 ,,.,,.,,.., tr ,voA-no...,:
I. T'A ~ E E" _.. At..'-
2. ~ ~1..1C j,AJ/
~. C..."'T Fe , r-H
f N\JoLV~.
> The JAF is prepared to release these weapons o/a 29 July and we
> have arranged line-haul capacity £.or l August so its really a
> matter of closing the terms of the deal. We'll support as best we
c ~~ °'"" "\.. ~ 1 1
• 'Do iu. P• ~ .f-d~-J ~ '" oct- Cg..,..., ~ ._ .._ __ 7
r- -
. -------------~
_
1 61c~ ~
• ~i'~
1
' .., t5S 10... ''t__ J
~<~·~ ? ~-----~-------------------~
cJ.cT'4Co ~ "?
-----------------------------------------------~---~--~----

> can to facilitate .
>
> Thanks,
>
: .•••
> Kl\J, USAA
>
> NOTE: The D~TT/HAP Chiet has info'd oso and CENTCOM on curren~
> status of ~hese discussions and asked for their assistance. > Ori
> F"rom: LTC
>Date: Tuesday. July 22, 2003 1:44 pm
> Subject: RE: RE: RE : Support from Jordanian Military
: >COL ·····
> > See the attached for an update on weapons . More soon. Let rne
> > know if you
> > hove questions.
> >
> > VR,
>> -
> >
> > LTC
> > oeput
> > Cocran:
> > Mobil
> > SIPR:
> >
> > -----Orisinal Hsrales-----
> >From: • • • ••• •• (0-6 Ministry of
> > •
> > Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2003 10:44 PM
> > To:
> >Cc: LTC
> Ministry o
>>Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES);
> >
MAP-Jordan}
De tense)
> > Subject: RE: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
----
: -and -
> >
> > Very important that nothing goes back to DAO Al:\'\rnan until Hr
> > Slocombe has cleared it with A.MB Bremer.
> >
> > - - please see me or call me
if you need
> > to meet
> > or clarify guidance.
> >
> >
Thanks!
> >
> >
-
> >
> > -- - - Original Messa e-----
> > From: Lt Col •••••••••••••••••
> > Sent
> > To : •1 I
>>> ~ >> Cc: 11:
1s
1a
1t
1u
1r
1d
1a
1y
11.
1J
1u
111_., 1 ~ , ~ 2 ! 0~0~3 6:23 PM
(0-6 Ministry of Defense) ; LTC -
~ ............ lllllllllll!!!!!!lllCIV M inistry of Defense;
> Slocombe.
> > Walt B
- LTC;·········· > > Subject~ RE: RE: RE : Support from Jordan~an Milit~ry
> > (SES); ·····
> >
Sounds like a plan, thanks
>
>
2

> > DATT
> >
> >
>
>
of Defense); LTC~
Ministry of Defense;
> >
- LTC;
> >
Re: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> >
> >
> > Sir,
> >
> > As discussed today.
we met both yesterday and today with the
> Ministry> ot
> > Defense and Interior teams. We have a good laundry list of
> > re~irementsfrom both that we will pull together and review
with
> > COi.m on
> > Saturday.
> >
> > I' l l put something out from there for you t o float with the
> > J ordanians.
> > If they are in agreement. we can begi n to finallze details of
> > logistics.costs, etc.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> >
> > MAJ, USAR
> >
> > - - ---
Origina~Messa e
> > From: Lt Col 11111111111111111111111!!
> > Date: Tuesday, Ju y 8, 2003 6:48 pm
> > Subject: RE: RE: support from Jordanian Military
> >
> > > llW-ha ir - I hoped to get there but so much going on
or I) were not able to get away this week.
> > > here we
was-
> > >
> > able to
> > > discuss way ahead in a face-to face with you today? I am standing
> > > by to help coordinate JO support for the effort.
of Defense>
> >
> >
> > > Cc: CIV
> > Ministry o
>>>Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. !SES}; LTC
> > >Subject: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > >
>>---
>>.-!
> > >
> > >
Su.r:;.;y Wt! iniss~d (.;Ornm.s today - let's talk tomorrow.
> > >
> > >
Very much agree with your desire to discuss way ahead.
> > >
> > >
Thanlte!
> > >
3

> > >
COL
> > >
> > > -----Origina
> > > From: Lt Col
> > > Sent: Sunday,
> > >
> > >
> > > Cc: IV
> > Ministry of
>>>Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES);lilllllllllllll LTC
> > > Subject: RE: RE: Support from Jor~ry
> > >
> > > Col - t:hanks for the invite. We hope to help bridge the
> > > Jordanian offer of help made in Washington this May with firm
> > > Co1JU11itments. I will
> > > discuss this issue and visit proposal it with the Ambassador
> > > tomorrow to
> > > see
> > >if he'll let me (or Lt Collllllllll travel. Looking for a detailed
> > > listof
> > > requirements from your end (training/equipment/etc) that JO just
> > > roay be
> > > able
> > > to help fill.
> > >
> > >
> > > Lt Col, USAF
> > > c ing e ense Attache
> > > Air Attache & Chief, AF Assistance Pgm
> > > USDAO/MAP Amman
> > >mail: US Embassy Amman Jordan USDAO
> > >
> > > phone:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > of Defense)
> > >
> >
AM
> >
> >
Slocombe, Walt 8. (SES)
Jordanian Military
> >
> > >
> >
> >
> > -
> > >
Great!
> > >
> > >
> > >
My cellphone is (US nwnber)
> > >
What's yours?
> > >
> > > Would definitely like to work with you and-on
> > Wednesday -
>>>have puc placeholder on calendar from 1530-1630 ... but can
> adjust if
> > > morning makes more sense.
> > >
Thanks, 11111111- looking forward to this ...
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
4

··---------------- --
.....
> > >
> >
> >
en e
> > >
> > >-----
> >
M i nistry of Defense;
Re: RE: Support from
Wa t B. ($ES)
Military
> > >
> > > Sir,
> > >
> > > I'll give you a call tomorrow to discuss. I'm curiou& as to
> > what the
> > > iesuee on this end were/are that are holding this up. I'm not
> > > aware of any requests for support that have come through the
> > > Embassy here .
> > >
> > > Let us know what you need and we can help.
> > >
> > > LTC is considering making a trip to CPA this week
> > > {Wednesday) if
> > > there is a need to discuss this and other opportunities for
> > Jordanian> aupport of your efforts. I think it makes a lot of
> > sense as there
> > > is a
> > > ton we can provide through the network of support the MAP/DAO team
> > > havedeveloped here. Please let us know if you would like to meet
> > > LTCF ] on Wednesday so we can arrange.
> > >
> > > I will be at CPA on Wedtlesday as I am coming to work on some other
> > > issues so I will stop by then.
> > >
> > > Thanks.
> > > •==;=:::;:t1
> > >
> > > a:::==:a:;.i
> > >
> > >
> > > -----
> > > Froll\: (0-6 Ministry of .Defense)•
> > > .. e ______ ...... _-"----=--=-__;.. ..... ,
> > > Date: Saturday, July 5, 2003 5:~5 pm
> > > Subject: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > I'm Walt'5 MA and will work details from thi9
> > end .
•
. workino to
> > > > get more info soon.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks!
> > > > r
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > -----Original M.essage- - ---~-~----~->
> > > From: Slocombe, Wal~ B. (SES)
> > > > Sent : Sat urda Jul 05 2003 6:16 PM
> > > > To :
> > > > Cc : LTC Lt Col ..._~~~~
> r I> > > -~--r::::-:-:-::M.:":'in.....,i;""stry of Defense;
4'. &
-: -=-
--- ==-- -
_
(0-6
> Ministry of
> > > > Defense) Subject : RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for the reMinded.
I am trying to organize a trip to
> > > Amman to
> > > > discuss these issues, but there are scheduling problems (at that
> > > endl .> Walt
> > > >
> > > > - ---- Original Message-----
~=

- -
> > > > From: - -
- -
> > > > Sent: Friday, July 04, 2003 5:07 PM
> > > > To: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) 11111111111111111111111111111111
> > > > Cc: LTC•••!!!!!!!!!!!!••• Lt Col
> > > > JamesCIV Ministry of Defense
> > > > Subject: Support from ~ordanian Military
> > > >
> > > > Walt,
> > > >
> > > > We have met on a couple of occasions during my visits to OCPA.
> > > >Usually.the discussion was about sourcing the material for the
> > > > uniforms.
> > > >
> > > > During my last vi$it, r ~poke briefly with HG Eaton about the
> > > > potentialfor having trainers £rom Jordan involved with the NIC.
> > > > He indicated an interest in a contribution, but requested that
> > > > the Jordanians
> > > propose> something rather than we officially requesting a
> > > contribution.>
> > > > we have worked on this a bit from our end and it looks as though
> > > this> would be well received by the Jordanians. In fact, it
> > > appears there
> > > > ¥/ere conuni LrntmLY made by senior Jordanian mili r..a.ry o!ficiall:J at
> > > > the Dep. Secy Defense level offering to support your efforts.
> > > >
> > > > Unfortunately, the critical follow up was not accomplished
> and the
> > > > Jordanians are awaiting some sort of list of what the needs of
> > > MoD are
> > > > for trainers.
> > > >
> > > > I am cc'ing LTC (acting Defense Attache) here at US
> > > Embassy> /ullJnan so that he can carry these discussions forward with
> > > you or M'i.........
> > > > Eaton. ~would like to come down to OCPA this week if
> > > possible to
> > > > discuss this.
> > > :;,.
> > > > Could you let us know if there are still needs from OCPA MoD and
>>>when> may be a good time for LTCllllllto visit?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Thanks
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> >
>
~-
~
6

·"' - -
(A,Sj
[ ] (0-6 MoNSD)
From:
To:
Cc:
Sent: 1:50 PM
~----~ lC0-6 MoNSD); Kennedy, Patrick AMS; [ .._.._ _____ ___.
Subject: {)v { L, L (Z C l,l O&v
r uV' ro0/r11.
interview by the WSJ and a ef1 You may want to look at this e-mail which highlights an
r"' lin the north. I'm not sure what weapons cache they're referring to in Bag or
who he spoke to a CPA, but I can give you the following
update orr-= !bile>! issues.
We received a note this morning from that our budget through December has been
approved, add:i;-essing police uniforms and equipment, weapons and ammunition, vehicles and
e. quipment, public order equipment, forensic equipment for the approximately 30,000 police
officers that are on board already and some training facility needs.
As for radios and communications, there is an assessment and proposal that will work on a
nationwide system that will be interoperable for all MOI agencies. This is for the long
term, but for the short, perhaps Col.r" J ean do what Baghdad and many other cities
have done and that is to acquire small portable point to points to address present
necessities.
I'll keep you updated.
MIKE BRAUN:
According to the police advisory team, recalls a Col.r
spoke with regards to his quotes.. Can you please see who he
~----~
-----Q:-ig-in .... a- · l...,_,.~ ... ~-s~ --- --
From: r'"~~- ---"--~~-~ J
Sent: Monday, JulY=1: , 2003 2:59 AM
To: I ~ ; .Sraun Michael A. (SES-5)
Subject: Pw: WSJ query that requires response on Monday
..._ __ <&_lC'_..1Michael,
We need to respond to this by tonight. Grateful for guidance.
Spokesman
Coalition Provisionary Authority
Iraq
[
Forwarded by L '--'ll•••••ll CIC on 21/07/2003 11:55 -----
[
To
21/07/2003 10:33
l

cc
Subject
WSJ query that requires response on
Monday
In a visit to Mosul I was told to top commanders of the 2nd brigade of the lOlst Airborne
of the numerous problems the h obtaining weapons and radios for the Iraqi police
and fixed-site secu 1 y orce~ 1ng ere. ome po icemen are s a i
just 10 Motorola radios, Col.~told me. Efforts to obtain more radios through
the coalition administration 1n Baghdad have fallen on deaf ears, he said.
Also, th second brigade sa s it has tried fruitlessly to obtain weapons from caches in
Baghdad. When a request was made to t e coalition a inis ra ion, e answe
~•you guys solve that problem up north," Col. llllllllllsaid. Under the current
system troops give weapons seized in raids to the cops, but those weapons oftentimes are
old or don't function properly.
According to the aecond brigade, bureaucracy continues to stifle efforts to bring law and
order. Pots of money are strictly designated. For example, the lOlst has purchased police
uniforms and boots, refurbished a police academy, re-built a prison and are rebuilding
police stations -- all using mostly seized Iraqi monies designated for community
development. Funds were even authorized to make police batons. But guns, radioa and police
vehicles don't fall under •projects to help the people,n Col.llliiiiiililliisaid.
Perhaps you can respond to these quite serious claims by the military in Mosul. Are more
efforts being made to obtain weapons and radios for the police? What is the timetable to
do so?
I will need a response today (Monday, 7121) by 9 p.m. Baghdad time, as this is for a story
scheduled to run in Tuesday's Wall Street. Journal.
Thanks and best,
Alexei
Alexei Barrionuevo
Staff Reporter
The Wall Street Journal
Alexei.barrionuevo@wsj.com
PLEASE NOTE: THE ABOVE MESS~GE w~s RECEIVED FROM THE INTERNET.
On entering the GSI, this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet
(GSI) virus scanning service supplied exclusively by Cable & Wireless in partnership with
MessageLabs.
GSI users see http://www.gsi.gov.uk/mainfnotices/information/gsi-003-2002.pdf for further
details. In case of problems, please call your organisational IT helpdesk.
2

-"---
- --
co~
A meeting was he!d today i;lj.J.;a.C.1..1..11!!!il.1..l,...l,,"'-U.
Organization) to hammer out the terms of safe/ lransfer. There are several options that came up
during the meeting, we need CPA direction ASAP ... <3HO would \ike us to provide them with a
~uest.
~:K47s at $275 each= $17,875,000
S ippiog (estimate) 5300,000
PTION :
6 . AK47s at $275 each:::: $17,875,000
30,000 K AK47s (0ddilionat), IF USG agrees to replace with M16A1/2s (in the future}; JAF uses
this 30,000 as "reserve" weapons but would prefer to have M16s
Shipping
Ttiere is a third o lion working in which the USG can urchase 50 o
and get the weapons ree_. _ a nee s addition;:it discussion at higher levels. t spoke with the
Vice Chairman tfiis evening and he said whatever the option we choose, he will make it work ... he
wants a ··win-win."
The discussion will continue at 0830 hours tomorrow with MG Kai id Jamoka, ACOS Planning and
Defense Resources. Please provide guidance and we'll continue to work it.
VR,
-

From:
Sent:
To:
Cc;
Subject:
RESEND
Sir
Again sent SIPR I'd add that you might want to send an assessment team to see the
vehicles.
Sir
Our former JTF-West C-4 Majllllllllllllllland I ran all the JTF military convoys out of
Jordan. Major is ~ing up the JTF base redeployment. I had him
go today look at the AK-47 car o and recon the loading area to calculate linehaul
requireme ars we could probably pie up on e irs day they are available,
which may be Tuesday the 29th, load out and depart for the border on t with escort
needed from Trebil to ing of the 1st. We can work the linehaul
details from here, as we do ~his from here on e regular basis. vs CJTF-1 having to
reinvent the wheel. However, we may need some assistance in securing a more robust
security escort than usual, especially east of the hwy 1/12 split.
On another note, I also went to the vehicle storage/rehab base and looked at vehicles.
Although they don't have any available for use now in storage, but they have a rgha1> program which would allow them to take vehicles out of current seJ;:V"ice and replace them
witfl: rehabbed units. I believe the quantities of US made equipment available in within a
couple weeks are:
L 1
Apporx..,5,5 duece-and-a-halfs and SS five ton units. We probably could get these within 2-
3 weeks (time to clean, repaint and service). -
There were also 2~4~0~~e~e~~M~l~S~l~A~C~o~~~~'.::-~~~"":":~~~~~~~~~f~u~l~l~r~e~h~a~b~~~~~:...,!
~erviceable. They indicated that they would be willing to do a full re
requested but it would be several months for the first unit and "'! ... r-,,.t~n-ott..,.n,..k->~$...,,(';;';=;;:r-,_.,,
dilapidated condition.
Available immediately are 19 Jeep liberties less than a year old. They were too small for
the in tended us here. '
Also a vehicle from our Spanish allies, the Spartan APC ( 6 man tracked APC). There are
80 units available now and they are supposedly nearly new. They are mogas powered and were
intended to be reengined with diesel but they have not been able to afford it.
They have us Tank transporters, M-60 tanks, reeove:cy vehicles and other misc v~hicles
available. They have no cranes or wreckers.
They would really need a breakdown of your requirements as they have not been very
irnaginacive abou~ what they could provide, V/R

-
Will sort that out in the AM - just covering emails after long trip.
Wilt keep you informed.
---·-Ori I
From:
Se~, 2003 4:50 PM
SUbject: Weapons Co-
To-----(0-6 MoNSD)
Col-here with the JS in Qatar.
Question: If the country that is offering weapons for sale come through, are you
set to "buy" them? I have seen some emails that indicate there are some people
that believe they are being donated, and we know that is not the case. Just want to
make sure that we are all oo the same sheet of music to execute as SOQTI as the
agreements are struck.

TO: L. Paul Bremer
FROM: Walt Slocombe
RE: Decision on Priorities for the Issuance of Weapons
DATE: 23 July 2003
Attached for your approval is a policy paper regarding the
priorities for the issuance of weapons to entities of the CPA and
units of CJTF 7.
The first step in providing a safe and secure environment in
which the government and economy of a new Iraq can develop involves
emplacing a properly equipped security structure, including police,
Facility Protection Guards, the Iraq Civil Defense Corps, and other
organizations. To date, none of these organizations has sufficient
weapons to arm its personnel. As weapons become available, a policy
decision is required to ensure that they are issued to those
organizations that need them the most.
This policy was crafted by a "Weapons and Facility Protective
Service Prioritization Board• chartered by AMB Kennedy on 15 July.
The Board is co-chaired by the Senior Advisors for the Ministry of
Interior and for National Security and Defense. Its members include
the CPA Operations Office, the CPA Requirements Coordination Office,
and CJTF 7. It was vetted and endorsed by representatives of
ministries, Baghdad Central, and CJTF 7 at a detailed briefing on
Saturday, 19 July.
We request that you communicate the urgency both of ensuring
di~ciplined adherence to these priorities as well as expeditious yet
thorough accountability of weapons as they become available
The paper has been cleared by the individuals below. They did,
however, raise the following concerns:
•
Please sign the attached paper if you approve of the policy as it
is presented.
~~~ Approve ~~- Disapprove ~~- Approve with Modification
Cleared:
Sent to:

--
---
---- -- -- -
COALITION PROVISIOIU.L AOTBORITY
Policy Paper
Apportionment of weapons for Security aJld Military Purpoae•
23 July 2003
The overriding challenge to establishing a functioning Iraqi
government and economy, is the establishment of a commonly recognized
and respected security infrastructure. The first step in achieving
this infrastructure is an adequate and appropriate apportionment of
the weapons necessary for security forces of all kinds.
The police, ministries, military units, governates, the Iraqi Civil
Defense Corps, and the New Iraq Army have all identified a critical
need for weapons. In total, this requirement exceeds 65,000 weapons.
Efforts are underway to obtain weapons from a variety of sources to
meet this requirement. The inunediate challenge, then, is to logically
apportion these weapons.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has decided that weapons for
security forces will be apportioned in accordance with the fallowing
procedures.
l. 2. 3. 4. CPA entities. including Ministries, Governates, and
Muni c.ip.;;i.11 t.ie~, hav~ suhmi tted weapons requirements
(rifles and pistols) to the Requirements Coordination
Office {RCO) as of 20 July. The RCO will consolidate
these requests by geographic area (coinciding with CJTF
7 MSC Areas of Responsibility (AOR)} and submit them NLT
1 August to CJTF 7 C3.
CJTF 7 C3 will integrate these requirements with those
submitted by its MSCs. The result will be a matrix of
weapons requirements by type, by unit, for the command.
Weapons and ancillaries are being acquired from a
variety of sources. As they become available, they will
be consolidated and inventoried by CJTF 7 C4.
As soon as accouncability is assured, weapons will be
issued in accordance with the following priority.
(Unless otherwise noted, unit of issue is one weapon
with one magazine):
a. weapons present in depot stocks at the date of this
policy will be issued immediately to lA.D for issuance to
the Baghdad Police.
b. The first 1000 available new AK-type rifles, with 4
magazines each, will be issued to the Coalition Military
Advisory Training Team (CMATT) for use by the initial
battalion of the New Iraqi Army. 6 rW £"~r
~A'-IOM ,'~u"'""'' b; SJf,:~11f" , A.}M, N~r\ J ~
c. In lots of 1000, ,weapons]will ~issued to the following
units in order: JJrf:f, 4lB, 3?~.'\.iKP...~1¥, :t'tJK D!v, .J..aJ.
.AASLT 3Ac.a... The order of issue will be repeated until
each unit has received its full requirement or 5000
weapons, whichever comes first. (Units are responsible
2

for issuing, with proper accountability, weapons to
Governing Council Protective Service Details, police,
government FPS guards, Border Guards, and ICDC units, in
that order, within their geographic areas of
responsibility.)
d. Once this scale of weapons is issued, CJTF 7 C3 will
review additional requirements and apportion additional
weapons to MSCs as required.
e. Weapons remaining at the end of this process will be
issued to the CHATT for use by subsequent units of the
New Iraqi Army.
3

UNCLASSIFIEOi'fFOR OFFICIAL USE. m1L¥
REPORTING UNIT - AK-47 MAGAZINES 7.62AMMO 9MM MAGAZINES IMMAMMO
·.
1AD 410 310 8758 17516 525480 3000 6000 90000
3ACR 2314 9{174 294420 3
406 10372 155580
_
101AA 1300 2600 78000
7,607 15214 456420 16,982 33964 509460
2500 5000 75000 3000 6000 90000
I MEF 9000 18000 540000 3000 6000 90000
UK Div 6000 12000 360000 3000 6000 90000
!Total 287211 626881 18038401 293881 62336) 9350401
urqetA~~lfi'IEOl'l'FOR OFFIC~L USE ONtY

WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS
Note 1: For all but NIA and /GDF. need one magazine per weapon; for NIA and /GDF need_ magazines per weapon.
Note 2: For all but NIA and /GDF, need 25 rounds of ammunition per AK, 10 rounds per 9MM; for others need_ rounds per weapon.

-- ------- -- --
From;
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
AITTISl!r .JPG ( lS2 KB)
AlmSOOOlJPG (715
KB)
Arm$0002.JPG (738
KB)
An'rlSOOOl.JPG (712
KB)
Anns001>4 .JPG ( 788
KB)
Ann.ooo6Jl'G ( 202
KB) Sir,
Attached is the list that was passed to the DAO at the Embassy in Amman recently. Open
with Windows Imaging or to read them clearly. Closer examination shows like they
actually have 98,663 new AK-47s (see last page), and SBOO Mls. Apparently they also have
a number of used AKs as well that aren't listed here, but based on the number of new AKs
available and needed, that doesn't seem relevant now, so we aren't inquiring further on
used AKs.
As for pistols, it appears there may not be quanities of any one type that meet your needs
except the Mark 5 Lighting Pistol, which we have no idea what type or caliber it is. You
may also want to have someone check with the CMOC in Najaf. I recall when we visited them
2 weeks ago they had taken in a large quanity of Iraqi 9mm pistols that looked new.
Le~ me know if you need any additional info on anything on the list and we will inquire.
We can put eyes-on any of these items, such as the Mark 5 pistols if needed as well.
V/R
---r-Qriginal Message-----
From: (0-6 Ministry of Defense)
Sent: 15, 2003 9:50 AM -
To:
E-mail)
Cc:
(E-mail);
.-----, CE-mail); ••••••• (E-mail)
Subject: RE: weapons
From Jordan
Gentlemen,
Excellent news - well done!
We are adjusting letter now and will await Derek's next transmission before
finalizing for review by Mssrs. Slocombe and Kerik.
Thanks!!!
COL.
To:
Cc;
mail);
Subject:
-
LTC (E-
Currently it doesn't appear that the Jordanians have yet had enough of the Ml6Als replaced
.
1

and taken out of service to meet CPA needs, except maybe for use by the Border police.
However, Jordan has 40,000 brand new unused 1U<.-47s, Czech made, still in the box, with
wood stock, magazines and cleaning kits etc. Major at MAP has seen these at the
zarka armory and the Jordanians have said they are available ASAP. He said we can go look
at these to get more info if needed The total AKs available including used but serviceable
is up to lOOK rifles. Those additional eOK Mes may not all be the same model and are used.
~lso that initial offer of 2000 Ml6Als was made was apparently also made by Prince Faisal
in Washington to OSD as well as to CENTCOM.
While not optimal, the AKs would meet COLlllllllllbasic requirements for time
and quantity. They would probably want to donate them vs sell as they
would then get a greater return via their own FMS needs from the US. Larger quantities of
M16Als would be down the road as they replace them with A2s.
I am scanning a recent list of other weapons besides the AKs they have offered {see its
cover letter) including 3000 Ml4 rifles, 300 Ml training rifles, assorted pistols and
light machine guns that are in their current inventory. A shopping list of current
inventory so to speak. I'll get that to you within the hour.
US Embassy Amman/MAP HACC-West
SIPRNET
Mobile
Iridium
2

/
·,
GHQ or Jordan's Armed Forces
Directorate of Planning and Organization
No.: TMS/20/JAF Excess Equ./2'f
J Date: 13 April2003
.\
Colone
Chief , MAP and Defense Attache
Embassy o:f the United States of America
Amman • Jordan
\
--~~~~~~~~
l . I would like to extend my complements and thanks to you
for your constant efforts to further strengthen the cooperation
between our Armed Forces and to enclose herewith a list of
JAF's excess weapons from different origins (small arms,
machine guns, cannons, and artilleries).
(
2. Since the storage of these weapons has become costly in
terms of money and effort, JAF intend to sell or trade these
weapons provided that an end-user certificate be provided by the
buyer. Therefore, we see'k your assistance with the US
concerned authorities to obtain their approval to transfer the US-
origi n weapons to a third party and help to find customers for
both U.S. and other origins.
3. While highly appreciating your constant cooperation, I
assure you of my highest regards and best wishes.
Brigadier O,;~
Director of Planning and Organiz.ation
Moh'd Taisir Massad,eb
..
:

SWNft Arms , Mld\IMgUI\• • C.nof\• , 8nd Artllerln
out of HfVfce available ft •IDcb .-t RMC ...... Stores
1 2237 PISTOL ,,., • 2 2 NIA u.s.s.R
2 2257 LAMA 7.11115 PISTOL - & 5 NIA NIA
_3 ZZ~A .LAMA PtSTOL "7 ....... ,..,----------+----"12=----+--"'12.., _ --Nl""""'A'---+--·NI~~- --+--- ---1
4 2250 TOLITOU PISTOL 1MORRESE1 • 7 7 NIA ,.
5 22lll8 S>MMSTARPIST()t. 32 5 :U ""' NfA
0 227'5 WIPPL Y Pl.STOl 14 • 3 3 NIA NIA
7 =- STAR PISTOL .. "6HORTNOSF' • 9 I NIA HIA
8 22988 $TAR NTOl d '"SHOtU HOSE" • II 11 NIA NIA
10 2215 8 38 PRABLLO PISTOL - '7 17 NfA NIA
t1 2'2Sl8 MARK 2 WIPLL Y PISTOL - 2 2 WA NIA
17 2318 9MM STYER PISTOL • 1 1 NIA SPAIN
18 231M 91YMPISTOI. 1 1 WA EGYPT
19 2321 MORRESE PISTOl. • 1 t NIA ITAl V
:Ill 2324 PARTA PISTOL 1 1 NIA ITAlY
21 23o6 SPAtiii'PisroL 1 • 1 NIA SPAJN
22 23Cl5 WIPLL Y 38 PISTOL I • 1 NIA NIA
23 221111 WIPU '( 38 PISTOl 1 • 1 NfA NIA
24 22*. -: ... RMllJ\t PfSTOL 1 • I NIA QERMANY.=....-+------1
2IS 2230 1PISTOl. 39 - t I NIA NIA -
211 ZS2IS STAR PISTOl I • I NIA SPAIN
rl 233M FAST TYPE PIST~ 1 • I NIA NIA
29 2230 911.W L.AtM PISTOL • 10 10 NIA NIA
29 n32 11 MM WIL TEil PISTOL • 7 7 NIA N.IA
30 2234 7MM PROWNING PISTOL • 4 4 NIA NIA
31 23'40 ,7 MM JiAAti: PisroL 2 10 12 NIA tTALY
32 »42 lSMITH PISTOL 3 2 5 NIA U.S.A
33 23-47 MARKIS LIGHTING PISTOL 121i 102 1321 _1,..-.950=--+---"Nl~'A;.:__+-------1
34 2~50 MARK 3 LIGHTING PISTOL. I) 4 SI N1A NIA
36 2354 LAMA PISTOL Ill & 18 22 NIA NIA
$8 23611 11.lSPISTOL 12 1 13 NIA ITALY
37 23Sel JltSTOl ft . t 1 NIA NIA
38 2'57A II MM PARTA PISTOL • 2 2 NIA ITALY
30 t .2362 : PISTOt. "8 - 2 2 "'" NIA
«1 35284 'slMM--=SM1T=--""t1-P""1"'"sr..,.o""L-----4--....;;.._ --+---::s---+-~s-""1--...:""~"-+--u.;..;;;s""A..--+-----1
413 39119 __ 22 ~ TOUTOU PISTOl..lMORRESE • 1 1 NIA NIA
44 3700 M 4 WIPPI. Y 3& PISTOL • 1 1 N.IA NfA
46 37a2A 7.85 PARTA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA ITAi. Y
40 3703A PI STOL WT - e e NIA NIA
47 37(MA 7.M PRISA PISTOL 12 13 25 NIA NIA
'48 ~ MILL PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA
~ 3706 STYER #9 PISTOL • 3 3 NIA AUSTRIA
50 37<MI Ol.O STANIAN PISTOL • 7 7 NIA NIA
lo-l!5~14-~3~7t=o:--+7~MM~~PRA8~~L~atN:..:.,..:.~P~.S~T~O~L--~~~-.'---l----:.l--+--,;;---t--·Nl:~A~+-~~Nl.~~':f---+------t
52 37UIA 9 MM DIFFERENT TVPE PISTOLS • 2 2 NIA NIA
!5:l 3821> 12 MM A PISTOl • I I NIA NIA
64 38:» 38 P SIMM PISTOl - 2 2 NIA NIA
55 311J:2 7.65 *PE PISTOL - I 1 NIA SPAIN
!Sa 3933 SPAIN PlSTOL • 1 I MIA SPAIN
S7 39:'4 !t MM SI PA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA
59 ae35 WATER l'ISTOL • 1 1 Nf.A NIA
!i8 2711 E~GLISHIPISTOL I I NIA ENGLAND
OD 2715 1 MM MAP! PISTOL • 2 2 NIA FRANCE
fl1 2716A 7MMARMESE PISTOL - 12 12 NIA FRANCE
112 2726 7 MM PISTOL • :ZS 25 NIA NIA
83 2726A 0 MM PISTOL • 5 5 NIA NIA
1M ~ 9 MM PISTOL • 2 2 NIA HUNGRIA
ti 27&4 7.116 PISTOl • 2 2 M.IA N.IA
97 2787 U5 PtSTOl • 3 3 NIA 8ELOIUM

SmaM ~- • Machln9gl.l"5. C.MOM • and ArUl'lertiea
out of .-viee avallabfe n a.tocks at RMC Mein Stor.s
70 2ll30A LIGHTINING PISTOL • t 1 NIA CHINA
11 m1·--r9MMFB PISTOL 1 • 1 HJA NIA
72 2723 7.85 PISTOl . ...._.__ _____ -+---1 -----.---+--,-1---Ni~'A'--+--,G'"'E,,,;Rw.~-HY--+-------f
73 :2856 STARLINGE PISTOl 1 • 1 NfA NIA
74 283ol MAs>s=~=s:~OL==-'.;.;..;-=--------1f----t;----i1-----B..----+........,7:-+---;Nl~A,,._.-+--F~RA~ . ~N~C~E,--+-------4
71 ~ 9 W4 PAATA PISTOL 1 2 3 NIA llAl Y
IO 31157A 9M'4 PISTOL - t t NtA U 8.A
8t _..... &MM NAPt.ION"'"'-"P""IS~T'-'Ol=---- ---+--.;;..• --+--~S;___ • ._,....;;1_+-_N:.,:1~A:-......._~F~flA:;;;NCt<~;........+-------I
92 31169 MAPE PISTOL • 3 3 H:A FRANCE
8J 3800 TARia"=p1='=s-=ro=:-L--------+- ----4---:2~--+--:2'--~:-~M-'::.;'A' ........... --'...:,IR=A~Q'== -l-------1
l-i94~t--~386~1:;-..+C~H~l~LD~R~E~H:.;::Pl~S~T~O~L-------1---.;__-.,_ _ _:..t __ +--.::.1--;;.-..~Nl~A--+-·-~,T~A~LY,__-+------r
115 38S1 8M'M'w~1t'=r""E""'R""P""ro:;.:s:;,,OL:-:-----+--....;.-------,---1--,-1-t--"""Nl,.,...,,A..__...,G""1e;.,;R"'MA.,.,..,.N""Y,......... _____ --r
89 38e3 8MM PARTA PISTOL • t I NIA ITALV
87 3984 !IMMRECKPISTOl :.7' =-- ~----+---.---4...--~2;.-..--+---:!2;,.-..+--;.N<::.;A;,:---+--..:..:,:Nl~A:..:....--1------~
81 _...., 7.G5 RECK PISlO\. • I 1 NIA NIA
89 388S 7 65 °'STER PISTOL • 4 .. HI" NIA
SIO 3866 SIMM PARTA Pl$T0t. • 11 11 NIA ITALY
... ,_ ·-·-""""~
92 *8 7.85 STAR PISTOL • 2 2 I N1A SPAIN
93 30e& 7.0SPARTAPISTOl • 4 4 N.IA ITALY
IM 38el9A 7.65PARTAPISTOL • 1 1 NIA ITALY
95 3870 1 VT 7 PARTA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA ITALY
lie 31171 «lOOASTE~R~P~IST~Ol:-:-------T...,-...,-_~-. ~-- 1'--~-t-~1--i----.NJ~A,---+--.....-Nl~A----.1----~----1
97 '872 ~AA ME SE PISTOL. • 1 1 NIA NIA
99 3873 ·- «lMM PISTOL • 2 2 NIA SPAIN
--
1-"GD~+-~38~7~ ..
STAR.~P~rs~T~O~L~~-~-------1---. ---f.-- ~~1"----+--.:;:1'--+-·-:.:N~IA,__-+----~s~PA~t~N~-t--------1
100 3875 PRABBELLO PISTOL • 7 7 N1A NIA
i--:-,O=-=l'-+-~38:;,.7.=.6 SMALL PISTOL • S 3 t4.'A ITAL V
102 3877 8MMPRA8El~LO~P~IS~T~O-L------~---.--_..,1----2"'--...,--+--'2~ . --t-~Nl~A'-'-_.._,..G~E~RMA-=-'~N~--+--------4
103 31182 2'2MM PISTOL • 1 1 NIA U.S.A
UM - llMM PISTOl • 2 2 NIA GERMANY
105 *7 9MM PART-' PISTO'- • 1 1 NIA ITALY
100 38lllJ SMM STAR PtSTor-- . 4 4 NlA NIA
tOI &1 DIFFERENT PISTOLS • 2 2 NIA NIA
108 3811811 8.!iMMEASTER~N-PJS~T~OL..-~~--+--~-.----<~---2"-----+--'2,._-+-~Nt~A~-+~-'-Nl=A~-+--------i
110 3lil07 ~~T~R~P~IS~T-OL=----------+--------t-~.......,;•;-----t--::'--t---::-:N/~A,__-+--~SIP~A~l~N---t---- -----t
!1t 3lllJ8 ........ PISTOt. • 8 9 NIA SPAIN
112 3SI09 9MM PARTA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA
ttJ ~o SPEc1~ At."""'""'M'-"1t"'"L""'P""'rs""r""'o .... L-------.-------,-----=-,-1---N1~A.'---+--e""GY~a=r---+-----
11• 3811 22MM ASTRA .PISTOL • t 1 NIA NIA
... .....,_. ..... 1.-.,1_ _ 5;..+.-"512 'TMMBA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA
118 3913A 38 MILLPiST;,;.0.;;:;L.:._ _______ ~-----~~--2.:..----+_,2,__.+---;.N;;.;/A'f--f---;.;HJ~'Ai---f--------1
117 391$ GMM PISTOLCLONG NOSEi • 1 I NIA SP"1N
1111 3917 9MMPARTAPISTOL • f 1 NIA ITALY
119 l9t8 eMIVI MILL PISTOL · 1 1 NIA NIA
l
f
~
\22 3$21 OIFFERENT tMUZ£Jt PISTOL • 2 2 NIA NIA
123 39'12 38MM LAMA r1STOL • 5 G NIA NIA
124 3828 7..65PtSTOL • 2 2 NIA NIA
125 mt 74M00£L PISTOL 8 • a NIA NIA
1211 • NIA TYPE PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA
127 • PISTOUl6 • 119D 1'951 NIA NIA
129 2382A 1tM STAR l'IS'!'Ol • 2 2 NIA fo&IA
129 'ntn 7.&SFAZORE PISTOL &4 70 134 NIA N.'A
tJO 2373 22MM PARTA PJSTOl 14 4 18 NIA ITALV
131 2314 22 MM PARTA PISTOL • 3 3 NIA ITALY
132 2375 LAMA PISTOL 1 t 2 NIA SPAIN
133 2370 za4M STAR PISTOL • 1 I NIA SPAIN
134 73llG SMITH 311 PISTOL 2 t 3 NIA U.S A
t3S 2703 9MN PAR1'A PISTOL • 10 10 NIA ITALY
t35 2371 22MM STAR PISTOL I • 1 NIA SPAIN
137 23IS4 MAP PISTOL a - a NIA FRANCE.
138 ~ AMERICANPISTOl T • 1 NIA U&A
138 31:)8 M.1 PISTOi. 3 • S NIA IELGIUM
I
I
~

- - - -------
___.... ........ .-.................................... __ .............................................................................................. ..,; .................... _
&Mall Alm• • MachifteOUhs • 1 caftl'IOI\• • Mtd Artll~id
out ol HrYlce availab» ae stocks at RMC Main Store•
141 3841 9MM p. iSTOL 1 - 1 NIA ITAl..Y
142 3El60 GERMAN PISTOL J • 3 NIA GERtdANY
143 3833 "WILLIAM P ""lS::-:T:-:O:=olc--------r-~3--+----.-----=-_,-+---:eNl;,,A,---T- --,ti-,.,IJ'°'N..,- _CU~~="="IA.,--t--------t
144 3861 MAP PISTOL 4 • 4 NIA FRANCE
145 3862 0.:26 PISTOL 1 - 1 NIA U.S.A
1411 3854 8MM PISTOL 1 - 1 NIA GERMANY
147 3042 9MM PARTA PISTOL 1 - 1 NIA ITALY
1"8 3843 7.65 PISTOL I - 1 NIA IT~ Y
~14.9~-~3844,..,_ 7.65 PARTA PISTOL 1 - 1 "4/A ITA\.Y
!50 3854 8.35 W.11 PISTOL 38 - 38 NIA NIA
1$1 3846 6.~MMPISTOI. 44 - 44 NJA GERPMNY
152 3847 6.35 MM PISTOL 1 - 1 NIA GERMANY
153 3848 6.35 M'JI PISTOL 3 - :! NIA ITM. Y
154 3849 ITAUAN PISTOL 4 - 4 NIA ITAl Y
157 3714A 22MM PARTA PISTOL - 1 1 N.'A ITALY
158 3715A OLD Mill PISTOL - 4 4 NIA NIA
l-'-159~+-' __,3"-"7""16=- JO MM PISTOL -
160 3716A·-+s=-'_32=-'M~M'°"P~IS~T:;.:Ol:=-,... -------+--- _--+---:.:t3;.--+~13:;-+---'N.(.=:.,:A"---- ...: N/.o:,A:,:..--+-----t
1~ 1S--+--,-Nl=A~--..---'-N.l = 'A""--+-------l
161 3717A SMITH PISTOl - 3 3 NIA USA
le-2 3722 RANIWE PISTOL - 1 1 NIA ITALY
163 3722A DIFFERENT PISTOLS - A 4 NIA NIA
164 3724 7.65 PISTOL - ;J :1 NIA ITALY
105 3727 JAMPO PtSTOL 32 11 41 NIA IT.ALY
166 • 3729 MILi.. MORRESE PISTOL • I 1 NIA NIA
\~ 3TaA MOFl.RESE '12. PISTOL - I I f\llA NIA
168 3730 ANORACOFf PISTOL • I 1 NIA USSR
189 3730A NIA PISTOLS 11 22 33 NIA NIA
170 3733 HUNTING PISTOL• 12 ~ 1 1 NIA NIA
111 3734 PARTA PARSOlAM PISTOL - 1 1 NIA ITALY
1 n 3135 38 MM PISTOL • I 1 NiA NIA
173 3737 J8 MM PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA
174 3758 SMITH PISTOL C SHORT NOSE l - 3 3 NIA IJSA
175 3765 ~MM SMITH PIS..T""OL"""-'------+- ~~ · ----+----''-----1--..;.. 1 -1-..;.;N/-.A'--+-- - u,..s~A---1- -----1
176 3772 581 MAGNOME PlSTOL 2 2 NIA USA
177 3797 PISTOL# 7 - 3 3 N.IA NIA
178 • 3830 7 MM PISTOL 1 4 5 NIA eELGIUM
179 3832 9 MM PISTOL 8 IQ 18 WA USSR
1$'.l ~ ?.65 PISTOL 2 - 2 N1A ITALV
181 'J7'32 SMITH J8 PISTOL 1 • 1 NIA USA
1S2 ~ 6.~P,f,RTAJAMPOP ISTOL 32 -
~ N.IA ITALY
t
~ ·
189 3761 CARTRIDGE I 12 101 • 101 NIA NIA
I
190 379
191
192
194
195
1!l7
198 2812
199 2812A
2718
HUNTIOO RIFLE I 12 10 e6 76
HUNTING RIFLE S S
HUNTING RIFLE I 8 • 13 13
HUNTING RIFLE: I 16 1 6 7
OLD HUNTING RIFLE - 1 1
9 MM HUNTING RJFLE '4 2 6
0.1( HUNTING RIFLE - 1 1
9 MM HUNTING RIFLE 1 • 1
MAW HUNTING RIFLE - 3 3
MAW HUNTING RIFLE - 1 I
TOOTOU MORRESE RIFLE 1 1 2
HUNTING GUN• 12 52 52 •
AUTOMATIC HUNTING .RIFLE 21 - 21 I
NIA
NIA
HJA
NIA
NIA
NIA
NIA
NIA
NIA
NIA
NIA
NIA
NIA
NIA.
NIA
NIA
NIA
USA
"'" Ni A

·$ ... ;
:203
2().-
205
206
'207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
218
217
219
219
220
w
222
223
_zz4
Z2S
226
Z!T
228
229
230
231
232
233
23'4
235.
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
2-43
244
245
246
2.ol7
2411
249
251
252
253
254
255
25&
257
258
259
260
~I
282
263
264
285
2«l
268
269
270
27t
272
~
~
Small Arms , M.ctllnegun• , ~nnons • 8fld ArllllMles
out or Ht''YQ aYallable as ~tocks al RMC Main Stores
···.·:
IS'Nlf lliwE" ·'·::':. QTY O.le In
~ ;::· .;:;-;-: ,;•
~ u '··-· _..-ice
260 ENGLISH RIFLE - 21 21 NIA
ENGi.ANO
28(lA ENGLISH 7RAINING RIFLE . 2 2 19'8
ENGL.ANO
2'61 M 1 TRAINING RIFLE 301 452 753 UM9
USA
261A M 16 RJFI.$. F 1 ' NIA
USA
301 G3RIFLE - 5 5 NIA
GERMANY
301A G3RIFlE 52 28 80 1969
PAKISTAN
3018 G3 RIFLE I , --
NIA .
SPAIN
4028 AIR RIFLE 5 4 9 NIA
4'02 AIR RIFLE '" 14 NIA
NIA
NIA
$)4 TRAINING RIFLE 3 1 4 NIA
14/A
410 EN9USH RIFLE - 60 60 NIA
ENGLAND
4106 MARK I Et.JGLISH RIJ'LE - , 1 NiA""'
ENGlANO
4HI EGYPTION RIFLE - , I NIA
EGYPT
::-,MQ8;RESE E RIFLE , I 2 NIA
ENGlANO
MOAFIESE E • RIFLE - 1 I NIA
ENGLAND
445
MOR~~E RIFLE , s 6 NIA
USA
448 22MM RIFLE , 1 2 Nlill.
USA
450 MORRE E22Ril'LE 11 3.t 45 NIA
ENGLAND
4S1 TOUTOU Rif.i.e (MORRESE RIFl.EI 1 1 NIA
NIA
454 MORFIESE RIFLE 1 I NIA
USA
45$ MORRESE MORSEGE RIFLE 1 1 NIA
USA
62-4 OIFFERENT TYPE Of RIFLES 29 29 NIA
NIA
2709 MASS RIFLE , 1 NIA
FRANCE
:28'l3 NATOWRIFLE 28 IQ 45 NIA
BELGIUM
2824A AASHIAN RIFLE . I 1 Niii
USSR
27fJ7 SIMINOF£ RIFLE 77 - 27 NIA
USSR
391!! M80RIF~E 1 1 NIA
TIJRKEY
- NIA RIFLE. - 1 1 NJA
NIA
2655 CHEECIAN RIFLE 12 11 23 NIA
GERMANY
2e56.'. CHEE.CIAN RIFLE l 3 NIA
GERMANY
2656 GERMAN RlfLE 14 13 27 NIA
NIA
2'8564 GERMAN RJFl.E . • 4 NIA
NIA
2679 SAMTOFE RllFE - 2 2 NIA
USSR
21183 17ALIAN RllFE - 2 2 NIA
ITALV
3925 CANADIAN RILFE . 1 , WA
CANAD ...
HI08E•IO M1 RILFE 5801 ~
9 8 .s] 1980
USA
1006£+10 M14RIFLE 2991 27 30t8 1970
USA
..
--
~· ~·~ .:·~·
. <TOTAL r.lill''. ~ 41U '14"'""
. .... _f.iiA.
142A LAUNCHER MACHINE GUN . 5 5 N.-A
--
148 STEN M2 MACHINE GI.IN 1 - I NIA
ENGLAND
149 MARK3 MACHINE GUN-. 22 22 f9Gs
ENGLAND
14QA sreN""rJAcHINE GUN . 1 , NIA
ENGLAND
150 STEN MARKS MACHINE OUN . 24 24 1949
ENGLAND
158 STEN MACHINE GUN - 1 1 NIA
ENGt.AND
167 SHMAIZAR MACHINE OUN r- \ 1 1 NIA
CHINA
570 STEN MACHINE GUN I 813 I 760 1373 1970
CHEE CK
1316 VIKERs MACHINE quN \. . / I 1 NIA
NJA
1901 MACHINE GUN -:- 1 1 NIA
BELGIUM
3)Q5 TRAINING MACHINE GUN 1 1 NIA
NIA
2009 MARK ,-·MACHINE GuN . 1 1 N•A
ENGLAND
2101 CARL.OWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN 48 272 318 1970
NIA
21018 CARLOy.t MACHINE GUN . , I NIA
NIA
2832A OOSHCA MACHINE OUN . 1 1 NIA
USSR
3500 SOO E PAACHINE GUN . '2 2 NIA
ENGlANO
3500A 500 E MACHINE GUN . 1 1 Ii/A
ENCL.ANO
3Sll08 500 E MACHINE GUN . I 1 NIA
ENGL.ANO
3511 SMALl ~Oo!INE GUN . 3 3 NIA
CHINA
3579 AFEOOW IMCHINE GUN . I 1 NIA
BELGIUM
3858 $MM STARLINO MACHINE GUN I 1 2 NIA
NIA
37G4 SHMIZAR MACHINE GUN . 2 2 NIA
CHINA
3510 SHMIZAR MACHINE. GUN 6 . 8 NIA
CHINA
3936 SIG MA.CHINE GUN . I I WA
USSR
2IM8A CHINESE MACHlNE GUN - 21 21 NIA
2647 HOWJCUSE MACHINE GUN . ' 1 NIA
NIA
CHINA
2ee88 KiASHENCOFE MACHINE GUN 71 105 132 NIA
USSR
2692A. BKM MACHINE GUN . 20 20 NIA
US.SR
2692 81<M MA.CHINE GUN . 9 9 NIA
USSR
21112 EASTERN MACHINE G\JN . 5 5 NIA
CHEE CK
27116 STEN MACHINE GUN STEN 4 o4 NIA
FRANCE
251QA 03 MACHINE GUN 2 2 4 NIA
GERMANY
2822 ~MACHINE Out.I :l t 3 NII.
NIA
.~·"°'
.,,..-...
Nuteti
~_'.'---·-
..
:~~~·:•
·-
f
t
i
..
I

-
-
-
·- ------
Sman A.r"'s • M«.tltn~uns . C•nnol\S , and Attllltri..
oul of Mtvk:4r av4Uable as stoclt• at . RM(; Mah' St. ores
•
' 'I74 3.892 KLASH£NCOF£ ~CHI. ~£ GUN 11 , 11 NIA USSR
1
I
23
·-
<12'1
I
.
.
,' .;;.:.. -----
28:2 251 AN.~R,9~4 . EJECTOR 36
----~--~ =~2=---+---=----+-"-' 10'2'""'"'"6 .___1;.:; 9 -..70.;.._r- _U"'" SI! ~--+-----~
4
253 ;res ANERG.O. EJECTOR 19191 1696 : 1970 .USA
28-4 I 006E ~ 1 0 ROCKET 1.AUNCHE'Ft 409 605 1075 USA
19'&
2eS 400 MOB!,ER '4 S N/Jio N.IA
* 268 ,
~OCK£ "' T °"' LA_U_1'4_C_m: _·- -~ -C -A _N _N _ O_ N~ --+--........:.--+--...;.,,,.- -+-- 42"~-+ --NIA NIA
•2
~ :21S8A I ROCKE :r LAUNCHER CAt>iNON· 1 NIA NIA
1
180
~2tle:= . ,-, . r--: f:-:- 0009=""2-i":OIFFERENT SMOKE CA.NNON • 4
4 t NIA NIA
5
25 3. 517 Sl\.10KE CANNON lEF'T 22 27 _L_Nf.::,:A;o--+ --+f'l;;_, I A,,.__-t-- ---~ll
........ m --- 35 ~ ,8 -_..... SM ......... O ~Kc~E~c A.trN °ON .,..,... "'R ..;;1 0 "" ; 1-f "" T ,__ ----1--= z "" 2 --+- --""----""'3 ....... , T--N!.., G
NIA
TOTAL 44 82 I
18 '
29! eso ·3 ~ MORT E>! CANNON 20
20 ' NII\ Ni4
292 IOOo 2" CANNON 48 541 • N!A NIA.
6
2
2
10
,
297 Yn7 HOWEN «>MME CANNON 1
1 NIA ENOUINO
298 3.7 ~ CA.NN'O. N 3 NIA NIA
3
299 14.SMMM/ICHINE. GUN CARRIAGE 40 ~ NI-. KOREA -
.
-
•
1•
I
'305 • 1A 5 WA M>.C!-ilNE. GUN 5 5 l NIA KORE.A
..
271 USA I I
. · .·
. , · .
..
I
' I
~
I
l
'

./
..
·.
Unysed sm1ll l'JI!& ayalfible M stocks at RMC Main Store.•
P/N Oe•crlptlon Qty status Date rri Source Of
S.N Service Suoplv NOTES
CLASHtNKOfE MACHINE
I :!688 GUN,fOLDABLE BUT 9177 Brand New 1987 GERMANY
CLASHlNKOFE MACHINE
2 2686A GUN,FOLOABLE BUT 1895 Brand New N/A CHINA
CLASHINKOFE MACHINE
3 2686 GUN.FIXED BUT 49869 Br1tnd N~w 1988 HUNGARIA
CLASHINKOFE MACHINE
4 2666 BG GUN.FIXED BUT - ~ - Br•nd New 1987 GERMANY
-
I ' ~ ilrOJAl:.
- ~~
-
- -
..
. '
..
,w.., ..

Page 1 of2
Slocombe, 'Walt B. (SES)
From: r l(0-6 Ministry of Defense)
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 5:39 AM
To: r IL TC, DSCA/ME""r.--------------,1(COL, v Corps)
Cc: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
Subject: RE: Weapons
r
Roger - got some internal decisions to make.
Will be in touch.
Many thanks for working this for us!!!
D
;;;;~rpirJS!I M§saJ~~~~-DSCA/ME
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 1:04 AM
To:r -i (0·6 Ministry of Defense);( Subject: Weapons -----~
Importance: High
I (COL, v Corps)
Sir,
Thanks for the update, any future information is always appreciated. The situation as I understand it is as
follows:
1. CPA requested from CJTF-7 for specific numbers of specific types of weapons and ammunition to be
delivered by 30 July.
2. CJTF-7 has 657 serviceable AK on-hand. Decision has not been made to prioritize these weapons for
NIA use.
3. CJTF-7 Is looking at availability of AKs within the region.
4. DOS has informally approached Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. DOS to send form<JI
request oTMvailability: of we~ons is known wit!!..!!:J...e region.
Additional questions that need to be addressed.
1. Has the Program Review Board given approval for the purchase of weapons and ammunition?
2. If so, still require nomenclature, model numbers and quantities for required weapons.
3. Has .... C _ _.....I been approached about their ability to purchase initial weapons?
4. POCs in CJTF 7 C4 arid CFLCC-PARC, specifically a cot.r._ __ ~lwould be appreciated.
Bottom llne Sir, I need an answer on if you want to pursue purchasing weapons or receiving donated
7/15/2003

--------------
Page 2 of2
•
weapons?
If you want to pursue the donated weapons I need to tell DOS that found weapons are available but are
not being prioritized for the NIA. still require nomenclature, model numbers and Quantities for weapons.
-
We presented attached brief to Amb Bremer and L TG Sanchez on Fri AM.
As you will see, brief captures info you have passed, highlights decision to focus on AK-
type rifles, and emphasizes that we need to press ahead to acquire weapons.
Accordingly, could you please continue your efforts to press hard for weapons? We have
agreed that POC for inbound weapons will be CJTF 7 C4 and comms will flow through CENTCOM
to keep chain of command clear and informed.
coLr pass you to others as appropriate.
I whom I Know you know very well, is gooo initial POC at CJTF 7. He will
Pis continue to keep me informed.
Thanksf~--~
7/15/2003

CL>
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Current Situation
• Consolidated requests for weapons (some double-counting)
- Police, Ministries and Baghdad Central (as of 10 July)= 17,025 AK &
9420 pistols for police and FPS guards
- CJTF 7 (as of 4 July) needs= 28,721 AK & 29,388 pistols (1AD = 8,758
& 3,000) for police and FPS guards
- NIA needs min 1000 AKs by 2 Aug, 3000 more by Oct
- ICDF needs - TBD
• AK-4 7 availability
- CJTF 7 on-hand in Taji & AO Glory (as of 10 July) 657 serviceable
AKs ... very few pistols
- No "white-world" AKs avail in CONUS or Bosnia (JCS J4 & Army G4)
- MEK weapons - awaiting policy decision
- Peshmerga weapons?
• Other Options
- War Stocks= 40,000 M16A1 and 2800 M1911A1 (some ammunition
concerns)
- Jordan just transitioned to M16A2 and has M16A1 available - DATT is
checking
- DOS informally approaching Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic today

Considerations I Recommendations
• Considerations:
- Optics of bringing large numbers of weapons into Iraq
- AK vs M16 ... local experience, ammo availability, cost, and
non-"Americanization" all favor AK
- Poor state of repair of "used" weapons
• Recommendations:
- CJTF 7 lead w/ CPA support
- Go with new AK-4 7 w/ 1 mags and 25 rds as base of issue
(more for NIA)
- Full court press to get weapons ASAP from multiple sources:
• MEK decision
• Coalition partner donations/sales
• Allow purchase of weapons from individuals/commercial firms
- Priorities:
• NIA gets 1 000 off the top
• Police
• Protection of Oil, Electricity, Water infrastructure

Q)
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Current Situation
• Consolidated requests for weapons (some double-counting)
- Police, Ministries and Baghdad Central (as of 10 July)= 17,025 AK &
9420 pistols for police and FPS guards
- CJTF 7 (as of 4 July) needs = 28,721 AK & 29,388 pistols (1AD = 8,758
& 3,000) for police and FPS guards
- NIA needs min 1000 AKs by 2 Aug, 3000 more by Oct
- ICDF needs - TBD
• AK-4 7 availability
- CJTF 7 on-hand in Taji & AO Glory (as of 10 July) 657 serviceable
AKs ... very few pistols
- No "white-world,, AKs avail in CONUS or Bosnia (JCS J4 & Army G4)
- MEK weapons - awaiting policy decision
- Peshmerga weapons?
• Other Options
- War Stocks= 40,000 M16A1and2800 M1911A1 (some ammunition
concerns)
- Jordan just transitioned to M16A2 and has M16A1 available - DATI is
checking
- DOS informally approaching Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic today

Considerations I Recommendations
• Considerations:
- Optics of bringing large numbers of weapons into Iraq
- AK vs M16 ... local experience, ammo availability, cost, and
non-"Americanization" all favor AK
- Poor state of repair of "used" weapons
• Recommendations:
- CJTF 7 lead w/ CPA support
- Go with new AK-4 7 w/ 1 mags and 25 rds as base of issue
(more for NIA)
- Full court press to get weapons ASAP from multiple sources:
• MEK decision
• Coalition partner donations/sales
• Allow purchase of weapons from individuals/commercial firms
- Priorities:
• NIA gets 1 000 off the top
• Police
• Protection of Oil, Electricity, Water infrastructure

Page 1 of 2
Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
---
-----
----
From: 0-6 Ministry of Defense)
Sent: To: Thursday, July 17. 2003 5:58 AM
- L TC, OSCA/ME; Walters. Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. DSCA; Mlllies. Richard, , OSCA/FO
Cc: -· DSCA/MEANFO DSCNME£lE·mail)'i1· ••••
Col, DSAA/FO CIV, OSO-POLl~Y
DSCA/ER: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); Eaton, Paul; Riley. Jonathan P. (Brig
(COL, V Corps)
Subject: RE: IRAQ WEAPONS UPOA TE
-
Great summary!
Info you provide below is invaluable for long term efforts for NIA.
Near term solution. we believe, appears to be the Jordanian option you mention. We are on the cusp of
getting permission to begin to work the details thru DATT in Embassy Amman; numbers are plentiful and we
should be able to move via ground trans.
As far as practical action in support of our weapons needs, please hold. We have the ball to run the
Jordanian option to resolution.
Will keep you closely informed - but if you have any questions or concerns - please call or write anytime.
Thanks again-You are an absolutely terrific teammate!
coi.m
;;;,~~~-DSCA/ME
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 12:17 AM
To: Walters, Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. OSCA; Mfllles, Richard, , ~
Cc~EANFO; 05<;,NME;~E-mail)
DSAA/FO;---, , DSCA/FO POLICY I DSCA/ER
Subject: IRAQ WEAPONS UPDATE
(0-6 Ministry of Defense)
~ion has not been made reference the 657 serviceable AK47s on hand. In COL
-update today they are currently working a Jordanian option.
2. Based on DOS feedback it looks as if Poland is the best country to approach. Not
clear yet how much they would be willing to donate, as opposed to selling. In any
event, the Poles are aware of the issue and are prepared to be responsive, so the
groundwork is laid for a formal approach. Once CENTCOM verifies there are
insufficient quantities of weapons and ammunition available in theater, DOS will send a
formal request.
It could be very difficult - perhaps impossible - for Poland to supply weapons by
August 1. Whether Polish equipment is sold or donated, the transaction would need
MoD and Council of Ministers approval (though NO/NO par1iamentary vote) before
going through Poland's export-control system. A Polish contribution is unlikely before
7/17/2003

Page 2 of2
mid-September at the earliest.
3. I have talked with Mr C F I Director, Southern Region Contracting Center,
Army Contracting Agency and have verified there is no reimbursable procurement line
in the contract. The NIAT SOW clear1y identifies all training aids, equipment.
ammunition etc., as Government furnished. This is a Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF)
services contract. I have attached copy of the final SOW, the Letter RFP and a copy of
the Letter Contract.
I have also talked with General DynarnicsMOrdnance and Tactical Systems (GDOTS).
GDOTS currently has contracts working similar issues in Afghanistan and Georgia.
This may be the long-term solution for a quality weapon and ammunition source as well
as for maintenance and spare parts. If sufficient quantities in acceptable condition
cannot be found in country, or be donated, this is an option.
4. For future reference, IFF funds are available for use to purchase weapons and
related items, requested by CPA, for the New Iraqi Army troops. Both OSD/GC for
Fiscal and International Affairs agree that the lFF funds are available for this purpose.
A key criteria for transfer is that SECDEF notify the Congressional defense committees,
NL T 5 days in advance of transfer, the amount and reason for the transfer. The· normal
rule applies regarding Congress having to be in session when notification periods start.
~~-=~=-===~ LTC,USA
ountry Program Director
(Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia)
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Middle East, Asia and Norlh Africa (MEAN)
1111 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Suite 303 (East Tower)
Arlington, VA 22202
Phon ".&:-~~~~~~~--i
FAX
NIPR.
SJPR ~ . --~~~~~~~_,,,----.
7/17/2003
,_

Page 1 of2
Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
-----------------
From:
, ..
-
Sent:
(0-6 Ministry of Defense)
- ---
Wednesday, July 16, 2003 11 :31 PM
To:
CIV. OSD-POLICY
Cc: ·------ Col, DSAA/FO , , DSCAIPOUCY
, DSCA/PPPFO; Slocombe. Walt B. (SES); Eaton, Paul
Subject: RE: Training programs for promising Iraqi officers
Sir,
DSCA/POUCY;
Many thanks! You and your team are terrific es alwaysll!
~nd-
Obviously completely new govt, new military, new situation here and we want to get things started - and
as there is no base so we start afresh. Given that, we think we are talking more than just IMET, rather the whole
gamut. .. including where to start ... in-country language programs, Mobile Education teams on a variety of subjects,
etc .... need for 505 fonns completed by the country and filed with State, etc ..... all of those things ....
Where do we start?
Thanks!
-
DSCA manages the lMET program and ·1s probably your best starting point. lfwe can't get
something done, we
probably know who can.
are our two experts.
Call my exec, Col Tome Walters
-----orilat Mw.---
From: av, OSD-POLlCY
Sent: WednesdaB JulL 16, 2003 7:2~
To: I I (0-6 Ministry of Defense)'
Cc: Walters, Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. DSCA
Subject: RE: Training programs for promising Iraqi officers
for advice/answers anytime and we'll help.
7/17/2003

Page 2of2
r-lthis is more of a DSCA-STATE issue, but I will crank it up. 1 will pass this to L TG Tome
Varrers Dir of DSCA to get his best thoughts on how to crank it up. My guy for this wm beliiilil
__ __, all the best Break Break ... Tome, engaged with recreating the Iraqi Army. He needs advice on imet. etc.C I
is no. 2 to Walt Slocombe and is
--- -Ori~! Message-----
from: C ·· ~ (0-6 Ministry of Defense)
Sent: Tuesda.y, JulX 15, 2003 10:39 PM .__ ___________ .....i
To: L J CIV, OSD .., -PO ,.....;;... U """ CY .;;....;.... ___ ___,,
Cc: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) JP"---........ --~---.--.. .,-
Subject: Training programs or promising raqt o 1cers
[
Could you and your team lay out for us the steps we need to take to get promising
Iraqi officers (and civilians) into US training programs?
we are talking more than just IMET, rather the whole gamut.. .including where to
start .. .in-country language programs, Mobile Education teams on a variety of subjects,
etc .... need for 505 forms completed by the· c. ountry and filed with State, etc ..... all of those
things ....
Can you establish a point of contact on your team with whom we could work these
issues?
Thanks!
VR,~[~
7/17/2003

Iraq Page 1 of2
Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
From: (0-6 Ministry of Defense)
Sent:
Friday, July 18, 2003 6: 19 AM
To:
Cc:
L TC, DSC.AIME· (0-6)
Subject: RE: Iraq
-
Thanks very much for the note and for the offer.
The service you offer is very attractive and may, in the long tenn, be the course we need to pursue for
reanning the New Iraqi Army.
In the short tenn, however, we have identified a local source for a substantial number of new AKs and are
moving to acquire them now.
I will remain in touch, initially vi~as the situation develops and as other needs become apparent.
Thanks very much!
co
----Original Message---
From: -
.....
- -- -- - - - -- - - - -- -
Sent: Friday, July 18, 2003 2:32 AM
To:
cc:
-
Col.-
By way of introduction, my name is - and I am the Sr. Manager, International Business Development
for General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GD-OTS). I received your contact detail.s from Lt. Col.
lliiiiilat DSCA. He suggested I contact you regarding some of the armament and ammunition requirements coming
out of your office in Iraq. We undC?Stand that there is an immediate requirement for 40,000 A K-47's and associated
ammunition, as well as various small arms and ammunition. Although we do not make either of these products, we
have been conducting a very successful anununition "one-stop shop" together with the US Govemmenl for the
Government of Kuwait under an FMS Case. This has involved the provision of more than 80 line items of
ammunition, including ilems of US, Russian, WesVEast European and other origin. We procwe, consolidate and
ship these supplies in counb-y for the Govemment of Kuwait from 15 countries and 23 suppliers using a proprietary
process known as GAPS or "Global Arrununition Procurement System" which Generol Taylor at USASAC is fully
briefed on and supports.
The GAPS system was recently enhanced and under the namr ofCS3 (for Coalition Supply and Support Services)
has enabled us to offer major support across a number of discipline!! to include weapons, vehicles, logistics and, of
course, munitions, with a full range of support services to USA SAC on the highly successful Georgia Train & Equip
program. Currently, CS3 is being investigated by CENTCOM as an ideal vehicle for the Afghan National Anny's
Train & Equip program, UAE, Jordan, Colombia, and several other international customers.
7/18/2003

Iraq Page 2 of2
To emphasize the benefits of having a company lilce GD-OTS wtder an ID/IQ contrac1 ...... we made some
preliminary inquiries with our contacts in Ea.stem Europe and feel that we could provide the AK47's and ammo NLT
Sept 20Cn and maybe sooner. I hope the above proves to~ you and the rest of your team. Ifso,-
••••••l(his email is attached and his mobile number i~) is in Kuwait and hopes to meet with you
and your team in Iraq. He has been fitted wilh a bullet ;,:oof vest and has olher gear to help him in his journey. If
you would like a meeting sometime nex.1 week. al eeds from you is an invitation and support for
traru;portation in country (either military or ccmmercial, if available).
Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can provide any further information on lhe above and I look forward to
hearing from you on the subject in due coUISe.
iiiiiii.
Sr. Manager, International Business Development
General Dynamics • Ordnance & Tactical Systems
Phone:
Fax:
7/18/2003

Q.)
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Current Situation
• Consolidated requests for weapons (some double-counting)
- Police, Ministries and Baghdad Central (as of 10 July) = 17 ,025 AK &
9420 pistols for police and FPS guards
- CJTF 7 (as of 4 July) needs= 28,721 AK & 29,388 pistols (1AD = 8,758
& 3,000) for police and FPS guards
- NIA needs min 1000 AKs by 2 Aug, 3000 more by Oct
- ICDF needs - TBD
• AK-47 availability
- CJTF 7 on-hand in Taji & AO Glory (as of 10 July) 657 serviceable
AKs ... very few pistols
- No "white-world" AKs avail in CONUS or Bosnia (JCS J4 & Army G4)
- MEK weapons - awaiting policy decision
- Peshmerga weapons?
• Other Options
- War Stocks= 40,000 M16A1 and 2800 M1911A1 (some ammunition
concerns)
- Jordan just transitioned to M 16A2 and has M 16A 1 available - DA TT is
checking
- DOS informally approaching Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic today

. .
Considerations I Recommendations
• Considerations:
- Optics of bringing large numbers of weapons into Iraq
- AK vs M16 ... local experience, ammo availability, cost, and
non-"Americanization" all favor AK
- Poor state of repair of "used" weapons
• Recommendations:
- CJTF 7 lead w/ CPA support
- Go with new AK-47w/1 mags and 25 rds as base of issue
(more for NIA)
- Full court press to get weapons ASAP from multiple sources:
• MEK decision
• Coalition partner donations/sales
• Allow purchase of weapons from individuals/commercial firms
- Priorities:
• NIA gets 1000 off the top
• Police
• Protection of Oil, Electricity, Water infrastructure

-
------ ---
-
Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICV
From:
Sent:
To:
SubJect:
Tuesday, April 22, 2003 3:26 PM
'Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY'
RE: What's the reality?
Walt,
I move Thursday by air. We simply have to get to Baghdad and begin the
process of introducWl!i.ourselves before more time goes by, as people are
already skeptical .... has alot of charm, but we need to start to deliver
and put fears at rest. It will take awhile before we have a place to
work/stay comfortably. Our •compound• still lacks power and water. Biggest
problem will be transport and comma.
REsourc:ii..are a problem. We are constantly told we are running out of
money. 11111 think has to ask permission for many things wh. drives him
crazy. ODS reps emphasize getting someone else to pay, and claiming victory
while we move on to the next. There is little appreciation for the enormity
of what we have undertaken and how ill-prepared we are on the governance
side (hU111anitarian and reconstruction are known qualtities). The struggle
between the social en ineers and the tists continues.
In short, the chaos continues, although I remain convinced there is an
important job to do here, and even more convinced that we MUST finish what
we started. Most of the people are talented and dedicated, They just lack
coherent leadership and clarity of vision.
Do not mean to sound too discouraging. I think we are probably at the
lowest point psychologically. r must admit I have never experienced such an
uneasy day before opening night -- and virtually everyone here agrees. But
we will somehow get through it. My advice is that you send someone
perceptive whom you trust to check it out soonest. The best would be you,
but you would frankly be too high profile just now. Defense is a long term
proposition I think, but a bit less urgent in that it is not a "basic
service" at the moment.
Hope this helps. Best, 111111111111
-----Original Message-----
From: Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY
~~~t: 4/2112003 2:3S PM
Subject: What's the reality?
11111111111-- I gather from~l ________ ~Jthat you have in fact moved
forward. - -
I would be grateful for any information you can pass on as to the actual
state of affairs out there and your advice to me about whether I should
press to get out faster than now scheduled (something like 19 May) and
what
1

to try to get settled in advance. Col my MA, will probably be
going out to Qatar for a quick ontheground look this weekend, but I
would be
very interested in your perspective, in particular on the degree to
which
there is a real chain of conunand and someone with authority over
resources.
(You can reply to my personal e-mail
if you prefer.)
Walt
2

Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
r;: et. al. -- I will be pulling up stakes soon to move north but~
jshould be with you now in Qatar. I would like to pass on my thoughts
about the NIC concept before I lose my connectivity with the group.
The concept i9 a sound. one in so far as it addresses the territorial
security of Iraq in the short term until the Q. AI can be built. The
implemenr:ac:.ion of the concept will be harder. I suspect that 12 months will
be needed at a minimum to create a force of sufficient size to have even the
least credibility with the Iraqi people. The force is noL so much as to
deter foreign aggression as it is to assure the Iraqi people that there is a
centra l power that is resuming control of Iraq. Any foreign thr eats will
likely be dealt with by the coalition. I continue to believe the force
should not lead any law enforcement effor t while the coalition remains in
control of Iraq as required under the Geneva Four requirements. ~or should
it be re~ponsjble fo~ border ~ro~~ing npera~ions or tariff collections as
that will eventually lead to corruption within the force.
On the issue of recovering equipment, we (ORHA) have the potential to
contract that task out if it would support the implementation of the
concept. The actual training of the force is something the group needs to
decide on this weekend (contract?, task CFSOC?). Also need to figure out
the internationalization angle too .
Recruiting the force can be accomplished through a couple of venues. We can
use the DDR center process which is now being implemented and should start
accepting its first batch of EPWs in the next two weeks; and we can also
conduct a major IO effort to convi nce self- demobilized forces that they need
to return to a DDR center or report direct l y to one of th
e bactlefield
_
recovery teams for work and eventual DDR processing . Something that CENTCOM
should take on board is that the EPW compound should halt the release of
EPWs until they can be screened by the DDR center.
We should also get the NDU folks started on drafti ng a strawman of a NSS and
NMS for consideration by the reformed Iraqi MOD. We are finding that many
of the indig enous bureaucrats are not comfortable (that's politely putting
it) with making any kind of decision unless they are d i rected to do so. If
we expect them to take the initiative to articulate to their newly freed
countrymen the strategies by which their armed forces will operate, we will
l.ie walLiug for a long Lime. I suggest that we go ahead and prepare
something in concert with CENTCOM and NDU so that they can see an example.
As alway's, comments are valued! If you don't hear from me for a while, it's
because my comrns aren't I have been giv~n ~ Thuraya phone for use in
Iraq -- number is
1

- - ---
---·-----
~
Walter Slocombe
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject;
Sir -- MG Carl Strock <.1sked that I contact you about providing you a_ny information you may
need regarding the reformation of the Iraqi military. I am currently serving as the chief
of policy and speci al initlacives in ORHA, on loan from r-" j reserach directorat:.e
at nrss. By way of background, I served 4. yeat:s in OSD(Policy) with~ when he was the
DASO for Peacekeeping and Humanicari. an Assistance, working both peacekeeping and HA
issues. and I worked the RA issues together.
As you know, much of the Iraqi military has self-demobili2ed, in all likelihood as a means
of avoiding direct combat with US forces. While we have destroyed much of their armor and
artillery systems, I doubt that there has been the slaughter that some media venues have
ouggeated. I was here for the last war and thought I would have seen many dead Iraqis but
I did not. Empirical evidence suggested that many survived because their units retreated
back across the Euphrates, knowing that there was little support for the 91 coalition to
pursue them and that they had the strategic depth in which to retreat. However, this time
the indiv·idual soldiers fled because they kne..., we would not atop until we had taken over
the entire country.
Some have cuggeeted that if theee Iraqis have aelf - demobilized, we should. let them go and
not try to pull them back into some organ.i.zed body. I would offer that the need to gather
them back tog· ether for some form of accountability and vet: ting is critical to the future
internal security of the new Iraq. We do not. know what soldiers have demobilized or what
their motivations were in doing so, ot.her than the obvious one o, f self- preservation, Some
may have fled to their hometowns in an effort to assume a quiet. non-political life; others
may have fled in order to avoid captivity and to prepare for ~urther mischief. If we can
begin to gather soldiers back into some organized process to demobili ze them, we can
demonstrate to botb tbem and the Iraqi people that the US is committed to reforming the
mi.litary, ensuring t hat thousands of unemployed are not dumped at one time on to a non-
existent economy, and give us more time and informat.i on wich which to vet people of
interest. My concern is that we not unintentionally create the conditions that would
result: in a power vacuum such as Afghanistan or Somaiia.
On another note, the Britisb have agreed in principal to provide ORHA an expert on
internal security matters t:o help review what has been done by the ORHA staff so far and
harmonize their various efforts. I wanted to inform YC?U of this because the Minist. ry of
Defense will be affected by this expert's work/recommendations as we seek to ensure that
the .repressive internal security organizations of Saddam's era are not rebuilt:.
Finally, on the issue of rebuilding the Iraqi military into a new . force that provides for
the protection of Iraq's terrority, respects civilian rule and doesn't , pose a threat to
its neighbors, I would like to recommend that a professor from t.he Naval War College
contact you. Dr. is a. recoginzed expert on the !t:aqi military and has dooe
considerable. work on 1es future organization. I think. his work is ve-ry good and recommend
that you discuss his· thoughts with yo.u. If you wo:uld like I can have him contac1: you.
Sir, please let me know if there is a. n.ything else tbat you may need. Once you learn your
cravel da~ea, pleaae lee me know so we can prepare your quartere, etc.
VR, r
Colonel, U.S . Army
1

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Subj: Thought• on atafflng
4/51 2003 11 :01 ·30 AM Eastern Da Ii ht Time
Date: From;
To:
CC:
Sent from
Walt.
Good to talk w;th you yesterday. Thanks for your vote of confidence. This
is going to be great!
On the issue of the personnel "package'" for the MoD, I think there are
probably three sets of folks:
1 ) Core team of Slocombe plus 5 substanti\1e people
2) US admln/\og/comms/security etc support pacitage
3) lraQI exlles with substantive military backgrounds
On #2. I understand that Centcom has been tasked to provide a full support
pack~ge to each of the ministries. The sensitive nature and scale of the
MoO will require a more "robust" package. I think we are looking at a the
following·
Slocombe: 2 secretaries, 1 translator
Core staff (5 ): 1 secretary and 1 translator each (As a small team, we
w1ll llkety to need the ability to operate during the .;fay individually, l.hus
the team of translators)
Comms: 5. Of' however many necessary for 2417 ops
Admln: 05 . and 3 E-5/6 personnef (05 oversees complete support package and
handles admtn llaison with CENTCOM, including security. mil air. access
throughout the, country, etc.)
Motorpool: In addition to travel bacic: and forth from the residence compoun<S
to the MoD. we wllt need secure transport to various sites In Baghdad and
around the country. To begin with we may need only one transport npa.ckag , e"
with the. ability to draw on CENTCOM assets for additional "packages" if we
need to have two teams in different locations.
Security. Need a package that wraps around all of the above, including 24/7
protection for our offices at the MoD.
Other: There is always an "other", but the above tist is a good starting
point.
On #3, I understand that Policy has put together a team of about 100 Iraqi
exiles, trained as doctors, lawyers. civil servants, now living in the
United States. A couple of these have formal military training-one was a
general who attended Sandhurst They are potential candidates for seruor
ministers and wlll also be useful to the '"sorting" process and are obviously
fluent m Arabte. Whether these folks become the "Interim Ministers" or
remain "technical support", is being debated between the WH, DOD and State.
On #.1. the Core Team: I think we nee<! to keep the c.ore staff small. As
fewer, we win be-more nimble, less obvious in the Ministry. and more easily
achieve the. unity of effort whereby we can do a "no look" pass from person
to person. fully confident that the issue is being handled well. The members
of the team shot.ltd be relatlvety nexlble and Interchangeable to handle the
flood of Issues that we will need to deal with each day. The type of people
we ne'eQ are those who have worked at the top of a large orgaoiz:atfon, ltke
OoO. and know how to get things done quickly In difficult bureaucratic
environments. We will need strong knowledge of the team back in Washington
(boo. State and NSC) and thelr trust. The core team should understand
Sunday, April 06, 2003 America Online: Usdpwbs

--- ----------
Page 2 of3
defense organ1%atlons and have e)(perience in defense strategy and planning
at the Ministerial level A& in 1990 In Eastern Europe, we will be dealing
with a country \hat has no tradition of civilian control of the military,
never had a nanonal security strategy as we would know It. never had a
defense strategy, never had a defense planning document. At least one of
these folks should be able to fight the money wars in the US system to make
sure we have the funding we need. As you noted. the team will need to be PA
sawy, antJ someone will need, at least uoofficialJy, to watch this ISSUe
The core group will aJso need to know when and how to bring In
1ssue•specific, occasional expertJse for partic:ular Issues (munitions
disposal, legal, medical pohcy, etc} through one of the several contract
vehicles DoD has In place.
Is an excellent choice. He'd bring to the
ng of the Iraqi military and knowledge of Iraq
Beyond we need people responsible for:
1) ministry organlzallonal reform and management;
2) a strategy, foroo planning, policy guy; and
3) a resources/budget/acquisition person.
My thought is to volunteer for the organizational reform and management
portfolios
ct Vil
(In addition to handling PA Issues and llarson with other mrnistnes and the
administrator as collateral duties).
For strategy/ ~/force planning. I'd strongly recommenci I
have known inoe I hired him 10 years ago. entered OSO as a PMI and
has had an outstanding civil service In Policy (you detailed him to USS to
wnle his Adelphi Paper on coalition warfare-copy available on request).
Is also a US Navy reserve officer. I'd p-ut him at the very top of my
hst Very lnnovatrve and probabty the best ·10e~s· guy J n OSO - he was tho
lead pen on the 2001 QDR and formulated the post-2 MTW force plannlng
construct We going to need someone to work with the Iraqis to help
formulate a new Iraqi defense strategy, force structure and basing
requirements, and qulci<ly draft up key defense policies and guiding
principles for reform. the guy. At present, he's Wolfowil.z's special
assistant (and has been n imately Involved fn postwar planning efforts). If
Wolt'owitz could be persuaded to let him join us for some period of time,
he'd be Indispensable. This will certainly require a by-name request from
you to Wolfowltz but is definitely worth It.
::.:.::.:.;:.::.:..:..c..::::.:. rs .=: o::..:n ..:.!., agarn I'd recommend a career
person, \his time from PA&E. ls the director for theater
asse$sments and projections and began his OSD career as a PMI He oas also
been the PA&E lead for a number of Defense Resources Management Studies
we've done 1n Eastern Europe and Central Asia so tie's famlllarwtth the
nature of the challenge of standing up a new resource allocation s stem that
can produce some degree or transparency and civilian control. ___ _,
terrific - he's versatile and would mesh nicely on a team Again, as with
.. the issue will be persuading the system to \urn him loose
I would also recommend that you request one or two 05/06 Foreign Area
Officers (FAQs) for the core team. In addition to regional and language
expertise. it will be useful to showcase US cfvH-milltary relations I
don't have Immediate names. but if this sounds right, I'll hunt a few
candidates down.
I look forward to your thoughts and to working With you.
Sunday, April 06, 2003 America Online: Usdpwbs

Page J of3
.. y.
·s a PRIVATE communication.
recipient, please o
others. Please notify the s
message, and e it from your system.
If you e intended
o not disclose it to
r by replying to this
Than y
For more information on The Cohen Group please visit our web5ite at:
http://www.cohengroup.net/
Sunday, April 06, 2003 America Online: Usdpwbs

Pagel of 1
Walter Slocombe.
Froul: Stat:Fri 4/2.512003 4.02 AM
To:
Cc:
Auach· mcnts:
~et al.·· I wilt be pulling up slakes s.oon to move north buL]
-~should be with you now in Qa1ar. I would like to pass on my thoughts
about the NIC concept before I lose my connec.:tivity with the group.
Ilic toocept is a sound one m $0 far as 11 addresses the terricorinl
security of Iraq in the shon tem1 uncll the QAI can be bu1h. The
implementation of the concept wilJ be harder. I SlL~pcct that 12 months will
be needed at a mioimwn 1 0 create a force of sufficient size to have even the
least credibility wilb the Iraqi pe<1ple. The fQrce is not so much as to
deter fmeign ag&ression as it is to assure the Iraqi people that thece is a
central power that 1 s resuming conrrol of Iraq. Any foreign thr\:ats will
hkely be dealr wilh by the coalition. I cont 1oue to believe the fo~
should not lead any law enforcement effort ~bile the coalition n:maios in
control of Iraq as required under the Geneva Four requirements. Nor should
tt be re ponsible for border crossmg operations or tatlfr'collectmns as
1hat will evemually lead 10 corruption within the force.
On lhe issue of rccQvering e4uipment, we (ORHA) have I.be potential 10
contract that task Ou\ if lt wo11ld support the implementation of the
concept. The accual !raining of I.he force is something !he i;roup needs to
decide on this weekend (contrnct?, task CFSOC?). Al~o need to figure out
the lntemationalir.a.rion angle 1 00
Recruiting the force can be accompli.shed through \l couple of venues. We can
use the DOR ccrucr process wl11ch is now being implemented and should stan
accepring its fin;t batch of P.PWs in the next two weeks; and we ca.n also
conduct a major 10 cffon to convince self-demobilized forces that they need
10 return 10 a DOR center or rtl'\Ort directly to one of the battlefield
recovery teams for work and e~c11tual DOR processing. Somcthmg that CENTCOM
:.hould take on board is lh31 the EPW compound should hall the release of
EJ>Ws until they can be screened by tJ:ie DDR center.
We should also get the NDU folks started on drafting a su- .iwmiin of a NSS and
NMS for consideration by the ~formed Iraqi MOD. We are nniling that many
of the indigenous bureaucnit.~ are nor comfonable (that 's politely putting
it) wnh malu.11g any kind of dcc1S1on unless they are din:ctcd 10 do so. If
we expect them to lake the mi1iative to articula te to their newly freed
counlrymen the strategics by which rheir armed forces will npcrarc, we will
~ wiutmg for a long time. I suggest that we go ahead and prepare
something m concert with C ENTCOM and NOU so tt11n they can see .lrl example
As always, comments are valued! If you don't hear from me for a while, it's
because my comms aren't up. I have been given a Thuraya phone for use in
Iraq u number i.f" I
hnp://email.capdalc.com/exchange-nbox/NIC%20Conceptual%20Planning.E... 4'2612003

Onyszkiewicz Notes http:l/email.capdale.comiexc~box/Onyszkiewicz%20Notes.EML?Cmd::opei
•, t. i•'ll'i.
~1~1!~~ .. I~
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Walt:
Last night I was at a dinner at the German Ambassador's residence and
was fortuitously seated next to an ~Id friend of yours--Janusz
1 Onyszkiewicz, the former defense minister of Poland. Dr. Onyszkiewicz
sends his best. However, the real reason for this email is that I took
the opportunity to pick his brain about how you go about transforming a
military built by a totalitarian system into one suitable for a
democratic system. What follows is a summary of what I took away from
our conversation.
Obviously, there are considerable differences between Poland and Iraq,
and under no circumstances would I suggest that we simply copy the
Polish experience. Nevertheless, I think Onyszkiewicz's insights are a
useful and helpful input into the process and can help sort out our own
thinking.
On vetting officers, Onyszkiewicz's method was to rely first on foreign
, intelligence services--in the case, the U.S., UK and Germany. He relied
on them to pick out the worst of the party hacks from the officer corps.
1 (In the case of Iraq, he and I both felt that soliciting information
from the Turks, Jordanians, and Egyptians--all of whom had
military-to-military contacts with the Iraqis--might be helpfuJ in the
same way. We could simply ask who seemed like good, professional
officers, who were party hacks, snitches, or idiots.) Second, he did
have people go through personnel records. He had them look for who was
competent or not, and who was considered an enthusiastic party
supporter. He pointed out that everyone had to be listed as a loyal
party supporter, otherwise you could not advance, but he said that if
you learned to read between the lines, you could find out who were the
most committed to the party and the most involved in party
activities--all of these people he cashiered. (He specifically did not
use the intelligence files on the officers because he felt they were
probably too politicized and "full of junk" to provide and accurate
assessment. He also felt that the personnel files were likely to
provide the same kinds of information that he wanted--if you knew how to
read them--but without the same political junk.} He mainly cashiered
people by retiring them (he noted that Poland had a low minimum
retirement age which proved very useful lo him in this.)
Overall, he suggested that he really did not purge that many
officers--perhaps only 10-20 percent of the total. He said he basically
erred on the side of leaving people in. He wanted to get rid of the
worst of the lot, but felt that beyond them, it would be too difficult
to try get down much further. He also felt that by forcing out that
many, the rest would get the message and fly right.
The two most important positions in the MoD are the director of
personnel and the director of counterintelligence. Having people you
1 of2
4129nJXl3 1:23 p:p,..

Onyszkiewicz Notes
http://email.capdale.comlexchange•••9Jmbox!Onyszkiewicz%20Notes.EML~1
can trust in these two jobs are what count the most. The chief of
1 staff, chief of operations. and all of the other positions are
secondary. What matters in this new organization is people--whether it
does its job (i.e .• defend the country) properly is a distant second.
For the moment, the key is transform the institution and that means
getting out the dead wood, bringing in new personnel, and keeping the
officers who are most trustworthy. Moreover, as he pointed out, if you
need someone to run a division, you just have to have a military
officer--there just aren't civilian careers that provide a close
alternative from which you can draw personnel, so he had to come many of
the personnel just to keep the organization functioning.
Onyszkiewicz felt that establishing what civilian control over the
military meant was critical right at the start. He said that he
purposely laid down a marker early on with the Ministry: the
professional officers tried to explain to him that his role, as a
politician (as under the old communist system) was to set broad policy
guidelines and leave all military technical matters to the officer
' corps. He told them that ~if I want to decide what the organization of
a battalion should be, then I will decide what the organization of a
' battalion should be."
He said that he tmned away all of the exiled former Polish military
officers because he did not believe the rest of the officer corps would
accept them. However, he did seek out Polish military officers still in
Poland who had been arrested for subversive activities and he reinstated
and promoted them, in part to help push forward the reform agenda.
Finally, he noted that an important factor that made the transition
somewhat easy in Poland was that the Polish military appeared to have
been expecting the transformation for some time--lower level officials
apparently saw the handwriting on the wall beforehand and this seemed to
have prepared them psychologically for the blows when they came.
I think you~ in touch with him as well. His number in
Warsaw i~d his email is
In addition, might it be worth bringing together a small number of
other officials from Eastern Europe and other countries (South Africa?
Chile?) that have undergone similar transitions to get their thoughts on
how to go about this?
1 On another note, I am hearing some pretty disheartening things about
how the reconstruction effort is being handled (or not handled, in some
cases). I will send a separate email on these points, also suggesting
some questions that you might raise with your interlocutors, as you
requested.
Best
Senior Fellow and Director of Research
, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue. NW
Washington. DC 20016
2of2
4129/2003 1 :23 PIV

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Caplin & Drysdale. Chartered
One Thomas Circle, NW Swte 1100
Washington, DC 20005
1202) 862-5000
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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
1200- l 7th Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, OC 20036-3011
(202) 457-1700
(202) 429-6063
Contact: Neil Kritz, Director, Rule of Law (nkritz@usip.org 202-429-3888)
Paul Stares, Director, Research and Studies (pstares@usip.org 202-428-3891)
Conclusions of USIP Roundtable on
Lessons Learned From Prior Vetting Processes·
Qanuary 24, 2003)
I. Why is vetting critical to the success of a democratic transition?
Vetting is necessary in order to:
1) Sanction those who have committed abuses and remove them from positions in
which they could continue to do so.
2) Instill public confidence in the reformed and cleansed institutions of
government. The vetting process can serve as a means of inculcating new social
norms, promoting government legitimacy, and building a new sense of civic
responsibility and national identity. This emphasis is increasingly preferred
under international standards to the Point (l)'s focus on patently punitive
vetting.
3) Render the handling of past abuse more manageable. Even if prosecutions occur
for abuses of the ousted regime, there will be very few trials relative to the
number of potential cases.
4) Contribute to public order. A hesitant, arbitrary or incomplete vetting process
can likewise result in personal vengeance, festering grievances, and lack of
public trust in government.
II. Who does the vetting?
* With the encouragement of senior NSC staff, the United States Institute of Peace organized a roundtable
discussion on Janurary 9th, 2003 involving former U.S. government officials and non-governmental experts on the
experiences of several countries with efforts to screen and purge the security forces and civilian administration
during a transition from a repressive system to democracy. Prior cases that were discussed included post-WW II
Germany and France, the purge of the military in El Salvador, de-Stasification of various sectors following German
re-unification, and police vetting programs in the Balkans, Haiti and elsewhere.

-
--
-- ---------------------- -- -
Vetting may be conducted by (1) one centralized government agency or specially
established commission; (2) separately by each ministry and agency; (3) by foreign
occupation authorities; or (4) by an international interim authority; or (5) by a
combination of the above. In the last two cases, it will be essential that carefully
selected and publicly credible locals participate in or advise the process. If local
authority is to have responsibility for the vetting process, international pressure can be
important to ensure implementation, enforcement and fairness of vetting decisions.
Authority: In most cases, vetting is based on the enacbnent of a law, the imposition of a
decree by governing authority, or the provision for vetting in a peace accord. Vetting
will often be subject to charges of arbitrariness and "victor's justice," making it
important to clarify the standards and procedures to be applied. A greater expectation
applies in this regard in the vetting of the civilian sector than security forces. Whenever
possible, make use of local laws and legal principles. This legitimates the process in the
eyes of both accused and surrounding public.
III. Who gets vetted and when?
Vetting requires balancing the need to purge with the necessity of "keeping the trains running."
The need to have sufficient personnel in place to run essential government functions,
especially security functions, may constrain the thoroughness of an initial purge. Before
beginning any purge, determine (a) the availability of qualified replacements; (b) the
time it will take to recruit/train new personnel; and (c) the level of disruption that will
ensue in any institution during a gap between dismissed and new personnel.
It is essential to determine-and prioritize-which positions in which sectors should be
vetted lest they pose a threat to immediate post-conflict security and undermine public
confidence in the transition. ( In various cases, this has included the military, security,
intelligence forces, judiciary, teachers, financial officials, media, and health
professionals.)
In the initial phase, vetting must focus on removal of unsuitable personnel from police
and security forces. This serves to enforce immediate public order for the interim
administration, break up cabals of corrupt or criminal officers, and dissuade victims
from taking private vengeance.
Vetting of prosecutorial and judicial personnel must keep pace with the vetting of
security and police forces in order to ensure a functioning justice system. Leaving
corrupt judges in place can undermine efforts to reform police forces and can facilitate a
return to police abuse.
Vetting must take place in all areas of government, and often in the private sector as
well as the public sector, in order for the public to feel justice has been served. Private
2

sector vetting may follow its own procedures, but should be monitored so as not to
violate the democratic principles that will govern under the new regime.
As seen in several prior cases, accusations and purges can easily get out of control.
Vetting should be thorough, particularly in the security forces, police and judiciary, but
should be constrained .
IV. What Criteria are applied?
In previous vetting programs in various countries, the following categories of
implicated personnel have been excluded from key positions on the basis of vetting:
• Senior officers (e.g. from colonels up), except as truly needed
• War criminals and human rights abusers
• Secret police informants
• Senior party officials
• Drug traffickers/members of criminal syndicates
• Those deemed unqualified based on professional history and competence
V. What sources of information provide the basis for vetting?
Ideally, vetting should be based on a comprehensive review of as many sources of
information as possible given the possibility of incomplete, missing, and falsified
records. It is necessary, therefore, to be able to fuse/filter disparate sources of
information and to account for distorted/politically-based allegations.
It is imperative to immediately locate, secure and restrict access to all relevant personnel
records, intelligence files, court and prison records, and other relevant databases as
quickly as possible. These will provide the main basis for vetting. Unsecured, these
records will be destroyed, falsified, or used for blackmail. In addition to records of the
new deposed government, vetting can draw on data from publicly available news
sources, international human rights groups, and foreign intelligence sources. Compile
as many records and sources of information as possible before the transition.
Elements of vetting review:
(1) Records and data sources as noted above.
(2) Publication of candidate lists (ideally in local papers and in refugee centers
abroad), with a request for the public to submit any relevant information
regarding candidates.
(3) Applicants should be required to self-report their history and activities, with any
falsehood being an immediate disqualifier. Self-reported histories can be cross-
3

checked against available records and witness testimony. Misrepresentations,
even impersonations, are conunon.
(4) Vetting review must not only clear an individual of culpability for abuses of the
old regime, but also determine his/her objective qualifications and ability to
adapt to the norms and practices of a new, accountable and civilian-led
democratic government.
VI. What are the key procedural considerations?
Fewer cases versus faster processing: Vetting can target and purge specific individuals
based on past abuses. This is by definition retrospective and retributive, and
consequently a higher due process standard is required. Alternatively, all current
holders of the designated positions are required to re-apply. In this case, vetting is
prospective and, like routine civil service screening, a lower due process burden can be
applied to the program. In the second scenario, continuation of the applicants in their
jobs is contingent on eventual approval in the vetting process - making it possible to
more quickly remove targeted individuals while review of other cases proceeds more
slowly.
Due process: Three due process questions routinely arise: (1) Is there a right of the vettee
to confront the evidence against him/her? (2) Is representation by counsel permitted?
(3) Can vetting decisions be appealed? Provision for a limited appeals process is
helpful, particularly for civilian positions, in that a successful appeal by an accused
abuser vindicates the legitimacy of the vetting process.
Standardization: Vetting rules may (1) be rigid and uniform, to expedite the process and
avoid the appearance or reality of arbitrariness, or (2) allow for subjective evaluation,
taking into account such factors as severity of misdeeds, mitigating factors, coercion or
other reasons for taking the action in question, later remorse/ change in conduct, or
distance in time from the abuse.
Duration: Dismissal from the security forces may be permanent, given concern over
renewed abuses. Civilian vetting, on the other hand, is usually of temporary duration
(typically 5-10 years) to allow breathing space for government and society to re-create
itself, after which they move to a level playing field.
VII. What happens to the purged?
Types of sanctions which may result from vetting: Those sanctions which have been
employed in various countries include employment dismissal; exclusion from
appointed office; exclusion from elected office; exclusion from designated private sector
4

positions or professions; denial of benefits (including government pension); exclusion
from suffrage.
Prevent the purged from becoming spoilers: Those vetted out cannot simply be sent home,
but must be placed in some sort of organized, remunerated activity. This temporarily
ensures their livelihood so they do not turn to criminal activity, facilitates observation
of their interactions with former colleagues, and prevents them from organizing a
troublemaking underground force.
VIII. What happens to those who survive the vetting process?
Probation: Those retained - particularly in the police and security forces - should be
retained on a probationary basis. The probationary period should be long enough to (1)
allow refugees to return and provide additional relevant information, and (2) permit
monitoring of performance to ensure suitability. This may last up to two years. It may
be useful to put outside personnel in place to closely supervise the work of these
remaining employees during this period.
5

Iraq Corps • Iraqi Military Reconstruction wysiwyg://1/tile:/Cjn)ocuments and Setti ..• qis - Iraqi Military Reconstruction2.htii
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Iraq Corps - Iraqi Military Reconstruction
On 23 May 2003 the US civilian administrator for Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, abolished several ministries and
institutions of Saddam Hussein's regime, and disbanded the Iraqi army, declaring them illegal.
The ministries of defense and information were among institutions being dissolved as well as the military
and security courts, the Iraqi Olympic Committee, and the Republican Guard units. Bremer's office said
that plans are afoot to create a new Iraq Corps as the first step toward forming "a national self-defense
capability for a free Iraq." The statement said the corps will be •professional, nonpolitical, military
effective and representative of all Iraqis." The move Is aimed to get rid of Ba'athist influences in the
military and security institutions. It follows last week's decision to abolish Hussein's Ba'ath party and
order the dismissal of party officials from the civil service.
It is estimated that about 400,000 people, mostly military personnel, will lose their jobs.
Originally, the hope was in fact that large elements of the army would stay intact, and that the municipal
police [the political security police] would very quickly return to their beats in Baghdad and other areas.
The team under the former civil administrator [Jay] Garner was really taken somewhat by surprise in that
the apparatus of the Iraqi government went home. The army dissolved.
Ten years of sanctions and continual air patrols, the destruction of nearly all air defense capabilities, and
two wars, left the Iraqi military expectantly decimated. If the United States Ins not going to maintain a
persistent armed presence in Iraq, then Iraq must prepare to defend itself in the absence of or in concert
with us forces.
The rebuilding of the Iraqi military will, in all likelihood, be closely supervised and controlled by the United
States as part of an overall rebuilding process. The rebuilding of the Iraqi military seems paradoxical
considering the amount of time and effort spent dismantling the Hussein regime. However, a stable and
well-trained Indigenous military force will be key in maintaining internal stability and filling the power-void
left by the removal of the Hussein regime.
It is Important for the United States to monitor and supervise Iraq's military reconstruction as the US has
an interest in reequipping Iraq with US military equipment. The use of US systems would require
significant training and allow the US to have continued military influence in the country long after
significant US units had departed. likewise, if left to its own accord Iraq would likely tum to other
available systems on the open arms sales markets, most likely Russian, or Russian derivative arms that
the Iraqi military already has experience using.
Concerns over Iraq eventually turning these weapons against its neighbors should be limited when one
considers that, as in Saudi Arabia, significant dependence on US technical advisors would exist to
maintain the most sophisticated weapons systems. In addition the dependence on US technical expertise
and training will ensure the US will have a continued military presence within the country.
Naturally, it will be difficult to guarantee that a defense force constructed in any country would maintain a
permanent defensive poster. It would be Important to formulate a control regime that would monitor Iraqi
defense forces as well as integrate US technical personnel to attempt to Insure that Iraq would continue
to maintain a force structure with limited offensive capabilities.
This assessment assumes that Iraq will be able to resume normal oil production by the beginning of 2004
and military spending will be structured in a way to allow for maximum resources going toward
infrastructure reconstruction. Assuming 22 billion dollars in oil revenues with s per cent available for
defense allocation, Iraq would be able to allocate approximately 1.1 billion per year on defense.
Procurement structuring would likely take place over five to ten years with an increasing in defense
allocation to coincide with completion of infrastructure projects.
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Iraq Corps - lraqi Military Reconstruction wysiwyg://l/filc:ICl/I)(icuments and Setti ... rps - Iraqi Military Reconsuuction2.hm
A caveat of military reconstruction will be that none of the systems provided will surpass Israeli systems
and the force structure will primarily defensive in nature and therefore not an immediate threat to any of
its neighbors.
Security Forces 200,000
Why this number?
These are enough troops to perform internal defense but not enough to launch offensive attacks against
neighbors.
Tanks
M1A2 500
M60A3 750
Why this number?
Saudi Arabia and Jordan both utilize M-60 systems and Saudi Arabia has M1A2 tank systems but nearly
half are in storage because of a shortage of trained tank crews.
APC
M2 500
LAV 500
M113 1500
Why this number?
Smaller force structure--lraqi defense force will likely be a much smaller force than the Iraqi army prior to
the first gulf war. To be effective, these troops need to be able to be highly mobile.
MOR
Bl mm
M29 81-mm 400
107mm
M30 107-mm 100
120mm
M121 120-mm 100
Why this number?
This number corresponds with proposed force structure and based on similar sales to other countries
Towed Artillery
105mm
M101/Ml02 100
155mm
M198 50
M114 50
Why this number?
This number is in line with artillery systems found in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Self-Propelled Artltlery
105mm
M52 150
155mm
M109A6 110
203mm
MllO 100
Why this number?
This number is in line with artillery systems found in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
MRLS
M270 MLRS 50
RCL
M-67 90mm 100
M40 200
Utlllty vehicles
AMEV 100
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512812003 12:21 PM

Iraq Corps - Iraqi Military Reconstruction wysiwyg:/11/file:ICl!Documents and Setti...rps - Iraqi Military Reconstruction2.htr
M548 500
Why this number?
It is like that Iraq would need this number of support vehicles to operate and supply its defense force.
Anti tank weapons
M136 AT4 500
M47 Dragon 750
Why this number?
Iraq will need systems to protect against armor assault from its neighbors. The optimal number of
systems was derived from the number of AT systems possessed by Saudi Arabia and the relative size of
armored forces possessed by Syria and Iran.
Attack Helicopters
AH-64 50
Why this number?
Attack helicopters have a relatively short range and can not hold territory. As a result they are perfect for
a combined role but in and of themselves do not possess an inherent offensive threat. Sophisticated
attack helos would be dependent upon US technical expertise for optimal usage and maintenance.
General-purpose Helicopters
S-70 15
UH-60
25
SA-365n 5
Bell 406c 15
Why this number?
These numbers are in line with other militaries' in the region of similar size and structure.
Air Force
25, 000
Fixed wing
F-15 40
F-16 160
Why this number?
F-15's are flown by the Saudi air force. They are modern fighting aircraft but are not the most advanced
US aircraft being flown in the area. The F-15 is a capable of conducting both air and ground missions
however, the variant likely to be sold or leased to Iraq would be the F-lSC which is an air superiority craft
not a ground attack craft.
The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, multirole fighter aircraft. It is highly maneuverable and has proven
itself In air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack. It provides a relatively low-cost, high-performance
weapon system.
In an air combat role, the F-16's maneuverability and combat radius (distance it can fly to enter air
combat, stay, fight and return) exceed that of all potential threat fighter aircraft. It can locate targets In
all weather conditions and detect low flying aircraft in radar ground clutter. In an air-to-surface role, the
F-16 can fly more than 500 miles (860 kilometers), deliver its weapons with superior accuracy, defend
itself against enemy aircraft, and return to its starting point. An all-weather capability allows it to
accurately deliver ordnance during non-visual bombing conditions.
Naval Forces
FF-1040 Garcia 3
PC- 1 Cyclone 30
Anti mine 5
Service Craft 2
Why this number?
Iraq will have no need for offensive naval systems but well need craft capable of patrolling costal areas
and guarding oil assets.
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Iraq Corps - Iraqi Military ReconslIUCLion wysiwyg:lll/file:ICIJDocuments and Setti...rps - Iraqi Military Reconsll'UCtion2.htr
Air Defense
20mm
M163 PIVADS 100
3Dmm
AMX-30 SO
SAM
MIM-104 Patriot 5
MIM-23 Hawk 10
M6 Linebacker 100
FIM-92A Stinger and Redeye missiles 500
MIM-72 Chaparral FAADS 10
Why this number?
Air defense will be a priority. Likely systems would include multi-use missile and air defense systems to
protect against scud and mlg systems prevalent In the area.
Iraqi Military Reconstruction
Army
200,000
Armor
M1-A2
M-60
M2
LAV
M113
500
750
500
500
1500
APC
MOR
BJ.mm
M-29
J.07mm
M-30
J.20mm
M-121
J.OSmm
M-101/102
155mm
M-198
M-114
105mm
M-52
J.55mm
M-109a1b/a2
203mm
M-110A2
MRL
Astros II
RCL
M-67 90mm
M-40A1 106mm
400
100
100
Towed Artillery
100
50
so
Self-Propelled Artillery
150
110
100
so
100
200
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5/28/2003 12:21 p~

Iraq COipS - Iraqi Militacy Reconstruction
wysiwyg://l/file:/CVI>ocwnents and Setti ..• rps - Iraqi Militacy Reconstruction2.hm
Utility vehicles
AMEV
M548A3
100
500
Anti-Tank Weapons
500
TOW
M-47
750
Attack Helicopter
AH-64 50
1,000
General Purpose Helicopter
S-70 A 15
UH-60a (Medlvac) 25 (5)
SA-365n
Bell 406c
10
25
Air Force
25,000
Fixed wing
F-15c
F-16c
Frigate
Patrol
Anti mine
40
160
Naval Forces
3
30
5
Air Defense
20mm
M-163
30mm
AMX 30
PAC
I Hawk
M6
Stinger and redeye
missiles
M48 Chaparral
100
50
5
10
100
500
10
SAM
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inlq Corps - Iraqi M1htlll'}' Reconstruction wy$iwyg://l/fi\cJCVDocumcnls and Seui ... rps - lr.K(i M1htary Rccon~uuclionl.h1r
6 of 6 Sf.1.8fl003 12:21 Pf.'

Education and Its Important Role in the National Defense of Iraq
by
Brigadier General (Staff) Najeb M. Al-Salhi
[ I
In a country such as Iraq, which has been susceptible to radical political, economic
and social changes, and after its participation in several external wars with its
neighbors and internal wars in the north, the south and even the country's central
region, there has been a resultant intervention and haziness of the doctrine and
philosophy of national defense. That doctrine requires a number of educational and
training programs in accordance with a new strategy of defense that reflects the policy
of a new government These probrrams w ill jncludc the following benefits:
• Education of the people, especially the new generation, in the doctrine oflraqi
patriot-ism and what Iraq means as a geographic region, a people, a political
system, what are Iraq's intei:national boundaries, lraq's human resnurces, Iraq's
rich popular culture (without chauvinism or fanaticism), and what.are the
rights and duties of the Iraqi citizen
• National symbols, such as the Iraqi flag and the Iraqi national anthem, and
their imponance
• Peaceful coexistence among the populations inside the Iraqi nation
• The principles of human rights under the auspices of a democratic and
pluralistic government
• Tlte meaning of Iraq's national defense, including moral and political defense
by means of confirmation of love of Iraq and commibnent to protection of its
interests, its land, its resources and culture, and confirmation of its national
unity and the cohesion oflraq's people
In regard to military and civil defense, education and training can enable the
following:
• A culture of change and transition from war to peace, including the conditions
and requirements of such change
• Civil defense programs
• A culture of protective securiry and inte11igence
• Educational and :protective programs about wars of mass casualties, such as
chemical, biological and nuclear wars, and training on the use of suitable
specialiwd procedures

• Programs for basic military training of volunteers for limited time-periods and
their introduction with recreational and educational programs
• Activation of scouting programs (Boy Scouts), young peoples' programs, and
youth camps
• The priority importance of sports programs for physical fitness and readiness,
such as programs for parachute jumping, climbing, rifle marksmanship, field
navigation and map reading, individual combat, survival camping, etc.
• General awareness of the Iraqi people about wars in the world, their causes,
their causes and methods, their results, how to avoid such wars, and the human
and material lessons learned from such wars

W.alter S. locombe
From:
Sent: ~-~-~....._, CIV,JCSJ5f: )
Tuesday, April 01, 2003 16:53 ------------
To: Walter Slocombe
Subject: FW: Iraqi MOD
MOD Guidance.doc TheFutureoftheiraqll.l·Salhi CV.doc (32
(40 KB) iMllitary.do... KB)
Mr. Slocombe--
co1 .... r_~
asked that I forward these to you.
Best,
r
-- - --Original Messa~e - - -- -
From: L: _COL, JCS JS
Sent:: Tuesday, Apri 01, 2003 4:36 PM
'l'O: r-" I, CIV I JCS JS
Subject: PW: Iraqi MOD
- - - - -Original l"lessag· e- - - - -
From: r: :"
Sent: Sund a¥, March - 30 , 2003 10: 57 PM
To: .. ~ r- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ )
Subject: lraqi MOD
[
Please confirm you recieved this. This is in prep for the meeting with
Walter Slocombe today. There are a couple of things here.
1.) Start of paper I drafted on ORHA objectives and Immediate actions.
This is a working paper, so comments and corrections are much appreciated.
2.) There is also a paper from Najeb Sahli, an Iraqi Brigadier who defected
in 1995. l met with Najeb last week and friends of his sent me this paper
that he worked on with SAIC. It says all the right things, but the word is
he is not a trusted agent. We are suspect as to his real motives.
3.) Also attached is a CV on Najeb. You might run the trap line on his
credentials down there. We are doing it over here.
Help STOP SPAM with the new MSN 8 and get 2 months FREE*
1

http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail
2

----·----------------
Free Officers & Civilia1i Moveme111
November 1st 2001
The Future of the Iraqi Military and Its Role in Civil Society
When we think about a new regime in Iraq and contemplate the horizons of a
bright future, our nigh hopes oblige us to make an effort to formulate a way in which to
sketch the features and the essential nature of the Iraqi military establishment, in a way
that makes it a vital force which can share, along with the other social and national
institutions, in the building of a new and democratic Iraq. At the same time, the military
must be able to defend effectively Iraq's national borders and to maintain Iraqi
sovereignty and the unity of Iraq's lands.
Iraqi National Security
Any group of nations, regardless of the differing nature of their regimes, wilJ all
work to guarantee their national security. which is simply an expre-ssion in which arc
enshrined the following fundamental values which nations strive to perpetuate and to
protect:
1) the ability to survive and continue as a nati. onal entity and to guarantee
political independence and the unity of the national territory.
2) 3) the ability to attain a certain level of economic well-being.
the ability to perpetuate and maintain the national characteristics of the
country.
In other words, national security means preservation of the manner of living in society,
religion, culture, intelleotual ]jfe. science, and the arts, among others. The effort that the
state exerts in order to preserve these fundamental values is called "the national security
policy of the state". Every effort or step (and even refraining from taking action) that an
individual or a group undertakes to attain or perpetuate these fundamental values is
described as serving "the national interest". In addition, the preparation by the state of
steps that it will take to guarantee the above-mentioned goals is caUed "the higher
strategy of the state".
Further, the various lines of general action designed to attain the higher strategy
are referred to by the term "strategy" and fhjs term can be used to describe many things,
such as; political strategy, or economic strategy, or military strategy, or environmental
strategy, among others. ln each case, the term strategy applies to all the lines of approach
deploye-d in support of a given policy in any particular field, as well as the apparatus used
to attain that policy, including all the variations and permutations of approach. On the
other hand, something that is too often the c, ase, the pursuit of this grand strategy should
not lead to a situation in which a part of the overall strategy ("a branch strategy") ends up
hanning the grand ( overaJJ) strategy or is in contra.diction with the othe.r strategies. In
other words, it is imperative that in the future the political strategy for Iraq not conflict
with the country' s military ~trategy.

2
At present, discussions about the future policy of Iraq (post-Saddam Hussein) are
focused on the creation of a democrati. c regime, the development of a civil society and the
adoption of a policy of openness ('" infitah") to the world (and in particular the
neighboring countries and the great powers, especially the USA), the settlement of
disputes through peaceful diplomatic means, and the adoption of effective economic and
social development schemes which would compensate the Iraqis for past backwardness.
11 is therefore natural that this state of affairs shouJd be reflected in the military
establishment in a clear and tangible way. The mi1itary should be made into an attractive
establishment, we.II diversified and capable, which is self-controlled and compatib'le with
the new democratic life and with the peaceful tendencies of the new state policy. The
lraqi military will need to make a commitment to adopt modem ideas and theories
concerning national security. No longer will security be attained only by the strength of
the army or by its size or by the advanced technology of its weapons systems, or by the
militarization of the people a.nd placing them in a perpetual mass mobiJ: ization.
At present, the concept of security has come to mean comprehensive development
and the creation of an educated and aware citizenry which is civilized and liberated and
bas the power to make its will felt. Democracy is a strength. Economic and social
development are strengths. All of these strengths serve to ensure the national security,
which is tied to the freedom of the individual with an indissoluble bond, ooe
complementing the other. It is not possible to violate the freedom and the rights of the
individual on the. pretext of protecting the security of the political regime or of the state
from the threats and dangers which surround it, although many dictatorial regimes have
used this argument as a justification. In other words, it is not possible to talk about
national security in the context of a de:Prived citizenry which does not enjoy a ce. rtain
degree of democracy or is living under a repressive regime based upon the denial of
intellectual and political pJuralism, where constitutional institutions, legislative and
executive au. thorities, and the judiciary have been converted into empty fonris. When the
right of the citizens to share in pohtical decision-making is undermined, when individual
initiative is para.lyzed, when justjce is demolished, when human existence is distorted,
when there is aggression against political. religious, and cultural freedoms, then there is
no guarantee for the security or the stability or any political regime which rules under a
police tyra1my. There is no way to achieve national security other than through a
democratic political system that respects the basic freedoms of the individual.
In this regard, the well-known American political expert Henry Kissinger
commented that there cannot be a contradiction between the demands of national security
and the demands of individual freedoms, because both depend upon the other.
The Milit~ry Establishment ... and Development
The Iraq of the future is in need of comprehensive development in all aspects (the
economy, services, sciences, human resources, and others). In addition, at present
military expenditures constitute a terrible waste of the nation' s resources, sapping the

3
natio. nal strength and taxing currently ineffective human resources, while weapons, war
materials, and equipment are imported at astronomical prices.
Iraqi milita.ry expeudjture reached (as was reported in an article by NidhaJ al-
Laythi in "al-Hayat" on July 7, 1995) in the years 1981, 1982, and 1983 the level of 24.6,
25.1, and 25.3 billion dollars respectively. At the same time, the revenues from oiJ
during the same three ye-ars were only 10.4, l O. l, and 7 .8 billion dollars. This means that
the ratio of military expenditure to oil revenue du. ring these three years was 236. l %,
248.5%, and 324%. In additio· n, these figures are certain to be too low, because they do
not take into account secret deals. Further, the level of military expenditures increased
markedly during the following years frorn what it was in '1983. For one thing, the prices
of weapons and war equipment have become much more expensive today for many
reasons. We should not forget that the estimates of the losses which were inflicted upon
the Iraqi economy exceed 600 billion dollars, in other words more than 60 times the real
value of the gross domestic product in the year 1993. This figure includes the value of
what was destroyed during the Gulf War, compensation paid during the two wars (Gulf
and Iran), foreign loans, and the expenditures of the arms inspections committees. We
point to the estimates of economic analysts who say that the future of [raq will be black
during the coming years unless the way of doing business is changed and
comprehensively reviewed from the bottom up.
Necessity and logic dictate the setting of priorities that guarantee the appropriate
level of the necessities oflife, of education, and of development of human resources.
This in itself will make e.xtensive military expenditure unlikely , or at least military
expenditure wiH take second priority, because development and construction will become
the first goal of the state.
The Size of the MiJit, ary Establishment
The size and capability of the Iraqi military establishment will be determined by
many factors that are too numerous to mention in this summary study. There are three
principal factors, however, which must be pointed o·ut briefly:
First: We hope that the possible threats to the country, when we are seeking a
peaceful democratic regime which wiU strive to handle its problems with neighboring
countries by peaceful means and by good will, far from recourse to weapons and the
desire for wars, will be reduced to the minimum through a peaceful and open political
strategy.
Second: Iraq's economic and human resources impose upon the country certain
limitations that cannot be avoided.
Third: The resolutions of the UN and of the UN Security Council oblige fraq to
abide by certain limils for the armed forces. In addition, the efforts by UNSCOM are a
continuation of this mandate to remove \VMD and other prohibited weapons, including
long- range surface-to-surface missiles. The UN resolutions, however, permit Iraq to
maintain military capabWties and · defensive missiles which will allow it to react to any
aggression, within the re. stTicti.ons on the size of the armed forces. the limitations on
Iraq's military industries, and Iraq's ability to benefit from dual-use technologies. The

4
issue oJlifting the economic and political sanctions on Iraq in the future is tied to the
extent to which a future regime is committed to execute the resolutions of the
international community. It has become necessary, however, to reexamine all of those
resolutions, because they we.re imposed on a11 aggressive regime after its attack on and
occupation of a ueighboring country (Kuwait) and thus were the products of that attack,
occupation, and aggression. Thus. the removal of those resolutions bas become a
legitimate Iraqi goal. in the event that the aggressive regime is removed. In addition, the
increase in armaments in the region, particularly in Iran and Turkey, makes it necessary
for Iraq to have sufficient defensive capabilities to defend its te.rritories and its vital
interests and not to be weak. Weakness will only encourage those countries to violate
Iraq's vital interests and even to attack Jraqi territory.
Ao Army for Defense or a For'Ce for Attack
There is no clearly-defined boundary between an anny committed only to defense
of the country or destined for attacks outside the country. This issue depends on many
factors, the most important ofwbich are intentions and legitimate or illegitimate
ambitions. The distinction can also be discerned from training programs, from planning,
and from political strategies. In the end, the military establisbment remains the tool of
the poticymakers for the attainment of their goals and plans. We can never imagine a
defensive army under a regime committed to an aggressive political ideology, just as we
cannot imagine the opposite. Indeed, there must be harmony between the overall strategy
and its components (policy is the womb in which war grows; it is tbe politicaJ goal which
becomes the strategic objective; war is the means to attain this political goal, but one
should not view the means separately from the strategic objective.)
For these reasons, what we aspire to in the future is a defensive national anny
with a size and armament that conform with a policy of national defense and are
consistent w. ith the pressing demands of comprehensive development which our country
requires and which does not involve of necessity any aggressive intentions. ln fact, the
size and quality of the Iraqi armaments at present, despite the losses that Iraq has
suffered, are considered appropriate to serve as the basis for that defensive force. We
will be able to compensate for d~ficiendes in some highly expensive areas of annament
through more effective investment in Iraqi capabi.lilies and expertise, in scientific
planning, in sound use of economic resources, with concern for the individual and the
development of his personal capabilities, through re1ationships based on humanity,
justice, equality, and a recommit:roent to the Iraqi social fabric, which bas been exposed
to splits and breakdowns as a result of Saddam's dictatorial regime.
Volu· oteers in the Armed Forces
The anny of the future must depend upon a significant number of volunteers
(officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers), for they are the important nucleus and
support for the military. These volunteers should be qualified educatjon<tIJy.
professionally, and in terms of health to form that nucleus. The extreme importance of
this element should be stressed to the military leaderships at all levels of the chain of

5
command, because the most important elements in the command of the soldiers are the
noncommissioned otUcers. ln this regard, it will be necessary to treat an ingrained
problem in the Iraqi military establishment, because the soldiers and the
noncommissioned officers come from certain governorales and locations, while the
officers. come from other governorates. l am referring here to discrimination between
Iraqis, even though tb. ey serve the same country. This discrimination is based on
unreasonable assumptions and springs ftom political, confessional, and racial
per.:;ecution. For that reason, in the future, membership in the lraqi military and security
establishments should be based on national nonns, far from any distinction based on any
race, religion, belief, or region. This discrimination is no longer valid in the selection of
officers, noncommissioned officers, or soldiers. Nor is it acceptable that key leadership
positions be filled on the basis of discrimination concerning ideology, race, origin, or
politics, as is the case at present.
Indeed, it is necessary for the lraqi mWtary college, the Iraqi staff college, and the
rest of the other Lraqi military schools to include young men and officers of aH the
differe.nt types in fraq, in a way that truly represents the demographic realities of the
countTy. This point will become a virtual litmus test of the intentions of the new Ira. qi
political regime and will become a reflection of its true orientation, not only on the level
of tbe military establishment, but also on other political levels. The extent of the
regime's seriousness in implementing these reforms will show whether it can move in a
positive direction and whether it has a just and evenhanded attitude toward Iraq's
citizens. The opposite is true as well. Repeated experiences have caus(;;d Iraqis not to
believe in promises and not to be satisfied with what is written in the constitution or in
the laws or in politica] pronouncements. Instead, Iraqis look at what is happening
concerning the practical implemc. ntation of what was published or announced.
What applies to these military training institutions should also be evide.nt
throughout the lead,ership structure of the Iraqi armed forces, for there are many in&,11'ained
problems in tWs area which cannot be solved other thao by an evenhanded and egalitarian
approach which puts all Iraqis on the same starting line. The regime of Saddam
cotnmitted serious crimes against the people and favored one soldier over another and
one o fficer over another, including even the positions filled by staff officers who were
graduates of the staff college. There is discrimination ... it operates in regard to the
movement of troops, although it is not permitted in regard to work in the field of military
intelligence. This discrimination becomes imbedded in the training process and prevents
the exerdse ofleadership. All of this rises from irresponsible assumptions and i.s
attribuled to an anxiety about security. There should not be mything preventing an
officer from graduating without restrictions into the armed services other than his
competence and his absolute loyalty to the country (Iraq). In other words, his beliefs., his
race, or his region should not stand in the way of the fulfillment of the legitimate
aspirations of any person in Iraq, most particularly in the armed forces.
The Elimination or Artificial Formations

--··- - ------
6
It has become necessary to review the military forn1ations created to protect the
regime, such as the R~public1m Guards, the Special Republica11 Guards, and various
otlier security orga11izations. These unJts should be disbanded and their cadres should be
dispersed, because they were fotmed in the service of the dictatorial regime and
according to discriminatory principles that should not be allowed to continue wider a new
regime that is committed to democratic equality a:nd to human rights. All of the
equipment and anns of these units should be returned to the united, national Iraqi
military.
In addition, the persons in these units should be handled with caution. Do not
attribute the crimes of Saddam in an overly emotional way to those belonging t'o all these
institutions. These units iac.lude honest office.rs and nationalist elements who have
committed no crime against the people. This makes it necessary to be precise and to be
completely objective. Accusations should only be directed against active and effective
clements who persisted in the.ir support for Saddam. These should be singled out, but
only as few as possible.
The Building of Nationalist Armed . Forces
The lraqi armed forces and the army should be rebuilt according to the tenets and
programs of democratic life and the new political atmosphere, and should reflect as well
the general situation in the country. There is considerable educational literature that has
been published concerning how to remove the military mentality and hostile mind-set and
how to develop the latent humanitarian impulse that is also present in each individual.
There also must be remedies for the negative effects caused by the dictatorial systems and
methods and the paralysis resulting from overly bureaucratized activity, which defined
the nat'ure of the forms of social interaction within the armed forces.
Compulsory Military Service
There must be a review of the laws pertaining to compulsory national service and
to reserve duty in a way that is appropriate for the special sit\1ation in Iraq. The country
is in nee. d of comprehensive development, in a way that will mandate a reduction in the
length of service to the shortest term possible, with no possibility of extending that term,
no matter what the reasons. It is important to treat the problems and the frustrations that
have afflicted the youth of Iraq as a result of erroneous policies. There needs to be a new
emphasis on scholastic achievement for lraqi youths, on teaching them various skills, on
raising scientific qualifications. This need.s to be done in tandem with a new system in
the military for recruiting, for selection, and for training. This new approach must also be
part of a system tluit is fafr to all Iraqis and guarantees the most productive investment of
effort and energy, making compulsory military service a humane and patriotic interval
that takes place on an accelerated basis, is a known quantity, and is a positive experience
for all.
Respect for Constitutional Institutions

·-- -------
7
An effort, based on a rapidly-i.ntroduced educational program, is needed which
can inculcate in the armed forces a respect for d. emocratic, constitutional institutions that
represent the wilJ of the people and a commitment to support the decisions of the people.
The necessary measures should be taken to prevent a repetition of the old phenomenon of
military coups. In addition, instruction on human rights should be one of the primary
topics in military educational institutions and in ntilitary units, so that the am1ed forces
are in conformity with the prevailing humanitarian concems of the country.
Humanitarian concerns must be impressed upon all thQse belonging to the anned forces,
from officers to soldiers. It is really embarrassing that . officers and soldiers receive
instruction in security and military intelligence without knowing anything about human
rights.
Defining the Mission of the Army
The mission of the army is defined as the defense of the country, protection of
national sovereignty, and protection of the constitution and the laws. The use of the army
in the case of internal problems and disputes is exduded. The natural location for the
anny is inside the military barracks. The specific duties of the army are to he defense of
the horuers and protection of national unity. 1n addition, the army is to preserve the
democratic regime and to protect the regime from the dangers of factionalism and from
plots.
PolUicallncUnations and Party Tendencies
The armed forces are to be above political inclinations, party tendencies. and
ideological cun-ents, in order to protect their unity, their national identity, and the desi;red
level of professionalism. The military must be removed from the causes of division and
factionalism. It must be assured that there is no opportunity provided, that the
atmosphere is not allowed to develop, for the formation or the proliferation of blocs
within the military, which might be exploited under certain conditions in ways that to not
serve the national democratic effort and the true interests of the country.
Indeed, the entry of the military into potitjcs created a dangerous precedent in the
political life oflraq. lbe result of this intervention was a convulsion in the political
stability of the country that exposed the unity of the armed forces to divisions, as well as
the removal from the military of effective leaders and commanders. This led to th.e
exploitation of the military and to its inevitable unpopularity, because it was involved in
endlt:ss adventures, entered numerous wars, and was exploited as an instrument of
suppression againsl the people and liquidation of political opponents. This was in
violation of the rights of the citizenry and of the fundamental responsibilitjes of the
military. For this reason, thjs is no justification for the politicization of the anned forces,
which does not in any case accord with the fundamentals of democracy and the objectives
for which the military was created.

8
The Defense Budget
The drawing up of a military budget must be in conformity with a well-considered
prog,ram that takes into consideration the most pressing requirements for the defensive
requirements of the military and the development of its technical and bwnan capabilities.
This must be done in a way that conforms to the requirements of comprehensive national
development. The size of the military budget should be announced yearly, along with the
other ministerial budgets.
Military Manufacturing Enter
_ prises
There should be an effort to make enterprises involved in manufacturing military
equipment operate according to their productive capabilities. The programs of the
enterprises should be defined according to Iraq's defensive needs. All excess production
capacity should be turned into civilian productive enterprises. These military enterprises
should participate in meeting the requirements of the army and the armed forces in terms
of maintenance and industrial production of traditional defensive items. These
enterprises should be developed in a way that (l.SSurcs self-sufficiency within the military
and contributes to the comprehensive dcve lopment of the country.
Su pervisfon o( Military A ff airs
It has become necessary to have complete supervision over the affairs of the
military, to keep a:n eye on military locations, activities, and ranks. It is essential to make
sure of the return of the Iraqi military to normal civilian life. In accordance with that
goal, military personnel must be made ready to be effective elements who can participate
in the uew democratic life oflraq and can contribute to its prosperity. On another
important level, there should be a study concerning compensation for military men who
were exposed to dire penalties because of their stands on national principles and policy.
TI1is study should examine how to guarantee their professional rights, thei.r retirement
rights, and their military accomplishments, specifically salary and military ranks, but also
including other rights.
Modern Expertise
There shouJd be reliance upon modem foundations in military education and
training, wl1ich will cost less in time and money. Modem technical know-bow among the
military should be utilized and the military should become open to the world. Iraq should
send military technical and cultural delegations to the advanced countries to develop and
exchange expertise with the militaries of the modern world. The level of military and
political culture of the Iraqi anned forces needs to be raised in a way that strengthens the
humanitarian outlook and the desire for peaceful solutions to problems that arise.

9
The System of Mobilization and CaUing to Arms
A new Iraq military of the appropriate size and annament requi-res a modem
system for general mobilization and calling up the people to arms, as well as wcll-
deve1oped plans to call up the reserves. Such a system will save considerable expenses
within the armed forces and will prevent damage to the national economy. Such a system
will ensure that there is no popular anxiety or fear over the sma11 size of the military
during normal times. In addition, the speed and precision of a modern system of
mobilization, something every nation is anxious to have, are considered elements of a
successful response to possible crisis, particularly under future· conditions in lraq, when
economic development will take first priority within the operation of rebuilding and
modernizing Iraq.
Intellectual and Morale Considerations
We will need in the futur:e to exert considerable and sincere effort to restore an
adherence to the national social framework within the Iraqi armed forces. The spirit of
citizenship and brotherhood must be strengthened among those be1ongiag to the armed
forces. An Iraqi national identity needs to be created. In addition, it is essential to deal
with any feeli11gs of unreasonable discrimination among members of the military
establishment. It is important that the loy~lty of everyone in (he military establishment
be to Iraq, the military, and the constitution. The handbng of any attempts within the
military to form blocs, interest groups, or regional, confessional, or racial factions must
be firm and decisive. The example provided by the national leadership ·in tem1s of
applying the law with justice to all will be sufficient to lay a strong foundation for this
new and lofty military edifice. It is incumbent upon us to foster civilized behavior in
military interaction with the people. Sound citizenshjp depends upon that. Unhealthy
attitudes of some military men toward civilians must be eliminated, and the opposite is
true as well. A new page must be opened in which relations among Iraqis are governed
by respect. decorum, poise, and self-control in relation to others.
The End
Nov. 1st 2001
General Najeb aJ-Salhi
Secretary General
Free Officers & Civilian Movement
r 1

To
From:
Subject:
Amb. Bremer
Wa1t Slocombe
Accelerating NIA Deployments
This is a preliminary report on the outcome of MG Eaton's training discussions on
Sunday with the Jordanians.1 Because I know of the interest in Washington and Tampa
in speeding up NIA deployment, I want to give you a preview of a concept MG Eaton has
developed, and that I support, for doing that in a way that will not only exploit the
training facilities of Jordan, but also will make more optimal use of the human resources
of Iraq and the experience of the US and British armies in developing junior leadership
than our present course.
The initia1 round of training has shown th at we have access to a very large pool of rank
and file enlisted men who are reasonably proficient in basic soldier skills. To some
degree therefore the current program of basic skills instruction is re-teaching what many
of the trainees, both enlisted and officers, already know fairly well. What is lacking is
junior officers and NCOs with the leadership skills necessary to transform groups of
individually trained soldiers into effective military units.
The basic ronccpt of our proposal - which the CMATT team is developing into a detailed
proposal that will be ready in a few days - is to shift our emphasis to focus very heavily
on training junior officers .and NCOs in the fundamentalJy new leadership skills needed
in a proficient army.2 This training would be done, for the officers in Jordan using a
combination of US and Jordanian military trainers, and for the NCOs, at the Kirkush base
by a combination of US active duty military and contractors. The Jordanians say they
could be ready to receive large numbers of officer candidates at the beginning of January
2004, and we believe the NCO "academy" at Kirkush (which would not require new
facilities) could be staffed and ready by then as well.
At that point, we would stop providing large scale basic training to recruits and instead
for several months concentrate entirely on training leaders. The resulting cadre of newly
trained officers and NCOs would then mold the intake of former Iraqi (and PershMergaf
privates - who already have the basic individual skills of a soldier- into fighting units.
This approach would allow us by the middle of next year to have a force much closer to
the 27 battalion target (probably organized in brigades, rather than divisions) now
scheduled for mid 2005.
L TG Sanchez' talks on the other issues went very well, and will be reported in a separate,
classified channel.
2 It would also be sensible to use Jordanian training facilities next year to bring back into the force
junior level specialislS - from lank drivers to truck mechanics to payroll clerks - who will be needed in lhe
target force and whose specialized training would otherwise alrophy. There is also 11 case for doing the
same with pilots and other air force persoMel, but that obviously depends on a basic policy decision
whether to move toward any sort of air capability.
J The new army cannot rely forever on prior service privates, so eventually, perhaps as soon as the
second half of 2004, we wou1d also need to open a basic !raining facility- staffed almost entirely by Iraqis.

This concept, we believe, is a way to get NIA units into service faster (and probably
better) than our current course. It would, however, require that we also accelerate into
2004 funding that would otherwise stretch into 2005, for the equipment and garrisons the
units would need, as well as for the structure to administer, maintain, and otherwise
manage and support the force. We would also have to substantially expand recruitment
and make it more sophisticated, because we would during the course of the next t 2
months be recruiting potential officers and NCOs, ex-servicemen with special skill sets,
and much larger numbers of ex-privates.

IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS
PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
Current as of: 01 08450 Aug 03
PURPOSE: The purpose of this guidance is to provide media handling instructions for
the implementation and mission of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC).
BACKGROUND: The concept of an ICDC was approved on July 11, 2003 and
subsequently referred to at press briefings by senior commanders (such as Lt. Gen.
Abizaid and Maj. Gen. Sanchez). It is therefore firmly in the public domain. No details
have yet been made available.
CJTF7 FRAGO 488 dated 23 Jul 03 directs all Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) to
begin recruiting immediately. Hiring is authorized and visible activity may have
occwred already.
IO is directed to encourage Iraqi support and PAO is directed to ensure ICDC is widely
recognized and understood.
POSTURE: The PA posture is Active.
STATEMENT: The Combined Joint Task Force-7 is establishing an ICDC with nine
battalions located in Baghdad and throughout Iraq in the north, north-central, south-
central and south regions of the country. The ICDC battalions are attached directly to
Coalition divisions and work side-by-side with the Coalition to provide an Iraqi face on
daily internal security operations. The ICDC security forces will enhance Coalilion
operations by initially providing language skills, cultural knowledge and support.
Eventually the security forces will form units to execute missions as independent fire
teams, squads, platoons and companies.
ISSUE AND CONSTRAINTS: The concept of the ICDC places it between the New
Iraqi Army and the Facility Protection Service (FPS). The scope of the ICDC as
described in the FRAGO means that it will O'o'erlap both of these forces, in tenns of
capabiJity, training, equipment and recruiunent. This will confuse external audiences,
including potential recruits, and make us vulnerable to accusations of lack of clarity.
In order to avoid these issues. but not unduly constrain commanders, for presentational
purposes the scope of ICDC is confined to operating only directly with Coalition Forces,
as part of joint forces, and not above squad level.
It will be acknowledged that the ICDC could develop, but that development is not
planned. However, if commanders so wish, they can recommend changes. Any changes
will be approved only once the roncept of the NIA and FPS are fully accepted. Any
significant development after the first year would probably be made by those other than
CJTF7.

Terms and conditions of service for recruits will need careful handling to ensure they are
not misled about their ultimate liability without discouraging recruiting. For example,
they may have to serve away from home if included in escort missions. To date Terms
and Conditions of Service have not been published, but are needed urgently to prepare for
questions and answers.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Active recruiting for the ICDC will be preceded by a
public announcement. This will be made at a central Press Conference in Baghdad and
then repeated at MSC level with local emphasis.
PA wilJ prepare a statement and response to questions. The central announcement will be
made by a CJTF7 spokesman and a "subject expert" nominated by CJTF7 C3 (Maj.
-· MSC arrangements will be directed by Di vision PA Os.
A media release will be issued following the announcement by CJTF7.
SUMMARY: For presentational purposes, the scope of the !CDC will be limited .. CJTF7
PA will co-ordinate the announcement and preparation of responses to questions and
handling of subsequent enquiries.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:
Ql: What is the purpose behind the creation of the ICDC?
Al: The initiative expedites the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Iraq,
facilitates the transition to a new Iraqi government, fosters a sense of Iraqi national pride,
stimulates Iraqi economic recovery and creates the foundation for future U.S.-lraqi
military relations.
Q2: What is the ICDC?
A2: A corps will provide individual Iraqis to augment coalition patrols and provide a
highly visible symbol of Iraqis contributing to establishing a secure environment. The
individuals may be formed into teams to execute low threat security operations in
conjunction with Coalition forces such as convoy security, fixed site security and linguist
support.
Q3: Why is the ICDC not a multi-ethnic nationally representative organization?
A3: ICDC is a multi-ethnic organization, but regionally recruited and based. Therefore,
the demographics reflect those of the locaJ Govemorate.
Q4: Who is excluded? Why are they excluded?
A4: Just like with the NIA, former Iraqi officers holding the rank of Colonel and above
are excluded from joining the ICDC.
Q5: Is the ICDC focused towards a certain type of security?
AS: Individuals will execute low threat security operations to include: coalition linguist
support, coalition HUMINT enhancement, contractor security, contractor vehicle drivers,

fixed site security, natural disaster assistance, humanitarian aid support, route security
and convoy security.
Q6: Is the ICDC, a military organization similar to the National Guard?
A6: No, ICDC security forces are full time. Therefore they cannot concurrently work for
the fixed site security program, border guard program, local police organizations, NIA or
another employer.
Q7: What type of individuals can join the ICDC?
A 7: Recruits will reflect local Govemorate demographics and include former vetted NIA
officers and soldiers, new recruits with no prior military experience and soldiers recruited
with the assistance of local Iraqi leaders.
QS: Is the ICDC similar to the NIA?
AS: It will have similarities to the NIA but have different responsibilities. It will be
localJy based and members will live at home. All soldiers will be equipped with AK-47s
but not other weapons.
Q9: How will the ICDC be equipped?
A9: Initially the units will be minimally resourced with most of the soldiers living at
home. Recruits are encouraged to provide their own personal weapons, which will be
controlled by the ICDC.
Q 10: What if someone wants to join the ICDC but has no weapon?
A 10: If someone does not possess the required weapon, they will be equipped with an
AK-47.
Q 11: Who will recruit and train the ICDC?
Al 1: Coalition Divisional Commanders are responsible for recruiting and individual and
collective training of ICDC soldiers and integration with Coalition forces. Training is at
the discretion of the Brigade Commander based on the area of operations, the
performance level of recruits, and security tasks.
Ql2: How much will Coalition forces oversee recruiting?
Al2: Recruiting districts will correspond to current military regions occupied by
Coalition divisions.
Ql3: What will be required of people wishing to become part of the ICDC?
Al3: Individuals must be able vetted and registered using the same standards as the NIA,
they must pass the minimum training requirements, and they must conduct a basic
medical screening.
Ql4: What are the training requirements?
A14: Candidates will receive basic training instructions to achieve a common standard.
Classes will be a minimum of two hours. The curriculum will consist of the following:

Weapons Familiarization, Basic First Aid, Human Rights, Rules of Engagement,
Introduction to English, Basic Physical Fitness, and Civics training.
QlS: How will the ICDC be paid?
AlS: The Ministry of Internal Security and Defense will coordinate the monthly
payment of payroll for ICDC security forces.
Ql6: When will the ICDC be implemented?
Al6: CPA approved the ICDC program on July 11. Upon completion of individual
training, the ICDC security forces initially augment into Coalition forces.
Ql 7: How much will recruits be paid?
Al7: They will be paid the same as the NIA. CPA anticipates releasing the NIA pay
tables on or about 15 August. ICDC people in administrative in-processing or individual
training status will receive $60 per month.
Q 18: What will be the policy of the ICDC?
Al8: ICDC will adhere to all policies established for the NIA and wiJI be aligned with
Iraqi law.
Ql9: What challenges are expected in arming the ICDC security forces?
Al9: Newly hired ICDC security forces are encouraged to bring an unloaded AK-47 to
training. Once the individual enters training, the weapon becomes part of the ICDC
program. Compensation will be paid for the weapon. The reason ICDC security forces
are encourage to bring their own weapon is that the various forces are in competition for
weapons including the NIA, the Border Guards, the local police forces and the Facilities
Protection Services.
Q20: How are former regime loyalists screened out?
A20: Former members of the top four tiers of Ba'athists are excluded, just as with the
NIA. A list of approximately 9,000 Ba'athist individuals is available to the units. If their
name is on the list, they will be prohibited from joining the !CDC.
Q21: How long is the training?
A21: All recruits wiJJ participate in a seven-day course where they must receive a
satisfactory completion of the following tasks:
Required tasks
l. Wear of uniform 2. Understand rules of en_ga_gement 3. Weapons trainin~ and maintenance 4. Searching a detainee and vehicle 5. Identify UXO/IED 6. Human rights trainin~
7. Basic first aid
8. Familiarization with Coalition rank
9. Understanding basic commands in
English
10. Securing a check point

Opening Remarks
The Iraqi Civil Defense Force is an initiative that Combined Joint Task Force-7 is
undertaking to establish a safe and secure environment for Iraq that will facilitate the
transition to a new Iraqi government, foster a sense of Iraqi national pride, stimulate Iraqi
economic recovery and create the foundation for future U.S.-Iraqi military relations.
CPA approved the ICDC program on July 11. Upon completion of individual training,
the !CDC security forces initially augment into Coalition forces.
CJ1F7 is establishing the !CDC with nine battalions located in throughout Iraq. The
ICDC battalions are attached directly to Coalition divisions and work side-by-side with
Coalition forces to provide an Iraqi face on daily internal security operations. The ICDC
security forces will enhance Coalition operations by initially providing language skills,
cultural knowledge and support. Eventually the soldiers will form units to execute
missions as independent fire teams, squads, platoons and companies.
A corps of ICDC security forces will provide individuals to augment coalition patrols and
provide a highly visible symbol of Iraqis contributing to establishing a secure
environment. The individuals may be formed into teams to execute low threat security
operations in conjunction with Coalition forces such as convoy security, fixed site
security and linguist support.
ICDC security forces will execute low threat operations to include coalition linguist
support, coalition HUMINT enhancement, contractor security, contractor vehicle drivers,
fixed site security, natural disaster assistance, humanitarian aid support, route security
and convoy security.
Recruits will reflect local Govemorate demographics and will include former vetted NIA
officers and soldiers, new recruits with no prior military experience and soldiers recruited
with the assistance of local Iraqi leaders.
Candidates will receive basic training instructions to achieve a common standard.
Classes will be a minimum of two hours. The curriculum will consist of the following:
Weapons Familiarization, Basic First Aid, Human Rights, Rules of Engagement,
Introduction to English, Basic Physical Fitness level, and Civics training.

' ,
•
• •
•
•
•
• ,.,
•
I
CJTF-7 Public Affairs
BAGHDAD, Iraq
xxxxxx
CJTF-7 COALITION PRESS INFORMATION CENTER
oW
Release #XXXX
IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS STARTS
BAGHDAD, Iraq - The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps started XXXX by Coalition Forces
across the country to work to provide an Iraqi face to daily internal security operations
conducted by the Coalition.
The ICDC is split into nine battalions located across the country and fully integrated into
the Coalition operations. Initially, the ICDC will provide language skills, cultural
knowledge and support to the Coalition. Eventually, the ICDC soldiers will form units to
execute independent fire teams and squad level missions.
All recruits will enter a seven-day training course where they will learn rules of
engagement, weapons training, searching detainees and vehicles and securing a
checkpoint.
The purpose of the ICDC is to expedite the establishment of a safe and secure
environment in Iraq, facilitate the transition to a new Iraqi government, foster a sense of
Iraqi national pride, stimulate the economy and create a foundation for future U.S./lraqi
military relations.
The ICDC is an organization whose purpose lies between the New Iraqi Army and
Facility Protection Service.
-30-

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTRORJTY
BAGHDAD
1\1EMO
02 September 2003
FOR:
CC:
FROM:
SUDJECT:
r;; ~TG San~h . !Director, Office of Management and Budget
CG, CJTF-7 and BG Hahn CS, C1TF-7
\Valt Slo · eiJirector of Security Affairs (National Security and Defense)
SECURI Y SECTOR SALARIES
As we have discussed, over the past 3 days a combined team of personnel from the Ministry of Interior,
CJTF-"r, Baghdad Central and a number of Ministries that employ Facilities Protection Service (FPS)
guards, the CPA staff and our Office of Security Affairs, collaborated to produce ao agreed scheme for
integrating security sector pay scales in support of the new Salary Progression Chan scheduled for
publication on 4 September. This security sector scheme 'is captured in the attached matrices.
This model is based on the following premises, each coordinated with the Ministry of Finance:
Persons currently employed under existing security sector pay scales are .. grandfathered'', at
least for near term.
The new pay scheme will take effect on 1 October 2003 and will apply to all members of the
security sector. including those employed by the CPA. CJTF-7, the UN, USAID, and other
agencies.
Base pay for security sector employees will be adjusted above normal civilian rates based on
the inherently hazardous and uncomfortable working conditions normally encountered by
security forces. This adjustment does oot apply to civilian personnel in the employ of security
sector entities.
The base pay for lowest ranking serving members (not trainees) will not exceed the Iraqi
Salary Committee recommendation of $60/month for security forces.
FPS guards will have a lower pay scale than military, lCIJC. or police forces.
Special allowances will be paid on a case-by-case basis . in very rare circumstances and then
only to individuals, not groups.
Annual step pay increases for satisfactory service are allowed.
No step increases for performance, because performance will be the main factor in
performance.
A. Death Gratu. i.ty for security forces ki1le.d in the execution of their duties will consist of
monthly payments to the widow or children of Lhe deceased until the ehildren reaeh age 18 or
the widow dies, whichever occurs later. The amount paid will be slightly less than the
person' s rnonthlysalary at the time of his death.
FPS guards in the oil and electricity industries may share in the Ministry's 30% performance
bonus, when it is issued, based on documented individual productivity.

2
I agree that this Integrated Security Sector Pay Scheme is fair and logical. It is endorsed by the Ministry
of Interior, other key Ministries and the CPA staff.
I must note, however, my significant concern with the application of these rates as a practical matter.
From talking with Coalition Conunanders and staffs across the country- literally from Basra thru Tikrit
to Mosul - T have become convinced that the current low end of the market pay scale for an entry level
policeman or soldier (not trainee) is somewhere between $100 and $120. Accordingly, the independent
application of these pay scales will not only fail to attract the quality of recruit we seek, I believe it will
absolutely prevent us from coming anywhere near manning the New lraqi Army, the battalions of the
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, or the Iraqi Police Force in the numbers necessary to bring a safe and secure
environment to this country, at least if quality is taken into accollllt.
Accordingly, I must as firmly as possible reconunend that, if the $60 entry pay is in fact established, the
CPA must put into effect an uncompromising and comprehensive application of the new Salary
Progression Chart in every portion of the Iraqi public sector and in every province around the country for
all grades and new entrants (subject only to the interim grandfather clause). If this is not done with
thorough rigor effective base pay must be raised (possibly by special allowances). For example, the
Authority could re-norm the Salary Progression Chart to reflect current market realities and allow
payment of $100 vice $60 to the lowest ranking servicing members of security forces. This option must
be carefully considered. Ifwe don't our efforts at security sector salary reform will fail.
The greatest doubt expressed by both Iraqis and Coalition military personnel about these efforts is the
challenge of attracting and retaining skilled, dedicated and honest personnel. Unless their pay is
genuinely competitive, we will fail.
I stand ready to discuss any of these points at any time.
Walter B. Slocombe
ATTACHMENTS: Comparative Security Sector Pay Matricies

CORRELATION OF RANKS BY PAY GRADES
NIA/ICDC NIA/ICDC IPS BORDER GUARD FPS
GRADE enlisted commissioned
SUPER A
SUPERB
I LG National Director of Border
Commissioner Enforcement
2 MG 2ommissioner Deputy Director
3 BG Dep Commissioner Bureau Chief
4 COL Superintendent Region Chief Colonel
5 LTC Inspector Asst Chief
6 SGM/CWO CPT/MAJ Lieutenant I Captain Lieutenant I Captain Major
7 SFC/MSG/ WO 2LT / ILT Sergeant Sergeant
8 SGT OFC 'Senior) Constable (Senior) Agent Captain
9 CPL Constable IAgent Sergeant
10 PVT I PFC Constable (Probation) lt\.gent (Probation) Guard
11 RCT rrrainee !Trainee

- --- - - --------
-
-
COMPARISON OF RANKS <SHOWING INITIAL STEP INCREMENT>
NlA/ICDC NIA/ICDC JPS BORDER FPS
GRADE enlisted commissioned
SUPER A .
SUPERB
National Dir of Border
1 LG Commissioner Enforcement
1 1 1
2 MG Commissioner Deputy Director
1 1 1
Dep
3 BG Commiss·ioner Bureau Chief
l 1 l
4 COL Superintendent Region Chief Colonel
l 1 l 1
5 LTC Inspector lA.sst Chief
1 1 l
6 SGM / CWO CAPT/MAJ Lieut I Captain Lieut J Captain Major
1 2 1 6 1 6 l 6 I
7 SFC/MSG/\VO 2LT I lLT Sergeant Sergeant 1 1
4 7 8 6 7 6 6
8 SGT OFC (Snr) Constable (Snr) Agent Captain
6 8 6 6 1
9 CPL Constable Agent Sergeant
7 5 5 I
10 PVT I PFC Constable (Probatio11) Agent (Probation) Guard
4 8 4 4 1
11 Recruit Trainee 1'rainee
1 4 4

..
G
R
A
[)
E
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
9
10
10
11
ENTRY LEVEL SALAR1ESJ}Q,RN£\.Y IRAQI ARMY/ IRAQI CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS
STEPS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Enlisted' Commission
LG 493 507 520 533 547 560 573 587 ' l
·
-
MG 382 393 403 413 424 434 444.
.
.
BG 296 304 312 3W 328 336 344 l 1 r
COL 228 2.34 24.1 24·7 253 259 265 t.
LTC 176 181 185 190 195 200 .! . •
MAJ 154 158 161 165
cwo 139 143
CPT 136 139 143 I
J ' I
SGM 136 139 . ' ••
WO 125 128 130
1LT 122 125 126
MSG 122 125 128
2LT 116 119 122
SFC 113 116 119 - :
OFC 99 -
SGT 95 97 99 101
CPL 79 81 83
PFC 66 68 69
PVT 60 62 63 65 66
RCT 50 l - i
'
,

•
G
R
A
D
E
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
7
8
9
10
11
ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR IRAOT POLICE SERVICE
STEPS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Natjonal Commissioner
Commissioner
Oep. Commissioner
Supenntendent
Inspector
Captain
Lieutenant
Seraeant
Constable (Senior)
Constable
Constable (Probation)
Trainee
493 507 520 533 547 560 573 587 600 613
382 393 403 413 424 434· 444 455 465 475
296 304 312 320 328 336 344 352 360 368
228 234 241 247 253 259 265 271 278 284
176 181 185 190 195 200 204 209 214 219
154 158 161 165 169
136 139 143 147 150
113 116 119 122 125 128 130
95 97 99 101 104
75 77 79 81 83 84
60 62 63 65 66 68 69
50 .
. j

ENTRY LEVEL SALARJ . ES FOR FACILIT£ES 1,ROTECTION SER VlCE
STEPS
G 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4
FPS Colonel 228 234 241 247 253 259 --
R 5 t
A 6 FPSMaior 136 139 143 147 150 154
() 7
E 8 FPS Captain 83 86 88 90 92 95
9 Guard Semeant 68 70 72 73 75.
10
~uard 56 57 59 60 1: ·

--
..._ ~,
.. ~
Ct?lL
c:pf
...
' ·'
._t ,,. ...
:·
COALITIONPROVJSIONALAUTBORITY
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
.... ,: ~.
IS June 2: 003
MEMORANDUM FOR. COMMANDER OF COALmON FORCES
SUBJECT: Cnmqa1nden• Emergency Response Program
I hereby redelegate to you certain authority vested in me pursuant to Deputy Secretary
of Defense Memorandum~ subject: Certain State- or Regime-Owned Property in Iraq,
dated May 29, 2003. Specifically, you. are hereby authorized to take all actions . necessary
to operate a CQnunanders' Emergency Response Program. This Program, will enable
commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements
within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will immediately assist
the Iraqi people and support th. e reconsttuction of Iraq. Under the Program:
(a) Individual division-level commanders may expend seized funds in a total
amoWlt not to exceed $500,000 peT commander, provided that the amount of
individual transactions carried out by each division-level commander shall not
exceed $100,000 per transaction; and
(b) Individual brigade-level commanders may expend seized funds in a to'la1
amount·not to exceed $200,000' per commander, provided that the amount of
individual transactions carried out by each brigade--level commander shall not
exceed $50,000 per transaction.
(c) As funds are e~nded by division- an, d brigade .. level coa>Jll.and!ers in
accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, the funds may be replenished
in like.amounts not to exceed the limits specified in those subparagraphs.
(d) Division- and brigade-level commanders shall d.ocwnent programs on the
Program Review Board's funding Request Form (PRB 01), and submit
completed forms to the CPA PRB Program Coordinator .
. . , .
This authority may be exercised in a total aggregate amount not to exceed
$10,000,000; may not 'be redelegated, and shall be exercised in accordance with the terms
and conditions set forth in the above·referenced Deputy Secretary of Defense
Memorandum and such other instructions as the CP, A may prescribe. The authority
previously delegated to you under CPA Memonmdum, subject: Certain State- or
Regime-Owned Pro. perty in Iraq, dated 3 June 2003, is hereby rescinded,
1 l?r ~~''l&>
iW ~er, Adoifuistratar
Coalition Provisional Authority

, .
COALl110NPROVISIONALAUIBORITY
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
lSJune2003
MEMORANDUM FOR REGIONAL DIRECTORS
SUWECT: Regional Directors' E.mergency Rapome Program
I hereby redelcgat.e to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Regional Directors
of Iraq certain authority vested in me pursuant to Deputy Seccctaiy of Defense
Memormd~ subject: Certain Stale- or Regime-<>wned Property in Iraq, dated May 29.
2003. Office of IUlconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) Memorandum,
subject: Region Level Quick Impact Projects. dated 19 May 2003, is hereby rescinded.
Specifically, each Regional Directors is hereby authorized to take all actions necessary
to operate a Regional Directors" Emergency Response Program. in order to assist the
Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq, provjdcd that:
(a) Each Regional Direetor may expend seized funds in an amount not to exceed
SS00,000; and
(b) The amount of individual projects carried out by a Regional Di.rector shall not
exceed $100,000 per project; provided further, that per project authority in
excess ofSl00,000 may be granted upon advance request.
(c) As funds are expended by a Regional Director in accordance with
subparagrapbs (a) and (b) above, like amounts may be replenished up to the
monetary limits specified in those subparagrapbs for each Regional Director.
(d} Regional Directors shall docum.ent all expenditures on CPA Program Review
Board's Funding Request Form (PRB) Form OJ, and submit completed forms
to the CPA PRB Program Coordinator.
The authority delegated herein is sepamte and distinct from the llllthority delegared to
the Regional Directors under CPA Memorand~ subject: Construction Initiative for
Iraq, dated IS June 2003. The authority delegated herein may be exercised in a total
aggregate amount not be exceed $7,000,000; may not be redelegated; and shall be
exercised in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the above-referenced
Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum. and otbc:r procedures the CPA may prescribe.
W?~~!~oJ
Coalition Provisional Authority

_ _ _ • • ---· ..
-
, ~"' , >Jr u1:.r 1;.NSE
1010 OEJ"KNSIE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301·1010
llAY Z9 m1
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR OF l1IE COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY
SUBJECT: Certain Slate- or llegime·C>wned Property in Iraq
I berdJy delegate to you the authority confirmed in the auached memorandum from
the President, subject as above. dated April 30, 200l, regard.ins the seizure.~
administration. or use of state or regime-owned property in Iraq.
Propeny taken under U.S. control under this delegation abaU be held on behalf of
and for the benefit of the Iraqi people, and shall be used only to assist the Iraqi people
and supPQrt the recomuuction of Iraq. You may redelegate this authority in writing, and
assign such duties and responsibilities in writing to other Depar1ment of Defense (DoD)
officials as you deem n~essary. and aball consider the feasibility of contracting out
administraa:ive functions related to your exercise of this authority. as 1pp1opriate and
authorized by law.
The authority delegated herein shall be e.xmciscd in accordance with DoD
procedures developed in consultation with the Department of the Trea.mry. the
Depanment of State, and the Office of Management and Budget. These procedures shall
ensure that aJI property subject to this delegation is appropriately accounted for, audited,
and used only for the purposes specified herein. Under these procedures, DoD officials
remain responsible for property under their control until the property is disbursed to
recipients or to a noo-DoD entity for distribution to recipients in accordance with
safeguards that ensure the property will be ( 1) secuml at all times; (2) used only for
purposes authorized by Jaw; (3) provided only to recipients who are entitled to such
payments; and (4) subjected to appropriate accounting and auditing controls.
This delegation. of authority shall cxpn 1 year following the date of this
memonndum.
Attachment:
As stated
cc: Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff U0?602 103

) ) )

..
COALIDON PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
15 . June 2003
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, PROGRAM REVIEW BOARD
REGIONAL DIRECTORS
SUBJECT: Construction Initiative for Iraq
l hereby redelegatc to , the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) IPtogram Review
Board {PRB) and the Regional Directors for h&fs North, South and South Centr-al
Regions Qenain authority vested in me ~ .Deputy Secretary · Of Defense Memorandum,
subject: Certain Staie- or Regime-'Owned P.roperty in Iraq, dated May 29. 2003.
The CPA PRB shall review and is hereby authorized to approve all projects. carried
out under the 1.-ooal Projects Element of the Construction lnitiative for Iraq that exceed
SJ 00,000, and all other projects under \M Consn:uction 'Initiative. for Iraq, in a - total
aggregate. amount not to exceed s100.ooo,ooo. .
Each o.f the above~nanied. R.,egii;mal Directors is
_ hereby authorized to take all actmns
nece-ssa:ry to oper~ the Local Projects Elemen~ of the Construction Initiative for Iraq, in
a total amount not to exceed $45 ,000,000, :io order to assist the Iraqi pieople and support
the reconstruction of Iraq. provided that eac-b Regional Dir~tor:
(a) may expend seized funds in an· amount not to exc.eed $15,000.000; and
(b) may approve projects with a cost of $100,000 or less, and 5hall submit project
proposals with a cost over Sl00 .. 000 tp · the CPA PRB for approval;
( c) shall ~ out projects under this Initiative in coordination with CPA or
Coalition F<>rces engineering elements available to provide tecludcal advice
and suppon in the Regional Ditector's area of operations; and
( d) shall document programs on CPA PRB funding Request Form (PRB 0 l ), and
submit completed forms to the CPA PR.B Program Coordinator.
The . authority delegated herein · may not be redekgated,. and Shall be exercised in
acc-0rdance with the abov:e.-refe:renced Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum and.
such olbet pro<.edurcus the CPA may PW"'-" r ~~ &./1[,( 0 3
L. Paul B.mner, Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authoricy

. '.
~- \ •
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD, DlA.Q
ActionMemopndnm
IS June2003
TO: Administrator, CPA
FROM: Office of General Counsel ~(_.,
SUBJECT: Delegations of Authority to Use Seized Iraqi Funds
Enclosed for your signattue are three delegations of authority that will (l) permit
clivisfon· and brigade-level couu:nan.ders to use seized Iraqi :funds for urgent humanitarian
relief and reconstruction pmjects in their areas of operatfon; (2) extend that authority to
Regional Directors, in amounts equivalent to those prescribed for division-level
oommanders; and (3) enable the CPA Program Re. view Board (P~) and Regional
Director-s to carry out the CPA 's .$100 million CQnsn:uction lnitia. tive for kaq.
• In a memol'alldum dated April 30, 2003, the President confirmed the a. uthority of
the Secretary of Defense to seize., sell. administer, or use state- or regime-owned
cash, funds, or realizable securities. in Iraq. The President specified that the seized
property may be used only to assist the Iraqi people and support the
reconstruction of Iraq (enclosure 1 ).
• On May 29~ 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense delegated to you the authority
to use seized Iraqi property for the same pwpose.s (enclosure 2).
• The three proposed memoranda at enclosures 3, 4 and 5 redelegatc this authority
as necessary to cany out the following CPA programs:
-- Commanders.' Emergency Response Program. Enables brigade- and division-
level commanders to spend seized funds for urgent .humanitarian relief and
reconstru, ction projects within their areas of responsibility ~ in respectiv· e amounts
that may not exceed $500,000 and $200> 000 at any one time, and subject to
respective per-project limits of$100,000l and $50,000 .
• ,. Regiomil Directors ' Emergency Response Pro.gram. Provides the CPA' s fow-
Regional Directors with the same authO'rit:y conferred u.nderthe Command.en'
Emergency Response Program~ in amounts equivalent to those assigned to
division-level CODllJlander~.
- Construction Initiative for Iraq. Authorizes CPA ls North, South and. South
Central Regional Oire<:tors, to spend up to $ 15 million eti:h in construction
Projeds, subject to per-project limit' ofSl00,000, and authorizing CPA' s PRB to

. . . ' ".
approve constrUCtion projects i.a excess ofSl.00,000, and all other projects
c.arried out under the Construction Jnitiative for Iraq.
ACTION REQUESTED: That die Administrator sign the attached delegations of
authority.
COORDINATION: Chief of Sta {" ~ LMsr._· _
-
___ ....______... __ ---.J
2

(i) l . 2. 0) 1. 2. J. (k) 1. 2. 3. 4. (l) I. 2. avoiding the performance of a duty or negligently pcrformin2 a duty
Elements
the accused had a duty to perform; and
the accused was aware of that duty; and, EITI IER
(i) the accused did not perfom1 that duty; and
(ii) the accused did not perform the duty either deliberately or by
neglect, OR
(iii) (iv) the accused performed the duty to a poor standard; and
the accused performed the duty to a poor standard either deliberately
or by neglect
making a false statement concerning any official matter relating to the
Nc\\I Iraqi Arnty
Elements
the accused made a statement about official New Iraqi Anny matters; and
the statement was false in a significant way~ and
the accused knew that the statement was false at the time he made ii.
without reasonable excuse, fighting with another Member of Che Ncn·
Iraqi Ar-my;
Elements
the accused was involved in a fight; and
the accused's involvement in the fight was deliberate; and
the fight was with another Member of the New lrnqi Army; and
the accused did not have a reasonable excuse for fighting.
willfully or by neglect damaging or causing damage to or the loss of
any property of the Ne'" Iraqi Army;
Elements
the accused lost OR damaged property of the New Iraqi Army; and
that loss or damnge resulted from EITI IER
(i) the de\ ibcratc aclS of the accused, 0 R
(ii) the neglect of the accused.
CPA/OR0/7 August 2003/23
16

L.PB HAS SF.EN
ACTION MEMO
21August03
To: Ambassador Bremer
From: Walt Slocombe and
Subject: PA YING KURDISH PESHMERGA COSTS
There are a variety of pressures to move forward on the PcshMerga question. The Kurds,
and some others outside the country, argue that it is unfair to pay stipends to the former
Iraqi military while leaving the payment of the PeshMerga to the Kurdish authorities.
CPA's stated general policy is that eventually the PeshMerga need to be disbanded, on
the ground that regionally based anned forces are incompatible with the goal of a unified
nation. Paying the PeshMerga who are still in active service is clearly incompatible with
that policy, and neither we, nor the Governance people, believe it would be wise to
change that policy.
On the other hand, in June when we announced the stipend payments to Saddam's "self-
demobilized" military, we said "CPA will ... continue pensions to military retirees and
payments to the disabled, widowed or former POWs~ [and] provide a monthly Jump sum
to Kurdish authorities in the northern three govemorates for payments for wounded
PeshMcrga and the widows of those PeshMerga killed (these authorities will be
responsible for disbursal of payments.)" Pursuant to this policy we are paying the costs
of pensions to about 120,000 pre-war Kurdish pensioners. running about $2.3M/month.1
At issue is how, if at all, to go beyond this. One non-controversial step is to encourage
the Kurdish authorities to enlist current PcshMerga personnel to work in the police, FPS,
and CDC.The Kurdish authorities have said that the PeshMerga have traditionally done
what should be done by police and security guards, and would presumable be open to this
approach. From the point of view of national unity, however, in Kurdistan these
fanctions ought to be performed by organizations that are under certain control - which
implies central payment. Since these payrolls are already centrally funded., there would
be no net increase in the relevant budgets for the Kurdish govemorates. provided of
course that we hold the Kurds to national standards for numbers of police and other
security people needed relative to popuJation. Transferring PcshMcrga members to these
organizations is probably a more verifiable and politica11y acceptable, forrn of
The 120,000 pensioners are about 2% of the estimated Kurdish population. About a million
pensioners are being paid south of the green line (at tb.e same $20/month average), roughJy 4% of the
population. MOF representatives from tbe CPA have examined lhe Ku.rds' systems for adn'Unistering t:heir
pension programs and have verified thnt they have audita.ble, by-name accountability of their pension
payments,

deactivation than formal 'demobilization.' It is also consistent with the GC's recent call
for "using some of the existing assets in lrnqi Kurdistan ex-police and anny by recruiting
young officers and conscripts."
Recommendation: Authorize the Governance team, with support from the commands
and from other CPA dcmt!'Clts, lu start discussions with the Kurdish authorities about
making these transfers, with the inducement that CPA will make central funds available
for bona fide transfers that meet national st.andards, e.g., for police training. These costs
should be reflected in the 2004 budget plans of the respective institutions.
Approve W~(~i,....--- Disapprove ______ Modify _______ _
More controversial, if only because more costly, is the possibility of agreeing pay some
32,000 "new retired" PeshMcrga, including Kurds who have joined the NIA. Both
parties in Iraqi Kurdistan have passed laws establishing criteria and procedures for formal
retirement of PeshMcrga, and they have each indicated that about 16-18,000 will so retire
from each pany's scrv ice, for a total of 32-36,000. In prnctice, the situation of people,
assuming they genuinely leave tbe active ranks, though I.hey may have "reserve" status, is
substantially analogous to that of the self-demobilized Iraqi armed forces who are now
receiving stipend payments. Our declaration, when we announced the stipend program
for the old Iraqi Army, that we would pay the Kurdish authorities funds to pay, inter alia,
Kurdish military retirees can fairly be read as applying equally to this class of "new"
retirees.
Paying this group at the rate applicable in the south - about $65/month2
-- would cost
$2.3 million per month, if there were 36,000 beneficiaries3
. As with the current pension
payments, we would not pay the retirees directly, but would provide the funds for the
Kurdish authorities to do so.
The problem, of course, is that the additional $28M/ycar burden on the budget. Paying
for only a few months - say to year end - limits the total cost, but puts the burden on the
2003 budget, which is under the heaviest pressure. Moreover, we have not put any
deadline on the payments to the former Iraqi army, and if we are not going to offer the
Kurds a payment program that can fairly be described as equivalent to what Saddam's
former soldiers get. we would probably do better to do nothing at this point, and simply
The payment rules called for in the Kurdish laws range up to $500 per monlh. We have told che
Kurdish authorities that we would not be prepared con.sider payuig more lhan the appro1dmate average
payment to lhe ex-rrulilary in the south, i.e., $65 monlh. Kwdish officials indicate: chat they would likely
accept !his amount as the CPA contribution- though they might chose to augment 11 from other resowees.
; We would also pay Kurdish members of the NIA - including trainees - as .. retirees" in this
catt:gury since tht:y art!, by cle fllliliou, out of the Kurdish force. Thil would produce cqunl treotment for
Kurds in the NIA with prior military service equiHlcnt to that afforded the Arabs in the NIA - a step !hat is
essential to maintaining Kurdish support for lhc fl.:IA project because, in the absence of any '"anti-double
dipping" rule, most of the Arab NIA soldier will be paid stipt."tlds in addition to their NIA pay. on the basis
of their prior service in Saddam's anny. The amounts tnvolved are tri'"iaL for example, a September 03
payment based on agreed fonner-lraqi military payscales would be only $12,650, because: !here are only a
125 Kurds in the first banalion group who are former PeshMerga.

stick to the line that we don't intend to go beyond the current payment of pre-war
pensions at pre-war rates until there is a general demobilization of the PeshMcrga.
One option, which we both support, is to start paying "new" retired PeshMerga at
"stipend" rates, but simultaneously put before the Governing Council a proposal to phase
out or limit the payments in both north and south. Options for doing so include (a)
simple termination sometime next year; (b) relating duration of payments to length of
service, so that. for example, people with less than 5 years' service would lose their
stipends after a year, while those with more than, say 15, would be continued indefinitely
as pensions, and those in the middle gradually phased out; and (c) instituting a "double
dipping rule" that would reduce stipends by, say, half of pay from other employment, at
least if the employment was in the public sector. Each of these limitations has its
drawbacks, importantly including restoking the anger among ex-military that led us to
institute the stipends in the first place.
Recommendation: Start paying up to 32.000 PeshMcrga "new" retirees, and budget for
$28M for the purpose in 2004 {and find $7M to pay in the last quarter of 2003), but
propose to the Governing Council phasing out stipends based on length of service and
reducing payments by one-half of income from public service employment.
Approve recommendation _~_i:f { v J...-
Start payments now. address phase out later __ _
Make no payments now, defer issue until agreement on general demobilization
Pay only at current retiree rate of $20 __ _
Other
-----
Coordination: Governance, General Counsel, Finance, and CJTF

.,
~ Ak3 : c.\ AL ;t2_ .e.-~ AL D ot- 1" ~ ~
Foreign Languagei-----~-~~----F-o-re-ig_n_L_a_n_g_u_a_g__, e
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I ~rf Fe>.cltyt::et! ~~"' 4q 4- ... v- o f" , i.e. ....
Forei: gn Language
Foreign Language
"-51 Forl '\:l. Foreign
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~
Foreign
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Foreign Language I
Foreign Language

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD
MEMO
02 September 2003
FOR:
CC:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
i'• -.:----i Director, Office of Management and Budget
L TG Sanchez, CG, CJTF-7 and BG Hahn CS, CJTF-7
Walt Slocombe, Director of Security Affairs (National Security and Defense)
RECOMMENDED SALARY GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY SECTOR
As we have discussed, over the past 3 days a combined team of personnel from the Ministry of Interior,
CJTF-7, Baghdad Central and a number of Ministries that employ Facilities Protection Service (FPS)
guards, the CPA staff and our Office of Security Affairs, collaborated to produce an agreed scheme for
integrating security sector pay scales in support of the new Salary Progression Chart scheduled for
publication on 4 September. This security sector scheme is captured in the attached matrices.
This model is based on the following premises each coordinated with the Ministry of Finance:
Persons currently employed under existing security sector pay scales are "grandfathered", at
least for near term.
The new pay scheme will take effect on I October 2003 and will apply to all members of the
security sector, including those employed by the CPA, CJTF-7, the UN, USAID, and other
agencies.
Base pay for security sector employees will be adjusted above normal civilian rates based on
the inherently hazardous and uncomfortable working conditions normally encountered by
security forces. This adjustment does not apply to civilian personnel in the employ of security
sector entities.
The base pay for lowest ranking serving members (not trainees) will not exceed the Iraqi
Salary Committee recommendation of $60/month for security forces.
FPS guards will have a lower pay scale than military or police forces.
Special allowances will be paid on a case-by-case basis in very rare circumstances and then
only to individuals, not groups.
Annual step pay increases for satisfactory service arc allowed.
No step increases for performance.
A Death Gratuity for security forces killed in the execution of their duties will consist of
monthly payments to the widow or children of the deceased until the children reach age 18 or
the widow dies. whichever occurs later. The amount paid will be slightly less than the
person's monthly salary at the time of his death.
FPS guards in the oil and electricity industries may share in the Ministry's 30% performance
bonus when it is issed based on documented individual productivity.
I am comfortable that this Integrated Security Sector Pay Scheme is fair and logical. It is endorsed by the
Ministry of Interior, other key Ministries and the CPA staff. I add my strong endorsement as well.

2
I must note, however, my significant concern with the application of these rates. From talking with
Coalition Commanders and staffs across the country- literally from Basra thru Tikrit to Mosul - I have
become convinced that the current market pay scale for an entry level policeman or soldier is somewhere
between SlOO and $120 US. Accordingly, the independent application of these pay scales will not only
fail to attract the quality of recruit we seek, I believe it will absolutely prevent us from coming anywhere
near manning either the New Iraqi Army, the battalions of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, or the Iraqi
Police Force in the numbers necessary to bring a safe and secure environment to this country.
Accordingly, I must as firmly as possible recommend that the CPA commit to the finn, comprehensive,
no-nonsense, application of the new Salary Progression Chart in every portion of the Iraqi public sector
and in every province around the country. If this is not done with thorough rigor, our efforts at security
sector salary refonn will fail.
Alternatively, the Authority could re-norm the Salary Progression Chart to reflect current market realities
and allow payment of$100 vice S60 to the lowest ranking servicing members of security forces.
I stand ready to discuss any of these points at any time.
(Original Signed)
Walter B. Slocombe
ATTACHMENTS: Comparative Security Sector Pay Matricies

'
NIA/ ICDC NIA/ICDC IPS BORDER FPS
GRADE enlisted commissioned
SUPER A
SUPERB
1 LG National Director of Border
Commissioner Enforcement
2 MG Commissioner Deputy Director
3 BG Dep Commissioner Bure'tu Chief
4 COL Superintendent Region Chief Colonel
5 LTC Inspector Asst Chief
6 SGM/CWO CPT /MAJ Lieutenant I Captain Lieutenant I Captain Major
7 SFC/MSG/WO ~LT I tLT Sergeant Sergeant
8 SGT OFC ~Senior) Constable /Senior) Agent Captain
9 2PL Constable Agent Sergeant
10 PVT I PFC Constable (Probation) ~gent (Probation) Guard
11 RCT Trainee ifrainee iTrainee

..
NIA/ ICDC NIA/ IPS BORDER FPS
GRADE enlisted ICDC
commissio
ned
SUPER A
SUPERB
National Dir of Border
1 LG Commissioner Enforcement
~-
1 I 1
2 MG Commissioner Deputy Director
I 1 1
Dep
3 BG Commissioner Bureau Chief
1 I I
4 COL Superintendent Region Chief !Colonel
l 1 1 I
5 LTC lnspector [Asst Chief
1 1 I
6 SGM/CWO CAPT/MAJ Lieut I Captain Lieut I Captain Major
1 2 1 6 1 6 I 6 1
7 SFC/MSG/WO
~LT I lLT Sergeant Sergeant
4 7 8 6 7 6 4
8 SGT OFC (Snr) Constable
~Snr) Agent Captain
6 8 6 6 1 I
9 CPL Constable Agent Sergeant
7 5 5 1
10 PVT I PFC Constable (Probation) Agent (Probation) Guard
4 8 4 4 I
11 Recruit Trainee rrrainee rrrainee
1 4 4 1

G
R
A
D
E
ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR NEW lRAQI ARMY /lRAQI CIVIL D. EFENCE CORPS
STEPS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
a
8
9
10
10
11
Enlisted Commission
LG 493 507 520 533 547 560 573 587
MG 382 393 403 413 424 434 444
BG 296 304 312 320 328 336 344
COL 228 234 241 247 253 259 265 i
LTC 176 181 185 190 195 200 ' ~-i. _
,._,
MAJ 154 158. 161 165
cwo 139 143 1 n~ Ti'. .
fl ' '
J
CPT 136 139 143 II 1 1
SGM 136 139
WO 125 128 130
1LT 122 125 128
MSG 122 125 128
•
2LT 116 119 122
SFC 113 116 119 I
OFC 99
- I l
SGT PVT 95 97 99 101 ,,
CPL 79 81 83
PFC 66 68 69
60 6.2 6"3 65 66
RCT 46 i
~
~
I ~

-
National Commissioner
Com mi ss1oner
Oeo. Commissioner
Suoerintendent
lnsoector
Captain
Lleuten.ant
SerQeant
Constaole {Senta()
Constaole
Constable (Probation)
Trainee
--
G
R
A
D
E
' 1
2
3
4
5
6
6
7
6
9
10
11
ENTRY LEVEi~ SALARIJ£S FOR IRAQI POLICE SERVlCE
STEPS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4~3 507 52£1 533 547 560 573 587 600 613
382 393 403 413 424 434 444 455 465 475,
296 304 312 320 348 336 344 352 360 368
228 234 241 247 253
259 265 271 216 284
_
17'6 181 185 190 195 200 204 209 214 219
154 158
165 169
1~1
136 139 143 147 150 154 158 161 165 169'
113 116t 119 122 125 128 130
95 97 99 101 104
75 77 79 81 83 84
60 ' 62 63 65 66 68 69
46

G
R
A
D
E
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR FACILITIES PROTECilON SERVICE
FPS- Colonel
FPS Major
'
.STEPS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
228 234 241 247 253 259 265 271 278 2'84
j , , •
136 139 143 147 150 154 158 161 165 169
I
FPS Captain
Guard Sergeant
Guard
Trainee
83 86 88 90 92
95 97 99 101 104
-
68 70 72 73 75 77 79 81 83 84
56 57 59 60 61 63 64 66 68 69
46

CMATT
C7
OPENING OF THE NEW IRAQI MILITARY ACADEMY
AIM
Determine the necessary conditions and actions for opening, as soon as possible, the
New Iraqi Military Academy (NIMA), able to furnish the number of 2nd lieutenants,
who will be required by the Iraqi Army.
STRATEGY
New Iraq.
Qualities of the officers of the New Iraqi Army must be according to the character of the
Professional efficiency, love to its country, permanent concern for the well-being of the
soldiers under its command, high cultural level, democratic mentality, respect and
subordination to the civilian power, respect to the human rights and to the international
law and prestige amongst the Iraqi society are some of unavoidable qualities required of
the new Iraqi Officers.
Combination between the education and training, that will be given by the New Iraqi
Military Academy, and the personal conditions demanded from the candidate to be
admitted to the it, must be the guarantee of a perfect preparation of the new Iraqi
officers.
CO:'ISTRAINTS
A. In order to increase the confidence of the Iraqi population about the quick
rebuilding of its national institution the opening of the Iraqi Military Academy
must be a reality before September 2004.
B. The process of build-up the New Iraqi Anny demand a quick availability of 2nd
lieutenants in order to complete the new infantry battalions and the brigade's
units. By those reasons, temporarily, the New Iraqi Military Academy must
work as a one year school. Regular system of working of the Academy will
decided subsequently.
C. The set-up of the New Iraqi Military Academy means expenditures, not only in
31/0&1200310:02 AM IRAQI 1111/LrTARY ACADEMY

----------- --
CMATI
C7
operating costs, but also due to the necessity of repairing infrastructures and
facilities. All those expenditures must be included in the budget for year 2004.
By this reason, a first approach of the refurbishing, equipment and operating
costs must be ready before Seotember I .
D. Multiethnic character of the New Iraqi Army demand specific attention to those
Kurds student who do not speak Arab.
E. By the moment, Arab and Muslim mentality advise to avoid the admission of
female candidates to the NIMA.
ASSUMPTIONS
A. CMA TI is responsible for opening the New Iraqi Military Academy as soon as
possible and for esLablishing the operating conditions in a temporary way.
Definitive organization, preparation of study programs, determining of
conditions of admission for the candidates and other aspects of the New Iraqi
Military College must be arranged, definitively, by the Iraqi MOD, when it
would be in conditions of assuming their responsibilities.
R. Coalition N;itions ;md other friend countries (especially Arab countries such as
Egypt and Jordan) would be ready to co-operate to the opening of the New Iraqi
Milit.ary Academy furnishing teachers and instructors.
C. Some of the former teachers in the former Iraqi Military College could be
employed in the new Academy, after verify its previous behaviour, that they are
reliable to the new Iraqi Government and that they are in accord with the
character of the New Iraqi Anny. Those teachers will be considerer as civili;in.
D. Most of the programs of the former Iraqi Military College (especially those
dealing on technical matter) can be used by the students in the NIMA. That
means that after screening most of the books and other educational elements,
coming from the former Iraqi Military College, could be used in the new one.
E. Before 1990 it was a tradition of the Iraqi Anny to sent the best students of each
course to complete its military training overseas (England, Jordan, India and
PakisLan). It seems that this tradition must be continued sending yearly some of
the best students to the Military Colleges of the Coalition Nations ~nd other
31/0812003 10:02 AM IRAQI MILITARY ACADEMY 2

CMATT
C7
friendly countries. That possibility must be considered as a complementary
training and not as a replacement of the course at the NIMA.
F. In the future, the Iraqi Army must co-operate strongly with the Annies of the
Coalition Nations, not only in Iraq, but also in other multinational peace-keeping
operations. By this reason, a good knowledge of English language must be one
of the conditions required from the new candidates.
G. According to the old Iraqi Educational system, young people finish the High
School when they are 18 years old. That must be the lowest age limit for
candidates. Highest limit must be 26 years old, enough to allow young people,
with university degrees, to apply as candidate.
11. 2nd lieutenants graduated from the new Military College must replace the junior
officers trained for the new battalions of the NI ARMY that have started its set-
up from Oct OJ. By this reasons training given by the Military College must be
focaliscd on light infantry. Training for other branches of the Army (Armour,
Artillery, Engineers ... ) must given subsequently.
I. ln order to help the recruiting of the new Iraqi Battalions all the candidates to be
students of the Military College must came from the ranks of those battalions
(NCO and privates), no matter the rank that they have reached.
J. During the last 3 years, more than 6.000 young people were admitted as cadets
in the old Iraqi Military Colleges. Afler a de-ba'athfication process most of them
can be acceptable as candidate for the new Military College, but following the
requisite of being enrolled in the new banalions.
K. Without consideration about how many 2nd lieutenants can be required to
complete the new Iraqi battalions, the maximum figure of candidates admitted
as students at the new Iraqi Military College must be related to the foreseen size
for the New Iraqi Anny. 300 students must be the maximal number of students
that can be admitted for the course to start on September 2004.
L In the old Iraqi Anny, the total amount of lieutenants was higher than 15.000.
After a de-ba'athfication process, it seems possible that most of them can be
acceptable as officer for the New Iraqi Army. Training of those officers must be
considered independent of the training of the NlMC. It seems that a short course
31/0812003 10:02 AM IRAQI 111/UTAR'f ACADEllf'f 3

CMAIT
C7
{of at least of 3 moths), focalised on verify their real capabilities and giving
them democratic principles will be enough.
M. Educational level and personal qualities of the former Iraqi NCO were very low.
The opening of a NCO school must be taken in account.
ACTIONS:
A. Verify the present conditions of the former Iraqi Military College and the
feasibility of utilisation for the !st course (from Sep. 04 to Aug. 05).
B. Estimation of costs for repairing and adaptation of the facilities. (initially, only
for a maximum of 300 students).
C Estimation or costs to improve the educational equipment of the NIMC
according to the western standards (computers, language labs, slide
projectors .... ) and also other necessary equipment (weapons, signal, topographic
and field fortification material.. .. )
D. Evaluation of costs of the necessary furniture and other necessary equipments
for the working of the Military Academy.
E. Evaluation of operating costs including salaries for local teachers and auxiliary
workers (maintenance, cleaning, catering, administration, transportation,
security, welfare ... ).
F. Preparation (before September) of a first draft of budget to be included m
general budget of 2004.
G. In co-ordination with the Education Ministry, drawing up of a first approach of
the study and training program for the students of the first course.
H. Selection of the texts and manuals for the education and training.
I. Obtaining of the required texts and manuals.
31/04'2003 10:02 AM fRAQI MILITARY ACADEMY 4

CMATT
C7
J. Shape up a "Selection teacher board". This board must be composed of military
officers of the Coalition Nations, CPA personnel of the Education Ministry and
Iraqi civilian with former academic experience.
K. By the "selection teacher board": Selection of the personnel to fill the teacher's
posts.
L. Ask to the Coalition Nations and other friend countries about the possibility to
host in their military college students coming from the NIMA.
M. In co-ordination with the Education Ministry, to determine the educational level
required from the candidates.
N. Give publicity by means of media and other advertising ways to the admission
conditions and to the future of the military career.
OTHER RE.MARKS:
A By now, it is considered not necessary to open an Iraqi Air Force Military
Academy, due to the fact that by now its not possible an appropriate air training
for Iraqi students (lack of training airplanes, financial raisons, ... )
B. By the same raison, the open of an Iraqi Naval Military Academy must be
postponed. The opening of a civilian naval school, in the former facilities seems
to be a temporary good solution until a final decision about the future of the
Iraqi Navy.
Baghdad. August 25, 2003
31/0&l200310:02 AN IRAQI MILITARY ACADEMY 5

A STUDENT CANDIDATES I
I B TRAINERS ANO TEACHERS I
I c AUXJLIAR WORKERS
Define teacher's condition& Pre-seltctlon Stlectlon
& announcomtnl to enroll of teachera of tMChers
Selecflon Board
Determine requlrtd auxJliary
Workers & offtclal
announcement to enroll them
D REFURBISHING
OF BUILDINGS
G TACTIC EQUIPMENT
(SIGNAL, NBC, TOPOGRAPHY)
H WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION
I LANGUAGE AND
COMPUTERING LABS
J STUDENTS
PERSONAL EQUIPMENT
K FURNITURE AND
OTHER EQUIPMENT
Deftnt requlremenla In
Fum11U19.
~ Announe»ment ol
r--'jt-,--
~ng.

Gross Capital Formation in Iraq: 1980-2001
8000.0
7000.0
...
• c
Q 6000.0
°&
!
- 5000.0
CD
CD
a.
...
... 4000.0
0
• c .2 3000.0
-
-
...
:I
Social
2000.0
1000.0
Source: Ministry of Planning

Iraqi Per Capita GDP
90000
MaJCm\IT\: S7 ,730 in 1960
8000.0
~/
7000.0
...
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8
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August 18, 2003
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Ti 1ne Ii Ill'
Budgets due to
Ministry of Floaace
Finaace Mi.Witry·
Review of Budget
25A~t
2 6
September
Compare pri()ridts with Budget approved Donon Conference
UN and World Bank and published
Needs Assessment
•
. ,.
1 Oct
15 20
Sep.
" ~
23 Oct.
Donor Conference Pledging
Donor Conference pre-work by Governing Council
• Capiw Project PcrsoMJ (100 '*1) to planning minimy.

1Aiiii6i
2003
CPA with Iraqi Ministry
Assist
1004
Iraqi Ministries with CPA
Assist
Allotments based loosely on
2002 in consideration of
extreme circumstances
Hard topline guidance
Donor Conference Project
Development
Governing Council Review

2004 Budgd
Prlortdes
Securitt
Establish an effective police, customs and border force
New Iraq Army
International Police Force
011 lndustrr
2004.
Provide for the investment necessary to reach pre-war production by October,
Infrastructure
Provide for an electrical system which will provide more nationwide power
and facilitate rapid micro and small business development.
Start work on the establishment for an effective water and sewage system.
Provide a national wireless oommunication netwo~ and the broadband
capability which will facilities commercial development
Complete necessary rebuilding of looted building and facilities
Provide other essential services necessary for economic development (eg.
Transportation)
Social Safety Net
Provide for the oontinuation of the Food Basket Program in it's current form,
or in an improved monetized version.
Provide for training of the Iraqi workforce in computer utilization, for the
appropriate retaining of workers made redundant by the restructuring and
privatization of the sate-owned enterprises, and appropriate unemployment
insurance
Control Wlemployment rate to less than 20%
Provide for continued improvement of health system

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I .

Office of Security Affairs 2004 Budget Estimate A,ccelerated (non-US prices)
UKHCPA :.....-.A • . -'-~
-
~ 2Q0.4 CPA 2001 CPA
OperatlOns (Salaries)
Budget Summary
(In USS Millions)
NIA
US ContractorlForetgn Trainers
Coast Guard
Air Force
Iraqi OSA
Military Academy
Purchased lnternatlonal Training
Faclllties Equipment
Operations {Alf Else) Total. I
$600.71 $593.68 $19.46 $133.55 S1.347.40
$164.00 $164.00
$41.00 SS0.00 $0.98 $3.&9 $7Ul6
$41.00 $47 . . 20 $0.88 $64.49 $153-57
$16,50 $3.00 $1.50 S2.S2 $23.52
$46.21 $4.32 l0.36 $0.83 $51.12
Clvil Defense Corps
F. orce Protection Serv1 cea
(Charged to "1inlstrles)
Stipends
$6.00 $6.00
$17.15 $18-90 $39.53 $75.58
S7.47 $25.06 S39.20 $71.73
I $2.56.70 $-256.70
Total $7<4 .00 $703.00 $324.00 S-455.00 $2 ll&.OO
CPA (Iraqi) CY<U $1,296.57
US 'Appropriated Supplemental '$931.43
Total $2,228.00
The \ley drlll&r tof the majo!lty of costs assoclatocl wltll ttii. budget i. th• training sei.ctulit, ;ony c;h•nget to II w!U drive chenges 10 each of the high c0&t budget Item•, namely facllJliff ;ind equlPl!lenl.
Army- fi!'SI 27 imt•llo111 of first thr" clivi•lon• { !!'cludlng 1 brigadt of huvy) ph!i ~y Aviation oucleaua (18 refurbl1bed UH·Ullll (All of lhtH iterm provide the ablllly . 10 shoot, move, commul!lCJte.
Army· EquiPoruint procurem.nt ~ Is now primanly noro-military ,JMC, COfllm•r!llJ'pff the s:hetf equl~nf. Th• trade olf la che1~r ~ulpmenl fat. 1tr, bllt eqittpment wltl not be a_s durablt and mu.I
Coast Guaio • llmlled Coast Guard capabflity wltll fu11dt alloea,te,d for 1 arnefl patrol boi*I fora, 1.'upport °"""'~· ll. nd a 1\llval Infant!)' bai\allon.
Air F0tee-
Incl~ training to n.tain llte,_. !:Q111P&tency and a sm•ll 11111n1Mir 9t ,.,...,. lift and fillht&r •~d !\Ind aJrer a. 11-
lt~ l OSA · alan.d up and _ hiring of Iraqi Pe~onnel for a o.i:1- nce SupPO!t ~"l:Y WhJlha& llie ~paelty lo morpll lpfo a traql governed mt11'5try over time.
Ntllta"i' .Academy • et11:1<1 up <:if tM Millluy Aadeii\y.
StltH'nJla include eosls for tM t¥ lraql /!omly and P8hme1'9l,
Civil OefenH • 11 blllolfons only
Salaries usu me• 26% factor for •pedal atlowanc••

Office of Securtty Affairs 2004 Budget Ettlmate (Accelerated at US Prices)
200fCPA
-
_...
. ... . ........
2QO" C&\
Budget Summal)'
(ln USS Mllllons}
Equipment ()perarJons (S.lsrlva}
Opeta~s (All Else)
Total
NIA
$600.71
$'n5.88
$19.MJ
$1l:Us
$1,529.40
US Contractor/Foreign Trainera
$184.00
$184.00
Coast Guard
$41.llO
$37.00
$o.98
'3.89
$82.8(!
Air Foree
$41.00
$47.20
$0.88
SS4..49
S153.57
lraql OSA
$16.50
$3.00
$1.50
$2.52
$23.52
Mllltary Academy
$48.21
$4.32
$0.36
$0.83
$51.7Z
Purchased lntemational Training
$8.00
$6.QO
Civil Defense Corps
$17.15
$18.90
$39.53
$75.58
Force Protection Services
(Charged to Mlttlstrin)
Stipends
$7.47
$25.06
$39.20
S71.73
1256.70
$25$.70
Total $746.00 $892.00 $324.00 $455.00 $2,417.00
CPA (Iraq!) CY 04 $1.296.57
US Appropriated Suppl&mental $1, 120.43
Total $2,.417.00
nit 1<91 <lrtwr fot fl!• ~ ol llOtM ••M>CIMM with w, l:Mlg9' It 11Mt tre111lng KMdui., uy ~ni" th It .,.M drt.. ~to 9'dl vf ~ tllgh c;Oll bldgtt ll11m1, narrwtr flclllli9t alld equipment.
Amft · fl.-t 27 ~ al first Ill,... diVWon1 {lneilldiftV 1 bftgaila ol '--f) pl.G Amr/ Awllllofl nUCINw (11 ~,_,.II.cl WMSt) (All al ttiete lteme ptO¥ldd the~ b:> aho<IC, '9!0\'9, coi-.nu~t.
Amft · Equlp!llflll ~nt lllOdfl I& - priinarlly nofM'lllllt:ary tpte, -'ti off lht thelf .. uiPft'tl'll. "-ttlldlt off Is ci.tper t111UIJl'fttllt flallw, but .. ulPft'tl'll -411 nol bt u durabltt end mlltt
C-t Oual'd • llnllltd C<>Ht Ovard c.1J11blllty wittl fundt al~ for ~ 11m1111 ~ bO&l bee. •llllf)Olt .,.... .. , tmd a .,.,,,I lnflntry bdAROll.
Air F-• ll'ldlidM tralnl119 lo ~lft •1-~a~ •em.all nuntti.r al l!Mldkml llll tlld flglrl.tr MeOftd baftd alrctllfl
1,.ql OSA. at.nd up and hf ting or lr.-ql Pwao1·111tl tot a Defence Suppolt Agtncy which llaa th• eap.M:lty to m~h Into• Ir-cal 90Y'l'lltd mllllttry «Mir llrM.
MHIU!fy Aca61my • lltlnd up ol tM Mllllacy ~-
Sll!Mftdt lnellldt COii& fot Ill• .x l,.ql Amr/ and PH!llne1'9ll.
Civil Deflln .. • 11 blttallonl only
Siii'* 9tMlm9 a 26% fadOf fer •'*'81 lllklw1111ClliS

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Salaries: Min:istrics in SOE's assume fiscal responsibility by 1 Jan.
Redundant Worken:
Twelve months salary
Funds to establish micro businesses
Computer training
Vocational training
Budget Ira I11a.il~q11atefundsfor:
Security
Electrical
Water
Sewage
Irrigation
Housing
Education
Health
Agti cu 1 turc

CPA FORM 1034
PUBLIC VOUCHER fOR PURCHASES AND SERVICES OTHER THAN PERSONAL
CPA Compcroller's Office
CPA-(C8)
Date Voucher Prepared
2003--08-25
Contract Number and Date
DAB VO 1--03-C-0008
Re uisition Number and Date
GHQ of Jordan Armed Forces Pay~·s Name Directorate of planning and Organization
aod Address P.O. BOX 791816
AMMAN-JORDAN
Voucher No. 000004
Schedule No.
Paid By
Date Invoice Received
2003-08-24 Invoice #1
Discount Terms
Bill of Lading Number
Shipped From to Wcighl
N.....bcr &nd DH: of DalO of ~h,,..ry
Order or Smoxe
tEANr dacriptio-.. WM ~r cf c01tract or o,_ i"fo'mo-a---1
~)
I August 2003
21August03 Brand New, Neva Fired. Fixed Stock AK.47
(7.72 X 39MM) Ass.a.uh R.Jtles w1lh Certified
Manufacture Dares not earlier than 1987
Quanlity
48000 S59.00 EA $2,832,000.00
(Use""'"""""'"' •-tf•J if~) Payment·
Approved for
$2,832,000.00 By-Ch1cfFuianClal Officer CPA
(Payee must NOT us.e the space below) Total $2,832,000.00
Exchange Rate
= $1.00
$2 ,832,000.00
-------
- - I - - -
Signarure
Title CFO
cMvanc:e
PuTM1allt to aulhonty vested 111 • ' , < A I_, c:orrei:t and proper for paymmt
25 Augusc 2003
Date
Title
Data
Paid by Wire Transfer, FRBNY for Cenrral Bank ofl1'8q IO account numbe
"':;---
-
- - - - CITIBA.1'1'.., F.S.B.,
1400 G ST NW, Washingion, D.C. 200.S, Account Name: J01dan Armed Forces PAID ON 28 August 2003.
PAIDBY
DFI
Check Number
Ort (Name of &ullc) Check Number
On (/Vallll! of Bank)
Cash
PAYORDER#4
When •°i.tcd in r.,,..;.,, ClllttftCY. iftSefl IW'llC or cumnc) ' If l!IC abihty to cnaf)• ond audoonty to_.,,,., .,., COfrim>ed m one pcnoa.. one l'pallft is _.,, ~ Ibo IJIJll'O'rill&
off acer "'1!11..,. ia die space pn>Y>ded. o...,- b1S otllc ial llllr
'wt.... 1 .....,Ila"' noceipled 10 die.....,. of a COf11'Al'Y or~ dlt nunr orita ~ .._, Ila_,,....,. or~
,,.....,, ...... 11u111r ~io) m ...-ho: .,..,.._ """" -
For~ -Jn 0oo ~r··. pa Jo11n Doc. Praido:nl.. Per
Title
5

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD
INFO MEMO
31 August 2003
FOR:
CC:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
,,,
'~-
- --- Director, Office of Management and Budget
Amb. Pat Kennedy, MG Paul Eaton, Ms BG Hahn
Wa~be, Director of Security Affairs (National Security and Defense)
MODIFICATIONS TO OSA(NSD) FY2004 BUDGET SUBMISSION
The Office of Security Affairs (National Security and Defense), hereby presents a revised
budget submission for 2004. This revision is in response to a request' for provision of a cost
estimate in order to support an accelerated NIA training program. This submission is
provided in two parts. The first part contains the budget estimate calculated using market prices for
equipment and the second part is based on US prices. Facilities costs have been calculated based on
real life experiences at Kirkush. All prices are in USD$.
Key Affects of this change are:
• 27 Battalions (including 3 heavy) will be operational by August 2004 (vice 9 Battalions
currently planned.
• Provision of an Iraqi Defense Support Agency of some 600 civilian personnel which will
serve to administer the administrative and logistical support necessary for the ongoing
maintenance of the NIA.
• Allows for a modest army helo lift. Air Force and Coast Guard These forces are leveraging
off existing equipment and trained personnel wherever possible. I recognize that these have
been ruled out - and so they are separately stated. But I would like the opportunity to
explain why t think it is important, on both efficiency and effectiveness grounds to start
these programs in 2004.
• Prices are based on procurement or primarily non-military specification, commercial off lhe
shelf equipment, which has allowed for a substantial reduction in price for equipment per
Bn. By definition the equipment will not be as durable as its military counterparts. And it is
certainly not to a US military standard. For example, the "US pricing" alternative assumes
we would buy old M-60s and recondition in the US, not supply the NIA with M-ls.
• Modest increases in the costs for Purchased International Training and for the use of US
contractors or foreign trainers to augment the existing training capability. This is essential
for achievement of 27 Battalions by the time required, panicular in light of the need for some
relatively .senior officers.
• Includes provisions for the central funding of Iraq's Force Protection Service, which would
be administered by the Ministry of the Interior. (Personally, I feel strongly this should be in
the Interior budget, but I am conforming to guidance on this, as on every, point.)

2
• Includes modest increases in the Stipends Payments to reflect the decision to pay certain
additional categories, notably disabled officer veterans.
• A bringing forward of facilities costs from out years based on a revised construction
schedule to meet the garrison requirements of 27Bns.
• Increase in salaries and subsistence costs for the NIA as more NIA personnel will be brought
on faster than previously anticipated. This is simply the consequence of the proposed
acceleration.
In accordance with your guidance, this Office has made no recommendation on whether facilities
should be paid for using Iraqi or US funds. OSA suggests that equipment and payments to US
contract trainers should be paid for utilizing appropriated funds, whilst salaries and subsistence for
NIA personnel should be paid for using Iraqi funds.
In addition this is aH based on the premise that the FY03 Budget remains unchanged at $100M for
capital and $4.SM for operating. Fully recognizing the problems of further CY 03 spending, if we
decide to go for the accelerated program, we simply must not wait until the end of the year to start
facilities construction. Perhaps the fact that the US FY begins in October will offer some means of
not wasting three critical months.
I am. of course, happy to disCUSf any aspect of this witb ¥2" qr }i}JlE staff.
Walter B. Slocombe
ATTACHMENTS:
1. 2. Revised Budget Submission (non-US prices}
Revised Budget Submission (US prices)

r
JLTC
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Importance:
r... IL Tc cJTF?-FuoPs
Thursday, July 31, 2003 11 :23 AM
ILTC
~OL C5CMG3FUOPS;L' ~ I ~~~~~~~~.
7-25-03 FPSF Status for CJTF71.xls
High
~OL G3 CHIEF OF OPS;
7-25-03 FPSF
Status for CJTF71 ..•
<<7-25-03 FPSF Status for CJTF71.xls>> FPS WAS AUTHORIZED IN FRAGO 444M BY
CPA TO PRODUCE UPTO 15000 GUARDS. WE ARE AT THE POINT WHERE UNITS SAY THEY
HAVE HIRED OR HAVE IN TRALNING 14340 GUARDS. SOME MAY HAVE QUIT BUT IF THE
UNITS DATA IS CORRECT WE ARE APPROACHING THE UP9ER LIMIT, IS SOMEONE GOING
BACK TO CPA .r:.ND ASKING THEM TO RAISE THE LIMIT?
LTC p«e ) PLEASE PROVIDE HARD COPY TO COL j~lhlC6l~---~
1

C, JTF7 IMEF
Has it be.en implemented? YES YES
If not, when is hiring to begin? ONGOING NA
When is training tQ bealn? ONGOING NA
If so, bow manv hired? 12727 3683
How manv In training? 1613 902
How many comoleted trainino? 8310 3233
How maJly tsltel are being 1 ·:39 99
manned?
How many total guards ar.
required afld over what time 15415 9089
frame?
Generally, it is a Greatly reduces
oombat multiplier Marine
that frees requirements to
coalition soldlers perform guard
Wh.at impact will thl~ program
have on overall availability Of from point guard tasks
missions to
Coalition Forces and In what time
frame? roving and
combat missions.
. Trained plus completed 9923
TOTAL HIRED AND IN TRAINING
14340
..
1AD
YES
310 410 101AASLT DIV lACR UK
YES YES YES YES YES
ONGOING
NA ONGOING NA NA NA
ONGOlNG
5153
321
4832
511 Require
Protection
2-Jul-03 ONGOING ONGOING 1-Jul-03 ONGOING
221 1324 1518 401 648
0 330 60 Q 1200+
221 316 UNK 24
27 218 10 3, 16
5200
As of 1 AUG all
Tier 2&3 sites will
be l\Jrned over to
FPS. Asof 1
OCT2003, all
sites will be
turned ovef to
FPS.
5153
0
2508 for AUG;
200 27528 when UNK 926
school starts
The establish· The more slies No answer. Unfixes forces
menl. of the FPS under FPSF and allows
will anow Relieve co. alition security the more Coalltloo Forces
coalition forces forces from coalition forces freedom to take
to come off' some guarding sites, · available for
fixed site security allow lraql other on more
e ltectivel}'
and provide government to requirements (or patroling tasks
more presence take redeployment), lhrol)ghoul AO
for roving patrcils responsiblltlty.
and · surge forces
In their AO.
when required.
221 60 24

.. \
tOST PlU)JECTIONS FOft PROPOSED SALARY STRUCTURE
Costing based on Salary Guldetlnes (assumes some grade inflation)
Costing based on CPA percentages
estimated estimi!lted
c.ost at cost at estimated
number of percent of salary top of r. ange number of average total
employees erootovees
~ progression empto:xw ~
CO$t (0QQ)
Council 24 0% $576 $576 Council A 600 0% $10,800 $10,800 A 13 2,000 0% $24,000 $24,000 B $576
$10,800
$24,000
l 12,9'74 1% $83,032 $95,487 top 1% 12,974 $6,125 $79,464
2 38,921 3% $193,0SD $222,007
3 77,843 6% $298,915 $'343,753 ne.xt 9% 116,764 $4,000 $467,0SS
4 129,ne lOtMi $384.023 $441;1617
5 194,606 15% $443,703 $510,258 middle30% 389,213 . $2,400 $934,111
·6 194,606 15% $342,507 $393,663
7 194,606 15% $.264,665 $304,. 364 bottom 60% 778,426 $1,100 $856,268
8 129,710 10% $140,117 $161,134
9 129,738 10% $114,169 $131,294 Total estimated cost: US dollars: $2,372,274
10 129,736 10% $93,411 $107,42j
u 64,869 5% $38,921 $44,7S9
1,300,000 100% $2,396,513 $2,155,990

salary Progression Chart, 2.So/o progression per steps; ten steps pet grade.
~
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step4 Step 5 'Step 6 Step 7 Step 8 Step 9 Step 10
Monthly salaries in Iraqi Din"r (ODO)
l 740 76(} 780 800 820 840 860 880 900 920
2 574 589 605 620 636 651 667 682 698 713
3 444 456 468 480 492 504 516 528 540 552
4 342 352 361 370 379 389 398 407 416 426
5 264 271 271l 285 292 299 306 314 321 328
6 204 209 215 · 220. 226 231 237 242 248 253
7 157 162 166 170 174 179 183 187 191 196
8 125 128 132 135 138 142 145 149 152 tSS
9 102 105 107 110 113 116 118 121 12. 4 127
10 83 86 88 90 92 95 97 99 101 t04
11 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 63 .84 86
Monthly s.tlaries in U.S. Dollars
1 $493 $507 $520 $533 $547 $560 $573 $587 $600 $613
2 $382 $393 $403 $413 $424 $434 $444 $455 $465 $475
3 $296 $304 $312 $320 $328 $336 $344 $352 $360 $368
4 $228 $234 $241 $-247 $253 $259 $265 $271 $278 $284
s $176 $161 $1.85 $190 $195 $2.00 $204 $209 $214 $2.19
6 ~ $136 $139 $143 $147 $150 $154 $158 $161 $165 $169
7 \,<>@ $108 $111 $113 $116 $119 $122 $125 $128 $130
8 : $83 $86 $88 $90 $92 $95 $9'7 $99 $101 $104
9 ·~'~
$70 $72 $73 175 $77 $79 $81 $83 $84
10 J- :s $57 $59 $60 $62 $6. 3 $65 $66 $68 $69
l1 $46 $48 $49 $50 $51 1 $53 $54 $55 $56 $58
Hf'.l f;. Ji I (\1..• 'JV...1\_ J(J
: 3C> 1 f AT) f)>J \ -
l\'-\Vv, ,-....... ,.._ •
G;. /"'1•"1'~'""'1
CA-.1.. [?-, , ... 1>·111) ;{I._ 4 w. ,: ).I \T\1-·1 (' hv-~'1 I IJ)• J
,.,,, •'.,l, ~T"I"'-; ('""'I.'\. ilV ·
c; r-r.r ~
- -

l
Ministry of Interior Pay Scales
lnterior
Deputy
Minister
Director of Border
Enforcement
Director of EMS
--
;
$280 . .
~
'$128 ..
~ ~ ......
f!1:
S.188 ~
oJ
. ,
-·~
$157 ~
Supervising
Atiomey
Manager
/Lawyer
Accountin, g
Manager
Entry Lawyer
I Accountan I .
t:'.nt.cy
Commissioner* Deputy Director
Deputy
Commissioner*
Su'Perintendant*
Supervising
Auon1cy
Bureau Chief of Bureau Chief
Border P. olice
of Inspections
Deputy/Regional
Deputy/
Chief
Regional Chief
Bureau Chief of
Fire
Nationality
Commissioner•
Deputy/Regional
fire
Administrator
Superintendent•
Assistant
lnspector* Senior Manager Assistant Chief Assistant Chie
Admi nistrator Fire lrispe<;tor>
Accounting
Captairt*
Manager
Captain Captain
Manager Captain"
Entry Lawyer
Lieutenant*
/Accountant
Lieutenant Lieu_tenant
Accountant Lieutenant*
.
"": $135 Accountant Sergeant Entry Accountant Sergeant Sergeant Captain Enlry A~cou ntan l Sergeant
suo,. Bookkeeper Constabl . e Bookkeeper Agent Tnspet!or Lieutenant Bookkeeper
$10~~ Secretary Secretary Sergeant Secretary
Journeyman
Firdighter
Apprentice
17irefighter
... i ~ ... . ;.. M~scngcr Messenger
)..~ -41> " .. ,.
•,, $46.1;,.. /Cleaner Trainee Messenger /Clea11e Trainee Trainee Guard /Cleaner
onthly Danger Pay for IPSt Border/C11stoms Police, Bo. rder Inspectors, and Ffrefigl1ters in Grades 2 thl'ough 10 Ooly
Prior service credit of 1 step for every l year of prior service (maximum of step 10) .
*The titk 1'Cbief of Police., or "Fire Chier' is allocated to the lop officer in a town. A Chiers rank may be anywhere
from Ueutenant to Cornmission~n~ rank determines the , pay grade.
Trainee
~

ACTION MEMORANDUM
21 June 2003
To: Ambassador Pat Kennedy
From: \\'alt Slocombe
Subject: Coordinating Security Guards
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
CJTF7 has detennincd a need to modify guidance to commanders on hiring Security Guards. The purpose of this
memo is to clarify and harmonize Security Guard policies between CPA and CJTF7.
DISCUSSION
CJTF7 FRAG ORDER 286 to OPORD 03-33, "Implementation of the Facility Protection Services" dated 081143Z
June 03 is the existing directive document on Security Guards. Since its publication, the situation has evolved and a
revision is required. Moreover, a CPA policy on Security Guards is also needed.
RECOMMENDED ACTION
Reco~nncnd approval of the following Security Guard tenets. These will be incorporated into an appropriate CJTF7
FRAGO and into a directive CPA document that will be prepared at the completion ofthe "Security Guard
Synchroniz.ation Boards" to be conducted late this week. The training and management provisions of FRAGO 286 are
not affected by this policy change; they will be reviewed as part of the Board process.
I. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Security Guards may be hired immediately by military commanders as they see fit.
Commanders will pay Security Guards from "Vested" funds distributed by the CPA Comptroller
via CJTF 7.
For an interim period, effective immediately, Security Guards will be paid $50/month. (For
reference: Tier I salaries for occupations Ii ke Teacher and Policeman are $60/month) Guards
already hired at higher rates may be "grandfathered" at their current rate. of pay for the duration
their current contracts, then paid at the $50/month rate
Security AfTairs Team will chair "Synchronization Boards" 25-27 June to harmonize operational
requirements and fonding plans for Security Guards. Board members will include senior members
of Ministries Coordination, Budget, Finance, Interior, and CJTF7 Teams. The details of these
boards will be promulgated by the Security Team NL T 22 June.
In preparation for these sessions, CJTF? will coordinate with Ministries and appropriate
municipalities to establish the number and duties of Security Guards required at each Ministry
location. Ministries and municipalities will assume fiscal and operational responsibilities for
Security Guards on or about 1 August 2003. On the assumption that Security Guards will be hired
as Civil Servants, they would then be paid at Civil Service rates.
Private firms al'e not allowed to hire Security Guards until the CPA policy is published.
rurther. recommend Requirements Coordination Office be tasked to pass these tenets officially to CJTF7 and Security
Affairs Division be tasked to develop CPA Policy on Security Guards for approval NL T 4 July.
~~=====:.i... ----...,.,.~~ ;====~:::---;--;--:-~-:--~-------.JCOL LJ (CJTF7); MG Strock,
~--------~ LTCf.._J1 _
" 1
___ _,ICBaghdad Central)
SAPPROVE Al'PROVE WITH MODlFlCATION
---
~s:~
Senior Advisor, Security Affairs

ACTION MEMORANDUM
To: Ambassador Pat Kennedy July 12, 2003
From: Walt Slocombe
Subject: Establishing a Weapon and Security Guard Prioritization Board
SUMMi\RY AND PURPOSE
After 3 weeks of detailed study two related security points have become clear. First, the demand for weapons
for police and security purposes vastly exceeds t:he supply and) second, Coalitio:n Forces in Baghdad are una.ble
to secure every site that Ministries desire guarded. The purpose of this memo is to estabUsb a board that will
recommend weapon and security guard priorities.
DISCUSSION
Protected Sites in Baghdad: lAD now covers 417 sites w/ 40·50% avail soldiers-the sustainable rate is 33%.
Miniseries are requesting Coalition coverage of 105 additional sites
Weapons: Requirements for at least 26.000 weapons for police and FPS; only 657 available. New Iraqi Anny
and other initiatives a:re add-ons. CJTF 7 is working hard to obtain numbers required.
Conclusion: Need to establish a CPA process for identifying most critical sites for protection and apportioning
available weapons~ both Interior and National Security I Defense have equities.
RECOMMENDED ACTION
Establish a CPA Weapon and Security Guard Prioritization Board to recommend priorities for weapon
discribution and coverage of key sites by coalition forces, initially .in Baghdad.
Recommended Board composition: Co-Chai.rs: Nat Security and Defense I Interior Members: Principals or
representatives of Director of Operations, Requirements Coordination Office, Baghdad Central, and CJTF 7
Board meets initially on 16 July. Takes prioritized lists . of sites· needing protection and weapons requirements
developed by each Ministry and creates draft CPA "1-n" list. The Board then vets tbis list with Ministries and
rnake. s final adjustments before submitting it to CPA Chief of Staff for approval and passage to CJTF 7. CJTF 7
guards most imporlant sites to agreed limit of capability and provides weapons for police and FPS guards iaw
CPA approved pri. ority.
CONCURREN CES
, r lfor Baghdad Central
CommissionerF for Interior
cor land COLL · """~--...Jfor CJT1F7
MG Strock for Director of Operat· ons
COLL J for Re9 · : ents CoonJ Office
AP PROV
__ APPROVE W/ MODIFICATION
----
1u fJJ!Jo~
SA foT National Security and Defense
- - - -----

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
DOCUMENT TRACKING SHEET
ACTION OFFICE: Security
ACTION: SUBJECT: Prepare views on new security service
Managing Liquidity in the Banking System
COORDINATE WITH:
Special Instructions
See attached.
SUSPENSE:
ROUTING DATE:
CONTROL NO.:
17 July 2003
030717-20
INFORMATION COPIES TO:
ACTION TAKEN/RESPONSE:

To .__I ___ <b_><_,S>I
Dear Sir:
A Colonel with Bachelor of Chemical Engineering concerning what
we know· about your human treatment \ that you are so careful to
employ the military staff and to choose the suitable jobs to this class
of people to enable them to live in peace and pride.
I hope you agree to transfer my work from the ministry of
defence (the leadersh. ip of anti aircraft defence) to another !Vli.nistry
J.E. l\tlinistry of ·health~Higher Education~ndustry or oil because of
my ability and and profession to wor k in one of these places as
achemical engineer.
Finally I hope you would take in consideration the bard
circumstances of living that I suffered under the shadows of Saddam
regim and till now.
With my respect

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I

UNCLASSIFIED
Iraqi Security Forces~ SITREP
11111
Required Hired In - Training Shortf~lll
wrrraining (as of 18 Sep 03)
Border Police 11,574 fi,026 250
75,000 49,822 5,334
21,996 2,364 3,220
Facility Protection 4,950 5,328 1,320
Service# (Oil+Electric)
FacUity Protection 16,686 14, 115 0
Service # (Others)
New Iraqi Army (NIA) 40,000 0 731
170,206 81,039
(1) Note: FPS (Oil aud Electric) have o'• er hired by approx 2.0K. This takes up the 2.0K slack in the balance of FPS positions.
Effectively FPS has now 1 'eacbed its recruiting ceiling. MSCs informed to stop recruiting.
UNCLASSIFIED As at 26 Sep 03.

UNCLASSIFIED
Iraqi Security Forces~ Phase la: 30 Kin 30 Days
11111
INITIATIVES
Tbt.al
Personnel
7.6K
Shortfalls
Funding
Required
NIL
Action
lrnt i Ci\·il Defense
Cor >s ICOC :
Total () h:tttalio11~ h~ ·
cud uf l'has1.• I ;i.
- 2 x BNs salaries,
uniforms. OCIE.
- Request funds via PRB
or reallocation NLT
050ct03 (Action CS).
New lragi Arml'.
(NIAi
. 7K
NIL
'Iraqi Border
Police 0 BP)
I.SK
-1AI>, 410 - additional: VCA, 130EN, MKF
accelerated .
-FR.\GO 798 1mhlisht'd 6 Se1>.
-FR\GO 80.t puhlishccl 8 Sep.
- Fundine .lustifkation to be 'lubmitted to Pl~B on S
Oct for additi11n:1I bMlalion!'..
• No FRAGO re<1uircd .
-Training Requirements post pass out for P1 BN
submitted.
- P, ass-oul date 4 Oct 03.
- Not fully et1uipped until 29 Nov 03. (CMATT).
- 1 1'RAGO 828 vublish{'(J 14 St>-Jt. Hire former
border and customs officials where possible.
-l'RB to hl' submitted this week hy . Mui.
- This funding will see us through Phases la-le.
5.3K
- Money for Radios and
vehicles.
- Selaries are paid
through CE.RP until 29
Se1> 03)
- Need uniforms, body
armor, utility belt, and
e.quipmcnt.
NIL
• No FRAC.0 required.
-These are former Police Officers who require
personal equipment prior to de1>loying on the street.
-
. l\lol already funded, contrarts need to he submitted
as 'oon as possihh.'.
UNCLASSIFIED
•

UNCLASSIFIED
Iraqi Secu, rity Forces"" Pliase la: 30 Kin 30 Days
11111
INITIATIVES Total
FPS (Oil&
EJectric)
Shortfalls
Personnel
I A6K NIL
Funding,
Required
NIL
Facilities
Protective
Services (FPS}
Utilize
PESHMERGA
(Bordtr Pollett.
and/or ICDC)
Iraqi Prison
Service
2.9K
101<
J.JK
TOT AL 3_3.4K
- Personal Equipment. S0o1ne
wea1>ons, uniforms iuid
vehicles. MSCs are working
around this.
- Funding .str<'am I BC
-May rcc1uire a different '1 1
uniform. () \ p..._/\. \> U
Nil
NIL
($1.25!\1
CERP)
Action
- PRB O!Submillctl ~~ approH·d #-125. Fin·
$4.75:\1.
- f R \GO 818 nuhlhhcd 1 I ~cp, itlthough
Electricity Commission already putting this
into action - wages throu~Jt Ministry budget.
- FR\GO 828 published 14 Srp.
- FRAGO required to stop MSCs hh'ing any
more . FPS, clearly stating reasoning.
- l itllt la, Rcquin S6AM for .1 months,
$J.(,;\I for 'ialaric~ and S1.Xl\I for l'qu ipmcnt.
~IL
-No FR \GO required.
Already in motion, completed training by 11
Oct.
$ 1 l 6.6!YI
Notes:
1. 14.0K realizrd so far.
2. FPS reached recruiting ceiling: FRAGO sent telling MSCs to stop recruiting furUaer . FPS personnel.
UNCLASSIFIED As at 26 Sep 03.

UNCLASSIFIED
Iraqi Security Forces~ Border Police & Customs
•1111
Iraqi Border & Customs Police
Mlnistrv: Interior (Dept of Border Enforcement)
Duties: Border guarding and patrolling,
enforce customs/immigration laws
Uniform: Khaki shirts
Vehicles: Various, mainly all terrain.
Weapons: Pistols, AK 47 Rifles
Pa. y: Civil pay scale.
"Secure borders make
good 1 · ieighbors ".
Border Police undertaking weapon training.
UNCLASSIFIED As at 26 Sep 03.

IRAQI Border Police & Customs/Immigration
REQUIRED = 2370
HIRED/TRAINED= 1488
i.. 'TRAINING = 130
SHORTFALL = 752
REQUIRED = 1428
HIRED/TRAINED= 461 ~!!!I!!
TRAINING = 0
SHORTFALL • 987
REQUIRED = 642
HIREDITRAINED= 25
TRAINING = 0
SHORTFALL = 617 REQUIRED = 1674
HIRED/TRAINED= 372
TRAINING = 120
SHORTFALL = 1182

UNCLASSIFIED
Iraqi Security Forces ~ The Iraqi Police Services
•1111
The first line of future
security
Recently Commissioned Police on
duty with Coalition Forces
UNCLASSIFIED
As at 26 Sep 03.

Al Kut
- ........:. TIP (3 Weeks}
Currently Running
As at 26 Sep 03.

IRA QI Police Service (/PS) ON DUTY = 2228
IRBll
ENDSTATE = 4099
ATTAMIM
=3772
ON DUTY
ENDSTATE
=4168
s 8385
SALAHAD DIN
ON DUTY
ENDSTATE
ON DUTY
ENDSTATE
•577
= 2003
BAS RAH
ON DUTY
ENDSTATE
=4462
s 8289
DHIQAR
LEGEND
---~·• OVER ON DUTY = RED
ON TARGET = GREEN
UNDER ON IDVTY = YELLOW

UNCLASSIFIED
Effective Police ~ Personnel
11111
Number of Police Numbers by Level
Salaries City Highway Traffic FPS
Sem'i NQ~
Paid By Police w/Arrest
Patrol Police
l;ff~cJive , 6JfeGti . y~ :· Effective:
MS Cs (Cerp/MOI) Officers Auth.
1AD MOI 9746 0 1965 0 738 6055 4918
101st CERP 15225 285 I 500 0 710 12928 900
410 MOI 7155 846 360 130 522 6633 0
82d UNK 1114 371 lnlPS# * 150 994 782
MND-SC MOI 12326 0 lnlPS# 0 241 12085 0
MND-SE MOI 8367 0 405 3300 0 8367 0
TOTAL 539'33 1502 3230 3430
Chan e 867
UNCLASSIFIED As at 26 Sep 03.

UNCLASSIFIED
Iraqi Security Forces~ Facilities Protection Services
11111
The protection of Iraq's
econo1ny and heritage.
Facilities Protection Service (FPS)
Ministry: Most
Duties: Fixed site protection of Ministerial,
Governmental, ot private buildings I facilities I
personnel
Uniform: Grey shirts
Vehicles: Provided by Ministries
Weapons: AK 47 Rifles
Pay: Civil pay scale
FPS Protecting National Monuments
in Baghdad
Note: Formerly known as the Ministry of Vital Institutions.
UNCLASSIFIED As at 26 Sep 03.

80 - 1 00 Percent Manpower
40 - 79 Percent Manpowe'f
0 - 39 Percent Man ower
UNCLASSIFIED
21,323
19443
21,636
17,127
6,681
6 681
43,861
6 681 As at 26 Sep 03.

IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS . RANK INSIGNIAS
Mulaazem Mulaazem Awwal
2nc:1 Lieutenant 1st Lieutenant
Naqeeb
Captain
Raaed
Major
Muqaddam
Lt ColorH31
Wakeel Wakeel Aareef
Awwal Awwa1
Sergeant Master Sergeant
Major Sergeant 151 Class
Aareef
Sergeant
Naeb
Aareef
Corporal
Jundi
Awwal
Private
1s1 Class
ATTACHMENT 1

IRAQ/ CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS RANK INSIGNIAS
5.5cm - Background color is
brown.
13cm
-lnsi, gnia color is gold.
- Size of star is
proportional to the
shoulder board. It is
approximately 2.5 to 3cm
from point to point.
- Shoulder board should
wrap around the
epaulette when affixed.
The insignia is centered
vertically on the
shoulder board.
1cm
7cm
ATTACHMENT 2

IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS RANK INSIGNIAS
5.5cm - width
- Background color
is brown.
-Insignia color is
black ..
- Shoulder board
should wrap
around the
epaulette when
affixed.
1cm
13cm
- Bars are 9cm
distributed evenly
on the shoulder
board.
5cm
2mm
1cm
ATTACHMENT 3
?cm

IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS RANK INSIGNIAS
- The Eagle is centered
on the shoulder board
vertically and
horizontally.
-The star is centered
between the base of
the eagle and the
bottom of the shoulder
board.
ATTACHMENT 4

. . .
IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE C· ORPS RANK INSIGNIAS
CAP BADGE INSIGNIA
- The eagle is metal.
-The eagle is one solid
color. The color is gold.
- Glossy finish on the
insignia.
- The cap badge will be
a pin-on type.
- The badge is to be
affixed with two pins.
30mm
20mm
ATTACHMENT 5

Iraqi Security Forces "'Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
•1111
Civil Defense Corps Recruit in Training
The short-term initiative with a
longer-term future.

~---.. REQUIRED = 3384
HIRED/TRAINED= 871' ~~a..__
TRAINING = 427
SHORTFALL = 2086
REQUIRED = 846
HIRED/TRAINED= 0
TRAINING = 0
SHORTFALL = 846
REQUIRED = 2538 ....-... ~
HIRED/TRAINED= 375
TRAINING = 72, 1
SHORTFALL = 1442
REQUIRED = 2538
HIRED/TRAINED= 0
TRAINING = 181
SHORTFALL = 2357
REQUIRED = 3384
HIRED/TRAINED= 57
TRAINING = 580
SHORTFALL = 2747

IRAQI Civil Defense Corps (/CDC) - 26 Battalions
.__....._-i REQUIRED = 3384
HIRED/TRAINED= 871
TRAINING = 427
SHORTFALL = 2086
REQUIRED = 2538
HIRED/TRAINED= 0
TRAINING = 0
SHORTFALL = 2538
REQUIRED = 2538
HIRED/TRAINED= 0
TRAINING = 181
SHORTFALL = 2357 REQUIRED = 4230
HIRED/TRAINED= 57
TRAINING • 580
SHORTFALL = 3593

!CDC Stand-up Plan
•1111
I AUGUST I I SEPTEMBER I I OCTOBER I I NOVEMBER I I DECEMBER I I JANUARY I I FEBRUARY I
II
11
11
11
1
l 1
1
6
8
9
•
7
6
6
•MND(SE)
• MND(CS)
• 82DABN
D lAD
• 4ID
• lOtST

/CDC Stand-up Plan
•1111
I AUGUST I
I SEPTEMBER I I OCTOBER I I NOVEMBER I I DECEMBER I
I JANUARY I I FEBRUARY I
II
11 II 11 11
I 1 11
~1'1AD~
1
1
I xlAD
2* I x l\fND(SE) 2 *
6
8
*3 Add'I BNs are in Yellow
9
8
7
6
•MND(SE)
• MND(CS)
•82DABN
D1AD
• 4ID
• 101.ST
AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER

Proposed /CDC Stand-up Plan
11111
I AUGUST I I SEPTEMBER I I OCTOBER I I NOVEMBER I I DECEMBER I I JANUARY I I FEBRUARY I
II II
1
2
3*
5*
6
8
*5 Add'I BNs are in Yellow
9
•COSCOM
•MND(SE)
•MN. D(CS)
•82D ABN
DlAD
•4ID
AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER . JANUARY FEBRUARY • 101 ST

•1111
18 Battalions
-
UNITS AUG SEP OCT 280CT-21NOV NOV OEC JAN TOTAL
101ST 1(JISC} 1 (22 SEP) 2 (12&31 OCT) 4
410 3 (16 SEP) 1(120CT) 4
,AD 1 (25SEP) 1 (230CT) 2
3ACR/82ABN 1{:300CT) 1
MND-CS 1(30SEP) 2(300CT) 3
l1J r r 1 bn and 1 coy
:!li (28 Dec) May be 1 bn (18 Jan )
i= possible to May be possible
//of llN!>
f..~t l>alc of expand mis to expand this
lking Trained
substantalHy su .bstantallly
Will elm shortly Will elm shortly
MND-SE 1 bn(27 Oct) J coys (3 Nov) 4
Battallons per Month 1 • a 1 41 1 1 11
(.NL T 01 SEP 03) (NLT01 OCT03) (NL T 01 NOV 03) NOTNG (NLT 01 DEC 03) (NLT 01 JAN 04) (NLT01FEB04)
Compl~tiun
Projected Throu. ghput
By M.onth 846 5076 6768 646 0 846 846
..J
l1J
z Projected Cumulative 646 5922 12690 13536 13536 14382 15228 16 ?28
z
0 Actual Tltrougtipul by
t/)
c: Month 648 2025
I.LI
Q.
Actual Cumulative 648 2673
----
Dlffe renctt In
Projection -~qa
-3249
COST PER MONTH CE.RP $1,484.800.00 $2. 784,000.00 $2,969.600,00 $3.155.200,00 $3.526,400.00 $17,817,600,00
....
"' 0 CUMULATIVE COST
0
PER MONTH $1,464.800.00 $4,268.800 00 $4,268,800.0Q $7.238,400.00 $10,393.600.00 s 1'3.920.000 00

•1111
~
21 Battalions
RAMADAN
UNITS AUG SEP OCT 2tOCT ·2'NOY NOV DEC JAN FEB TOTAL
101ST 1(JISC) 1 (22SEP} 2 (12&31 ocn 4
4.10 3 (15 SEP) 1(120Cl) 4
1AO 1 (2SSEP) 1 (230CT) 1(8 JAN) 1 (5 FEB) 4
3ACR/82ABN 1(300C1) 1
MNO.CS 1(30SEP) 2(300CT) 3
w t I 1bnand1 coy
:E {28 Dec) May be 1 bn (18 Jan) 1 bn(S Feb) May
possible to May be possible be , possible to
II of UNs l;.~t Date of expand this to expand this expand this
Being Trained Completion substantall!y. sutls 1antailly substantailly.
Will cfin shortly. Will cfm shortly. Will elm shortly.
MNO-SE 1 bn(27 Ocl) J coys (3 NoY) 5
Battallonsper Month 1 6 8 1 0 1 2 2 21
(NL T 01 SEP 03) (NL T 01 OCT 03) (NLT 01 NOV 03) NOTNG (NL T 01 DEC 03) (NLT 01 JAN 04) (NL T 01 FEB 04) (NLT01 MAR04)
Projected Throughput
By Month 846 5076 6768 846 0 840 1692 1692
..J
w
z Projected Cumulative 846 5922 12690 13536 13536 14382 16074 (19BNs} 17766 17766
z
g Actual Throughput b~
a: Month 648 2025
w
Q..
Actual Cumulative 648 2673
Difference In
Projection 198 -3249
COST PER MONTH CERP $1.484,800.00 $2,784,000.00 $2.969,600.00 S . 3.155,200.00 $3,526.400.00 S3,897,600.00 $17.817,600,00
~ CUMULATIVE COST
u
PER MONTH $1,484.800.00 $4,268.800.00 S4.268.800.00 S7,238.400,00 $10.393.600.00 513.920.000.00 $17,817,600.00
" UNCJ.;ASSl.FIED"
~

Proposed Manning Recruiting Timeline
11111
~
26 Battalions
RAMADAN Current
UNITS AUG SEP OCT 260CT -26NOV NOV DEC JAN FEB End state
101ST 1(JfSC) 1 1 (22 SEP) 2 (12&31 OCT) 4
-
410 3 (15 SEP) 1(120CT)
1(31Dec03) 5
1AO 1 (25SEP) 1 (Z30Cl) 2(8& ??7 JAN) 1 (5 FEB) 5
3ACR/82ABN 1(300CT) 2(31Dec03) 3
-
MND..CS 1(30 SEP) 213oocn J
I t 1 bn and 1 ooy
(28 Dec) May be
~ bn (18 Jan) 1 bn(S Feb) May
possible to May be possible be possible to
~ ti ofBNs F.sl Dale of expand this to expand this expand this
Being Traine d Comple1ion subslantailly. substantailly. substanlailly
Will cfm shortly. Will elm shortly. Will cirri shortly.
MNO.SE 1 bn(27 Oct) 3 coys (3 Nov) 5
COSCOM 1(31Dec03} 1
Blttallonsper Month 1 ' 8 1 0 5 3 2 26 I
{NLT 01 SEP 03) (NL T 01 OCT 03) (NLT 01 NOV 03) NOTNG (NL T 01 DEC 03) {NL T 01 JAN 04) (NL T 01 FEB 04) (NLT01MAR04)
Projected Throughput
By Month 846 5076 6768 846 0 4230 25 . 38 1692
..J
w
z Projected Cumulative 846 5922 12690 13536 13536 17766 20304 21996 21996 I
z.
0 Actual Throughput by
"' ~
Month 648 2025
w
Q.
Actual Cumulative 648 2673
Difference In
Projection -198 3249
COST PER MONTH CERP $1,4S4,800.00 $2. 784,000.00 52,969,600.00 SJ. 987 ,600.00 $4,268.800.00 $4,825.600.00
.....
"' 0 CUMULATIVE COST
() Wh.tlfn of24
!PER MONTH S1 ,484,800.00 $4.268,800.00 $4,268, 800.00 S7.238,400.00 $11,226,000.00 $15,494,800.00 S20,320.400.00 Stp03

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 23
CREATION OF A CODE OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE FOR
THE NEW IRAQJ ARMY
Pursuant to my authority as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), relevant UN Security Council resolutions including Resolution 1483
(2003), and the laws and usages of war,
Noting that Resolution 1483 appeals to Member States inter alia to assist the
people of Iraq to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq.
Recalling in this regard that CPA Order Number 22 created the New Iraqi Anny,
Acknowledging the need to ensure that the New Iraqi Army has a system of
discipline to maintain order,
Noting that CPA Order Number 22 provides for both military and civilian
jurisdiction over members of the New Iraqi Anny
1 hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION l
DEFINITIONS
"Accused,, means a Member of the New lraqi Army subject to this Code of
Military Discipline, against whom disciplinary proceedings are conducted in
respect of an allegation of a Military Offense under this Code of Military
Discipline,
"Charge" means a formal accusation in writing, prepared at the direction of the
Disciplinary Officer and signed by a Disciplinary Officer, that a Member of the
New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of MiHtary Discipline has committed a
Military Offense,
"Commander of the New Iraqi Anny" means the Iraqi officer appointed by the
Administrator of the CPA to command the New Iraqi Army,
"Disciplinary Proceedings" means the investigation into, hearing of and
the decision reached, under this Code of Military Discipline in respect of an
allegation of a Military Offense and includes any appeal of any such decision,
CP A/ORD/6 August 200.l/2.l

"Elements of Military Offenses" means the elements of the Offenses required to
be proved to the required criminal standard before a member of the New Iraqi
Army can be convicted of a Military Offense.
"Junior Disciplinary Officer" means either the officer of at least Captain in rank
who at the time of any part of the Disciplinary Proceedings in respect of an
allegation under this Code of Military Discipline commands the company or
equivalent unit, or battalion or equivalent unit of which the Accused is a member.
or the officer of at least the rank of Captain who is appointed, in accordance with
the provisions of this Order, by an officer in command of a Brigade to be the
Junior Disciplinary Officer of the Accused for the Disciplinary Proceedings,
"Member of the New Iraqi Anny" means a person serving in the New Iraqi Army
from the time of attestation until the date of termination of service,
"Military Court" means a civilian court with a civilian judge who has been
appointed as a Military Judge pursuant to Section 5 of this Order,
.. Military Judge,, means a civilian judge with jurisdiction over Military Offenses in
accordance with the pmvisions of this Order,
"Military Offense" means an act or omission described in Section 3 of this Code
of Military Discipline,
"New Iraqi Anny" means the military forces of Iraq organized for the purposes set
forth in this Order including all components of the national armed forces of Iraq,
specifically including the ground forces recruited, trained, and organized as the
first step in the process of creating a military defense force for the new Iraq.
Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, all references to the "New Iraqi
ArmyH are references to any element of the national defense forces of Iraq,
"Senior Disciplinary Officer" means either the officer of at least Colonel in rank
who at the time of any part of the Disciplinary Proceedings in respect of an
allegation under this Code of Military Discipline commands the Brigade or
Division of which the Accused is a member, or the officer of at least the rank of
Colonel who is appointed, in accordance with the provisions of this Order, by the
Commander of the New Iraqi Amy to be the Senior Disciplinary Officer of the
Accused for the Disciplinary Proceedings.
CP AJORD/6 August 2003123
2

SECTION 2
MlLIT ARY JURISDICTION
1) Members of the New Iraqi Anny are subject to this Code of Military
Discipline at all times from the date of their attestation until the date of
termination of service.
2) A Member of the New Iraqi Army who is subsequently determined to have
been ineligible for service in the New Iraqi Anny remains subject to the Code of
Military Discipline until discharged.
3) All Members of the New Iraqi Anny will remain subject to the jurisdiction
of the civilian courts while serving as Members of the New Iraqi Army; provided,
Members of the New Iraqi Army enjoy immunity from civilian criminal
prosecution or civil liability for acts or omissions arising within the scope of their
duties and authorized operations to the same degree as other governmental
officials.
SECTION 3
MlLIT ARY OFFENSES
1) Any Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military
Discipline who commits any of the following shall commit a Military Offense and
shall be liable on conviction to any punishment laid down in Sections 10 and 13 of
this Order.
(a) (b) (c) (d) mistreatment of Members of the New Iraqi Army of inferior rank;
causing or engaging in a disturbance or behaving in a disorderly
manner;
behaving in an insubordinate manner;
striking a Member of the New Iraqi Army or a memher of another
armed force of superior rank or civiJian instructor placed in
authority over the accused;
(e) while on sentry duty either
(i) engaging in misconduct, or
(ii) failing to do the Member's duty;
(f) disobeying a lawful order;
(g) drunkenness if, owing to the influence of alcohol or any drug,
whether alone or in combination with any other circumstances, the
Member is:
(i) (ii) unfit to be entrusted with his duty,
unfit to be entrusted with any duty which the Member was
reasonably aware that he could be called upon to perform,
CP A/ORD/6 August 2003/23
3

(iii) (iv) behaving in a disorderly manner, or;
behaving in any manner likely to bring discredit on the New
Iraqi Army;
(h) absence without leave;
(i) avoiding the performance of a duty or negligently performing a
duty;
(j) making a false statement concerning any official matter relating to
the New lraqi Anny;
(k) (1) fighting with another Member of the New Iraqi Anny;
willfully or by neglect damaging or causing damage to or the loss
of any property of the New Iraqi Army;
(m) (n) conduct to the prejudice of good order or military discipline;
behaving in a manner likely to bring discredit on the New lraqi
Anny.
The Elements of the Military Offenses are contained in Annex A to this
2) Order.
3) Any Member of the New Iraqi Anny subject to this Code of Mi1itary
Discipline who commits a civilian criminal offense shall be guilty, by reason of so
doing, of a Military Offense against this Section and liable to trial, and on
conviction, to any punishment under the provisions of this Order.
4) Any Member of the New Iraqi Anny subject to this Code of Military
Discipline or any other person who by the Jaw of war is subject to trial by a
Military Court for any crime or offense against the Jaw of war as adopted by Iraq.
In the event the law of war convention or treaty was adopted without specifying
the penalty for violations the maximum penalty shall be the maximum penalty
specified for the most closely analogous offense under the civilian criminal code.
SECTION 4
DISCIPLINARY OFFICERS
1) Junior Disciplinary Officers have jurisdiction over all Military Offenses
created under this Order, with the exception of the Military Offenses created under
Sections 3 (3) or 3( 4 ), in respect of Members of the New Iraqi Anny below the
rank of Lieutenant.
2) An officer in the New Iraqi Army, not below the rank of Captain may be
appointed in writing as a Junior Disciplinary Officer by an officer in command of
a Brigade to be the Junior Disciplinary Officer of the accused in respect of the
allegation of the commission of any Military Offense.
CPA/ORD/6 August 2003/23
4

3) Senior Disciplinary Officers have jurisdiction over a11 Military Offenses
created under this Order, with the exception of the Military Offenses created under
Sections 3(3) or 3(4), in respect of members of the New Iraqi Anny in the rank of
Lieutenant and above, so long as the Senior Disciplinary Officer is at least one
rank above the Accused. Senior Disciplinary Officers have jurisdiction over all
appeals of decisions of Junior Disciplinary Officers.
4) An officer in the New Iraqi Anny, not below the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel may be appointed in writing as a Senior Disciplinary Officer by the
Commander of the New Iraqi Army to be the Senior Disciplinary Officer of the
accused in respect of the allegation of the commission of any Military Offense.
SECTIONS
MILITARY COURTS AND MILITARY JUDGES
1) Military Courts have jurisdiction over those Military Offenses created
under Sections 3(3) and 3(4) of this Order.
2) Military Judges have jurisdiction over those Military Offenses created
under Sections 3(3) and 3 ( 4) of this Order.
3) In circumstances in which allegations against an Accused involve Military
Offenses under both Section 3( 1) and Section 3(3) or 3( 4 ), then the Military Court
and Military Judge to which such matters are referred will have jurisdiction over
Military Offenses under Section 3(l) in addition to those under Section 3(3) or
3(4).
4) Military Judges will be selected from sitting civil judges. The Senior
Advisor, Ministry of Justice, in coordination with the Interim Minister of the
Justice will appoint such civil judges, as he may deem appropriate, to be Military
Judges on a standing basis who will sit as Military Judges when a Military Offense
is referred to them in accordance with the provisions of this Order.
5) A civil court in which a Military Judge is conducting Disciplinary
Proceedings in respect of a Military Offense will be deemed to be a Military Court
for the duration of those Disciplinary Proceedings.
SECTION 6
APPELLATE COURTS
In circumstances in which a Member of the New Iraqi Army has been convicted
by a Military Coun then the appellate coun to which any appeal is made will have
CPA/ORD/6 August 2003/23
5

jurisdiction over any Military Offense referred. Appeals will be made to the
appellate court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from the trial court.
SECTION7
ARREST
1) Any Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military
Discipline found committing a Military Offense, or reasonably suspected of
committing a Military Offense, may be arrested in accordance with the provisions
of this Section.
2) A Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military
Discipline may be arrested by (a) a Member of the New Iraqi Army of superior
rank, (b) by a civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused, (c) by a
civilian police officer acting within the officer's authority, or a Member of the
New Iraqi Anny serving in a provost position.
3) As soon as possible, but in any event no later than 24 hours following
arrest, the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Army must be informed of the
reasons for his arrest.
4) Within 24 hours of arrest, unless the exigencies of operational
circumstances prevent it, a Disciplinary Officer must be informed of the arrest and
must consider the necessity of retaining the Member of the New [raqi Army in
arrest. The Disciplinary Officer shall order the release of the arrested Member of
the New Iraqi Army unless he reasonably believes that if released:
(a) (b) (c) the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Army will absent himself or
flee disciplinary proceedings;
there is a risk that evidence will be lost, tainted or destroyed; or
the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Army will commit further
Military Offenses if rckascd.
5) If, in accordance with Section 7(5) of the present Order, the Disciplinary
Officer shall have determined that the member of the New Iraqi Army under arrest
shall be further retained, the period of such further retention shall not, unless the
exigencies of operational circumstances prevent it, exceed 48 hours.
6) Except for the exigencies of operational circumstances or the referral of the
matter to a Military Court, before the expiration of the period of 72 hours of arrest,
the Disciplinary Officer must have either released the Member of the New lraqi
Army under arrest from arrest under this Section or dealt with the allegation of the
CPAJORD/6 August 2003/23
6

Military Offense upon which the arrest is based through Disciplinary Officer
action or referral to a Military Court.
7) In circumstances in which a suitable facility within a military location in
which the Accused can be retained under arrest is unavailable, use may be made,
with the agreement of the civilian police, of such civilian police or prison facilities
as may be available.
8) Upon referral to a Military Court, that Military Court will determine
whether an Accused shall remain in arrest on the basis of the civil procedures
applicable in that court.
SECTION 8
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS
1) An allegation that a Member of the New Iraqi Anny has committed a
Military Offense created under Section 3(1), Section 3(3), or Section 3(4) shall be
reported to a Disciplinary Officer, who shall cause each such allegation to be
investigated.
2) ln circumstances involving an allegation of a Military Offense under
Section 3(3) or Section 3(4), the Disciplinary Officer will act in accordance with
Section 13 of this Order.
3) In circumstances in which allegations against an Accused involve Military
Offenses under both Section 3(1) and Section 3(3) or Section 3(4). the
Disciplinary Officer shall, if the Disciplinary Officer considers it is in the interests
of justice for the matters to be tried together, refer all allegations to a Military
Judge in accordance with Section 13 of this Order.
4) During the course of an investigation into an allegation of a Military
Offense under section 3( 1 }, if it becomes necessary to speak to the Accused, the
Accused shall be offered the opportunity to have an officer of the member's
choice, if reasonably available, and of at least the rank of the investigator present
during the conversation to assist the Accused. It shall be explained that the
Accused is not obliged to say anything unless the Accused wishes to do so. The
answers of the Accused will be written down sequentially, together with the
questions asked and the Accused shall have an opportunity to sign the record as
accurate.
CPAJORD/6 August 2003/23
7

SECTION9
DECISION BY DISCIPLINARY OFFICERS ON CHARGING
1) In the case of an allegation against an Accused with respect to of a Military
Offense under Section 3(1). the Disciplinary Officer will decide whether the
evidence discovered during the investigation would support a Charge being
preferred against the Accused.
2) If the Disciplinary Officer determines that a Charge should be preferred, the
Charge shall be reduced to writing, signed by the Disciplinary Officer and a copy
given to the Accused.
3) At the same time or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter the
Accused shall be provided a copy of all documentary evidence and access to an
real evidence with respect to the charged Military Offense.
SECTION 10
DISCIPLINARY HEARING
1) The Accused shall have at least 24 hours to prepare for the Disciplinary
Hearing. The 24-hour period shall begin when the written Charge or copy of the
evidence is provided to the Accused, whichever is later.
2) The Accused shall have the assistance of an Officer of his choice, subject to
reasonable availability, in preparing for and during the Disciplinary Hearing.
3) Disciplinary Hearings will not be open to the Public.
4) Disciplinary Hearings will be conducted in accordance with the procedures
set forth in Adminislrative Instructions issued by the Administrator of the CPA or
by a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly to the Administrator and to
whom authority to issue such Administrative Instructions is delegated.
5) Disciplinary Hearings shall be conducted in a manner that provides for the
basic rights of an Accused, including but not limited to the following rights:
(a) the Accused shall have the Charge explained by the Disciplinary
(b) ( c) Officer;
the Accused shall have the right to question witnesses called to give
evidence against the Accused;
the Accused sha 11 have the right to present evidence in support of his
case, and if convicted, to present evidence or speak in mitigation of his
punishment
CPA/ORD/6 August 2003/23
8

( d) the Accused shal1 have the right to remain silent and have no adverse
consideration taken by the exercise of this right
6) A Disciplinary Officer, having considered all the evidence presented to
him, will only find an Accused guilty of the Military Offense charged if the
Disciplinary Officer is satisfied that Accused committed the Offense in respect of
each of the elements of the Military Offense listed in the Annex to this Order.
SECTION 11
PUNlSHMENTS BY DISCIPLINARY OFFICERS
I) In adjudicating cases involving enlisted or non-commissioned personnel, a
Disciplinary Officer may award the fo1lowing punishments in respect of each
Military Offense of which the member has been found guilty:
(a) Detention for a period not longer than 7 days;
(b) Fine not exceeding 14 days' pay;
( c) A reprimand;
(d) Extra duties to a maximum of 7 days;
( e) In respect of a Private First Class, Corporal, or Sergeant, reduction
by one rank;
(f) Stoppages of pay in respect of damage or loss caused by the act or
acts which formed the basis of the Offense charged, not exceeding
14 days' pay.
2) A Junior Disciplinary Officer may combine those punishments listed in
Sections l l(l)(b) and l l(l)(f), except that no more than 28 days pay may be taken
from the convicted member of the New Iraqi Anny in respect of all the Offenses
dealt with by the Junior Disciplinary Officer at one hearing.
3) pay.
Detention may only be awarded to a Private, Private First Class, or
Corporal. It may not be combined with any other punishment except stoppages of
4) 5) Reduction in rank may not be combined with any other punishment.
A reprimand and extra duties may be combined with any other punishment
not othetwise excepted under this Section.
6) In adjudicating cases involving officers, a Senior Disciplinary Officer may
only award the following punishments in respect of each Military Offense of
which the member has been found guilty:
CPAIORD/6 August 2003/23
9

(a) (c) ( d) Fine not exceeding 14 days' pay;
(b) A reprimand;
Extra duties to a maximum of 7 days;
Stoppages of pay in respect of damage or loss caused by the act or
acts which formed the basis of the Offense charged, not exceeding
14 days' pay.
7) A Senior Disciplinary Officer may combine those punishments listed in
Sections 11(6)(a) and 11(6)(d), except that no more than 28 days pay may be taken
from the convicted Member of the New Iraqi Army in respect of all the Offenses
dealt with by the Senior Disciplinary Officer at one hearing.
8) A reprimand and extra duties may be combined with any other punishment
not otherwise excepted under this Section.
SECTION 12
APPEAL FROM DISCIPLINARY OFFICER
I) An Accused who has been convicted by a Junior Disciplinary Officer of a
Military Offense under Section 3(1) of this Code of Military Discipline shall be
entitled to appeal to the Senior Disciplinary Officer. An Accused must submit the
appeal and any supporting evidence in writing to the officer in command of the
convicted member within 14 days of the Disciplinary Hearing.
2) An Accused who is an officer of the New Iraqi Army who is convicted by a
Senior Disciplinary Officer of a Military Offense under Section 3 ( 1) of this Code
of Military Discipline shall be entitled to appeal to the Commander of the New
Iraqi Anny or the senior Commander of the New Iraqi Anny. An Accused must
submit the appeal and any supporting evidence in writing to the officer in
command of the convicted member within 14 days of the Disciplinary Hearing.
SECTION 13
REFERRAL FORTRJAL BY MILITARY JUDGE
1) In the case of an allegation of a Mi1i tary 0 ff ense under Section 3 ( 3) or
Section 3(4) the Disciplinary Officer will refer the allegation, together with all
available evidence relating to the allegation, to a Military Judge for consideration.
2) Where an investigation into an allegation of a Military Offense under
Section 3( I) discovers evidence of additiona 1 Military Offenses under Section 3(3)
or Section 3(4), the Disciplinary Officer shall terminate the investigation and refer
the allegation, together with all available evidence, to a Military Judge for
consideration.
CPA/ORD/6 August 2003/23
10

3) In accordance with Section 8(3) of this Order, where there are allegations
against an Accused involving Military Offenses under both Section 3(1) and
Section 3(3) or Section 3(4) the Disciplinary Officer shall, if the Disciplinary
Officer considers it in the interests of justice for the matters to be tried together,
refer all allegations, together with all available evidence, to a Military Judge.
4) The Military Judge will investigate and otherwise deal with the allegation
of the Military Offense referred in accordance with this Section in the manner
applicab1e for civil Offenses laid down in the Iraqi Law of Criminal Procedure
1971 as amended by Iraqi law and by CPA Orders.
SECTION 14
PUNISHMENTS BY MILITARY JUDGE
The Military Judge will apply the sentences appropriate to the civil Offense
charged under the provisions of Section 3(3) or Section 3( 4 ). except that in
determining the appropriate level of sentence within the sentencing range for the
Offense, the Military Judge may consider the impact that the Military Offense had
on good order and discipline within the New Iraqi Anny.
SECTION 15
APPEAL FROM MILITARY JUDGE
1) An Accused who has been convicted by a Military Judge of a Military
Offense shall be entitled to appeal in accordance with civil procedures.
2) The court hearing the appeal wm consider the matter appealed in
accordance with the applicable law and procedure for civil Offenses laid down in
the Iraqi Law of Criminal Procedure 1971 with amendments and as amended by
CPA Orders and the Third Edition of the Iraqi Penal Code 1969, with amendments
and as amended by CPA Orders.
SECTION 16
SUSPENSION OF IRAQI LAWS
The Iraqi Military Law Code Number 13of1940, the Iraqi Military Procedures
Code Number 44of1941, the Code of Legal Notification of Military Personnel
Number I 06 of 1960, Punishment of Military Deserters Law Number 28 of 1972,
and the Penal Code of the Popular Army Number 32 of 1984 have been suspended
under CPA Order Number 21 entitled Creation of a New Iraqi Army.
CPA/ORD/6August1003/23
11

SECTION 17
ADMINISTRA TfVE INSTRUCTIONS
The Administrator of the CPA or a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly
to the Administrator and to whom such authority is delegated may issue
Administrative Instructions not inconsistent with this Order, prescribing all
matters that are necessary or convenient for giving effect to or carrying out the
purposes of this Order.
SECTION 18
ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature.
L. Paul Bremer, Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority
CPA/ORD/6 August 2003/23
12

ANNEX A TO
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 23
CREATION OF A CODE OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE FOR
THE NEW IRAQI ARMY
ELEMENTS OF MILITARY OFFENSES
CREATED UNDER SECTION 3
(a) mistreating in any way of a Members of the New Iraqi Army of
inferior rank;
l. 2. 3. 4. 5. Elements:
an act that amounted to mistreatment; and
the act was committed by a Member of the New Iraqi Anny of superior
rank (hereinafter in this subsection "superior rank") on a Member of the
New Iraqi Army or a member of another anned force acting with the New
Iraqi Anny of inferior rank; and
the superior rank (accused) knew the victim was inferior in rank; and
the superior rank (accused) deliberately carried out the act~ and
the superior rank (accused) knew that the act amounted to mistreatment
"Mistreatment" means unwarranted, harmful. abusive, rough, or other unjustifiable
treatment which, under all the circumstances:
(a) results in physical or mental pain or suffering, and
(b) is unwarranted, unjustified and unnecessary for any lawful purpose.
(b) causing or engaging in a disturbance or behaving in a disorderly
manner;
Elements:
1. the accused EITHER
(i) caused a disturbance, OR
(ii) became involved in a disturbance, OR
(iii) behaved in a disorderly manner; and
2. the accused acted in such a manner deliberately.
CP A/ORD/6 August 2003/23
13

(c) 1. 2. 3. 4. behaving in an insubordinate manner;
Elements
the actions OR words of the accused were insubordinate, insulting or
disrespectful to a Member of the New Iraqi Army or a member of another
armed force of
superior rank (hereinafter in this subsection "superior rank:") or a civilian
instructor placed in authority over the accused; and
the actions OR words of the accused were used in the presence of the
superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and
the accused knew that the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority
over the accused was his or her superior or civilian instructor placed in
authority over the accused; and
the accused deliberately spoke or acted in such insulting or disrespectful
manner.
(d) striking a Member of the Iraqi Army, a member of another armed
force acting with the New Iraqi Army of superior rank, or civilian
instructor placed in authority over the accused (hereinafter in this
subsection "superior")
I. 2. 3. 4. Elements
the accused struck a Member of the New Iraqi Army, a member of another
armed force acting with the New Iraqi Anny, or civilian instructor placed in
authority over the accused; and
the accused had no lawful excuse for striking the superior or civilian
instructor placed in authority over the accused; and
the accused knew that the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority
over the accused was his or her superior or civilian instructor placed in
authority over the accused; and
the accused deliberately struck the superior or civilian instructor placed in
authority over the accused
"Strike" means an intentiona] blow, and inc1udes any offensive touching of the
person of the superior, however slight.
(e) while on sentry duty either
(i) engaging in misconduct, or
(ii) failing to do the Member's duty;
I. Elements
the accused was on sentry duty~ and
CPA/ORD/6 August 2003/23
14

2. the accused EITHER
(i) (ii) deliberately engaged in misconduct, OR
the accused failed to carry out a duty whether deliberately or by
neglect.
(f) disobeying a lawful order
1. 2. 3. 4. Elements
an order was given to the accused; and
the order was lawful; and
the accused was aware of the order having been given to him; and
the accused deliberately or by neglect did not obey the order.
(g) drunkenness if, owing to the influence of alcohol or any drug, whether
alone or in combination with any other circumstances, the Member is:
(i) (ii) unfit to be entrusted with his duty.
unfit to be entrusted with any duty which the Member was
reasonably aware that be could be called upon to perform;
(iii) (iv) behaving in a disorderly manner, or;
behaving in any manner likely to bring discredit on the New
Iraqi Army;
1. 2. Elements
the accused knowingly took alcohol OR drugs; and
as a result thereof the accused EITHER
(i) was unfit to be entrusted with his duties, OR
(ii) was unfit to be entrusted with any duty that he was reasonably aware
he could be called upon to perform, OR
(iii) (iv) behaved in a disorderly manner, OR
behaved in a manner likely to bring discredit on the Defence Force.
(h) absence without leave
I. 2. 3. 4. Elements
the accused was required to be at his place of duty; and
the accused was not at his place of duty; and
the accused later returned to his place of duty; and
the accused did not have permission or a reasonable excuse for being away
from his place of duty.
CPAJORD/6 August 2003/23
15

(i) 1. 2. (j) 1. 2. 3. (k) 1. 2. 3. 4. (I) 1. 2. avoiding the performance of a duty or negligently perrorming a duty
Elements
the accused had a duty to perform; and
the accused was aware of that duty; and, EITHER
(i) the accused did not perform that duty; and
(ii) the accused did not perform the duty either deliberately or by
neglect, OR
(iii) (iv) the accused performed the duty to a poor standard; and
the accused performed the duty to a poor standard either deliberately
or by neglect
making a false statement concerning any official matter relating to the
New Iraqi Army
Elements
the accused made a statement about official New Iraqi Army matters; and
the statement was false in a significant way; and
the accused knew that the statement was false at the time he made it.
without reasonable excuse, fighting with another Member of the New
Iraqi Army;
Elements
the accused was involved in a fight; and
the accused's involvement in the fight was deliberate; and
the fight was with another Member of the New Iraqi Army; and
the ac(;used did not have a reasonable excuse for fighting.
willrully or by neglect damaging or causing damage to or the loss or
any property of the New Iraqi Army;
Elements
the accused lost OR damaged property of the New Iraqi Army; and
that loss or damage resulted from EITHER
(i) the deliberate acts of the accused, OR
(ii) the neglect of the accused.
CPAJORD/6 August 2003/23
16

(m) 1. 2. 3. conduct to the prejudice of good order or military discipline
Elements
an act or omission by the accused; and
such act or omission was likely to prejudice good order or military
discipline
the accused was aware, at the time of such act or omission, that the same
was likely to prejudice good order or military discipline.
(n) I. 2. 3. behaving in a manner likely to bring discredit on the New Iraqi Army
Elements
an act or omission by the accused; and
such act or omission caused discredit to the New Iraqi Anny; and
the accused was aware, at the time of such act or omission, that the act or
omission was likely to bring discredit on the New Iraqi Anny.
CP A/ORD/6 August 2003/23
17

4 .
UNIFIED SECURITY SERVJCES CONTRACT FOR IRAQ
-----
Surrounding Circumstances: The intent of this contract is to obtain high quality
security services of various types for a wide variety of customers across Iraq. The
contract is intended to obtain these services from a contract services provider who is fully
qualified, tTained, equipped. and capable of mission performance. An Indefinite
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contract is contemplated, with initial qualification of
candidate firms who gain acceptance to a Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors
based on fulfillment of qualification criteria as established by the Ministry of the Interior.
From this Pool are selected competitors who compete for award of individual Delivery
Order requirements as they become available under the contTact. These competitions are
intended to be accomplished easily and rapidly in order to respond to the dynamic
circumstances being experienced in the Iraqi security environment. It is contemplated
that, at a minimum, every 3 months a qualification window will be opened to consider
firms that have demonstrated in the interim that they meet the minimum qualification
standards. Therefore, acceptance of contractors into the Pool of Qualified Security
Service Contractors is possible across the life of the ID/IQ contract.
Contractor Responsibilities: The contractors selected for award, as a result of the
source selection process initiated through Delivery Orders issued under this contract, will
be responsible for including in their price all costs, including costs associated with the
following items. The following list is not intended to be all inclusive but is representative
of the types of costs for which contractors will be responsible in their price. It is
anticipated that, over time, the Ministry of Interior may promulgate regulations, or other
laws or regulations may be enacted, which govern the operation of security service
contractors. The contractors will be responsible for compliaIJce with all such
requirements without additional cost.
• InsuraIJce. The contractor shall be responsible for maintaining insurance in the
types and amounts as may be required by the Ministry of the Interior or by law or
regulation, or as otherwise required under the competition for a Delivery Order
under this contract. All costs associated with such insurance are the
responsibility of the contractor and must be included in their price.
• Bonding. The contractor shall maintain Bonding in the types and amounts as may
be required by the Ministry of the Interior or by Jaw or regulation, or as otherwise
required under the competition for a Delivery Order under this contract. Costs
associated with such bonding are the responsibility of the contractor and included
in their price.
• Uniforms. The contTactor shall be responsible for providing all uniforms required
in the performance of work under this contract. Uniforms shall comply with
requirements as may be established by the Ministry of the Interior or by law or
regulation, or as otherwise required under the competition for a Delivery Order
under this contTact. Costs associated with uniforms are the responsibility of the
contractor and included in their price.

• Training. The contractor shall be responsible for providing security personnel
fully qualified and trained in accordance with Ministry of the Interior standards
for the types of security service being provided or by law or regulation, or as
otherwise required under the competition for a Delivery Order under this contract.
Training updates and maintenance of ongoing trd.ining which may be required by
the Ministry of the Interior shall be the responsibility of the contractor. Costs
associated with training are the responsibility of the contractor and included in
their price.
• Weapons. The contractor shall be responsible for providing a11 weapons
necessary and appropriate for the performance of work. Weapons wi 11 be
maintained on the work site in a secure weapons cage or facility, in accordance
with Ministry of the Interior requirements or by law or regulation, or as otherwise
required under the competition for a Delivery Order under this contract.
Weapons wilJ not normally be transported to or from work by security personnel;
exceptions are allowed for security services of a nature such that transport of
weapons is a necessary compliment to the work being done. For example, in
providing security services for an electrical transmission system, the nature of the
work may inherently require transportation of weapons over wide geographic
areas. In all cases, weapons will be secured, transported, maintained, and
operated in accordance with Ministry of Interior requirements or by law or
regulation, or as otherwise required under the competition for a Delivery Order
under this contract. All costs associated with provision and maintenance of
weapons sha11 be the responsibility of the contractor and included in their price.
• Weapons Cards and Identification Cards. The contractor will provide personnel
who have appropriate Weapon and Identification Cards. Offerers are placed on
notice: it is anticipated that requirements for Weapons Cards and Identification
Cards will evolve over time, changing in type and configuration. There may be
licensing, testing, and qualification or user fees associated with these evolving
requirements. Any such costs shall be the responsibility of the conrractor and
included in their price.
• Ammunition. The contractor shall provide all ammunition. The ammunition
provided shall be in the types and amounts required to perform the security
mission. The cost for all ammunition is the responsibility of the contractor and
included in their price.
• Vehicles. The contractor shall provide all vehicles necessary for the performance
of all work under this contract, unless otherwise explicitly stated in the Delivery
Order Statement of Work initiating the security requirement. The customer will
not be responsible for the transportation of contractor employees to or from the
work site, or within the work site unless explicitly stated in the Delivery Order's
Statement of Work initiating the security requirement. All vehicular costs for

vehicles provided by the contractor are the responsibility of the contractor and
included in their price.
• Communications. The contractor shall be responsible for providing all
communications equipment necessary for the performance of mission
requirements. The contractor shall be responsible for providing all
communications equipment required for internal communications within the
secured site. The contractor shall be responsible for providing all
communications equipment required for full integration of the secured site into
the external local geographic emergency response system. Such integration shall
include 1ocal geographic police and emergency response personnel and
organizations as well as local military organizations. All costs associated with
providing such communications equipment shall be the responsibility of the
contractor and included in their price.
• Food. Unless otherwise provided by the customer as outlined in the Delivery
Order establishing this security requirement, the contractor shall be responsible
for providing all food and water requirements for security personnel. All costs
associated with providing food and water shall be the responsibility of the
contractor and included in their price.
Integration into Local Geographic Entities: Contractors performing under this contract
shall fully integrate all security personnel and security activities into local emergency
response plans and organizations. This integration requirement shall extend to the local
goverrunent and shall include local government first-responders, local police, local fire
departments, and other local organizations as may be required by local government
regulations and Ministry of Interior regulations.
Contractors performing under this contract shall also be responsible for fully integrating
all security personnel and security activities with all military organizations, both Iraqi and
Coalition, which have responsibility for the geographic areas where work is to be
performed.
By the term "integration" it is meant that contractors perf onning under this contract are
required to be pro-active and to take the initiative to be fully communicative with, and
working in compliance with, local emergency response organizations. The contractor
shall be responsible for contacting local emergency response organizations daily and
coordinating all ongoing security activities. This integration shall include the ability to
communicate directly with local emergency response organizations by radio, telephone,
or whatever combination of communications technology complies with local
governmental regulations, local practice, and Ministry of Interior regulations.
It is essential that security contractors performing under this contract have clear
understandings with regard to relationships between on-site security personnel and
personnel fi-om local goverrunent first responders. Contractor personnel at the locations
being secured must clearly understand these on-site response relationships. Contractors

shall establish Standard Operating Procedures for communications operations and a copy
shall be provided to the Contracting Officer at the time of application for inclusion into
the PoolRules with regard to these relationships must be clearly posted in writing at the
work site in a prominent location. Weekly training must address these relationships and
be accomplished and documented with 'Written records signed by the personnel being
trained. In all communications and training, a clear distinction must be made between the
relationships which exist between the contractor and local civilian response organiwtions
and the relationships which exist between the contractor and local military response
organizations.
Contract Description: The contract will be an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity
(IDIQ) contract. The contract will pre-qualify contractors for placement within a Pool of
Qualified Security Service Contractors who are then eligible to compete for security work
which comes available under the contract. The pre-qualification process places
contractors within the pool of qualified contractors only after the firms applying for
qualification have demonstrated they satisfy threshold requirements. Threshold
requirements are defined as those requirements established by the Ministry of the Interior
for Security Service Providers. These requirements may include such things as bonding,
insurance, training, uniforms, and equipment standards. Offerers are placed on notice
that these requirements are expected to evolve and change over time, and that new
requirements may be added. In each case, contractors who are within the Pool of
Qualified Security Service Contractors will be expected to accomplish whatever remedial
action is necessary in order maintain their qualified status. Failure to maintain standards
in accordance with Ministry of Interior requirements for Security Service Providers MAY
RESULT JN BEING REMOVED FROM THE POOL OF QUALIFIED SECURITY
SERVICE CONTRACTORS Wltil the standard is again achieved.
Contractor Qualification: Placement of an oITeror within the Pool of Qualified
Security Service Contractors does not guarantee the award of any work under this
contract. Placement within the pool means that offerors are eligible to compete for work
which may come available under this contract. There is NO guarantee that any work will
come available under this contract. This is not a contract which is mandatory for use by
its potential customers. Coalition customers are free to seek other alternatives to meet
their security needs, including 'Writing other contracts and conducting other contract
competitions.
Customer Orders: Orders are placed by customers when they fill out, and submit
to the office designated to perfonn as the Contracting Office, a Delivery Order
accompanied by a simple description of the work to be done (a Statement of Work) with
a commitment of funds sufficient to cover at least the minimum quantity of work to be
done.
Order Competition: Upon receipt of a properly completed Deliver Order from a
customer, the Contracting Office will take action to conduct a competition to fulfill the
order requirements. The nature of this competition is to award a Delivery Order to the
competitor who offers the "Best Value" in their proposal; that is, the proposal which

offers the best combination of technical proposal, past performance. management and
team, and cost in the competition. The selection process will involve an integrated
asses~ment of all offers, measured against the evaluation factors outlined below. The
competition wil1 take place as follows:
Selection of Competitors: The Contracting Office will select a number of
contractors from within the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors to compete on
each Delivery Order requirement received from a customer. The selection will be
influenced by four considerations:
First, the nature of the security service requirement and the capabilities indicated by the
competitors. The wide variety of security services offered under this contract may mean
that not all competitors can offer the full array of services. Obviously, a company would
not be asked to compete for work of a type for which they are not capable. Capability
data will be identified by offerors on their application forms when they request placement
within the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors.
Second, the geographic area within the nation of Iraq in which the work is to be
performed. It is understood that not all security service firms will have the capability to
operate across the entire nation. The selection of competitors wi11, of course, be made in
accordance with the geographic availability of the competing firms in mind. Geographic
availability data will be identified by offerors on their application forms when they
request placement within the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors.
Third, the dollar value of the requirement. The number of contractors selected by the
Contracting Office to compete for a specific Delivery Order award from the Pool of
Qualified Security Service Contractors will be sufficiently large to ensure that
meaningful competition is accomplished. In general, the larger the dollar values of the
requirement the larger the nwnber of competitors that will be invited to compete.
Fourth, the characteristics of the available pool of competitors. When the Contracting
Office is selecting contractors to participate in the competition for a requirement, AT
LEAST ONE HALF of the competitors will be selected based on demonstrated past
performance in performing work under this contract. Past Performance scores are
determined based upon scores received in the Award Fee Evaluations to be accomplished
by customers.
AVERAGEPASTPERFOR..'\fANCEUNDER PAST PERFORMANCE CATEGORY
THIS CONTRACT (AVERAGE AWARD FU::
SCORE)
ABOVE 98 % AVERAGE OUTSTANDING
BE1WEEN 90 % AND 97% AVERAGE EXCELLENT
BETWEEN 80 % AND 89 % AVERAGE GOOD
BETWEEN 70 % AND 79 % AVERAGE FAIR
BELOW 70 % A VERA GE POOR
For example, for a requirement at the $ 70 thousand dollar level, the Contracting
Office might identify 5 competitors who will then provide meaningful competition and

compete for the Delivery Order Award. At least 3 of those competitors must be selected
to compete based on their demonstrated past performance under this contract, as
demonstrated by scores earned in Award Fee Evaluation. For example, companies
selected to compete based on past perfonnance scores will be selected in rank order from
highest score downward, from the "Outstanding" category first. If there are fewer than 3
companies that fall into the "Outstanding" category, additional firms will be selected
from the "Excellent" category and so forth until 3 finns have been selected for the
competition based on past perfonnance. For the 2 finns selected to compete, based on
their availability on the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors and not their past
performance scores (principally this wil1 be firms which have not yet had an opportunity
to earn a past performance score under this contract or who have not earned scores
sufficiently high enough to qualify based on demonstrated superior past performance) the
list of contractors chosen to compete wil1 be accomplished by selection from the .. Pool of
Qualified Security Service Contractors" using a Bidder's List rotation technique.
Obviously, when work is first initialed under this contract, none of the competitors will
have demonstrated past performance under this contract; therefore, a simple Bidder's List
rotation system with random selection to compete will be employed until a past
performance data base is built.
Evaluation Factors: While there may be special situations which will require special
evaluation factors. the following information is provided with respect to typical
contractor evaluation and source selection. It is anticipated that the vast majority of
evaluations and source selections will utilize these standard factors. If factors other than
these standard factors are to be used, the special factors will be spelled out during the
competition for that particular Deliver Order. The standard factors are provided below in
descending order of importance for selection purposes.
Assessment and Technical Proposal: The first step in each competition for a
Delivery Order requirement will be an Assessment and Technical Proposal. The
Assessment activity is considered of utmost importance in this competition. Unlike
security services performed in many other areas of the world, security services in Iraq
stand a high probability of being violently tested. It is considered absolutely essential
that offerors take the opportunity to visit the site to be secured and to make on-the-ground
assessments of such things as the nature of the threat. fields of fire, avenues of approach,
previous security challenges at the site, and similar considerations. We are not interested
in proposals which are not based on a real-world assessment by qualified security
professionals. Upon selection for competition, competitors will be provided an
opportunity by the Contracting Office to meet as a group at the location where work is to
be perfonned. Offerors are expected to attend and to accomplish an assessment. At that
time and location the Customer wi II accomplish a w alkthrough of the perfonnance site
and provide the competitors an opportunity to observe local conditions and to ful1y
understand the nature of the security requirements. Competitors are encouraged to ask
questions and take whatever steps are necessary to thoroughly understand the nature of
the work required. There will be no second chances to visit the site. If competitors are

unable to meet at the location or time established for walk-through, they will be
disqualified so that another qualified competitor has the opportunity to compete.
Within two days following the on-site walkthrough, the competitors will provide
to the Contracting Office an Assessment and Technical Proposal that outlines the results
of the competitor's assessment and the Technical Approach intended by the competitor to
best achieve the goals of the customer. It is anticipated that the Contracting Officer will
nonnally establish a page limit on the length of the technical proposal consistent with the
nature of the requirement. Proposals will only be evaluated to the length of the page limit
(e.g., a 6 page proposal submitted in response to a Delivery Order requirement with a 5
page limit will only be evaluated to page 5). Each offeror's Assessment and Technical
Proposal win be evaluated in order to determine which competitor best achieves the
customer's goals.
Past Peiformance: The second most important factor for selection will be the
demonstrated past performance accomplished by contractors in the perfonnance of
previous work under this contract. Past Performance assessments will be accomplished
by a review of Award Fee scores earned by the competitors under earlier work perfonned
under this contract. There is no requirement for any information to be submitted by the
competitors during the competition with respect to this factor. Competitors are cautioned
that their Past Performance scores are being earned during the performance of work
accomplished under Delivery Orders accomplished through this contract. Competitors
should strive to always perfonn well in order to earn the highest possible past
perfonnance scores. Past performance scores are important because of the score's impact
in earning the opportunity to compete and then in their importance in being selected for
award.
Management an.d Personnel: The third most important factor for selection will be
the team proposed for performance of work under the proposed Delivery Order. Each
competitor will put together a Proposed Management Plan in accordance with the
Contracting Officer's instructions. It is anticipated that there will be a page limit
established for Management and Personnel proposals reflective of the nature of the
technical requirement. The proposal should outline the makeup of the personnel and the
management personnel the competitor proposes to use to satisfy the customer's
requirements.
Key Personnel: The Plan should address the Key Personnel to be used
and their qualifications. Information should be provided with respect to their
education, training, and experience which uniquely qualify them to provide
superior security service performance. Please note that this solicitation does not
establish minimum qualifications requirements. Competitors arc expected to
provide the best possible team members, especially with respect to key managers.
The competitive environment will help ensure the best qualified teams are
selected.
Team Makeup: The plan should address the makeup of the team, with
special attention given to the training and qualifications of the team members.

Cost: The least important consideration for selection will be cost. It is
anticipated that competitions conducted wider this solicitation will be of a "Propose to
Bud get" nature and that selection of contractors wi II be based on "Best Value··
assessments. The intent is to select the proposal which best meets the customer's
requirements and provides the Best Value for the funds available. Recognizing that there
are many different ways with which to provide security services for a given area, the
nature of the service provided and the range of security technologies employed is likely
to be bounded by budget considerations_ In order to ensure the greatest performance
within available budget, the competition will establish the budget within which the
competition will be conducted. Thus, the offeror who offers the most effective security
approach, and who provides the greatest content within available budget, will be
providing the Best Value and will receive the award.
OtTerors are cautioned that the Source Selection Authority may empJoy analytical
measures to review the effort proposed within the budget in order to ensure that the
proposed level of work can actually be performed within the budget. This technique,
known as "Most Probable Cost" ensures the integrity of the cost proposal. Offerors who
propose levels of work which cannot be accomplished within available funding levels
will have their cost scores reduced for lack of realism.
The disclosure of budget information will include the disclosure of the Award Fee
Pool established within the Delivery Order to reward excellent contract performance.
Source Selection Relative Order of Importance: The Evaluation Factors above are
listed in their order of importance. Their relative order of importance is as follows:
• The Assessment and Technical Proposal is the most important factor and is
slightly more important than Past Performance.
• Past Performance is the second most important factor than slightly more
important than the Management and Personnel
• Management and Personnel is the third most important factor and is much more
important than Cost.
• Cost is the least important factor.
Source Selection Authority: Nonnally the selection of the successful offeror will be
made by the Contracting Office on behalf of the customer for whom the Delivery Order
is being accomplished. In those cases, the Contracting Office will ensure the
accomplishment of all documentation in support of the award and will complete the
selection and award activities. In some cases the customer may serve as the Source
Selection Authority. In those cases, the Contracting Office will assist the customer in
the evaluation process but the documentation in support of the award will be the
responsibility of the customer making the selection. After the customer making the
selection completes the documentation activities, the Contracting Office will the
complete selection and award activities.

It is the goal of this ID/IQ contract to enable the entire process of source selection to
nonnally be accomplished, and for a Delivery Order award to be completed, within one
week after receipt of a complete Delivery Order requirement from the customer. This
one week period includes selection of competitors, a site visit, receipt and evaluation of
the Assessment and Technical Proposal. evaluation of the Past Performance of the
offerors, evaluation of the proposed Management and Personnel, and an integrated
assessment against the cost of the proposal in order to determine which proposal
represents the Best Value for the money spent. A different time schedule may be
established for Delivery Order award by the Contracting Officer.
In cases oflarge dollar value requirements, more extensive or highly technical
requirements, or requirements which extend over wide geographic areas, this evaluation
may take longer than one week. It is always the intent of this contract, however, to
accomplish evaluation and award as rapidly as possible, consistent with good stewardship
of the monies involved.
Award Fee: ln order to ensure the highest possible perfonnance by the providers of
security services under this contract, an Award Fee will be used. An Award Fee is a pre-
established amount of money (called an "Award Fee Pool") which is set aside to reward
contractors for good perfonnance. Normally an amount of 10% of the available budget is
set aside for use as an Award Fee prior to initiating the competition process. This Award
Fee amount will be disclosed during the competition for award so that the competitors
clearly understand the entire budget and compensation opportunities available under the
contract. An Award Fee amount in the I 0% range is considered relatively high and
reflects the seriousness with which security services are taken. We expect top flight
perfonnance and will reward such performance accordingly. Contractors who perform
at less than the highest levels will experience reductions in Award Fee awards
accordingly.
Mechanics of Award Fee: The total Award Fee Pool will be divided equally into
sums which will be made available for Award Fee Pool Determination each 3 months
during contract performance. For example; an Award Fee Pool ofSlOO thousand,
established for a contract with a performance period of 2 years, would have 8 Award Fee
evaluations performed, each on an A ward Fee amount of $12,500. The purpose of the
Award Fee is to encourage high quality performance by the contractor and to HELP
ENSURE THE CONTRACTOR PAYS CLOSE ATTENTION TO CUSTOMER
REQUIREMENTS. In order to ensure that the contractor has every opportunity to earn
the maximum possible fee, djscussions should be held frequently (AT LEAST once a
month) to keep the contractor informed of how the customer views their performance.
Contractors should not be surprised by Award Fee evaluation scores.
The CUSTOMER serves as the Award Fee Determination Official. As the
Award Fee Determination Official, the customer evaluates contractor performance on an
Award Fee Evaluation Form and determines how much of the Award Fee the contractor

has earned. The detennination is made in terms of a percentage of the Award Fee
available to be awarded to the contractor. (For example; in the $12,500 example given
above, an Award Fee determination of90% would result in an award of Sl l, 250). This
detcnnination is documented on an Award Fee Determination Worksheet, signed by the
customer and forwarded to the Contracting Office. The Contracting Office then awards
the percentage earned to the contractor. IT JS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS PROCEDURE
BE KEPT FAST AND SIMPLE. A simple Award Fee Determination Worksheet sample
is included in this document. This determination process should only take a few minutes
but is essential to keeping contractors highly motivated to provide good performance. It
is also essential in documenting contractor past performance which plays a significant
role in the selection of contractors for award. It is also essential in helping contractors
learn how to improve their scores by providing good performance and meeting their
customer's expectations.
The Philosophy of Award Fee: An award fee which cannot be earned is not an
incentive to contractor performance. Ifwe place money in an Award Fee Pool it is
placed there with the intent that it CAN be earned. The Award Fee Pool is a tool
intended to reward good performance and Award Fee Determination Officials should use
that tool for its intended purpose: to reward good performance. The ideal situation is that
contractors earn 100% of Award Fee, because such a score indicates that the contractor
has provided very good performance. Very good performance does not imply PERFECT
performance. Human beings never perform perfectly. Use good common sense. On the
other hand, the Award Fee approach provides an opportunity for a customer to strongly
communicate displeasure with contractor perfonnance and to ensure the contractor
understands the consequences of poor perfonnance.
Availability: It is intended that this contract will be available for use by a wide variety
of users. The requirement for security services across Iraq is ubiquitous and making such
services readily available will improve the overall security environment. It is intended
that this contract wilJ be available for use by all Coalition Partners, and all Iraqi
Governmental Organizations. The contract will be available for use by these
<>rganizations within limitations which may be established by law, regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Interior, or other laws which may govern security service
contracts.
Organization and Staffing: The intent of this contract is to ensure the ready
availability of high quality security services which can be accessed in a competitive
manner, quickly, and with a minimum of effort. [n order to ensure this outcome it is
essential I.hat certain minimum qualifications be established for the security services
personnel to be used in tactical security settings. These standards, which are mostly
physical in nature, are not applicable to personnel who may be employed in sedentary or
clerical jobs.
Physical Requirements:
• Minimum age= 18 years

• Run a kilometer in less than 1 minutes
• 20 pushups without rest
• 20 bent knee situps without rest
• Carry your own weight l 5 meters within I minute
• No physical abnormalities to prevent performance
Other Requirements:
• No criminal record
• Basic literacy
o Able to read and understand written orders
o Able to write reports
o Able to learn simple English phrases
Available Services: The following types of services arc contemplated under this
comract. This list is not to be considered all inclusive. If additional security services of a
type not contemplated here are identified at a later date as being necessary, they may be
added to the available services at that time. OfferoTS will be requested to identify the
types of services which they can provide.
• Tower guards
• Motorized or airborne roving patrols
• Entry point control
• Quality control
• Personnel escorts
• Supply
• Offsite services
• Pon security
• Electrical transmission facilities

• Alarm and Security monitor
• Electronic surveiJJance
• Dog teams
0 Explosives detection
0 Personnel control
0 Other
• Security Safety
• Security equipment maintenance
• Convoys
• Pipeline
Training: The intent of this contract requires that the personnel provided by the
contractors be highly qualified and properly trained. The nature of the competitive
environment envisioned by the source selection process to be accomplished under this
contract will help ensure that competitors ensure such training and qualifications.
Offerors are placed on notice that it is anticipated that training requirements~ promulgated
by the Ministry of the Interior. will probably evolve over time. Such changes may result
in the de-qualification of competitors who were fully qualified at an earlier point in time.
Competitors are expected to promptly take action in such circumstances to re-qualify
their personnel. Failure to re-qualify personnel in accordance with Ministry of Interior
regulations could result in removal of the competitor from the Pool of Quali fled Security
Service Contractors.
Contractors under this contract are responsible for providing personnel who meet all
requirements established by the Ministry of the Interior. The contractors are responsible
for accomplishing this training. The Coalition Provisional Authority will recognize and
accept any and all training which meets Ministry of the Interior training requirements
when proof of training is provided. The Ministry of the Interior may establish
requirements for documentation and proof of training~ should such requirements be
established. contractors wilt be required to provide such documentation and proof in
whatever manner is required by Ministry of the Interior regulations.
At a minimum, all security service personnel who are expected to take an active physical
role in security activities will be required to be trained in the areas of:
• Weapons familiarization
• Use of force

• Communications procedures
Integration with Geographic and Military Orgaoizations: The contractor must report
all sites guarded by security service personnel to local police, local military, and civil
authorities. This reporting must be accomplished in accordance with local regulations
and procedures.
At a minimum, the contractor must report, in accordance with local police, military and
civil authorities, the following information for every site where security services
personnel are located:
• Address
• Grid Coordinates
• Number of security personnel present (total for 24 hours)
• How to communicate with the security guard force
• Other information in accordance with local procedures
The contractor must also maintain a company-wide roster of approved and employed
personnel, with a current copy monthly to the Ministry of the Interior and with a copy to
the Contracting Office. This roster must include at a minimum:
• Name of each employee
• Assignment location of each employee
• Rank or pay category of each employee
• Other identifying data as may be required
Pay and Benefits: There is no Government-established pay rate for this contract at any
level. Contractors are free to pay at any rate as determined by market conditions.

I
l
IRAQ INFRASTRUCTURE
RECONSTRUCTION
The Way Ahead
Oct 2003

The Challenge
• Supplemental is progressing towards
enactment.
• The focus will soon turn to Baghdad to learn
what will be done and how it will be
accomplished effectively, efficiently and in
compliance with the legislation.
• Important Programs to be funded by the
supplemental are counting on funds immediately
to do work that is crucial to their success

-- /_¥T -t- /+m1nf-PJ-
r 111 °' Rr!P .,,..._ rJ
DRIVERS
• Funding rules
• Contracting rules
• Close scrutiny and transparency
• Complex program in accelerated
timeframe,
- the art of the possible
• Cross cultural sensitivities
• No fail ma, ndate

PMO Basic Tenets
• Financial and Contract Authority follows chain of
responsibility i.e. with CPA in Baghdad
• Innovative and highly leveraged total program
management approach including contracting
strategies that comply with Federal Acquisition
Regulations must be used
• Maximum transparency in everything we do
• Accountability rests entirely with one office of
CPA

Program Management Organization
Governing CPA
Council
Iraqi
Ministries Needs
Regional
Govern ates
Needs
PM Office ' ...............
CIC IO's
lntemation al Comm.
Donors
NG O's
Implementation
Sector PM Offices*
I I I I I
Public Worksi Security/ Trans/
Oil Electricity Water Justice Comm
Bid gs/ Director of
Housing/ Construction
Hc.~lth
*PMO and Sector PM Offices
F edera lfCoal ition Employees Iraqis (capacity bldg) Sector PM Contractor
Iraqi Ministry Sector Rep
North
)-
Responsibilities (USG/CPA/Contractor staffed as appropriate)
PM Office - overall program management control/integration, personnel,
security, financial, communications, information management, legal,
contracting, audit, public affairs, political liaison, overall Iraqi Ministries
coordination/liaison, real estate, logistics, Iraqi capacity building
Sector PM Offices - Sector related responsibilities: financial, programming,
reporting, Iraqi Ministries' coordination, contract administration and project
management.
Director of Construction/Regional CM Offices - construction
management, coordination, quality assurance, schedule, financial and
progress management
Re gional Constr.
Mg
mt. Offices
Central
I
I
...
South
....

Areas of Contention
• Contracting approach and control
- Washington ~ Washington
- PMO ~ wherever it makes sense
• Interface between AID, COE, Army and
others who are contracting for work in Iraq
• Size and role of PMO office
• Integration of existing programs into the
overall approach

Actions Underway Currently
• Project definition in progress
• Building staff here and in Washington
• PMO process and proce· dures being assembled
• Acquisition plan be. ing written in Washington
• Acquisition actions like contract scopes under
preparation
• Technology plain under preparation and actions
started

Proces. s Overview
Requests tor
Information
Select 3
Contractors/
Contract
PMO Iraq
Con tracts
Awarded
••• ••
.. ~ ..
r----------
1 Iraqi Prioritization 1
1 Process :
. )---------'::"
• • •
_,.,
• •• ; .. ;& '
.
-----
ID/Prioritize
Projects Prepare Task 1 ng
Packages
Program Management
Task Various
Contracts
Complete!

February 1 2004
January 9 2004
December 24 2003
December 12 2003
November 26 2003
November 18 2003
November 11 2003
November 7 2003
NOW
SIGN CONTRACTS
PR. OPOSALS EVALUATED &
REC. OM MENDED
PROPOSALS SUBMITI'ED
ANNOUNCEMENT OF SHORTLISTS
EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN
INDUSTRY DAY
RFI
SECTOR SCOPES COMPLETED
APPROACH APPROVED

Key Next Steps
• Prepare for the attention shifting to Baghdad
after supplemental is signed
• Establish effective interface with CPA, Ministries,
IGC and others
• Find acceptable solutions for programs that
have urgent requirements (N*I, Oil, Electricity,
etc.)
• Ac, celerate staffing, project identification,
prioritization and package for construction • Execute No~
f , .. J~ v/.P I
_.,, ' v- 'iJ I\ ci<--
l.)1 ' ~
'-
l/l . \r t\ "'l.lt'J
~ \) 11'\J 9\ '-r
/

Purpose of Exercise
L ---------.oo 0000
To create an environment in which Ministry and
Coalitio· n personnel identify milestones, policy
issues and resources needed to achieve CPA's
security end state.
•Why?
To provide decision support guidance to AMB Bremer and GEN
Abizaid (and to SECDEF) to enable them to identify decisions that
need to be made ahead of time to ensure CPA reaches its endstate.

Conceptual Exercise Framework
';.---------'DD DD DD .___._"J,.
Today Endstate
Iraqi Security Capacity
I Coalition Forces I
Time

Anticipated Outcomes
. , _____ _.. DDDDDD
A refined strategic plan that ensures synchronization between
CPA and CENTCOM activities
The outputs will support the de· cision-makers and you by:
• Identifying dependencies between events/tasks
• Identifying critical paths to help AMB Bremer and GEN
Abiza' id "see" the decisions they need to make ahead of time
• ldenti~ying po1icy decisions required and identify decision
owners
• Identifying resource gapslmisallocations
• Identifying transition points towards building Iraqi capacity
• Deter1 mining areas that may require contingency planning

Exercise Protocols
-----000000
• Exercise is conducted at Secret level
• Each ministry/entity is allotted 5 minutes per tum
to present their ' plan for achieving end state
• Each participant will brief based on a previously
pr, epar' e, d Powe.rPoint representatio, n of the entity's
plan
• Three turns, at ap, proximately 1 hour per tur· n with
tw, o 15 minute breaks

Behind the Scenes Work to Prep
,,_ ____ _.DDDDDD
MS Project is Not lllte11ded for Use During the Exercise - Just to Help Prep
ID Asst % Cor Task Name I I 41h Quarter 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter l"d Quarter 4 th Q
St811 FWsh Seo Oct l Nov I Dec Jen I Feb I Mar Atx l Mey I J..rl ..U I NxJ I Sep Oct
o • 12% Security Strategic Plan •J:J0/03 111301115 : : : •
1 • 0% Uchieve a Secure and S table E:nvironment 1Dl'Ul3 12J31Al4 . ~ : : : :
17 ~ · 1 13% 1 2 Public Safety __
- 101'tAl3 111!05 : : :
18 I t 0% 2.1 Develop end apply consistent vetting policie .. nd p1 1Dl'tlt3 1/3Hl4 : : ~
21 ~ , -1 1% _ 2.2 Establish Governance framework for Internal Secur 11Jtl03 1 111/04 : '
29 I t 1!.._ % 2.3 Creete an effective and accounttble Police 5}111tem 101'tl03 12131184 : : : : ·:
55 Q 16% 2.4 Create the FPS 1Dftl03 1 111/05 : : :
61 • I 30% 2.5 Form the ICOC 10fti93 f 31'l/04 : : "'!
65 • 1 ~ % : 2.6 Reconstruct Civil Defensetnd Est1blish Mine ActiorJ 10.1uJ~2/3 ~ 111_.-• : -•: -•lli: -• : -·-= -• : -••: -• : -••
72 I 3% 2.7 Develop Effective Border Security 11Jt.t3 12Jl1Al4 /e /} ~ . :
73 I 0% 2.7.1 Develop Border Policy 1011Al3 I • ~ '
74
_ , 21% 2.7.2 th rm train Staff tor DBE (13658) - 10/IA'.13 I \..11)111
.ii.- •••• DBE
Toi.el Personnel _DBE- ~atelf.2.,165 Pers~)
_
75 • 0% 2.7.3Deploy13K0111Cm - 1 f\. ~...,. ~tree 31 'IJ ; : :
~ e 0% 21.40ep1oy141Kotteers \) tor I · : ~tf"~ 31'14 . j
1
n • 0% 2.7.5Deploy161<. 25.71< Officers 2131.()4 I I
78 • 0% I _ 2.7.6Selecta.reauchlefs 1/IJU4 • .
79
eJ 0% __ 2.7.7Begbi..hionnlssue ~ ' 10/IA'l3
1/IA:H
_
60 I 0% 2 7 8 St~ bltilg reoovatilns 1
10/1 m 111 A14
81 • 0% 2.1.9~ Mjor Airports f, Air TrlfTl 10fti93 21t..U4
...,.
86 • - 0% 2.7.10 lmplem [ 10Ml3 .-111/04
87 • . 0% l 2.1 Devetog ent C2 System 101UIJ ~!04
89 I ~ J lluild Jus1tce _ __ _!IJO. GJ 121311114
116 I 27% 4 Oeuelop IZ defe ilities and oversight mechttnisrr l 10fti113 41tl04
141
'H Z2% I 5 E nable r z .to become iresponsible member of the interne t 10.11/03 iiiii4
'
'
153 • 0% 6 Quad II (IZ Lo~al Control) 1f1J11'4 41tl04 _
156 I 0% 1 Quad Ill (IZ Regional Control) 41tAl4 11ti05
160 • 0% T 8 Quad IV (S1rttegic Overwatch) - 1.11J115 11/30/05
:
:
:

Team Scripts Per Tur, n
"'----
___ _ _.. DD DODD
Prepare one slide per turn for your ltne
• Announce assumptions,
• Identify milestones
• Identify dependencies between
eve. nts/tasks
• Identify transition points (to Iraqis)
• Identify gaps that require policy or
resource decisions
• Highli· ght major risks

NSD- Turn# 1: No, w to Apr '04 (example)
_______ IDD DDDD.....__.~~.wr
Oct '03 Turn . #1
Apr '04
Troop Stren th
Milestone Mille stone
OSA
--
E uipment
Milestone Milestone Mile-stone
Focus on headline deliverables:
• Numbers of forces, prisons beds, capabilities.
• Key capabilities (e.g. special units, internal controls, governance
capacity)
•Major events (e.g. economic shocks)

Focus is on Key Tasks and major milestones
. ______ DDDDDD
Turn #1
Apr04
Turn #2
Oct04
Turn #3
Apr05
NSD
Milestone
Milestone
Milestone
Milestone

• Ask yourself "So What" before you si peak please. Help your
audience leap to a deeper understanding of how they and you
link. Don't assume we can intuit.
• Understand your plan before you come in at the MS Project
Level as well as the PowerPoint level. Know the answers to
your script because you will brief it.
• ~ehearse what you have to s~y and then cut it in half - s_ave
time for others to help you with your plan - that's the point.
• Immediately pull y· ourself up fr~m the weeds or the rat hole as
soon as you sense yourself going there - don't go there, table
it for another time.
• 1R~ emind yourself of our deliverables as if you had to explain
them eventually to SEC DEF yourself.
• Focus on what you can do for others in this exercise not the
opposite.

Next Steps
:t---____ ___.DD D DOD
Friday October 1 o•h
1300-1700, Ambas. sadors' Conf Room
We are here to help you p1 repare

MDI-# 1: Oct 03 to Apr 04
. _____ ___.IDD D DOD
Issues
75,000 IPS of which
?? Newly trained
1,000 IPTF starting to
deploy
11.Sk BP TIP trained
Police
Dec03 Jan 04
1,500 new New officers
graduates deployed
Mar04
SPU stood up
Borders
Feb04
25k staff hired
FPS size depends on
budget decisions
MOI new structure &
staffing complete
Feb 04
FPS
Jan 04
TOA complete;
. 21 k employed
Mar04
45k employed
Police oversight
mechanisms
established
Security governance
Jan04
Accountability
system established
Mar04
JA fully functional
Baghdad C3 network
complete

MOI - # 2: Apr 04 to Oct 04
'#---------DD DODD
Issues
Police
Special investigative
units require
intensive training
Police capability
outside urban areas?
June.04
SPU 100% functional
(int, emerg. ency, A·T)
Borders
??
NIA role on borders?
FPS
Security governance
Regional Operations
Centers & C3
network operational
country·wide
May04
Militias dissolved?
Sept 04
Constitution defines
roles of governors

MO/ - # 3: Oct 0· 4 to Apr 05
'#--------.!DD DODD
Issues
Police
All rehired police
phased out?
Corruption and
efficiency levels?
??
??
Borders
??
FPS
??
Securit overnance

TF RIE UPDATE
2 Oct 2003
TF RIE Commander: BG (P) Steven R. Hawkins

MISSION
TF Restore Iraqi Electricity (RIE)
supports CPA and CJTF(7) in the
delivery of reliable and consistent
electrical power to the country of
Iraq to assist the Iraqi people by
providing services that meet or
exceed pre-war standards on a
reliable and predictable basis.

COMMANDER'S INTENT
• Endstate:
- TF RIE, by upgrading generation,
transmission, and management I control
systems, supports the Electricity
Working Group Fiscal 04 Power
Program. Seamlessly transition projects
to CPA's Program Management Office,
Ministry of Electricity and it's senior
civilian advisor.

PM (2)
I
Security
TMs
I
I
....
3 T earns Total
Task Or anization
Program Manager
Commander
Deputy Commander
PAO(l
Aide ( 1- CPT)
Interpreter ( J - LN)
Counsel Internal
Review
Safety (1) OPNS
RM (1) EN (5}
Contract
Officer
P&O (2)
Security/FP LNO (4)
Regional T earn
North
South
Central
LOG(4)
IT (2) Personnel ( I)
LOG
TM 2
KT
TM 3
3 Tcitms Total 3Teams Total
QA
TM 2
TOT AL - 81 Individuals
18 Teams Tot.al

Pro· ect Overview
• Direct support to CPA
• CENTCOM and CPA requested USACE support
due to demonstrated expertise
• Work accomplished through existing competitive
contracts
• USACE provides the engineering and contracting
expertise, with an end date of 20 Dec 2003
• TF RIE tasks include new generation, rehab of
existing facilities, restoring transmission lines,
management and control systems, increasing
national power reliability
• One member of the "Team of Teams"

Pro·ect Criteria
• Baghdad center of gravity- NEW POWER
• Improve transmission lines to stabilize grid
• Consumption priority=fuel oil, crude, Natural Gas
& finally-diesel
• Use stand-alone generation at key facilities
• Avoid duplication of effort-deconflict with other
efforts
• Build project packages based on funding levels
• High-impact projects-10 MW system threshold

GENERATION PROJECTS
Project TF RlE PROJECT NAME CPA START
-JI. ESTIMATE DATE
GENERATION TOTAL: $643M E15 Proj -10 Started, 5 waiting funds)
4 NEW GENERATION: QUDAS - 180 MW $100M 26-Sep-03
28 NEW GENERATION: BA.JI -160 MW $100M 26- Sep-03
27 NEW GENERATION: TA.JI - 66 MW $29M Need funds to
start
30 NEW GENERATION: NASIRIYA-150 M 'W $SOM Need funds to
start
31 NEW GENERATION: QUOAS -25Q MW $77M Need funds to
start
9 NEW GENERATION: BUZULGAN -40 MW $,30M 2&-Sep-03
32 NEW GENERATION ~ KESSEK - ZQ1 MW , $108"'1 Need fund$ to
start
3 NEW GENERATION: NORTH -10 lndust'ries $14M 26-Sep-:03
1 CUT from GRID: 100 MW - Baghdad Water Funded by 26-Sep-03
USAID
2 NEW to GRJD: 270 MW of SOM 0 GEN Funded by 26-Sep-03
DFI
5 REHAB/REPL Khot Al-Zubayr:Units #2 and#"- $45M 26-Sep-03
6 REHAB D i bis: Unlts #4 and #6 $20M 26-Sep-03
7 REHAB Najaf: Un'its. #1 and #2 $20M 26-Sep-03
8 REJ-IAB Hilla: Units #1 and #2 $15M Need funds to
start
26 BACK-UP GEN: 200 MW (.Japan GenSets) $26M 26-Sep-03
Fifteen projects begun totaling $643 M

TRANSMISSION PROJECTS
TRANSMISSION: $395M - ( 8 Projects - all started)
11 400 KV LINE: Baghdad (W) to Haditha $20M 26-Sep-03
12 400 KV LINE: Baghdad (W) to Bajii $20M 26-Sep-03
13 400 KV LINE: Baghdad (S) to Diwaniyah $20M 26-Sep-03
16 400 KV LINE: Hartha to Q.ut Was.sit $60M 26-Sep-03
17 11 /33 KV SCADA: Baghdad only $100M 26-Sep-03
14 132/400 KV SCADA - IRAQ - Phase 1 only $120M 26-Sep-03
15 REHAB: 4 Baghdad Control Centers $5M 2S.Sep-03
18 REHAB: Priority 11133 KV Subs'tations $50M 26--Sep-03
Eight proJects begun totaling $39· 5 M repairing the
Nation's transmission system

PROPOSED PROJECTS
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL: $36M (3 Projects - 1 started)
22 DESIGN MoE LOGISTICS MGMT SYSTEM $30M 26-Sep-03
23 EQUIP POWER POLICE -1500 men / 1 year $4M Need funds to
start
25 PROVIDE SECURITY DETECTION EQUIP $2M Need funds to
start
Three propo. sed projects totaling $36 M

• TASK FORCE "RIE" PROJECT OVERVIE
Project Not Started
Project Begun, 0-50°/o Complete
Project on track, 50 • 100°/o
Project Complete & Energized
Task Force RIE:
• $1 ~OSB planned
COUNTRY WIDE PROJECTS aee•eeM
• over 500 MW
PROJECT QESC.RIPIIQN
'l"F RIB PROJl!<;;T NAMS
27
31.l
31
NEW Gl!iNCRATJON : TA.JI • 68 MW
.. e wOE N ERA TION: "IA:ill'UYA-15Q MW
N B W Gero -'1'101'0 QUtiAS - 250 MW
5
fl
NEW <o Gl~JO: ~7Q MW .:>f so-.o Oll!:N
FU! - 0 l<hor Al.Z...l>IO)'I Uni ... .a ....... '1t4
R:EHA(J Olbla; Unit» #4 ttnd WO
ooo a<v W H E : Baortdaa fW) co eaU.•
400 f<V ~INS; Q411ghda (t (:!t) to Oiw•,,ty• t\
400 KV LIN G.: N· &rth• t a Q\lt W••••t
--
uo ..
Hl!HA.Ot 4 Ba-ghq8d COOtt'OI f:;•l1•••ll
~~~~~~--1~~~--1~~~-1
At IWtlftlMI'
LJ Power Generation~ Transmissian Line~ REHAB Generation(} Control Systems
25
P~OVlOG
'61ECU'SUT"Y QaTf!CTlON UO:U JP
--
·-
...

, ->
t"'· /; . r 1 ~~A~ Ministry of the Interior
. ~·.i / ~lfMIJ Public Safety and Security lor All Iraqis
~ ;
"",..
Facilities Protection Services
Transition Plan
Mrr IMA{ . I
....-------......

I
-~ ''fr.L.,•·
-pr"jS/f
-s-~ ~/n
S1Gr. ~ .
~ .. J? .
.;: ·. -
....... - '/: _-
-
.
82d
71111/9/39

~ Pte~ Au_,., Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and ~curity for All Iraqis
I FPS-Manpower Status I
1-3 days Old !-----!:==-----+-~ 7
•
0
•
~\ .
.,,. r
et10
---.. ~~~~~!---;! ~
ti
3+ weeks Old 1-~~<::l:!- -t-::: :::-
l!G
0
_ .,
-
mt ... ,
2121 dl

~Pro~ A~ Ministry of the Interior
~ /fMI/ Public Safety and Secu1ity for All Iraqis
Constraints/Liniitations
4
• C01 MMAND & CONTROL: PROGRAM IS DECENTRALIZED TO MINISTRIES
NO C2 AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL PROVIDING GUIDANCE AND STANDARDS
~ c.J ... I')!),....
~ j" ~~
0!.2.~'1 ~ I ~ • PERSONNEL: CONSTRAINTS IN PERSONNEL PREVENT FULL l\'IANNING OF FPS
RESULTING NO DEDICATED FPS REPRESENTATlVlCS IN TR'E 1\1 IN lSTRIES
_,.~ ~~ Yl...b--~ k_ F-f• ~~."t.- r p,~ -
• RESOURCES: LI~~ it.r;~cr~ftE~lss~~t~Eiri)Ns ~~ni'Nc ~
WHICH WILL BE COMPUTED NLT I JAN 04 PR:OVIDJl!llG WEAPOl!llS FROM @
JQRDAN ARRIVE. - A-\\> ~ ~ JJ. - • -
.. --2) -L +r- ) r -
. ~
- (_ . )
/-3 fO.. 0
- c ... ft .. T lM..- : ~ 0- rt G"t: ~ Ilk... ·
- ''.}Jwj- z.. 400 ,, ~~c...
- "J..J -
~ ~ d,.y ~ Lt...J..u. ~
-
•FUNDING: LfMfTED FUNDS TO PAV SAL.ARIES AND PURCAASE UNIFO~
$2...4 n L1'... ~ ~ PYCJ./-- '4 nc..J: I 1'4. -~ -(Mic. :J~ ~ cf/Q>/~
~ v.l ,.•.; ~-~~ ~f.2,c,h
vtc .

~ flfo~ Au-.-Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Proof Of Principle I ~c ca...,
1~,,~ J cn".4
. ~ °""" i..- -:y 7 b
s~-
• RESOURCE A MANAGEMENT CELL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL "'f Mor.
, "Jtca. ,,_k,... ~
• TIL\NSITION BY l~VENTS STARTING 3 OCT AND ENDING 15 JAN 04 ..c. s;,i>.
•CREATE A TRANSlTlON TEAM TO SERVE AS MINISTRIES FPS POC
L.. "-11 c... -::r;-;:..... 7 ""'P .
• SYNCHRONIZE TEAM EFFORTS,.., MTNlSTRIES TO MSC
• COMPLETE 90°/o · OF THE SITES BY 15 DEC ~
• USE CERP FUNDS UNTIL MINISTRIES ASSUME SALARIES UNTIL I JAN 04
UMf a.01-,.,1 11 '*" ti A. fl "tJ '-' - Id/ TZ>A , (Co.,.. lU< C.lat-1> If Tlie a~piratio11 that Ministries pick up all salary pay1ne1, itsfrom 1No· v03
onwards will not be realized, because:
·J
• Mi11istrles may not accept all MSC /tired FPS personnel {fl YS - & ~ 12ef~ .
• Mi11istries maJ' not he fi1lly geared up to achieve this witlli11 tlte (/esignated timefra11ie. ·

~ flfo~ Autftof~ Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
TOA Criteria
~~si\.
,/SECURITY PERSONNt:L-rRE SCREENED AND TRAINED.
,/SITES THAT ARE MONITOR ONLY, AND ANY NEW SITES, MUST HAVE AS A MINIMUM: A SITE-
BOOK (PERTINE.NT DA 1 A) AND MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MSC AGREES TO
MONITOR SITE/MINISTRY AGREES TO BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR FORCE PROTECTION)
-
~ ~ sir:...,, ~ u...ir .A.L Cov~.
-
,/FPS SITE AND EMPLOYEE DATABASE SUBMITTED TO~ L
- I-Ilk D "'-'j 5-hf/. ScJ ~ ~ dJ.t.. Jw ~1k
,/FPS EMPLOYEES PROVIDED TEMPORARY IDENTIFICATION BADGES AND RULES OF FORCE
CARDS - l'1'...A Q.V ~ ~
-
~ 'iiocf -
-C:Vr?''~~- .
,/WEAPONS CARDS FOR EACH PERSON - lt..Jbs .' a R.Jlt-;
5~6..12 _ ~ c:.. ~
~ 1Z>A--

~~~A~ Ministry of the lnte1rior ,
~'MAI Public Safety and Securff.y for All Iraqis
I Show StoPJlers I ~ . 'r; .
•Fu11di11g: . _,, ~tf,.o'.f
CAUSE -- EXCEED HIRING GOAL ESTABL1SHED~Y MINISTRY. MIN'ISTRIES
NOT ABLE TO ACCEPT SALARY PAYMENT OF NUMBERS GREATER THAN 20k 5 eut
EFFECT,.., CAUSES MSCS TO CONDUCT LAY-OFFS/FIRE EMPLOYEES LOCALLY
o1
CAUSE - UNABLE TO PURCHASE UNIFORMS '(e.~ ~ -pe-"6· , j1(
EFFECT- EMPLOYMENT OF PERSON'NEL LACK EFFEftTIVENESS t ~ /
. ••~ -4,,.-f' er
, ,..,.... ~rT" \t'
• Personnet: 15c.«A fls > ,
CAUSE -- NO C2 ELEMENT TO MANAGE FPS AT NATfONAL LEVEL , .... t~, fY\iP
CAUSE-NOCPA REPRESENATJVE@GOVERNATE LEVEL
EFFECTr- NOT AVAILABLE TO TOA SITES 10~r.. ~ ~
.) ..
-f ,, #
r" -l_,.M I
(,N"' ~ 5'"
ULTIMATE EFFECT: MILITARY FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO GUARD OR
MONITO ·SITES WELL INTO 2004 ::: e~, -:p~l&Ju JJc>-J. c.)t-t.. ~G

Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
Initiate l1:1itiatr
TOA 'l'OA
101 M MNl>SE:
lnillatt
TOA
4 Ill
Initiate
TOA
MNO CS1 82 ·\II
22 Sep
29Sep 3 Oct 15 Oct l Nov
15 Nov
I Dec ?
•
(\..;,,. :
i..J,. ~«:> .. ~ ~~ ~\)cl'(>
Establish TOA Establish Shift Ministries Mimstries 7' i T A ~
Sc l A[') ("2 C 11 S J Assume assume Salary : FPS Progr·1m \
. ·c . , e · ~ a ary I ' · '
Mangers Baghdad r W.,li t\O~ Payment Hiring/vetting/ Payment i r
Within Ministries '(: I training t'\SC.. f~ ~- :
: ,.....i:-;~ il
~,u . y I -,,,
y .r 1 lnitiatc ,
'--,.-&;.--&-+--,,,.-H1-~ t-1
_ _.,_ . TO A with i 11 ! Assimilate
Transfer ,. . ~ Sccltors ! MSf hires
Database--~"""--+-.-_..__..N'-..,,.w:.;.---+-: -------------..-' -~ ~
Show
stoppers
I
I
I
I
I
l
I
I
I
I
l •
•
Go/No Go Excess at Risk
Brief on
Natfonal TOA
[!oA is a Go if greater than 90% hav:__been TOA j

~ flfo~ Autftof~ Ministry of the Interior ·
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Course of Actions I
COA 1 COA2 * COA3 *
SECURITY ROLli' • MSCS RETAIN · J · -
. t ~ CHARACTERISTICS; TOA JS
DELA YEO UNTIL MJNISTRJ ES
HIRE FPS MANAGERS AND C2
CELL IN MOl
•MINISTRIES ASSUME SECURITY • MINISTRIES ASSUJ\lE \VITH 90
DAY UELP FROM C..'JTF7 ~
ROLE c.2
C'HAll!\CTERJSTICS; MINISTRY
ASSUMES 0 AS IS" \!VITH LITTLE
C2/STAFF
FAVORS~ MINISTRY ALLOWS
TtJgM TJME TO STANDUPTH(lj
FPS SECURITY CELLS FllOM
NATfONAl, LE'\'EL 00,VN TO
LOCAL
CHARACTERISTICS; CJTF7
AUGMENTS IN ORDER TO
JUMPSTART MOl Cl CELL,
MlNJSTRrt ~S AGGRESSIVELY
HIRE FILLS
FAVORS: MSCS ALL0"''1NG I?AVORS:
COl\fMANDERS TO SHIFT C2 ANO
MOVE INTO A MON: ITOR ONLY ROLE.
MSC & MINISTJtlES
PROBLEM; REQUIRES MSCS TO
CONTINUE TO HlRE/TRAIN/EQUJP AND C2 PROBLEM: M- INJSTRll£ S ARE NO
STRUCTURED TO ASSUM.E PROBLl ~ M: REQUIRES C.fl'F7
TO SUPPORT WITIJ
PERSONNEL. NO GUARENTEE
THAT l\'TTNISTRTES WILL HAVE
PERSONNEL AT END OF 90
DAYS

Location
National Level
~ ~~A..._"1 Ministry of the Interior
~- Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
( Personnel Resource Requirements I
Fl'S
Management CeJI
21 Personnel/OH 1
Reco111111end Su· pport
1 Supervisor (Officer -03)
I Office Assistant- (E6 up)
5 Trainers- (E 1-E5)
1~
r "~ tJJ 1 I" ry.. ,,.
v' 1'" °"
.v . ~
-
l\11 rS
~
-r~<" ·~
{) ()"-
Operations CelJ- Plans, Policy, Standards
Training Cell· Standardize & Execute Training
Logistics Cell- Ora.ft/ 1>rorure requirements
Budget Cell-Monitor & Submit purchases
FPS
Govemate Level
Transition Managers
26 Person ncl/ l 1
Implement- Plans, Policy, Standards, -----..----
coordinate Training with Mana. gemeot Cell
prcpa1·e equip1nent requirements &
submit purchases. Assume TOA
Site level fr PS
Site Managers
1156 Persoouel/onk
0

Colltfoft Pro~ Au~ Ministry of the lnte, rior
~ lfJllllt Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
li'atiliiy Protection Services Program
IU: i()nal Llwcl TOA 15 .Ian 04
rH-\SF. I.
J"AILIS'.JWtxl:
"'••ri•
l.a .. cin(M•<IAI.
·· ~-1111111)
l'llASl:I•
t;> I i\111 M!~l.ffil 1
IW'Glll(f
.... " ..
\\Iii
,,...,r ..
\buttl"
Concept
- -----1 PHASE Ill: NATIONAL LEVEL
TRANSITION: THIS PHASE JS
TENTATIVRLV S"ET FORIS.JAN 04. IT
DEPENDS ON TOA TO B~ AT LEAST 90
PERCENT COMPl,ETE. IN SOME CASES
MSCs WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT
MlASt: JI,
11! VjSII!Of\,
ll•tom-1 p
~ .....
TIER I/IA AND SOME TrER 2 SJTES
UNTIL RRLrEV'1:D UY MINISTRY TllRKS
IAW IURING GOAl.S F 'OR CY 04.
~llli'11~Sl1tt
fo)t'('
.>ll<I - IH)(l
PUASE I: ESTAHLISHMlt:NT! National Level f!'PS Managcrot~ntCell
PHASE II: TRANSITION: THIS PHASE
COl\>lMENCES 0/A 3 OCT 03 WITH 1 AD
CONDUCTING TOA ANll ENDING ON 15
JAN 04. TOA IS CONDUCTED BY
Sn'F. WITH REP.QESRNTATlVES FROM
EACH MINISTRY AND MSC
PHASE I: ESTAHLISITMENT: TB.IS BEGINS ON
DEVELOP1NG THE FJ•S STRUCTURE
NRF.DED TO MANAGE AT TH~~ NATIONAL LEVEL (fHE FPS
PROGRAM TRANSJ'rtON OF
SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS (HLJUNG, VETTING AND PAYMENT
OF SALARIES), PURCllAS~
OF UNlHORMS AND FlLLING J;'PS SECURITY MANAGERS AT
THE MINISTRY LEVF.L.
PHASE I IS COMPLY.TED WHEN EACJJ AREA IS STOOD UP.
REPRESENTATIVli ~S .
PRIORJTY OF EJ<FORT IS 1 AD,10.l AA, 4 ID,
MND CS,MND SE, 820.AB.
CJTF assists in "Jumpstarting"

L
C..Mlon flt@~ A .... ft.1 Ministry of the Interior ·
~lfiitllt Public Sa/tty and Security for All Iraqis
I Command & Control I
1156 Sites (local, Goven1 ate/National Structures)
xx~
26 Ministries
Sets Training Policy
Enforces Standards
Professional Conduct
For Minisries

~Pro~ A~ Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Command & Control I
Nation Wide
26
Military
Stove-piped

~ flfo~ A~ Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Priority Of Effort I
Ministry 1-15 Oct 15-31 Oct 1-15 Nov 15-30 Nov 1-15 Dec 15-30 Deel 1-15 Jan
A gr/culture 1AD 101 AA 410 MNDCS 82d
Cen traJ Bank 1AD 101 AA 410 MND CS 82d
Cultvre 1 AD 101AA 410 MNDCS 82d
Education 1AD 101 AA 410 MND C.S 82d
Finance 1AD 101 AA 4to MNOCS 82d
Foreign Affairs 1AD 101 AA 410 MNDCS 82d
Health 1AD 101 AA 4 ID M.ND CS 82d
Higher Education 1AD 101 AA 4,10 MNDCS 82d
Housing & Construction 1AD 101 AA 4 , m MNDCS 82d
lndustty & Minerals 1AD 101 AA 41D MNDCS 82d
Interior 1AD 101AA 4H> MNDCS 82d
Ju~ce
1AD 101 AA 410 MNDCS 82d Open Dates I -<
· abor & Soc/al Affairs 1AD 101 AA 410 MNDCS 82d
Oftlce of Security A ffalr;s 1AO 101 AA 410 MNO- CS 82d
Nat1011al Standards 1 AD 101 AA 4!'0 MNDCS 82d
Public Works 1AD 101 AA 410 MNDCS 82d
Plannltlg· 1AD 101 AA 410, MNDCS 82d
Rellglous Affairs 1AD 101 AA 410 MNDCS 82d
Scien<:e & Technology 1AD 101 AA 410 MNDCS 82d
Trade. 1AD 101 AA 410 MNOOS 82d
Trans & Communlcatiom 1AD 101 AA 410 MNDCS 82d
Water Resources · 1 AD 101AA 410 MND CS/MND SE 82d
Youth & Sports 1AD 101 AA 410 MNDCS 82d
Oil & Electric 1AD 01 AA 4. ~
Reschedules

~ fllfo~ A~ Ministry of the Interior
~ lf MlJ Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
1AD
Lessons Learned & Contention Points
D Ministries unwilling to assume MSC hires:
~ Ministry of Trade and Ministry of YS: Want to contract the service
D FPS personnel walking off and joining ICDC
» Better Pay
0 TOA 3 OCT at CPA o s· ·natures ~ Having difficulty in pro ·
. :ng TOA sheets
'Y?

~ flfo~ A~ Ministry of th Interior
~ I MRJ Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Progress Review Board I
• A review board held to resolve contentions; frequency to be determined
• Panel (4-members) review locations that are in contention
• Panel composition (2 CJTF, 2 CPA)
• Panel send recommendation to Decision Panel
{Chairman/0-10-CENTCOM and (2) Co-Chairpersons {1-CJTF, 1, CPA))
on resolution
• Co-Chairpersons provide impacts and recommendation/ vote
• Chairman serves as swing vote and decides

~ flfo~ A~ Ministry of . he Interior
~If ~ Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I
Progress Review Board
I
Sent to
Decision
Panel
Site in Contention
Ministry will not accept
Even though criteria is
being met.
Panel Review
4 member Panel reviews
Contention points and recommends
To Decision Panel
1 day Process
==----- -----l D D
Decis.ion Sent to
Ministry and MSC
CJTF7
Decision Panel
Maintain on site
Or move to monitor & support Must have 2 : 1 Decision in Favor of recommendation
1 day Process ·- - -. - -1
. '

~ Pfo~ Autftof"' Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I WayAhead I
~Brief Commanding General and obtain approval
~ Issue FRAGO directing execution. of Transition
~ Commence Transition 3 Oct (1 AD Lessons l .. earned)
.
,, vr-
~ \ ,, . ~
v,,.. t1 . :\~'"' ~ ~ Estabhsh C2 Cell 15 Oct
: .f, ,,, 1t'f s /
.:11 'YJ.1conduct Periodic Updates to the Commanding General
(._"J. ~ C. _l:
; \"\ ~~ ,,
,. \V' '~ c,' .. » ~ Develop Conceptual Plan to incorporate co11tract support
t'o~ ./
(j~ ~ ~ t""

•• 1 ~ A@~.A,ultottf.r Ministry of the Interior
f ~lfil!IR/ Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
. l ~ ;"
Facts/ As, sumptions
---~ "' I I
• FACTS
- FOLLOW-ON FORCES WILL HAVE LIESS MANPOWER
- MINISTRIES ARE LIMITED TO COMBINE 20,000 FPS CAP UNTIL 1JAN04
(DROVE BY FUNDING UMITS)
- MtNISTRIES ARE RESPONSIBLE TO ASSUME SALARY PAYMENT 1DEC04
- MSCS MAKE FINAL PAYMENT SALARY 1 NOV (COVERS OCT)
- FPS. PROGRAM IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MINISTRIES
- CURRENTL. Yt CPA-FPS IS NOT STRUCTURED TO TAKE. ON FPS SECURITY
- 3 OCT 031 AD INITIATES THE TOA PROCESS IN BAGHDAD
- MINISTRY OF TRADE DOES NOT WANT MSC FPS HIRES COUNTRY WIDE
- MINISTRY OF YOUTH DOES NOT WANT MSC FPS HIRES IN BAGHDAD

Colttttoft flfoWs:loMf Autftwft1 Ministry of the Interior
~lrllR{ Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Concept I

~ flfo~ A~ Ministry of the Interior
~ IMRf Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Facts/ Assum]Jtionsco111. I
• ASSUMPTIONS
- FOLLOW-ON FORCES WJLL HAVE SUFFICIENT MANPOWER TO COVER SITES NOT
COMPLETED
- NATIONA LEVEL TOA WILL BE ON 15 JAN 04
- WITHIN 30 DAYS CPA/FPS WILL HAVE THE STRUCTURE TO TAKE ON FPS SECURITY
- MINISTRIES WILL HAVE THE AB~LITY TO CONDUCT TOA
- MINISTRIES WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR MSC HIRES NL T 15
JAN 04 (NATIONAL TOA)
- CERP MONIES WILL BE AVAILABLE UNTIL 1 JAN IOT PAY MSC POSITIONS UNTIL TOA
- MSC WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT CERP FUNDS TO PAY SALARIES
- MINISTRIES ASSUME PURCHASE OF UNIFORMS 1 JAN
- 50% OF THE MINISTRIES ARE STA1 FFEO WITH FPS MANAGERS
- CONTRACTORS CAN ABSORB MSC HIRES
- PERSONNEL NOT RETAINED BY FPS CAN SHIFT INTO IC.DC

~"°~A~ Ministry of the Interior
~lfRRt Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Concept I
TRANSITION ' IS CONDUCTED OVER THTtEE PHASES AND IS EVENT DRIVEN AND
\\/ll,t, llUN SIMULTANOUSELY TO EACH OTHER
PHASE 1: ESTABLISHMENT: TRlS HEGINS ON DEVELOPING THE FPS STRUCTURE
NEEDED TO MANAGE AT TEIE NATIONAL LEVEL (THF: FPS PROGRAM Tl~ANSITION OF
SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS (HIRJNG, VETTING AND J•AYIVU~NT OF SALARIES), PUHCHASli
011~ UNI lt'ORMS AND FILLING FPS SECURITY MANAGERS AT TRE MINISTRY LEVEL~
PHASE I IS COMPLETED WHEN EACH AK~ ~ A IS STOOD UP.
PHASE LI: TRANSITION: TIDS PHASE COMMENCES O/A 3 OCT 03
\''lTH 1 AD CONDU CTING TOA AND ENDING ON 15 .JAN 04. TOA IS CONDUC'rED BY
SITE WITH RE.PRESENTATIVES FllOM EACH MfNISTRY AND MSC REPRJ ~SJ ~NTATIVES.
PIUOIUTY OF EFFORT IS l AD,101 AA, 4 ID, MND CS, MND SE, 82D AB.
PHASE lll: NATIONAL LEVEL TRANSITION: TUJS PHASE rs TENTATIVELY SET FOil
lS .JAN 04. IT DEPENDS ON TOA TO BE AT LEAST 90 PERCENT COMPLETE. lN SOME
CASES MSCs \>VILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT TlER 1 /I A AND SOME TrER 2 SITES UNTIL
RELIEVED BV MlNISTRYHIRESTA\~ HJRING GOALS li'ORCY04.

~ flfo~ A~ Ministry of the Interior
~ lf/flll/ Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Specified Task I
• CONDUCT TOA FROM MSCS TO MINISTRIES
• PROVIDE SUPPORT TO MINISTRIES
• PROVIDE SECURITY COVERAGE (ESTABLISH LOCAL STAND-OFF

~Pro~ A~ Ministry of the Interior ·
~ t rrm, Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Implied Task(s) I
• PREP.ARE FRAGO THAT WILL PROVIDE. DIRECTION FOR TOA
• CONTINUE TO PROVIDE COALITION GUARDS AT TIER 1 SITES THAT CAN NOT BE
TRANSITIONED (COMMANDERS ASSESS OTHER LOCATIONS GUARD V.
MONITOR)
• TRANSITION OF SALARIES CONDUCT AS SITES COMPLETE TOA PROCESS
• ENSURE HAND-OFF OF DATA BASE FOR EACH SITE
• ENSURE SUFFICIENT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE (MINISTRIES HAVE SUFFICIENT
PAY DOLLARS/CERP FUNDS
• ENSURE GUARDS ARE PROPERLY VETTED/TRAINED IAW MINISTRY STANDARDS
• ENSURE GUARDS ARE PROPERLY EQUIPPED (UNIFORM/WEAPON)

Co1Mfoft l'fo~ Autftof4'1 Ministry of the Interior
· ~tr~ Public Safety and Security tor All Iraqis
Task & Purpose
T1: Conduct Transition of Authority of Ministry Sites
P1: IOT transition security from CJTF7 to the Iraqi Government and establish local
standoff
T2: Conduct Support. OperaUons to the Ministries
P2: IOT to support the sustainment of a, safe and secure environment
TJ: Conduct Site Security of Critical Sites
P3: IOT to safeguard critical sites

ColMloft Pto~ Autftofftf Ministry of the Interior
~lrtflllt Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I I
6550 Required
7000 ----------~::;i.....__------------.
6000 -+------------~-----=~-------I
5000 ~---------~------------!
4000 -+------------ · -------1
1423
3000 -l--------l~P-------Jlf'--------"--; ----/~06 .......... 3-----t
2000 ~ ______ __,___; :;__ ___ __::-
, ___ -I
1000 ~---= ., -=- ------c:.:::..._
__________ -----!
0 -+-----.---- ~~--,-~~~~-.-~~~~-
CURRENT OCT NOV DEC
1-. Requirement Issue ........_ Cummlative I
Based of 1 :3 Ilatio for 19 ,650

Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
The WayAhead
I (Mal)
Col [' i(CJTF-7)
BG Gallinetti (Chief of Staff)

UNCLASSIFIED
FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)
(5) TF's will ensure and verify that each subordinate unit has conducted appropriate right seat
and left seat rides with the FPS hirees at each site. No unit is authorized to pull U.S. troops off of
currently manned sites until approved by BOE. No unit is authorized to pull U.S. troops off designated
sites {see attachment 1) until approved by the BOE COR.
(6) TF's will ensure, by the presence of a unit representative able to identify their hirees. that the
designated number of hirees attend training on the appropriate dates as follows. The μnit representative
w ill coordinate w ith the BRT to accompany them for initial link up and screening/class roster on the first
day of class. and will c oordinate with the BRT for a location and time following graduation {e.g. the
following morning at 0900) to allocate and direcVtransport trained FPS to each site.
5-6 JUL 03
401
" EN 80
1-35 AR 40
7-6 JUL 03
1-35 AR 120
9-10JUL03
1-6 IN 60
2-6 IN 60
12-13 JUL 03
4-27 FA 60
401
" EN 60
(7) Payment Instructions:
(a) Payment is according to the following guidelines for payment of FPS (TF CDRs do not
have the authority to exceed these guidelines);
HOURS GUARD SHIFT SITE
SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR
24hrs/week $50/month $60/month $70/month
36hrs/week $70/month $60Jmonth $90/month
46hrs/week $100/month $110/month $120/month
(b) Payment schedules will be designated by the TF. TF's will identify, on orders (see
attachment 3) a Certifying Officer/ Project Procurement Officer for the CERP funds utilized for payment of
the FPS salaries. TF's will use attachment 5 and SF 1034 for payment trackin9.
(c) Payment Agents will retain the original SF 1034's and rosters (see attachment 4 ). Copies
of the completed SF 1034's and roster will be retained by the Certifying Officer and copies will be
forwarded to the BOE FPS project officer NL T the last day of each month.
(6) Uniforms:
(a) Interim Uniforms are being contracted by BDE and will be distributed as received (o/a 10
JUL 03).
{b) Uniform requirements will be turned in by the TF's as part of attachment 2. Uniform sizes
can be in U.S. or Iraqi size equivalent.
2
UNCLASSIFIED

...
UNCLASSIFIED
FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)
(9) Weapons: The requirement for weapons 1s one weapon per guard position (e.g. a guard
position with 3 guards covering a 24 hour period in 3 shifts will be authorized one weapon), or . one
weapon for a tier 3 site.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. POC for this order is CPT XXXXXX. 2BCT FPS Project Officer. ONVT
r-- jorrx" I
ACKNOWLEOGE
r
COL
OFF· ICIAL
S3
ANNEXES
Attachment 1
Attachment 2
Attachment 3
Attachment 4
2bctMASTERSITELIST for distro
FPS Site Employment Roster
Duly Appointment for Certifying Offic€r
FPS Payment Roster
3
UNCLASSIFIED

FPS RECOMMENDED SITES
llllt1
IHT ZONE 9m! ~NAllE
........ . .....
HOURllOP •Of' •OI,,,., -
Im: GNOlll!lldlC- COWIWill GUARDS CUW!Nn. •A
DESCRIPTION DIGl1) PIRDAY
lllZG4 RVREU
-
~y
2-61N Pf003N!Polnt Moron MB S17ll04 e t 1
Elecfrlc/ly
2-d 111 r11A llluaskat Power P/anr CGm;n/sslon 1118'90lf 24 27 3
2-61N 321() P-TNl!lomw Qlc!ricKy 1.48 557739 8 4 1
Commission - --
2-6 IH 3W Pov.Et T~$1otme<
Eledridly MB 567 742 8 4 1
CommlSSlo!1
s..:111c11y
241/i 11/A S.,lldad Po-,.,.,,, 1118490135 .u ZT 1
Co/tlmlsslorl
2-61N 4g,,; p,,..... frRnsfomier Electlicity MB 525796 8 4 1
CommlssiOl1
2-6lN II/A Rashe«l M~lll'Y HCdPillll fi!a!Heallh MB •9!>826 74 12 l
~--
.
2-f>IN 1118 Medoc;il VIP Waro MolHo>ollh M.849'821 24 12 3
NllH 41111 lraf9t" Tl8al,,,.,,tFMlllry .,.,., dislslbu!ion 11ss35n3 14 fZ J
l~AR Silhlve ~· a.an~ I;! of Finallal MB434Bn 8 1 1
1-6 IN Ba11>d3d ttuOtlar fuel ~ Mof~ MB 44756340 16 21 3
1~1N RJOl ll;t'* ... cl FilWD! MB 441186401 24 12 3
1-6 IN Laroe Gas S1111io!i M of Oil MB«8833 9 7 1
l~IN ~ Gas Slallon M of Oil MB464650 9 3 1
1.{)IN Mezl>a Bal>k M Of Finance MB473&15 8 3 I
1-411N w.,., WOrlr• 111845PIJ2 .u • 1
1-6 IN Childtren's HOISPlll M Qf lielllll M849085S 24 15 ~
1-61N Bab• Gas Slallon MOIOll MB44838l39 20 11 2
1-61N Kar&dan S1 F\3pliae1Hoec:lo~J
M ofHeeltn MB 46308561 24 15 3
1-61N BabU Mlnislly or F1113nce Free Zone Md Fina~ MB 474411£4'! 24 9 3
1·35AR Kll1dl Olntc: ~"1o1Heehh MB40813853J6
2~
8 3
1-3SAR Klndl Olnic M1nol~llh MB 40908695 ~ 9 3
1-3SAR T9$1v1!e Clioc Min of Heall!> M84~098~ 2.C • 3
Attatc:hment 1 to FRAGO 3 lo 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)
Bold Ital/cs denote sites to be relieved only with BOE COR approval

1-3SAA Ta~hree Clinic Mmo(Heetth ~B«•285n 2• t 3
1-3 ~AA S&ll'li)'8 CARl>\lC HOSPIT~ "lll>OIHNl!h M84Jt6787737 2• 9 3
l-35AR Salh'l)'9 TEl.EPHONE COMPANY Min r:l kl!O<lllilllOn MS429Qa768 24 t 3
4-71FA ,,._,,.11ar
~· T/\Nll!lont Faclllty 61841311974 2" 12 3
-
H7FA l<etth Al Ra~O Ba!ik M olf" 11111nce MB 428881).42 24 24 3
---
4·27 F" Al Alam Al K.arome H-.,i i.loF'Hullh l,IB 4 210ll810 24 12 3
4..27FA Mal>allat Al l<'.aftJ> . Pulll!C Ho$pital LIQ(Heatth MB~0948974 24 15 3
._Z7FA l'ilt>slon Bulldlng 1118 'JOSH75 u u 12
4-27F A $oul11Gl>C• IWB'1IOl"'1 24 12 J
~-27 FA KAM G<IS Sia•IOll M 610!1 MB428 878 8 • 1
4•2HA Raily.iro Gas Station Mo! Oii !.16403692 8 5 1
4·27 FA Jariald GAS STATtON.ll2 Mor Qi! M8 413 866 16 34 2
Hn'M,
Allatcliment 1 to FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)
Bold lra//cs detoole si1es lo be relieved only with BOE CDR approval

'IBI
RillUIED IGF""
HOURS OF IOF IOF ... ......
UNJ1' ZONE 8llE SITEIWR Im! Gfll> llNllMI Ct -- CUlllBITL .... ..• ····-
llUCllPTlON lllGITI PllitW.Y
--
ltllllM
HOURS ....
2-6 1N 49/G Old Nnma CQll«.1lM Polnl (ACPJ M OI OllenM MB52S805 24 12 3
2.a IN 111A Al NUmin ~ ~ 8'ICI llR•Feclo<y M OIOl!eftle MB 494 8l4 - 24 12 3
N IN JW ~Ai •ltd Slo Rxh Cir, Tuwllll.t fll "'At()m/C
,,_
11185#7~ • ' 1
UIN 32.() Bact.decl IM:ltat ~ Feolily M Cl AltJtrtC Eller0 M8$35 741 8 4 1
2-6~ 491G Nudear~eei. M cl AIOI!.: EllelQj M6~ll05 2" ,. 3
2~1M 4Mf Nuclear Reasoirdl C.... MOIAlonlc~
waS20n8 8 4 1
2-6 IN 48/H Boal Uindin\) Fadllly Md Ti Ma s11n1 8 4 ,
2-41H ~~$/llt ll ol ~ "'84Tlff u u 1
2-6 IN Bao*ldad 8artae:lc$ Sd1ClOI BOE HO Mo!Ollense 1.18506839 24 12 3
IW olAromlc
24"' JW Yllllow c.Ae FKIOfy MS5U722 lA Jt 3
EIMrvY
"'5toricel
40!hEN ~, MOOOJllltl'll 10 Ftlen $a<llers M8431&$ 2A • 3
mor'ilimetll
M d Higher
!-6 1N 10 un1vtRi1y E.rllranc:e CP 1 M6428282S1 24 15 3
Eduallf<ltl
l-6 1N 10
M dHIQhe<
Un~Enlian<:9CP 2 M B43018239 24 15 3
EdlobQn
1-6 IN 10
MoHligtw
Unt~•y Enlnlnce CP 3 Educaficn M8 41948278 24 15 '
HSIN 14 UnMlSlly cl T~ M OI~
MB~ 2• ,. 8
~
4.-rT FA tniql Hriotwil - llolQllWle tlB 4290'7t0 lA "' J
·~·-
Atlatchment 1 lo FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03·204 (FPS)
Bol<l IC.llcs denote sites lo be relieved only with BOE CDR approval

,..
--OP tOF . .,, ... -
- ......
UNIT JOlllf 91111 llTlllllAlll SIT£ mu ..... -
~ II.A • a •
DESCIP?IOli DICllTJ ,..Ol'V ....., 1•-
= llYlala
1·15AR ,. ..... ,.,a1,............,,, Molltlf"""""°" 111 . B 4277&756 24 ' 3
- -
- -
,_
l~AR ....... olF'OfW9>,.,..... M o! ~~ 1184~ " • 3
1·36AR °"" 9olllGI M al EduGl'1ltln I ..S«l870 ~ • !
-
1 ·35AA
~
1-~AR !Ci!d
SCIOOt~
1-JS>.R Kllldi Sd'Cld~~
Mei- M84J$&71 24 ' '
Mrislly or MDoll" l 11 tiroeun
- -1 · ~·
24 ' J
M IJ.l 130UIS2••
M io a Ed.lcanon MB41""""5236 2A t 3
E~llon
1·3SAR Kr.di
~
M io al Educauon MIMQal!6!15?'1 24 I 3
1·3!">AR Kindl Aps1me<li Cc:irrc>lex Enva"°" ~dH®~ng MIW3506$Z0 24 18 3
1·3S-'R KilnO
~r.w-m MEMo6o 6 ~30 2'4 • J
1~AR &lh)ll iAAOJ l'AAI IANEHl -a4.Jusla MEM2blll'I08 24 • J
. .
h35AR
SI~ flAGl1[)j\!) l11EA TER Mll4llMIW19 ZA • 3
t-35AR s.ir.ra ~ Sllacprl>o Plm:a M&4;)47812• 24 10 4
41/EN Z.!11191 Zoo 1118 42'f "' ,, ,~
2-elN ti/A .. ll<I ~ TCP Mil •11 18J6 e 4 I
2-6 IN
• I>~ -1 1 ~1Si<t MB•ll4e1e 8 • I
1.0IN 13
1.1 or Ed\atiOn MB • ~ e I 1
t-Sc~
t-6 IN lJ Natlil ,SCfiOO t.I of Edut:a:m Mii 460211441 8 1 1
1-6 IN 13
!-! or E<Malion Mii 4'97835!1 8 1 1
1-6JN 13
tJ of Educa!lon M B 4S791l39& e 1 )
1-e IN 13 v.rim ....... C..lllof"' Sd'.ool M<llEdUealiotl M B 45968:3.96 Ii 1 1
~""'" ~$qj'il;ld
1-61 N 13 Al-1<~1 SchOOI M of Edllctiiion M 04&996394 8 1 I
1-61 N 13
M cl EdUcal • on MB 47761U~ 9 8 1 I
'""""""'~Sdiool
~
Atlalchmenl 110 FRAGO 3 lo 28CT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)
Bold hallcs denote r.i1es to be relieved only wirh BOE CDFI approval

1"1>1N t3 S)'(lan C8lheft<: Sdi<Xi IA cl E.tfocsbOn M9466856
·1 24 • 3
1-6~ 13 lNllll!W Fldory M9453e3S 24 • 3
1-1>1N 13 Cva<-Fadoty M8452831 24 • 3
HHN 13 ~ol!Oly
MB4568a2 24 • )
I-GIN ~3 Virgin IM'Y Olord! M94599839S 24 • 3
HllN 13 Syna n C..V..ii: 0-.irc!I MB41i68· 56 24 • 3
Hi IN 13 S1 Ma!l<s Calhohc Cl'iu<t:h MB'62856 24 • 3
I-GIN 14 Duldl EmbaMy 24 12 3
-
-
4·27 FA Ra1fy;<d \/'i«rit Food Wmel-Qlse t.164061~5
24 IS 3
4-27FA Rail)ard warenc.ises MB 40588935 24 24 3
4·27 FA Mw>lslry cl Cuhuie end T CUOStn MB 42008840 24 18 3
4·27FA Mlno$lfY OI lnlomiafiQn MB 43308810 24 le
3
I
4·27 FA GlrlsHl;ti scrlOOI MB42668912 24 • 3
H7FA Lzwyer eor-n1on Ce<lle< MB 407(1868() 2• 12 3
4-21 FA Gotls Hl(ji Scnca 1\18 3\HJ7864e 24 3 3
"RTl',M.
Attatchment 1 to FRAGO 3 lo 2BCT OPORD 0. 3-204 (FPS)
Bold Ital/cs denote sites ta be relie~ only 'Witti BOE CDR approval

~ -..>-l J .. :;; .. :~.'. l .
SITE:
•GRIDLOC:
DATE STARTED HRS/WEEK DAYS MISSED HATSIZE SHIRTS. IZE PANT SIZE SHOESIZE
Shift 1 NAME DATE STARTED HRS/WEEK DAYS MISSED HAT SIZE SHIRT SIZE PANT SIZE SHOE SIZE
Shift2 NAME DATE STARTED HRS/WE.EK DAYS MISSED HAT SIZE SHIRT SIZE PANT SIZE SHOE SIZE
Shift3 NAME DATE STARTED HRS/WEEK DAYS MISSED HAT SIZE SHIRT SIZE PANT SIZE SHOE SIZE
ATTACHMENT 2 TO FRAGO 3 lo 2BCT OPORD 03·204 (FPS)

Attachment 3 to FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division
Unit 23704
APOAE09034
OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Duty Appointment, Certifying Officer
L Effective inunediately, CERTIFYING OFFICERS RANK, FULL NAME, SSN, and UNIT is appointed to the
following duty: Certifying Officer to TF COMMANDERS RANK, FULL NAME, and UNIT.
2. Above individual is authorized to certify SF 1034's for the purpose of paying Facility Protection Services Forces
from the BDE Commander's Emergency Response Fund.
3. POC is XXXXXXX at xxx-xxxx.
CERTIFYING OFFICER
CPT, IN
Certifying Officer
TF COMMANDER
LTC, ii'~
Connnanding
DISTRIBUTION:
Individual
S4, znd BDE, l" Armored Division
Cdr, glh Finance Battalion (FWD)
08, l" Armored Division

r
I
I Attachment 3 to FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division
Unit 23704
APOAE09034
AETV-THO
01JUL03
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Delegation of Duty Appointment, Certifying Officer
I. Effective inunediately TF Commanders within my command are authorized to appoint, on orders, Certifying
Officers for the express purpose of certifying SF 1034's for the purpose of paying Facility Protection Services~
from the BDE Commander's Emergency Response Fund.
2. POC is XXXXXXX at xxx-xxxx.
COL, IN
Commanding
DISTRIBUTION:
Individual
S4, 2nd BDE, 151 Armored Division
Cdr, glh Finance Battalion (FWD)
08, l '1 Armored Division

- -
TRANSLAT SALARY -
PAYME PAY STATUS
Shift 3 NAME OR ASSIGN PHOTOGRAPH HRsrNEEK NT AMOUNT PAID (e.g. Currently
STATUS ED DATE being paid/
(YIN) not being paid)
ATIACHMENT 4 TO FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORO 03-204 (FPS)

SITE:
GRIDLOC:
TRANSLAT SALARY
OR
STATUS ASSIGN PHOTOGRAPH HRS/WEEK
(YIN) ED
PAYME PAY STATUS
NT AMOUNT PAID (e.g: Curr~ntly
DATE being paid I
not being paid)
Shift 1 NAME
TRANSLA T SALARY
OR
STATUS ASSIGN PHOTOGRAPH HRS/WEEK
(Y/N) ED
PAYME PAY STATUS
NT AMOUNT PAID (e.g: Curr~tly
DATE being paid I
not being paid)
Shift 2 NAME
TRANSLAT SALARY
OR
STATUS ASSIGN PHOTOGRAPH HRS/WEEK
(Y/N) ED
PAYME PAY STATUS
NT AMOUNT PAID (e.g: Curr~ntly
DA TE bemg paid I
not being paid)
ATTACHMENT 4 TO FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)

UNCLASSIFIED
Headquarters, 2BCT, 1 AD
Baghdad, Iraq
011300JUL03
FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)
References:
a. FRAGO 249A [Modification 7 to recruitment for establishment of the Facility Protection Security
Force) to OPORD 03-215 [Iron Stability)
b. 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (Establishment of FPSF), 1 OJUN03
c. FRAGO 071A (Recruitment for Establishment of the Facility Protection Security Force) to 1AD
OPORD 03-215 (Iron Stability), 05JUN03
d. FRAGO 089A (Mod 1to1AD FRAGO 071A), 07JUN03
e. FRAGO 101A (Mod 2 to 1AD FRAGO 071A), 08JUN03
f. FRAGO 114A (Mod 3 to 1AD FRAGO 071A), 09JUN03
g. FRAGO 122A_l~-~.!.~;D FRAGO 071A), 10JUN03
h. Meeting with ---Ministry of Interior, 14JUN03
1. SITUATION. (No Change.)
2. MISSION. (No Change.)
3. EXECUTION.
a. Commander's Intent. (No Change.)
b. Concept of the Operation. (No Change.)
c. Tasks to Subordinate Units. (No Change.)
d. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Task Force Commanders are responsible for establishing the command and control structure
of each site in their respective AOR's.
(2) TF's will recommend the number of translators per site using the following criteria (note:
Translators may not exceed two (2) per site.):
1. Number of Guards per shift.
2. Nature of the Location (e.g. threat)
3. Size of the Site (e.g. visibility)
4. Experience level of the Guards.
5. Tier priority of the Site (e.g. 1,2,3)
6. Other factors as determined by the TF Commander.
(3) TF's will update the 2bctMASTERSITELIST for distro (see attachment 1) with Shift
Supervisor names NL T 030BOOJUL03 and 0800 every Thursday thereafter.
(4) TF's will submit a by name list of hirees per site upon completion of left seat ride at the site.
(see attachment 2)
UNCLASSIFIED

---y COVER PAGE
FORMATION OF THE NEW IRAQI ARMY
JUNE 2003
PAGE 1
FORMATION OF THE NEW I~AQI ARMY
INTRODUCTION:
L THE IRAQIS, AFTER THE FORMER REGIME, MUST PROVE THEIR
GENUINE NATURE BY OVERCOMING THE PRESE.NT SITUATION
WITH OPTIMISM IN ORDER TO BUILD THE BRIGHT FUTURE OF
THEIR COUNTRY AND ARMY, AND TO MINIMIZE THE NEGATIVE
EFFECT OF DISMANTLING THE FORMER IRAQI ARMY ON THE
IRAQI PERSONALITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE IRAQIS MUST
DO THIS LEARNING FROM THE HISTORY OF OTHER NATIONS
THAT HAVE GONE THROUGH SIMILAR EXPERIENCES.
2. IRAQ IS ABLE TO REALIZE SOME OF THE GOALS LJSING ITS
VARIOUS CAP. ABILITIES. HOWEVER, CERTA.IN GOALS MUST Bf::
ACCOMPLISHED BY THE USE OF ARMED FORCES. WITH ARMED
FORCES IRAQ CAN DIRECTLY REPEL AND CONTAIN ANY HOSTILE
ATTACK OR ANY THREAT TO ITS NATIONAL SECURITY'. ALL
THIS IS POSSIBLE IF IRAQ HAS SUFFICIENT POWER.
PURPOSE:
3. THE PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT IS TO OFFER A SPECIAL AND
BRIEF STUDY ABOUT THE FORMATION OF THE NEW IRAQI ARMY,
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING SPECIFICATIONS:
A. AN ARMY WITH DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES.
B. AN ARMY REMOVED FROM POLITICS AND CLEAN WITH ITS
ELEMENTS .
C. ITS SIZE IS SIMILAR TO THE SIZE OF THE IRAQI ARMY
BEFORE THE FORMER REGIME.
D. CONTEMPORARY ARMY, FROM THE ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT
AND TRAINING PERSPECTIVES .
a ABSOLUTELY HAS NO MILITIA COMPONENT.
PAGE 2

COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION AND BALANCE:
4. IN ORDER TO EXERCISE THE FULL RANGE OF THE NEW IRAQI
ARMY, IRAQ MUST OWN ORGANIZED AND BAL~NCED LAND
(INFANTRY) FORCES, AIR FORCES, AND COAST GUARD FORCES
THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH ITS SPECIAL NEEDS. EACH OF
THESE FORCES HAS ITS OWN CAPABILITIES, IN SUCH A WAY
THAT NO ONE FORCE CAN BE TASKED OF CARRYING ALL THE
RESPONSIBILITIES .
5. BASIC ELEMENTS OF ORGANIZING DEfENSE AT THE HIGHER
LEVELS:
A. POLITICAL AUTHORITY: CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONS
REQUIRE THAT THE HEAD OF STATE IS (KING -
PRESIDENT) THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES. IN
OTHER COUNTRIES' CONSTITUTIONS, THE HIGHER
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE IS CARRIED BY
THE PRIME MINISTER, INDIVIDUALLY (BEING THE HEAD
OF' THE EXE:C:U'T'TVE AUTHORITY} OR BY THE MINISTERIAL
COUNCIL AS A GROUP. AS FOR THE PERSON WHO WOULD
HOLD THE POSITION Of DEFENSE MINISTER (EITHER A
CIVILIAN OR RETIRED MILITARY OFFICER) HE WOULD BE
CONSIDERED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, RELATIVE TO
DEFENSE POLICY MATTERS. CONSEQUENTLY, HE WOULD BE
IN CHARGE OF THE MANAGEMENT, CONTROL AND
EXECUTION OF DEFENSE POLICY . DESPITE THAT, ALL
POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE MADE BY THE MINISTERIAL
COUNCIL.
B. MINISTRY HEADQUARTERS: THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE
DEFENSE M~NISTRY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF NECESSARY DAILY WORK.
C. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF COMMAND: THIS TS HF..ADF:D RY
THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, THE AIR FORCE COMMAND IS
LINKE:D TO IT AS WELL AS TRE COMMANDS OF DIVISIONS
AND COAST GUARDS.
ROLES AND TASKS:
6. ABILITY TO REPEL FOREIGN ATTACK: THE LAND FORCE
CARRIES THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND
CONTINUOUS MAINTENANCE OF THE LAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF
IMPOSING THE NATIONAL NEED ON THE PEOPLE AND THE
DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND AGAINST ANY HOSTILE ATTACK.
THE LAND FORCE (INFANTRY) IS DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR

COMBAT AND FOR REPELLING OF RELATIVELY LARGE HOSTILE
LAND FORCES, AS WELL AS DEFENDING IMPORTANT STRATEGIC
AREAS.
PAGE 3
7. PROVIDING HIGH LEVEL OF SECURITY AT HOME: THE LAND
FORCES PROTECTS THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF IRAQ WITHIN
ITS G~OGRAPHIC BOARDERS AS NEEDED.
8. THE INFANTRY FORCE DEPENDS ON THE AIR FORCE IN GETTING
AIR SUPPORT, RECONNAISSANCE AND AIR DEFENSE, IN
ADDITION TO AIR TRANSPORT OF SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS.
9. THE AIR FQRCE ORGANIZES AND OPERATES WITH THE
EXPECTATION OF FULFILLING WHAT IS NEEDED OF IT, BY
ACQUIRING AND USING FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, INFANTRY SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT, AIR TRANSPORT, HELICOPTERS AND AIR DEFENSE
AIRCRAFT.
10. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COAST GUARD IS TO PROTECT
IRAQI PORTS OVERLOOKING THE GULF.
SIZE OF FORCES:
11. IN DETERMINING THE SIZE OF THE NEW IRAQ ARMY WE TOOK
THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS INTO ACCOUNT:
A. FIRST ASSUMPTION: TO ENSURE THE REPELLING OF
FOREIGN ATTACKS, WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE WORST
CASE SCENARIO, WHICH IS FACING THE THREAT FROM
THE EAST (1200 KM). THIS REQUIRES AN ACTIVE LAND
FORCE NOT LESS THAN FIVE DIVISIONS. IN THIS CASE,
THE EFFECT OF VARIATION OF TOPOGRAPHIC AXES ON
THE QUALITY (TYPE) OF UNITS MUST BE CONSIDERED.
B. SECOND ASSUMPTION: TO GUARANTEE THE INTERNAL
SECURITY THE FOLLOWING TWO MEASURES MUST BE
ADOPTED.
FIRST: SIZE OF LAND SPACE / PROVINCES' GEOGRAPHIC
BORDERS.
SECURITY.
SECOND: THE SIZE OF POTENTIAL THREAT TO INTERNAL
THE ABOVE TWO MEASURES REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF A
FORCE NOT LESS THAN FIVE DIVISIONS IN ORDER TO

REPEL THE THREATENING FORCE. THIS FORCE IS
SIMILAR TO THE ONE MENTIONED IN ASSUMPTION ONE
ABOVE.
C. THIRD ASSUMPTION: IN CASE OF THE REALIZATION OF
ONE OF THE ABOVE TWO ASSUMPTIONS, WE SEE THE NEED
FOR COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE ALLIED
FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA. IN ADDITION, THERE IS A NEED FOR THE
ADOPTION OF AN ADVANCED MOBILIZATION SYSTEM TO
DEAL WITH THE SHORTAGE OF THE ACTIVE FORCES, AS
WELL AS FOR INSURING WELL-TRAINED RESERVE FORCE.
0. FOURTH ASSUMPTION; IN ORDER TO MAIN TA.IN RAPID
INTERVENTION (DEPLOYMENT) FORCE THERE HAS TO BE
AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE TO BE USED AS A FAST GENERAL
RESERVE IN THE HAND OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND.
12. COMPARISON or QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ADVANTAGES;
A. QUANTITATIVE ADVANTAGES:
FIRST: OPERATION IRAQ FREEDOM HAS PROVED THAT GOOD
ARMED FORCES, NOT LARGE ARMED FORCES, IS WHAT WINS
THE BATTLE. THIS CONCEPT IS VERY TROE; VERY LARGE
FORCES REPRESENT A DRAIN ON HUMAN, MATERIAL AND
FINANCIAL RESOURCES, AND THIS REDUC8S THE VALUE OF
NATIONAL SECURITY INSTEAD OF ENHANCING IT.
SECOND: THE MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY THROUGH ADVANCED
MOBILIZATION SYSTEM MAY ADD TO THE ACTIVE FORCES
POSITIVE ELEMENTS. DESPITE THE VARIATION OF THESE
SYSTEMS FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER, MOST COUNTRIES
USUALLY MAINTAIN SMALL, PERMANENT ACTIVE ARMIE:S,
WHILE THEY DEPEND ON COMPLETING THEIR STRUCTUFAT,
UNITS IN A VERY SHORT TIME WITH SKILLED RESERVE
E"'ORCE.
B. QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGES:
FIRST: ABSOLUTE NUMBERS ARE MISLEADING MOST OF THE
TIME. INDIVIDUALS' EFFECTIVENESS IS EQUAL IN
IMPORTANCE TO NUMBERS. CULTURE AND NATIONAL MODE,
SUCH AS WHETHER THE PEOPLE ARE PEACE OR WAR LOVERS,
OR NEUTRAL OR INEFFECTIVE PROVIDES ONLY ONE
INDICATOR. WHILE DISCIPLINE, LOYALTY, CHALLENGING
SPIRIT AND HIGH MORAL, INCLUDING ONE'S ATTITUDE

TOWARDS MILITARY SERVICE ARE ALL TOGETHER ANOTHER
INDICATOR.
SECOND: NAT10NAL INTELLIGENCE, CULTURE, AGE AND
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BUILT, TOUGHNESS AND
ABILITY TO WORK UNDER VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO
KEEP CALM UNDER PRESSURE, AND ABOVE ALL, EFFECTIVE
LEADERSHIP ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT DISTINGUISH
THE HUMAN RESOORCES OE' A NATION. TRAINING AND BATTLE
EXPERIENCE AFFECTS THE FINAL RESULTS AND THE QUALITY
OF PEOPLE.
PAGE 5
C. THE SYSTEM OF SELECTING AN OPERATION: MODERN ARMIES
DEPEND ON AN ADVANCED SELECTION SYSTEM FOR CHOOSING
(OFFICERS AND ENLISTED) AND OTHER ELEMENTS, FOR THE
REALIZATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OE' THE APPROPRIATE MAN AT
THE APPROPRIATE PLACE. DOE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
ADOPTING THE CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM (100%) FOR THE ENTIRE
RECRUITS OF THE NEW IRAQI ARMY, AND TO GUARANTEE
MAKING THIS ARMY BALANCED AND MODERATE, AND TO INCLUDE
ALL SECTORS OF THE IRAQI J?EOPLE WITHOUT
DISCRIMINATION, IT IS INEVITABLE THAT ALL INDIVIDUALS
WISHING TO BE RECRUITED (INCLUDING OFFICERS AND
ENLISTED, WHF.THER THEY ARE RETIREES, OR THOSE WHO WERE
IN THE SERVICE BEFORE THE DISSOLVING OF THE ARMY, IN
ADDITION TO CIVILIANS AND CITIZENS WHO WISH TO JOIN)
TO PASS THROUGH A STAGE OF SELECTING WITHOUT ANY
DISCRIMINATION OF NATIONALITY, RELIGION, CREED, OR
GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONALISM.
13. CONCLUSONS: CONCLUDING WHAT WAS MENTIONED ABOVE; IT IS
POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE cOLLOWING:
A. IT IS NECESSARY TO FORM AN ARMY CONSISTING OF A
MODERN BALANCED INFANTRY FORCE THROUGH VOLUNTEERING
FROM DIFFERENT IRAQI SECTORS AND WITH A SIZE OF (5)
DIVISIONS (2 INFANTRY) AND (3 MECHANIZED INFANTRY),
AND TO MAINTAIN ONE AIR-BORN BRIGADE.
B. IT IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A NOMBER OF
HEADQUARTERS FOR THE LEADERSHIP AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THIS ARMY, AND IT SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST: THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN
BAGHDAD WOULD BE SIMILAR TO OTHER MINISTRIES OF THE
GOVERNMENT. (REFER TO ATTACHMENT A) ATTACHED FOR
INFORMATION ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
THIS HEADQUARTERS. WE SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE
SAME PLACE OF THE FORMER DEFENSE MINISTRY.
SECOND: THE HEADQUARTERS OF CHIEF OF STAFF IN BAGHDAD.
REFER TO (ATTACHMENT B) ATTACHED FOR INFORMATION ABOUT
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THIS HEADQUARTERS. WE
SUGGEST THAT IT MUST BE IN THE SAME PLACE INSIDE THE
BUILDING OF THE MINISTRY or DEFENSE.
C. FORMATION OF THE AIR FORCE COMMAND IN BAGHDAD. WE
SUGGEST IT TO BE IN THE SAME PREVIOUS LOCATION.
D. FORMATION OF THE COAST GUARD COMMAND IN BASRAH. WE
SUGGEST IT TO BE IN THE BUILDINGS OF THE PREVIOUS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE NAVAL FORCE.
PAGE 6
MECHANISM OF THE FORMATION or THE NEW ARMY
a,μ...,.. .;... __,,¥
14. THE FIRST CHOICE (FROM 't:0f' TO BO'f'TOH)
A. ADVANTAGES:
FIRST: AVAILABILITY OF LARGE NUMBER OF HUMAN RESOURCES
SECOND: POSSIBILI~Y OF IMMEDIATE TRAINING AT THE
EARLIEST TIME.
THIRD: TO SECURE THE FORMATION OF A FIGHTING FORCE TO
BE AS A NUCLEUS IN EVERY BRIGADE AND DIVISION.
B. DANGERS:
FIRST: THE DIFFICULTY TO FORM UNITS BECAUSE OF LACK OF
EXISTENCE OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS OF CONTROL.
SECOND: DIFFICULTY Of ADMINISTRATING THE TRAINING OF
THOSE UNITS WITHOUT ADOPTING A CLEAR TRAINING POLICY.
THIRD: IMPOSSIBILITY OF SECURING NECESSARY EQUIPMENT,
VEHICLES, AND WEAPONS WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF SPECIAL
PARTIES WHO WOULD ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY.
FOURTH: IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO START BUILDING UNITS
WITHOUT COMPLETING THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS AND SYSTEMS

PERTAINING TO THE SERVICE AND RECRUITMENT OF OFFICERS
AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED.
FIFTH: IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SELECT INDIVIDUALS
(OFFICERS AND ENLISTED) WITHOUT PREVIOUSLY FINALIZING
THE FORMATION OF A SCIENTIFIC SOUND SYSTEM.
SIXTH: IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND GOOD SUITABLE LOCATIONS
AT THE PRESENT TIME TO PROVIDE HOUSING FACILITIES FOR
THOSE UNITS, WITHOUT PREVIOUS DETERMINATION TO BUILD
THEM, AND CONSEQUENTLY COMPLETE THEM AND EQUIP THEM.
SEVENTH: THE FORMATION OF AN ARMY REQUIRES LONG TIME,
THAT WHAT CAUSE THE PEOPLE TO BECOME IMPATIENT, AND
(WE) WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
FORMATION OF THE NEW ARMY.
PAGE 7
15. THE SECOND OPTION (FROM THE HIGHEST TO THE LOWEST)
A. ADVANTAGES:
FIRST, GUARANTEE OF LEADERSHIP WITH HIGH COMPETENCE
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER THE ALL OF THE BASIC
COMPONENTS OF THE AR~Y AND THE EXECUTION OF THE PLANS
WITH PRECISION AND AT THEIR CORRECT TIMES.
SECOND, GUARANTEE THE GENERAL STAFF THE COMPETENCE
TO OCCUPY THE HIGHER POSITIONS AND PREPARE THE
DIRECTIVES AND THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS, INCLUDING
TRAINING
THIRD, PLANNING TO GUARANTEE A REGULAR SYSTEM FOR
THE NECESSARY MODERN WEAPONS, MATERIAL AND IMPLEMENTS.
FOURTH, COMPLETE THE REQUESTED RESTORATION AND
FURNIS~ING OF THE MILITARY BASES BEFORE THE TIME,
ACCORDING TO A REGULAR SCHEDULE.
tIFTH, PRE~ARATION OF THE SYSTEMS AND SPECIAL LAWS
FOR VOLUNTEERING AND MILITARY SERVICE, IN ADDITION TO
THE COMPLETION OF A SELECTION SYSTEM AT AN APPROPRIATE
TIME.
SIXTH, THE CREATION OF HIGH POSITIONS IN THE ARMY
LOOKS TO REASSURE THE PEOPLE AND DEEPEN THE TRUST IN
THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE COALITION FORCES ON ONE
HAND, WHILE GUARANTEEING A POSITIVE SPIRIT OF
COOPERATION ON THE OTHER.
SEVENTH, WASTE LESS TIME IN FORMING THE ARMY.
B. DANGERS:

t
FIRST, TAKES LONGER TO CREATE COMBAT UNITS.
SECOND, THE PRESERVATION OF A LARGE NUMBER O~
LOW-RANKING DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS (OFFICERS AND
ENLISTED) FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME WITHOUT JOINING
THE ARMY.
C. THE THIRD OPTION:
FIRST, THE ADVANTAGES: THIS OPTION CONTAINS
ADVANTAGES OF THE TWO OPTIONS ABOVE.
SECOND, THE DANGERS: TREATS THE DANGERS OF THE TWO
OPTIONS ABOVE.
16. CONCLUSION: WE BELIEVE IN THE sueERIORITY OF THE THIRD
OPTION.
l?AGE 0
A MODERN, BALANCED ARMY
17. THE MODERN, BALANCED ARMY MUST BE DISTINGUISHED BY THE
FOLLOWING:
A. IT MUST BE tORMED OF COMPATIBLf., BALANCED LANO AND AIR
FORCES AND A COAST GUARD, IN ADDITION TO THE NECESSARY
SUPPLIES AND SERVICES TO ENTER AND DIRECT JOINT
OPERATIONS.
B. IT MUST HAVE THE ABILITY TO REMAIN IN THE MODERN
BATTLE;fIELD.
C. IT MUST HAVE AN ADVANCED SYSTEM FOR COMMAND AND
CONTROL, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND CALCULATING.
D. IT MUST DEPEND ON A SCIENTIFIC AND EFFICIENT SYSTEM TO
GUARANTEE EQUALITY JOINING THE ARMY WITHOUT
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON ETHNICITY, RELIGION,
CON fESSION, GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION ... ETC, AND IT MUST
APPLY THE PRINCIPLE: THE RIGHT M~N FOR THE RIGHT JOB.
E. IT MUST HAVE SUPERIOR TRADITIONAL FIREPOWER.
F. IT MUST BE DISTINGUISHED BY A HIGH DEGREE OF MOBILITY
ON LAND AND IN THE AIR. ,
G. IT MUST HAVE AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM FOR MOBILIZATION IN
ORDER TO HANDLE THE SMALL SIZE OE" TllE ACTIVE ARMY.
H. IT MUST HAVE A SMALL, POTENT, EFFICIENT AND HIGHLY
TRAINED FORCE FOR RAPID INTERVENTION TO DEAL WITH
EXPECTED AND UNEXPECTED SITUATIONS. (AIR-BORN MAJOR
GENERAL)
I. IT MUST DEPEND ON THE GREAT EXPERIENCE ANO ABILITIES
OF THE COALITION FORCES IN ALL AREAS (ARMING, TRAINING
AND MOBILIZATION).

RECOMMENDATIONS:
18. WITH THE AIM OF CREATING A NEW IRAQI ARMY, THE
COMMITTEE BELIEVES IT NECESSARY TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING
RECOMMENDATIONS KEEPING IN MIND THE EXPECTED LIMITS:
A. AN ARMY OF VOLUNTEERS (100%). RELIANCE ON A SUITABLE
SYSTEM FOR VOLUNTEERING {FOR OFFICERS, NON-
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS; AND ENLISTED), AFTER OFFERING
THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN THE ARMY TO IRAQI PEOPLE FROM
ALL SPECTRUMS WITHOUT REGARD FOR THEIR ETHNICITY,
RELIGION, CONFESSION, OR GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION.
PAGE 9
B. POLITICIZATION IS BARRED: ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITY NO
MATTER WHAT SHAPE OR FORM IT IS WITHIN THE NEW ARMY IS
FORBI DDEN. IT IS NECESSARY TO INTENSIE'Y THE AWARENESS OF
HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO SERVE THE PEOPLE AND THE NATION BY
IMPLEMENTING THE POLICIES OF THE LEGAL ANO ELECTED
GOVERNMENT.
C. FORMING MILITIAS IS NOT ALLOWED: THE PRESENCE OF ANY
TYPE OF ARMED MILITIAS INSIDE IRAQ IS NOT ALLOWED ~OR ANY
REASON WHATSOEVER.
D. FORMING MODERN ANO BALANCED FORCES: IT IS NECESSARY TO
FORM THE NEW ARMY , A MODERN AND BALANCED ONE, MADE UP OF
LAND AND AIR FORCES AS WELL AS A COAST GUARD.
E. SIZE OF THE NEW ARMY: THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT THE
BEST APPROPRIATE SIZE AT THE PRESENT TIME (AS AN OPERATING
FORCE) rs TO BE MADE UP OF (5) FIVE DIVISIONS WHILE KEEPING
AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE WITH A SUFFICIENT AIR FORCE AS WELL AS
A COASTGUARD FORCE.
F. A SUITABLE GENERAL STAFF SYSTEM: IT rs NECESSARY TO SET
UP A SYSTEM OF A SUITABLE GF.NERAL STAFF FOR ALL FORCES.
THE COMMITTEE SEES IT IS MOST APPROPRIATE TO SET UI? THE
GENERAL STA. FF ESTABLISHED IN THE BRITISH ARMY OR THE ARMY
OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .
G. THE BEST CHOICE FOR FORMING AN ARMY: THE COMMITTEE SEES
THAT THE THIRD OPTION IS THE BEST ONE TO BEGIN fORMING AN
ARMY FROM TWO DIRECTIONS (E'ROM THE TOP AND THE BOTTOM
SIMULTANEOUSLY} BECAUSE OF NUME:ROUS CHARACTERISTlCS . IT
WILL ALSO GUARANTEE SPEED AND BALANCE.

H. TRAINTNG: THF. COMMTTTEE SUGGESTS TO BEGIN TRAINING IN
THE FOLLOWING PLACES:
FIRST: FOR OFFICERS UP TO CAPTAIN INCLUSIVE
{l}- TRAINED SESSIONS IN SCHOOLS OF BROTHERLY AND
FRIENDLY ARMIES (IN THE MIDDL8 EAST, JORDAN FOR
EXAMPLE , OR IN EUROPE OR IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA) .
(2)- ADOPT THE WF:STERN/AMERICAN IDEOLOGY IN TRAINING
AND MOBILIZATION ACCORDING TO THE NATURE OF ARMAMENT
AND EQUIPMENT INTENDED TO BE SECURED.
(3)- SERVICE ACADEMIES SHOULD BEGIN ADMINISTERING
SESSIONS INSIDE IRAQ JN CASE TRAINED OFFICERS AND NON-
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS RETURN TO THE COUNTRY .
PAGE 10
SECOND: NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
(1)- TRAINING SESSIONS IN ALL SERVICE ACADEMIES OF
BROTHERLY AND FRIENDLY ARMIES.
(2)- BEGIN ADMINISTERING SESSIONS INSIDE THE COUNTRY
SCHOOLS WHEN THEY RETURN.
I. THE ADOPTED DRESS CODE: THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT IT
IS NECESSARY TO DECIDE ABOUT THE MOST APPROPRIATE TYPE OF
MILITARY DRESS CODE FOR THE NEW IRAQI ARMY BY BENEFITING
FROM THE COALITION FORCES EXPEBIENCE IN THIS DOMAIN. THIS
REQUIRES A SPECIAL STUDY . THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES IN THE
USE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MILITARY DRSSS CODE BY
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT IRAQI CHARACTERISTICS.
J. ADVANCED SELECTION SYSTEM: IT IS NE:CESSARY TO CREATE AN
ADVANCED SELECTION SYSTEM TO GUARANTEE JUSTICE ACROSS THE
ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND SECURING QUALIFIED
ANO CAPABLE ELEMENTS FOR THE NEW ARMY (OFFICERS, NON-
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED) BY USING THE EXPERTISE
OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN ARMIES .
K. THE FORMER MILITARY BUILDINGS AND INSTALLATIONS: IT IS
NECESSARY TO KEEP THE FORMER MILITARY BUILDINGS AND
INSTALLATIONS FOR THE NEW ARMY, BEGIN REBUILDING THEM
ACCORDING TO A CAREFULLY STUDIED PLAN AND DEFINE PRIORITIES

ACCORDING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMY FORMATION. THE
COMMITTEE SUGGESTS KEEPING THE INSTALLATIONS OF THE FORMER
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS FOR THE SAME PURPOSES.
L. THE COALITION FORCES' ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE : ADOPTING
THE COALITION FORCES' ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE IN FORMING THE
ARMY . THE COMMITTEE SUGGESTS ALSO THE USE OF EXPERTS AND
ADVISERS FROM THESE FORCES TO ACHIEVE THIS PURPOSE.
M. SPECIAL STUDIES: THIS BRIEF STUDY IS CONSIDERED AS THE
GENERAL OUTLINES TO FORM THE NEW ARMY . SPECIAL STUDIES
MUST FOLLOW IN MANY FIELDS AND ACCORDING TO PRIORITY NEEDS.
N. APPROVING THE STUDY : THE COMMITTEE IS PREPARED TO
CLARIFY ALL ASPECTS MENTIONED IN THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO GET
IT APPROVED. THE COMMITTEE ASSERTS ONE MORE TIME THAT THIS
STUDY REPRESENTS ONLY GENERAL OUTLINES FOLLOWED BY SPECIAL
DETAILED STUDIES ACCORDING TO THE NEED. THE COMMITTEE ALSO
CONFIRMS THE NECESSITY Of THOROUGH COORDINATION AND
COOPERATION WITH COALITION fORCES IN ALL STAGES WHETHER
RELATED TO THE COMPLETION OF SPECIAL STUDIES OR BEGINNING
THE IMPLEMENTATION .
PAGE 11
IN CONCLUSION, THE COMMTTTF.F. HIGHLY APPRF.CTATf.S ALL
CONCERNED PARTIES THAT PLACED THEIR TRUST IN THIS ELECTED
COMMITTEE OF OFFICERS AT THIS SENSITIVE STAGE . THE
COMMITTEE WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM THAT IT DOES NOT SPARE ANY
EFFORT IN THIS NOBLE ATTEMPT TO FORM THE NEW IRAQI ARMY .
IT IS READY TO COOPERATE UNTIL FRUITION OF THE STUDY.
SINCERE APPRECIATION.
STAFf LIEUTENANT GENERAL NEMAT FARIS, PRESIDENT COMMITTEE
STAFF MAJOR GENERAL MUHAMMAD ..J' AJM-AL- DIN AL-NAQASHSANDI,
MEMBER
STAFF MAJOR GENERAL (AIR FORCE) AHMAD KHAYRI, MEMBER
STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMJAD llASAN AL-ZUHAYRI, MEMBER
STAFF MAJOR GENERAL FAYSAL FARID, MEMBER
STAFF MAJOR GENERAL 'ABD-AL-MUN'IM SULAYMAN, MEMBER
STAFF BRIGADIER GENERAL 'ABD-AL-RAZZAO YA'QUB, MEMBER
STAFF BRIGADIER GENERAL NABIL KHALIL SA'ID, MEMBER
STAFF BRIGADIER GENERAL '!MAD MOHAMM!\D HASAN, MEMBER

PAGE 12
ATTACHMENT A
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE E'OR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS
(TN: ATTACHMENT IS A ONE-PAGE CHART, TRANSLATED AND
DESCRIBED BELOW AS FOLLOWS)
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER (TN: OFF TO THE RIGHT SIDE)
DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE (TN: DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE)
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (TN: OFF TO THE LEFT SIDE OF DEPUTY
MINISTER)
ARMED FORCES COUNCIL (TN: OFF TO THE RIGHT SIDE OF DEPUTY
MINISTER)
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF (TN: DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO DEPUTY
MINISTER or DEFENSE, BOX IN MIDDLE OF DIAGRAM)
(TN: EACH OF THE FOLLOWING IS ALSO SUBORDINATE TO THE
DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE)
--ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR FOLLOW-UP AND VERIFICATION
--ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR ACCOUNTING AND BUDGET
--ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS
--ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
--CHIEF OF THE HIGHER MILITARY COURT
PAGE 13
ATTACHMENT B
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE ARMY CHI8F OF STAFF

(TN: ATTACHMENT IS A ONE-PAGE CHART, TRANSLATED AND
DESCRIBED BELOW AS FOLLOWS)
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
PRIVATE OFFICE (TN: OFF TO THE RIGHT SIDE)
(TN: DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF ARE
FOLLOWING OFFICES WITH THEIR SUBORDINATE POSITIONS)
ASSISTANT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ADMINISTRATION AND ??
OFFICERS ADMINISTRATION DIRECTORATE
ENLISTED ADMINISTRATION DIRECTORATE
CONTRACT AND SALES DIRECTORATE
LABOR AND HOUSING DIRECTORATE
MOTORPOOL DIRECTORATE
MEDICAL DIRECTORATE
EXERCISES AND MOVEMENT DIRECTORATE
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE
MILITARY OFFICERS DIRECTORATE
ASSISTANT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS AND PLANNING DIRECTORATE
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
TRAINING DIRECTORATE
STAFF DUTY DIRECTORATE
COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE
INFANTRY DIRECTORATE
ARMOR DIRECTORATE
ARTILLERY DIRECTORATE
MILITARY ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE
CORPS COMMAND
AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES COMMAND
COAST GUARD COMMAND

Page 1of3
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 2:58 AM
To:
Cc:
Dear ~ I
r=::= forwarded your note about private security. The following art. icle is a good
summary about the stat:e of the art. The organization cited, Il?OA, is run by a
friend, He is one of the most knowledge persons on the subject. His
email is If you can be more specific about what exactly you
need I e more than appy to help you on this issue.
Again, our thanks to you for all your support. I, have · Some great photos that I
would like to send you. I guess the APO is best.
Take care and stay safe. Your boss has been getting some very good press these
days.
[
Private Mi1itary Servicea C0111p.niea For P•acekeeping P•ter N. Singer of the
Brooking• Inetitution baa written a long article about private military ••rvic••
entitled Peac;iekaepers, i;. ne .
The contrasting experiences in Sierra Leone between the military provider firm
Executive Outcomes and the U.N.'s pea. cek.eeping operation are the most often cited
example of privatization•s promise. In 1995, the Sierra Leone government was near
defeat from the ruf, a nefarious rebel group whose habit of chopping off the arms
of civilians as a terror tactic made it one of the most truly evil groups of the
late twentieth cem:ury. Supported by mul.tinational mining int.erests, the government
hired th.e private military firm, made. up of veterans from the So.uth African
apartheid regime's elite forces, to help rescue it. Deploying a battalion-sized
unit of assault infantry (numbering in the low hundreds), who were suppo. rted by
firm-manned combat helicopters, light artillery, and a few armored vehicles,
E-xe. cutive Outcoo:ies was able to defeat the RUF in a span of weeks. It:s victory
brought enough stability to allow Sierra Leone to bold its first elect.ion in over a
decade. After its contract termination, however, the war restarted. In 1999 the
U.N. was sent in. Despite having a budget and personnel size nearly 20 times that
of the private firm. the U.N. force took several years of operations, and a rescue.
by the British military, to come close to the same results.
The UN is incredibly expensive and ineffective. The British military is more cost
effective. But what about Executive Out.comes? I be.t they we.re cheaper still. So
where are they?
Curiously, while the Executive Outcomes home page still exists in Google Cache if
you click thru to the Execut:.iveOutcomes.com web site you now are redirected to an
organization that sounds like it offers the same kinds of services: Northbridge
Services Group Ltd. They have all sorts of services available:
Northb. ridge Services Group prides itself on the success of its team which is
comprised of a highly professional workforce. We have a track record of over 5000
man-years of milit:.ary knowledge, combat and training experience, with staffing . from
organi:z.ations such as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. and British
7/l 7/2003

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special forces. All personell are hand picked and highly trained, assuring you
nothing less than the best. Our success record is as yet unequalled. The
corporation is most probably the largest of its type in the world.
Northbridge offers a wide range of services designed to meet the needs of most
organisations. Whether it is strategic advice, intelligence support, hwnanitarian
disaster relief. counter-terrorism, supper~ ~or law and or~e~ or clo~e protection
teams, we have the services and resources to suit.
Wouldn't it be easier and cheaper to pay these folks to change the government in
Liberia and to make it a relatively peaceful place? Thie may sound funny or somehow
irreverant perhaps. But think about this seriously. Why not contract out
peacekeeping if private organisations can do it more cost effectively? Iraq is
probably too big a problem to be tackled by a private company. But Liberia is a
whole lot smaller. A company like Northbridge could probably name a price for the
removal of Charles Taylor and various other prices for other desired outcomes.
Singer reports that Executive Outcomes claimed it could have handled the Rwanda
situation more quickly, cheaply. and with much less loss of life:
Similarly, the aforementioned Executive Outcomes performed a business exploration
of whether it would have had the capacity to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. Internal
plans claim that the company could have had armed troops on the ground within 14
days of its hire and been fully deployed with over l,500 of its own soldiers, along
with air and fire support (roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Marine force that
first deployed into Afghanistan), within six weeks. The cost for a six-month
operation to provide protected safe havens from the genocide was estimated at $150
million (around $600,000 a day). This private option compares quite favorably with
the eventual U.N. relief operacion, which deployed only after the killings. The
U.N. operation ended up costing $3 million a day (and did nothing to save hundreds
of thousands of lives).
Singer also mentions an association of private military services companies called
The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) whose own web site
description makes it sound like just another industry trade association.
The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) ia an association of Milicary
Service Provider companies - companies who work or are interested in international
peace operations around the world. This includes companies that do everything from
mine clearance, to armed logistics, to emergency humanitarian services, to actua1
armed peacekeepers.
The association was founded to institute industry-wide standards and a code of
conduct, maintain sound professional and military practices, educate the public and
policy-makers on the industry's activities and potential, and ensure the
humanitarian use of private peacekeeping services for the benefit of international
peace and human security.
Update: One reason to be for the use of private militaries is that the US military
is not big enough. As I've previously posted, the US military is too small for its
current responsibilities. we already can not sustain current force levels in Iraq
indeiinitely. Aleo, see Trent Telenko'a lengthy post on the overstretched US
military. If the UN or the Europeans or US liberals want something done about
Liberia then it is cime to hire a private army to get the job done. This will spare
the a1ready overstretched US Army and save money.
7/17/2003
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To: Ambassador Bremer
CC: LTG Feliu, MG Eaton,
From: Walt Slocombe
Date: 7/16/2003
Re: Timelines for National Security and Defense
--~~~~~~~~~~-
Attached, with apologies for my limited table generating skills, is a matrix
showing where we should be in the National Secu. rity and Defense areas over
the next year and a half - notionally the point of turnover to the Iraqis of full
sovereignty - or at least of essentially full power over security is.sues, subject to
a theoretical CPA veto. Note that the projections are limited to national security
fairly strictly defined and within the scope of this office. Police, border controls,
law enforcement, infrastructure protection, the criminal justice and penal
systems, and the like are not addressed.
The matrix is divided into the main categories that I see as constituting our
work, and for which the end states are as described:
National security institutions- all key constitutional, legal, and
institutions approved and in formation
National armed forces (including NIA) - heading for 18 infantry BNs
trained and operating, with support elements, and higher
echelon HQs and staffs named and at work
Ex-military - Stipend programs ready to phase down or convert into
retirement payments; retraining courses and job matching in
full operation
Intelligence - Agency (or agencies) with both internal and external focus
(to include vetting/clearance system) in place, under effective
oversight arrangements
1

July 16, 2003
Defense industry (including current MIC)-SOE's fate settled (keep,
transfer, sell, or close), minimal indigenous military industry
operating to supply armed forces
Governing Council/llA involvement - Decisions made, on the basis of
consultation and analysis facilitated by CP A.1 on all critical
national security constitutional and legal provisions and on
institutions and policies, including national strategy,
international security reJations, interagency national security
oversight, MOD and military staff structure, resource
allocation system, force structure
US resources - Contracting and budgeting process in synch with US
schedules; modest grant FMF/IMET program in place;
decisions made on long term security relationship with Iraq
Iraq resources - Basic decisions on sustainable scale of spending on
national security made, resource allocation system in place
1hird country role - Steady state third country support arranged, chiefly
training and technical advice
IDCF - Having been fully functioning as augmentation to Coalition
forces, ready for decision by Iraqis on future role, if any
Paramilitaries - Status decided and implemented as function of broader
political settlements with Kurds, Shia community;
demobilization assistance operating
(I acknowledge that this is not the most logical sequence, but my efforts to
reorder the boxes by manipulating the Microsoft Table functions have been
unavailing.)
2

Jufy 16, 2003
MATRIX FOR Immediate Short term Medium term Long term
NATIONAL (to mid Au1) (Sep-Oct) (end 03) (end 04)
SECURJTY
AND (Assumes constirution
DEFENSE aooroved)
National NIA Order, GovCon Adv. Com at Training on-going for civilians Legislation on nat sec
Secu.-lty Disdplinary work for MOD, nat sec jobs enacted
Insfitutioos Order issued
Interim Min for MIC GC malcing decisions on NSC, new MOD,
GovCon appointed future nat sec GenSlaff, resource
advisory structure/legislation allocation system in
conunission on process
Nat Sec formin~
National 1" Bn training Officer cadre chosen BNs 24 trained, InfBNs S-9 trained,
Defense underway commissioned, operating commissioned and
Fon:es, 111 Bn conunissioned operating, by mid-04;
Including NIA and operating Promising officers selected addn'I BNs training
and assigned for foreign
2d-41b BN training training (Jordan)!EL T Suppon BN(s) trained,
staned, applying LL equipped and operating
from fint Set up Defense Suppon
Agency for logistics, Training increasingly
Identify potential persormel, admin fens ISO shifting to Iraqis
foreign IIBining NlA
opportunities Brigade (&DIV??) staffs
Start long-term acquisition in place;
programs, in lraq/foreign
Stan process for re- bid/expand training conttact for Sel~t and prepare garrisons place
specialized training for additional BNs
Provisional Gen staff in
Substantial Iraqi
Decide and prep Start decision process on participation in
garrisons for combat capabiliries beyond IMET/other international
deployed BNs motorized iofantry, e.g. armor, training
air components
Define equipment needs for full NIA force
Plans underway for high
end ca~bilites
Ex-Military lsiround of Conscript payments Stipend payments largely Decisions made on
(Incl. sttpend CO/NCO complete shifted to banb continuation of stipend
program) stipends paid; program
2d, 3d CO/NCO IOMIDOL job matching
Conscript one- stipends paid program started "Double-dipping" policy
time payments decided and implemented
started JOM registration
system extended to Sob matching program in
IOM registration COINCOs Iraqi hands
system in place
Adar>t oavment
3

July 16, 2003
systemlAW LL
Intelligence Vetting system Vetting system in Nat sec adv commission National intelligence
agreed place briefed on intell system (internal/external)
structure/oversight issues, in place;
starts consideration of options
Oversight established
MIC/Defense lnventory Initial decisions on Implementation of decisions Iraq largely self-sufficient
industry assel$1personnel SOE retention., on fate of SO Es on most military
transfer to other equipmet1t (small artnS,
Pursue WMD mins, privatization, Decision on structure for vehicles, light arty, some
issues closure retained enterprises (keep comms)
MIC? In MOD?)
Initial de- Fini.sh de-Baalhif of Civil spt system operating
Baalhification MIC/SO Es Plans made for intergration of
complete; most military support in civil
followup Plan to economy
investigatiollS establish/restart local
started defense indwuy Start minimum foreign
(small arms, vehicles, buys/arrange donations
uniforms, personal (comms? Helos?)
gear)
Governing Brief on all Briefings on issues to GC adopts statements of Decisions by IIA on
Coun~il/UA initiatives, be addressed; principles for national national security slJUctural
In"ol"ement advisory security/constitutional issues;
commission DCAF international provisions
appoinred conference on Draft legislation on
options Advisory commission report national security
on options to
Approve consider/recommendations on Constitutional provisions
establishment of national strategy; international agreed
DefSpt Agency security relations; interagency
nat sec organization, MOD
Stan work on 04 budget structure; resowce allocation;
mili ta.Ty staff s true tu.re; force
SIJUcture,
Approve plans for senior staff
structw"e of NIA
Aonrove 04 nat sec bud~et
Resources: US Identify likely Secure Insure inclusion of necessary FMF-financed imports of
needs for OSD/OMB/Hill OK funds in US budget for FY 05 arms Wlder way
apPropriate for additional funds
funds to for FY 04 Start flow of FMF Budget request for FY 06
continue NIA,
fund IMETIFMF US analysis underway for Permanent mutual security
decisions on furure security arrangements agreed and
relationship with Iraq in place
4

' .
July 16, 2003
Prepare and approve CY
Resources: Fund NIA from PRB approval of Iraqi budget fund.5 to cover 05 budget
ovemms
Monitor budget
adequacy Prepare and approve
budget for CY04
costs
3dCountry Requests to Solicit spaces in PME Address possible multi-lateral Steady support - mostly
Role Jordan mutual security arrangements training and technical
Solicit equipment for region assistance
contributions support
IDCF Start first 8 BN 8 BNs operating w/ CJTF Addn'I BNs operating as augmentation to CF units Phase out, fold into FPS,
or other fina I disposition
Evaluate operations, decide on continuing
Decide on future of IDCF
If continuing, recntit
addn't BNs
Paramilitaries Pay K-stan Decisions on MEK Decisions on future of Pesh; PermanentarrangCillCnts
"pensions" Badr Corps for Pe.sh, Badr m place
Pay stipends to de-mobbed
paramilitaries
Job inventory, training
proizrams for ex-paramilitaries
5

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- · 9 21:'A C'R 1 1 (;.i}_ u>~r Mark~! F<«l Mf:l 51 -'i 9$l ?JI 16'
.. 1'04 111 8 ~ l
1
1'01'M.. 3IO 3&l '.lO 7
~
SU•"""'~
~
TPk _~

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
TRANSFER OF ENTITIES & PERSONNEL BETWEEN
MINISTRY OF SECURITY AFFAIRS TO MINlSTRY OF HOUSING
AND CONSTRUCTION
The Military Industialization Commission is one of the Iraqi government agencies
under the control and jurisdiction of the Senior Advisor for National Security
Affairs and Defence. The SOEs under MIC control include a number of
companies involved in construction work. Included in their portfolio of
companies are SAAD Engineering and Al Fao Construction.
In an effort to promote the effective provision of housing and construction services
across Iraq, it is appropriate that SAAD Engineering and Al Fao Construction be
transferred from the MIC to and the Ministry of Housing and Construction, and
that responsibility for them within CPA be transferred to the Senior Advisor for
the Ministry of Housing and Construction.
This will enable these valuable entities to be used in enhancing the effectiveness
of the Ministry of Housing and Construction thereby addressing a pressing need
for such skilJs in the reconstruction of parts of Iraq. This is, however, an interim
measure that will be reviewed periodically, and may be, modified if, inter alia, the
effective organization of the armed forces for the new Iraq so require and is
subject, in due course, to the agreement of an internationally recognised,
representative government, established by the people of Iraq and assuming the
responsibility of the CPA.
Mr W Slocombe
Senior Adviser for
National Security and
Defence
::semor A <Wiser
Ministry of Housing
and Construction
5 July 2003

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
MILITARY lNDUSTRIAL COM. MISSION
TRANSFER OF ENTITIES & PERSONNEL BETWEEN
MINISTRY OF SECURITY AFFAIRS TO MINISTRY OF HOUSING
AND CONSTRUCTION
The Military lndustialization Commission is one of· the Iraqi government agencies
under the control and jurisdiction of the Senior Advisor for National Security
Affairs and Defence. The SOEs under MIC control include a number of
companies involved in construction work. Included in their portfolio of
companies are SAAD Engineering and Al Fao Construction,
In an effort to promote the effective provision of housing and construction services
acros.s I.raq, it is appropriate that SAAD Engineering and Al Fao Construction be
transferred from the MIC to and the Ministry of Housing and Construction, and
that responsibility for them within CPA be transferred to the Senior Advisor for
the Ministry of Housing and Construction.
This will enable these valuable entities to be used in enhancing the effectiveness
of the Ministry of Housing and Construction thereby addressing a pressing need
for such sk1lls in the reconstruction of parts of Iraq. This is, however, an interim
measure that will be reviewed periodically, and may be modified if, inter alia, the
effective organization of the anncd forces for the new Iraq so require and is
subject, in due course,. to the agreement of an internationally recognised,
representative government, established by tbe people of Iraq and assuming the
responsibility of the CPA.
l Mr W Slocombe
[
Senior Adviser for
Senior Adv ~ iser
National Security and
Ministry of Housing
Defenc· e
and Construction
5 July 2003

Memorandum for: Mr Ted Morse 6 July2003
From: COL._r __ ___,
Subject: Funds for Security Assessment
Per tbe advice of the CFO, who indicated that he will reimburse these funds should that
be necessary, request $1500 from the Baghdad Central Regional Coordinator's
Emergency Response Fund for the purpose of paying for a security assessment of Iraq's
major power lines.
I understand the explicit condition that this money will be paid only to indigenous Iraqis.
(Note: This memo supercedes a simj!ar memo of 5 July requesting $1000)
•
Thank You!
COL -
From Ted Morse ~.
To: COLJ ~ __ cb_J<6~>J
Approved.
Baghdad Regional Coordinator

Memorandwn for: LTG Sanchez 6 July 2003
From : Walt Slocombe
Subject: Security Assessment Authorization
The security of Iraq's national power distribution system is vital to the developmen. t of
the Iraqi economy.
Traditionally~ local tribes have assisted in the security of key powe.r lines. With a view to
establishing a relationship between the Coalition Provisional Authority and. key tribal
leaders for this purpose, AMB Bremer has au.thorized fonner-Iraqi Brigadier and IR.DC
member Tawftk Al-Yassiri and 5 companions to travel from Baghdad generally along the
route of the major power lines to meet with the major tribes. He will report on the re-sult. s
of his efforts upon return.
To facilitate this assessmeot, request you sign the attached letter authorizing Brigadier
Al-Yassiri and his companions unrestricted travel within theCJTF 7 AOR from 7-25 July
and giving them permission to carry small arms for self-protection.
Thank You.
Lb-~f~
Walt Slocombe
1 incl as

Memorandum for: Mr Ted Morse 6 July 2003
From: C01f~--~
Subject: Funds for Security Assessment
Per the advice of the CFO, who indicated that he will reimburse these funds sbould that
be nec· essary. request $1500 from the Baghdad Central Regional Coord. inator's
Emergency Response Fund for the purpose of paying for a se-curity assessment of Iraq's
major power lines.
I understand the explicit condition that this money will be paid only to indigenous Iraqis.
(Note: This memo supercedes a similar memo of 5 July requesting $1000)
Thank You!
COL
From Ted Morse
To: co { ~-~
Approved.
Ted Morse
Baghdad Regional Coordinator

Memorandum for: Mr Ted Morse 6 July 2003
From: CO L ~[ ___ __,
Subject: Funds for Security Assessment
Per the advice of the CFO, who indicated that he will reimburse these funds should that
be necessary. request $1500 from the Baghdad Central Regional Coordinator's
Emergency Response Fund for the purpose of paying for a security assessment of Iraq's
major power lines.
I understand the explicit condition that this money will be paid only to indigenous Iraqis.
(Note: This memo supercedes a similar memo of 5 July requestin g $1000)
Thank You!
cof,__ __ _..
From Ted Morse
Approved.
Ted Morse
Baghdad Regional Coot"dinator

------------
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• U N C L A 5 5 I F I E 0 •
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TO RUFPAVC/CDRVCORPS HEIDELBERG GE
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ZEN/CDR377THTSC DOHA KUWAIT KU
ZEN/CG 320 AAMDC DOHA JCUWAIT KU
Z£N/CDR416TH ENCOM DOHA KUWAIT XU
Z£N/CORS13THMIBDE DOHA KUWAIT KU
ZEN/CDR335THSIGCHD DOHA KUWAIT KU
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RUCADRQ/USCENTCOM FWD
RUCAACC/USCENTCOM HACOILL AFB FL
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RHSDAAA/COMCFSOCC
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RUEORYK/COMUSARCE.NT SA//Sl//
RUEASRT/CDRCJTF7 MQS FT MCPHERSON GA//WATCR//
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KSGID/GENADHIN CDRCJTF7 DOHA KUWAIT XU//CJSFVOPS//
StJBJ/CORCJTF7 FRAGO 286 TO OPORD 03·0l3 IMPLEMENTATION (U)//
/OF THE FACILITY PROTECTION SERVIC£S (U)//
REF/A/KSO/COHCFLCC/l90600ZAPR03//
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REF/G/DOC/CPA/ORD/23MA¥03/02//
N"1lR/ REF A IS C'OMCPLCC OPORO Ol-033, OPERATIONS IN IRAQ. REF B IS
A COMCFLCC MESSAGE THAT DIRECTS MSCS REGARDI N G CAPTURED E~EMY
EQUIPMENT. REF C IS A CDRCJTF-7 FRAGO 96 TO OPORD Ol-Oll THAT
ESTABLISHES THE NATIONAL IRAQI W2APONS POLICY. REF D IS CDRCJTP-7
FRAGO 164 TO OPORD 03-033 PAYING IZ CIVIL SERVANTS. REf £ IS
CORCJTF-7 FRAGO ll6 TO OPORD 03-033 ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR PAYINC
IZ CIVIL SERVANT SALARIES NATIONWIDE . REF F IS THE ORDER OF
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) REGARDING TH:£ 0£·
BA'ATHIFICATION OF IRAQI SOCIETY. REF G IS CPA ORDER REGA..'\.DING THE
DISSOL\TI'ION OF IRAQI ENTITIES. TRIS FRAGO OUTLINES PROCEDURES FOR.
IMPLEMENTillG THE FACILITY PROTECTION SERVICE.//
61912003

Page 2 of s
'lVATION. BACKGROUND : THE VITAL INSTITUTE PROTECTION FORCE
) WAS AN ORC~IZATION UNDER TH2 SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME ~T
VIDEO GUARDS POR ALL TKE MINISTRIES. ALMOST HALF OF THIS FORCE
RB COMPRISED OF MILITARY FORCES .
2. MISSION. NO CHANGB.
3. EXECUTION.
3.A CONCEPT. THE CPA SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FUNCTIONAL
IRAQI MINISTRIES WITH THE CREATION OF A TRAINED AND PROFESSIONAL
FACILITY PROTECTION SERVICE (FPS) THAT REPRESENTS THE NEW IRAQI
INTERIM GOVERNMENT. THE FPS PROVIDES SECURITY FOR IRAQI MINISTRY
BUILDINGS AND MINISTRY SITES IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE THEFT OF
GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS, AND PROPERTY. TH& CREATION OF
THIS NEW FPS ALLAYS THE FEARS OF MANY IRAQIS WHO DID NOT TROST THE
PREVIOUS REGIME SECtJ'RITY FORCES AND VIPF. THE CPA IS RESPONSrBLE
FOR THE INITIAL RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND SUPERVISION OF THE FPS .
THE FPS WILL BE EMPLOYED UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE MINISTRIES, WITH
CENTRAL OVERSIGHT (TO INCLUDE TRAINING) SY THE MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR. CURRENT SECURITY FORCE SUCH AS THE NORTH ANO SOUTH OIL
COMPANY SECURITY, WORLD FOOD PROGRAM SECURITY, A.ND OTHERS, WILL
TRANSITION AND BECOME PART OF THE FPS. THIS WILL BE A FOUR PHASED
OPERATION THAT RUNS CONCURRENTLY. PHASE I - RECRUIT, PHASE II -
SCREEN, PHASE III - TRAIN, AND PHASE IV -
EMPLOY~ENT BY THE
MINI:STRIES.
3.A.l. PHASE I - RECRUIT. THIS PHASE BEGINS IMMEDIATELY UPON
RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER. TAAGET AUDIENCE: IS FORMER VIPF, FORMER
MILITARY AND THEN CIVILIANS. USE BROADCAST AND PRINT MEDIA TO
ENCOURAGE APPLICATION AND HIRING TO THESE POSITIONS. ENOSTATE FOR
THIS PHASE IS TO DRAW A LARGE POOL OF FPS APPLICANTS TO ENABLE THE
HIRING OF A FORC£ STRUCTURE THAT IS ETHNICALLY REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE REGION'S TOTAL POPULATION. CJTF-7 WILL DEVELOP THE FPS
--- REQUIREMENTS PER MINISTRY. THIS PROGRAM CONTINUES UNTIL THE
REQUIRED NUMBER OF FPS IS HIRED.
3.A.2. PHASE II - APPLICATION ANO SCREENING PROCESS. THIS PKASE
BEGINS UPON RECEI VING THE IRAQI APPLICATION THEN SCREENING TO
D~Eru..INE I F THE APPLIC~1 ' CAN BE HIRED IMMEDIATELY. ONLY
INDIVIDUAL IRAQIS MAY SUBMIT APPLICATIONS AS FPS. FORMER HILITAAY
UNITS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO APPLY. APPLICATIONS HOST SE FILLED OUT
COMPLETELY BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THE SCREENING PROCESS . ALL
CANDIDATES MOST FILL OtJT THEIR OWN APPLICATION WITHOUT ASSISTANCE
FROM OTHERS. THIS HILL TEST THEIR ABILITY TO READ A.ND WRITE . ALL
APPLICANTS MUST BE ABLE TO RE.AD, WRITE AND SPEAK ARABIC, AND BE
OVER THE AGE OF 18. APPLICANTS MOST ALSO COMPLETE THE DE -
BA'ATHIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE. IF THE APPLICANT DOES NOT FALL INTO
ONE OF THE CATECORIES DESCRIBED BELOW, HE MAY BE HIRED. THE
SCREENING CRITERIA ARE AS FOLLOWS:
3 . A.2.A. NON-WAIVERABLE DISQUALIFICATION:
J.A . 2 . A.l. MEMBERS WITH FORMER REGIME SECtJ'RITY ORGANIZATION
AFFILIATIONS LIKE A FORMER MEMBER OF THE SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARD
(SRG) .
3 . A. 2 . A. 2. SENIOR BA ' ATH PARTY M...~SERS .
3.A.2.A. 3 . TERRORIST ORG1'NIZATION AFFILIATION/ HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATORS.
3.A. 2.A. 4. PRIOR RANK OF COLONEL OR HIGHER IN IRAQI ARMY OR
SECURITY FORCES .
3 . A.2.B . WAIVERABLE :
3 . A.2.B . l. CRIMINAL HISTORY.
J.A.2.B.2 . FAMILY RELATIONSHIP TO FORMER REGIME MSMB£R .
3.A.2.B .3. NON-IRAQI CITIZENSHIP.
3.A.2.S.4. EXTREMIST ORG1'NIZATION CONTACTS.
3.A. 2 .C. SUBMIT ALL APPLICANTS' NAMES TO THE MOI FOR RECORD
6/9/2003

Page 3of5
SUBMIT NAMES OF ALL CURRENT s2cURITY GUARDS PROTECTION
&TRY FACILITIES (IB OIL INF'RASTRUC'IVRE, WORLD F'OOC PROGRAM
HOUSES) TO THE MOI FOR RECORD KEEPING. MOI IS THE OVERSIOHT
GENCY FOR THE FPS . lT IS THE CPA'S GOAL TO HAVE A QUALITY FPS
TJiROUGH PROPER SCREENING RATHl>R THAN TO RELIEVE P2RSONNEL AFTER
FtJRTHER REVIEW OF THEIR RECORDS.
3 . A .2.0. THE ENDSTATB IS A GROUP Of' QUALIFIED, PROPERLY SCREENED
CANDIDATES f'OR f'PS TRAINING.
3.A.3. PHASE III • TRAINING. THIS PHASE ENCOMPASSES THE REQUIRED
TRAINING f'OR FPS . THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WILL PROVIDE THE PROGRAM
OF INSTRUCTION FOR STANDARDIZED TRAINING. MSCS CON'OUCT TRAINING OF
FPS CANDIDATES. DO NOT TERMINATE EKPLOYMENT OF ClJRRENT SECURITY
GUARDS BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT HET THE MINIMUM TRA.INING REQUIREMENTS.
CONDUCT TRAINING OF ClJRRENT SECURITY GUARDS TO MEET MINIMUM
REQUIREMENTS . CANDIDATES ARE IN A PROBATIONARY STATUS UNTIL
COMPLETION OF TRAINING . UPON COMPLETION Of' TRAINING, CANDIDATES
ARE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE SALARIES. NOTIFY MINISTRY or INTERIOR OF
THE NUHBER OF CANDIDATES UNDERGOING TRAINING IOT PRIORITIZE THEIR
UTILIZATION. THE GOAL IS TO TRAIN, EQUIP, ANO EMPLOY APPROXIMATEL~
lS,000 f'PS. ENDSTATE WILL BE TO PROVIDE TO THE MINISTRies AN PPS
TRAINED IN us~-OF-FORCE AND SAPS WEAPON USE, PROPER REPORTINO
PROCEDlJRES , ANO f'AIR AND JUST TREATMENT OF PEOPLE.
3 . A .3.A . MINIKU'H TRAINING REQUIRED:
3.A.3.B. SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE MINISTRIES ANO TO THE NEW
IRAQI GOVERNMENT. (2 HOlJRS)
3 . A . l .C. INTERPERSONAL COMMtJWICATIONS SKILLS TRAINING; VERBAL
PERSUASION ; HUMAN RIGHTS AWAJlENESS. (2 HOURS )
3 . A .J .D . WEAPONS SAFETY; USE Of' FORCE; WEA.PONS FAMILIARIZATION
WITH SIDE ARMS/AX 47. ( 2 HOURS )
J.A.3.E. ACCESS CONTROL/STATIC GUARD PROCEDURES ; REPORTING
PROCEDURES; BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES; PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE SEARCHES;
CHARACTERISTICS OF A SUICIDE BOMBER. (2 HOURS)
3 . A .3. F. ON-TH£·JOB TRA.ININO (OJT) WITH COALITION FORCES (1 DAY}.
3 . A . 4 . PP.ASE 1•; - S:MP:.OYMEt''r BY MillISTRI ES . MSC' S NOTIFY MINISTRY
OF INTERIOR POCS, MR. JIM ANDERSON OR MR . JOHN HUGHES JONES, WITH
THE NUMBER OF FPS AT EACH LOCATION AS TRAINING SESSIONS FINISH.
MINISTRY Of' INTERIOR WILL PROVIDE IRAQI MINISTRY PRIORITIES FOR
f'PS . MINISTRY or INTERIOR WILL CONSIDER THE CANDIDATE'S POINT OF
APPLICATION , AND MINISTRY REQUIREMENT FOR f'PS ASSIGNMENT. FPS UPON
EMPLOYMENT AT A MINISTRY! SITE, f'PS WILL RECEIVE UNIFORMS MD
EQUIPMENT AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE . REPORT UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS TO
THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REPRESENTATIVE. WEAPONS ANO A.MMUNITION
FOR FPS WILL BE CENTRALLY LOCATED AT THE MINISTRY SITE. FPS WILL
KAVE RANK STRUCTURE IN ORDER TO HAVE SUPERVISION OVER 6ECURITV.
PPS F.MPLOYMF.NT CONCEPT IS PHASED, JOINT COA.LTTION OPERATIONS WITH
f'PS , THEN COALITION MONITORING AND SlJPSRVISING FPS ANt> LASTLY TO
KAVE TH& MINISTRY ASSUHS FULL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY
OPERATIONS. CURRENT SECURITY GUARDS WILL TRANSITION INTO THE f'PS .
ENDSTATE IS MINISTRY SITES SECURED BY f'PS . OCPA KAS A THREE TIER
PRIORITIZED LIST FOR MINISTRIES . TIER ONB IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY .
· J":"x.~ . A. TIER ONE MINISTRIES : ELECTRICITY, FINANCE, TRADE, OIL,
HEALTH, EDUCATION, INTERIOR, JUSTICE, AND ATOMIC ENERGY.· .
3.A . 4.B . TIER TWO MI~ISTRIES : AGRICULTUR£ , LABOR A.ND SOCIAL
AFFAIRS, HIOHER EDUCATION AND SCI£NTIF1C RESIDENCE, HOUSINO AND
CONSTRUCTION, INDUSTRY AND MI~RALS. IRRIGATION, ANO TRANSPORTATION
ANO COM1'4UNICATION .
3 .A. 4 .C. TIER THREE MINISTRIES : rOR£IGN Af'f'AIRS, PI.ANNINO,
CULTURE, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANt>AR.DIZATION QUALITY CONTROL,
YOtrrH, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, INFORMATION, ANt> MILITARY
INDUSTRIALIZATION.
. .
6/9/2003

Page 4 of S
1'ASK TO UNITS .
. 1. I~ '!:)K>RPS .
. s . 1.A.f AND HIRE FPS APPLIC~S IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE
INISTRIES A VIABLE 66CURITY FORCE FOR THEIR STATIC SITES.
J.B . l . B . CONVERT EXISTING SECURITY GUARDS AT MINISTRY SITES TO
CONDUCT THEIR TRAINING RETROACTIVELY .
J.8.1 .C . PROVIDE LOCATION, DATE, AND TIMS FOR RECEIVING
APPLICATIONS TO LOCAL MEDIA AND CJTF-7 LNO TO MOI.
3.8.l.D. CONDUCT AH INITIAL SCREENING OF APPLICANTS IAW APPl::HOIX
29 (SCREENING AND VETTING PROCEDURES), ANNEX C, COMCFLCC OPORD 03 -
033. HIRE THOSE THAT ARE NOT IN QUESTION. LOCAL AREA COALITION
COMMANDERS (COMPAHY OR HIGHER) HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE
WAIVERS FOR APPLICANTS.
l.B .l.E . CONDUCT TKE STANDARD TRAINING IAW PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION
OUTLINED IN PARA 3.A.3.A.
3 . B. 1. F. ISSUE UNIFORMS, EQUIPMENT AHO TWC TO FPS . CONTINUE TO
IDENTIFY THE UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS FOR FPS TO THEIR MINISTRIES .
3 . B.l.G. PROVIDE SIDE ARMS OR AK 47 WITH COLLATERAL AMMUNITION
FROM AVAILABLE CAPTURED WEAPONS TO MINISTR IES. IDENTIFY SHORTAGES
OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO THE 377TH TSC.
l . 8 . 1 . H. NOTIFY MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WITH THE NUMBER OF FPS
COMPLETING TRAINING AT EACH LOCATION.
3 . 9. l. I . R£P0RT THE NA.MES AHO l\."'J'MBER OF Cl.''9.RENT SECURITY GUARDS AT
CURRENT MINISTRY SITES TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IOT TRACK T~
AS PAAT ~F F F~
3.8.~. 7TH TS~
3 . 8.2.AOROVIDE THE REQUIRED ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO V CORPS AND I
MEF FOR THE FPS .
l . 9.2.B . PROVIDE UNIFORMS AND £0UIPMENT TO V CORPS AHO I M£F FOR
THE FPS .
3 .C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
3.C.l. TIHELINE .
3.C.l.A. 15 J\,""N, BEGIN LOCAL RECRUITMENT OF FPS APPLICANTS TO
SUPPORT MINrSTRr SIT£ s~c~~iTY.
3.C.l . B. 21 JU'N, HSCS ACCEPT APPLICATIONS AND HIRE QUALIFIED
APPLICANTS.
3.C . l .C. 23 JUN , BEGIN TRAINING FOR POTENTIAL FPS .
3 . C . l .O. 25 JUN, PROVIDE QUJU.IFIED FPS TO THE MINISTRIES FOR
£MPLO'/MENT. BEGIN JOINT COALITION OPERATIONS.
3.C.l.E. 28 AUG, BEGIN COALITION MONITORING AND SUPERVISION OF
FPS .
J . C . l .F. 7 SEP, ALL MINISTRIES GUARDED BY THB MINISTRY FPS
3 . C.2. THE FPS ARE NOT LAW E~FORCEMENT OFFICIALS AND DO NOT HAVE
EXECUTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS. THEY DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY
TO ARREST, INVESTIGATE OR CONFINE PERSO'Nt-IEL .
3 . C .3. THE FPS WILL DETAIN INOIVIOUJU.S FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICIALS TO ACCEPT CUSTODY OF THE PERSON .
l. c . 4 . THE FPS HAVE TH£ RIGHT TO BE AAKEO WITHIN THE CONf'INES or
THEIR FACILITY WHILE ON-DUTY.
3.C.S . FPS WEAPONS ARE HAINTA!NED IN THE FACILITY . TH'E FPS WILL
NOT BE ARMED WHEN OFF-Dt!TY.
3 .C.6. ALL CURRENT MEMBERS or THE FACILITY PROTECTION SERVICE HILL
NEED TO COMPLETE THE APPLICATION FORM AND TH£ DE-BA 1 ATIFICATION
QUESTIONNAIRE. VETTING OF THE CUR.RENT APPLICANTS WILL BEGIN WITH
THE HIGHEST StANKING PERSONNEL J\H'D WORK DOWN TO THE LOWEST LEVEL.
3.C.7. FALSIFICATIONS OR OMISSIONS TO THE DE-8A 1 ATHIFICATION
OUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINE TO INCLUDE TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT.
3.C.8 . THE MINISTRY EMPLOYING THE PPS WILL PAY THE SA.LARY. SALARY
FOR FPS WILL START AT $100 PER MO!'l"ll{ FOR GUAA!>S 't·
619/2003

ERVICE AND SUPPORT. NO CHANGE.
COMMAND AND SIGNAL. NO CHANGE.
OCPA MOI: POc MR. r" . I OR MR • 1>. T DSN
CJ'I'F- 7 LNO TO MOI, MAJ
________ ..., OSN
**********•••··············•••••*************••··················
* U N C L A S S I F I E D *
6/9/2003

--------
---
-
- - --
- ---- -
- -
--
-~-
..
Nazaroff, Boris A.
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
~---,-----, ,-- (b _ )(6 ~ ) l l TC CJTF7 -FUOPS
Saturday, June 28, 2003 '1 :45 PM
CSCM-IMEFLNOMAINI (b)(6)t C5CR-G4CHS&S l {b)(6lJ L TC); I (b)(6)1
fibl] L TC; [ (bJ(6qLTC;j (b)C6)1 COL .._ __ """"""' .____ ___ ___,
RADCLIFFE, R COL G3 CHIEF OF OPS
FW: Facilities Protection Service (FPS)
l MEF FRAGO
1-03 IMPLEMENTA1
below ia the l mef SPSF plan. It comes the closest to answering the mail and
points up two issues we have. to solve to make this :functional. 1 is
arms uniforms and equipment.. and LTCCJiill621 is worki. ng a FRAGO on that right
now. The other is pay and turning these people over to ministries to pay
in the future. There are some things not in the report we need, I MEF
Is the list in priority order?
Is it complete?
Which ones are being guarded by FPSF?
What equipment do you need to address the shorfalls· you noted? That is how
many radios, uniforms, weapons, ammo, vehicles.
4 ID did a good job of laying out what it needed it terms of money, radios, and equipment.
But we need a nation wide program to standardize radios, allot frequencies, and buy
vehicles.
Solicit your help in moving this through CPA.
Ask that I MEF au.gment their submission. with the requested info. Again it is the most
complete I have recieved.
(b)(6)1
LTC, CFO 49
~;~J (b)(,
> -----Or~nal Message-----
> From: I_ (b)(6)j CJTF7-C3 Current OPS
> sent: saturaa}'; -'b June 28, 2003 12:37 PM
> To: f (b)~J J L' fC CJ'l'F7-FUOPS
> Subject: FW: Facil ities Protection Service (FPS)
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: C5CM-IMEFLNOMATN
> Sent: Saturday, June 28, 2003 8:17 AM
> To: I (b)(6)j CJTF? -Cl current OPS
> Subject: FW: Facilities Protection Service {FPS)
>
>
> - - - - -Original Message-----
> From: IMEFDF G3 coc SWO
:>Sent: Saturday, June 28, 2003 8:21 AM
> To: CSCM-IMEFLNOMAIN
> Cc: IMEFDF G3 COC CUR OPS 0
> SUbject: Facilities Protection Service (F'PS)
>
> Gentlemen,
> If anyone asks, the MEF's plan for Facilities Protection Service
> (FPS} is captured in the attached I MEF 'Frago. This frag is well
> written and detailed.
l

>
> <<I MEF FRAGO 461-03 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FACILITY PROTECTION
> SERVICES, txto»
>
>
" LtCo
> LtCo
" I MEF SWO
~
>
2

Baghdad/Central Munic1pal Facilities Facility Security Program 3 Jul Facility -0 ,..
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u.. ..J Cl) II) Q. u
Water
Karkh Waler Trea\mem Plan1 50
7N Water Treatment P.lant 20
LTc._r __ __..
~
~
Water Intake syste ~m gc;rOss stcco:11nt.1 bool Md dre_age MO
Watll!NI Waler lrcatmenl Planl MIH171090380 y N N 18 5--6 2!>0 ~250m y 0 41644 90392
Karar.ra Water 1realrnent Plant MB 40146 91018 y
~ 25 10 100x300m y 0 water intake acrossstreel MB 40t46 91018
Qadisya Wa1or r1eauncnt Planl MM 4~24 84047 y N 15 12 JOOx'.20011 1 y 0 10 fl walls around perimeler. oot burned, gQOd COi1Clltfon
Wah<la Water Treatment Plllnt MM46161- 83854 y N N 15 6-6 1QO x 400m y 12 good cond1tJon
Ra5hed WalJlr Troalrn11.nl Plant MM 49169 83039 y N N 15 4·5 u good condition
Dora Wat
_
er Treatment Plant, MM 42~64 80354 y N N 40 6"- 200l!" 300m y 12 f -'nctional. with good staff. Located In good nuighbofhilOd
Dora Pumping Stlltlon MM 42172 77464 y N N 7 4 !lOx 100m y 0 functional with small stall, on srte
Norlh Reservoir 0
South Reservoir 0
Abugr-.ilb Resurvof/ 20
very . goad shi!pe, a~ss dispute >'jjlJJ ll(lople In r!Yar ol
Tan Reservoir MC 30239 02424 y N N 16 "' 150 ~ 150M 27 facifity due to new facl(l('f next door blocking access
Amin ResetVolr '40
Rustvrrliya Re'S>ervolr MM 56056 83091 y N N 6 4 75x 1oom y 0
Kamal'ya Re&ervOlr 0
Ubaidy Reservoir 0
Kasratash Wareflouse MM 41566 98-tO& i an Warehouse 15
8-00JIJ 500rn If I 16 Badfy loOled and damaged, slalf 1J!la
ble to re1um 1intil secure
_
Huge waferpipe warehouse, comphilety des_troyed, tonsla11t
loollng, ne~s roving patrols and c;omms, staff unable to
Yousliya WarehOuse MM 40743 74031 0 hi k:m• '( 16 return unlll secured
Wahda Warehou~.e 0
warehouses and car shops. dastroyoo and unm~nnea, st;Jff
Main Workshop MM4771193480 8 200 J;: 400m y 0 unabl!! to return until secured
Abu Nawas RWPS 0
Wat!lba Fuel Reserve 6
HabtblvaPS MM 49213 91966 y N t-1 7 2 26 JI 5011'1 y 0
Talblya i"S 0
lalran!ya RWP$ 0
Falh GU MM 52110 76984 y N N 3 ? y 0
UborCU 0
Tariq 0
0

Baghdad/Central Municipal Facilities. Facility Security Program 3 Jul
Facility ~
...
Ill
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Mil GRID "" -I co Ui iii Size 0.. 0 Remarks
Sewa"o (}
Severely fooled or all ma:nncr of olcctrieal eQUlpment,
Rustiimlya 0, 1,:l MM 56462 81891 35 16 70011n11011 y 72 building:; damaged
Ru5fumlva 3 1(11rkl) MM~~483327 ;:. 35 16 900ml!.2.5k '{ 2Q S. overely lootiid oiid not furiet(()Oal • f)rolighl on site
MM 47345 75190 N 30 t6• h3Ktn y 25 very large CO/TlPloJ - IC>m1l 9al fuel rese!VC
Rainfall Worcoouse MM 44A5<1 69495 N 30 8-12 200x 300m y () urt>ao v.od:sllop area
llabl!)iya Wiire!lOuse MM •!!!100 00960 y N 5 1 2.00w HiOm y 2S s!Qrago yard. ~II bulld1ng not dama{IOO. eare~ker on stte
0
Construction 0
Z<>ne 1 Oaz.al!yo 5 ~
Zone 2 Saydln 5
zooe 3&4 Shab 5
Curt) Casllng Unit 0
Karkll lntersec. tlcms 4
Rasa•:i lnterse<:tJoos 0
Traffic light 0
Tri\'lf ic S.ign_s 6
Zone 5 · 6'1Y11a 0
Asphalt Plant Dora MM 4094975490
s 100 ? 3x 5!1m y 13 heavily darnage1l and looted
A&phalt Plant Ta~ MM 26226 05253 N 50 12 2.5kmsq y 11 somewtiat looted
eaoshmkl Batching Plant 0
~
UR. B:itc.hlng Plant M B 47437 97431 I y I S I N 6 3 175x 175m y 6 needs generator for li<ihling also mino1 repatrs
Maintenance Unfl 0
Concrille factory MB 49064 97431 N 30 3-4 200 x 300m y 9 $.everely tooted, Jorms slo~aQe yard across street
Katlltlli;h £llltG.h!!lQ Plant MO 488M 9763.5 y N N 20 3 200 x 300m y 8 prulecled by caretQker ve.ry OOO<l COOdltlon
ShulJa B11lct\ill(l Plal)I 6
'Quarries 0
Building DeparJmcot MM 38960 91831 y N N 35 3 30m ~ 5Clm y Q Smn8 HQ bo1lil111 gs
- -
0
Work&hop• 0
Mnctian1<'.S Wol'f<ShoP. MM 44697 89108 N 64 24~ 300 x. '400m v 12 Mechanlcal workshop In lndui.lruJI area looted and damage d
~nvv VohicJes Workshop MM 44789 89711 N T7 ? 150 x 200m y 12 heavy machine repair
CarpeoO'y WOO<shOp MM 446.lS 899. 39 N 46 ? 100 x 150m y 12 carpentry wolf<snops
WorksJiofl Dept. HQ MM 4~606 89954 N 65? 50 x 120111 y 12
Bcnt.o ne VehlcJes W MM 44649 89980 1 ? 120 x 120m y , .. c0111plelely loolcd. no stafrpresent
'Tires aod Elattorfcs Warehouse MM44709 89970 ? ? 40x 90m y 12 c11rnpletely looted, no staff presen1
Leyla1'd Workshop MM 44616. 90131 7 2·3 3\h 100m y 12 oomp1e1e1y looted, no starr present

Baghdad/Central Municipal Facilities Facility . Security Program 3 Jul Facmty -ti
• "-
ftl
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c ):; >= ~ 0
0 ! 'ti - >
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c: It: .,. - -
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~
4' :2 0 c:
LL _, co (/) IO CL u
Mamter10J1ce W011W1op MM 44,591 90159 N ? 3 30.t60m y 12 completely looted, 110 &laff p!'llsent
Submers1bkl Pump Repalt Shoo MM 45156 89708 N 40 6 100){120m y 12 underwater pump. storage all<I fepal! (founrains)
Fuel Station MM 45'469 89550 N 6 40 ;r;60m 12
toel Md oir ·&forage. neavy k>Merpa.11<.Jog, carwast1.t famRy
rlat Trallet WarllhOu~ MM 4841>6 907:14 N 33 10 y 12 careta!(ers
Car Wash MM 48480 906.56 N ? 20x 30m y 0 car wash tooted and destroyed, squaller& on·srte
Habiblya Lubrle;.)ot Wareliouse MM 46811 90115 N 1 6 150" t100m y 12 compla!ety looted Md d
_ es1f<>yed
tire arid battery warehousefslorago tlml 1'iJ)h&lt heating pool
Canal WarehQU. $e MM 49087 8992..4 N 1 5 200x400m y 12 (sunK ~lMMV)
Generator WorKshop MB 48991 97552 N 25 6 100x 200m y severely looted, warehouse destroyed
Eloclrlcal
(l
0
uc._r ___ _.
multiple departments within warehouse arl!a consldered not
0 safe In late afternoon, ne\tds Qquipm.1mt ancJ pilrtS
BQ<1h<IM • Nal1H1a MM 44601 89593 66 1 -
0
Parh 0
Baatidad Forest MB 35320 97705 0
Saad Nutsery MB 42260 95847 'II 111 . KJ\:llld Nursery MB -171.37 95601 y N N 16 0
Japanese G:atden MM 51700 87200 y s N 5 3 0
0 trailer moun1ed water pump stolen · required
severely looted building~. W'<\ter PlPllS dam.aged 1 111d stolen,
l111qi armyvehlcles on iike artillery stte1!s (UXO) l)Jl ske •
Qli!JI 1\1(11t;c.ry MB 49206 8893. 8 N zo 6 1200 1(60Qm 'I 0 reported
par!llog lot •or equipment that~ al ZrJWra P3r1c may
Gara98 MB 40314 87608 N 32 0 150,. 1Wm y relocale to pall\
~
Offlt:!! HQ z.a~~ Par'li MB 4og-1 s 80008 N 'II 20 1 40 ~ 4Qrn y Q Small tlO bulk:lirig
'MB. 42691 86684 N 113 12 ~ '( 0 Major parll lnci zoo • huge facl11ly·specml re.qu1rements
0
~afil Munlclpa!ity
0
Main (J{llca l\.1M 44678 89653 100 1 y 20
Mun tiQ and parking lot for city truoY.s. has many llulks and
Garage MM 447~ 1 89598 16 4 100 x 100m y 0 oil5pllls
1<1fal1 Maint Center MM 43853 89527 20 2 30 ¥ 3Qm v Q 0r0ken water pipes, caretaker Oil silo
P<llstcn Malnt Co11ter MM 46773 912.37 y N N 13 5,.() 30x 30m y sewage and water main aflice
0
~
K111ktl MuntcJpallty 0 -
HO Bldg f,10 43306 86242 y - N t30 t JO x.Som y 19 Stagti I_ renewal, funct!Onl~g. s~aff on site
Car & True~ Gar<19e 1 MB 42331 884 79 y N 70 2-3· 30X60m y 0 Emptpyees take vehicles home for sateguaJdlng

Baghdad/Central Municipal Facilities Facility Security Program 3 Jul Faclllty -0
..
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MILGRID .. iii Size Remarks
if. 0 :i Ill ,, .I:. 0
....I al U) Q. (.)
Storage and veh10te oanabillzatlon for keeping olher vehicles
car & True~ Garage . 2 M04157586457 y N N 5 2 4h60m y 0 operaft0nal
0
0
Adha.mlya ~unlclp.allly
Car & Truck Garaae 1 Municipal HQ 6
Car & Truck Garage 2 0
Kahdmlya Munlctpaflly 0
Thawra Munlcipallty 0
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
L TC~r_ '---~
MansOOf Munlclpallty 0
Sewage treatment facility s. everety damaged pte·war and not
funcl1onai Pumping station OK Two ware.hOuses wen
stod<ed and organized, no loolll\Q. new etectocat equipment
IC2 MB 40253 87546 s N N 5 tOOm x:IOOm y 30 and pumps in stoci\
Municipal HO Bldg MB 38948 87959 y N N 150 1 30~ 50m y 0 Good shape. 3 guards • 1 on s11e
Dirt 101 wiih tow l shaped'"" of small buikfmgs. 'Trash ano
Munidpat riarage MB 38. 937 87864 y N N Odrive 2 rows 50x200m y 0 w.iler trucks oo site
Heavily looted. Major equipment/truck damage. du. a lo
El Adil Equfpment Storage MB 37530 88659 N 7 3 50i1100m y 0 tooli:ng.
WaterPipe Warehouse MB 35429 85020 y N !'ii 20 2 100tn x'3 y 0 Triangular tot Security guan:I on site
Nissan Munlc.tpallty 0
Municlpa1 HQ 80
Car & Truck Garage 1 0
Car & Truck Garage 2 0
Wa_rohou&e 0
Warehouse 0
0
0
R111hed Municipality 0

Baghdad/Central Municipal Facilities Facility Security Program 3 Jul
Faolllly ~
...
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jij - ).:: z C)
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0 i 1l • >- u
u - c: :i: Ct 0 -
c: 0 ... Ill "O c
MILGRID :::s 0 :::s 0 iii Size s::. 0 Remarks
lL ..J ID D.. u
Munlelpol HQ 30
Car & Truck Garage 1 0
Car & Tl\Jot- Garage 2 0
Warehouse 0
Wa . ret1011so 0
SloraQO Waretiouse 0
0
Kar . adl Munlclp.alltv 0
Municipal HQ MB46033 aims y N N 85 1 50x60m 34
Main Garage MB45349 895.3~ y N 150 2 70x 150m 0 heavy equipment storage
Car&. Ttuck Gnrage 2 {Al Zafranla) MF.l 62376 812.4· 1 y N N ~ 1 2 80 x 35.m 0
0
Ctmtterlo• Dpt 0
0
Landfill Dpt 0
HQ B111 ldi,no 0
Oatage 0
0
0
new Scanlll Volvo Pla.nt 12
new Merce<les Planl 12
flaw A:lb11ya Fuel SlaUon 12

Facilities Protection in
Baghdad
3 JULY 03
AGENDA
• Background and Current Gudiance
• Actions by First Armored Division to
secure key sites
• Challenges
• Way ahead
1

Background
• Former regime:
- Vital Installation Protection force
- 7000 members
- Preserve installations for regime not people
• No orderly transition
• Immediate actions
- Ministry Initiatives
- Laci< of coordination, training, personal protection,
communications, etc.
• Coordination and Guidance (May - June)
- Result: •FRAGO 286·
- C¢o..p ,_/ J¥.1-.J 1-r• l.J rF-} Co~n)
Current Guidance
• FRAGO 286 to OPORD 03-33, 8 June 03, "Implementation of the Facility
Protection Services·
FPS provides security for ministry buildings anmd sites in order to prevent theft of
equipment, documents, property.
011 Company, WFP, other security all become part of FPS
Phaaea: Recruit, Screen, Train, Employment by Mlnietrtea
Deslgnatea Ministries by prioritized "Tiera"
• 1 - Electricity, Finance, Trade, Oil, Health, Education, Interior, J111Uc•. Atomic: Energy
• 2 - Asir1culture. L•bor & Social Affalre, Higher Education & Scientific RHldence,
Hou11ng and Construction, Industry •nd Mlneral1, lrng•lion, TrantPonaUon •nd
Communlc:lllion
• 3 - IE'orelgn Af'faira, P .. nnlrig, Culture, Stand•rd•
, Rel1 glou1 AfleW.. O.t.nae,
In llDrm •lion, 9fld Mifilary I ndustrie I iz.allon
Ta&ks to Miiitary unita
• Rectl.I ~ hire. conYert.. s.creen
• Trwt to ltlllldel'd9 (set by Mlnislry of tntenot}
• luve Uf'lfonn~ . equipment, and-pona
• P~ number& and names lo a.i:nistry of INeftOf
Time line
• ~ J~
- Pl'CMde qualiled FPS to MiniWtM tot em~nt: begin Joint Coetibon
Oper91jons
• 2.8 Auguat - Begin Coelilion mc:11W>nng end aupervillon of FPS
• 7 Sept - All Mirlilltlea guerded by Uinlltry FPS
Salary: Starts at S100/month for Guards
Po'"'l ' ""
fV\C# ~ tF I. c..,,._n ,.._,,
- # \-01~
{.Iv' o,J II'
- ~'"""
2

1AD Pitch
Challenges (Baghdad only)
• Coordination with and Transition to Ministry or
Municipal lead:
- Military> Transition to Iraqi FPS>military patrols and ORF
only>Pollce takes over from military
- Ministry organization vs geographic dispersion
• Acquiring Material:
- Weapons. uniforms, commo gear
• Certifications:
- Training certificates, badges, weapons cards
• Pay:
- No standardized pay-scale
• Dealing with particular challenges of certain Ministries:
- Eg. Oil and Electricity
• Q(Lf' ~ l ~l ~ 1..(..-.J. 't- "'1l- t. ~~ ...
'-
~-~1
-
3

Way Ahead
.., s ,,.. 6'1 $\.rt'..
• Document Require~
- Numbers of guards/for each Ministry and the Municipality of Baghdad
- Material requirements. esp. weapons but also uniforms and comms
gear '- a ;:;: Ti w/ l.ou.u,
- Bein consolidated now b
• Fill equirements
- CPA RCO icw CJTF 7 and other sources
- Apportion resources by prioritized requirements
• Develop management structure
- Idea: Baladiya boundaries = BCT Boundaries ... facilitate coordination
and response .... role of Baghdad municipality in coordinating FPS?
• Consider other approaches
- Contracting for Security Guards\
-C~~ f.A-~ 4'.Llvt ,.... .. _., •,
I
k-
Next Steps
• Weekly meetings
- Tuesdays 1000 (Tied to 1100 Police Coord meeting)
- Attendees: CPA Staff, CJTF 7, 1AD, Ministries, Municipality
(Chair: Baghdad Central?)
- Specific Tasks and Timelines
- Next Meeting : 081000 July - right here ....
• Find solution for weapons & uniforms
- Gardner I Crawford-Noble w/ CJTF 7
• Recommendation on Management Structure
- wl Baghdad Central
4

. . .
Summary: FPS is critical piece of
long term security for Ba.ghdad-
needs attention of all within
lanes .....
5

Facility Protection Services (FPS)
Intent
This short brief aims to lay out the Kroll Team's understanding of the current security
situation in Iraq and make an outline FPS implementation proposal for the MOL
Kroll Team Meetings and Discussion
In the limited time avai1able the Kroll Team has tried to cover as wide a programme as
possible in order to understand fully the policy, perceptions, problems and challenges to
be addressed. The programme has included:
Visit to the Office of the Director of Oil Policy.
Visits to the CPA Ministries of Housing and ReoonslrUction, Industry and
Minerals.
Discussions with the Iraqi Ministers of Industry and Minerals, Trade and the
ex Minister of Electricity.
A meeting in the Office of the Director of Operations.
Meetings with the Office of the Director of Security Affairs.
Meetings with General Eaton and the NIA Staff.
A meeting with the Director of Interior.
A visit to the Office of the Director Press and Public Affairs.
A meeting with MG Viggers DCG CJTF 7.
A visit to 82nd Airborne (Dora oil refinery) and 1 AD Se.curity Training Team.
Discussions with Company DGs of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals.
Visit to KBR.
Strategic Objectives
As a priority:
Protect essential industries - oil, electricity and water related.
Start to enable economic revival.
Involve Iraqi's in their own security.
Thereby taking disbanded military elements off the street and paying them.
Promote Iraqi morale and self-confidence.
Free up coalition forces from static KPs and lower their profile.
Providing positive media material.
Security Policy and Organisation for Facility Protection
Security Policy promulgated by CPA Ministry of Interior (MOI) and including basic
model training objectives.

The debate on FPS organisation has been between:
A centralized FPS under the MOL
Each Ministry controJling their own organic FPS.
Neither of these options is workable. The MOI has many other issues to address and
neither has the capacity to implement an FPS programme nor would it encowage
operational connectivity to other authorities such as the police. The latter consideration
of "stovepiping" operational command applies to organic Ministry guard forces. A
further consideration is that there is a reluctance to re-establish the ministry guard forces
that existed under the previous regime. In many cases they were part of the problem as
they were themselves comipted. The decisive issues are:
Operational control and linkage to the civil authorities and police services.
Maintenance of the integrity of FPS
Therefore the emerging model, based on Baghdad, is that FPS will be provided by the
MWlicipality, or the Governorates, to the various ministry facilities in their areas of
responsibility. This will ensure the correct operational cormectivity and ensure an even
implementation of MOI policy and regulations.
Current Situation
Facility security for the former regime was primarily entrusted to ministry guards. In
many cases these were comipted and part of the problem. They also included informers.
Some facilities, particularly pipe and powerlines, included tribal support. This meant the
buying in of the local tribes to ensure protection. The involvement oflocal tribes,
whether as recruits to the new FPS or in outlying areas to provide depth or cover linear
resources, is seen as a key continuing factor. The immediate response, in the aftermath of
military operations, has been the identification by the coalition forces of 150 KPs in the
Baghdad area and the organization of their security by the coalition forces. This has been
done through local recruitment in conjunction with facility managers, their training and
basic equipping. This has tied coalition forces to static positions. These local guard
forces will need to be handed over and maintained. Elsewhere in the Govemorates the
same model will have to be applied. The situation there is less clear. Discussions with
various facility managers suggest that they are making do with local arrangements
including the use of old guard forces and paying local protection. However there are
sound lessons to be learnt from these initial initiatives:
Local involvement is essential.
Recruitment must be of suitably qualified individuals.
Recruits must be vetted as best as possible.
The better elements must be kept on but the older, weaker or corrupted
elements must be weeded out.
Pay must be balanced so as to include enough of an incentive but also be
affordable.

Equipment - uniforms, radios etc - must be adequate to instiII pride.
Constant advice and management is required to advise and therefore maintain
morale and standards.
Armoury security is essential.
This has all to be done in a sensitive manner. The task has to be sensitive to local custom
and sensibilities with Iraqi commanders and guards backed by professional assistance.
Role For Kroll as a Commercial Security Company
In broad terms there is a pressing need to accelerate the implementation of the FPS
programme, essential to Iraqi confidence and regeneration, and relieve coalition forces.
The role for a commercial security company is to assist the lraqi's in the imp1ement.ation
of the FPS programme, on behalf of the MOI and in conjunction with the Baghdad
Municipality and Governorates. There is judged to be a strong will on the Iraqi part to
implement this programme. The key input from Kroll is ensuring that the FPS
implementation does not simply create what went before. Therefore the main effort is in
assisting Iraqis in establishing the FPS with a new professional culture. Although the
will is there the understanding and expertise to do this in detail - establishment of proper
manning, a disciplined approach and clear procedures - cannot be expected.
Tasks
The tasks envisaged at this stage are below. It is stressed that all of these have to be
developed in conjunction with the MOI AND Iraqi chain of command:
The consistent implementation of MOI policy.
Feedback on policy issues - recruitment, vetting, management, equipment etc.
Liaison with the MOI, Baghdad Municipality, Regions and Govemorates.
Liaison with coalition forces.
Security advice on the organisation and management of the FPS.
An assessment of the priorities for the implementation of the FPS plan.
Assessment of each sites security requirement.
Site security plans and orders for each site.
Development of basic operational procedures in conjunction with local police
etc.
Development of an FPS Manual.
Development of the training moduJe.
Training of FPS officers and guards.
Training of an FPS training Cadre and establishment of a central school.
Advise on suitable and affordable equipment procurement.
Write an equipment strategy for the longer term.
Purchase and distribute basic equipment.
Equipment management and repair chains.
Development of a Career Handbook.
Constant programme review.

Phase Development and Timelines
Kroll is currently configured to take on the role of FPS implementation. It has the
management and field assets and resources available at short notice. The phast:
development, depending on CPA initial approval in principle, is anticipated as follows:
• Phase I - Between 4 and 8 July-Agreement in principle with MOI/CPA that
there is merit in pursuing the implementation programme outlined in this brief.
• Phase 2 - 14 July - Kroll deploys permanent team to develop detailed proposal in
conjunction with the MOL
• Phase 3 -21 July at earliest- If proposal agreed start to bring Kroll elements into
Baghdad to start handover/takeover from coalition forces and development of FPS
overall assessment and organization in Baghdad.
• Phase 4 - 28 July - Start initial site assessment, plans and training.
• Phase 5 - Beginning of August - Simultaneously start assessment of Govemorate
requirements.
• Subsequent phases, simultaneously executed, continued implementation,
establishment of Training Cadre and officers course, development of FPS Manual,
Career Handbook etc.
Kroll Team Structure
The Kroll team structure will to some degree depend on the urgency of the programme
and the available funding. These factors will detennine the number of assessment and
training teams. The structure below should give a feel for the eventual size of the Kroll
team:
A London office manager.
A Project Leader.
A Baghdad office - operations officer, manual and development officer,
equipment procurement officer, finance officer, secretary and translator (or
translation contracted out).
Four two man assessment and plans teams.
Four training teams.
An officer and cadre training team.
Four regional liaison officers to cover the Regions and Govemorates.
Drivers and interpreters as required.
Total less the in country support 28 to 30.
Key Issues
The following issues are seen as key to the early implementation of the programme:
A seriously deteriorating security situation.
Slow decision making.

I--.-- -
Late identification of key Iraqi officers.
Early establishment of the Iraqi chain of command.
Recruitment of the suitable guards.
Insufficient or incorrectly structured funding.
Clear delineation of responsibilities.
Favourable, but realistic, pay and conditions of service.
Suitable equipment for the threat and task.
Kroll Requirements
The Kroll Team would be self supporting. The main requirement would be access to the
CPA and MOI; possibly an office/desk within the building, and access to tbe coalition
forces.
Summary
The creation of a professional FPS is a key objective in the overall strategy of
reconstructing Iraq. The Kroll Team fully understands the current situation in Iraq and
can ca11 on an extensive and unriva1led base of expe· rtise worldwide. It can mobilise
rapidly for the task. This outline brief is tendered in · order to seek an early decision from
MO I/CPA so that the Kroll Team can move to the next stage of detailed programme
deve'lopment and a possible contract.
nc

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MPRI Support Options (Rig, ht Now')
The Vehicle Contract Amendment What MPRI C111n do for you Costs When can we start
Phase II civilians to work, show vrsible LJ Pvt fonner IAF members and pr . ogress, ID future lead.ers Teams in 2 111eeks1 JeSt
to follow
Now , 3 Reconstruction
LJ Phase U Recruit leaders and Now, 3 Reeonstructionl
Recruiting Only soldiers for NJcnAF Recruiting Teams in 2
weeks, rest to follow
establlshlR1.1n Replace CMA TT and exl)and Now, 9 person plan,!\lng
Training Center(s) the tr.lining base team, rest to follow
~
MPRI P nasel 8 C.ontract w/OOD Develop/implement
DA SW 01-03-F- plan to stand up A . NICll.AF trained and ready Now, 9 person planning
team, rest to folJow
0510 ' NIC/IAF
Consolidate, inventory, triage, How, 3 Tea· ms In 2
[;] Iron Mountain
bri"9 to standard, repositioo, weeks, rest to toUow
issue
Others
Respond to Client's needs NOW, hire + CDC +
Requirements In county otienta.tlon~

COSTS
.
l. Costs: All costs \Vould be rough order of magnitude (ROM) and cannot be
finalized until the Client's requirements are provided.
2. Governmental Support .for all ' Options:
A. The government will furnish office sp. ace, to include furnishings, computer
hard\vare/software, class A telephone and long-distance telephone service
for official business, DSN access, facsimile access, copy machine access,
computer network file server access, printer access via network server,
internet access (Classified/Unclassified) and electronic mail service and
shall provide the contractor team members with necessary access to
functional points of contact for ORHA/ITCA activities.
B. Additionally, in the theater of operations, the government will provide
housing in a secure environment, subsistence, laundry, health/medical
support and PX/BX support, interpreter support, personal security teams,
body armor, MS Project tracking software, POL products, Chem/Bio
detection capability, and necessary communications and transportation
support (to include GS aviation support) for contract team men1bers.

MPRI Support Options (Right Now)
The Vehicle Contract Amendment What MPRI can do for you Costs When can we start
p 188.( clvillans to wortt, show visible 0 Put fonner IAF members and progress, ID future leaders Teams In 2 weeks, rast
to follow
Now, 3 Reconstruction
0 Phase II Recruit leaders and Now,3Rec:onstructlon/
Recruiting Only soldkn for NICllAF Recruiting Teams In 2
weeks, rest to follow
[:] EstabllshlRun Training Center(•) the training base team, rast to follow
Replace CMATT and expand Now, 9 person planning
MPRI Phase I I 18 Contract wlDOD Develop/Implement
DA SW 01-Q3-F- plan to stand up A NICAAF trained and ready Now, 9 person planning
team, rest to follow
0510 NlcnAF
-- --
I 8 Iron Mountain Consolldatll, Inventory, triage, Now, 3 Teams In 2
bring to standard, reposition, weeks, rest to follow
Issue
IGJ Others Requirements Respond to Client's needs In county orientation
Now, hire + CDC +
r , j,

Iraqi Armed Forces Reconstruction Support Progra. m
Put Them to Work
Concept: Immediately put former 1AF members & Civilians to work in support of reconstruction.
Key Aspects of Program:
• Stand up an IAFRSP command, control and management structure that can implement the
Phase II Reconstruction Plan
• Ensure integration of IAFRSP into the overall reconstruction planning and execution.
• Manage the Reconstruction Process.
• Put people to work now, demonstratjng the U.S .. commitment to rebuilding Iraq to the international
community and to the Iraqi people.
• Contribute to the overall national reconstruction effort and make visible local level improvements.
Identify IAF and governmental leaders for a future role in the future of Iraq.
• Facilitate the transition of the reconstruction program to the post-war Iraqi leadership.

The Vehicle
MPRI Phase I
Contract w/DOD
DA SW 01-03.f-
0510
MPRI Support Options (Right Now)
Contract Amendment
What MPRI can do for you
Phase II
Put fonner IAF members and
civilians to work, show visible
progress, ID future leaders
Recruit leaders and
aoldi.ta for NlcnAF
Establish/Run
Training Center(s)
Replace CMATT and expand
the training base
'
-- '
Costs
LJ
0
EJ
When can we start
Now, 3 Reconstruction
Teams In 2 weeks, rest
to follow
Now, 3 Reconstruction/
Racn11tlng Teams In 2
weeks, rest to follow
Now, 9 person planning
team, rest to follow
Develop/implement
plan to stand up
NIC/IAF
Iron Mountain
Now, 9 person planning
team, rest to follow
I
Consolidate, inventory, biage,
bring to standard, reposition,
Issue
Requirements I Rn~~ma~- I ~
Others
EJ
Now, 3 Teams In 2
weeks, rest to follow
Now, hire + CDC +
In county orientation
:·~

Iraqi Armed Forces Reconstruction Support Prog~am
Recruitment
Concept: Immediately employ future IAF volunteers in minor reconstruction projects while
conducting basic military skills necessary in preparation for entry into the IAF training center.
Key Aspects of Program: :
• Eliminates the need for the completion of a formal training center prior to start-up since
the Recruiting Team will be conducting tow level training while accomplishing reconstruction tasks.
• Provides the recruits limited basic military orientation, prior to their transfer to Basic Training.
• Regional and Reconstruction Team Indigenous Coordination Gel.ls will hire local interpreters/tran. slators
• Provides gainful employment of recruits through minor reconstruction projects prior to
basic training, for as long as required, thus reducing the possible formation of tribal militia groups
or criminal gangs.
• Form COHO.RT units as recruits arrive and then progress the MTI through the training,
providing assistance as required and gathering information and lessons learned
for the training of future units. The MMT will stay with COHORT unit until mission essential task are
certified in basic squad security tasks {six months).
• Provides a mechanism for the identification of potential future leaders for NIC/future IAF _

MPRI Support Opti1 0. ns (Right Now)
The Vehicle Contract Arnendrnent What MPRI can do for you Costs When can we start
Phase II civilians to work, sliow visible 0 Put former IAf members and progress, ID future · lealfers Teams in 2 weeks. rest
Now, -3 Reco rlstruetion
to follow
0 Phase II Recruit leade" and Now, 3 Rec-0n1tructlonl
Recruiting Only soldiers tor NICnAF Recruiting Teams in 2
weeks, rest to follO!N
c:J Replace CMATI and expand the training base Noli", 9 person planning
team. mt to foUow
MPRIPhasel c:J Contract w/DOD Develop/implement
' OA SW 01..()3-F- plan to stand up A NICllAF trained and read}' Now, 9 person planning
team, rest to follow
0510 NICllAF
[:] Iron Mountain Consolidate, inventory, triage, bring to standard, reposition, ls.sue
VWftks, rest to follow
Now . • 3 Tea.ms in 2
OtheN> Now, · hint + CDC +
Req.uirements Respond to Client's n eeds In county otfentation~

Establish and Oper-ate IAF Tra· ining Centers
Concept: Replace the Coalition Military Advisory Team and expand capability to support the
initial entry/advance training of the future IAF.
Key Aspects of Program:
• Operate the Iraqi Training Centers.
• Integrate the COHORT recruiting system with the Training Center in order to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the training process.
• Establish a NCOESIOfficer progressive · educaUon system.

MPRI Support Options (Right Now)
The Vehicle Contract Amendment What MPRI can do for you Costs When can we start
Phase II Put former IAF members and civilians to work, show visible progress, ID future leaders Now, 3 Reconstruction
Teams In 2 weeks, rest
to follow
~
CJ Phase II Recruit leaders and Now, 3 Reconstnictlonl
Recruiting Only soldiers for NICJIAF Recruiting Teams In 2
weeks, rest to follow
EJ Establish/Run Training Center(&) the training base team, l'llSt to follow
Replace CMATT and expand Now, 9 pel"llon planning
· :I
.. ..... .. -4~ ' l.4*
MPRI Phase I I I EJ Contract w/DOD
·~!l).v~~
DA SW 01-03-F- :t -
·:-plan _ tO stand. up- : • A NICJIAF trained and ready Now, 9 person planning
team, rest to follow
0510 H~iclrAF -~ ~ ·-~ · ·.-
. . .. ·~ .... · i ~: .~ ....... ,.-._ ..
-----
---
EJ Iron Mountain Consolidate, Inventory, triage, bring to standard, reposftlon, Issue
weeks, rest to follow
Now, 3 Teams In 2
Requirements Respond to Client's needs In county orientationOthers I I Now, hire+ CDC+
~

Stand up the New Iraqi Armed Forces
Concept: Recruit, organize, train, equip, evaluate and continue to improve the readiness of the
NIC&IAF.
Key Aspects of Program:
• Follow the successful model used in Bosnia and Afghanistan.
• Capitalize on the Phase II COHORT Recruiting model.
• Capitalize on the Training Center concept.
• Cascade the National Military Strategy to the IAF Mission Essential Tasks and down to squad
and platoon level.
• Institutionalize the Force Management System and a multi-year budget process.

MPRI Support Options (Right Now)
The Vehicle Contract Amendment What MPRI can do for you Costs When can we start
Phase II civilians to work, show visible LJ Put former IAF members and progress, ID future leaders Teams In 2 weeks, rest
to follow
Now, 3 Reconstruction
0 Phase II Recruit leaders and Now, 3 Raconstructionl
Recruiting Only soldiers for NICllAF Recruiting Teams In 2
weeks, rest to follow
EJ Establish/Run Training Center(•) the training base team, rest to follow
Replace CMATT and expand Now, 9 parson planning
MPRI Phase I
: I IEJ Contract wlDOD Develop/implement
DA SW 01-03-F- plan to stand up A NICMF trained and ready Now, 9 parson planning
team, rest to follow
0510 NlcnAF
EJ Consolidate, inventory, triage, bring to standard, reposition, Issue
Now, 3 Teams In 2
weeks, rast to follow
Requirements Respond to Client's needs In county orientationOthers I Now, hire + CDC +
~

Equipment Consolidation, Repair an, d Red: istri1 b, utio, n
Iron Mountain
Concept: Immediately begin the identification1 consolidation, inventory management, repair
and redistribution of materiel.
Key Aspects of Program:
• Utilize future IAF personnel in the identification, consolidation and movement of
equipment to Regional Depot location centers (proposed).
• Coordinate movement's control of materiel to centralized location.
• Overhaul, repair, modify, retrofit1 test and modernize military equipment; trucks1
tanks, artillery1 helicopters1 engines and components.
• Develop logistics plan for the identification and consolidation.
• Develop database of equipment and supplies.
• Develop Depot system for future sustainment.
• Develop Hub and Spoke system for future logistical support operations.
• Form the training base for maintenance training at Depot.

•
MPRI Support Options (Right Now)
The Vehicle Contract Amendment What MPRI can do for you Costs When can we start
Phase II clvlllans to wortt, show visible [2J Put fomier IAF members and progress, ID future leaders Teams In 2 weeks, rest
to follow
Now, 3 Reconstruction
0 Phase II Recruit leaders and Now, 3 Rec:onstruc:tlonf
Recruiting Only soldiers for NICAAF Recruiting Teams In 2
weeks, rest to follow
EJ Establlsh/Run Training Center(a) the training base taam, rest to follow
Replace CMA TT and expand Now, 9 person planning
MPRI Phase I I 18 Contnct w/000 Develop/implement
DA SW 01-03-F- plan to stand up A NICllAF trained and ntady Now, 9 person planning
team, rest to follow
0510 NICnAF
EJ Iron Mountain Consolidate, inventory, triage, bring to standard, reposition, issue
Now, 3 Teams in z
weeb, rest to follow
Now, hire+ CDC+
In county orientation

Other Suppo, rt Capab, ilities
Concept:
~ ~
1. Provide Rear Detachment functions and movements control coordination for ORHA.
2. Provide Base Defense operations center (BDOC) in support of ORHA operations in Baghdad.
Key Aspects of Program:
• Provide LN NCO at CHC (Bliss/Sill).
• Run Kuwait rear detachment.
• Provjde Kuwait arrival reception, processing and transportation ope~ations center.
• Provide Baghdad avail/departure reception, processing and transportation operations.
• Provide Command, Control and coordination for all a· spects of Base Security for ORHA.

---------,
¥ 6-~d- (
I LA.~1.Lf-<-v~d .
STANDING UP THE NEW IRAQI CORPS (NIC)
(Enclosure 1)
I Pr'--< .._L(
iw f:( o.clc
rr===================================================================il
PM Countn Team 04l
Admin 0~1i cer
~· :~
·:· IT System Tech
CNlOOITioo- Ops orncer
CA/10 Tech Ops Tcch/LNO
I Rg:ional Teams
(1 Nonh, I Ceninl. I Somh)
TOTAL: 3"8•24
REGIONAL
TEAM CHl£F
Admin Officer
CA/IO Officer
Operat ions Ofli~er
0pcl'lltions Tech
logistics Officer
logistics T cch
... Plans Officer
Unit Teams
(I Tm per BOE/l,SOO IAF soldiers)
tOTAL: 24 x 12 "288
UNIT
TEAMCHIH
Platform lnslllictor
Drill Instructor
Equipment rei.:h
Operations Tech
I..og tech
..
Plans Officer
'•
Plans Tech
.. : '
rA F TTalnlng Ceufer (1 JI
Director of
Training
S.Die>r ln11r11elo,,
Senior Otll«r T11g
Senior lmlr11tlor,
Junior Ortktt Tag
S.olor loslrl><lor,
NCOT"C
Range Officer
; .
# •':·
TO'f AL PE.RSONNEL
Country Team- 14
Regional Teams - 24
Unit Teams - 288
School House - _.Ll_
TOTAL: 339

STANDING UP THE NEW IRAQI CORPS (NIC)
(Enclosure 2)
CDay 30 Days
I I
I R
60
I
E
c
90 120 ISO 180 210 240 2'10 JOO 330 360
R u I T f "tt (j I
I I I I I I ! I ' I
~I
17.500 Reauil3{ lxRT
4:dJT
GRO'UP FOUR,< rRA INlNG:CYC.LE
GROUP l' IV ~ TRAINING CYCLE
t i ~7-,50-0 _ R_ecru __ l_~r1-- ----~------,...-- G -~ O - U_ f_S_l ~- T- R.MN'IN - · ---G- C - ¥ - CLE ----~~--~~---.
CT"'C-0untry 'feam
TC=cTraining Cmrcr Team
RT=Region_al Team
lfl',.Unit Te<im (ronnerly Recons1ruc1ion Team)
4~trr
TRAINING CYCLE
TDa;r JO Dl)'I 90 uo
1 80
NCO LBADERSIDP ... Sr. NCOi
TRAINING
OFF'lBBR BA~'l C TRAINING So.Mier Assignments
STAFF 'fRAINlNG
·-:"'
GOLLECTIV&
TRAJN)NG
VElTING OF FIELD GRADE OFFICERS Junior Officer A ssignments
COMMAND & STAFF TRAINJNG
C'PX
Senior Officer ASsignments

STM1DING lJP THE NEfJl/RAQJ CORPS (N.ICJ
1. Facts:
a. A professional Iraqi military firmly under civilian direction and control needs to be
established ASAP to meet Iraq's se. curity needs and allow coalition forces to redeploy.
b. The NIC will be the first unit to stand up in the new lraqi Armed Forces (IAF).
c. The Coalition Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT) will be established to set up a
training center to train the NIC.
d. A contractor will be needed to assist in recruiting, fom1ing/mcntoring COHORT units,
and capturing policies and procedures for establishing a pcnnancnt training center when CMATT
withdraws.
e. MPRI is available and has extensive experience in fhis arena.
2. Assumptions:
central regions.
a. NIC organization will be three division-size units with one each in the north, south and
b. Aner the NIC is established CMA TI will tum over the new training center to the IAF and
contractors will assist them in running it until they are ready to take it over.
c. Brigades win be the largest combat units allowed in the new IAF to facilitate firm civilian
control over the military and reduce the threat of a military sponsored coup.
d. A total of 45K personnel will need to be recruit.ed to field a N IC 40K strong.
3. Execution:
a. The intent will be to . recruit, organize. train, equip, evaluate, and (for a period of time)
assist in continuation training Iraqi units.
b. MPRI will modify its proposed IAFRSP Phase 11 organization to meet the intent (sec
enclosure I).
(1) The Country Team (CT) will coordinate and lead the recruiting effort with a goal of
7,500 per month nation-wide. Additionally, as the CMATI' identifies Iraqis to take over the
training center and condu.ct training, the CT will inslitutionali7..e CMATrs processes and
procedures and prepare to assist the Iraqis upon the departure oftbe CMA TT (after the first NlC
is trained).
(2) The Regional Teams (RTs) will lead the recruiting effort in their region through the
hiring of indigenous coordination cells (ICCs) in key localities and assist the CT in
institutionalizing end~of-cycle collective training and FTX:s. They will also assist brigades in
transitioning to their regions and setting up their GOP positions. and training plans.
(3) The Unit Teams (UTs) will fomJ COHORT units as recmits arrive and then progress
through the training with ihem, providing assistance as required and gathering information and
lessons lea.med for U1e training of future units. They will also assist units in transitioning and to
lheir regions and setting up their GDP positions aud training plans.
c. A model for training the NIC is at enclosure 2.
4. The costs for year one (assisting/shadowing CMA TT) and subsequent years (taking over the
operation) are at enclosure 3.

. FW: NlC Pagel of 3
-MAJ-~--------------
From: ._ L........_ ___ _,IL TC CFLCC-CJTF4
Monday, May 12, 2003 1:05 PM
Sent: To:
Subject: FW NIC
..._ ________________________ ___,
Classification: U'NC:l.ASSIFlcD
Caveats: NONE
MAJ~
MPRI numbers
proprietary don't email it aound I don't want to get sued.
LT~
-···On •inal Messa e-···
From:
Sent: Thursday, May 08. 2003 5:04 PM
To: ~~-------------
Cc:
..... ~.,..,,.--'"""'!!!'------------~~ ~~~~~~ .....
Subject: RE: NIC
...._--~~~~~~~~~~--------------'
Encl 3 was just a sprcadshcc1 that I used to e.x1rapofotc fil!,urcs provided by
corporate for ccrt3in packages i»1.o a best guess for wha1 this package of
339 people would cost. I'll gi. ve you the numbers l came up witb, bul be
advised lbey are just a guess on my part (though an informed one) and could
be off from the actual number, possibly badly off (higher or lower).
S72M First year. with mosl teams arriving as needed one to six months into
the op¢ralion
$87M Subsequent years. with all 339 folks on the ground tho whole year
When I divide this out ii seems high. acrually, perhaps as much as lOO A. or
more, but I'd rather be high than low (we consider ourselves different from
most contractors who tend to bid low and pile it on IMer). As with the
other numbers I gave y ou. this number may seem hjj?h, bu1 it pays for a 101
more dtan just salanes. To get top quality people, especially on shon
notice. you've got lQ pay them adequately and it requires a robust and
aggressive human rc5ource.s depanment to ge1 them (and we've got the bco;1).
It also pays f0r company bem:fils such as medical, insurance. retirement.
etc. Then there's tnmsporution costs, equipment, pn:parations for
deploymenl. etc And. of oourse, there is a slice for company overhead and
profit·· there are a lot of smart guys up al corporate that provide u.<i with
the direction. strntegic vision. and ht>rscpower 1ha1 enable us to provide ;i
quality product aver time. I sound like a salesman, but I'm not. I'm not
even a full time MPRI guy. I'm u retired OS. former OC. SAMS grad, etc.,
but now I ru.n a form and teach school when I'm not helping with these kinds
of pro1c. ct..<>, I believe in this compan)' and (especial!>• believe I.hilt
05/ 12/2003

-----------
-- - -
-
• FW: NIC
Page 2 of3
successfully rebuilding Iraq is vital to this region and our country. 1 did
not hesitate to come over here when the company called me. The other guys
here with feel lhe same way.
Pleas"' be careful how you use this infom\acion as c<>rporate woulrJ not
a[lprovc: of me trying to do their job for them I'm copying my bo s. (L TG
I (b)(6)l, so ho I.nows I've gone outside m} left and rij!.ht limns ll little
bit in giving you this informotion, in case he W1lfltS lo reign me in. I'm
also CC'in~ our log planner.
Hope this helps. Call - any time or write if you have questions.
> From: L TC CFLCC-CJTF4"
>To
>Subj~ct : RE: NIC
--------~----------=!I
>Date: Thu. 8 May 2003 15.16: 10 -0000
>
>Classification; UNCLASSIFIED
>Caveats: NONE
>
>--·Oniinal Message·--·
>From:[
>Scnc. '"' w"'"c'"'d,.. n- es
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'=" 3 : """2""3'"'p""'M"'"' ' ~-~----'
To: ..._ _____ _.. ..... _______ __
>Subject: N IC
>
>
::>
>Here are che documents I prepared fortbe NIC. They'rejus( lhe
> beginning--still lots of work to be done. Some of rny assumptions might not
>be on target, but it was a starting point.
>
J
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>Classifica1ion: UNCLASSIFIED
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05/12/2003

--------· --
FW: NIC
Page3of3
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
05/1212003

•
RONCO Consulting Corporation
2101 '4 Slrwl i.. w
'>utt~ 411(1
W•stun111on, IX" 20037
(~(12) 7llS-2791
, : ,,.x (2021 1 iq07~
fm.>il ~dm1n4<i'tMt<'l":&.'11 C<1m
C '11l1fumi.a Office
1?9S ln1V<.'1Sll)' i\\'""W
~une ~2(1
Bcrkcil<'y. C: A '>4 704
(SlO) ~4& . ~922
FAX l~IO) 843-l~lll
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
FROM;
COLONEL._r_ · __ __,jc-5, ORHA
LAWRENCE CRANDALL. VTCE PRESIDENT FOR
JNTERNA TTONAL PROGRAMS
New Iraqi Corps (NIC} PILOT IMPLEMENT ATlON PROJECT
SUBJEC'f
IN IRAQ:
l)ATt.:
May 8. 2003
L"ITRODUCTlO~
Tius 1110mote1nd11m with anachments describes one potential op11on aruoug several for
Jump St;'U"ting a six-month pilot project to inaugurare dcmobihzauon and retraimng of
sdect<•d Iraqi groups. It is based on Coalition thinkmg made 11vaila.ble to the RONCO
Con.sulun~ ('orpMathm as Qf dQse of business May 7. Other Options url! po sibk.
A potential dcc1 sion tree for identifying the more impon.am onc.s 1s found in slide three of
lite enclosed. PowcI Point present11tioo. The basic approach is both scaleable in terms
or the optlrnal leveJ(s)-or-effort and modular In lcrm'i or lhc C'hoicc(s) of l'ilot Proj«'I
clements. In essence, any element or the Pilot Project u n be modified nr deleted
according to pOllC'y dictates funding constraints, and/or changin2 field conditloos.
There are no inberent suppositions fn tbe moduJarfscoleablc approach about untouchable
clemen1s. There arc no sacred cows. This radlltates nexJble decl~lon- makiog and is
hi(:hly sensitive to the Cl'lticaJ throughput level which I~ discus5Cd below .
•
Some of the key underlying 8"Wllptions ll!'C di:l.cusscd in the "Planning Variables"
section below.
Attached ar~

-- -
.....---------------------------~- --
• AlTACHMENT 1 ·A proposed Concept of()perauons reflects the above::.
• ATTACHMENT 2 · All of1his is captured in an a.u&mentcd Power Point
presentation,. In order to assjst readers of the prede«ssor brief. ch11nges arc
limit~ to two addjtiooa.l slides
• A lT ACHM EN r 3 • A detailed draft budget foy f3cJlit1111ni; the c tilbhshmCllt of
the NIC'. using some 35,000 Peshmerga (PUK :1nd KDP) lb '"ell as iapproxnnatC'ly
5,000 SCIRJtlJadr lJnga.dc figb1en as an 1llustrau..,·e rccru111ng base These
numbers save •n as8Umcd S.IZC for the ~cw Iraqi Corps (NIC) of approxun:udy
40,000 rnunmg \\<111 surt with three ban.alions idennfied through thrtt
Rcll4b1htauon and Development Ceoters or .. Markaz'' 1n Mosul, BaghJiul Ql)d
Unsrah 'fhc NIC t.ranung will occur at a to - be·detcrmin~ 1111c south of OashdllJ
and Wlll rcqulre an uok.nown amount of renovation. A e<1tenni; foc1hty Is needed
ror recru i t~ whale they are at the 1'1C trairung and deployment fac1h11cs The
mnu1l wcnpoM and tr3nsportation requirements will come lrcun captured ~tock_s .
Monthly ~upenll~ will be pa1d by the P1lo1 PrOJecr adm1nistnt110n but from <;0urccs
ouu1dc the PrOJCCt budget. An appropriate 1 0 c:imp111in \I\ 111 be mounted by the
Eighth PsyOps Group. Budget notes explam the more relovanL. non sclf-cv1dcnt
numbers.
• A1TACI IMENT 4 - Role descriptions expl:un the capnh1lllies of lhc prime
contracror, RONCO. and each subcontractor. 11JC\c sttttcmcnts C~\cn1101Jy
rcprc~cnt "sub-CunOps" and are the building blocu for the ConOp:i 11'1Cy
dovetail wub the budget.
• A 1T ACI IMENT 5 • Wh1le Coalition tbanlont as of May 7 only mduded an an1t1al
1u11111ng cohorl of three battalions, an optinnal fou.nh battle 1tten. nnnc and OU
(depleted uramum) clearance battalion •~ proposed. It "-Ould be comp.n~cd of ~o
1c¥1onal M 111e Ad.1un Centers fru tlit: nut.ltllt: aml wu1lac111 1c&m•~ (Tllc llOl lb is
drc11dy co\crcd by a number of~GO clearance ac11v11acs) TI\C proposed founh
Nltalmn fits w11h koo'"--n pohe1es 10 cle:u pnonty arc.ii of uncxplodt.-d ordmmce
and n11ncs and to employ lraqis-cspccfaUy fonner comh.ttan1 s- 1n producuvc
~111.-rpm,es as qwckly llll possible:. Thi~ uptrou !&.bu help:. m::ahi !in cJ1 ly pu tll\c:
pubbc image for the NIC and captun:s 1~lllnt econom1crof.scalc by raw
h3Ckmg onto sunk cosls of already eXJSllfl!? effort~ for the NIC. 1 h1 ~ offers a
potcnwilly cost dTcc11vc way for feeding pohcy needs and ccmlaanin~ co:.is The
1n<:rt'~ntal cost would run to S&.8 nulbon fnr roughly one yc:n ThlS figure 1 s nOl
mt:ludcd in the attached ''NlC budget". though 11 ~paratc 1nd1cauve buJgc:t for
nunc/UXO clearance 1s attached_
Pl.ANNING VARIABLES
ORJIA npcct rapid procening ol r ecruits so that the NIC can be formed in the
\ hortest tlmt pos51ble consistent with appropriate rt&li tration, crel'nina, proceuing
and tr11ininc. 1'hit expectation helps set t he overall l ev~l- of -c.- ffort llanmtters
lndudln& the budget totals.
There arc i.hining unknowns with respect 10 1hc: actual sir< and C\cn physical condition
of the NJC popufolron' to be tre;ttcd under lhe Pilot Prog,rrun As l>001111s these: foctors uc
beth:r undentood. then more accurate scale trauung sue culc:nng, mcthcaJ Krecntntt and
other clements Cll.Jl be refined.
2

The phy 1cal stale or lhc cho en NIC tratning Sile" south of Raghdad also '4111 arr eel the
budget 1rthc s11c 1s m rcla11vely good condition. tbcn hnle renova1ron will be required If
not, then tn\)rc extmswe physu:al rehabiblation will be needed At thas point. the fm;il
sue hu not been selected, though some surveys have been conducted. An 1 nd1cal1vc
rcnovauon budget figutc ss mcludcd. lt may need rcvision
Transpon111on rcquucmcnts are u.nknown mat least three ways hrst, will a sullicicnt
number of appropnate and scl'Vlccabte fonncr Iraqi Anny vehicles be made aviulot:i\e'> lf
not, then the: budget musl be augmented. Second. bow many, how often and how far must
recruits he tran.'lponcd from the Centers and to the training sue') hnally, will RONC'O he
folly, rartutlly or not at all tc.\poruable for transportation under the Pilot" rhcse factors
must be ~c 1 ghc d against desired lift and load requircmencs and the need for tna)Cimu_m
efficiency Accordingly, the vehicles and minimal 11\3int~n:ince )hown in the Jrafl bui.lge1
arc plac~holdcl'll
The followmg points amplify the budget notes.
l. I>uc to the pilot nature of the activity. the evolvmg condillons under which It l5
1mplcn1cn1ed and the large number ofunlcnown and r otc:ntlally t111conlrollnhlc
variables. st is nnticipatcd that budget mod11icatiom1 will be ~ccssa.ry arut
advisable as implementation matures. In order to minlmlu the number of
modi0caelon1, ~ncurnnc.e is nquested for utilldo& at RONCO Initiative, a
rifrttn (IS) p<'r4'ent adjustmrnt authorb.allon bottM·tcn apprn..,ctt llnr ltcnu
r Ins "-OUld include all ~ppropriate advance discUS~IOl\ .'I :ind cootdinauon With the
field COTk. Every cffon should be made to m1111m11c nwrl1lic1111on \\<h1ch
1mphculy suu,cst administrative delays th11t negatively 1m~ct on the need for
tllp1d impkmcntahoo..
2. The contract ongm.:i.Jly negotiated with RONCO c:21ls for l"-O scp~te 120 day
opuon pcnods. ff fundmg for the Pilot cannot be contnu:ted m 1he near future,
lhen ll IS recommended that the option periods be :tctJvatcd m adv:incc oflhc PLlot
PrnJCC:t funding itself This would allow for robust 1mpkmentat1on pl:inmng
including all needed s.itc v1 s1 rs, preparallon of unplcnienr:illon pl11ns and
prchrruno.ry mobihz.at1on. Obv1oosly, battlefield events greatly exceeded both the
expcc:lations and planning assumptions used rn the original propo~I. Thus,
1c11vating lhe 120 day options rccogniz.cs the hm1t.nt1on of the ong111al eontrac1
nod wauld allow for necessary pre-deployment ac~1ons to proceed wubm the
flexible form:it required to successfully deploy for and begin 1mplcmcnta11on of
the Pilot. Ttns would not be necessary if Pilot Pro1cct funding 1s 11v:uloble in the
nc.ar-lcrrn.
3. In fom1ulaling the bunkued rates dcr:uled in the budget, HONCO utilized
approved ~lacy levels under its existing GSA contract. These rotes are cons1 stc11 t
with those proposed under our initial conr:nct. ALI 111d1v1duals employed tor the
Pilot activny will be p;ud in accordance v.uh U.S.G . rcgulauons 1 .c., no
mdw1dual(s) will patd a d:uly salary rnte(s) above wh.ar is authonzed by U.S.G
pohc1es.
3

--------- ·--
Became oflhc: many v1r11blc:s, a C ontingency Liability figure 1 s included in rhc budgc1
1 0 cover v.hal we partnlJy understand or don't know. As noted throughout th1'I
presentauon. every effort will ht' made 1 0 conmfo costs w11h1n c 1111bh~hcd 1mplcmcn1a11on
stand3tds lo include c'(pcctaaons with respect to rapid process in& of recnul ind 5tandmtz
up the NTC
'I Ht : RONCO TEAM
1llC." RONCO CQnsuJting Corporation will be the Pnmc Contractor for rhc Pilot project.
RONCO v.111 man:age ind supervtSc all o~tions related tn m1plc:mcn11u1on 111 foll
accord With U.$ CJ policies and relatcJ programs under the sup<:r\!1S1 Q 11 of tlc sl~mued
C'n:tlmon j)<'fM1ntlCI Each or the proposed sub-<:ontraclors. IU \\oCll as RONCO. has
mcurr cd cons1dcroble prOJCC:t preparation costs outside the original contrnct IC ;i Pilot
Pr0 Jec1 contract is granted, then reasonable rcimbursc:mcot for such cos~ 1s requested
RONCO pl•n11 to U'le nve (5) subcontractors to help in1plcment the Pilol according to
lhc brief dc:scripttons offered bc:low. lndividual functions may O\Ctamorpho!IC or even
disappear following the decisions raised on matters in this cover Memorandum and others
th.DI may be mutually identified.
'rhe bal1nccd use of both rqional and U.S. sub--conlr•ctors wu a &tudicd decldon
This approach reduces the American footprint and thereby hmit5 polcnliaJ pohuc.:il
1cns1on:i;; 11 mcrcas« the culturally sensitive Arab prcseoc:c ond llngu1s11c capah1lity thlll
will be cntJcal Cor success; 11 reduces costs: 1t c:n~ce<: the choticc~ lhr complenng rhc
P1lo1 within c.xpcc1 aoons; and. shows appreciauon for regional fncnds and their
conuibuuoa.s to Coal1t100 rlfoTts. Additional mformanon nn c:\rh p.'lrtncr · ~ 1n lhc
anacbments. --....
\
/ -c~hb<' ~~ultlng wtll be rcspon~blc for selected vemng u '"ell .:is reqt11red
1 tlo IC nu htary tra1n1ng. The Prcsjdent and CEO lS the former SOCCQ.i 1
Commander dunng Desert Storm. He enjoys excellent contacts lhroughou1 the
rt:t;1on. Recently. Cochise trained elite Saudi forces under FMS sponsorship.
Alrudy written and tested proprietlr)' Anbk l11n1uacc culnlnt ~llabl for
uch rcqu.ired training segmenl preclude lht netd ror rurriculul.ll
dndopmenl, thereby saving considerable costs ind lime. The Arabic: syllabi
are available to the Pilot at no additional cost. ~
-
-
··Arabi Holding Group (Ku~· ait) Wlll be lhc Procunmcnt and l..<>g1..'lt1cs
5<-rv1ccs Agcvt for both the prime and sub-contractors as directed by 1ht prime.
They pravide the "U-Call, We Haul" services on a task OTder or demand basis The
KuwaH-w1de McDonaJds franchise is omong Arabi's many businesses. Arabi 1 s
well nod fovorably known to the U.S. Embassy m Kuwo11 A& appropmue.
individual subs may undcrtaltc their own procurement cspcc1ally when this helps
contain overall contract costs. If desired by ORHA, An1b1 can oq;amzc and
deploy short-term Kuwaiti volunteer intcrpretcr/tronslntors who would help
contain overall co ts These are proven md1vidu~ls who were seen 11ee-0mp:mymc
lioth pnnl and media JOurn.ahsts dur10g open bosll11t1e~ 1n I ~ For the mosr p:lft.
they lire college studenr s
j
,../
4

·---
--- ------------
.
- The Saha,.. Trading Complln)' (Jordan) will be rcspon'l1ble for 1den11ry1ng.
oontr;icung. and managmg local construcm;m fimlS 1 0 refurb1$h and/or construct
r11c1Jll1cs that are needed lo house our staff and NIC 1n11nccs at each of the
processing and trammg centers. They are also responsible for oontracung for
fac1ltty and camp management. including catering services at each or the centers.
S:ihara h11 )ubc:onlracted a sear.<med IotJanian firm that has c:~tc:ns ive catennt
ex.pencoce 1n lroq h is import•m1 to note that thtS finn provided catering servaccs
10 coahtlon force!. dunng Desen Storm. and intends to utih1e local Iraqi stalTto
facilitntc their operations. Sahara will also provide human resources suppon to
1dcm1fy and C'rnploy IOC<ll hire s~ff. induJmg tr11nsla1ors/in1erpre1er s. $Ccurity
per onncl, and .tdntinistrative staff. Sahara 1s well oind t'avorably known to thc
U S, EmhCISS)' 111 Ammlln. The owners are naturah1.cd Amertcnn c1ttzens.
--The International foundation for £1~tio n Sen,.ices (lFl<:S/U.S.) will be
rcl!poM1ble for rcg1stra11on or recruits :md sh:mng infom1a11on in the darabase
w11h the Coalition and lnlenm Iraqi Go\'Crnmcnt as and when requested. Their
worldwide e1tpcriencc performing elections rcg1s1ratlon services offers
tremendous registration experience as well as a transparency window lo external
groups who rnny wish or "need" to find fault. In time, and at the discretion or the
U S ,G .• poruons of or all the database may also be shDrrd w11h oppropnate
mtcrnatlonal orgami.ations, oou-govcrnmental organlzat1ons am.J the media
--AffiUated Compulu Services (ACS/U.S.) through 1ts We lfare and Workf orce
Services 01v1s1on and supponcd by its Jordanian affiha1c, TAGI, w1Jl 1mplcmcnt
non ~mif na ry trammg lbJough existing ITDqi iOSflfDUOns 1f fas appropriate. Tius will
include 11tihz111g still functional Iraqi vocational and technical m~titnhons to feed
fimsbc>d tnnnees 10 the lnterim Iraqi Government. donors and pnvate sector
emptoyrncn1 opportunities. ACS ranks fourth on Fortune Magaz.me's most
adrrurcd companies
EX-PECTED THROUGHPUT
The Co11liUon'.s primary intt.nt for thr Pilot Projccl 1 1> 10 recruit. rel!1s11:t, snccn
selected individuals (vetting). medically clear. provide bo.. ic mihrnry tr'ammg skilb io
N lC recruits and dtrploy them as quickly and effectively l\S 'possible within the si:<t-momh
Pilot implcmC'ntation period. Understanding the NIC throujthput parameters is
crWcal In this r~ga_rd. The parameters are, or course, 1em1>cred by some ofU1c planning
V'uriilblcs given above. Still. expected throughput levels can be met 1 r cont.ractHtg occurs
soon and financiCll resources are adequate and appropriate co tht: tasks e.g .. S11pend money
1 s available from non-c<>nh'act sources.
Calculating the level-of-effort for the desired throughput Is both a.11 and science, given
both the known and unknown variables. All recruits must be reg1Stered. med~ally
screened and a dctcnnination made for militi1ry suitabiliry.
With ten registtation stations per center, eacb ca.n rcgistC'r 38 l per day or over l ,000 for
1htce centers per day. Twenty·tho1,1sand can be reg1stcrcd in appro1Wt1ately lhrcc months.
We nsumc ti~ same period oruillC' for medical screening.
5

OnJy sclc:crcd rccru1r will be \"encd for their past activ1ucs For example:, those wirh
m1htary rank of hcutenanl colonel and above will automatJcally be ~uhJCCltd to an 1n-
<kpth eurmnahon process unless tlxn: arc conttuy 1 ndic:ators Othcn. may be ' ub1cctcd
to I.he ume proceA 1fthcrc arc reasons to do so. We assu~ roughly 100 lieutenant
colonel• per J1v1 ion- four dJv1 ions for a 40.000 ~IC &"cs 400 hcutcnant colonel' Add
10 tlus nnothcr 1.600 p.-n.onnel of potential m 1t1es1 for a total of2,000 in depth
mterv1c~.x. The mt:\ of ranks may vary but the 2.000 cohort provides a ~ful live
percent plaMmi figure (2.000 divided by 40,000 equals five percent)
In the bo.x below, "'f offer a JC ln.iruog level-or ...... rrort 1hat cre:ate> 19.200 lnlnff'
at the end or the slx·montb Pilot. To reach the 40,000 Cicure, the tralnln& penonnc-J
11 .~, ·el -of -e ffort rnay 001 have to be doubled in budeet te rms bur would o~d
personnel auamentatlon. At lhb point, lesser cost Jordanl11n tnlnen \\OUld be
lntroduct'd as a force multiplier. ln addition. tJie C oehl c lralnln1t program wlll
utUILe the tnln- thc-tnlner concept wbereb)' sclcclcd Individual (rum each
tralolnii cour e will be used as assistant inslructors for the ~ubliequ e nl tralnhlK
periods. ndC?r tbls conccpl the Iraqis will eventually ll5'umc ruponslblllly for the
eullrc lnlnln& proiram. This approach helps conllaln c. ·o'h'-
NewlraqiCorps(NtC) Pilot Program
1 Month 2 Months 3 Montns 4 Mon~ S Months 6 Monttw
I
lteO'Mr-
Vt!UnOJ
M1!oury
AuessmeM
ln•Deptll
Ca•mliltllon
fnitf'tlll
• team RONCO wlU register 350 i>eOl>le per d•y per center (Mc>Sul, 8ootod1d. O.•ra);
• Tum RONCO will medlc•llv eum1nc 160 c>eople per ci.v per e.cnter1
• ltam RONCO wOI conduct an lnltial vctllng/tNh~ry au.ssment on 160 people pe1 d<1y per cent•r;
• Tum RONCO ut1matH the ~for 1n tn·dep«ll SCTCcnlng of 2000 voluntffrs:
• tum llOtKO ¥1111 P'O\llde bcltoc: moltUlry tri11n1ng for 3200 volunttt"1 per tour·we.I( ~no4 •
• Tum RONCO INY pro\hde C>Ytl..., skills H~:Ssmcrit and lrtfn11'11 '°' thOte wt>o Ol>l·out ol 1~ HIC.
• l••m RONCO"'''~'°"" 1ra.ned 800-pef'SOll l>llDbons evfUY lour we.t.• tor 1 totA.1 ol 19,200,
• If tile "1lne ..,d bclltle·•-durance option is <T>Ole<',
- ol tl'le twenty-four bltUhon1> ..... be
tOeOaly tr•.,,eO tor 11111 ""~-
6

DELIVERABLES
All dclivc:rables will be pro,i.dcd in paper ind electronic fonn to the COTll. RONCO
pr~ lhe follnwing deliverables and limelines:
• Pilot program dec1S1on brief based on s1te survey and addmonal coordination;
• lmplerncntanon plan ~1thtn r""o weeks of contract a";ard that lflcludc~ rumcJces
for rccommc:ndcd vctung criteria. ba:.ic Aiab1c 1ra1runs prognun of in.struclloo
{POI). r~mmcncbttons for an Information Campaign and for a shared dat1 ba..e;
• Daily, weekly and monthly situa1ion reports upon initiation of the Pilot.
• Monthly lessons learned repotts ~
• 1- ·111JI vut h11ef w11hfo JO days after redeployn~nt , 1111d, u
• F111:1l report within 60 d3ys a fin redeployment
U:GAL Rt:SPONSIDl UTIES
RONCO t~ cogn1 zanl of the legal parameters surrounding this Pilot progn1m.
lmplemcnta11on will occur in full compliance with 1hc rules ofrhc Gencvo Convention
.ind lhc l.nws of I.and Warfare. as applicable. When/as npproprlalc1 Pc:ntai;oo lou:il
1dv1ce will be ought. Whenfas appropmte, RONCO leglll coun«-1 wHI be U.\Cd.
·1 he
modalities will be established du.cing meetings between the two lcg:il en1111cs,
Additionally, as noted in the cover Jetter of our original proposal. \lie request that th1.s
p1lo1 acti\•11y not preclude RONCO from future rdated opponunille~ in Iraq
AT1'ACllMENTS
J. Concept of Operallons
2. Pilot ProJc::C t Power Pomt Bnef
3. 4. Ortfi Oudge1 &. Budget :-.:otes
1 e3m Capll)l!ity Statements with subcontractor concepts or op:nuu> m
S. .Battle area and Mme Oear:ioce Option - 11lc 4• Battalion
7

ArrACHMENTONE-Concept of Operations
5110{2003
CON OPS for the Pilot Program to facilitate the establishment of the New Iraqi Corpe
(NJC).
I. Situation. With the declaration of an end to major combat operallons, destruction of
Iraq's military and the establishment of a permissive environment in most of traq,
Coalition efforts now focus on reconstruclion and creating 1 secure and stable
en\ 1ronmcn1 in ln:iq. A kcy conditioo in s111Jpon oJ a ~~<:urc und srablc cnvfronrncnt as
well u" facihu111ng d1c rmm:ioon to a new lr.aq1 Go\1Cmmen1 1~ rhe c·re:11ion nfa
professional and representative lraq1 nulitary. An mitial step in r.11smg a new Jrnq1
military is the esuibhshment of the New Iraqi Corps (NIC). The NIC will he o nascent
military capability that os11is1s C'.cJalition efforts. However, mitiul efforts h> establish the
NI\ will have to he rmdcnt nnd "1Cll~Urect The n•nson ts lhli! nfler !Tlflr(' rh.tn 12 years of
sonclions and wars, there \s a tremendous lack of Jobs. Un and underemployment
estimates run as high as 80 per cent. IL is safe to say tha1 the Jroqi economy and
inf~stnicture urc extremely weak. l11erefore, 1hc sudden infusion of more than 350.000
r;elr-dcmnbilittd and EPW<; Iraqi soldiers places dungerous r1dditiol\Lll strain<; on lhc
economy. The NtC will provide some of the un and/or underemployed Iraqi soldic1s a
rroductivc '-''llY lo suppon themselves and their families, and prevent some of them from
seeking or being dnwn into other means of CnJ?IO)'Tl\Cn1 t~t cause mstabihty. I lowever,
m11jat e ffort~ to start the NIC \>r1U be tailored to attrilct the right kinds of volunu:ers ns
well as cn~urc that the process ts not overwhelmed.
2. MU.loo. Team RONCO conducts operations to facilitate the processing, selection,
and trainifli of the New Iraqi Corps (NIC).
3. Concept.
a. Comma nder's Intent. P u rpose. The purpose of the pilot program 1s to
promow s1ab1lity through the establishment of a basic and cnmpetent military capability -
the NIC. Additton;tlly, establishment of the NIC provides on upport\1mty to address 1he
problcrns associated w}th over 350,000 self-demobilized lraq1 soldiers :md other armed
groups such as the Peshmcrga alld the Dadr Corps. The N'IC is the first step in
transforming tbc Iraqi military into an institution that is professional, reflective of the
populotion dcmograph1~~ and a so\1rce of national pt\de. The ratSing of 1hc NlC will be
11111tally fac1 htatcd by the cstabUshment of three s1nne . i;1cally located Rchobthiation and
Development Centers, a Cen!Tal Training Facility aod three NIC camps. Methodology.
The three centers, central training facility and three NIC camps will pTovidc a location
where Iraqi volunteers will be processed. selected and tromcd for the first three Nl\
ha11alions. Addiuonally. the central training fac1ltty a. nd the three comps will provide ::ill
tiasic life and administrative su-ppon throughout the proc ess for cac11 sclcclcd soldier. At
1he completion of processing <hose volun1 eers selected for the N IC nro transported to the
ccnrra1 tr.1inLBg facihty for basic training. At the cod of basic tr:uning, the NlC soldiers
arc transponed to one of rhe three camps. Fwther, the pilot may provide those not
selected and/or washout alternl1tive slolls resulting in viable employment End State rs
the rapid and d'fecttvc cstabUshmeot of a baste a.nd competent Iraqi militnry copabihty.
g

llus new c1pab1hty will assI£t Coaliuon efforts m susra1mng a stable cnvnonmcnt.
solidify the transition to Phase IV operation~ as well as demonstrate the ("03l111on·~
rc,,olve to c1c.itc the ne<:~s:uy conditions to tnnsfer authority to a ne~ Iraqi ~ovemmcnt
as quickly as possible
b. chcme oJ Mancu\cr. 11ic: process to fac1lm11c the rapid :>nd cfTcc11ve
C\l.:1bhi.h111cn1 oflhe NlC ~·"be conduct~ in fh·c pb3~. Uurang l'ha~e I. ream
RONCO will conduc1 detailed planmng in order to foc1htatc lhc prompt assembly and
dcploymc:nt of the required resources to esiablish the three rch:ib1htat1011 and
development centers. 1hc central tnuning facihty and three NIC' camps. Each center wtll
h.:ivc the necessary capab1ht1es to c.ondu1.-t all act1v1ues required includmg n:g1stra11on.
vcn1ng, med1cal scrccrung, and basic military skllls trammg Ii> fac1hta1c sekct1ng
qualified volunteers for the t\IC. The Central training fac1hty and the three \,llC camps
will be eapJblc of housmg. feeding, providing basic medical ca~ :>s wcll u
adrn11us1rahvc ~uppon Concurrently, during Phase l , Coahuon F'orccs ~•II conduct a
comprchcM1vc, coordmotcd aud carefully tailored and sequenced (w11h I com RONCO)
Information Campaign in an effort to attract a specifically targeted portion of tho
population. Addit1onally, Team RONCO will coordiniue with Coaht1on and ORllA
rcprcscn1a11vcs 10 order to 1den1ify opportunities for the mtcgrotion of quahficd lroq1s into
the C'"emer,, Cc111r;il Training focilityand Camps i.e., doctors, nurses etc. In Phase II,
·r cam RONCO will c.su1blish the three reh.ab1litahon ond development ci:ntcrs, centr.il
training f1c1hty and three camps. The three ccnte:rs will be est3blishcd in key
demographic locations throughout Iraq. The initial loca11ons well be m Mosul. Oa'1ld;id
and £\a~rah 1'hc C:<'Ortal lr:urung focjtity will be established ID the VICllllty of liagbd:ld
and the three camps will be stnltcgically located throughout the country in order to
f:\(1ht11tc 11ss1~1ng C'oaht11l11 operations The c~nter m R:iehdad w1ll 11l~n c;crvc as the
hcadquancrs for the Pilot project. During Pbase ID, \Oluntcers \\Ill be reg1stercc.J.
~d1ca.lly screened. vi-ned "hen necessary and assessed for 1hc1r nnh1nry training. At
lbc complc11on ofproccssm&. those volunteers th3t arc sclcc:ted for the NIC will ht'
transported 10 the central trauung facility where they unckrgo basic c:n11mng At the
complctton ofbas1c trammg, they wt.II be transponed to one of three MC camps~ Those
volunteers not scle<:tcd for the NIC as well as those th:u 'A-ashout during ba'l1e tr:umng
may he pro\ 1dcd :ippropnalc skills tr:nmng and C3SC management acllvlt1e foc11itat1ng
v14bJc employment. Dunng Pbasc IV, Team RONCO, in coordinauon with ORJIA, will
conduct an assessment of the process as well as inillatc appropn:uc coordmauon m order
to fac1hta1c a smooth and seamless rransfc:r ofproccssrn& and tnuning act1viucs to a ocw
Iraqi Govcmmcol. At the completion of band-off , Team RONCO m1hates Phase V
opcrauon, recJeploymc:nt. Throughout all five ph:tses. cl<.\i.c coordm:ition will b.: made
wirh Coahoon Forces and the new lraq1 Govc.mmcn1 to cn~ure that appropriate meoisures
:m: implemented to ensure a . n effccnvc: and efficient procc~s ing and m11mng program
c. Concept of the Operation.
I. Phase I - Planning & Prcpara11on. !'cam RONCO, cons1 slS ()f the
necessary cap:.bihncs to conduct planning and maoai;cmcnt. proccssiJli;, refurbishment of
the three rchabihtarion anrl development centers, central miming factlily and three NIC
camps. Addlt1onally, Team RONCO conducts detailed planmns and coordumuon "'1th
ORllA, CFL.CC, CFNTCOM. Coaliooo Forces. Coahuon members. lr:iq1 Government
and oppropr101tc lntcm:ition:tl Organi:zat1ons (10s) 1100 Non govemmcntol OTg:tniz:moos
(NGOs) The mlent ts to dc,-clop and dchver a comprehensive plan for the conduct of all
9

associated operations to fac1ltlatc the establishment oftbc NIC. Planning wilt include
development of selection criteria. development of a focused 10 campaign. development
of vcitmg c:ntcr1a. development of medical selccricm cntena and development of a
program ofm~tn1cuon with the intent ofpioduetng competent Iraqi sold1cn calla.hie of
conducting basic miJitary o~ra tions in suppon of Coalition cffons.
F'unhcr, Team RONCO will assemble and deploy all of the required capab1lit1cs that v.111
enable it ra rapidly move 11110 lraq in order to qwckly and proficiently establish the three
rehabihtation and development centers, the central trairung faci111 y and three NI\ camps
diat will be utili7 .cd to process, select and rrafn volunteers for the NIC. ·
Additiono.ll)', ORHA and Coahtion F0<ces will conduct carefully constructed lnformauon
Campaign that targets specific elements of the population in order to initially attract 21
representative and manageable number of volunteers.
2. Phase ll - Mobihzation. Team RONCO conducts appropriate actiVJtics
10 identify, deploy, establish and operationalize 1hc three rehabilitation and development
centers, central trairung facility and three NTC camps.
3. Phase llJ - Processing, Selection and Tram mg. T eam RON\O 1s
postured to receive. process, facilitate selection and train volunteers for the program. The
first step of processing will be registration. Registration wiJI be conducted by Team
RONCO in order to enable appropriate peTSonncl activities m support of each volunteer.
The reg1~trat1on data basc will be synchronized and sh:lrcd with the PWIS data base in
order tu facili1atc pcT$0nnel adrninisu:irion for those selected for the NIC as well a
follow-up acuv1t1es for those not selected for the. NlC. The SL'COnd c;tcp "111 be to
medJc:illy screen each volunteer in order to identify any dtsqualifying physical and
psychological problems. Simult':Uleously, the voluntc1:rs arc scree11cd and 1hc1 r miluary
slo alls tisscs!>ed. In some c.a.scs there wtll be volunteers who warrant follov. ·ur lnose
volunrccn; 1dcn1tficd for follow-up will undergo nn m-tfcprh m1crv1 cw. Aller undergoing
processing, Team RONCO "'ill prepare a recommcndauon for each vulunlcer to enable a
Coalition decision. Alter a decision. those selected for 1he NIC will be transported to the
central training facility where they wm be gjvcn basic 1ra1mng. At th~· eompklion of
ha.;ic 1ram1ng, they will hi; nansponed 10 one of three NI ca mp~ :'Ind 1he11 h.-inrlcd off t<>
the Coalition. Those not selected for · the NIC wtll rarticipate in a rcmteg.r1111on survey m
order to son them inro groups for potential sJc.il.ls training. The purpose of 1he survey is lo
place them into appmpriare techn.ical U:Linjng, sk ills traimng, and vocatiooul trairung
progmms.
'f hose wbo are w;tshcd out of basic training \i.1111 be i:;cm back to the
rehabilimuon and development center and may be provided with skills training and case
management. Additionally, there is a chance that there may be volunteers who are not
suitable for the NIC as well as skills uaining. They will be returned home All personnel
who enter a center will n:ce1vc a stipend according to the durauon o fthc1r participation.
Concu.rrcn1 ro tltc processing ;ind training of each volunteer. icam RONCO will conduct
appropn:Lt c planning and coordination in preparation for Phase IV - Transition to Iraqi
Government.
3. Phase JV - Transition. Transfer of processing and tnuning act1v111cs to
new Iraqi Government. During this phase, Team RONCO tr:rnsfcn; all responsibihttes
associated with processjng and training activities to lhe new Iraqi government with a
10
-·

view to institutional strengthening. Additionally, Team RONCO conducts appropriate
planning and coordina1ion for redeployment.
5. Phase V - Redeployment. Team RONCO conducts acrivities to close-
out and redeploy.
ll

-- ----
~' .J ~Ull jS.;--
"Markaz Al-Ta'heeJ wa Al-Tatweer"
Rehabilitation &
Development Center Brief
May 05, 2003
Purpose: To fadlltate a decision to: 1)
' process, support and assist problematic
groups in a post-Wair Iraq; and/or, 2) to
fadlitate the establishment , of the New
Iraqi Corps (NIC) and/or the Quwatt ad-
Dlfa'a al Iraqia (QDI).
1

---------------------
llfnll Scaleable Uodular Options.
omi:.oat-.ert.dt:r> __ ....,....,_
~ ---------· ·--K:=J C'.I DD DOI
001
3
• ~ & a.dr Brigade ...... nol beelt ~ lo def!~ .,.,,.,. pr19e • ...... IO SlaOoWy
• °"91' ~. 000 ~ Ir.qi~ wlklamobiizl!i(f
• TIIOae llOldie<9 - left the · ~ ...... n..ng ...-.1orw
• The ... ~....,,. .. gnhil. lo ....... ...,."*'..,. job-.,.._..~'°"~
• The .._ 119qi CQlp. (NIC) 111 ~ to .iart Yo11!1> 3 SillfalloM. One In the north, Cllflll« ei1C1 _,ih
• 80 per,.,... of'"" 8"""8g!I houMtlcld . ~ • ~lll'lOd ..,. ,.,. food· raiion
• eo ~· oen1 o1iha ~ nitt~ O!l IM ~· (obd 11aa1re1111o maat all~,_.~
WOulilt b9dlJeCl!y Ind ~all9cled i1'. ·~ dtha·rood ~~
• E....,......-y, bQI .......,.,..,. Jn h(I _....._.SOW.~ ..S 80'lb (CIA)
• Appiou1...., ~of Iraqis~ on UoW"••••• tood ~.and 49'11. ol hql......._.
~ daft(ll ..... hir b9ic ._.
n,. -~-& .Clhet' •l'lh9d gr~ •• llkln to Kapl.n'r. "loaM
molecuie.· end rnuat be given • PQ911w .,.. In 90dllly 10 enaure ll•lllllly
4
2

------
-------
-----
Intent of Rehabilitation & Development Centers
, .. ,. .. tJ Oll'lo9d,...,.,..,_, -~~
•11111111!11~-lll!!ll!lll!llll!I- --· ~ CJ D D DOI
• Seal.able and modular approach frees Coalition peBonnel
• Prornot• ttability by demObiizing and reintegr.ung the Peshm«;e & Badr
BOgsde
• Facilitme establishment of the NIC andlor QDI
• Provide employment opportunltiea through tklll• & vocational train!~
• Case management & counseling to help prevent problem c:.ses from
causing instability i.e., band"'Y
• Capacity building in support of MOO - processing and training
• Establish the preconditions to reintegl"llte the 350,000 sett-demobilized
5
Rehabilitation & Development Process
·
- IC::! c:::> CJ CJ DOI ... -u 0111»o1-........-. --~
~~ .. -----· ·-·-
3

Scheme ot Maneuvw for R•habiltdon & Development Centers
CJ CJ CJ 001
• Retutbfthtion & Ocwelopment C~ers
stniteglc:aly loceted to tlirget •pecifk:
grou~
· Centers are scaleabl• & mOdular In
design
• Cent.,.. concurrently proc .. s NIC
and/Of 001 volunteers 1nd proY1de
basic mllrtary •kllls training
• Utilize exitting Iraqi tnfraatructure
where pou1ble
•Centers 'Ml p~ food, sMtter &
medical aH1ttance throughout
processing & tralntng
Centets synchronb DOR of~· and
e.dr BrlQade With the~ of the NICIQDI 1
Center Implementing Elements
ia• ..... c:...d __ , ...
---
!
~!!!!~!!!!!!!!!!!!!-
·---=::J CJ D CJ 0 D I
----
.-.Cot
__
....,... ___ _
""
-
---
_
_ ..
-
...............
,,__
~:.C--
--
_..,...
,..... ........
....... '" ... ,_.
--
-- --
.:: "'O.T:"" ...
-
--- "' ......... ....,. ....
--
·---
..
...__ ... _, ..
-...- --
----
.._._.. . ._
........_.__.._...
--
--
-
---
---
--
- - -
-
--
---
---
-
........... ~ ..
--
--
·------~
•
4

Processing c:::J CJ D D 001
9
Registration
m::::J c:::::::l Cl 0 DOI
•Short- and Medium-Term (Immediate to Six Months)
• Identify potential recruits for the NIC from demobilized population
• Identify f'ndMduals Yftth skills key to reconstruction to offef training and
employment
• Determine priortty training programs for demilltariZed p9r$onnel
• Regulate distribution, of cl\111.ian reintegration packages (i.e. wuohers1
materials, funds)
•Long-Term (Six Months to Five Years)
• Create the basis for efficient and democratic public administration:
• Facilitate the creetionlrenewal of out.of-date, damaged or lost public
records
• Pr011ide voter registration data and vertfication for t111entual elections
• Reduce costs of poblic data maintenance lhrough centralization of core
information
10
5

~
~ Registra ;;; Process
Qlli»a/,_,..,..,,, .. __
------
......
·--a=J c:::J D D DOI
Registrant
Enters, ,.. 1 ___ ......_
Receives .,--
lnfonnation
Core Iden~
Data Colected ....___>
Temporary Blometnc Digital
. Record <....-----'' (Angerpt1ot) <'------., Photo
Generated Oat. a captured captured
Registrant
Sy:=~:~ & -1 --> ~~=o
Sorted tor Olsposlllon
Dupllcatesl
Errors
--->
ID Card
Generated
11
m:=J c:::J D D DOI , ........ Ol!ioeol~-,..,,.,._~
----llj-......
Registration Input/Output
·--
~ T~
~Database~
t::;:/ <? D ~ ~
EJEJ§J~~
12
6

Registration Stages
---"'°""""'"' __ ,__Asdl_
-----------· c::J c::J D D DOI
( Baghdad )
Baseline
Operation
( Mosul
Military
) ~ ('---"eas_hra~)
2-S Civilian
(;!)
( Vatar/CIYll )
RwpbClon
Extended
Operation
{
(~)
c;:~)
(;~)
C VablrfCMI )
- Repbatloo'I .
13
• Fadlltstes the rehabllttstion and reintegration process, and et the
same time supports Coalition trrlelfigence collection efforts to
Identify end capture •undesirables•
• Contributes to pubHc on:ler and safety
- Identities and removes undes!rables from the wort<force pool
- Lack of or a poor1y conceived and managed wtting pl0088& can
result In acls of vengeance, unnecessary public grie'o'8nces, weak or
no bu5t in a fMP# government and 8V80 weakened •1lf!¥1" Institutions.
- Helps strengthen public confidence in a "rvformed" Of' new
"demoaatic" gowwnment
• Vetting promotes government legitimacy and helps build a new
national Identity
• If done in a transparent and orderty manner, public perceptions of
•punittve vetting• can shift to more positive perceptions of
increasing Iraqi adherenc.e to wtdely acoepted international nonns
o1 behavior
t4
7

........ Olae,, ....... _
\.llVJIFK>
Vetting Process
----
CJD Cl DOI
• Preliminary screening and interviews used to separate
volunteers/others into three categories:
• cat 1 - No threat
>Allowed to enter into the~ and r-1tegr9tion ~·
> PrcNldM • WQftdorce poOI of eliglbte r.tum ... (NIC. 001,
cWnlntng. reintegrmtion !reining, etc)
• Cat 2 - Needs further screening - In-depth saeen
> Held for •dditionel vetting
> PoHlbl• use of edvenoecl wtting tectmlqu" (OVSA"' VSA)
> e>ep.ndlng on ftndjngs rectnsrlled •• Cat 1 or Cet 2
• Cit 3 - Threat
> Referred to Coallbon °' other reaponstble agency
> Pouibly r«um.o to EPN '*"P tor ~ling end dttentlon
15
Basic Military Skills Training
CJD DODI
...-.- _...,._
---
-
----
-
--
--
-
--
-- -
..
8

Medical Screening & Primary Care
--..Olllc9!1J!a1!-!!!!!!-!-!!'J!""'!,! • ..,!!-.!i!,-!!..,! ... !' ·---=:J c::::J D D 0 DI
• Each Center will provide medical scraening and
primary care for all individuals
• Demonstrates USG commitment to ensure the health
and welfare of former combatants (confidence building
initiative)
• Encourages participation in the program, facilitating the
recruitment process
• Provides job placement opportunities for demobilized
medical personnel
• Provides a mechanism to establish health reoords on
all processed individuals (medical database interfaces
with PWIS and the center's registration database)
17
Preliminacy Med.ica-1.s~~igi 001
l ........ ~.,,---~
• Separates individuals into three categories:
• Cat 1 - Healthy or treatable
> Eligible for raintegration training
> Traated at primary care level
• Cat 2 - Needs further screening
> Herd for additional laboratory screening
J> Test resultS determine if individual is redaS5ffied as Cat 1 or
cat 3
• Cat3-Sick
>Not treated at the •Mal"tYlr
> Referrals to proper treatment centers
J> case follow-up to ensure patient receives proper treatment
1a
9

Reintegration Process c:J
i-.--...&10..,,,,.,._._..,,_ ·-~
0 0 001
~
• Partiapating Individuals
will be screened and
vetted
~
~
I _.... -. .... · ~
11 I
• For those wno want to
return to civilian life,
training, employment,
and retention services
will be available
UCl.I--
... __ _
• Skills Training
- IT T echnlaal\1
- English ••• Second
La09uage (ESL)
- S.OUrity
20
10

Flexible Implementation Tim ~~~
1•im .. u_111 ,,,,.,, .. ..,__,.., __ _
0 0 1
I Decisions to develop • detailed tlmet1ne I
Good
~ OWIO F•
11
Consequences for Inaction
CJD D 001
........ , ................ ,.,... .......
• ......... ., ...... type ... _ ... tt.t,... ........ •--rtty a.Net ID
.... , .....
• PDp ......... ......., mnt. ....... , Plf M11¥1 •fer......,.._ C1191wt11.__
,....., a ... ., ... ,13, ... ..
•quad n1111t11l11' nr:ie•w11 • ... ,t..,1 atlt: It••
.... , ....... ...... dd'••-.tlb111illnti .... , -··111 .... .
!Security and .toe. are comeastuiles of stabil1tyj
11

Initial Policy Issues
111--~u omc. of Rlciona........., end__...., AMII.._,
IC=:J CJ D D D 0 1
1. If pilot begin• with the P•hmefQll end Baor Brtgede, does this. lnd1C8le •
precttaposltlon to leave the 350,000 self demotwlQ:ed out of the prooeH?
1. Wiii the IO C8IT'lpetgn exclu9ively terget the P•hmerga end e.dr Bt1gadt Of'
will it be more encompa$Sing?
2 W'1 the CoaWon d-.rm Pwtvnerge and Sadr Brig11de prior to SMQCeU1ng?
3. Wiii the 350, 000 Mlf-d«noblliZed and ,,.,.oled EFYls be the source of
recruit• for ttle NIC? If not, where wtll they come from?
-4. As• seperate c.nters required fol •c:h ~ t~ P.,.hmerga r.dtont end the
8edf Brig.de?
5 Wiii ~eel Peshmerga & Bedr 8ngade 1ndi'ltdu ... be alowed ll"lto the NIC?
6 Wiii vetted Peahmerga & Sadr Brigade rndll'iduats be alowed f ~o the NlC?
Initial Policy Issues (contin .. )
1....i ... ~ ---------· ·--c:=J c::J D D DOI ... Ollli'9ol~.---~
7. Wiii stipends be paid during ptooetslng? If so. where will the money come
from and how wtll It be P9f(t?
8. The Peshm«ga ... 19iativety well known to the Coalition. Is vetUng
required?
9. The Bedr Brigade Is not as well known. Wh9' level of vettino is required?
10
_
/tt.se ttl«e probl.-ns ce>-&ocatlng the process to demobilize and r•ntegratetne
PMhmerva and a.ctr Bri9ade with the prooeu to n1gister, screen end tnlin
the NIC recNlta?
11. lfextenstve refurbishman is required of'ttle fac:itrti•, then Will be a
requirement to either inoreeff the 1....i of effort or extend the time line.
. ~ .............. ,.. ... , ......... ~ ... lllldc:ow.. ClOf'Ndf••· .
I __ .. __ "I:.»-.·•--· A-u>lo-O'w--- 1
12

uc:a. cu
Summary
., • .,.u~o1~-"'""*·-~
c:::J CJ 0 0 DOI
•A ~ end modular approecll provldee llnfbilly, tr .. ec.ltion penonnel Md
oont.in9 cOllU
• PrOYldes • mec,_..,,. to proc.e the P.etwnerge & 8edr 8rigede
•Molner oppoftllnity to cafdt & identify ~ WICl98nbtes
• PrOYldes I m.;ti.,._,, to prac.. r.erullit for lhe MIC erdi« QOI
• Proc...ing & nt'*'9 •Pf*9tua , • ...,,.. ,,_Ultc>MI ~ buildlrtg lt1el can be
lrl....aon.d Into MOD
• E••bllllhft precondmons to lll"OC*9 tr. 360.000 plul aoldlete Who h•ve •t•pped
Mide Ind/or Mlf-demobiRzed
•A eoure• '"' trefneO & velled work fon:e fot ln1ql Governm..-C and oth.,.
• A. .. llOnld 10 Cll~ • MC89MrY t.o 9"CCUIQ9 targeited groupallndlvlldUit& to
report to ...... lleaon & cMli•taptnent C8f'lt•l9 lo 1vi>'d blcoming pot.ntlll «tweet to
. ..,. . .,
• A. p&.c. & proceea kif NGOs, IOs wld other Oonore to prcwlde 9dcMJonal IUJIPO"
A ec:•11bM & moduls ~ ptowldn ~ ,,...,. .. " • ...... dldeion
toot Wll9' n~ IUrtl.... a KCIOfdine lo •...,k:al ~
•NttJr Cb
ca-!!., , ~ !!!!!1!! - ~ Hao ! m !! e !! ao ~ • !!!!! .., !!1' ·-·· -==:J CJ 0 0 D DI
Back-ups
13

___ L
11 o!llca-111 T 11 r 11 al!llin 11 i11 n .... g .• P_ro.v~~rsc::J 0 , ...... ~d---~
• Kuwait partner intends to establish an Iraqi
company that is able to hire local trainers and
case managers
• Sources of local trainers and case managers
include:
-Mosul
• University of Mosul
- College of Medk:ine
- College or Engineering
• Various Technical Institutes
0 001
27
• Sources of local trainers and case managers include:
- Baghdad
• University or Technology
- Oepar1ment of Mechanical Engineering
- Department of Bect11cal Engineering
- OepaiVnent of Building and Conatruc:tlon Engineering
- OepaiVnent of Computer Science
• Various Technical Institutes
- Basra
• University or Basra
- College of Science
- College of Engineering
- College of Medicine
• Various Tedmical lristttutes
14

Civil Registry m:=J CJ DD 001
· ~"WTIC!:
· ~ •!'« ' ~
• .-.c:idte:s~
• AD!deJX:)'
• Gen~r
• leiepl'()ne ....,,,,_
• F'lioto / 8'11n"!llW'<
• DGl.e ti. 8ll':tl
• Clttftl'dllop
• ~ 1)1'C31 ~llplJ<l<l
O ~i!».flllicd!Klf\
t;umll'lr
• Plln\or)' p., !0181 Pnlpe')'
·~· • Squere t.loll•<1 1ge
•"4il<"" V~lue
• Co11rtrt.oe:11on O.e
• Munlc.opal")'
• GEo-•""8xl'lg 1 oe,n.<ier
(£1oetor"t D 1st1d }
• Mortal SI0!\1$
• 01118 Cl -1111911
• OO!p>l!101 !1 1"
• 0;,1 1!('1) of B<J1 11. ~ lilrTlilgot O<to•h
· ~~S\.oWs
• N.'llCIMI 5efVl(e Stell.I>
29
~ Reinteara~ Plan~
omo.e1-..._ _ _..........Aa#_
0 0 000
• Design of ehort-tBnn curricula fonnats fOr soft skills training
(e.g., job rudi~, ma1ivation in Arabic) and hard •kills training
(IT technicians, pml1lfll8dics, plumbers, electrician•, mechanics,
carpenters, demlning etc.)
• Selection of training providers in Iraq who will help complete the
curriculum fonnat for hard skills training
• Selection of softwan!! customized for case, management
• In coordination with Cc>ali\ion and donor entitles, design
st,.tegies for job c..ation; and,
• ldentjfy specific employers invotvecl in the reconstruction of
Iraqi infrutruc:turw
JO
15

Reintegration Matrix
-=:J c:=i D D DOI
-
c_.. ---...... - -
-- IT-.....
··-'-
- --- ---
..-..---- ·-----
---- ...._ ................ ,_
-----~~ ........
--
---
---
-
-- ----- --------· - -- ·----- ----
-- -
.._ ___ ,,
---
-- ----
,..._ ----
_.., ___
-- _,_......,.. "'*'' a -· ----
-- -:-:::...-
--··--
-- -- -· ..., ___
-- ..-.-- ---·--
--
,._, • a ----
--~--~--- ·-----
----
-
----
...-
31
16

'' · · .~ \.:ll\ ~(
J,;~ J~ ~jA
"Markaz Al-Ta'heel wa Al-Tatweer"
Rehabilitation &
Development Center Brief
May 07, 2003
. · t.~t,
I I
' I
I I
'

---
UNCLASSIFIED
- -
-
-
_..,....
- . - - - ---- .: • .!l
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
Purpose: To facilitate a decision to: 1)
process, support and' assist problematic
groups in a post-War Iraq; and/ or, 2) to
facilitate the establishment of the New
Iraqi Corps (NIC) and/or the Quwatt ad-
Difa'a al Iraqia (QDI).
2

- - 1
!
UNCLASSIFIED
Scaleable & Modular Options
W,,·;:· I f"~:-.:: I D D D 01
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
Phase I
#1
P~h & Badr , 3501000,,
B® Self Demob
'~ i-=.;::.:;'-"7=:.;.;.=....i
3

UNCLASSIFIED
Conditioning Factors
M CJD D DOD .. ---~ ~
·-----
-~
Office of Reconstruction and Humanftarian Assistance
• Peshmerga & Badr Brigade have not been disarmed & demobilized. They pose a threat to stability
•Over 350,000 regular Iraqi so. ldiers self-demobilized
• Those soldiers who left the battlefield have rising expectations
• The self-demobilized soldiers will gravitate to where they can find a job - the major population centers
•The New Iraqi Corps (NIC) is likely to start with 3 Battalions. One in the north, center and south
• 80 per cent of the average household income ls constituted by the food ration
• 60 per cent of the population re'ly solely on the monthly food basket to meet all household needs arnd
would be directly and seriously affected by a disruption of the food distribution system
• Estimates vary, but employment in Iraq runs between 50% (UN) and 80% (CIA)
•Approximately two-thirds of Iraqis depend on government food hand-outs, and 49% of Iraqi families'
earnings do not meet their basic needs
The self-demobilized & other armed groups are akin to Kaplan's "loose
molecules" and must be Q 'iven a positive stake in society to ensure stability
4

UNCLASSIFIED
Intent of Rehabilitation & Development Centers
Fl" ~ I · c=J D D DDEJ
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
• Scaleable and modular approach frees Coalition personnel
• Promote stability by demobflizing and reintegrating the Peshmerga & Badr
Brigade
• Facilitate establishment of the NIC and/or QDI
• Provide employment opportunities through skills & vocational training
• Case management & counseling to help prevent problem cases from
causing instabHity i.e., banditry
• Capacity building in support of MOD - processing and training
• Establish the preconditions to reintegrate the 350,000 self-demobilized
Centers are a key· building block in support of stabili~
5

UNCLASSIFIED
Rehabilitation & Development Process
rt c=J DD DOH
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
Disarmament &, Demobilization - Weeks
Coalition .~ --~- .. ~~ @Rm ·
- I • ..,;.->
Reintegration - months
EPWj::amp
(17 holding pens)
- Registration
-Sereening
-Vetting
- Processing
Case Mgt & CounseHng
__________ ,,,)...._~--------~
r "'
Train'ing
- Technical Jobs
- Vooational
~ J ~bl JS.>'
''Man<az Al-Ta''1eel w. a Al·latwee,..
Rehabilitation & De.velopment
Centers.
1. Processing - Pesh & Badr Bde
• Registration
-
M~c;al Sc:reeoirig
• Velting
· Demot>IUzatfon
·Voe/skins screening -
..
- Food, shelter & medical
·Stipends
2. Pro<lft9 NIC Volunteers
- Basic military skms-training
6

UNCLASSIFIED
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
Option #2 - Pilot Process
-' ,, ~ ...
~DD DDfl
•• -.:s
EPWCamp~
(17 holding d~ms)
- Registration
-Screening
-Vetting
• Processing
~
Home
.;ola:il J ~bl JS.>"
"Mafi(az Al-Ta'heel wa Al-Tatweer''
Rehabilitation & Development
f.:- Processing - Pesh & Sadr Bde
' - Registration
- Medical Screening
,. vetUng ~·
• Demobilizalioii•
-'Military skill~ assessment
• Voe/skills screetiiJlQ
.~ Food, shelter & medical
· -Stipends
2. Affer processing selected volunteers
are moved to NIC training Center
Case Mgt & Counseling
,,.,,.. ______ __.,A..._~--------....
r '
Training
-
. Tecimical ,~t Jobs
-Vocational 1-----.
Home
7

UNCLASSIFIED
Scheme of Maneuver for Establishing the NIC
~~ ~ I CJ D D DD []
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
•Three Rehabilitation & Development
Centers strategically located to target
specific groups
• Centers are scaleable & modular in
design
•Centers process NIC volunteers in
order to facilitate selection
• Utilize existing Iraqi infrastructure
where possible
•Centers provide job opportunities for
Iraqis, i.e., doctors, nurses etc
8

UNCLASSIFIED
Scheme of Maneuver for Establishing the NIC
IJ. I CJ D D QIO~
Office of Reconstruction and Humanffarian Assistance
• Those that opt for and are qualified for
the NIC are transported to NIC
Training Facility - south of Baghdad
• NIC Training Facility is scaleable and
modular
• NIC Training Facility conducts
basic training
• NIC Training Facility provides all life
support and administrative support
• NIC Training Facility provides job
opportunities for Iraqis, i.e., doctors,
nurses etc ...
•Trained NIC soldiers are transported
to their Battalion camps
9

UNCLASSIFIED
Scheme of Maneuver for' Establishing the NIC
f\ I CJD D DO~
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
• Three NIC Battalion camps are
scaleable and modular
•Camps provide all life support and
administrative support
• Three camps could provide the
foundation for the QDI
•Utilize existing Iraqi infrastructure
where possible
10

UNCLASSIFIED
Center Implementing Elements
-
It& EJ DD DOI ~---- ...
-
-- - --
.
~-
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
• Project Management Team
-,. (RONCO)
Center Management Team
(RONCO)
IStipend & Finance Mgt.
(RONCO)
I
•
Procurement & Logistics
I Services & Medical
Screening (Arabi)
! Renovations & Catering
L-- (Sahara)
+
-
' -KuWaitl fimt
-Jotdantan firm
} -Establishlng an Iraqi
sub&idiary .
.Provides TCt.f.fnedical stafj
· ,.;provjdes primary ~ical '
care ,_, _,
·Transition to Iraqi $tf
·Extensive regiOnal experien
~~low~hlgh
quaUty regionallipettise .
· ·
-Extensl~ experience in Iraq
.Utilizes, ~ cootractors and
1oca1siaff, ••
-Provides lntef'Pre ' • .
ttanslatofs '!'!.' ,,
• 'in e~ng. ~reme
& 1c;~~rvi6es
"','.,
\.._ ___ .)
----y
Regional Partners
-~
I
Registration
(IFES)
+
Admin & Logistics
(RONCO & Arabi)
I
Vetting & Millf8ry Tng
(Cochise)
I
I Reintegratt6tlrrainlng
I (ACS)
l
l
..usli· ·,; c,.. ..
-Extensive regional e~
' .;.-;US firm .
~ ~WO!ldwide e~ in
In developing mlitary ttainirig
-..-& secqp_ty program,
~p,i;pgrams
-Network of~I partnets
-Extensive experience Jn force
~ -American Iraqi staff provides
development .
invaluable Insights
-R~ally qualified _ special
opera.-experieiJ.ee.
..fi)tvation of ~t.
lii\nlng, and ~
;.-DVSA vetting capabllil)'
management
.Utilization of Iraqi traln~,p ~
case managers .:~ -._~
-Transition to l~i ~
· ... 1nformat1on oufreactt ··· · • ) .·
, '. :."'
~
'
11

Registration
• Rl!gtstef each llld1V:lclual
• ld potential recn11ts for NIC
UNCLASSIFIED
Processing
Suitability
Screen in
• lnterJlew each in<11vtdtral
• Conduct prelim inary Interview • ln-Oep!h interview Medica· 1
Screen in
• Basic health and hygiene
• Identify disabilities
In-depth
Screening
If positive move inlO
NIC training °' vocftech
training '
14 I c=J D D DD~
---
Reintegration
Surve
• Determine level of ed!JcatJo, 1
• Determine vocatlQflat stcllls
• Tr aining suitability
Military Training
Assessment
• lnd1111duar skllls
• COfTlfT'()O skins
· If uncertain - sancllOn, i.e •
loss of pension. pecmanent
exclusion from appointed or
elected office elc ...
12

UNCLASSIFIED
Registration
- -,...:--- •• •>" .--
.. :
... ~~ -~=---~-- ..
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
~---'I CJ D D DOR
•Short- and Medium-Term (Immediate to Six Months)
• Identify potential recruits for the NIC from demobilized population
• Identify individuals with skills key to reconstruction to offer training and
employment
• Determine priority training programs for demilitarized personnel
• Regulate distribution of civi. lian reintegration packages (i.e. vouchers,
materials, funds)
•Long-Term (Six Months to Five Years)
• Create the basis for efficient and democratic public administration;
•Facilitate the creation/renewal of out-of-date, damaged or lost public
records
• Provide voter registration data and verification for eventual elections
• Reduce costs of public data maintenance through centralization of core
information
13

UNCLASSIFIED
Registration Process
- - '!'_"t
-· -~
fl: If, I c=J D D D O I!
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
Registrant
Enters, ~
Receives
Information
Core Identity
Data Collected
Primary
Skills/Plans Data
Collected
Temporary
Biometric Digital
Record <:~~__. (Fingerprint) <--___.1 Photo
Generated Data Captured Captured
Records
Synchronized & L-1 --->
Sorted for
Duplicates/
Errors
Registrant
Referred to
Follow-on ~
Disposition
ID Card
Generated
14

UNCLASSIFIED
Registration Input/Output
[1 I C=1 D D DD1 ID
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
PWIS
. ,
., Database
Coalition ORHA
Private
Sector
New
Iraqi
Governmen
Donor/
NGO.
Community
15

UNCLASSIFIED
Registration Stages
_,, · I c:J D D 0 D i
· Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
. .\
_ 'Et.' · ndad
:p. tt~~·; . ~ )~
' ,,.
Baseline
Operation
Military
Civilian
Contingency
Capacity
~
.. .
~- 'AdditiO,[laJ %- ..
C~J1ter ~
.?'· ii: • ~! ~ r ....-. • ~
Center,.,..
,, ;agmEtntatip~
-
4
Extended
Operation
, . .. ...., .......
Voter/GivJI ;
• . . Reg1~tcation
•· Voter/Civil
Reglstratiqn_
voter/Civil ·
, ~egLstr,atlori _ ~
"
Voter/Civi~
· _ ~egisirat1on
._ · Voterteivil' .. : .
·
~eg1Siration- ..
Ve>ter/Givil .,.
"' $egi~lrf:l~qn "· ·
16

UNCLASSIFIED
Why Vetting is Important
I t ~. I c::=J D D DOI~
_ ._.. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
• Facilitates the rehabilitation and reintegration process, and at the
same time supports Coalition intelligence collection efforts to
identify and capture "undesirables"
• Contributes to public order and safety
- Identifies and removes undesirables from the workforce pool
- Lack of or a poorly conceived and managed vetting process can
result in acts of vengeance, unnecessary public grievances, weak or
no trust in a new government and even weakened "new" institutions.
- Helps strengthen public confidence in a "reformed" or new
"democratic" government
• Vetting promotes government legitimacy and helps build a new
national identity
• If done in a transparent and orderly manner, public perceptions of
"punitive vetting" can shift to more positive perceptions of
increasing Iraqi adherence to widely accepted international norms
of behavior
17

UNCLASSIFIED
Vettin Process
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
IE. I C=:J D D D D IJ
• Preliminary screening and interviews used to separate
'VOiunteers/others into three categories:
• Cat 1 - No threat
»Allowed to enter into the rehabilitation and reintegration process
»Provides a workforce pool of eligible returnees (NIC, QDI,
demining, reintegration training, etc)
• Cat 2 - Needs further screening - In-depth screen
~ Held for additional vetting
» Possible use of advanced vetting techniques (DVSA or VSA)
~Depending on findings reclassified as Cat 1 or Cat 2
• Cat 3 - Threat
~ Referred to Coalition or other responsible agency
~ Possibly returned to EPW camp for processing and detention
18

UNCLASSIFIED
Basic Military Skills Training
•·.:v I ELJ DD DOii
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
- - -
Reintegration
, Process
-~auaUfi~ · -
• ltacrults ~
"II* ,ii,: .. "
"¥
~a~
Peshmerga Recr:μI~ .
Badr- Bridgade ~ecruitJ
Paroled EPW Recrolts '. ..
Self~~blJlzif Rec~it&
.,. -· :_.,~ ...... '
"" \
cammon&:llhs Tng '
.PMI ~ "' -. ~
1'-and Nivtgatlon
" , ;flll1!3rj"stake~
-Oriti "'
'<firSt Aid
..weapo;ns ·aatnt.
• ~RTng··· .,.
.i----~ 41----..
-
.. -_:-_-_-~----~ .-:
t ', I
r---·'-:..-- --------•-, t:
: Collectlw Skills · Tng~ :, :
I
' -Squad I 'J" I
' ..Platoon : : :
~... -<;:ompany : : :
~attallon ' : ~ :
Leadership Tng ! !· •
Culminating :-•
Ex~lse _ •• -'
.... ___ .. 19

UNCLASSIFIED
Medical Screening & Primary Care
l: I CJD DODO
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
• Each Center will provide medical scree· ning and
primary care for all individua· 1s
• Demonstrates USG commitmlent to ensure the health
and W 'elfare of former com, batants (confidence building
initiative.)
• Encourages participation in the program, facilitating the
recruitment process
• Prov; ides job pla. cement opportunities for demobilized
medical personnel
• Provides a , mechanism to establish hea.lth records on
-
- -
all processed individuals (medical database interfaces
with PWIS and the C · enter's registration database)
20

UNCLASSIFIED
Prelimina · Medic. al Screenina
-
~-·l~- .. ~
' b\O' I ' CJD~ OD~ ~ ~
I.-~~--*-~
Office of Reconstruction and Humanffarian Assistance
• Separates indiv· iduals into three categories:
• Cat 1 - Healthy or treatable
~Eligible for reintegration training
~Treated at primary care level
• Cat 2 - Needs further screening
~Held for additional laboratory screening
~Test results determine if individual is reclassified as. Cat 1 or
Cat3
• Cat 3 - Sick
~ Not treated at the ''Markaz"
~ Referrals to proper treatment centers
~Case folflow-up to ensure patient receives proper treatment
21

UNCLASSIFIED
ration Process
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
"" I CJ D 0 OOID
Recepflon
Mosul
Baghdad
Basrah
'----~ ~-----'
• Participating individuals
will be screened and
vetted
Vetting
• For those who want to
return to civilian life;
training, employment,
and retention services
will be available
lnitiar As: sessment
D D
~ Training&
~ Em lo ment Services
~
22

UNCLASSIFIED
Eml lo ment Services Process
r;: -~·-II! .... ~ • ~"" ,1:"".l;:,
r. 1... ,,_<~ d~A.,~~-
Mt*'--t~ I E=:LJ D D D D JI
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
,,,.
Placeme. nt·'sel\'ices
. ".ii.
I
..
VocatioQal Trainin~
·11<
ft ''lo
Placement Sirvices
(I' . n.
• Skills Training
- IT Technicians
- English as a Second
Language (ESL}
- Security
- Demining
- Reconstruction skills
(Electricians, Mechanics,
Carpenters, Paramedics)
• Will develop local Iraqi
staff as trainers and
case managers
• Goal is to transition to
self sustaining Iraqi
national institutions
1:1;~~~-;:3
~nt~ld}tmeJ)t ~~
..
'Re!&ntiap
' ·'
23

UNCLA.SS· IFIED
Flexible Implementation Time Line
-
-
.
I I c=J DD DOB - -
!'.i,._ ---- -.
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
Pf anning Phase Mobilization Phase
A A
r----
, • r ------
• I x Weeks ~
0
,
'
l,.... _y_W _
ee
_
. k_s___. >
Contract Award
lmphtmintation
Plan
Implementation Phase
e <----z_da_ys'---------'
Redeployment Phase
ConUnuatlon >
I ~
• ----~ .,A.. ____ _
Decisions to develop a detailed timeline
Good
Pick 2
Cheap...___ _ __ ____. Fast
24

UNCLASSIFIED
Consequ. ences for Inaction
E'I I c:::J D D 0 oa
Offlce of Reconstruction and Humannarian Assistance
• Peshmerga and Sadr Brigade hold onto their weapons
• Evidence. of growing competition bet. ween tribes
• Emergence of · 1awless armed gangs increasingly motivated by unem· ployment
• Emergence of Mafia type elements that pose a political & security threat to
gov· ernment
• Population openly ca. rries individual weapons fo. r "safety,. - cultural norms
require retention of' individual weapons
• Questionable allegiance to new . govern_
ment and institutions
• Population becomes, demonstrably uncooperative
.. ...
Security anCI jobs are cornerstones of stability
25

UNCLASSIFIED
Initial Policy Issues
~-- -: ·. - -
_1~.
-
-
-
~- ~
~-·: (it¥ *"' rs ....... · _ __.I C=1 D D D D ~
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
1. If pilot begins wi.th the Peshmerga and Badr Brigade1 does this indicate a
predisposition to leave the 350,000 self demobilized out of the process?
1. Will_the 10 campaign excl~sively target the Peshmerga a~r
will. ' It be more encompassing? l ~
2. . WHI the Coalition disarm Peshmerga and Badr Brigade prior to processing?
3. Will the 350,000 self-demobilized and paroled EPWs be the source of
recruits for the NIC? If not, 'Where will they come from?
4. Are separate centers required for each of the Pershmerga factions and the
Sadr Brigade?
' 5. Will vetted Peshmerga & Sadr Brigade individuals be allowed · into the NIC?
6. Will vetted Peshmerga & Badr Brigade individuals be allowed into the NIC- ?
26

UNCLASSIFIED
Initial Policy Issues (contin .. )
--:: - =-----
.
- • ~
-
-
-- --
..
f~ - I CJ D D DOD
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
7. Will stipends be paid during processing? If so, where will the money come
from and how will it be paid?
8. The Peshmerga are relatively well known to the Coalition. Is vetting
required?
9. The Badr Brigade is not as well known. What level of vetting is required?
10. Are there problems co-locating the process to demobilize and reintegrate the
Peshmerga and Badr Brigade w'ith the process to register, screen and train
the NIC recruits?
11. lf extensive refurbishment is required of the facilities, then will be a
requirement to either increase the level of ef~ort or extend the time line.
Policy field is filled with "Hobson's Choicesn. A scaleable modular approach gives
policy maker5 inaximum flexibility and known choices for mid course corrections.
27

UNCLASSIFIED
Summary
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
• A scaleable and modular approach provides flexibility, · frees Coalition personnel and
contains costs
• Provides a mechanism to process the Peshmerga & Sadr Brigade
• Another opportunity to catch & identify potential undesirables
• Provides a mechanism to process recruits · for the NIC and/or QDI
• Processing & training apparatus. represents institutional capacity building that can be
transitioned into MOD
•Establishes preconditions to process the 350,000 plus soldiers who have stepped
aside andlor self-demobilized
• A source for trained & vetted work force for Iraqi Government and others
• A tailored 10 campaign is necessary to encourage tar, geted groups/individuals to
report to rehabilitation & development centers to avoid becoming potential threat to
stability
•A place & process for NGOs, IOs and other Donors to provide additional support
A scaleable & modufar approach provides Policy makers with a flexible decision
making tool with numerous start/stop points according to empirical evidence

GI
0
0
D
D
D
0
CJ')
N

UNCLASSIFIED
Local Trainin Providers
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
I lc::JDDDDO
• Kuw· ait partner intends to establish a1 n Iraqi
company that is able to hire local trainers and
case managers
• Sources o, f local trainers and: case mana· gers
include:
-Mosul
• University of Mosul
- College of Medicine
- College of Engineering
• Various Technical Institutes
30

UNCLASSIFIED
Local Trainin Providers c~\bn~~~}
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
• Sources of local trainers and case managers include:
- Baghdad
• University of Technology
- Department of Mechanical Engineering
- Department of Electrical Engineering
- Department of Building and Construction Engineering
- Department of Computer Science
• Various Technical Institutes
- Basra
• University of Basra
- College of Science
- College of Engineering
- College of Medicine
• Various Technical Institutes
31

UNCLASSIFIED
Civil Registry
e:_·~~., f> Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
c=J D D ODD
• Name
• Father' Name
•Address
• Residency
•Gender
• Tel-ephone Num~er
Personal Identity
• Photo I Biometrics
• Date of Birth
•Citizenship
• Physical Description
• Unique Identification
Number
PROPERTY & LAND
• Primary Personal Property
• Address
• Square Meterage
• Market Value
• Construction Date
ELECTORAL M ANAGEMENT
• Municipality
•Geo-Indexing Identifier
(Electoral Dis1rict)
PERSONAL RECORDS
• Marital Status
• Date of Mamage
• Dependents
• Date(s) of Birtti. Marriage. Death
• Disability Status
• National Service Status
32

UNCLASStFIEO
Reinte· ration Plannin~
Ii'" L=:J D D OD D
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
• De, sign of short-term curricula formats for soft skills training
(e.g., job readines· s, motiva. tion in Arabic) and hard skills tra.ining
, (IT technicians, paramedics, plumbers, electricians, mechanics,
carpenters, demining etc.)
• S, election of training providers in Iraq who will help complete the
curriculum format for hard skills training
• Selection of software· customized for case management
• In coordination with Coalition and donor entities, design
strategies for job c: reation; and,
• Identify specific employers involved in the reconstruction of
Iraqi infrastructure
33

UNCLASSIFIED
Reintegration Matrix
•;&: C3DDDDI
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
General Specific Categories Methods Comments
Categories
Professional skills IT specialist, English as a Second Language Existing and custom-built courses Supports immediate need to resume
(ESL), mechanical engineer, senior financial at private and public and private communication and is coupled with
management training providers and during-training work experience.
professional development
organizations, e.g., selected
national universities and
polytechnics
Advanced technical Security, deminlng, medical, and agriculture skills management Existing and custom-built courses Facilitates humanitarian efforts and is
at private and public and private coupled with during-training work
training providers experience
Basic manual skills Carpentry, plumbing, some types of Informal apprenticeship Facilitates reconstruction efforts and
agriculture are skills acquired on-the-job
Basic arithmetic, Carpentry, plumbing Custom-designed courses at Facilitates reconstruction efforts and
reading, writing existing training institutions, are only •absolutely required" skills,
cooperating schools provided prior to, or during, training
Advanced arithmetic, Hospltallty, bookkeeping, Custom-designed courses at Only "absolu1ely required" skills,
reading, writing existing training Institutions, provided prior to, or during, training
cooperating schools
Mid-level/technology Aircraft mechanic, computer programmer, Existing and custom-built courses Coupled with during-training work
paramedic, management at private and public and private experience
training providers, e.g., selected
polytechnics
-
34

New Iraqi Corps (NIC) Pilot Program
1 Month 2 Months 3 Months 4 Months 5 Months 6 Months
Registration
Medical
Vetting/
Miiitary
Assessment
in-Depth
Examination
Training
Deployment/
Employment
II
~
-
• Te . am RONCO will register 350 people per day per cente.r {Mos1Jt, 8aghdao, Basra);
• Team RONCO will medically examine 160 people Dt!!r day per center;
• Team RONCO will conduct an inltial vettln9/m1litary assessment on 160 people per day per center;
• Team RONCO estimates the need for an in-depth screening of 2000 volunteers;
• Team RONCO w,1!1 provide bas ic military traming for 3200 volunteers per four-week period;
• Team RONCO may provide c1vf!lan skills assessment and training for those who opt-out of the NIC;
• Team RONCO will deploy rour trained 800-person battalions every four weeks for a total of 19,200;
• If the mme and battle-area clearance- option 1 s chosen, one of the twenty-four battalions will be
specially tra\ned for this mission.

f")'~J'bl~
~ 1111111 Clllial ~.;al ~_,I ' Ltla~I
lilllrll llnflrllt U·I U..'it
<Diii: lt ·a...I •
n.: 2 4 I 7 I ~ o o 3
To Mr. Paul Bremer
The Executive manager for the civil authority- Baghdad
Dear Sir:
• On behalf of my colleagues ( the retired Iraqi army officers ) and my self, I wish to
declare the followings to your Excellency :
1. Most of the retired officers who are anti Saddams regime were obliged by the
ex-regime to retire where the majority have fled abroad due to political
reasons.
2. Saddams regime has ruined their lives from all aspects for being deprived from
their right to work as most of them are professionals and below the age of
retirement.
3. Their salaries were less than $3.00 per moth. they have families of not less than
•
5 persons. That's why most of them have either sold their own property or have
to perform humble works.
4. Retired officers comprise a large number and possessmg a remarkable
influence in the community.
5. Your authority paid every retired officer $40.00 as a gift while officers of
Sad.dams army who have already enjoyed the privileges of that regime have
been paid$ 120.00 per moth. so they are enjoying the privileges every time.
6. Because of feeling unfair due to the discrimination in the rights. we suggest the
followings to your Excellency :
• The amount of the gift should be distributed equally among ex- officers
and the retired officers.

•
•
• Ex ... regime officers have enjoyed many privileges from Saddam such as a
land, a car and high salaries while retired officers gain nothing but $3.00
a month.
• Retired officers are looking forward and hoping to be included by your
kind care to justify them .
• The Iraqi National Coalition confirm all the above mentioned
informations and deeply hoping the kind care and attention of your
Ex.cellency to justify them.
• Retired officers refused the caH of Saddam to them to join the ( Elite
forces ) and they paid a lot because of this situation while ex army
officers have joined the Elite forces and gained many privileges from
Saddam.
Our best regards and respect .
Taufeeq Alyassiri
Secretary General
148 ~J( f:.}~~}il) 17 f:._μ616 41-.'1,...»' I JI~
00882165 5 509208 : ~y i:i.Jit

•,
. .
To: Colonel
Military Assistant to the senior Advisor
You have driven away all the members of Ba'ath party specially the senior
officials of the Iraqi army. We have been hurt by the ex-regime not only us (the
senior officials as you called them) but even the low ranking figures, we are all
victims.
The tyrant regime tortured me because my cousin was punished for he was a
member of Islamic party, they also ordered me to divorce my wife because her
brother was in one of the opposition movement at that time. They also prohibited me
from gaining any privileges which I worth for the previously mentioned reasons.
They have confined me for years since they knew about my relatives and their
relations with some of the opposition movement, as I mentioned before. I have many
documentary papers to prove my case including the divorce case.
Sir, not all of the Ba'ath members parts are criminals, they joined the party to
save their families from the humiliation they would face if they didn't join it ,as you
know they have been forced us to join it by many oppressive ways. I can't write it all
down because the papers won't be enough.
So, I would ask for an exception because I didn't receive my salaries since
March 2003 and I have four minors children and l'am basically an academic person, 1
would ask to transfer me to one of the universities to practice my duties as an
academic my C.V. and my certificates are enclosed.

•
. .
To:
..__~"'!'-~~~~---~--:~--::-:-~---
M iii ta. ry Assistant to the seTiior advisor
Appeal
Dear Sir,
Following a list of names and signatures of the staff and students of (M.T.D Militar;i
Technical Institute that appeal to you the acceptance of exemption forms filled by the
group members of some institute staff of the Deba Athification. The following
reasons are to justify our appeal:
1- He does not experience any harmful deed what so ever.
2- He is well educated and academic scientific staff who served this institute
3- faithfully over 26 years.
We are the one's who nominated him to be a group member in the demolished
Ba'ath party to fill the posts given to the institute.
4- He is very qualified in this subject that his leave will affoct the teaching
process badly.
5- He is supervise many postgraduate thesis in different stages of progress.
Therefore his absence will be very hannful on many postgraduate students
6- He holds:
B.Sc. In Mechanical Engineering "Belgrad University College of
Engineering "-1981.
M.Sc. In Applied Mechanics " University Of Belgrad Mechanical
Engineering Department" -1983.
M.Sc. In Power Mechanics" University of Technology Mecbanical
Engineering Department"-1995.
P.Hd. In Thermal Power Mechanics " University of Technology
Mechanical Engineering DepartmenC' - 200 I .
B,Sc. In Business Administration, ••AJ- Moustansyria University" 1992.
111anking you in anticipation.

AGREEMENT TO DISAVOW PARTY AFFILIATION
~\~· ~\ .Lii "'
• • _pa. t:"' c:---~~
I,\) 'f'. 1 Qom<.\. [ • f/""m'',/(name), hereby disavow and renounce my membership
in the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party of Iraq (Ba'ath Party). I understand that the
Ba'ath Party is disestablished and abolished. I expressly reject and denounce the Ba'ath
Party and Saddam Hussein and his regime, as well as my previous association with it
I acknowledge I.hat any continued association with, or involvement in, the Ba'ath
Party or its activities constitutes a violation of an order by the Coalition Provisional
Authority. I pledge to cooperate fully with the Coalition Provisional Authority in selving
the people of Iraq and building a new Iraqi government. I will obey the laws of Iraq and
all proclamations, orders and instructions of the Coalition Provisional Authority. As God
is my witness: · .
i.r-y..11 ~ y y.. ~ ~~ ~ J ow c .)"-d1 <ti .,.JI r--!) ~ .vjj, l-f,, /~' ~1
~ ,J;. i)c..1 .J y.cl L:A .J .~} .li ~ YY.. .:fa.~, .J .~ly..l\ ~ ~ ~IF'il
-~ r1
~ rU;u J ~ ·~ Y.. ~1
~\.... ~ i.,rl....:a..l""i
L;~ ".j~ ~~.;\..!..JI JI ~1 yY., ~.)~')'!JI ..!l\_'A ~W~l l)\.:iwjJcl J ..)1
J ~1 y-ll ~1 ~~I ul.} ~ ~lSJI 0Jt..:il4 ~ J .~1 ul.; .rlJ'i L.:.:.i.i
l;F oyl.....,.ll ..:..~ ·1\.·,\ J .r1J'i J ~\_;all i):cUl_,ill 4.l\S ~\ wY"'J .o~ ~ly:. ~~ ~~
. .!l1l ~ ..11 .l.f-!.\ J ~I ul.}
DA TE: _ ..... ;/_c.:-"-, /c__:.1?,_,./ ___ , 2003
•
~c:'"""~( . \\. \N\.,6~·,r:,
(name of sisnatory)
(ti _,..JI r-1)
2003 ---+'! __ !'- .... /'----\..;__· _&..Jlj,\I
: ' ---~~;
• \.. T'-_<.-<..-:
'.} ~'
(signature)
(od_,:JI)
!.
/Y) c b fu -"' -C c .... bo--~
(name of witness) o-
( ~L:JI r-1)
~fY2~· .:::..:0::__-"-.=..::--===:::--?
(signature)
Lester M. Mcfarland
(name of witness)
.. :r:-~~~
(signature)
(~L:ll ~)
(&i~)
(~.;JI)

-
-
~
Personnel Questionnaire
You must complete this questior.naire in fuJI, and truthfully answer all questions 1n order to be
considered for continued employment in the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific
Research and/or higher education institutions, including universities, colleges, and centres. The
infonnation provided here may 2Jso be used to determine your eligibility for exemption from
~ovisions of the Order of the. Coalition Pro,·isfonal Authority Regarding Dc-Baathification of
Iraqi Society, dated 16 May 2003.
To ccnify the truthfulness of yc~r answers, sign the statement at the bonom of the qucsiion.naire.
Y C'..I may use and mach 2dditior.2J pages to answer .;;.ny questi('ns for which there is imufficient
space on the questionnaire .
.....
1 ..
- S12te your full nz.me, including tribal :iame if a:iy.
J·a.~~ \-\ Q..."'"" \ J. ~ \,Q\. \ 'c A.'- - A. L o-.,vJ \
-
~. Curre:1t positic-:;:
\) ~ p \A.\. ~ \) e.o.. V\ 1'1 ·r I ( X - M .T 1 )
5. S1ate your educziic-n~l background, includir.g name, locz1icn, and ~ e:::rs of :?Tiendz~ce at a:Jy
universi;y or sp<!cizlized insiiiuie, and degrees receiwd, or anach full C.V.
\ V'\ C-V.
6. Siatc ~·our full employment his1ory, including pJaces of employment, ''here ihese employers
were located, pC1sitions held, and the time during which each position was held, or znach full
C.V .
. A·s
--
·-

7 ..
. ,
.•
-.. ·· · 7. Were )'CIU ever a member or affiliate of the Ba'ath Party? '/ e. S
8. Jfso, when did you join the Party? ~ '"" C. t.. . "°"' 'f 1 O \·\'\ \ ""~ _ \.-~~ ~Y W1 Y
9. State alJ Jc,·e)s of membership that you h:se e,·er held in the Ba· ath Party, and the times
duripg which you held them. •
RA.~K I y~ I DATES I
'Udw (~icmbcr) I "'< ~l \<\<.\I . l
'Udw 'Amil (Acth e Member) I 'i I \C\'\'L I
·Udw Firqah (Group Member) I i I '2.C 0 2_ . . I
'Lldw Shu'bih (Section ~1embcr) I A/ I I
·Udw Far' (Branch ~icmber) I IV I I
·Udw QutriY)a (Regional CC1mm2nd ~knbcr) ;./ I - I
12. Wh\' cid \(l;J re::'12in in the Ba·cih h:w?
,: . .
-
~ /¥1 · a. ; " ./-~,.,., +--'-" e
l.c:> ,, +,· Y" ""- o<.. . -}., 'o n
oi
S, ·r" C.. e \ CA.~ re.~ ~ o \'\ ~ ~ \o \ '-
( W .\ ~~ -+ y c~, · , \Jv--~~)
13. Did YCIU ever rcnC'uncc Ba " ath Pany ~f e :n!:lership, er were ycu cHr remond from the Pzr.y?
~. / h ~v e. \, ~~ "\ ~re..~- -Z e..J i-o r 2- y -e. O'\. Y-S ~ \ ; ..... <.'...(_
1''Y\. y LOY...<; Ir'\ '1\., 0.. ·
, 0"' ~ 0 f: ~E,> (J r', r 0 $/ .f: J ¢-/1
mov'emt.n-L mcm b~rs -to ~~J.cf.a,,,,, re_~jW1 e -
IY\-· tNJo/,'/.t'on /;C!J ht y 'oro..\.~~ r- iV\ \°'-~ vJ ~ o
\JJ <"-S 6 \f\ t. o t ~"'-~ o ~~ o ~-e..rs •
-
..
.
--
-
-
...
.
.. ---:--. ----------~-<s:::;;;;::.:--=i::. """-".:;-.::-:- ..
--
.. . "' :-. . . . . ,. :... . : . . . .. :· ... ..
~ -
. ... . ..
. \ -··-
.

.. r , .
' ..
..... '
·~
)4. \\'ere )·ou e\·er zrrested, prosecuted, N c:!et2.:ned for 2.ny rea~on under the regime cf Sadda~
Hussein? If so;-state the.occasions for each arrest, prosecution, or detention.
I vJe1---s \>...'A-Jer CcYl./-ino~s W\ til'\ -i··f."o r1'vi j, ~or
Y" e..O'--s 0 Y\ s yv\ " V'- \. \ ""'- J i-n ··(_
t 1) w ~ L.o f ~
0.. \ \. (?.. c.. '-'.-t..J. ~ o ? r.ov .e.. ~~t.. ~ V"
15. Sen·fre in .any of th<? a:r.ied fNre~, secur!!y sc;;·iccs, militzry Ng:rniz;atior.s, cir e,;,y o-:.her
emity diss('}Yed pa:s1,;c.nt ;o o;der r.1.;r:-.ber .2 (CP.;.~ O:lDi23 ~fay :?003/02):
I VJ°'"- s I ....,
h1 i I i ~ 0\. v ~ s c. ~ "V\ .\-. \ \ ~ c_ I Yl 5 ~ ·, ~ \A.:\.~
(H ,·~ \ "S..\-rj
o "t J.e.. ~~~c.e.) A; r ~~rc..e_ J
I ce:'tify thit ;!.)) m~· 2:1)\\ ers in this ques t ic-:-i.n~:re arc t:--~;hful. J ccr.ify ihzt I r.z.,·e read 1he J 6
~fay 2003 Proclzrna:io::i oithe .~drr.i:iiH~atN, Ccialitic:; P;c\·is!l)n;:J Ai.::!iciritv. l i.::;durnmd ;ht
if I h\·e pro,·ided 2.!':Y false info:-:r;21io::i, this wi!J res-..::1 i:i r:iy i~r.;ec:a:e ier~1!:1a:!0:i frc-n ci:!cc
c.:id.'N possib!e pro~c.:l:iio:i.
" . a::-:c
Date
(1 /g /200 3
3
•
I.
. "
I
•
'\
~J.E. . ?
_,...
:..
at. Ji t J 11i s . - --·-=-·--- - ~---'----- --..,,... . ~ ..

I
Iraqi Security Forces ~Phase la:· 30 Kin 30 Days
•1111
INITlATJVES
Total
Personnel
7.6K
Shortfalls
Funding
Re911ired
NIL
Action
- 2 x BNs salaries,
uniforms7 OCIE.
- Re<1ucst ftluds via PRB
or reallocation NLT
050ct03 (Action C8),
New lnlgi Arml'.
(NJA)
.7K
NIL
J ragi Border
Police @Pl
I.SK
-I AD, 4JD - additional: VCA, I 3ffEN, MEF
accelerated .
·FRAGO 798 pu btished <> Sep.
-FRAGO 804 published 8 Sep.
- F 'unding Justification to be submitted to PRB on 5
Oct for additional battalions.
- No FRAGO requirtd.
-Training Requirements post pass out for 1'1 BN
submitted.
- Pass-out date 4 Oct 03.
- Not fully eq1 uipped until 29 Nov 03. (CMATT).
- FRAGO 828 published 14 Sei>. Hire form~r
border and customs officials where possible.
-PRB to be submitted this week by Mot.
- This funding will see us through Phases 1 a-le.
S.3K
- Money for Radios and
vehicles.
- Salaries arc paid
lbrough CERP until 29
Sep 03)
- Need uniforms, body
armo:r, utility belt~ and
tquipment.
Nll,
- No FRAGO required.
- Tbl ~ Sc are fomter Polic::c Officers who rc11uire
personal equipment prior lo deploying on the street.
· Mol alrcad~· funded, C'ontracls oe, ed to be submitted
as soon as possible.

Iraqi Security Forces~ Phase la: 30 Kin 30 Days
•1111
INlTIATIVES Total
FPS (Oil&
Electric)
Shortfalls
Personnel
1.46K NIL
Fundinl?.
Required
NIL
F. acil ities.
Protective
Services (FPS)
Utilize
PESHMERGA
(Border Police
andlor JCOC)
lraqi Prison
Service
lOK
TOTAL 33.4K
- Personal Equipment. Some
weapons, uniforms and
>t'ehicles. MSCs arc working
around this.
- Funding stream TBC
-May require a different it \
uniform. f\,.f\. J..> U
Ol
Nil
NIL
($1.25M
CERP)
Action
- PRB OJ Submitted & approved #425. For
$4.75M.
- FRAGO 828 published 14 Sep, although
Electricity Commission already putting this
into action - wages through Ministry budget.
- FRAGO 828 published 14 Sep.
- FRAGO required to stop MSCs hiring any
more FPS, clearly stating reasoning.
- base la, Require $6.4M for 3 months,
$3.6M for salaries and S2.8M for equipment.
NIL
-No FRAGO required.
- Already in motion, completed training by 11
Oct.
$l6.6M
Notes:
1. 14.0K realized so far.
2. FPS reached recruiting ceiling: . FRAGO sent telling ~tSCs to stop recruiting further FPS personnel.
As at 26 Sep 03.

Iraqi S. ecurity Forces r--.; Border Police & Customs
11111
Iraqi Border & Customs Police
Ministry: Interior (Dept of Border Enforcement) .
Duties: Border guarding and patrolling,
enforce customs/immigration laws
Uniform: Khaki shirts
Vehicles: Various, mainly all terrain.
Weapons: Pisto1s, AK 47 Rifles
Pay: Civil pay scale.
"Secure borders make
good neighbors''.
Border Police undertaking weapon training.
As at 26 Sep 03.

IRAQI Border Police & Customs/Immigration
~~~ ~~~.::a1~:=:!~
REQUIRED = 2370
HIRED/TRAINED= 1488
TRAINING = 130
SHORTFALL = 752
REQUIRED = 672
HIRED/TRAINED= 1011
TRAINING = 0
SHORTFALL = -339
REQUIRED = 1428
HIRED/TRAINED= 461
TRAINING = 0
SHORTFALL = 967
RE, QUIRED = 642
HIRED/TRAINED= 25
TRAINING = 0
SHORTFALL = 617 REQUIRED = 1674
HIRED/TRAINED= 372
TRAINING = 120
SHORTFALL = 1182

Iraqi Security Forces,_ The Iraqi Police Services
•1111
The first line off uture
see,urity
Recently Commissioned Police on
duty with Coalition Forces
As at 26 Sep 03.

55
20 Sep
Al Kut
TIP (3 Wee-ks)
Currently Running

IRA QI Police Service (!PS) ON DUTY = 2228
IRBIL
ENDSTATE = 4099
ATTAMIM
=371'2
= 4620
=4168
= 8385
SAl-AH AO DIN
ON DUTY = 2462
ENDST ATE = 4693
ON DUTY =577
ENDSTATE = 2003
M SAS RAH
ON DUTY = 4462
ENDSTATE = 8289
DHIQAR

Effective Police, ~ Personn1 el
11111
Number of Police Numbers by Level
-
Salaries City Highway Traffic FPS
Paid By Police w/Arrest
Patrol Police
Semi Non
Effective Effective Effective
MS Cs (Cerp/MOI) Officers Auth.
1AD MOI 9746 0 1965 0 738 6055 4918
101st CERP 15225 285 500 0 710 12928 900
410 MOt 7155 846 360 130 522 6633 0
82d UNK 1114 371 lnlPS# * 150 994 782
MND-SC MOI 12326 0 In IPS # 0 241 12085 0
MND-SE MOI 8367 0 405 3300 0 8367 0
TOTAL 53933 1502 3230 3430 2361 47062 6600
Chan e 867
As at 26 Sep 03.

Iraqi Security Forces~ Facilities Protection Services
•1111
The protection of Iraq's
economy and heritage.
Facilities Protection Service (FPS)
Ministry: Most
Duties: Fixed site protection of Ministerial,
Governmental, or private buildings I facilities I
personnel
Uniform: Grey shirts
Vehicles: Provided by Ministries
Weapons: AK 47 Rifles
Pay: Civil pay scale
FPS Protecting National Monuments
in Baghdad
Note: Formerly kno,vn as the Ministry of Vital Institutions.
As at 26 Sep 03.

80 - l 00 Percent Manpower
40 - 79 Percent Manpower
0 - 39 Percent Man ower
21,323
19,443
21,636
17,127
6,681
6,681
43,861
6,681 As at 26 Sep 03.

Iraqi Security Forces f'J Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
11111
Civil Defense Corps Recruit in Training
The short-term initiative with a
longer-term future.
As at 26 Sep 03.

~~~ REQUIRED = 3384
HIRED/TRAllNED= 871
TRAINING = 427
SHORTFALl = 2086
REQUIRED = 4230
HIRED/TRAINED= 1061
TRAINING = 1311
SHORTFALL = 1858
REQUIRED = 2538
HIRED/TRAINED= 0
TRAINING = 0
SHORTFALL = 2538
REQUIRED = 4230
HIRED/TRAINED= 375
TRAINING = 721
SHORTFALL = 3134
~
REQUIRED = 2538
HIREDfTRAJNED= 0
TRAINING = 181
SHORTFALL = 2357
REQUIRED = 4230
HIRED/TRAINED;= 57
TRAINING = 580
SHORTFALL = 3593

Proposed /CDC Stand-up Plan
11111
t Jb04 I
I AUGUST I I SEPTEMBER I I OCTOBER I I NOVEMBER I I DECEMBER I I JANUARY I I FEBRUARY I
II
II
~
~
1
1
~
~
2
3*
5*
6
8
*5 Add'I BNs are in Yellow
--.--.-41 .....
• I • COSCOM
• MND(SE)
• MNO(CS)
•S2DABN
DlAD
D41D
AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY • IOIST
• As at 26 Sep 03 .

I
11111
Vehicles:
OCIE;
Personal
Protective
Equipment:
Weapons:
Training
Acee ssorie s:
-
l Items
Jeeps
Trucks
Water Carriers
Spares Pkg.
Uniforms and
lndi-v;dual
Equipment
Helmet
Body Annor
Winter Gear
\AK-47
Required
per for One
Battalion Unit Cost j Battalion
2 $8,641.75 $17,283.50
12 $18,873.ao I $226.485.60
7 $6,000.00 I $42,000.00
1 $50,. 000.00 $50,000.00
l
Remarks
930 $225.00
930 $325.00
930 $50.00 I
846 $100.00 I
$80,000.00
$209,250.00
$302,250.00 Includes 10% overage
$46,500.00
$84,600.00 O/NSD procures
Miscellaneous
PL T/CO Radios
99 $508.00
Communications:
HQ Radios
22 $3,050.00
Tentage
2 $6,680
Portaloo
8 $500.00
Basic Infrastructure: Plastic Chairs
50 $3.00
1 Plastic Tables
10 $10,00
ISO Containers
2 $100.00
TOTAL STAND-UP COST FOR ONE BATTALION $1, 196,071:10
$2,500.00
$50,292.00
$67, 100.00
$13,360.00
$4,000.00
$150.00
$100.00
$200.00 (Used Containers)
As at 26 Sep 03.

ICDC Batttilion Annual Running Costs
•1111
Cost Per Month Cost per Annum Remarks
Salaries $70,000.00 $840,000.00 -
MRE $45,684.00 $548,208.00 Stipen~~
I Subsistence Water $0.00 $0.00
Basic Infrastructure Fuel $1,000.00 $12,000.00 1 l)l/t 7 C.
V h. I (M . d F I) Trucks $6, 720.00 $80,640.00
. e 1c es atntenance an ue J ·
eeps $800.00 $9,600.00
Operations a.nd Maintenance --, $7,000.00 $84,000.00
MONTHLY COST FOR 1 BATTALION>> $131,204.00 $1,574,448.00 <<ANNUAL COST FOR 1 BN I
; \ ~.,A:
ir- \. nc-z:='tc.~ ,nl.
ICDC Battalion Equipment Table Costs
ICDC Batta. lion Annual Running Costs
ANNUAL TOTAL FOR ONE BATTALION
- -
ANNUAL TOTAL FOR 26 BATTALIONS
$1 ' 196' 0 71 . 1 0
$1,574,448.00
$2, 770,519.10
$72,033,496.60
As at 26 Sep 03.
-~~

I •1111
What is funded for the original 18 battalions?
• $2.2M for individual equipment and uniforms
• $17.4M for salaries and subsistence
• $ l .6M for MND(SE) vehicles and equipment
How much is spent/Committed?
• $2.2M committed for 26 BN sets of uniforms and individual equipment (FY03)
• $1,524,800.00 spent on divisions for salaries and subsistence (Sep 03)
• $15,875,200.00 of $17.4M remaining for 18-21 battalions.
• $ l .6M for MND(SE) is being administered by MND(SE)
As at 26 Sep 03.

IJ J Jc; L;.. :_; ::JJ F JED
I •1111
What do we need to Stand-Up 26 battalions?
• $2.8M per Battalion for Eqpt@ I year x 26 battalions= $72.8M
• $2 l .2M already allocated through PRB
• Therefore require $51.6M
• Supplemental Budget Request is $75.6M
• Balance outstanding (assuming supplemental in full) is a $24M credit
How can we get it?
• Program Review Board (PRB)
• Commanders Initiative Fund (CIF)
• Foreign Assistance Act
• Security Assistance Act
What are our options to stand up by Jan 04?
• Need the money now in order to have assets by end of Jan 04.
• If we want to have the equipment here by Jan 04 we will need to buy outside of Iraq
IJJ JSL;."~~J_F'J;::D
As at 26 Sep 03.

I
Iraqi Security Forces,_ The New Iraqi Army
•1111
New Iraqi Army
Ministry: National Security & Defense
Duties: Collective military tasks to protect the
territorial rntegrity of Iraq under Iraqi military
leadership, serving side-by·· side with Coalition forces
Uniform; Dese. rt camouflage
Vehicles: Wheeled vefllcles.
Weapons: AK.47 rifles, RPK LMGs, Mortars
Pay: Special payscale approved by· the Finance Ministry
Strength: 27 Light Infantry Battalions by Sep 04. 3 Div
of 9 Battal1 lons each. Combat support and support
elements to follow.
The longer-term security
Initiative
i--.--------------------------------.
New Iraqi Army tral.ning in Kirkush
As at 26 Sep 03.

NIA 40000
• Required
Iraqi Security Forces ,.. SITREP
North
Required Committed Shortfall
3384 1298 2086
237 0 1618 752
19046 17536 1510
FPS 3145 4678 ·1533
25130 2815 f
Baghdad
4230 1096
IBP 0 D
IPS 18254 6793
FPS 5572 5782
Total ISF 28056
4230 2372 1658
672 1011 -339
12527 7~1 4666
1834 1052 782
122.'96 6967
2538 181
IBP 1428 461
IPS 3376 1408
FPS 3296 3363
Total ISF 10638
Required Committed Shortfall
4230 637 3m
1674 492 1182
12327 7004 5323
5850 3408 2442
11541 12540
/CDC 25$8 181
IBP 642 25
IPS 9469 9220
FPS 1939 1160
Total ISF 14588 10586
COSCOM Required Committed Shortfall
/CDC 846 0 846
As at 26 Sep 03.
Legend 0 41 - 80 Percent Manpower
e 0 - 40 Percent Manpower

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
1 10 Oct03

'-"" ~~~,
-
( ~ : ;c -.. : t f ~~~
~,e; Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
~ :--~l Ii
AGENDA
• INTRODUCTION - COS
• AGENDA - cod' .. '
"----------"
• IPS STAND-UP STRATEGY/ACCELERATION - CH CONST BRAND/COLr.__ ___ ___.
• FINANCIAL UPDATE - MRr ~LTCr..
I
_
• FPS STRATEGY • MR.r· j
• GUIDANCE - CG

~, ..>~~,
11i1 :-~~ ~ Ministry of the Interior
· f ; ~ -i " • ! J Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
• )·.1 /J
otl.,.~ )"
,_. ~ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!~~~~~~~!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!~~!!!!!!!!!!!
Iraqi Police Services
Stand-Up Strategy and Options
.for Acceleration
3
10 Oct 03

Aini I
To provide ajoi11t CPA. /CJTF 7
Brief on the stand-itp strategy fo· r tlie
Iraqi Police Services and the options
to accelerate tliat strategy'
.
4
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior COl\4BINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7
I Agenda I
• Where we are now - the cu1Tent statistics.
• Current Training Methods.
• Where we are going, and how,..., the Mol Strategy.
• Acceleration Options.
• How they would affect the Strategy.
• Recommendations.
5 10 Oct03

lllere we are aow -le cuneaf sfaflsfJC&
6 10 Oct 03

J1~aq Police Services ,_
The Statistics
• Based on 1 :300 in population.
• End State 75,000.
• On Duty- 59,057.
• TIP trained - 31330.
• Jordan - 25,000¥
• On Duty (55,306) + Jordan (25,000) = 80,306.
• Betirement approxi. matety 5,000.
• Equals End State - 75,000.
7
10 Oct 03

On Duty
End state
Sliortf'all
J 7 ,528 19,046
1,518
(L,;.._ ____ .,...
,..._...". On Duty
End state
Shortfall
7,761
12,527
4,766
82ND
On Duty
End state
Shortfall
On Dutr
.~~---~~ End st.ate
Shortfall
._.
IAD
6,793
18,255
I 1,462
-----
JPS National Totals
On Duty 59,057
End State 75,000
Shortfall 15,943
On Duty
.~~=i End state
Shortfall
10,740
12,327
1,587

Ministry of the lnterio1·
Police Effectiveness by MSC
• Effective: Former IP, TIP trained working in a police capacity with a uniform and a
, weapon. Total 3,330
• Se1ni Effective: Former IP working in an active police capacity in a uniform with a
weapon. Total 55,823
• Non Effective: Former JP, paid but not working in a police capacity. Total 4,552
18000
16000
14000
12000
D1AD
10000
8000
•82ND
• 101 st
liil 4 ID
6,151
6000 u-~~~~~~---,..:~-
D MND-SC
• MN'D-SE
4000
2000
o-- __._ _ _
1
Effective
Semi Effective Non Effect. ive
9
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
Curreaf Tral1il9 &fefflods.
10 10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
AVA. ILABLE TRAINING METHOD. S
· • 'l RANSITION INTEGHATION PROGRAM (TIP): CONDUCTED AT MSC LEVEL FOR 3
- TARGETS FORMER IRAQI POLICE OFFICERS ONLY.
• THE JORDANIAN ACADEMY: NEW POLICE OI~ 'FICERS \\'ITH NO PREVIOUS
EXt>EnIENCE, UNDEH .TAKE AN 8 WEEK TRAINING COURSE:
0 Con1mence. 25 Nov 2003.
0 First class of 500 students.
D 1500 students 11er mouth soon. thereafter (1200 IPS and 300 IBP).
0 DynCorp Contract.
\VEl~ KS
• Tlu-ee Regional Academies:
• Baghdad - From 1 Jan 04 capacity 800.
• Irbil and Basrah - Fro1n Nov 04, capacity 500 each.
11
10 Oct 03

Tall Afar
TIP (3 Weeks) 122
Start Date 29 Sep
120
20 Sep
Al Anbar TIP (3 Weeks) 50 BAGHDAD
Start Date 11 Oct OIYALA
Tl P (3 Weeks) 50
Start Date 26 Sep
TIP (3 Weeks) 250
Start Oate
Al Hillah
TIP (3 Weeks) 100 Start Date Al Kut
Ukranian Run Awaiting Info
100
Mid Oct
An Najaf
TIP (3 Weeks) 200
~~~• Start Date 4 Oct
- Future Class
- Past Class
Black- Present Class
I I r rLP Tng
I I Other Tog

13 10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
Existing Police (3-Week TIP)
~000-t-------------------:;il"""""""".,:;._
55000
soooo -+- CURRENT
45000
40000 +L-___ A
A
T
_
_
_
E __ ---i------------------------~~----------"'"
_ _____ _____,.
30000 -t-----~-----------:--~~--~---~---_..,,
~000
20000 -t---------~-~-----------
15()00 t===============::::~~==========iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii=====~
-t------~ ........... ::;s__ _________ _
10000 +-------,,.,,........ic:--------------- 5000 +-.r::=--+=----------------
0 ---------------------.---.----.----------.....-----
30000
25000
20000 ------
15000 -1--------
10000 -r-~----------~~=.:...------f------------1
5000 +----------....-=.....-==: :;;.:_~---------1------------1
o +--.-.....---.--t ~!::;::~_,...__,..__,.~-.--..----.--.---.---.-----.--_J..----.--.-__,.~-.---..----.--.---1
14

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
'"f raining Beyond TIP
• Field Training: i.e. Prisoner Handling Course.
• In Service Training: i.e. Leadership, Forensics.
To be phased into Regional Acade1nies as capacitv and capability
becomes available.
15
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
Accelltaf1G1 Opflo1s.
16 10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7 ·
Options For Acceleration
ren1ains at the tail end.
• OPTION 2 - Accelerate the Stand-Up of the Regional Acaden1ies and con1n1ence 8
week (alternate training to Jordan) course. From J~u1 2004 in Baghdad capacity 500.
Basrah and lrbil by inid 04 add 1,000. Total capacity 1,500. CONFLICTS WITH
SPECIALIST lv. Pl~OFESSIONAL TRAINING.
• OPTION 3 - Establish an Auxiliary Police Training Progrmn of 4 we- eks duration
at the Baghdad Acade1ny only to 11rovide rapid acceleration to police numbers in the
City. Graduates remain on 10 n1onth probation and 111ust attend the 8 week course in
the future.
• OPTION 4 - A con1bination of the above.
17
100ct 03

Acceleration Option I - How it affects the Strategy
55000
50000 ---.-ACCELERATED RATE t--------__,....
45000
40000 -t--------- - -------...,_,__ ____ --i
35000 r-----------------::::;;;;t-..:::::11...--t----::-i~i\7!-j,,..._.-2:=====--_J
30000 -+---------------=------+---~~
25000 -+---------~=---------+--~~
20000 +--------,...-::::L---------1--..~
15000 +------.,=-"l?------------1--::::::::::
10000 -l----~'------------------1--__::=;;>-
5000 +--=_;;.....__ __________________ __,,, __
........,.-.--1Compares to:
45)423
O -+--.--,----.----,---..--.-----,---.------.-----,---,-.--~-r---+--i----r--"~A
30000
25000
20000 +-------
15000 +--- ----
10000 -t--- ----------...,......,::::oo+--=-:.-------1--- ---------i
5000-+--------~.+=-:=;_:__----------f------------i
o ..J__....---.--___.~t:::;::::!::.-~--~~----.-~~~....-~~_J_~~----,-~~~--.-.--J
18

Ministry of the Interior
Acceleration Option 2 - How it affects the Strt1tegv
55000
soooo -+- CURRENT
45'000 RATE
40000 +'-- - - -----1-
35000 +------~
30000 4--------
25000 +------------~~-=:;------~
20000 -t---------- -=--+=----------'s;;;:_
15000 -t--------~..-=:z--------------;;;;;;:;?
10000 +----~~tt:::--------------------?-1'
5000 -i-.,.,,...-... ~---------------------'~A
O +---.---.---.---.---.-----..--.------.-----------..--.------.--.----.-;_..ic--M-,..>1_:....-....-----.....-----.-.--1
30000 -+-JORDAN New . Police (8-Week Academy)
2sooo --+- B, AGHOAD
20000 +-'- --------'---------------f- 15000 -t------------------ - _.,,,.._.p:---f-=======--=--
10000 -t-- ----------__,......,,,,,.._=------ 4---'l-
--I----, .,,,.--=--- ---~
500~ t===::~~~~~~=======t=]
(:f'~o~ ()ii~.,,.~ ~JI ~fl;' ,.<t .~ ~~<::- ~.s- .. ~°'~0~ o~'"~o~ Qil ')~~ '<.~ ~~ .. ~~fl>~"':,~~ ~.$- ~~~c.J'~' 0~~6~ ()rf )'&~
~~~~~~~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·~~~~~
19 S I E 1 o Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Acceleration Option 3 - How it affects the Strategy
30000
25000
-+-Auxiliary
20000 .+ o- ---------
15000 -t-----------
10000 - · ---------
500~ t=~~;;~~::=~====:s====t=t=====:::~~~
20 10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
55000 Existing Police 12-Week TIP)
50000 -.-ACCELERATED RATE 1-----------.-----""'*-___:::,:;
45000
40000 +---------------+--i:,..c:;...--~
35000 +-------------~..:::a..-1----~:
30000 +-------------,,......-:_---1---__;:~
25000 t-----------::::>"'"'c;;,::_----+------=~
20000 +--------,_.-=------------+---~
15000 +----------,.--..-..IE-----------+----.
10000 t----:-~'-------------+---~
5000 +-co--~-------------+----~
O +--....----.---.--.--.--.--.--..-----r~--.--..---..--+---.---.--.---.--.----.----r-...--.r--..--...--.-.....--1
New Police lB-Week Academy)
aoooo -+- JORDAN
25000 -+-BAGHDAD
20000 + , _.__ _____ ..__ ____________ __._---..,,_..,...::;__ __ ~
15000 +-----------------~_.:::i~-1-------_...
10000 +---------------::-:::::>+"'==-------t--
500~ t===~:;~~~~==::========t=J
21
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Acceleration Option 5 - flow it affects the Strategy
Existing Police (2-Week TIP)
55000 r-------,-L..;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ~ _________ ____,
50000
45 000 40000 .__ ____ _.
35000 +-------------~..c::;a...+-----~
30000 +-----------~~---+------"':::-
25000 +-----------..:7'""""'-------f-----~
20000 +----------=~=--------+-----..::::::_
15000 +------ic::::r-F----------+-------...,,,
10000 +---~=------------+-----~ __..,
5000 +-=--.S: '"---'-------------+-------'~~A
Q-t--....--.--.----.---.---------------.----.---.-----.---------.---..---.---.-...-------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·~·~~~~
0CJ'~o~ <:)<I'":>"'-<:-~~ ~w ~Q ... ~'l>'\":>~~ ":>~'~.::;~c,e~
0~ ~o.:. Q"'CJ ~~~ '<J' +~ ~~._~,,4.":>~~ ":>~,~~~~"'~
0~ ~o.:. CJ<G' ~,,-<:-
30000 Auxiliary Police (Baghdad)
-t-- Auxi I iary
25000
20000 -+-------
15000 +---------1
10000 -+-------
500 er month
from Nov 03
0
5000 t=~~~~=:~==~:;::====i=======1
22 10 Oct 03

'I.~'.~':"": Ministry of the Interior
COl\lfBlNED JOINT TASK FORCE 7
\; ; 1 Public, Safety and Security fot All Iraqis
• * / /J
.... A
~,.i."' I Recom, mendations I
• Modify TIP Training to double output by reducing
course to 2 wk, s.
• , Support the Train the Trainer with the "Right"
individuals and establish Baghdad Academy by Dec
03 with 1000 capacity by Mar 04. Run 8 week
courses from Jan 04.
23
• 101st Continue their 8 week-course, , and cease any
further new· recruit 8 week training courses in Iraq
other than Baghdad.
-
--
- -
·~
- -~
..
~ ~! Hl~~~f;l:-1~
10 Oct 03

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I The Way Ahead I
• Agree Recommendations.
• Get the "Right" people on Train the Trainer in Jordan.
• Accelerate the stand-up of the Baghdad Academy.
• Provide the following support to the Mol:
• Help with firearms training post TIP.
• Recruiting.
• Me, dicals.
• Processing (CA personnel).
• Movement I Transport to Jordan.
24 10 Oct03

Ministry of the Interior
Public S afety and Security for All Iraqis
FINANCIAL UPDATE
Mr[ V L TC["--------..J
25
-
~....-,-- ..
...
: ,!(N~..f®:~Jj§E I
I _..._
-"- - --- ---- --::;...._ ---J
10 Oct 03

26
Ministry of the Interior Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
COMBJNED JOINT TASK FORCE 7
Ministry of Interior Funding.
FY 03 Budget PRB Approved Supplemental
Jun-Dec 03 FY03 Unfunded
FY04 Budget
Jan- Dec 04
Iraqi Police
Service $11.0M $129.1M $1,274M
Border
Enf arcement' $9.5M 15.6M $150M
Facility -
Protection $68.9M $67M
Service·
Mol $150M
-
General $2.4M Fire/CD $500M
$22.9M
To· tal (18.9M) $213.6.M $2, 141 M
Note: Salaries for IPS centrally paid by MoF in FY03 (Except for 101 st AOR)'
Salaries for Border and FPS paid with CERP in FY03
-
-
-
$124.8
$124.8
10 Oct 03

Funds Required Near-Term
• $8M Request for Border Enforcement
• $12M Request for Police Radios
,; $50M Request for lnt'I Training Academy
• $2M FPS Uniforms
• $4M FPS C2 Cell, Nation, al Level
27 10 Oct 03

• FY03 & Supplemental Funds Sufficient
• Supplemental Issue - Timing
-- Bridging Funds Unworkable
-- Ready to Execute Requirements
• Supplemental on Pace for Late Next Week
• FY04 Budget - Salaries Under Funded
-- Mal has until December to Adjust
--
28
--
-
-~ ------·~- -~
'·-~~.d
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security .for Alf Iraqis
FPS STRATEGY
29 10 Oct 03

0 CG Due Out
D Revisit "C2" piece, refine conc~pt and COAs
D Team Reviewe, d' four COAs:
D COA 1 Decentralized Control- CPA Ministries Control
0 COA 2 Centralize, d Control - Sing.le CPA Ministry Control
. 0 COA 3 Localized Control - Regionally
D COA 4 Localized Control - Governate
D Team selected COA 2 as the recommendation
-
~
30
1 0 Oct 03

~ .. ,_,.,. ~ ~
Ministry of the Interior
' ~ ~ J Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
.. :· : i JJ
COMllfNED JOINT TASK FORCE 7
I Pre-War - The Facts I
• Protection of critical sites managed by the Ministry of Vital Institutions
• Essentially an ann of the Iraqi Inte11 igence Agency
• Centrally Controlled throughout the country
• Only selected ministries \vere provided protection
• Ministry was corrupt
• Ministry charged for protection
31 100ct03

... : ·~,._ , , Ministry of f he lnterio. r
Public .Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Post-War - The Facts I
• Coalition Provisional Authority elected not to have a central agency
• Fear of establishing the old regime of "Ministry of Vital Tnst1tutions"
• Wanted a decenLralized progra1n within CPA where 1ninistrics are in control
• Wanted to eli111inate co1Tuption within the organization
• Wanted one ministry to serve as quality assurance and enforce standards only
• First consideration was Ministry of Security Affairs and Defense
• Ministry of Interior was second option but selected option
32 10 Oct 03

COMRINED JOINT TASK FOl{CE 7
I Dilemma I
What is the best solution for providing . a
protection service th. at will secure and safe
guard Iraqi fac'ilities and serve the Iraqi people?
33
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7
l"OA 1: Decentralized Control ~vithiti CPA
• Each Ministry is responsible for:
~Maintaining it's own FPS section, within the 1ninistry.
- Achninistrative actions i.e."pay".
- Equipping there 0~1
11 personnel.
- Managing it's o\vn crisis and consequence manage1nent.
30 Ministries managing an average of 20 sites within each Governate x
18 Governates =potentially 10,800 different variations of managing FPS.
/>robabili~v of chang,e is grealest due to too 111any chief\' with hands i11 the pot
34
100cl 03

Ministry of the Interior Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
COMBlNED JOINT TASK, FORCE 7
COA 2: Centralized Control witlzin CPA
• One Ministry responsible for:
- Maintaining FPS throughout Iraq/Govemates.
- Ad1ninistrative actions "pay"
- Equipping al1 sites and personnel
- Managing any crisis and consequence management within Iraq
Single Ministry managing an average of 4 CPA Regional FPS site managers.
An average of 20 sites per ministry = 2,400 si1niJar ways of managing FPS
Probability of change is lesser than decentra/iz, ed tlue to less chiefs with hands in the pot
35 10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I COA 3: Localized - Regional I
• 4 I~egional (CPA) Offices responsib1e for:
- Maintaining FPS within specific regions only.
- Ad1ninistrative actions "pay".
- Equipping all sites and personnel.
- Managing crisis and consequence management w· ithin sector.
4 Regions "managing" 30 Ministries with an average of
20 sites per ministry = 2,400 sinular ways of 1nanaging FPS
Probability of change is equal to Centralized and is greater than decentralized
dtte to less chief~ with lui1uls in the pot
36
10 Oct03

Ministry of f he l, n . terior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I COA 4: Localized - Governate
1
• 18 G · overnate Offices responsible for:
- Maintaining FPS within specific gove111ate areas only
- Administrative actions "pay"
- Equipping all sites and personnel
- Managing a crisis and consequence tnanagement within area
18 Govcmate Offices managing 30 Ministries with an average of
20 sites per ministry = 10,800 different ways of managing FPS
Probability of c/zange is eqllal to decentralization but is le~·ser than centralized a11d
Localized tit the regio11a/ level due to tnore chiefv with hands in the pot
37
10 Oct 03

Minis· try of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
The Criteria (Slide 1 of 2)
• Secnritv: Ability to quickly lower and increase Protection posture; fight com1>lacency; not
allowing a lowering of standards to a· cconunodate 1>ersonal beliefs.
IJenchmark: The Jess outside iuf1uencc on 1u·ocedures the better.
influence cc1ual to or< 3
• Management: Abilit~ ~ to administer systerns; handle crisis & consequence management
ncnclnnark: The less lcvcJs ntanaging a site the better.
levels equal to or < 3
• Training: Ability lo teach a conunon set of methods, practices and techniciues that coincide
with knowledge, skills and abilities
Beuchmal'k: The least amount of variation in Program of lnstruclions the hettrr.
variation ec1ual to or< 2
38
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
COMBINED .JOINT TASK FORCE 7 ·
I The Criteria (Slide 2 of 2) I
•Qualitv Assurance: Ability to ensure standards in the field are being maintained
Benclunark: The least amount of agencies conducting quality assurance the better.
amount 1nust be equal to or< 1
• Standardization: Ability to produce one product that is common throughout the country such
training, proc~dures and equiprnent
Bench1nark: The least amount standards being produced the better.
amount nu1st be equal to or< 1
• Corruption. : Ability to quickly identify iJlegal activity
Benchmark: The least an1ount of 01>portunities for corruption to exist.
amount must be equal to or< 1
• Cost: Ability to manage cost effectively
Beuclnnark: The abilit)' to minimize changes bearing on cost.
ainount of changes that can be made must be equal to or< 2
39
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior·
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
Security
I Comparison Analysis (tot 3)
Most Desirable Desirable Least Desirable
Localized-Uegional < Centraliicd < Localized - Governate <
Localized- Regional offers the best option for secudty in that all locations will answer to one person
and can not be degraded due to personal bel icf s or complacency of tenant agencies.
Most Desirable Desirable Least Desirable
-
.Ma11ageme11t Localized-Regional < CeutraJized < Localized - Governale < D • . ~t ,-;.. I ,
,u._.
Training
I.ocalized- Regional offers the best option for management in that centralized offers flexibility in pay
and can allow monies to shift to accommodate growing concerns or threats.
Most Desirable Desirable Lenst Desirable
Centralized< Localized-Regional< Localized .... Governate < Decen
-., ffrv·· .
·-
........
-
............
CenlraJized offers the best option for management in that centralized offers one
program of instruction in that is common to all and allows for changes to be affected quickly
... common language.
40
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
I Comparison Analysis r2ots) I
Most Desirable Desirable Least Desirable
Quality
Assurance
Centralized< Localized-Regional< Localized - Goveruate <De
CentTalized offers the best option for quality assurance in that all locations will answer to one agency
and can not be degraded due to personal beliefs or complacency of tenant agencies.
Most Desirable Desirable Least Desirable
--
Standardization Centralized <Localized-Regional < Localized - Governate < Dece
Centralized offers the best option for standardization in that centralize<l offers a common thread
at all locacions with in Iraq ultimately keeping cost down.
Most Desirable Desirable Least Desirable
~"-.
Corruption Localized-Regional < Centralized< Localized - Governale < D.e.c ~--j~ '
• ~\I~", .•
•'-
- '-..
.
Localized regional offers the best option for detecting co1Tuption but in this society where bargaining is
Critical to building ones image it can exist in all COAs the hardest to detect \\'ill be in a decentralized
program
41
-
·--
- -
-
--
~ ~
\ ~-~1
-
W#! .'~3~L$i I
- -- --
~- ......
~
10 Oct03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
Cost
I Comparison Analysis (sots; I
Most Desirable Desirable Least Desirable
-
..
'II\.;
Centralized < Localized-Uegional < Localized - Governate < Dcce
l If-~~-, .\!!. ,
- .4 ...
Cenlrnlized offers the best option for cost in that all locations w.iJI have one standard program.
and equipment and will allow monies to be shifted to strength an area without requesting more
dollars from the government
42
10 Oct 03

Decentralized
(COA l)
30
cntralized
(COA 2)
1-5
Localizt>d -
Regional
(COA 3)
4
(COA 4)
18
43
Ministry of the Interior Public S 'arety and Security for All Iraqis
COMBINED JOlNT TASK FORCE 1 ·
I Wf!ighting Criteria I
Cvst Corru1>tion Management Training
Scn1ril}' Standards Quality
A~suranct
2 I 4 3 5 4 ·'
60 30 120 CJO 150 120 CJO
5 20 G 25 G G
8 0 0 12 G 16 12
36 18 72 54 90 54 54
The lower the number the better
10 Oct 03

cntralizrd
(COA 2)
1-5
Jkgional
(COA 3}
4
Gm·crnate
(COA 4)
18
44
Ministry of the Interior Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
COMBll\TJID JOINT TASK FORCE 7.
I
Cost
2
60
8
36
Corruption
1
30
5
0
18
Weighting Criteria
Management
4
20
0
Trnining
3
G
12
Security
5
150
25
G
90
I
Standards
4
120
0
16
54
Quality
A&~llrnntc
3
90
G
12
54
The lower the number the better
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
Pros & Cons
Centralized COA 2 v.s Localized (Regi,onal CPA) COA 3
• Cost Centralized is better than Localized (Regional CPA)
• CotTuption: Localized (Regional CPA) is better than Centralized
• Management: Localized (Regiona1 CPA) is better than Centralized
• Quality Assurance: Centralized is better than Localized (Regional CPA)
• Security: Localized (Regional CPA) is better than Centralized
• Standardization: Centralized is better than Localized (Regional CPA)
• Training: Centralized is better than Localized (Regional CPA)
Most Impact ------- I1npact Least I1np.nct
• Securit)1 >l\1.anagement >Training> Quality Assurance> Standardization >Cost> Corruption
45
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
COMBINED JOINT1 TASK FORCE 7
I Recommendation I
COA 2 Centralized
• Uet·ausc of it's ability to stamlardize, train and J>rovide better quality assurance and keep costs down beHer than th.
other COAs.
• Provides an almost equal service by being able lo better res.pond (Ocxihility} to national lcveJ
crisis and consequence t,ype incidents (managin, g from 01e "bcart" of the country)
• Possess au ability to sbif't assets unimpeded without delay.
• Centralized Control pre.sents U1e least amount of vulnerabilities and ensures that Iraq will be safe and secure
• Centralized Control will be easiest to execute during TOA
46 10 Ocl OS

Ministry of the Interior Public Safety and Seeutity for All Iraqis
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7
GOA 2 Up-close
1 Ministry (CPA)
Lead/CJTF Support
Command & Control Personnel Cost .., Pay Travel
;1. • Ministry (CPA)
•-'/, FPS CeU
National Le-vel
?CPA
5 Iraqis
$1 .5 Mil
per year
7-10 days
Pros & Cons
Centrally Managed
9 CPA
9 Iraqis
$1.8 Mil
per year
4-21 days
r,).FPS Site Mangers
BDE/GST Local Level
30 Iraqis
per
Region
$648,000
per year
Now
+ Fast method to stand-up FPS Cell
at all levels
+ Site Managers existing hires
+ Easiest to Transition off to Iraqi
Government
+ Incident CMD
+ Greater Flexibility
+ Reduces vulnerabilities
+Better system for checks and
batances
• Ministrie.s not in control of FPS
• Way Ahead l ~2 yrs out
CPA transitions to Iraqi Government
47
10 Oct 03

Ministry of the Interior
Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis
GUIDANCE
CG
48 10 Oct 03

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COALXTXOS PRovrsrORAL AOTBORITT
Policy Paper
Facility Protective Service (FPS) ouarda
33 JUly 2003
BackgroW'l.d: Facility security is vi~al ~o returning the functions of government to
the people of Iraq. This makes security of public (and private) facilities a
priority in the reconstruction of Iraq. Without facility security, workers cannot
return to a safe work environment nor can the facilities be refurbished and
provided with new equipment lest it be stolen or destroyed again.
Under the previous regime there was a vital infrastructure facility protection
service, aka "police guards-, that guarded many public facilities. To many
Iraqi's this was an integral, though blatantly corrupt and thoroughly
unprofessional, component of an overall security scheme. This guard service was a
national~level force under the Ministry of Interior's (MOI) police function; it
was assigned to multiple locations throughout the nation as required.
Guidance:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has decided that new
Iraqi Ministry of Interior will no longer provide this force but
will establish and enforce the standards for the training a.nd
employment of FPS guards. Those standards are listed in Annex A.
The Ministry of Interior will also license private firms that
employ or provide FPS guards. These standards take effect 1
August.
A CPA contracting vehicle will be established NLT 30 ~ugust under
which FPS guards may be hired by public or private entities.
Contractors will be licensed by the Ministry of Interior before
providing any services and are subject to inspection by the
Ministry at any time.
Each Ministry and municipality will hire FPS guards as it sees fit.
These may be temporary hires or contracted guards; they will not be
civil servants, they will comply with all standards established by
the Ministry of Interior, and they will coordinate their actions
with local police and other security forces.
Regional Governates will coordinate the integration of FPS guards
with police and other security forces within their areas of
responsibility.
Private firms may hire or contract for FPS-like guards. They will
be licensed bY the Hinistery of Interior and operate in cooperation
wi~h local police and other security forces.
In Baghdad, by 5 August, CJTF 7 and the CPA will emplace a
sustainable FPS mooel t~at appropri~~ely protects all sites with
added emphasis on those deemed most critical by the CPA. By this
date, CJTF 7 will ensure that FPS guards on all protected public
sites in Baghdad are in uniform, appropriately armed, and
appropriately trained for their responsibilities. From this date,
however, CJTF 7 will supervise and pay only those FPS guards on the
~Most Critical Sited list at Annex B. All other FPS guards will be
paid and supervised by Ministries and the Municipality of Baghdad.
Countrywide, by 1 October, CJTF 7 will hand over full
responsibility for all FPS sites to Ministries or regional
governates and will provide only reaction forces as coordinated by
local commanders.
2

Annex A (FPS Standards)
1. Uniform: FPS Guards will wear a grey shirt, navy blue trousers, grey
beret, and brassard over left shoulder with ~Facilities Protective
SreviceN in bold Arabic text and small letters ~FPS• in English below.
Brassards may be further embroidered with the symbol of the organization
for whom the Guards are working.
2. Guidelines for the Employment of FPS Guards:
3. Training:
a. FPS guards will receive a minimum of 3 days training in the minimum
following subjects:
i. Interacting with the public.
ii. Standards of behavior
iii. Use of force
iv. Etc
b. Firms desiring to be licensed to ~rain security guards will submit
detailed proqrams to the Ministry of Interior for approval before
training begins.
4. Individual Certification, Licensing, Badging:
5. Communications:
6. Licensing Contractors and Private Firms:
7. Inspections:
3

Uf~CLA!elfilf8JiFeA 6FA01AL USE ONLY
The CJTF-7 Daily 02 October 2003
' --~~-----
NORTH CENTRAL
• . 2BCT Held a Ribbon Cutting Ceremony in the
Diyala Province for the Employment Center and I.he
Social Ccnier Offices in Baqubah.
• Soldiers from the Division Surgeon's Office
Began a Major Effort to Update the Medical Library
at Tikrit Medi..:.al College.
, • School Attendance in all North Ccnrra.1 Provinces
is0ver90%.
•
NORTH
• Nonh AO Received 3.872 MIL Liters of
Benzene, 5.946 MIL Liters of Diesel. 0.246 MlL
Liters of Kerosene and 920 Tons of Propane.
•The Nineveh Schools Opened 01 OCT 03.
• 101AA Held a Ribbon Cutting at the Birzginan
Primary School Northeast of Mosul.
•A Total Of2,123 Formeriraqi Milicary Paid
WEST
•A 3ACR Civil Affairs Team Went to Al Anah
and Met with Sheik Jamal. the Acting Mayt>r, to
Make I.he Final Payment of $5,000 for che City's
Water Project.
• 3BDE CA Personnel Went to the Town of
Nassir Wa Al Salaam and Met wicb the Mayor
and Engineers to Discuss the On-going Saniration
Project There.
CENTRAL SOUTH
• 2,525 Schools in the Area of Operations are
Open or Will Be Opened in the Next Ten Days,
School Rehabilitations Have Provided Safe.
Functional Classrooms for StudenL'> and
TeacherS.
• 290 New Jraqi Army Recruits Depaned Basrah
Today for Balad.
• 57 Recruits have Completed ICDC Training wilh
472 Individuals Still Undergoing T raining.
•A Total of l ,583 Formerlraqi MiliwyPai.d
Tolf!J Formeri Ir04i Milikl[ry Psi.d 1!o Date: 110,332
Meetings
0700
0800
0830
0900
1130
1200
1600
Meeting
Tactical Update Assessment Brietlng
Amb.assador Meetirrg
CMA TT Meeting
Strategic Communications Meeting
Ministry of Health Staff Meeting
Ministry Audit Meetin9
Security Meeting
Requirements Synchronization Board
Program Review Committee !PRC )
~
CJTF-7 Ops Center
AMB Breme.r's Office
CMA TT Conference Room
CPA Conference Room
CPA MOH Offices
CJTF-7 Conference Room
Baghdad Convention Center
CJTF-7 Conference Room
Ministries Conference Room
Issues
Attendees
CG & Staff. CPA Representatives
CG. AMB Bremer , CPA Representatives
03, CMATT, CENTCOM
PAO, CPA SC, 10
SURG, MOH RepresGntatives
09, Justice, Interior. Labor. Social. Affairs
CG. Selected Governale Council Members
C3, C4, C7. C9. RCO
CB, CPA Committee Members
Security ~
• MOI CAT (JOC: C0~..__11
_ __, J CPA: Mrl___J
Governance
• National ~s Card Po~ting Approval
(JOC: COr:___j CPA: Mrr::____j
Eoonomy
•Ministry of Trade and Transportation Will Be Aepstinfi
Suf'.lpon for OFF DellveriesJSe.curity (JOC: LTC Msr"ii I
CPA:
ONCLA!SIPl!!OflP-eR eFFIOIAl 1::16£ ONlsY

UNCLASSl .. ll!!C>NP'O" 0191ilCIA:L USE ONLY
Expanded Narrative- Issues -02 October 2003
Distribution:
• (U} The repairing of the 14n product line (Basarah to Nasiriyah).
o Repairs~ssed to be done by end of Aug.
o TF Rio, ..--iltraveled down to Basra on 25 Sept.
o SCOP is trying to flush benzene out of the pipeline from Nasiriyah to
Shuaiba. They cannot cut the pipe until this is done.
o They are pumping water in, but nothing is coming out the other end, so
they are troubleshooting.
o After the benzene is flushed they will put in the 19 new bends and then
hydrostatic test the pipe.
o They are estimating 3 weeks to finish, but a Jot depends on how long it
takes to troubleshoot the flushing problems.
o KBR offered assistance with on-site training to pump operators.
• (U) 10151 Reported a pipeline fire at grid NE of Tall Afar
o The initial investigation of the fire suggests it was caused by sabotage.
o There is a 2-foot hole in the pipeline that appears to have been caused by
and explosion.
o The pipeline is not operational and the fire is the result of residual oil. Will
allow fire to bum out.
o No Impact as this is a low priority/inactive pipeline.
• (U) On 30 SEP 03, 1 BCT (410) reported that a 3-66 AR patrol identified a
suspected leak in a natural gas pipeline 18KM SW OF Bayji
o The leak was identified because of the odor and "hissing" sound coming
from the pipeline.
o 3-66AR has contacted the Bayji refinery, and DTAC notified DIVENG.
• (U} 01 Oct TF-RIO reported a pipeline break 10 km South of Naftkhana.
o TF-RIO says it's a 10'' crude line.
o No major Impact.
o No further details; more to follow.
UNCLASSIFIED!VFOR OFFIGIAL USE ONLY

- -------
ur~etASSlfilf!B#f"Oft 6f"filCIAL USE ONLY
Electr· ical Infrastructure Issues:
POC: LTGFJ
CPTr==J
ovNtf...._"" __ ___.tosN [
CELL p
Oistribut. ion:
• (U) An oil pipeline fire at Qayyarah West caused four towers along the Ba.yji-
Mosul #2 line to collapse
o Impact: The damage to the #2 line (1 of 2) will reduce the amount of
power Mosul can distribute to Bayji or Bayji can distribute to Mosul.
o Redundancy in the system is last. Therefore, if the #1 line trips, it could
cause regional or national grid failure.
Ut46LASSIFIEO#FOR OFFtGlAL 'USE OP1,LY

COALITfON PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
Office of the Senior Advisor
National Security and Defense
Directorate of Industrial Conversion
Baghdad, Iraq
July 16, 2003
HAND DELIVERED /TM.MEDIA TE ATTE~TION
r' I
Director1 Al-Khazin Company
Iraq
Sir:
Thank you for your recent letter to Ambassador Bremer, concerning Al-Khazin Company
problems. I have been asked to respond to you and to this problem immediately.
Enclosed please find a copy of an Official Memorandum confirming the transfer of your
company.
Also enclosed please find an Official and Public Notice of Termination which is relevant
to your complaint.
With best regards and with good wishes for a new Iraq .
.1ce o· e emor visor
National Security and Defense
Directorate of Industrial Conversion
Attochm.:nls

Office of the Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authorrty
Baghdad, Iraq
July 13, 2003
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7
FROM ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
SUBJECT: Tasking Letter - Weapons and Ammunition tor New Iraqi Army (NIA)
Reference: Request from the Ministry of National Security and Defense (MND)
I request that the Commander, Comb· ined Joint Task Force 7 take the
appropriate action to provide the following items to the MNO in order to train the NIA.
WHAT-1000 AK-47s
4000 AK-47 magazines
30 light machine guns
. ao 9mm pistols
160 9mm pistol magazine
300,000 rounds o1 serviceable AK-47 ammunition
100,000 rounds of serviceable light machine gun ammunition
400 rounds of serviceable pistol ammunition
WHEN - No later than 30 July 2003
WHERE -- NIA training base at Kir Kush (West of Mandali in the sector of lhe 1st
Battalion, 10th Cavalry Regiment, /Avn/410(M)
Direct coordination between the tasked unit(s) and the CPA representative listed below
is requested.
Patrick Kennedy
Chief of Staff

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. James Haveman, Senior Advisor OCPA 14JUN03
MEMORANDUM FROM Directorate of Medical Military Affairs
SUBJECT Membership Proposal
1. Propose the following personnel as interim members oflhe Executive Committee for
the Directorate of Medical Military Affairs pending official approval from OCPA:
MG Dr. Hashim Husain Hashim
BG Dr. Zaid Fadhil AJ-Saffar
BG Dr. Ali Hameed Rasheed
BG (Pharmacist) Faiz Farced
COL Dr.
COL Dr
LTC D;,.;r·~ -------.-__J
LT Dr.
Wanant Officer Nurs
Specialty in Management and Fieldwork
Post Graduate Student in Plastic Surgery
Psychiatrist
Fonner Kimadia Military Representative
ENT Specialist
Dentist
General Practitioner
Resident
Warran~t'Ofli~1~c-er~N~urs--,11m ----..._~~~---,
N~(Female)
Nurse (Male)
2. The aforementioned meet the established OCPA criteria for committee membership and
agree to adhere to all rules and regulations set forth by OCP A and the
Ministry of Health.
3. The point of conta ct for this information is the undersigned, coir:
at DNVTL jor ThuryL jor-,-........:---'-----------1
BG Dr. Shakir Malunood Al-Ainachi
Director General
Directorate for Military Medical Affairs

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7

ACTION MEMORANDUM
1July2003
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
A maximum-security prison is urgently needed. Only Abu Ghraib prison could
safely house an appreciable number of high-security detainees within three years. I
therefore recommend that you approve reconstruction of temporary maximum-security
cell blocks at Abu Ghraib, despite its grim reputation, pending construction of a new
maximum-security facility at Kanban'i Saad. A memorial should be located at Abu
Ghracb as soon as possible, with appropriate notice to the public.
DISCUSSION
As we discussed last week, the Coalition lacks a maximum~security prison for
high-security detainees. Currently such detainees can only be confined at temporary
facilities using tents and razor wire barriers. As you are aware, the deficiencies in such
facilities have occasioned a number of demonstrations, riots and breakout attempts,
resulting in two prisoners killed and over thirteen injured. Although to my knowledge no
Coalition soldiers have been seriously injured, they are at grave risk.
Several alternatives for rovid~curity prison were investigated by
and-of the CPA Prisons Departmcnt--
w ose com me experience working in and operating prison systems exceeds a half-
century ·--and myself. Those alternatives are outlined in the attached memorandum from
(Page l of2]

Mr. -to me. L TG Sanchez and I visited the Abu Ghraib and severely looted
Kanban'i Saad prison sites on 28 June. We concluded that the only expeditious way to
realize a safe maximum-security facility is to rehabilitate Abu Ghraib cell blocks, which
could contain four thousand maximum-security prisoners within twelve months. No
other facility could be established in appreciably less than three years. We have therefore
already begun the first phase of reconstruction at Abu Ghraib.
All agree that Abu Ghraib's deservedly horrid reputation counsels against
perpetuation of ics use as a prison any longer than operational necessity demands. But the
only alternatives we have available are even less palatable. Immediate reconstruction can
and should therefore begin for a maximum-security facility at Kanban'i Saad, the next
fastest alternative. for completion in three years or less. This would signal to Iraqis the
phasing-out of Abu Ghraib, part or all of which should be turned into a memorial for
those who suffered there. Ex-prisoner groups have expressed an interest in helping to
establish such a memorial.
RECOMMENDED ACTION
1bat you approve the rehabilitation construction of a maximum-security prison
facility already underway at Abu Ghraib and immediate ground-breaking for a
replacement facility at Kanban'i Saad.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE
(Attachment)
Coordinated with: L TG Sanchez
AMB Slocombe./
Bernard Kerik
~ ..... ';. - '1 Senior Prisons Consultant
- - - I
APPROVE WITH MODIFICATION
''•', ---- -- -- - ', ..
--
- - - -- - -- -
.
[Page 2of2]
.

' . .
MEMORANDUM
--. -
TO: " I
. .
FROM: Department of Prisons
·-------
SUBJECT: Alternatives for Maximum Security Prison Facilities
We are continuing to examine potential alternatives for housing maximum
security and dangerous detainees/inmates in lieu of using the maximum security
compounds located at the Abu Ghraib Prison complex for the shortest possible
timeframes.
1. Review of existing assessed prison facilities earmarked for re-
activation to support the Iraq criminal justice system currently and in the
short term.
a. Al Hakmia (116 maximum security beds}
This prison complex was operated by the Iraq Internal Security Agency,
commonly called the Secret Police. This facility housed high security "political"
and foreign prisoners. It also obviously served as a major headquarters for the
Agency. All buildings are brick/masonry structures with a plaster finish. The four-
story main structure is the housing areas for all prisoners as well as a large
administrative headquarters. Prisoner housing was on the 3rd and 4th floor
levels. The third floor consists of 50 cells. Each cell was 9' x 9'. This cell block
can accommodate 100 maximum security prisoners. The fourth floor consists of
8 additional maximum security cells. This facility can provide a total of 116
maximum security beds for high custody or dangerous inmates.
b. Kanban'i Saad Prison.
In the assessment team's initial inspection on May 241 h of this new prison that
was under construction when the coalition forces began hostilities, there were 20
new cell blocks in two compounds that provided approximately 2,800 secure
beds. Following the initial phase of hostilities, 153 Arab families moved into the
complex. By June 12th, these Arabs had substantially disassembled the walls
and structures rendering the facility unusable. Even though the structures have
been mostly destroyed and cannot be refurbished for use in the immediate or
short terms, there are foundations. infrastructure and some cell block structures
that can be renovated and rebuilt. It would be necessary to relocate the Arab
families in order to do a thorough estimate of what is needed to rebuild the cell
blocks for permanent use. Although the team has not been able to do a
complete assessment of the complex. it is estimate that the previously existing
prison beds could be placed back into operation within twelve to eighteen
months.

The Kanban'i Saad prison site is also considered an ideal location for future
construction of a replacement maximum security prison(s) for the Abu Ghraib
Prison complex. The complex is very large and has the potential capability of
providing separate prison compounds to support the future Iraq criminal justice
system's needs. Construction time for a new secure maximum security prison on
this complex is estimated to be approximately thirty to thirty-six months.
Therefore, it is again strongly recommended that action be taken to
relocate the Arab families occupying the site, and that the military secure
this site so that planning and assessments can proceed in the near future.
c. No other prisons found throughout the country of Iraq are
capable of housing maximum security inmates.
2. Other Alternatives.
New Construction. The team has recommended that a minimum of three (3)
maximum security 3,000 bed modern modular designed state-of-the-art prisons
be constructed throughout Iraq. The first one in the central area (Baghdad), and
duplicates built in northern and southern Iraq. It is estimated that each of
these prisons will cost approximately $180 to $200 million, and take 30 to
36 months to complete. This is considered to be the long-term permanent
solution to fully support the needs of a fully operational criminal justice system.
Prefab cell Housing. The team is currently collecting information and data on
the feasibility of bringing into Iraq prefab maximum security cell housing that can
be placed in a timely manner to support the growing needs of the criminal justice
system. There are companies that prefab cells that can be brought in and set in
place, connected to sewer, water, electrical systems and be in operation quickly.
Normally these systems are used to expand existing facilities. A US/UK
company has been contacted for information. It is unknown if quantities of such
prefab cells are available, how long it would take to obtain this type of housing.
and what the costs of such construction woutd be. We hope to be able to have
answers to these questions in the near future. This information may be available
by the close of business on 26 June 2003
Prison ships/barges. The team is attempting to gather information on the
feasibility of obtaining prison ships/barges that could be placed in the area of the
Port of Um-Qasser. It is unknown if any such ships or barges exist that would
be available within the near future, the cost of such a facility, and the ability to
have the ship brought to Iraq. One team member has in the past researched
this option and determined that it takes 12-18 months to build a prison ship
or barge.

The major disadvantage of locating a prison ship at Um.Qasser is the
logistics of transporting high security inmates on a twelve hour trip from
Baghdad to southern Iraq. Given the opportunity for escape and ambush, the
trip would be extremely labor intensive to insure safety and security of the
transporting contingent
The prison assessment team will continue to explore other alternatives to the use
of Abu Ghraid Prison. At this point in time, we have found no other facilities that
can provide up to 4,000 maximum security beds between now and the end of this
year. The team supports the use of Abu Grab prison only until new facilities can
be constructed. The estimated time frame would be 30 to 36 months once
approval for new construction is received. Once assessed, perhaps the
use of the Kanban'i Saad prison site can shorten the estimated time that a
new prison could be constructed and in operation.
Department of Prisons, 1830 hrs, 1 D June 2003)
cc: Deputy Senior Advisor, Ministry of Interior

-
.
1st Armored Division
Tier 2 & 3 Site
TOA
30 July 2003
1AD Commander's Intent
1st Armored Division transfers authority
of 200 Tier 2 sites and 115 Tier 3 sites to
the Ministries' Facility Protection Service
(FPS) guards, while continuing to monitor
the security of Baghdad's vital facilities and
infrastructure.

Review of TOA Criteria
• TOA criter, ia include the following:
- 100% of fixed-site security requirements filled by hired,
screened, and trained FPS
- FPS site and employee database submitted to CPA
- FPS command and control (C2) and communic.ations
architecture proposal submitted to CPA
- FPS employees provided temporary identification
badges and ROE cards
- Assessment phase scheduled and implemented by 1 ..
Armored Division
Current Issues
1of2
• Uniforms.
- Berets on hand
- 550 uniforms on hand
- Brassards due-in 30 Jul 03
- Additional uniform requisition
• Badges
- Temporary badges issued to guards
- Permanent badges produced by DynCorp (Ministry of
Interior)
• Weapons.
- 1 per every 2 guards Level 2 Sites
- 1 per every 3 guards Level 3 Sites
. 2

Current Issues
2of2
• Communications.
- 1 AO contracted 350 radios (1 per site and corresponding
IP station) with expected delivery date of 15 Aug 03
- 1AD provided CPA with 1.75M contract for short- and
long-term C3
• Salary.
- 1AD is currently paying employee salaries until CPA is
ready to assume responsibility (projected as 1 Sep)
- Payments will be made through Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CE.RP) funds
Tentative Timeline
• 31 Jul
• 1 Aug
• -1 Aug
• -15Aug
• -15 Aug
• By 1 Oct
• Aug-Dec
550 sets of uniforms to
Thawra & 9 Nissan
TOA (Tier 2 and 3)
Receipt · of weapons from CPA
Receipt of uniforms
Receipt of radios
TOA (Tier 1 sites)
Security assessment
3

TOA Conclusion
• 1AD will continue to designate Baghdad's
532 fixed sites as named areas of interest.
• Units will conduct security assessments of
these sites after TOA.
• As Iraqis return to work and live in facilities,
they will provide an additional layer of
security - CPA must leverage this layer
1st Armored Division
Chief of Staff
4

Facts
• Our goals are mutual
• There will be some
mistakes; we cannot let this
stop progress
• Every US soldier guarding a
fixed site is one less soldier
finding, bad guys
• Your soldiers are- paying in
blood, and in two cases
with their lives, to guard
fixed sites
• The 1 AD Force Protection
Team will visit every critical
Tier I site and assess the
protection provided in the
next 60 days
1LT Jon•tlt•n D, Roziol'
ll<lk 19 July 2003
8~•d
5

DEPARTMEN' T OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST ARMOR.ED DNtSION
UNIT 24309
APOAE 09252
REPlY TO
At1E>O'ION01
AETV-THW-A
11 July 2003
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Requirements for FPS Communications
1. I AD is looking for communications support for FPS sites across Baghdad. The sites are
distributed across the city and require the capability to talk to a regional FPS site or to the
local police station in a crisis. A network will be established from the FPS sites lo a districts
base station. The FPS site will provide power for the radio charger and for base stations
wbere installed. The requirements are:
a. One vendor for all 532 FPS sites and 35 police !itations
b. Each FPS site will include
i. J radio with extra battery and charger
ii. Power connector
c. One base station for each district (9 total)
d. Programming sothvare for each rndio
e. Radios will be unsecure
f. Installation of base stations
g. Trainjng on use and programming of the radio systems.
2. Concept of the operation: Each FPS site will have <.>nc radio for emergency communications
to a regional base station or local police station. Each police station will also be provided a
radio for use on the FPS net. One base. station will be set up in each of the nine districts to
monitor activity. MP police base stations can be programmed to scan the unsecured networl..
as an additional means for communications connectivity.
3. Point of contact for I AO is MAr l. r· DNV-rr' I '-----~ .___ __ ......_ ______ -=-__,
I or
,SC
Deputy 06

Use Of Private Security Finns In Iraq Draws Concerns
Page 1 of2
Washington Times
October 6, 2003
Pg. 1
Use Of.Private Security Firms In Iraq Draws Concerns
By Borzou Daragahi, The Washington Times
KIRKUSH, Iraq -The use by the Pentagon of more than a dozen private security companies to guard
key installations and train a new Iraqi army has helped extend U.S. military resources but raised concern
among some active-duty soldiers and civilian U.S. officials.
That trend was on display recently here in northeastern lraq, where the U.S. authority proudly displayed
a battalion-size set of recruits it hopes will form the core of a new pro-American Iraqi army.
The camouflage-clad recruits - young and middle-aged, Kurdish, Arab and Turkoman - formation, launched ambushes and fired their weapons for a group of visiting reporters.
marched in
Bu.t their training was being handled not by U.S. forces but a group of gray-suited specialists under
contract from the Vinnell Corp., a subsidiary of American defense giant Northrop Grumman. Vinnell, in
tum, has subcontracted most oftbe Kirkush training to MPRl, an Ale xandria firm that helped train the
new Croatian and Bosnian armies.
"The Iraqi army is such an essential component for the future oflraq in terms of avoiding civil war,"
said Rex: Wempen, a Baghdad-based security consultant and former Special Forces member. "It shows
how embedded the [private military contractorsi or PM Cs] are. in the thinking of the Department of
Defense that they would use them to train that army.''
At a time when the overstretched U.S. military is struggling to persuade other nations to send troops to
help secure Iraq, PM Cs can relieve some of the pressure on American forces.
"If you're going to keep the number of troops down, this is the way to do it," said Mr. Wempen. "The
expense is the same or more. But politically it's much less expensive."
Staffed by ex-military personnel, the private firms are playing an increasingly visible role in Iraq~
*Armed employees of Custer Battles, a Fairfax firm, guard Baghdad airport, manning the type of
checkpoints often operated by American soldiers.
*Erinys, a British company with offices in the Middle East and South Africa. guards the oil fields.
*Global Risk, a British firm offering "risk m.anagement" advice, has the contract to provide armed
protection for the Coalition Provisional Authoricy, the U.S.-led power.
*DynCorp of Reston has been hired to help train Iraq's police.
Much of the work is conducted by former soldiers who retain high security clearances, said an Iraq-
bas. ed former U.S. military official who requested anonymity.
http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e2003 I 006222298.btml 10/6/2003

6 October 03
Memorandum for Ambassador Bremer
From: Walt Slocombe
Subject: Conscript Payment Issues
This memo outlines what we know about the payment for fonner lraqi Anny conscripts,
the disturbances across the country, and my recommendation on whether to reopen for
payments and where.
Briefly, here are some statistics:
Before Saturday, we had paid 329,777 of roughly 440,000 fonner conscripts on
the old MOD list we have and that we used as the sole test of eligibility (75%)
On Saturday, we paid an additional 16,802 at 8of9 sites. We did not pay anyone
at Basra, where there were significant disturbances.
Our conscript payment nwnbers therefore now stand at 354,096 or roughly 80.5%
of the mid-April roles. (Note that the total number of former conscripts is less
than our mid-April records show due to deaths, incarcerations, emigrations,
people who don't think $40 is worth the trip, etc .... so the paid percentage is
certainly higher of those who are both eligible and want to seek payment.)
At 3 locations, Diwaniya, Nasariya. and Mosul, local Commanders and Stipend
Payment teams, of their own accord, detennined that, due to delays from minor
disturl:>anccs on Saturday and people standing in line in orderly fashion when they
closed they needed more time so they opened on Sunday, paying an additional
7517 personnel.
No other location paid on Sunday (or today, Monday, so far as we can tell).
Bear in mind that, at least at Baghdad. relatively few of those who showed up on
Saturday were on the roster, and therefore are not ever going to be paid no matter how
Jong the sites stay open. Given the high percentage who have already been paid, that is
likely to be the case for many others who would seek payment on additional dates, if we
ofTcre<l them.
1 believe we ne~d to make decisions on continuing payments al 3 locations only:
Baghdad: We remained open Saturday until every person in line was attended
to ... 211 S hrs. Unfortunately, earlier in the day an unnamed, low·ranking police official,
acting independently, had told some of the crowd to come back the next day for pay, and
some people may have gone home in reliance on that. An undetermined number likely in
the hundreds did. Those were the ones you heard about this AM. They may have been
lold - again l:>y a policeman without authority to try again today. To the best of our

knowledge no one showed up at the site this morning. We understand that some Baghdad
radios are saying that the station will re-open tomorrow.
_Recommendation: I believe we should not reopen the Baghdad site .. We physically
cannot reopen tomorrow, because the teams don't know to come in. Having stayed open
late on Saturday, most of those most eager to be paid have been taken care of. We cannot
validate unauthorized police promises, much less media rumor. While there may be more
trouble, we will do better to firmly announce that payments at Baghdad are finished.
Approved: Disapproved: Open Baghdad as soon as possible:
Basra: The crowd that overran the Basra site burned all of our payment records.
These paper records were the only docwnentation of who had been paid and who had
not. We believe that there are approximately 6000 former conscripts from Basrah,
Medinat al Mudun, and Maysan on the list who have not been paid- a somewhat higher
percentage than overall. However, it would take us several weeks, wel1 into the Currency
Conversion period, before we could resume payments, because we would need to
transcribe individual chits filled out by those who received pay and consolidate them into
an reasonably accurate and inclusive list to use as the basis for checking any future
payments. I am also concerned that the type of violence we saw Saturday will recur if
we reopen the Basra site.
Recommendation: Accordingly, I recommend we not reopen Basra.
Approve: Disapprove: Reopen Basra as soon as a list is ready Other:
Babel!Hilla: At this pay-site there was a minor disturbance on Saturday, but the
crowd generally remained disciplined and quiet. The site paid 4598 former conscripts
that day, over 600 more than any other site, including Baghdad. The local commander
and site manager closed the site at 1900 on Saturday at dark for security reasons with
persons still in line. They did not open on Sunday as they did not think they had the
authority. We estimate 15,000 former conscripts on the list remain unpaid at this site.
(The conscript population was heavily Shia.) Both the site manager and the local
(Polish) unit want to reopen the site. We estimate it will take 4 days to complete
payments there.
We checked with ;·~_.~:_. ; ____ ,"
to get his assessment. He is somewhat
concerned that new life will be breathed into this 'dying' news story if the press
perceived unequal former conscript treatment across the country. Further, he is
concerned about disturbances at the other pay sites from both rabble-rousers and
FRLs/Sunnis who perceived they were unfairly denied payment at their locations.
Recommendation: Nevertheless, I believe we should reopen the Babel I Hilla site and
pay for 4 days, starting at an early date determined by the local commander.

Approve: Disapprove: Keep it closed for consistency:

2NO.L fST.L CAPT MAJ 't..T.COJ COL
32 9-4 291 606 9. 28 131l
9 45 113 272 393 247
48 40 98 118 1Z-7 27
5 113 303 94 92 24
141 10 3 1 2
1 2 9
3 3 10 18 g 11
238 305 818 1 .010 1551 1633
BG MG LG M,LG
1924 6'95 32. 6
173 31 1
12 5 1
29 8
12 2 1
13 40 28 6
2 2 1
2165 783 64 12
MAR .TOTAL
5821
1284
476
668
172
1 100
59
1 8580
GROIJP
14tja fo
~μ...:ii .)~\
l'l.i..a .,Hl!Ji
iJoOIJ. l,$ _ ~ !.)<I~
.:ii ·ta.. )I
UI~ J, '-JS
~~~
r.4-r,~.r
B o•H , Potf~
M.I, ~"'J r"'f,,I
Ft.io1 c.M
> 1 u'1 .. r ~ti' c..,.,u),
r,, f 6 11• ~ e,A~~
Si. Alv1S#fJ
8.d/ 1 r;..,.~dj

-
......
-
.....
. . .,,
OTHER
997
431
566
170
22
48
2234
FRKA
5006
262
41
101
1
9
9
6429
-
. . -o-;
SHIJBA FAREE
652 137
20 4
4
1
1
16 7
1 1
695 149
MKTB OEADA TOTAL
26 · 5821
1 1284
476
668
172
38 8 100
59 .
65 8 8580
GROUP
U'I~~
~~~~
.-IJ.A .,Holl.»
~ CSJ~U"~
~Ji.Jw
~J.tS
u,iil~~
(5o1 fh P~,ti
t'1;/J"' <11"ftl
re1~ i /,411
~etit. I "' C. ... tl
t 11+,,11:~ e11ce
S,.. Ari v .'$ ;1>
SJ' (Jll'M)I

... ...,,-· ' ..
I
l 2ND.L tST.L CAPT MAJ
COL BG !IG LG M.LG MAR TOTAL Sot\ TH DEGREE
4 1 2 1 8 ~iJl.ji~
10 7 40 7 1 65 ..,..a.._,.;...
10 2 1 3 12 16 100 4 1 149 r_) ,_&.
3 22 72 26 78 266 193 31 5 695 ~_,.&.
32 82 298 487 1019 . 1302 1749 436 12 2 . 5429 ii)~ .
32 95 322 · 560 1058 1402 2037 n3 : 55 11 1 6346
.
~T.COA
• ·'" .~· r

Memorandum Addressed to the Honorable Walt Slocombe
By Staff Lieutenant General Neemat Fares (Retired)
Submitted By Major General Mounzer Na]o (Retired)
1

Problems Facing Iraq At The Present Time
I. Iraq is facing several problems at present and the most important are:
a. Security
b. Unemployment
c. Services especially Security
2. If we were to focus on those major problems, we would find that they are
inter-related; therefore, unemployment causes insecurity because it incites
feelings of revenge. Certainly, the occupation is one of the causes of
unemployment. Moreover, there are thousands of unemployed due to the
disbandment of the Iraqi armed forces, Internal Security Force, Intelligence,
Information (Ministry) and other employees from other ministries which had
compounded past problems.
In my judgment, this latest unemployment would lead to acts of revenge
which may look individualistic at first. However, in due course it would be
organized in small and secret cells to undertake group revenge or terrorist
acts; and it would ultimately lead to loss of security and control over utilities
and government facilities.
The interruption of electricity for a long time during the day and in difficult
weather conditions in addition to psychological effects due to the occupation
disrupts of individual and collective security, as well as the security of the
occupier, and in tum encourages blackmail, theft and looting of public and
private properties, and organized killings of individuals and groups in
darkness. Consequently, it will lead to a loss of control and security which
would show the complete impotence of the Coalition Forces.
The Coalition Forces do not understand Iraqi society and cannot thoroughly
explore the feelings and thoughts of the people, unless they rely on Iraqis in
this difficult and complicated mission. Otherwise, the security situation will
get out of control and will cause internal infighting. This has appeared
recently in the incidents between the Turkmen and Kurds; and it could take
place in other areas in the south.
l

3. In this kind of situation that Iraq is traversing, there will be a race
between those forces which are striving to convulse security and stability
and those which are working to restore stability, re-building of state
institutions and to start up the government. Surely, this requires effective
and rapid measures among which are the following:
a. Perhaps, the Coalition Forces had a reason to disband the Iraqi Army
because it feared that that Army would pose a threat in the near future.
However, the manner in which the disbandment was executed and the way
that was carried out were not appropriate. Th.is has surely caused the loss of
security due to unemployment, and the fostering of feelings of revenge
because it deprived people of an income and a status that they had enjoyed
under the previous regime. This also applles to the resources of Security
Forces, Intelligence and Police. It would have been more appropriate to
gradually vet (weed out) the undesirables in those institutions, especially
those ones who had committed crimes, and would have retained the rest and
entrusted them with missions of internal security and border control.
In order to provide a quick solution to the security problems, I opine that:
First: Recall to active duty the Border Forces and assign to them the mission
of surveillance and control especially on the eastern and western borders. In
case that this proposal is approved, then the border will be controlled and
protected through fixed positions, roving patrols among those fixed
positions, with the retention of a reserve force as a back-up.
Second: The same applies to the Oil Protection Forces (facilities, pipelines).
I suggest recalling immediately those forces and assigning to them the
mission as it was done in the past. This does not preclude the participation
of tribes in certain areas, whereby they are assigned to partake in the mission
in exchange for contracts and salaries and holding them responsible for any
security shortcomings.
Third: There used to be a clear importance attached to the Internal Security
Forces, whereby they controlled the streets by knowing the criminals,
pursuing them and maintaining infonnation about them. In order to ensure a
secure and stable situation, the assistance of those forces would be sought to
undertake security missions either by re-constituting the security
departments, having its members rejoining them and vetting the undesirable
2

elements or by creating security departments affiliated with Police general
departments in the capital and in the governorates.
Fourth: The counter-criminal departments maintain a lot of information on
criminals and those with a criminal past. Those departments were fully
capable of pursuing and arresting criminals any time a security disturbance
occurred. I call for the re-constitution of those departments as soon as
possible in order to assist in the mission of security and stability, and to
punish those who are guilty of crimes past and present.
b. Creation of National Guard units in each govemorate. The size of the
units will correspond to the size of the population in each govemorate. And
therefore, I suggest the creation of these units from members of the
disbanded Iraqi Army or from the New Iraqi Army as a matter of
expediency.
c. The CPA has a duty to ensure well-being and therefore to give special
attention to the security factor because it is one of the duties of the occupier
in accordance with the Geneva Convention. This could be accomplished in
cooperation between the Coalition Forces and the Iraqis.
The Iraqis are most capable than any other international force because they
are aware of the intricacies of the situation, and they are knowledgeable
about people, traditions, customs and language. Therefore, I believe the
necessity of excluding Arab forces is due to, first, the sensitivity of Iraqis,
and second, to avoid the experiences of Arab armies in other Arab countries
such as the Iraqi Army in Jordan, the Syrian Army in Lebanon and the
Egyptian Army in Yemen. In addition, there is the possibility of those
armies being sympathetic with extremist fundamentalists or terrorists or
being exploited by the terrorists. As a consequence, it will create new
security conditions fiercer than at the present time. The hope is not to solve
a problem by creating a bigger one.
d. A state cannot be truly called a state unless the following conditions are
fulfilled:
First, the policeman to preserve security.
Second, the soldier to defend the nation.
3

Third, the judge to ensure justice and accountability.
Therefore, I suggest to recall immediately most of the police (local and
rescue) and reinforcing them with adequately trained members to ensure
security and stability. The same applies to the Border Force and Oil
Protection Forces, and other forces to protect the govemorates and the
borders from outside infiltration coming from the east (Iran, Afghanistan and
Chechnya) and from the west (Wahabi fundamentalists, and members of Al-
Qaida and the extremist jihadists).
The acceleration of restoring prestige to the judges and courts in order to
play their role in achieving accountability and justice.
e. Democracy does not mean political and media chaos, also it does not
mean absolute liberty. lt is imperative during the transitory period that Iraq
is going through; there should central guidance in this domain. It is
inappropriate that there are more than 100 daily newspapers which publish
as they please. Whereas in Austria, we see no more than 5 newspapers
published daily.
4. Reliance by the Coalition administration at the present time on Iraqi
individuals, who were overseas for a long period of time due to the political
situation, may not produce sound advice in most circumstances because of
their long absence from the country. And because they were not aware of
the numerous misfortunes which befell the coWltry neither did they suffer as
the Iraqis who remained in country. I therefore suggest that the Coalition
should seek the advice of those Iraqis who have lived in Iraq, through a
high-level advisory corrunittee consisting of known figures of political,
military and technocratic backgrounds, to assist the Coalition and to ensure a
sound path for the nation.
5. Managing the Border Forces, the Oil Protection Forces and the National
Guard in the govemorates, and the units of the New Iraqi Army require in
my opinion the establishment of a supreme headquarters, which is capable to
command and manage in coordination with the Coalition Forces and
Administration during the transitory period; thus ensuring the best
command, control and management. This could be done through a ministry
of defense or by creating a general command for the armed forces with all
the required organizational and administrative staffs, in order to enable a
minister or commander-in-chief to carry out their mission thoroughly.
4

6. The annihilation of the Iraqi Army units and also its disbandment may
have caused the proliferation and distribution of its weapons all over Iraq. be
it heavy. medium or light. These weapons present an appealing target to
terrorists and fundamentalist extremists who are spending money to buy
them and use them. Therefore, the manner upon which the Coalition Forces
have relied to collect those weapons is inadequate because it lacks the
incentive to relinquish them. A system of compensation and reward must be
adopted in order to collect the weapons and deny the terrorists from
acquiring them; the rewards and compensations should be measured against
the value of the weapons. I suggest that a statement would be released
through the Iraqi and even Arab media; provided that the statement is well
deliberated prior to its release, so that it meets the desired target.
7. In closing, I am well aware that the problems are plenty and the
responsibilities shouldered by the new regime are great. However, it is
possible to attain the desired goal and establish security and stability by
providing the basic needs of life especially those that are services related,
and by achieving security through measures which I have outlined above.
I emphasize that security is everybody's mission, beginning with the
occupation force being one of its main responsibilities as weil as of the
Iraqis who have a vested interest in the stability of their country, its progress
and prosperity. Certainly, the mission of security has to be accorded a very
special significance, due to the fact that there is a quick race between those
who want instability for Iraq and those who desire progress, prosperity and
stability.
Original Signed
Staff Lieutenant General
Keemat Fares
24 August 2003
5

Instructions from the CPA
1. A one-time $40 stipend payment to military conscripts will begin on 13
September 2003 and end on 4 October 2003. This payment will be for conscripts who
were on active duty as of 16 April 2003. No one eJse is eligible to receive this payment.
Eligible former conscripts will also be asked to provide some information concerning
their civilian and military education and training. This information will be used by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, assisted by the International Organization for
Migration, to design future employment and training programs. Iraqi administrators
chosen by the Coalition Provisional Authority will administer the stipend payments.
2. The following pay sites will service those people who were conscripted through
induction centers as detailed below:
Payment
C" tty
Mosul
Kirkuk
Tikrit
Ramadi
Baghdad
Diwaniyah
Babil
Nassariah
Bas rah
Payment Site Location
Sanobar Restaurant-close to Mosul forest
Main Shopping Center
Al-Alam Youth center
Social Security Bldg- across from the
main court bldg
Mutheoa Airport
Diwaniyah TextiJe Factory
Address to be announced later
Nassariah Stadium
Basrah Port
Old lraqi Military
c c onscnpt1on . enter
Nineva, Ashur, Al Jazeera
Kirlruk, Dialah, Eastern Areas
Salahadin
Al-Anbar, Western Areas
Rasaafa, Karkh, Salaam,
Saddam, Rasheed, Waasit
Qaadisiyah
Babil, Karbala, Najaf
Tbj Qar, Ur, Muthena
Basrah, Medinat al Mudun,
Maysan
3. Hours of operation will be from 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM, except on Fridays. Those in
line at 4:00 PM who are still waiting to be paid will be allowed entrance into the pay
site. The following categories will be paid on the days shown below:
l ' 1 Letter of Name
a
a
b,t,th.i
H
H
K.h,d,.Q,r
z,s,sh
Birth Year
198 l and below
1982, 1983, 1984
1981, 1982, 1984
1983, 1980 and below
Date
13 September
14 September
15 September
l 6 September
17 September
18 September
20 September

,•
s,~!,th 21 September
ain 1980 and below 22 September
am 1981, 1984 23 September
am 1982 24 September
ain 1983 25 September
gain,q,f 2 7 September
k,l,n 28 September
m l 980 and below 29 September
m 1981, 1982 30 September
m 1983,1984 1 October
h,w,y 2 October
Make-up 4 October
4. Conscripts must bring the following documents to the pay site:
• Ration ID Card
• Civilian ID Card
5. Your name must be on the list to be paid.
6. You must fill out a registration form prior to being paid. This form will be distributed
at no charge to the recipient.
7. You must go to your designated pay location on the day corresponding to the first
letter of your first name, as shown in the above list, or else you will not be paid.
8. Absolutely no weapons will be allowed on the pay site. People who are disorderly
will be removed from rhe pay site and will not receive their stipend payment. Those
attempting to bribe officials will be detained.
9. The pay sites will not be used to recruit people for the New Iraqi Army.
10. Additional requirements may be announced later.
11. We request your cooperation and assistance to make this a beneficial and successful
process.

UNCLASSIFIED
-----·--········ CENT COM
"Iraqi Energy Production & Distribution Conference"
25-27 Aug 03
• Background
• Draft Conference Goal & Objectives
• Draft Agenda
• Draft Attendance List
• Draft Conference Roles (CENTCOM Staff Tasking)
• Planning Timeline
• Breakout Group Guidelines
UNCLASStf!ED
UNC~IF'IED
25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference"
. --········ Background
"D1salfection among the population, associated with the inability to restore
basic services, ts a principal source of instability. The obstacles to progress in this
area include a lack of production and distribution capacity, the dilapidated and
fragile infrastructure, corruption and smuggling, and sabotage and looting, the
effe~ of Which are magnified by Ille infrast. ructure's fragility and lack of
redundancy. The problem of power generation and <fistributlon is the most
fundamental source of popular disaffection because it causes unemployment,
encourages criminal actMty, dashes expectations that the Coalition would affect
significant improvements. complicates oil and fuel production and thereby reduces
government revenue, prevents production of other critical commodities, reduces
water availability. and is the primary cause of general discomfort and
inconveniences in Iraqi daily lite. Moreover. plans to distribute limited electricity
among the provinces and the city of Baghdad risk reinforcing Iraqi sectanariism
because local leaders view power distribution as a zero sum game. General
disaffection among the, populace ls building and provides a pool of manpower to
those Who are inciting (and paying for) attacks against coalition forces and
infrastructure • - COLE' I CENT COM CAG, 10 Aug 03
UNCLASSIFIED
1

25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference"
-----·--········ Conference Goal & Objectives
(Draft)
• Goal: Outline way ahead to develop a CENTCOM
"energy production and distribution" campaign plan to
Improve the security and stability of Iraq
•Objectives I Deliverables: Immediate r1rlage") and long-term
ways forward for.
• Infrastructure security (oil & power) and counter-smuggling
• Oil infrastructure repairs and upgrade
• EJectric infrastructure repairs and upgrade
- Fuel (petroleum) distribution
25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference"
---········ Conference Agenda
(Draft)
• Sun 24 Aug (Cay 0)- Non-CEJllTCOM Pa11Jci1>9n1S Travel
• Mon.. 2S Aug (Oay 1)-lntroduct ory Bnefinga 1 0 non-c.ENTCOM POllJClp.llllS
CENTCOO Partlopal'ltt lCPA. CJTF 7 eic) Trev.I
• Iraqi Sec:unty Sl!Uation 0.-Srv.ew (J3)
• Iraq! OJ ~ and Pn:>duet.oon Slluellon 0-View (J4-E)
• Iraqi Eleen:: Powe<" ~ Siaiabon Overvl- (J4-E)
· •OM;• Fuel DtSlributJon Scuation ~ (J!l.GMOI
• Tue. 2tl Aug (Day 2J - Cuneo! Situation Boefs end Worling GtOll;) ~
• Morning CPA & CJTF-7 Cum!nr Pieri Briefs Oii lllOllWy. ai9(;l(IC lnouaty dtslnt:>Won. aecu,.-,
• AIWnoon 8.-kout Se=ons-
• ElecDlc aod Oil lnfrl!Slrudl.trs Sec:uniy lmpro-•• 81wcxa S-ion (JJ)
• Oi ~ Repaits ~ ~ Brw.out SeMion (J4.C)
• E"llClne ~ lnl'raslrucWn! Repa.t$ & .,...,,_, •• lkwW 5-lotl (.14-E)
• F\191 Daslnbulion Breal<out Ses...on (Js.cMO)
• Wed 27 "°G (O.y 3)-W~ & QA.8riels (o.o.on Bt*a7) IO C0A. USCENTCOl'.4
• Maming Wat-Garhng Sessions (1 hour pet I~
- • 4)
• Aftemoon OIA-8nefs & Campaign Wa y~ ~IO COR (J4 Cf> l.c21SJ
• Thu, 4l8 Aug (Oay 4)- T.......ei 10 Home Stations .... P~flll
2

25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference"
-----·--········ Conference Attendees
• HQ USCENTCOM: CDR. J3. J4 (J4-E, ~PJ.~.n~ J5, J6. J8. JSO. SJA
• CPA: Administrator or CoS. Oireclors of Eoonom1c and Secunty Polley, Bechtel & KBR reps
• CJTF-7: COR or DICDR, C3, C4, CS, C7, CS, SJA, TF RIO, USACE IPC
• Iraqi Govt: Interim OH. Electricity, Hydrology and Transport Mlnisters
• US Govt Agenaes:
· Joint Staff
• US Army Corps of Englneers
•DIA
· DESC
• Dept of Energy
· Dept ofTransportatlon
• US Industry Reps.
• Tenr>essee Valley Authority
• Oii industry Reps (ChevronTexaco, Shell, or other)
• Bulk Fuel Distribution/Transport Industry Re?S (Matlack or otl'ler}
• UK (MND-SE or other) Reps
CHALLENGE: Balance need to get all imporlanl player.5 & SMEs In versus keeping groop
small enough to be effective
•Conference Facilitator - J4 lead
• Cooference Host (Admin/Log Support) - J4 lead. with j 1. PA, & Protocol assist
• Br eakou1 Sessi. on Leaders:
• lnfraslf\icture Security Breakout Session -J3 lead, J8 & JAG panlclpate
• Etectrtc Power Production Breakout Session - J4-E lead, JS & JAG "•
• Oil Production Breakoul Session - J4-E lead. J8 & JAG participate
• Fuel OismbutJon Breakout Session - JS.CMO lead, J8 & JAG parttcJpate
• "Campaign Plan· Way Allead Milestones - J4 lead. full staff assist
UNCl..ASSlRED
3

•
UNCLASSIFIED
25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference" '.!J'fJ
-----·--········ Conference Planning Timeline
(Draft)
• NLT 13 Aug - COR/J4 message announcing conference & Inviting attendees (J4 draft)
• NLT 14 Aug-Non.US Go:vt attendees invited by T etter from CDR (CAG draft w/ SJA.
Protocol & J4 assist)
• NLT 19 Aug-All adminllogauppon in place (conference site, billetlng. etc.) (J4)
• NL T 20 Aug - Read-Aheads approved by CDR and published to attendees (J4 w/ J3 read-
ahead. oo security and J5 read-ahead Ol1 fuel distribution)
ONCLASSlf1EO
UNCLASSIFIED
. 25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference" . l':..(j
-----·--········ Breakout Group Guidelines
• Way Ahead proposals must be broken into two categories:
• Immediate {"triage") recommendations
•Long Term improvemenis
•JS-RM and JAG rep with every Breakout Group to provide resource & legal advice
• Pol·Mil rep (PolAd, PA. State, USAID. as available) wilti every group or rolate among
groups to provide diplomatic and informaliooal advice
4

...
18 August 2003
··--~
CMATT
THE NEW IRAQI ARMY
NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
SUPPORT AND SUSTAINMENT
1

·~ez:r THE NEW /RAQ/ ARMYBAugustZOOJ
Every modern Army in the world
has an infrastructure that feeds it,
equips it, pays it, sends it
replacements, and generally
directs its activities ...... THE NEW
IRAQI ARMY IS NO DIFFERENT!
2

-~~ THE NEW /RAQ/ ARMYBAugust2
00
3
Prior to, but no later than, the roll
out of the first operational battalion
in the new Iraqi Army, specific
elements of its infrastructure must
be established in order for it to be
supported and sustained.
3

-~~THE NEW /RAQ/ ARMYBAugust2
00J
Functions needed to support and sustain the new IA:
• Base detachments (nucleus), administrative in nature,
that are established for every garrison to provide
necessary base management and support.
• Brigade HQs (nucleus) that are operationally and/or
administratively capable, and available to CJTF-7
•An Army HQ (nucleus) that will provide the support
and sustainment down to the IA units.
4

·---~ CMATT
Base Detachment (REMOTE)
e Colonel, Commanding
ent LTCol, 2 nd in Command
QM
POST
r vers
Vehicles
Malntenanc
Public
Works
MWR
Medical
Clinic
Barbe an tee
Laundry
(1) Unit Cooks work in base mess halls when not deployed
18 August 2003
21 Officers
196 Enlisted
OUTSOURCED SERVICE'S
Fire
De t
Litter
Remo
Range
5

.... t:z:z' 18 August 2003
cMATT Brigade Command Element
(Three needed within nine months)
x 28 Officers
304 Enlisted
~
(7) Officers
( 113) Enlisted
(21 ) Officers
(191) Enlisted
6

...
Army HQ Staff (Nucleus) 18 August 2003
CMATT Acting Chief of Staff
of the Army 97 Officers
214 Enlisted
Personal Deputy C/S
Staff Of Armv
I Base -
.....
Chief of -
Det
Staff .
I I I
Staff Finance Chief of Public
Judge & Medical HQCO Affairs
Advocates Contracting Services Office
r I I
{G·1) {G-3) {G-4) {G·5) {G..S)
- Deputy C/5 - Deputy C/S - Deputy C/S - Deputy C/S - Deputy C/S
PERSONNEL OPERATIONS Log/Support PLANS CIS
Officers H Procurement I
- & lnve111torv Future
Branch Training - CIS
- Plans -
~ Maintenance j I nfrastruciure
Enlisted & Repair
- Coaliti0n
Branch
~ Base & Unit l - Military CIS
- Doctrine Suooort -
--.. MWR H Installations I
Assistance Operations
& Facilities CJTF-7 CIS
Plans -
Plans & - Plans ...___
~ y Plans I f>lans
Historical

. .
·--~ CMATT
I
Procurement
& Inventory
' ' '
· ' ' '
io- - -
Maintenance
& Repair
' ' " ' ' "
Material
Recovery
Teams_
I
I
-
-
(G-4)
Deputy C/S
Log/Support
Base Unit
Support
18 August 2003
30 Officers
25 Enlisted
Installations
& Facilities
I
Plans
l&F
Assessment
Teams
I
I
-
'
-
8

·~tz:'l THE NEW /RAQ/ ARMYBAugust2
00
3
SUMMARY OF INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED:
1. Four Base Detachments for garrisons currently planned for:
• Up to (21) officers, (196) enlisted men and civilian
employees (TBD).
• Miscellaneous commercial vehicles, office furniture,
warehouse equipment, etc.
• Contracted services wherever possible (TBD)
9

•?!:~ THE NEW /RAQ/ ARMYBAugust2
00J
SUMMARY OF INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED:
2. A Brigade HQ (nucleus) by 1 December 03; a second one
by 15 February 04; and a third one by 1 May 04:
• Up to (28) officers and (304) enlisted men each
• Tactical vehicles, communications equipment, and
engineer equipment (if combat engineer company(s)
established).
10

~~p: THE NEW /RAQ/ ARMYBAugust2
00
3
SUMMARY OF INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED:
3. Army Headquarters staff (nucleus)
• Up to (97) officers, (214) enlisted men and (TBO) civilian
employees.
• Miscellaneous commercial vehicles, office furniture,
warehouse equipment, etc.
• Contracted services wherever possible (TBD)
11

·~tzl THE NEW /RAQ/ ARMYBAugust2
00J
SUMMARY OF INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED:
Totals needed:
• Up to (265) officers
• Up to (1914) enlisted men
• Up to (TBD) civilian employees
• Various vehicles, engineer equipment, and
organizational property associated with this
infrastructure.
12

;
-~~THE NEW /RAQ/ ARMYBAugust2
00J
ACTIONS NEEDED:
Done By 20 Aug • Approval to create a new Iraqi Army
• Delegation of authority to create the Army
clarified ASAP
By 25 Aug • Establish officer selection, vetting and
appointing criteria
By 25 Aug • Determine and allocate FY03 and FY04
funds necessary for this infrastructure
By 25 Aug • Implement refurbishment plan and contract
for interim IA HQ buildings
13

...
.
~~ THE NEW /RAQ/ ARMYBAugust2
00
3
ACTIONS NEEDED:
By 1 Sep • Convene officer selection boards.
By 6 Sep • Establish an interim G-1 officer/enlisted
assignments section
By 15 Sep • Plan POI for a short IA officers Orientation
Course for officers receiving direct
appointments.
14

.. .
Agenda
• Finance
- Current FY03 Financial State
- The Problem
-Options
- Observations of the financial process
• Logistics & Communication Issues
• If we get time {heads up on construction
plan - noting may change as a result of
today).

Current FY03 Financial State
CAPITAL OPERATING
Approved Budget: 120.00M Approved Budget: 45.00M
Incl PRBs worth: 10.40M Incl PRBs worth: 9. ?OM
Plus extra PRBs: 9.84M Plus extra PRBs: 19.79M
TOTAL: 129.84M TOTAL: 64.79M
PRBs Dispersed: 1.03M PRBs Dispersed: 3.49M
Other Dispersements: 11M? Other Dispersements : 24M?
CURRENT STATE: 117.81M? CURRENT STATE: 37.lM?
Planned: 212M Planned: 173.6M
(172M in Facilities) (102M in Stipends)
SHORTFALL: 82.16M SHORTFALL: 108.81M
USA Appropriations are in addition to the above

•.
THE PROBLEM!
Need to drop $20M from the
Capital Budget in an environment
where we actually want an
additional $82M
Even with $120M we cannot buifd the facilities required, in the
places required to meet C5 defined capability requirements &
the training schedule.
2 Options presented and effects explored

FACILITY JUN ,JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ENDOFY. EAR
FUNDING
03 03 03 03 03 03 03 FY03
p, HI 1: I Tl l fE 3 RECRUITING STATIONS
RECRUITING
.45t,11 FY03 AND ADDITIONAL STATIONS .45
PREP READY FOR CONSTRUCTlON
PHI I CADRE 28N (E2} I 2 BNS TRAINED
KMTB PltA.SE 118 I 3BN(C41 2 BNS IN TRAINING
TRAINl,NG p SOM
SOM FV 03
-
... :H~A l -
3 BNS STARTING lR.NG IN
18~:: _ J_ PH:S:llC J:~E,
NEXT QUARTER
----
.. -·
~e 1 PHASE 118 f1 eNT 2 BNS I
GAR.R!SC»4 30M fY03 PREP
20M fY 04 llC PREPlll PHU
• PHASE nc·
3 BN.S A.ND BOE HQ
GARRISOl\!ED 30M
PREP PHASE II· I tBN I TAOJI PHU REFUR'B I SOM FY03 28:NS AND BOE HQ.
50·M
20M FYQ3 PREP GARRISONED 20M
40M FY04 PHI PH I - CLEARANCE PREP
Pf! Ill
AN NUMAAN.IA L
20M rYOJ PREP REFURB 1 BN GARRISONED 20M
80M FY04
MOSUL PREP CONTRACT TO 8E LE:T ON 01 0
tOOM FY04 JAN0.4
,\RMY HQ I 'PRE.P PHI .I
.1SM<FY03 PREP PHii
~ XBRl<S I I 1 X . BARRA. CKS .15 M
NAVAUAF PLANNING FOR NAVAL AND
BASE AF BASE 0
BOMFY<U
TRAIN I. NG I
OFFICER ' I PL.ANNING FOR OFF1CER I 0
l TRAINING BAS. E
40M FYO.t I
BASE MAINT AND USACE SPT TMS 1.4M
TOTAL FACILITIES COST 172M

Assumptions on which Calculations
were based
Cost per Bn
Facilities:
Equipment Bn Set
Subsistence
Salary
$25M/35M1
$15M
$600k p/month
$60k p/month
Avg Time to build a Facility:
2.5 Months2
•20o/o upfront payment on construction assumed. Balance on
acceptance.
•These figures are based on Kirkush, not US price estimates.
•Vinnell Costs ($2M p/month) are not included - appropriated funds.

Option 1
• Reduces FY03 Capital Budget to $1 OOM as instructed.
• 2 Bns will be ready by end CY03.
• 3 Bn training will start in Dec 03. Training 2 Bns in
parallel will not start until Mar 04. 3 in parallel in Oct 04.
• No new construction work, beyond Kirkush, this year.
• Work planned on Tadji and An Numahniya for FY03 will
now commence in FY04.
• 3Bn will be in Kirkush not Tadji (4 Bn).
• Will push most construction work planned for FY04 to
the right. Increase in $ required for FY04 and more
pressure on construction program.
• Planned facilities work for FY03 totaled $172M now
$54M.
• Increase in training cost per Bn as contract with Vinnell
is time based.

·•
SUGGESTED TRAIN. ING SCHEDULE
BN FACILITY AUG·03 I SEP 03 OCT03 I NOV03 DEC 03 I JAN 04 FE604 MAR04 APR<M I MAV04 JUN04 JUl 04 AUG 6.4 SEP04
1
1 BnTRG 2 Bn TRG 3 Bn TRG 4 Bn TRG 6 Brr TRG 8BnTRG 10 BnTRG
K
: 2
1 Bn Garrison
K
3 K . 2 Bn Garrison
4 K 3 Bn Garrison
5 K 5BnTR. G 7 Bn TRG 9 Bn TRG 11 Bn
6 T 4 Bn G . arrison
1 T 5 Bn Garrison
B 6 Bn Garrison
T
9 A 7 Bn Garrison
11
10 8 Sn Ga,-rison
A
11 A 9BnG
12 K 121h Site will be third training Facility

SUGGESTED TRAINING SCHEDULE (INCL COST/FACILITIES BUILD)
AUG 03 SEP 03 OCT 03 NOV 03 DEC 03 JAN 04 FEB 04 MAR 04 APR 04 MAY 041· JUN 04 JUL 04 AUG 04 SEP o.4
1 BoTRG 2 BnlRG 3 BnTRG 4BnTRG 6 BnTRG 8 Bn TRG 10 Bn TRG
Build 1 Bn Garrison
3 Build 2 Bn Garrison
4 K Build 3 Bn Garrison
5 K 5 Bn TRG 7 Bn TRG 98 TRG 11 Bn
6 T Build 4 · an Garrison
7 T Build 5 Bn Garrison
Build 6 Bn Garrison
8 T
9 A Build 7 Bn Garrison
10 A Build 8 Bn Garrison
11 A Build 9 Bn
12 K 12th Site will be third Training Facility Build
The 7M & 28M amounts are sunk costs as already committed to Kirkush:

·. SUGGESTED TRAINING SCHEDULE (INCL COST/FACILITIES BUILD)
AUG 03 SEP 03 OCT 0.3 NOV 03 DEC 03 JAN 04 FEB 04 MAR 04 APR 04 MAY 04 JUN 04. JUL 04 AUG 04 SEP 04
1 Bn TRG 2 BnTRG 3 Bn TRG 4BnTRG 6 Bn TRG 9 Bn TRG 12 Bn TRG
Build 1 Sn Garrison
3 ' Build 2 Bn Garrison
4
Build
K
5
Build 5 Bn TRG 8 BnTRG 11 Bn TRG 14 Bn
K
6
Build 4 Bn Garrison
T
1
Build 1 BnTRG 10 BnTRG 13 BnTRG
K
8
Build 5 Bn Garrison
T
9 T Build 6 Bn Garrison
10 Build 7 Bn Garrison
A
11
Build 8 Bn Garrison
A
12 A Build 9 Bn Garrison
13 Build 10 Bn Garrison

Option 2
As per Option 1, except:
• Will have 3 Bns in Training from Apr 04.
• 10 Bns will be garrisoned and available from Aug
04.
• Potentially larger facilities cost than in Option 1.
• Potentially less impact on Vinnell contract.
Recommended

·. SUGGESTED TRAINING SCHEDULE
8N FACILITY AUG03 I SEP 03 OCT03 I NOV OJ DEC 03 I JAN 04 FEB 04 MAR04 APR04 f MAY04 JUN04 JUL04 AUG:04 SEP04
1 k f Bn TRG 2 Bn TRG 3 Bn TRG 4BnTRG 6 BnTRG 9 Bn TRG 12 Bn ' TRG
-
2
1 Bn Garrison
2 Bn G. arrison
K 3 Bn Garrison
"
K
3
K
4
5 K 6
5 Bn TRG 8 Bn TRG 11 Bn TRG 14 Bn
-
4 Sn Garrison
7 7BnTRG 10 Bn TRG 13 e. n TRG
8 5 Bn Garrison
T
K
T
I
--
9
6 Bn Gar. ris· on
10 7 Bn Garrjson
11 8 Bn Garrison
12 9 Bn Garrison
T
A
A
A
13 A 10 Bn Garrison
-

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Observations of the Financial
Process
Observations:
- Need for a OSA CFO
- Way we account/manage our finances needs to
• improve.
- Delegations, rollup of accounts and each areas
roles & responsibilities need to be documented
and understood.

Logistics and Communication
Issues
• Maximum Work by Industry thru SLA with Ministry's.
• Need Iraqi OSD (NSD) involvement to ensure capital
acquisitions, basing decisions, organisation models etc
will survive post CPA- Need the panel/committee
ASAP.
• .For C7. If want A/C in FY05 will need to recruit PLAAF
and train in FY04, will require recruitment early in FY04
(may affect schedule for facilities).
• Major capability acquisition would also need to start then
- Political issue of committing large Iraqi $ (Maybe FMS
solution).
• Using logistics as a constraint to capability? If so,
equipment should restrict mobility, ie no purchase of own
water/fuel trucks, etc.
• DM at Base or Offsite. Suggest Offsite reduce ability to
project force & infrastructure for DM should be industry
requirement, reduce NIA setup costs.

. .
MORM
. ggested Relationship
(o,.1 ~.L r:;;y SLAs
$
CPA Ministry's
Invoice
Contracts $ Invoice
ion
Goods & Services
CMATI
Industry
V tl Excludes Local Purchase
G> ~!tc-eulllNL s 1 wr?ON

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WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS
AK-4Tt Requited
Vall dated
52
300
9
500
1,300
425
~-.. --~ 250
§74
800
940
73
1,000
500
20
250
940
2,500
9MM't Required
0
200
75
50
200
O!lO
510
8
1.000
165
935
46
50
50
5,316
200
0
0
300
0
0
-~-·
0
50
2,788
OTHER REQUIREMENTS
roTALS
50
19,685
AJ<-47'! Regull'9d
400
40
.J...§00
39,000
435
66,625
435
5,753
0
0
Note 1: For ell but NIA end ICDF, need one magazine per weapon; for NIA and ICDF need_ magazines· per weapon.
Note 2: For all but NIA and ICDF, need 25 rounds of ammunition per AK, 10 rounds per 9MM; for others need_ rounds per weapon.

AGREEMEl'ITBE1WEEN CPA ANDCITF-7
CONCERNING CY 03 RJNDING FOR ICDC BA IT AUONS
1. Given:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
l1lerc will be ICDC Bns with establishment of 846 personnel organized roughly on L'S Light Inf Bn personnel
structure. (Per CJTF-7 FRAGO 601 dtd 0500380 Aug 03, there will be a total of 18 total battalions: 9 Stood up by l
Sept 03. 1 more in Oct. .S more m Sov, 2 more m Dec, and a final battalion by I Ja.n 04.)
C2 for ICDC Bns, to i..Dcluding provision of basic means of communication with Coalition Wlits, is provided by
Coalition Forces; they are attached to and supported by Coalition Forces and they operate joinlly with Coalition Forces.
ICDC ntissions include: l.i.Dguist support, contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and conmmnitics, security and drivers
for CF. for humanitarian aid, international NGO, and commercial contractors, limited cro\\ld and riot control. fixed siie,
roure illld convoy security dis.aster response services, search and rescue, limited humanitaria.n assisrancc,
ICDC persorinel live at home and commute to work on a daily basis using o"IJ/n means oftr.msport or with as5istance
from CITF· 7.
Anns will be limited to AK-47s.
This agreement covers payments for [CDC Battalions through 31 Dec OJ onJy. After that point they will be paid by the
CPA budget for National Security and Defense which will require different procedures.
2. CPA. lb.rough O/NSD. agrees to:
a. Provide CITF 7 funds to pay end of month salaries for each esrablisbed ICDC Bn (Pay scale at NIA pay 111.tes = $70,000
per Bn/Month) This money will be: provided LO CJTF-7 ~LT the 2.5111 of each month. CITF· 7 will eDSU1c payment on ii
by-name/by-rank basis with excess funds rerumed to the CPA by the Ism of the subsequent month.
i. Cost Calculation = $70K /montb for each bn on the establishment by the end of that calendar month. (EOM
Aug= 9 Bns, Sept= 10, Oct=- 15. Nov= 17, and Dec= 18 Bos).
b. Provide CITF 7 funds to pay for unifonns for each lCDC member.
i. Uniform= cap, 2xBlouse, 2 x T shirt, 2 ic. trousers, belt, I x pair boots., a.ad 3 pair sock.& .•. cost per set= $90
ii. Cost Calculation~ $90 x 18 x 846 + 20% overage = 18,273 sets= SI ,650K. one time cost
iii. UnifOll'llS will be: purchased from Iraqi vendors on basis of 11 standardized design used by all suppliers
c. Provide CITF-7 funds to purdwe OCIE for each ICDC member
i. OCIE= web belt, suspenders, 2 canteens w/ c:over, first aid pouch and dccs.sing.
ii. Cost calculation: $25 x 846 x 18 + 15 % overage= 17 ,512 sets = $438K one time cost
iii. These will be purchased from Iraqi vendors.
d. Provide CJTF-7 monthly subsistc:nce cosis for ICDC membe'Ii (assumes 1 meal on duty per day and I day off per week)
Food stipewl equivalent to cost of I x MRE per day. Co!:t calculation= 846 x SJ.80/MRE x 2 x 27:: SJ74K month
e. Provide Cll'F-7 with 7 ,000 AK-47s w/ one magazi.oc, sling. and ancillaries
Cost calculation= No cost - funds already approved by PRB; deliveries subj~t to agreed priorities for allocating
weapons among various security-rel.aced users (GC PSO, police, NIA, FPS, as well as ICDC)
f. Provide CITF-7 with funding for AK-47 ~es
Cosl calculation= SW AG of SI 000/Bn = $SJ< one time cost
Swnmary:
One time con for 18 ICDC Battalions: Jl,706K~ August thru Dec 03
Monthly salary for ICDC B•ttalions: (Aug• S6301'. Sept= $700K, Oct= Sl,050K, Nov"" SJ,l90, 11nd
Dec- $1,260K) Total -S4.830K
Monthly subsistence for ICDC BattaUom: (Au1,. 5783K., Sept= S870K., Oct= Sl,305K., No-v - Sl,479K.,
and Dec • 51.,!66K} Total = $6,00JK
ToW ICOC cost for CY 03 = Sll.539K •
• Tbls ia the madm11m amount that will be provided to CJTF-7. It lz~ubj o pr>rov
Coalition Provitiiona.l Authority. · ~
~~ .
Walter B. Slocombe
CPA Qi.rector Security Affairs
(National Security and Defense)
August 8, 2003
Dan Hahn. BG, USA
Chief of Staff, CJTF. 7
August 8, 2003

Pagel of 1
'-.' .. '. ·1
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-
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_ .. (CPT)
From: (FS01)
Sent:
To: -~
-·· ._ .. .,_ ... ·--· OL GBR CJTF7-C3
Cc;
Subject: Questions re Border Police and Security Forces/Slide from J-5
CPA ExecSec acknowledges receipt from J-5 Joint Staff Response Cell inquiry of 9 Oct via SIPR en1itled "NSC
Query on lraqi Border Police." Our experts here deem this information request unclassified. and the attached
slide from which questions arose is itself designated unclassified. We are lherefore transmitting our interim
response via unclass email. Please be advised that your inquiry was not received in a timely manner because of
S!PR malfunctioning. In addition, our entire border and customs team (four people) is out in lhe field evaluating
border posts; they return tonight and will review your request at that time.
CPA Ministry of Interior Senior Advisor-ells us that a protocol has been established to de-conflict
inconsistent data and metrics re Iraqi security forces. Your point of contact shoutd be Co' a
British officer, CJ Effects Division Chief at Camp Victory, CJTF-7 Main, DSN
CPA ExecSec has distributed the attached slide internally within CPA to all concerned parties. along with J-5 Joint
Staff Response Cell questions. You should not consider the slide attached to the email inquiry to be CPA-
approved or authorized.
10/14/2003

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NSC query on Iraqi Border Police
From: CAT J5LO ' JCS NMCC
sent: Monday, October 13, 2003 5:23 PM
To: Executive secretariat CPA;
, OUSDP COL, OSD;"""""""'
CC CAT JSLO , JCS NMCC; CAT TMCHF, JCS NMCC; CAT DEPTMCtlF, JCS NMCC
subject: NSC query on Iraqi Border Police
RETRANS to CPA per CPT-request
we forwarded the below questions to CPA Execsec via CENTCOM on 9 Oct. Any idea when
we might expect a response? (our suspense to secoef / NSC is 12
Oct.) The original questions are in black; I've provided some clarification in
blue. Appreciate your assistance.
1) why did the "Border Guards" category change to "Border Po 1i ce," is there a
difference in what makes up, these groups? Previous versions of the attached slide
referred to "border guards' rather than "border police service." we modified the
slide because our understanding from current CENTCOM products is that "border police
service" is now the correct: term for what: used to be called generically "border
guards." Please confirm or provide proper name that we should use for this category
-- Is it "Border Police service," or "Border and Customs Police," or other? -- and
define what constitutes that group.
2) Why did the goal for the number of Border Guards/Border Police change from 20,000
to 11,574? understand that the goal comes off the JPERSTAT (from
CENTCOM) but the goal should have remained constant. I can clarify this,
but r have a follow-on question. The "20,000" was reported for one week; someone
used a very rough estimate for the entire Department of Border Enforcement rather
than reporting the goal for just the "border police" portion of that Department. In
contrast, previous versions of the slide included only the ''border police" component
of the oepartment of Border Enforcement as being part of the overall "Iraqi Security
Forces," and we have reverted to construct in the attached slide. Does CPA concur
that: only the "border police" component of the Department of Border Enforcement
should be counted as part of the overall "Iraqi Security Forces"? If not, please
provide recommendation. (Ties in to question #1 above.) If so, is the currently
reported goal of 11,574 accurate?
3) The 9oals for Civil Def Corps (21,996), Border Police (11,574) and Facility
Protection svc (22,674) are very specific. How did CENTCOM arrive
at these numbers? The issue here is not only how the goals were
established but also whether we should report the numbers to this level of
specificity. (Perhaps better to round, as done with "Police" and "NIA"
goals.)
Please note: All numbers on attached slide were derived from CENTCOM JPERSTAT
report.
v/r
Lt
!"',_: __
-------
LTC
. ~ ~ (
LTC
- Team le
- Team 28
Team 3B
J-S Liaison officer
Joint Staff Response Cell / NMCC / Joint staff
STU-I~/ Comm
DRSN-
<<Extract from Iraq Status briefl.ppt>>
Page 1

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD
For: Col Dennis Sabal, D/COS October I 0, 2003
From: COLL jets Office of Security Affairs (OSA) and Co IL jets,
CMATT ~---~ .___ _ ____.
Subject: MOU for Establishment ofthe Iraqi Defense Support Agency (DSA)
Given: With the graduation of the First Battalion of the New Iraqi Army (NIA), the DSA must
be stood up immediately in order to support the battalion's operat)onal deployment and ...
Given: That the DSA wilJ not be permanently established in the Palace or the Green Zone
and ...
Given: That OSA must immediately hire Iraqi members and cross-train them with the Coalition
Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT) in order to provide support to the NIA ...
Therefore, the undersigned agree to the following: ()# "!{ , ~ ,)
1. The OSA will be, allowed to hire and obtain CPA badges for up to . ...se'new personnel
to form the initial cadre of the DSA. These personnel will be allowed to work in the -Palace
until not later than 1 Fehruary 2004 while permanent locations are being established.
2. The OSA will establish permanent locations for the DSA in the former Iraqi Air
Force buildings at i'vffi 420872 and the building at MB 4458· 69.
3. The initial cadre of the DSA will work in the CMATT spaces in the North Palace
Ballroom u. ntil they leave foT their permanent accommodations.
Colonel, USMC
DICOS,CPA
I, rN, US Anny
SA
Colonel, USMC
C/S, CMATT

Governing Conncil
Dr Ebrahim. Jafari Al Eshaiker
Main Spokesman of the Islamic Da'wah Party. Born in Karbala', educated in Mosul
University as a medical doctor.
Dr Ahmad Chalabi
Head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a Professor of Mathematics and a
businessman. F<>under of the INC.
Ahmad Shya'a al-Barak
General Coordinator for the Human Rights Association of Babel. General Coordinator for
the Bar Association in Babel. Graduate of the Law Faculty, Babel University. Graduate
of the College Management and Economy, Baghdad University. One of the tribal leaders
of Al Bu Sultan tribe in Babel.
Dr Ayad Allawi
Secretary General of the Iraqi National Accord. PhD in medicine. Started to oppose the
dictatorial regime in the early 1970s and was in the forefront of efforts to organise
opposition both within Iraq and abroad.
Dr Jalal Talabani
Jalal Talabani is Secretary General of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and a leading
figure of the Iraqi democratic movement during the Jast 50 years.
Hamid Majeed Mousa
Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party since 1993. Born in Babil province. An
economist and petroleum researcher. Left Iraq in 1978 and returned in 1983 to continue
his political activities against the dictatorial regime
Judge Dara Nor al Din
A Judge who as a member of the Court of Appeal, held one of Saddam's edicts
(confiscating land without proper compensation) unconstitutional. Was sentenced to 2
years in jail. Served 8 months at Abu Ghraib before being released in the general
amnesty Jast October.
Dr Raja Habib Khuzai
Head of maternity hospital in Diwaniya. Studied and lived in the UK from the late 1960s
until 1977 when she returned to Iraq.
Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaidy
From the Al-Sumaidy clan with docwnented lineage from the Prophet Mohammed
through Mousa Al-Khadhum. Ancestral lands located near Haditha in the Al-Anbar
region. Writer, designer and entrepreneur. A prominent figure in the opposition to the
Saddam regime.

Salahaddin Muhammad Babaddin
Elected as Secretary General of the Kurdistan Islamic Union in the first conference of the
party in 1994, was reelected in the second and third conferences and still holds the post.
Born in Halabja. Has written several books in Kurdish and Arabic.
Soogul Chapouk
From Kirkuk and from the Iraqi Turkoman Community. A trained Engineer and teacher.
She heads the Iraqi Women's Organisation (based in Kirkuk) which aims to bring
together all the female communities of Iraq.
Abdul Zahra Othman Mohammed
Head of the Islamic oa·wah Movement (Harakat al Dawa al Islamiya) in Basra. Writer.
thinker and political activist. Editor of numerous newspapers and magazines.
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is a religious and political leader and the current leader of the
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. He is the brother of Muhammad Baqr
al-Hakim. They both retwned to Iraq after 20 years of exile and are both the sons of the
late Ayatollah Sayyid Mohsin al~Hakim.
Abdul Karim Al Muhammadawi
Head of Iraqi Party of God in Al Amara. Member and Rotating Chainnan of Interim
Supervisory Council in Maysan Province. Dubbed "Prince of the Marshes" for leading
the resistance movement against Saddam in the Southern Marshes for 17 years, for which
he spent 6 years in prison.
Dr Adnan Pachachi
President of the Iraqi Independent Democrats. Fonner Foreign Minister and Permanent
Representative to the United Nations.
Dr AJdla Al Hasbimi
Diplomat. Led Iraqi delegation to New York donors' conference. PhD in Modem
Literature and Bachelors in Law. Working with UN programmes in Iraq since 1991 in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ghazi Ajil Al-Yawar
Born in Mosul. A civil engineer. Recently Vice President ofHicap Technology Co. Lyd.,
Riyadh. Married with 4 children.
Dr. Mobsen Abdul Hameed
Secretary General of the Iraqi Islamic Party (UP). Born in the city of Kirkuk. Author of
more the 30 books in the field of interpretation of the Holy Quran. Detained in 1996 oa
the charge of reorganising the UP. Professor in the College of Education in Baghdad
University.

Dr Seyyid Muhammed Bahr ul-Uloom
Highly-respected Shi'a clergyman. Returned from London where he headed the Ahl al-
Bayt charitable centre. Elected as the Shi'a member of a leadership triumverate by the
Iraqi opposition after the Gulf Conflict.
Mahmoud Othman
Independent politician and Jong-term leader of the Kurdish National Struggle.
Masood Barzani
President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). He rose to this position from
peshmerga. He was elected President in 1979 and reelected in 1999.
Mowaffak al-Ruhaie
Born in al-Shatra. Member of British Royal Doctors' College. Consultant in internal
medicine and neurology. Author of the Declaration of the Shi a of Iraq. Ac ti vi st in human
rights. Student of the martyr Imam Baaker al-Sadr.
Naseir al-Chadirchi
Leader of the National Democratic Party. Resident of Baghdad. Lawyers, businessman
and fann owner.
Judge Wael Abdulatif
Born in Basra and practiced civil and criminal law before being disbarred and imprisoned
by Saddam. Had been head judge at Nasiriya and now deputy head judge in Basra.
Elected Governor of Basra on 4 July 2003 by the interim local council with the support of
all the leading political and religious parties.
Yonadam Kanoa
Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement. Active member of the
Assyrian-Chaldean community. Fonner Minister of Public Works and Housing and
Fonner Minister of Industry and Energy in Iraqi Kurdistan. Engineer since 1975. Activist
against the dictatorial regime since 1979.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Ht::AUUUAK 1 t::K~, LO t:iKll;;AUt: L;VMtsAI I t:AM, 1:~ AKMVKl:U UIVl~IUN
Ci'v'ii..·iviiL.iT AR.·r· A.55i~T Ai"Cc CEi~TER.-N-IR.i\h i..ii~l~iCT
"n""' "'..- '"'<I"'\",, >
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14 October 2003
MEMORAN.L>UM FOR MINISTRY OF 01::.FENSE
SUBJECT: Draft dodgers seeking "nghts"
l. Several y()ung men trom Basrah v1s1ted the Al Karkh CMAC/DAC Hall on 130CT03.
They all suftered the loss of at least one ear for fail mg to JOi n the army. They claim to
represent as many as 450 would*be soldiers from Basrah. We reterred them to the Rlghts
Violations Office in Al Mansour, Baghdad. This trip produced no results for them.
2. They have two requests. or demands:
o They want ear surgery - reconstruct1ve
o They want compensation for sutkrng
3. Request the CPA M1mstry of .L>efons~ consider their case and propose any possible
solutions to the Iraqi MOD or Govemmg Councd. Th.is office will not expect a response.
as thes~ men traveled from Basrah and any actions are hkely to be .. inst1tuttonal', and in
the hands of the n~w Iraqi Government.
4. We hope that these types of nghts violations are sertously considered by tJ1c ne\V
government. and will ask these men to watch and listen for news m this regard.
5. roe IS the undersigned at the Karkh J.)AC I {all on Karradat-Menam Street Cell phone
:~'.~>.::; .
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MAJ.CA ,/
DIR.ECTOR, CMAt.' AL-KAR.KJ-i
21:3CT, l AO

I ' UNCLASSIH.CD
DISTRICT INFORMATION OFFICE TO CPA ROUTING FORM
DATE OF REQUEST: Oc+. J ?. 2 (J C3
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I NUMBER. REPRESENTING:
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GIVIL AFFAIRS CONTACT: MA-r [' I ce11:J._'Jffo_• _____ _.
LOCATION: "North Gate CMAC. Dor what is now known as the "Karkh DAC Half"
MGRS (GRID): MB443870
422d CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION - KARKH DISTRICT INFORMATION OFFICE

In the Name of God the mo~t merciful the most gracious
~femorandum for protest
We are \\ar prisoners in l 99 l (Kuwait war) held a peaceful
demonstration more than three times in front of the Iraqi forum
in Baghdad and hence we demand (Ambassador P. Premier and
the governing council) to listen and to pay your attention to our
request and to be aware of our suffering from the beginning of
the war 1981 - 1991 and the problems that we arc in recently
and because of the latest war we hope you to apply the same
criteria and justice to all prisoners with out discrimination and
we state for you that tyrant Saddam got discriminated between
us and we have evidences for that. So, some prisoners in Iran
war had not gained their rights. Most of the prisoners in I 99 l
had reserved servic.:e more than l .t years and that against
humanity. The same prisoners alter our return bttc.:k to the
country Saddam had got stayed us in tht! military and that was
contrary to the Ueneva Convention that conc~rne<l wilh
prisoners and w~ state for you the following:
l-Th~ prices of food began lo rise tnl)l"C than doubks
2- ·1 he rt:nting of houses rose up Lo nuH·~ than \'.\!expect
3- Unemplo1 ment more than 75o/o
For all that above mentioned "c let. ·! hopdess. only fr~cJom,
non rights, \\ ' ~want lo s~y (culling for our n\.:cks and not t;Utt ing
th<! Ii\. ing of our ...:hildrcn) \\c hnpc you to tak<.: a suili.lbk
tk(.;is io11 ~"'quick a-; rossibk tu ... ohe a critical pn ... itinn. hnally,
our r~quc ~ l is to give us an nrg1.:11t 1...·nh.:rgi:n<.:y pay111c nt Hild that
follow~d by all rights of pri~Olh. ' f". I hank) OU.
. \ ulho1 i1cd by
all '' ar pri~<,ncrs
..