FOR OFFIOIAL JBE E )NLV
,.
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 ·2500
I-03/015831-SO
. lOV I 8 (t:OJ
fl LE
S P EC IAL OPERATIONS/
LOW·I NTE NSITY CONFLICT
FOR: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Iraq History Project
On 11 November 2003 you met with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy on the Iraq History Project. A memorandum for the record is attached for
your comments at Tab A.
I appreciate your support for the Iraq History Project and request your
assistance in gaining the support of the Iraq Survey Group. As you know, their
cooperation is vital to the success of this project.
Also attached at Tab B is a draft memorandum to the Secretary. Please
provide our coordi a ion no later than OB 21 November 2003 to my action
officer (b)(Sl at (b)(S)
' L.__ ____ __,
Thomas W. O'Connell
F O R OFF'G ' . A~
'
.
'SE "'.i~JLV

TABA,

l'Ol't OffleW: l:f6E OtdLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting on Iraq History Project 11 November 2003
Attendees: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations
• USDP began by referring to the decision memorandum on the Iraq History
Project from the DASD for Stability Operations at Tab A.
• The memorandum alerts USDP to the opposition of the Iraq Survey Group
(ISG) and recommends narrowing the scope of the project to supporting the
Iraq Special Tribunal.
• USDP expressed his desire to move ahead with the project as originally
conceived, noting that it was a Presidential priority. He also mentioned
Kannan Makiya's plans for a museum in Baghdad.
• USDP asked USDI about the opposition of the ISG. USDI expressed his
overall support for the project, with the following comments:
o The ISG should get "first cut" at the documents.
o The majority of documents of interest to the Coalition Provisional
Authority are in Doha (which means that they have already been
screened once).
o The ISG has had trouble recruiting translators.
• USDP would like to move the project along as quickly as possible. The
next step is to award a contract to process documents.
• The main obstacle is funding. There is no funding set aside in the
Supplemental for this project.
• Many possible funding sources were mentioned- the National Archives,
the Library of Congress, etc. However, most of them have already been
asked.
FOR Of!l'ICIAL tJSE ONLY

TABA

..
~
~
ASDSO/LIC&
NOV 6 'lJJ]~/ll
ACTION MEMO
1-03/014012-SO
EF-7186
FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY ~
FROM: Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense£ !ability Operat1ons;11 • .-~
-"1) "' I 1> y-;;:, {.
SUBJECT: Iraq History Project Y 0
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• You and the DASD for Strategy last briefed the Iraq History Project to the Secretary on 21
June.
• The goal of the Iraq History Project is to expose the true nature ofBa'athist rule in Iraq
through public access to Iraqi regime records. Specifically, the creation of an Iraq
National Archive, a digital archive, and a grant program.
• Without the support of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which possesses the majority of
Ba'athist regime documents, the scope of this project will be severely limited.
• I recently received a.
allowing access to d(
fully processed and '
li\101•3
outlining his opposition to
roj ect before they have been
1)1Scu.S.! i,.,j-Ho...1.-"'"
• He is willing to allo•
(o~l; ..... r
which could take yea
has completed its mission,
• The Coalition Provisi
for use in an Iraqi Sp
o Iraqi regime documents
• In light of these new
ths forward:
o OPTION I
direct the !:
Tab A).
AGREE. _____ DISAGREE ______ OTHER. _____ _
o OPTION 2: Focus on the immediate goal of supporting the Iraqi Special
Tribunal and recommend the Secretary direct the ISG to allow the CPA access
to those documents necessary for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (sample memo
attached Tab B).
AGREE _____ DISAGREE ______ OTHER, ____ _
07-11-03 11:24 IN

~
ASD SOILIC &.
~
NOV 6 'lJJJJ/f/i,,/a
ACTION MEMO
1-03/014012-SO
EF-7186
FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY ~
FROM: Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense fl tability Operations;,,.~b,,
41, I .,,y~, t
SUBJECT: Iraq History Project r• __,,e~t<f" · 1,i<J": •
...,_,~ ,.. ,_,,, 1' ... rSc,
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• You and the DASD for Strategy last briefed the Iraq History Project to the Secretary on 21
June.
• The goal of the Iraq History Project is to expose the true nature ofBa'athist rule in Iraq
through public access to lraqi regime records. Specifically, the creation of an Iraq
National Archive, a digital arclllve, and a grant program.
• Without the support of the Iraq Survey Group (ISO), wlllch possesses the majority of
Ba'athist regime documents, the scope of this project will be severely limited.
• I recently received a position paper from MG Da:yton 's office outlining his opposition to
allowing access to documents in support of the Iraq History Project before they have been
fully processed and exploited (Tab C)
• He is willing to allow access to documents only after the ISO has completed its mission,
wlllch could take years.
• The Coalition Provisional Authority wants immediate access to Iraqi regime documents
for use in an Iraqi Special Tribunal.
• In light of these new developments, there are three possible paths forward:
o OPTION 1: Stick with the original plan and recommend that the Secretary
direct the ISG to allow the CPA access to Iraqi documents (sample memo at
Tab A).
AGREE. _____ DISAGREE. ______ OTHER~-----
o OPTION 2: Focus on the immediate goal of supporting the Iraqi Special
Tribunal and recommend the Secretary direct the ISG to allow the CPA access
to those documents necessary for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (sample memo
attached Tab BJ.
AGREE _____ DISAGREE ______ OTHER~-----

o OPTION 3: Support the ISG's position that documents should not be released
until they have been fully processed and exploited.
AGREE. ______ DISAGREE
_ _ ____ OTHER ______ _
• The ISG will oppose Options 1 and 2. The CPA will oppose Option 3. I tend toward
recommending Option 2.
• The success of the Iraqi Special Tribunal is imperative to the long term stability oflraq. It
is important that the ISG support it even if doing so impinges on its other missions.
• Please give us your guidance on this matter.
COORDINATION: None
Attachment:
As stated
cc: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy
Director, Joint Staff
President, National Defense University
Prepared by: ~l(b-)(6
_) ___ ____JISO/LIC Stability Operations, ~l(b-)(6
_> ___ __,

TABA

THE SECREillWJF DEFENSE
1 000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. DC 20301·1000
COMBAT ANT COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND
SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project
(b){5)
cc: Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Director Central Intelligence Agency
Commander, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Iraq Survey Group
0
DRAFT

TABB

-
THE SECRE,llWJF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. DC 20301-1000
COMBATANT COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND
SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project
(b )(5)
cc: Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Commander, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Iraq Survey Group
0
DRAFT

TABB

,------ ----------- - --- - - - - ----·---·-·----
FOR OFFICIM: tJS! (
USD/P
ACTION MEMO
1-03/015830
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action __
FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict
SUBJECT: Iraq History Project
BACKGROUND
(b)(5)
n A s:n S:t<>h;J;t" o!9a~~~l'ICW:: USE Oc ~ ..
- ---1 (b)(6) I
Preoared bv:

FOA Ol'l'ICIAL tJ9E ONLY
(b)(5)
RECOMMENDATION: Sign memo at Tab A.
AGREE.
______ DISAGREE
_ _____ OTHER _____ _
COORDINATION: Tab C
Attachments:
As stated
FOR O FFIGIAL l:ISE ONLY

TABA

FOR OFFICIAL US! ONLY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1 000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. DC 20301 - 1000
COMBAT ANT COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND
SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project
(b)(1)
cc: Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
General Counsel
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia
Director, Joint Staff
President, National Defense Uni.
FOR OFFICIAL '=JSE ONLV

TABB

IRAQ SURVEY GROUP POSITION
ON
ALLOWING COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ACCESS TO CAPTURED IRAQI
DOCUMENTS
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) strongly disagrees with the proposal to allow the Coalitlon
Provisional Authority (CPA) access to ISG documents for its Iraq History Project prior to
the documents being fully processed and exploited. The ISG believes allowing CPA
this access will be severely detrimental to three distinct but equally critical areas:
A. The National Security of the United States
B. The internationally-vital ISG WMD mission
C. The DoD's and CPA's Iraq History Project itself
A. The Nation al Security of the United States
• Intelligence documents will be lost. ISG Is continually discovering documents
of high intelligence value from captured Iraq documents. Most of these docu-
ments are found in the initial review, or 'triage' of the documents. Many are also
found later in the exploitation process, to include during the latter ISG analyst
and subject matter expert review process. Access and review of documents
during any stage of this exploitation outside ISG will negatively impact the ability
to properly identify and classify these highly sensitive documents.
• Intelligence documents will be compromised. Building on the reasoning
above, access and review of documents during any stage of ISG exploitation
outside ISG will raise the risk of documents being inadvertently released to the
public or others without a need to know. This will severely damage U.S. national
security. Nothing outweighs taking all measures to ensure this does not occur.
• Counter Intelligence (Cl) documents will be compromised. Any release of Cl
documents, which the ISG also continually discovers throughout its exploitati ..,......., n ~~
recess would be extreme! detrimental to the security of the United States. b xe~A).(b)
(b)(7)( ),(b )(E)
-----::::-:-:--~~".'":'"""~~-;----;-~---:---..,,...;---:--:-:-~--~r-r -.-..-- -..-.-__,.,.!
a Cl document is publicly released, at best it can comp e e y ose 1 sine 1gence
value; at worse it could compromise the investigative process.
B. The ISG mission
• An already stressed OOCEX mission will be overwhelmed. Document
access for the Iraq History Project will considerably disrupt the already taxed ISG
DOCEX mission. ISG OOCEX physical space and expertise are limited. ISG
uses specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to guide the OOCEX
mission. Additional Iraq History Project search requirements, regardless if more
people are added to the process, will slow down the ISG OOCEX operational
process. A parallel review of already exploited documents will also be required
for the Iraq History Project, further upsetting the current ISG DOC EX mission.
• Original documents needed for follow-on e· xploitation will be lost. Although
ISG has digital copies of documents, this does not mean exploitation is complete.
l<b)(6) r u Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03
Once

ISG often must use original captured documents for interviews with high value
targets and other detainees. For effective operations, it needs immediate access
to these documents; losing possession of them and retrieving them from CPA is
not a viable alternative to current operations. Original documents are also sent
for forensic analysis in the US and are used to confront High Value Detainees
and other Iraqis suspected of involvement in Iraq's WMD programs.
• CPA document review will be taken out of context. ISG experts, and ISG
experts alone need to focus on Iraqi DOCEX during its WMD mission execution.
CPA review and reporting of documents will result in efforts to assist the ISG in
this mission. Although well intentioned, this will result in incorrect, incomplete,
and/or inadvertently inaccurate conclusions.
C. The Iraq History Project
• A CPA review as new documents arrive degrades the Iraq History Project.
ISG receives a constant flow of new captured documents every day. These are
reviewed and appropriately prioritized relative to other documents. The rush to
review and obtain ISG documents for the Iraq History Project does not outweigh
the increase in efficiency the CPA will have if it waits until after the ISG has
completed its mission. Without waiting, the Iraq History Project will continually be
reviewing, re-reviewing, and correlating new information with existing information
until ISG document capture mission is complete.
• A concurrent ISG WMD DOCEX and CPA Iraq History Project review dilutes
ISG capability to fully assist in the Iraq History Project. ISG resources for its
WMD mission are already at a premium. Sharing these with the Iraq History
Project will be inefficient and cause undue competition among the two missions;
ISG will be unable to assist CPA with the full capabilities it has to bear. On the
other hand, if the Iraq History Project waits until after ISG mission completion,
CPA will potentially have available more dedicated, expert resources to 1 execute
its mission.
Based upon these basic reasons, the ISG highly recommends the CPA wait until after it
completes its document exploitation mission before reviewing the documents
~Lt Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03

TABC

COORDINATION
Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
General Counsel
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia
Director, Joint Staff
President, National Defense University copy provided