COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD
INFO MEMO
March 14, 2004
FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: l~....-(b_)(_6)
_ _ __.
SUBJECT: Surveys Say Iraqi Economy Starting to Come to Life
These data are drawn from multiple surveys:
1CRSS January 5-17: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babylon, Samara, Karbala, Tikrit
1CRSS February 23-29: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babylon, Diyala, Ramadi, Suleymania
1/ACASS January 1-7: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Ramadi, Samara, Karbala
1/ACASS JanuarylB-25: Baghdad, Basrah, MosuJ, Hl/la, Karbala, Ramadi
1/ACASS February22-29: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Ramadi, Samara, Karbala
All results derivefromface-to-face interviews in the homes of the interviewee and have over
1,000 valid interviews. Where totals are shown for January and February, totals have been
adjusted to compare only same-city to same-city results.
Economic questions on January and February surveys show growth of confidence in the Iraqi
economy in the five to six weeks between the surveys.
Improved perceptions of the economy show up various ways:
• National Economy Improving
"Do you think that the economic situation in Iraq today is better or worse than the
economic situation before the war?" Same cities (Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babylon),
same question, same methodology from January to February: (both ICRSS)
o 20% drop in those who say "worse"
o 12% jump in those who say "better"
o Movement in the opposite direction in Mosul.1
1 Mosul often reports results out of line with other cities. This holds liVe with different questions from different
pollsters. Theories as to why this would be so vary lllld there is no clear explanation, but two theories might explain
this variance: 1. Mosul is perhaps less of an economic hub than it was before the war. 2. A lot of (former) military
personnel live in Mosul and this may affect outlooks.
o-,~~-o'S1<c
~'
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• Finances of Individual Households Improving
"Compared to before the war, would you say that your household's financial situation has
improved, worsened, or stayed the same?" Same cities (Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul,
Babylon), same question, same methodology from January to February: (both ICRSS)
o 14% drop in those who say ''worse"
o 12% increase in those who say "better"
o In Mosul the percentage saying things are "better" decreased by 6%, but the
percentage saying ''worse" decreased by 26%
• Big Jump in Those Saying they can "Get By," Decrease in Those Saying they Lack
"Basic Needs." (1/ACSS 1-7 Jan & !CRSS 23-29 Feb)
On this card, which is closest to your household's present financial situation?
o We have only the monthly ration
o We often do not have enough.money even for our basic needs, such as food or
rent.
o We can get by if we avoid buying non-essential or expensive items.
o We have enough to get by but have almost no luxuries.
o We have enough money to live comfortably
• Plurality says Prices Decreasing
"Over the past few months, do you think the prices of goods and services have been
generally increasing, decreasing, or have they remained the same?" Same cities
(Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul) from January to February: (both ICRSS)
o 20% decrease in those saying prices are higher
o 19% increase in those saying prices are lower
• Retail Purchases
Iraqis have been on a shopping binge. By asking what electrical appliances households
owned before the war and after, we have determined the percentage of all of a specific
type of appliance that has been purchased since the end of the war. Percentages
purchased since April 2003: (1/ACSS Jan I 8-25)
o 96% of all satellite TV s (banned by Saddam)
o 32% of all air conditioners
o 22% of all water heaters
o 40% of all ovens
• Unemployment Down in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Karbala
Employment figures in Iraq are very slippery. Unemployment estimates on some polls
have run as high as 50% (Why? When pollsters simply ask: Are you employed? They
capture housewives, students and the retired.) All polls certainly mask severe
underemployment. (For example, a December IIACSS poll showed that 27.1% of men
described themselves as "self-employed"; self-employment often being an indicator of
underemployment.)
Another complicating factor is that some pollsters have had a difficult time capturing
representative samples of women (because male family members are often reluctant to let
women be interviewed). The polls that skew towards men tend to over-report
unemployment because many women seek no employment outside the home. (In one
UNCLASSIFIED 2

-------------------------
-
reliable poll, 68% of women report themselves as "Housewife" and an additionall5%
report themselves as "Student.") But men are six times (15.4% vs. 2.4% in one poll)
more likely to report themselves as "Unemployed."
Nevertheless, the IACSS polls conducted 1-7 January and 22-29 February gained traction
by dividing activities into multiple categories: Full-Time Public Sector, Full-Time
Private Sector, Part-Time Public Sector, Part-Time Private Sector, Student, Housewife,
Pensioner and Unemployed. Thus, the "Unemployed" category is a reasonably reliable
indicator of those who consider themselves part of the workforce, but have no
employment.
o 15% report themselves unemployed in early January
o 8"/o report themselves unemployed in late February.
A IT ACHMENTS: 2 Power Point Slide Sets lllustrating Above Data (one annotated)
Distribution\!-!='L.!::!is~t ------.
COORDINATION: Counselor1(b)(6) I b(<.t. )
UNCLASSIFIED 3

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Jan-Feb Answers to Question: Economic Situation In Iraq Compared to Before the War?
Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS 2

"Compared to before the war, would you say that your household's financial situation has
improved, worsened, or stayed the same?"
Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS 3

·------
----~--
Big Jump in those who say they can "Get By";
Decrease in those who say they Lack "Basfc Needs."
60
We have only the monthly
ration
We often do not have
enough money even for
our basic: needs, such as
food or rent.
We can get by if we avoid We have enough to get
buying non-essential or by but have almost no
expensive items. luxuries.
We have enough money
to live comfortably.
Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS
4

Prices Seen Declining
Perception of Prices "Over the Past Few Monthsw 18-25 January Perception of Prices "Over the Past Few Monthsw 23-29 February
Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS 5

Percentage of Electrical Appliances Purchased Since Apri12003
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
DVD Radio
Water
Heater
Washer TV Air
Conditioner
Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS
VCR
<hen Computer Printer Satellite TV
6

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----------------------------------------- --
OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL ... LTD
t~o!YS
National Survey of Iraq
February 2004
Frequency Tables
Unweighted
2,737
Weighted Data
Governorate
Count Ofo
An bar 133 5.0
Baghdad 732 27.6
Basra 209 7.9
Diyala 148 5.6
Dohuk 51 1.9
Erbil 145 5.5
Kerbala 72 2.7
Missan 81 3.0
Muthanna 55 2.1
Ninewa 271 10.2
Qadissiyah 97 3.7
Suleymaniya 186 7.0
Tameem 97 3.6
-
Thi-Qar 159 6.0
Wassit 99 3.7
Salah Al-Din 117 4.4
Total 2652 100.0
2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL. Ill
•

[Ask all]
Q1 - Overall, how would you say things are going in your life these days- very
good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad?
Bas e = All respondents
%
Very good 13.4
Quite good 56.6
Quite bad 14.2
Very bad 14.8
Difficult to say 1.1
Total 100.0
[Ask all]
Q2 • Compared to a year ago, I mean before the war In Spring 2003, are things
overall in your life much better now, somewhat better, about the same,
somewhat wotse or much wotse?
8 M ase= l • respondents
%
Much better now 21.9
Somewhat better 34.6
About the same 23.3
Somewhat worse 12.7
Much worse 5.9
Difficult to say 1.6
Total 100.0
[Ask all)
Q3 - What Is your expectation for how things overall in your life will be In a year
from now? Will they be much better, somewhat better, about the same,
somewhat wotse or much wotse?
sa se = All respondents
%
Much better 36.7
Somewhat better 34.3
About the same 9.4
Somewhat worse 3.2
Much worse 3.4
Difficult to say 12.8
Total 100.0
2 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL. Ill

[Ask all]
Q4 • What Is the single biggest problem you are facing in your life these days?
Bas e = All respondents
%
Academic problems 2.0
Chaos .4
Terrorist attacks 1.8
Family problems 1.2
Housing problems 4.1
Health problems 1.3
No independence for Kurdistan .4
Rising prices 9.5
Lack of securitv/stabilitv 22.1
No job 11.8
The occupation 1 '1
Personal problems 1.6
Poor electricity supply 4.2
Social problems .5
Uncertainty about the political future of lraa 1.3
Poor public services <water, roads, etc.) 3.7
Ethnic/reliaious tensions .2
Poor livina standard 3.8
Persecution/imprisonment .7
Other 2.0
No problem/no sinale biggest problem 18.0
Not sure/no answer 8.1
Total 100.0
[Ask all]
Q5 • From todav's Perspective and all things considered. was It absolutely right,
somewhat right, somewhat wrong or absolutely wrong that US-led coalition
forces Invaded Iraq In Spring 2003?
8 a•e = All respondents
%
Absolutely right 19.6
Somewhat right 28.6
Somewhat wrong 12.9
Absolutely wrong 26.2
Difficult to say 12.7
Total 100.0
3 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATI<;JNAL Ill

{Asks//]
Q6 • Apart from right and wrong, do you feel the US-led coalition force Invasion ...
Base = All respondents
%
Humiliated Iraq 41.2
Liberated Iraq 41.8
Difficult to say 17.0
Total 100.0
{Ask all]
Q7 • A • I would like to ask you about today's conditions In the
village/neighbourhood where you live. How would you rate the following using
very good, quite good, quite bad or very bad?
Base == All respondents
'tl 1 1 1 g •
8 l .. :a
; 15 rl E
Cll i ~
~ :! ~ • • z 'a {:.
r:
1)
• :I " i
> a z
~
The security situation % 20.2 28.7 21.1 29.0 1.0 100.0
The availability af jobs % 6.5 19.1 22.5 46.1 5.8 100.0
The supply af electricity % 7.9 27.0 27.8 36.6 .7 100.0
The availability af clean water % 19.7 30.8 21.7 26.3 1.5 100.0
The availability af medical care % 16.9 34.1 24.4 21.8 2.0 .8 100.0
Local schools % 36.6 34.6 15.0 11.1 2.4 .4 100.0
Local government % 17.8 31.7 20.4 17.7 12.4 100.0
Availability of household basics % 18.0 38.5 23.7 17.3 2.5 100.0
The availability of products and services which 13.7 35.8 26.5 19.6 4.4 100.0
go beyond your household's basic needs %
Your family's protection from crime % 21.2 31.5 20.4 23.3 3.7 100.0

[Asks//)
Q7 • 8 • Compared to a year ago, I mean before the war in Spring 2003, would you
say [start with first rotated item in Q7A] Is much better now, somewhat better,
about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?
Base • All resDondents
'1ii • '1ii 8 ~
!I iJ =·
.. E
~~ "fi~
ii
~.!
Cl) o( ~;J
~=
li
~~
~= ~
z
The security situation % 25.9 27.7 18.1 15.0 11.4 1.9 100.0
The availability of jobs % 12.4 26.5 30.9 16.2 9.1 4.9 100.0
The supply of electricity % 15.2 28.2 32.0 14.6 8.4 1.6 100.0
The availability of clean water % 17.6 23.7 40.2 10.4 6.0 2.2 100.0
The availability of medical care % 16.2 28.1 37.6 10.7 4.9 2.6 100.0
Local schools % 23.7 23.2 40.8 6.5 2.9 2.9 100.0
Local govemment % 17.3 27.1 29.0 10.7 5.7 10.2 100.0
Availability of household basics % 18.1 28.4 34.6 11.2 5.0 2.7 100.0
The availability of products and services which
15.5 28.7 34.6 11.3 5.6 4.3 100.0
%
go beyond your household's basic needs
Your family's protection from crime % 23.2 27.3 25.9 12.7 7.9 .3.1 100.0
{Ask all]
Q7 • C • What Is your expectation for [start with first rotated item in Q 7 A] a year from
now, do you expect it to be much better, somewhat better, about the same,
somewhat worse or much worse?
Sue • All resDondents
'1ii • '1ii 0
.s:'"
.s.
ii ei 'SE :s 0 :s l 0
~~
1~ "fi~
"!lii li
0.1:'1 o"
.a= g i ::EJ Ill c: 1-
Cl) o( Cl) z
The security situation % 42.2 31.8 10.0 2.7 2.6 10.7 100.0
The availability of jobs % 37.7 35.3 10.6 2.0 1.9 12.5 100.0
The supply of electricity % 40.1 33.7 11.3 2.8 1.8 10.2 100.0
The availability of clean water % 42.8 32.1 12.6 2.3 1.2 9.0 100.0
The availability of medical care % 42.7 31.8 12.0 2.0 1.4 10.1 100.0
Local schools % 44.4 29.6 14.1 1.5 1.0 9.4 100.0
Local government % 40.1 28.9 12.4 2.1 1.7 14.7 100.0
The availability of household basics % 43.2 33.0 10.4 1.9 1.3 10.1 100.0
The availability of products and services which 41.9 32.7 10.4 2.2 1.2 11.5 100.0
go beyond your household's basic needs %
Your family's protection from crime % 41.6 33.0 11.3 1.8 1.8 10.6 100.0
5 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL ~~~

[Ask all]
QB • A. I am going to read some Ideas about priorities for the next 12 months.
Please tell me which one Is your first priority, your second priority and your
third priority.
Base •All d
· respon entlll
1 2-
Total
PriOI'ItY prioritY
% % % %
Regaining public security In the country 64.4 13.5 7.0 84.8
Ensuring that oil oroduc~on Increases 2.3 6.7 4.0 13.0
Re'Jivlng the economy 3.2 14.7 9.9 27.8
Deallna wtth the members of the orevious government .5 .9 .4 1.9
Rebuldlng the infrastructure 6.9 26.6 19.2 54.7
Ensuring that most people in this country can make a decent 4.5 8.5 16.7 29.7
livlnc
Regaining lracl control over govemlna this country 3.3 5.5 8.2 16.9
Rebulldina the education svstem .9 3.8 5.8 10.5
-ld not be attacked from the outside .9 2.3 4.3 7.5
s Ideals are ollowed 3.3 5.3 7.3 15.11
national government 8.1 8.5 13.5 30.1
ave more say about how things are done .7 .6 2.1 3.3
in their communities
DlffocuKtosay 1.1 1.2 1.6 4.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 300.0
pr~rltY
[Ask all]
QB- Bas e • All respondent~~
B. Also, please tell me which one you think is no priority at all.
%
Regaining public security in the country -
Ensuring that oil production increases Reviving the economy .7
Dealing with the members of the previous government Rebuilding the infrastructure .0
Ensuring that most people in this country can make a decent living Regaining Iraqi control over governing this country Rebuilding the education system .4
Ensuring that Iraq could not be attacked from the outside Ensuring that religious ideals are followed Holding elections for national government Seeing that people have more say about how things are done in their communities 3.1
62.0
.2
.a
1.3
2.3
.8
1.6
Difficult to say 26.6
Total 100.0
6 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL Ill

(Ask those who mentioned at least one priority in QBA]
Q9 - A. Who should take care of [read out first priority mentioned in QBA}? Please
mention only one
B. Who should take care of [read out second priority mentioned in QBA}? Please
mention only one
C. Who should take care of [read out third priority mentioned in QBA}? Please
mention only one
Base==Resp ondents who mentioned at least one' riorltY
, .. 2''" 3 Total
priority priority priority
Army/Police/ Ministry of Interior 6.9 2.9 1.5 11.3
Coalition Forces 4.8 3.8 3.1 11.6
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government .1 .1 .1 .3
CPA .6 .3 .5 1.4
Educated people/experts '1 .4 .3 .9
Governing Council 5.4 5.7 4.4 15.4
Iraq .4 .3 .6 1.4
Iraqi government 33.3 38.1 35.6 106.8
Iraqi government and people .3 .2 .3 .9
Iraqi people 17.3 14.1 14.8 46.1
Iraqi President .5 ,7 .6 1.8
Local government .6 .4 .3 1.3
Political parties .9 .5 .6 2.1
Regional government/leaders .5 .2 .1 .8
Religious leaders 2.7 2.3 2.1 7.1
UN 1.0 1.2 2.1 4.4
USA 7.7 7.2 6.6 21.4
Other 1.3 1.2 1.6 4.1
Not sure/no answer 15,7 20.3 24.6 15.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 254.7
7 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL Ill

Regaining public security In the country- Who should take care ...
~rties
%
Army/Police/ Ministry of Interior 12.0
5.3
overnment .1
p .6
Educated people/experts .1
Governing Council 4.9
Ira .3
Ira i government 30.9
Ira i government and people .3
Ira i Deoole 18.3
Ira i President .4
Local government .5
.3
ovemmentlleaders .3
eaders .9
UN .6
USA 7.3
Other .9
Not sure/no answer 16.0
Total 100.0
~
Ensuring that oil production Increases- Who should take Cll/'8 •..
%
Anny/Police/Ministry of Interior .2
Coalition Forces 5.1
CPA 1.5
Governing Council 5.0
Ira .8
Ira i government 42.9
Ira 1 people 11.6
Re ional aovernmentlleaders .6
Religious leaders .5
UN .8
USA 7.8
Other .9
Not sure/no answer 22.4
Total 100.0
Reviving the economy- Who should take Cll/'8 ...
%
Anny/Police/Ministry of Interior .3
Coalition Forces 2.6
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government .1
CPA .4
Educated people/experts .8
Governing Council 5.1
Iraq .4
46.3
~and people
.6
11.8
Iraqi President .6
Local government .3
Political parties .2
Regional government/leaders .3
Religious leaders .1
UN .7
USA 7.1
Other .6
Not sure/no answer 21.6
Total 100.0
8 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL Ill

Dealing with the memben of the previous government- Who should take care ...
%
4.9
Coalition~~
Governing 5.9
30.7
Iraqi people 11.8
Iraqi President 1.6
Political parties 1.3
USA 8.6
Other 5.5
Not sure/no answer 29.7
Total 100.0
Rebuilding the Infrastructure (electricity, water supply, telephone, etc.)- Who should take care ...
%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior .4
Coalition Forces s.o
CPA .3
Educated people/experts .2
Governing CouncU 5.1
lrao .5
Iraqi government 45.2
I raol government and people .3
lraoi people 10.8
Iraqi President .4
Local government .7
Political parties .1
Regional government/leaders .4
Religious leaders .s
UN 1.2
USA 9.0
Other 1.4
Not sure/no answer 18.6
Total 100.0
Ensuring that most people In this country can make a decent living - Who should take care ...
%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior .6
Coalition Forces 3.5
Coalition Forces and lraoi oovernment .2
Governing Council 4.4
Ira .6
Ira i oovernment 48.5
Ira !government and people .3
Ira i people 10.6
lraoi President 1.6
Local government .4
Political parties .4
Regional oovernment/leaders .4
Religious leaders .s
UN .7
USA 6.2
Other .6
Not sure/no answer 20.4
Total 100.0
9 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL Ill

Regaining Iraqi control over governing this country- Who should take care ••.
%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior 1.1
Coalition Forces 2.3
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government .1
CPA .2
Govemina Council 9.1
Iraq .4
lraai government 25.2
Iraqi government and people .5
Iraqi people 26.2
.7
.1
1.2
~iii~
UN 3.5
USA 6.6
Other .8
Not sure/no answer 20.0
Total 100.0
Rebuilding the education system- Who should take care ...
%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior .3
Coalition Forces 1.3
CPA .7
Educated people/experts 3.0
Governing Council 1.7
lr11q 1.4
Iraqi government 52.4
lraai people 11.8
Local_government .3
Regional government/leaders .9
UN .3
USA 3.6
Other .6
Not sure/no answer 21.6
Total 100.0
Ensuring that Iraq could not be attacked from the outside- Who should take care ...
%
Army/Police/Ministrv of Interior 2.8
Coalition Forces 8.6
Coalition Forces and lraai Qovernment .3
CPA 1.1
Governing Council 2.8
lraai government 24.3
Iraqi government and people .2
lraai people 13.1
I raCII President 1.8
Local government .7
Religious leaders 1.5
UN 2.2
USA 14.4
Other 2.4
Not sure/no answer 23.8
Total 100.0
1 Q 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL. Ill

Ensuring that religious Ideals are followed- Who should take care ...
%
Coalition Forces .2
CPA .7
Educated people/experts .3
Governing Council .0
IraQ .2
lraqi_government 18.2
Iraqi government and people .3
Iraqi people 10.3
IraQi President 1.0
Political parties 6.8
Religious leaders 26.0
UN .2
USA 1.3
Other 5.0
Not sure/no answer 28.3
Total 100.0
Holding e/ec:tlons for national government- Whp should take care ...
%
Arm_y/Police/Ministry of Interior .3
Coalition Forces 1.6
Coalition Forces and IraQI government .2
CPA .3
Educated people/~s
.1
Governing Council 8.7
I rae .6
I rae i Qovernment 18.2
I people 23.9
I rae i President .3
Local aovernment .5
Pol ~leal parties 1.2
Religious leaders 4.4
UN 6.0
USA 5.3
Other 2.2
Not sure/no answer 26.2
Total 100.0
Ira~
Seeing that people have more say about how things are done In their commun/Ues- Who 11hould
take care ...
%
Coalition Forces 2.3
Governing Council 2.5
Ira 2.5
Ira i government 39.7
Ira I people 14.0
Ira I President 1.7
Political parties .8
Religious leaders 1.5
USA 10.5
Other 4.2
Not sure/no answer 20.2
Total 100.0
11 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL. ~~

[Ask all}
Q1 0 • Considering everything, which country could seNe as a model for Iraq
in the coming years? ff you think Iraq needs no model, please tell me so.
Sa se • All respondents
%
Bahrain .4
Eavot .7
France 2.2
Germany 1.8
Iran 2.6
Japan 4.8
Jordan .5
Kuwait 6.1
Lebanon .7
Qatar .4
Russia .4
Saudi Arabia 3.6
Syria 1.3
United Arab Emirates 21.1
United Kingdom 2.3
United states 6.5
European Union .4
Denmark .4
Sweden .5
Switzerland 1.7
Other 2.2
lra<l needs no model 23.6
Not sure/no answer 15.9
Total 100.0
12 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL IIJ

[Ask a//]
Q11 - Which countrles/olflanisatlons should play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq?
You may mention up to three countrieslolflanlsatlons In order of impottance
Base • All respondents
1 .. z- 3'" Total
country country country
% % % %
Algeria .1 .1 .1 .2
Bahrain .4 .3 .7 1.4
Eavot 1.0 1.0 1.3 3.3
France 5.9 9.5 6.2 21.6
Germany 3.7 6.3 6.7 16.7
Iran 2.0 .8 1.1 4.0
Israel '1 .2 .2 .5
J!lPlln 19.6 6.0 6.1 35.9
Jordan .6 1.5 1.0 3.1
Kuwait 2.7 2.1 1.9 6.7
Lebanon .2 .5 .8 1.5
Libya '1 .1 .0 .2
Morocco .1 .1 '1 .3
Oman '1 .2 .1 .4
Qatar .2 .4 .7 1.3
Russia 1.3 2.4 2.4 6.1
Saudi Arabia 2.2 3.4 2.0 7.6
Syria 1.4 1.3 1.4 4.1
Tunisia .1 '1 .1 .2
Turkey .2 .3 .6 1 '1
United Arab Emirates 3.8 2.0 2.8 6.6
United Kinadom 3.9 12.5 5.1 21.5
United States 20.4 9.4 5.8 35.7
Arab Leaaue .1 .9 .5 1.5
European Union .3 .9 .9 2.0
Red Cross .2 '1 .2 .5
Relief oraanisations .1 .2 .0 .3
UN - United Nations 3.6 .6 1.3 5.7
UNICEF .6 .5 .3 1.4
Aruba .1 .4 .2 .7
China .1 .7 1.0 1.8
Italy .3 .6 .4 1.3
Korea South .0 .4 .2 .7
Spain '1 .2 .6 .9
Sweden '1 .1 .2 .4
Switzerland .4 .2 .6 1.4
Yemen .0 .1 .1 .3
Other .9 1.5 2.1 4.4
None 6.3 1.7 3.6 6.3
Not sure/no answer 16.5 27.9 38.3 16.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 226.2
13 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL Ill

[Ask all]
Q12 • Which countries/organisations should not play a role In the rebuilding of
Iraq? You may mention up to three countries/organisations in order of
Importance
Base = All respondents
1"' country 2'N 3'" Total
country country
% % % %
Afghanistan .3 .3 .1 .7
Alqerla .1 .2 .2 .5
Bahrain .1 .6 .4 1.1
Egypt 3.5 3.1 2.4 9.0
France 1.8 1.2 1.1 4.1
Gennany .3 1.1 1.1 2.5
Iran 6.7 7.7 5.1 19.5
Israel 22.8 7.9 6.1 36.8
Japan .3 .4 .5 1.2
Jordan 2.6 3.4 4.8 10.8
Kuwait 6.5 5.2 5.2 16.9
Lebanon .2 .3 .1 .6
Libya .2 .4 .2 .8
Oman .2 .1 .1 .4
Pakistan .2 .1 .2 .4
Qatar .1 .3 .3 .7
Russia 2.6 1.8 1.6 6.0
Saudi Arabia 1.0 2.1 1.5 4.6
Syria 3.5 5.4 3.7 12.6
Tunisia .2 .0 .1 .3
Turkey 5.6 3.9 3.9 13.4
United Arab Emirates .1 .1 .2 .4
United Kingdom 2.1 6.2 3.6 11.9
United States 8.3 4.1 1.8 14.1
UN • United Nations .0 .0 .2 .3
Australia .0 .2 .1 .3
China .2 .5 .4 1.2
Italy .0 .2 .1 .3
Korea North .1 .1 .1 .2
Spain .0 .1 .2 .4
Yemen .1 .2 .4 .7
Other .6 1.3 1.5 3.4
Unsure of specific 7.0 3.1 3.8 7.0
countrv/orqanlsation
Not sure/no answer 22.7 38.5 48.7 22.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 205.8
14 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL. lll

[Ask all]
Q13- A. Which national leader in Iraq, if any, do you trust the most?
Sa se = AI respondents
%
Abdul Aziz Hakeem 3.1
Adnan Pachachi 3.5
Ahmed Chalabi .2
Bahr Uloom .0
Ibrahim Jaaferi 7.7
Salahuddin Bahauddin .0
Jalal Talabani 5.9
Massoud Barazani 6.0
Muafaq Rubaee .2
Muhsin Abdul Hameed 2.0
Muatada Sadlr .6
Saddam Hussein 3.3
Sharif Ben AI Hussein .6
Saeed Sistani 4.7
Sultan Hashim .7
Sheikh Fawaz .1
Mohammed AI Doori .1
Unadim Yousif Kana .1
Kareem Mahmood .1
AIHawza .0
Noori Abdulla Tahir .0
Tariq~~ .0
Avad Alawi .2
Falah Hassan Naqeeb .1
Saad Mahir Ahmed .2
Avad Jalaluddin .1
Adnan Thabit Bukanan .0
Jamal Abdul Nassir .0
Nail Sabri Hadeethi .2
Mohammed Saeed Sahaf .1
Moamar Qathafi .1
Majeed Hameed Moussa .1
Members of previous reaime .2
Any Kurdish leader .1
Any Shia leader .1
Reliaious parties .2
Other .4
None 22.1
Not sure/no answer 36.7
Total 100.0
15 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL -

{Ask all]
Q13- B. And, If any, which one do you not trust at all?
Sa se • All respondents
%
Abdul Aziz Hakeem 1.8
Adnan Pachachi 1.2
Ahmed Chalabi 10.3
Ali Hassan Majeed .1
BahrUioom .1
Ibrahim Jaaferi .5
Salahuddin Bahauddin .0
Jalal Talabani .9
Massoud Barazani .2
Muafaa Rubaee 1.3
Muhsin Abdul Hameed .2
MuQ1ada Sadir .3
Saddam Hussein 3.1
Saeed Sistani 1.3
Osama Bin Laden .0
Mishaan Jibborv .0
Kareem Mahmood .1
Ayad Alawi .5
Hushiar Zebari .0
Abid .0
Yassir Arafat .0
Mahmoud Othman .1
George Bush .1
Members of previous regime .2
Governina CounCil .2
Any Shia leader .1
Baath Party .0
Reliaious parties .0
Other .3
None 27.3
Not sure/no answer 49.6
Total 100.0
16 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAl. Ill

[Ask all]
Q14 • A. I am going to read a number of organisations. For each one, could you
please tell me if you have hearci of them or not
Bas A e• II respondents
%of %of
Reeponses Cases
Iraq's religious leaders 5.2 54.9
New Iraqi Army 8.6 89.6
The (Iraqi Governing) Council 9.2 96.1
Ministries in Baghdad 8.3 87.2
The police 9.5 99.1
The CPA 9.1 95.1
The United Nations 9.4 98.1
Political parties 9.0 94.1
US and UK occupation forces 9.4 98.5
Iraqi Media Network TV 8.9 93.7
Local leaders in your community 6.2 64.6
Press 7.3 76.0
None .0 .4
Total 100.0 1047.3
0 missing cases; 2,652 valid cases
Q14- B. How much confidence do you have In [first organisation respondent has heard
of]: is It a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much
confidence or none at all?
Base • Respondents who are aware of this oman/sat/on
A great Quite a Not None Not Total
deal lot very at all sural no
much answer
% % % % % %
IraQ's religious leaders 42.4 27.6 12.6 8.9 8.5 100.0
New IraQi Armv 17.8 38.2 24.9 9.7 9.4 100.0
The (Iraqi Governing) 11.3 27.9 27.0 25.6 8.3 100.0
Council
Ministries in Baghdad 11.1 32.9 30~1
14.6 11.4 100.0
The police 26.4 41.4 19.7 8.2 4.4 100.0
The CPA 7.9 20.0 26.9 35.3 9.9 100.0
The United Nations 13.7 26.6 25.5 25.8 8.4 100.0
Political parties 7.1 20.7 25.4 35.7 11.1 100.0
US and UK occupation 7.9 17.4 23.5 42.8 8.4 100.0
forces
Iraqi Media Network TV 13.3 38.8 24.1 15.7 10.1 100.0
Local leaders in your 16.6 33.6 22.3 15.8 11.7 100.0
communitv
Prass 11.8 31.1 28.4 17.6 11.0 100.0
17 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL Ill

(Ask alf}
Q15- A. People have different ideas about what Iraq needs at this time. How about
you? How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Base • All respondents
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly Not Total
agree agree disagree disagree sure/no
answer
A Csinalel stronalraai leader % 66.5 14.6 4.7 9.4 4.9 100.0
A groUp of strong Iraqi leaders % 23.9 29.1 17.4 21.2 8.5 100.0
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA\ % 9.7 21.9 21.4 36.9 10.1 100.0
A government made up mainly of % 27.4 25.8 16.2 24.0 6.7 100.0
reliaious leaders
A government made up mainly of Iraqi % 11.1 23.2 20.3 37.3 8.1 100.0
military leaders
A UN transition government % 15.1 23.7 18.2 33.1 9.9 100.0
An lraai clemocracv % 72.2 13.7 4.1 4.6 5.4 100.0
An Iraqi government made up of experts % 34.6 32.4 11.8 11.4 9.7 100.0
and/or managers, not politicians
The Clraai Governlnal Council % 16.2 28.3 16.4 27.7 11.4 100.0
Q15B • What do you think Iraq needs In 12 months time? Please mention only
one choice.
one choice.
Q15C- What do you think Iraq needs In five yeaTS time? Please mention only
Base = All respondents
Q15B- Q15C-
In 12 InS
months years
% %
A (single) strong Iraqi leader 46.6 35.5
A group of strong Iraqi leaders 3.3 2.7
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) .7 .7
A government made up mainly of religious leaders 10.4 9.8
A government made up mainly of Iraqi military leaders .7 .2
A UN transition government 1.4 .6
An Iraqi democracy 28.0 41.6
An Iraqi government made up of experts and/or managers, not politicians 2.5 2.4
The (Iraqi Governing) Council 1.6 .4
Not sure/no answer 4.8 6.2
Total 100.0 100.0
18 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTI:RNATIONAL. II

[Ask all who responded to Q 15C}
Q15D - Can you tell me the [single] reason for your choice [In Q15C]?
Iraq needs an Iraq/ democracy In 5 yeats Ume- Reason for choice (41.6% of sample)
%
Dictatorship/autocratic rule is no good 2.6
It guarantees equality and justice 6.3
It guarantees freedom 34.2
It guarantees security/peace 5.2
It guarantees the rights of all nationaVrellgious groups 2.1
It improves the situation/brinas proaress 2.5
It is government by the people for the people 5.2
It is the best system 1.6
It provides unity 2.2
We want/need democracy 2.2
To make life better 1.5
To get rid of foreign occupation .3
To have a president/government/leader chosen by people 1.0
Other 5.5
Not sure/no answer 27.3
Total 100.0
Iraq needs a (single) strong Iraqi leader in 5 yeats time- Reason for choice (35.5"/o of sample)
%
For avoiding violence 1.7
He guarantees equality and justice 3.6
He guarantees security/peace 17.8
He guarantees the riahts of all nationallreliaious aroups 1.1
He improves the situation/brings proaress 2.0
It is the best system 2.8
He provides unity 11.7
We need strong people to do things 4.9
To take control of the countrv 24.7
To protect IraQ 1.9
To get rid of foreign occupation .7
He knows best 1.9
To represent the will of people 1.9
Other 6.8
Not sure/no answer 16.4
Total 100.0
Iraq needs a government made up mainly of religious /eadets In 5 yeats time- Reason for choice
(9.8% of sample)
%
They follow God's guidance 27.6
They guarantee eQuality and iustice 10.7
They llUarantee security/peace 4.8
It is the best svstem 5.1
People trust them 6.9
Other 15.5
Not sure/no answer 29.4
Total 100.0
19 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAl. Ill

Iraq need• a group of strong Iraq/leaders In 5 year.s time- Reason for choice (2. T"Ai of ample)
%
Dictatorship/autocratic rule is no good 12.0
They guarantee securitv/oeace 7.7
It is government bv the people for the people 4.0
To take control of the country 18.4
To solve problems 4.3
Other 31.9
Not sure/no answer 21.6
Total 100.0
[Ask all]
Q16 - In designing a new political order for Iraq, which of the following would be
most important? Which one would be second most Important? Which one
would be third most important? And which one would be least Important?
Base= All respondent/~
Most 2""most _3'~most Least
imDOI1ant important important Important
% % % %
A broad government 31.3 29.8 19.6 10.2
A strong government 23.9 21.4 20.7 25.2
A liberal government 19.6 26.5 26.9 16.2
A government which follows religious ideals 16.7 13.7 21.6 38.3
Difficult to say 8.4 8.6 8.8 10.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
[Ask those who answered 1, 2, 4, 5, or 7 in Q15BJ
Q17 • There can be differences between the way government is set up In a country,
called political system, and the type of people who run that system, called
actors. From the six options I am going to read to you, please choose one
system and one type of actors.
Bas e • All respondents
Political system %
Strong leader 27.5
Islamic state 20.5
Democracy 46.5
Difficult to say 3.5
Total 100.0
Sa .se • All rest:~ondent/1
Political actor %
Democrats 55.3
Religious politicians 13.7
Strong leader 27.3
Difficult to say 3.7
Total 100.0
20 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL. ~~~

Base = All respondents
%
Strong leader and democrats 7.0
Strong leader and religious politicians Strong leader and strong leader Strong leader and difficult to say 1.0
18.8
.7
Islamic state and democrats 6.0
Islamic state and religious politicians 11.4
Islamic state and strong leader 2.8
Islamic state and difficult to say .3
Democracy and democrats 41.7
Democracy and religious politicians 1.3
Democracy and strong leader 5.5
Difficult to say and democrats .6
Difficult to say and strong leader .2
Difficult to say and difficult to say 2.7
Total 100.0
(Ask all}
Q18 • Irrespective of whether you would like democracy for Iraq or not, what. would
you say Is the most Important component of a democracy? What else? What
else?
Base •All nNpondents
1"' 2 3 Total
component component component
% % % %
Better life .5 1.0 .4 1.9
Civil society .B .8 .5 2.0
{Fair) Elections 7.4 5.6 1.6 14.6
Equality .7 2.7 2.0 5.4
Issues of freedom 34.2 9.4 3.3 46.9
Respondina to oeoPie's needs 1.3 1.4 ,6 3.3
Govemment by the people for the people 1.1 .8 .6 2.5
Human rights .3 .4 .2 .9
Independence .7 .9 .4 2.0
Jobs .4 .7 .3 1.4
Justice 2.7 3.4 2.2 8.2
Multi-partY svstem .6 1.0 .3 1.9
Parliament 1.6 1.0 .6 3.2
SecuritYIStabilitv 3.0 4.1 1.1 8.2
UnitY of lraa .7 .4 .1 1.2
Other 4.3 6.4 3.9 14.6
Do not know anylfurther component of 9.8 8.5 5.4 9.8
democracy
Not suretno answer 29.9 53.5 76.7 29.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 157.9
21 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL Ill

[Ask all}
Q19 ~ And what would you say Is definitively !lQ1 a component of a democracy?
Bu e = All respondents
%
Ap~inted government (not elected) .7
Dictatorship/Autocracy 14.9
Extremism .9
Freedom without certain limits .a
Ignoring people's opinions .6
Injustice and exploitation 5.0
No freedom 2.0
No securitY 1.4
Occupation and foreign control 1.4
Racism 1.5
No division between state and religion 1.1
Terrorism 2.8
Rigged/unfair elections 1.6
Political violence 2.6
Fear .4
Corruption .a
Other 4.4
Do not know any components of democracy 23.0
Not sure/no answer 34.0
Total 100.0
[Ask all}
Q20- Which structure should Iraq have In future?
Sea All ... reapondents
%
One unified Iraq with central government in Baghdad A group of regional states Dividing the country into separate independent states 79.0
14.0
3.6
Difficult to say 3.3
Total 100.0
(Ask all}
Q21 - How Interested would you say you are In politics?
Bu e • AllrestJondents
%
Very interested 17.5
Somewhat interested 36.4
Not very interested 21.7
Not at all interested 19.6
Not sure/no answer 4.7
Total 100.0
22 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL Ill

[Ask all]
Q22 - Over the past 12 months, would you say your interest In political matters has
increased, stayed the same or decreased?
Bas e • All respondents
%
Has increased 30.9
Stayed the same 48.0
Has decreased 10.0
Difficult to say 11.0
Total 100.0
[Askalf]
Q23 • Now I would like you to look at this card. I am going to read out some
different forms of political action that people can take, and I would like you to tell
me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you
might do It or would never, under any circumstances, do lt.
Base • All respondents
Have Might Would Not Total
done do never sure/no
do answer
% % % % %
Talking with other people about politics 46.0 15.0 35.6 3.4 100.0
Voting at elections 17.5 61.8 18.4 2.3 100.0
Joining a political party or action group 4.8 13.4 75.3 6.5 100.0
Taking action such as demonstrating 5.1 19.3 70.3 5.2 100.0
Using violence or force if it becomes .5 11.9 82.1 5.6 1llO:O
necessary
23 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL. Ill

[Ask those who have heard of political parties (Q14A) and have or would vote at elections (Q23)]
Q24 - A. As you may know, there anJ now a variety of political parties In Iraq.
Please tell me which one you would vote for in a national election.
B. And, which party/parties would you never vote for?
Base• Respondents who are aware of pOlitical parties and have/would vote at elections
Party Party
would would
vote for not
vote for
% %
Islamic Al-Dawa Partv 10.0 2.4
Kurdistan Democratic Party I PDK 7.7 .3
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan/ PUK 6.9 .5
lraai Islamic Partv 4.2 .4
Higher Council of Islamic Revolution 3.9 1.6
AI-Baath Partv 1.7 6.1
Islamic Union Party 1.2 1.3
Iraqi Communist Partv .8 7.5
Allah Partv .8 .6
I Iraqi Democratic Nation: Movement .7 .1
mmed Sadia AI-Sadlr .6 .4
.5 .1
.4 .1
Wifaa National Movement .2 .4
AI·Taliah Partv .2 .2
Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yaoertol .1 .3
National lraai Conference Partv .2 1.4
The Movement of Free Officers .1 -
Ashunan Union .1 .1
Constitutional Monarchy Movement .1 .1
Al-adalah wal tanimiah AJ.Iraai Party (Justice and Develooment Partvl .1 -
.1 .0
Politicians Movement! .0
.0 .1
National IraQI Movement .o .7
Socialist Al-Nassirv Partv .0 .
Turkmen Front Party .0 .4
Zahm atkeshan .o .
National Alliance Movement . .1
Liberal Democratic Party - .1
National Coalition Movement . .0
Other 1.0 .9
Refused 27.8 34.5
Don't know 30.2 39.2
Total 100.0 100.0
~
24 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH IN'TERNATIONAL Ill

[Askalf]
Q25 - Now that you have told me about ¥RM! political action, I would like to ask you
what you find acceptable or not acceptable about the political action of other
people.
Sase•Resp d on ants who are aware of the organisation
Acceptable Not Not Total
acceptable sureJNA
% % % %
Attacks on coalition forces 17.3 78.0 4.7 100.0
Attacks on the CPA 13.6 81.7 4.6 100.0
Attacks on foreigners working 10.2 85.7 4.0 100.0
alongside the CPA
Attacks on Iraqis who work for the 4.6 92.7 2.7 100.0
CPA
Attacks on foreigners who work for 4.3 92.6 3.1 100.0
the UN and similar international
humanitarian organisations
Attacks on Iraqis who work for the 2.7 95.1 2.2 100.0
UN and similar international
humanitarian organisations
Attacks on the New Iraqi police 1.5 96.6 2.0 100.0
{Ask those who heard of the coalition forces- Q14A}
Q26 • Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly
oppose the presence of Coalition Forces In Iraq?
Base • RHJ>ondents who are aware of the coalition forces
%
Strongly support 13.2
Somewhat support 26.3
Somewhat oppose 19.6
Strongly oppose 31.3
Difficult to say 9.6
Total 100.0
25 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL Ill

[Ask those who heard of the coalition forces- Q14A]
Q27 • N you have had personally any encounters with Coalition Force soldiers, was
your last encounter very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or
very negative?
Base • Rf18Pondents who.,.. awai'IJ of the coalition forees
%
Very positive 3.5
Somewhat positive 5.8
Somewhat negative 2.5
Very negative 5.9
Never had a personal encounter with coalition forces soldiers 77.5
COlfficult to say 4.8
Total 100.0
[Ask all}
Q28 • For each of the following, please tell me whether you think it would be very
effective, somewhat effective, not very effective or not at all effective In
improving security.
Base = All ffJSI:Jondents
Very Somewhat Not very Not at all Not Total
effective effective effective effective sure/no
answer
Creating job opportunities for the % 91.1 4.9 1.0 .5 2.5 100.0
unemployed
Training and hiring more IraQi local police % 76.7 16.7 2.0 1.4 3.3 100.0
Transferring all political authority to an Iraqi % 68.3 18.9 3.7 2.4 6.7 100.0
government
Retraining and rehiring military officers and % 39.5 21.0 10.1 20.9 8.4 100.0
soldiers from the old regime
Increasing foot patrols of U.S. and coalition % 25.0 21.4 15.1 27.8 10.8 100.0
forces in lraoi neiohbourhoods
Immediate departure of coalition forces % 30.2 12.7 14.0 29.8 13.4 100.0
Giving more authority to independent % 23.1 18.7 11.1 31.1 16.0 100.0
neighbourhood militias
26 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL. Ill

[Ask those who heard of the coalition forces - Q 14A}
Q29 • How long do you think U.S. and other Coalition Forces should remain in Iraq?
Bas e • Respondents who are aware of the coalition forces
%
They should leave now 15.1
They should remain for a few months 8.3
They should remain for six months to a year 6.1
They should remain for more than one year 4.3
They should remain until security is restored 18.3
They should remain until an Iraqi government is in place 35.8
They should never leave 1.5
Difficult to say 10.6
Total 100.0
27 2004 OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAl. 111

ABC~; w.&o- WRM TWNG~ stAN»
Ed1i Ott RELEASE AFfll:R 6:30P.M., Monday, March 15,2004
While Ambivalent About the War,
Most Iraqis Report a Better Life
A year after the bombs began to fall, Iraqis express ambivalence about the U.S.-led
invasion of their country, but not about its effect: Most say their lives are going well and
have improved since before the war, and expectations for the future are very high.
Worries exist -locally about joblessness, nationally about security- boosting desire for a
"single strong leader," at least in the short-term. Yet the first media-sponsored national
public opinion poll in Iraq also finds a strikingly optimistic people, expressing growing
interest in politics, broad rejection of political violence, rising trust in the Iraqi police and.
army and preference for an inclusive and ultimately a democratic government.
More Iraqis say the United States was right than say it was wrong to lead the invasion,
but by just 48 to 39 percent, with 13 percent expressing no opinion- hardly the
umeserved welcome some U.S. policymakers had anticipated.
so%.,---- Iraqis' Views of the U.S.-Led Invasion
ABC News poll
50% 48%
40%
-~.~~-.....
30% ..
20%:
10%
0%
As m, .. ·" .;::, .. ·
oppo.:
he country; more
:;'~lougb most also say

----------------------
- -
they should stay for the time being); and relatively few express confidence in those
forces, in the U.S.·led Coalition Provisional Authority, or in the Iraqi Governing Council.
These results are from an ABC News poll conducted among a random, representative
sample of2,737 Iraqis in face-to-face interviews across the country from Feb. 9-28. Part
of ABC's weeklong series, "Iraq: Where Things Stand," marking the first anniversary of
the war, the poll was co-sponsored with ABC by the Gennan broadcasting network ARD,
the BBC and the NHK in Japan, with sampling and field work by Oxford Research
International of Oxford, England.
The poll fmds that 78 percent oflraqis reject violence against coalition forces, although
17 percent- a sixth of the population - call such attacks "acceptable." One percent, for
comparison, call it acceptable to attack members of the new Iraqi police.
There are huge differences in these and many other questions between Arab Iraqis, who
account for 79 percent of the population, and the Kurdish minority (17 percent). Forty
percent of Arabs say it was right for the United States to invade; that soars to 87 percent
of Kurds. Just one-third of Arabs say the war liberated rather than humiliated Iraq; it's 82
percent of Kurds. Thirty percent of Arabs support the presence of coalition forces, again
compared with 82 percent of Kurds. Positive views of the invasion also are held
disproportionately in the South of the country, as well as in the Kurdish north.
100%.,-----4
90%
Views of the Invasion
by Ethnicity
ASC News poll
87%
80%
70%
80%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
All Arabs
Kurds
US-led invasion: All Arabs
Was right
48% 40%
Was wrong
39 46
Kurds
87%
9

Liberated Iraq 42% 33% 82%
Humiliated Iraq 41 48 11
Presence of coalition forces:
Support 39% 30% 82%
Oppose 51 60 12
Attacks on coalition forces:
Acceptable 17% 21% 2%
Unacceptable 78 74 96
PERSONAL.J:lVES- On a personal level, seven in 10 Iraqis say things overall are going
welftottficffif::,. a result that rnigbt surpril!e outsiders imaginingthe worst of life in Iraq
today. Fifty-six percent say their lives are better now than before the war, compared with
19 percent who say things are worse (23 percent, the same). And the level of personal
optimism is extraordinary: Seventy-one percent expect their lives to improve over the
next year.
Again there are regional and ethnic differences. In the Kurdish north, 70 percent say their
lives overall are better than before the war; in the south, 63 percent. That declines to 54
percent in the central region, and falls under half- to 46 percent- in the greater Baghdad
area, home to more than a quarter oflraqis.
100%...-----1 How Iraqis See Their Lives Overall
ABC News
90%
SO% .-r Compared to
before the war:
... _.llbll
"''•JiWr.'
n%
70%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Good Bad Better Same Worse Better Same Woree

How Iraqis see their lives overall
How things are going today: All North South Central Baghdad
Good 70% 85% 65% 70% 67%
Bad 29 14 34 28 32
Compared to a year ago, before the war:
Better 56% 70% 63% 54% 46%
Same 23 15 21 22 31
Worse 19 13 13 23 23
How they'll be a year from now:
Better 71% 83% 74% 70% 63%
Same 9 4 6 10 16
Worse 1 4 9 10
Locally, unhappiness is highest by far with the availability of jobs (69 percent say it's
bad) and the supply of electricity ( 64 percent negative). Local schools are rated positively
(by 72 percent), and smaller majorities give positive ratings to the availability of basic
household goods and the adequacy of local crime protection. About half give positive
ratings to the availability of medical care, clean water and household goods beyond the
basics, and to local government.
Iraqis divide in their rating of the local security situation now, but strikingly, 54 percent
say security where they live is better now than it was before the war. However, for some,
local security clearly is a great concern; 22 percent call it the single biggest problem in
their lives, more than any other mention ("no job" is second, 12 percent). Local security
concerns peak in greater Baghdad, where they're cited by 36 percent as the top problem,
compared to a low of eight percent in Kurdistan.
Notably, across the country, no more than 26 percent say any of these conditions are
worse now than a year ago; in each about four in 10 or more say things are better; and in
each sizable majorities -mostly three-quarters expect things to improve over the next
12 months.
There's political danger, of course, if these expectations go unmet.
Ratings of specific local conditions
Today Compared to pre-war Expectations-! yr.
Good Bad Better Worse Same Better Worse Same
Schools 72% 26 47% 9 41 74% 3 14
Household basics 56 41 47 16 35 76 3 10
Crime protection 53 44 50 21 26 75 11
Medical care 51 47 H 16 36 75 12
Clean water 50 48 41 16 40 75 13
Local gov't 50 38 44 16 29 69 12
Additional goods 49 46 44 17 35 75 10
Security 49 50 54 26 16 74 10
ElectricitY 35 64 43 23 32 74 11
Jobs 26 69 39 25 31 73 11

-----------------------·-
SECUR;lTY;.. While less of a local issue for many Iraqis, security at the national level is
·a vast concern; the public's top overall priority, by a huge margin, is "regaining public
security in the country." Sixty-four percent give it "first priority" for the next 12 months;
out of a dozen issues tested, no other even breaks into double digits.
Combining frrst, second and third priorities produces a more complete list: Eighty-five
percent mention security in one of those slots; 55 percent, rebuilding the infrastructure;
30 percent, holding national elections; 30 percent, "ensuring that people can make a
decent living" and about as many, "reviving the economy." Last on the list: "Dealing
with members of the previous government," cited as a priority by only two percent.
100"' .------1 Iraqis' Priorities for the Next Year
ABCNewspotl
90% 85%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Regaining public
security In the
country
Rebuilding the Enaurlng that moat Holding na6onal
lnlraatructure Iraqis can make a elections
decenlllvlng
RevMng the
economy
Regaining public security
Rebuilding the infrastructure
Holding elections for national gov•t
Ensuring that people can make
a decent living
Reviving the economy
Regaining Iraqi governance
Ensuring that religious ideals
are followed
Increasing oil production
Rebuilding the education system
Ensuring that Iraq could not be
First, second or
third priority*
85%
55
30
30
28
17
16
13
10
First
Priority
64%
7
8
4
3
3
3
2
1

attacked from the outside
Giving people more say in
their communities
Dealing with members of the
previous government
*Up to three answers accepted
7
3
COALITION FORCES- As noted, 51 percent oppose the presence of coalition forces-
but that doesn't mean most want them withdrawn immediately,likely because of security
concerns. Fifteen percent oflraqis say the forces should leave the country now; by
contrast, 36 percent say they should remain until a new government is in place; 18
percent, until security is restored.
How long should coalition forces remain?
Until Iraq gov't is in place 36%
Until security is restored 18
Leave now 15
Six months or more 10
Few months 8
Just over three-quarters of Iraqis 77 percent - say they personally never have had any
encounter with coalition forces. Those who've had such encounters divide on the
experience: about half call it a positive encounter; half, negative.
Mll'*"llldl*ilii!IM~is overwhelmingly want their nation to
percent say so, compared with 14 percent who prefer a
federated group of regional states, and four percent who want the country broken into
separate nations. Among Iraqi Kurds, federated regional states- but not fully
independent ones - are preferred.
Preferences for Iraq's future governance
Unified country, central government in Baghdad
Regional states with a federal government
Divide into separate independent states
All Arabs
79% 90%
14 5
4 2
Kurds
26%
58
12
There is relatively little support for a religious theocracy forms of government.
it's low on the list of preferred
In one change from the first national poll in Iraq by Oxford Research International last
fall, more now call for a "single strong Iraqi leader"- 47 percent say one will be needed
a year from now, up from 27 percent previously. That's more than say "an Iraqi
democracy" will be needed, now 28 percent (essentially unchanged).
This interest in a strong leader (not necessarily an undemocratic one) seems based in
security concerns. In an open-ended follow-up, references to "freedom" dominate support

for democracy, while those who express support for a single strong leader are more apt to
cite the need for security and order in their country.
Iraq's needs for governance
Single strong Iraqi leader
Iraqi democracy
Government of religious leaders
Group of strong Iraqi leaders
Government of experts/managers
Iraqi Governing Council
UN transition government
Government of Iraqi military leaders
Coalition Provisional Authority
In 1 year
47%
28
10
3
2
2
1
1
1
In 5 years
35%
42
10
3
2
In another question, without a time frame mentioned, democracy wins more support than
two other options- a strong leader, but one who rules "for life"; or an Islamic state.
Forty-nine percent choose democracy, 28 percent a "strong leader" and 21 percent an
Islamic state.
Preferred political system
Democracy 49%
Strong leader •tor lifeH 28
Islamic state 21
As noted, more Iraqis express interest in politics- 54 percent, up from 39 percent in
November- and 31 percent say their interest in politics has increased in the past year,
three times the number who say it's decreased. Women are more apt than men to express
interest in politics, though it's up among both groups.
FRAGMENTATION -But other results suggest a level of political fragmentation that
may challenge the country's political development, and throws into some question the
notion of early elections. Despite interest In a strong leader, six in 10 Iraqis can't name a
single national leader they trust (though even more can't name one they specifically
mistrust).
Sixty-one percent express little or no trust in political parties, and nearly seven in 10
don't identify themselves with any party. The only parties that emerge with more than
minimal support are either Islamist or Kurdish; respondents named more than 25
individual parties, but most had Jess than one percent support. (All were volunteered in
response to an open-ended question.)
Political party support
Islamic Al-Dawa Party
Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK)
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
14%
11
10

Iraqi Islamic Party 6
Higher Council of Islamic Revolution
5
All other individual mentions 2 or fewer
Three-quarters say joining a political party is something they "would never, under any
circumstances, do"; indee4 after decades ofrepression, more than a third, 36 percent, say
that simply talking with other people about politics is something they would never do.
Have Might Would
done do never do
Talk with others about politics 46% 15 36
Vote in elections 17 62 18
Join a political party 5 13 75
Take action like demonstrating 5 19 70
Use violence/force if needed 12 82
Choices also are fragmented when Iraqis are asked which national leader they "trust the
most"- more than 40 individual answers, each with few mentions. Only five received
mentions from more than three percent:
-Ibrahim Al-Jaaferi, eight percent (main spokesman for the Islamic Dawa Party);
-Massoud Barzani, six percent (leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party);
-Jalal Talabani, six percent (leader of the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan);
-Sayyid Al-Sistani, five percent (the country's leading Shiite cleric, sometimes described
as the most powerful man in Iraq); and
-Adnan Pachachi, four percent (foreign minister in the government deposed by Saddam
Hussein in 1968, he founded the Independent Democratic Movement last month.)
One figure, meanwhile, was cited by 10 percent as a leader they "don't trust at all"-
Ahmed Chalabi, former leader of the London-based Iraqi National Congress, now a
member of the Iraqi Governing CounciL
TRUST- In terms of confidence in institutions, the gainers, as noted, are the Iraqi police
- 68 percent express trust in it, up from 45 percent in November- and the Iraqi army,
with 56 percent trust, up from 39 percent in the fall.
Confidence (not necessarily in political terms) peaks at 70 percent for "religious leaders."
No other institutions receive majority trust; notable are the IGC, at 39 percent, the CPA,
at 28 percent; and the U.S. and U.K. forces, at 25 percent.
Religious leaders
The police
New Iraqi Army
Local leaders in your community
Iraqi Media Network TV
Ministries in Baghdad
The press
% confident
70%
68
56
50
50
44
43

The United Nations 40
The (Iraqi Governing) Council 39
The CPA . 28
Political parties 28
US and UK occupation forces 25
90% Iraqis' Confidence in Organizations
ABC News poll
80%
70".4 70% 68%
60% 56%
50%
40%
20%
10%
50% 50%
44% 43% 40% 39o/o
30% 28% 28% 25%
MODEL- Few Iraqis see non-Arab nations as a model for their country- just six percent
cite the United States, five percent Japan- but many more want those nations to play a
role in rebuilding Iraq. Among top mentions, 36 percent say the United States should play
a role in rebuilding the country, 36 percent Japan, 22 percent the United Kingdom, 22
percent France, and 17 percent Germany.
Again in terms of a model for the country, 24 percent say it doesn't need one. The only
other mention above single digits is the United Arab Emirates, a primarily Sunni
federation of largely independent city-states (it was cited by 26 percent of Sunnis
compared with 15 percent ofShia Muslims, but was top-ranked, by far, in both groups.)
RELIGION- In religious terms, 96 percent of Iraqis are Muslim. In this poll 40 percent
identified themselves as Sunni Muslim, 33 percent as Shia, and 23 percent did not cite an
affiliation within Islam. Given the potential of sectarian strife and history ofrepression,
there may be reluctance to discuss religious matters in Iraq; just 55 percent say they had
even heard of"Iraq's religious leaders," in aggregate. Of those who say they had heard of
them, 81 percent of Shia Muslims expressed confidence in these leaders, compared with
57 percent of Sunnis.

In another difference, 92 percent of Shiites prefer a unified Iraq with its central
government in Baghdad, compared with two-thirds of Sunnis. And a quarter of Sunnis
called attacks on coalition forces acceptable, compared with 11 percent of Shiites.
DEMOGRAPHICS- The poll also paints a compelling demographic portrait of the Iraqi
people. In just 20 percent of Iraqi households does the main breadwinner hold a full-time,
outside job; 58 percent are self-employed. Average household income is the equivalent of
$164 per month, for an average of eight people per household.
Eighty-one percent of households have a refrigerator; 44 percent, an air conditioner (the
average daily high temperature in Baghdad in August is I 08 degrees); 44 percent, a
washing machine; 37 percent, a telephone; 21 percent, a still camera. There are disparities
across regions, with the south of the country substantially poorer.
The poll was conducted among Iraqis age 15 and up; those under age 18 accounted for 10
percent of the total sample (their attitudes are not strikingly different from their eldei1>').
Iraq is a young country: Sixty-six percent of Iraqis 15 and up are under age 35, compared
with 36 percent of Americans age IS and up.
METHODOLOGY - This poll was conducted for ABC News, ARD, the BBC and NHK
by Oxford Research International of Oxford, England. Interviews were conducted in
person, in Arabic and Kurdish, among a random national sample of2,737Iraqis age 15
and up from Feb. 9-28, 2004. The results have a two-point error margin.
Analysis by Gary Langer.
ABC News polls can be found at ABCNEWS.com on the Internet at:
<htto://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/PollVault/PoiiVault.html>
Media contactiL-(b_X_6_) ____ ----Jio1(b )( 6)
w would you say things are gai n 1n your lite these days - very
qui te bad, or very bad?
2/28/04
No
opin.
1
in Spring 2003, are things
about the same, somewhat
worse
About
Much Somewhat the same
22 35 23
NET
l9
No
op.
2

~/J
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUT~dRirl .
BAGHDAD
INFO MEMO
March 14, 2004
FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: L.:..l(b...:...)(:....;6):..______J
SUBJECT: Notes on 13 March IRl Focus Group on Ad Campaign. Story Boards and
Elections
The attached lRI report on the election campaign covers perceptions of Iraqi yah and Hoorah as
well as general political perceptions. This info memo covers only matters that relate to polling
and other infonnation about Iraqi opinion. StratCom will report separately on story boards and
ad campaign.
• Polling supports the positive assessments of Al-Iraqiyah, which now enjoys considerable
confidence.
• We are going to field a poll to test the sense that Jazeera and Arabiyah are anti-Iraq.
• A number of polls show the UN is not particularly trusted here. Generally speaking, the
UN enjoys a level of trust that is about at par with the GC and above that of the Coalition.
We are fielding a poll with questions testing who is trusted to run elections.
AITACHMENTS: COORDINATION: ~~~~:!1(~)( 6)
13 March IRI Memo on story boards, elections focus groups

(b)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(4)

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGIIDAD
INFO MEMO
March 5, 2004
FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: '-'-l(b_X_6) _ _____J
SUBJECT: 24 February IRI Focus Group in Nasariyah
The report reaches you late because technical communications failures prevented delivery to
CPA.
As usual,l (b)(6) I report contains important nuggets.
• As before, "making and keeping promises," is a resonant theme.
• IGC adequate interim solution, but not a substitute for elections.
• Chalabi seen as an American who arrived in Nassariyah on an American tank in an
American uniform.
• Nasariyahns want someone who will work not just for Iraq, but for them.
( . They are pleased that the Italians moved out of the center of town, but now deride them
as cowards who use the Iraqi Police to protect them.
• They like IS-minute speeches more than Saddam's long ones, but only if you have
something to say.
•' They said they would probably tune-in your speeches if they knew ahead of time when
you were speaking and what the subject was to be.
ATTACHMENTS: IRI focus group report: "Local Politics and Perceptions of Amb. Bremer
in Nasariyah
COORDINATION: NONE

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD
INFO MEMO
10-Mar-04
FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: ..._l(b...L;.)(...._.6).______,
SUBJECT: INR Analysis of22-29 Feb IIACSS Data
REF: 3 March INFO MEMO "First Look at 2 March Results"
The INR opinion alert does not cover new data. It is their take on same data used in Ref INFO
MEMO. For example, JNR's analysis notes geographic breakdowns which the "First Look."
memo did not
INR's opinion alerts are circulated in the Department of State and to the national security
community in Washington.
The opinion alert summary says findings "underscore the challenges of fmding an acceptable
form of interim government, particularly within the current security environment which
heightens Iraqi concerns over sectarian conflict and U.S. motives for staying· in Iraq."
The opinion alert emphasizes the following:
• High acceptability of caucuses in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Ramadi and rejection in
Karbala and Hillah.
• High value Iraqis place on direct vote
• Support for women's rights.
• Suspicion that CFs responsible for attacks and that CFs want to stay.
• Concern over sectarian war
I have sent an email to JNR expressing concern over the sub-head, "Attacks Heighten Concern
over Sectarian Tensions and U.S. Motives for Staying in Iraq." First, the assertion that concern
is "heightened" by the attacks is not supported by the data or text; and, second, that the casual
reader will assume that the "attacks" mentioned are the Ashoura attacks (even though the report
notes that the poll was taken before Ashoura.
ATTACHMENTS : INR "Opinion Alert"
Distri butio~ I ist
COORDINATION: Cotmselors j(b )( 6)

NEAR EAST
OPINION ALERT
Iraqis Value Nationwide Elections and Women's Rights in
Formation of New Government; Few Favor Role for Governing
Council in the Interim
Attacks Heighten Concern over Sectarian Tensions and U.S. Motives for Staying in Iraq
A February survey fielded just before the Iraqi Governing Council 's Constitutional agreement and the
Ashura attacks shows that most Iraqis look forward to voting in 2005 and support the interim
constitutional provision giving women a significant role in the in the new government. Other findings
underscore the challenges of finding an acceptable form of interim government, particularly within the
current security environment which heightens Iraqi concerns over sectarian conflict and U.S. motives
for staying in Iraq.
Many In Baghdad, Baarah, Moaul and Ramadl Say Local Caucuses Acceptable to Create Interim
Government
When presented with four possible alternatives for creating rut interim Iraqi government, Iraqis in
Ramadi (89%), Mosul (84%) wtd six in ten in Baghdad (61%) and Basrah (60%) think rut "acceptable"
approach would be to use "local caucuses to select a legislature to create rut interim government."
No more thwt half in wty city would find it acceptable to create the interim government by expwtding
the Governing Council, wtd even fewer would accept turning interim authority over to the current
members of Governing Council. No more thwt a quarter in wty city would accept "rut unelected body of
Iraqis appointed by the UN."
Iraqis in Hilla wtd Karbala have issues with each of these options. No more thwt l in 10 finds wty of
them acceptable; nine in ten say each are unacceptable (with eight-in-ten saying they are completely
unacceptable).
Table 1. Support for Possible Alternatives to Create Interim Govemment
(% Somewhat or Completely Acceptable)
Ba9hdad Basrah Mosul Ramadi Karbala Hilla
Local caucuses select a legislature and the 61% 60% 84% 89% 6% 12%
legislature creates an interim government.
The current Iraqi Governing Council becomes 36 35 26 32 8 6
the interim government.
An expanded form of the current Iraqi Governing 38 46 39 22 7 7
Council becomes the interim government.
An alternative unelected board is appointed by 22 24 21 17 2 4
the UN as an interim government.
Findings frorn tile Office of Research survey in Iraq are based on ]ace·toface interviews conducted arnong 1187 urban iraqi
adults, ages 18 and uver, in Baghdad {N=402). Basrah {N• /95), Mosu/ (N~ 237), Hilla {N;/09), Karbafa (N=/16) and
Rarnadi (N• /28). The polf was carried out between February 22 and 2fcblQ The mqryin q(eaqr fqr the eptjre wmqle i•
roxirnate ±4 ercent but varies arnong cities. Prepa~ed by 6) ]
(b}(6)

Iraqis Underacore Value They Place on Casting Direct Vote
The interim constitution calls for nationwide elections to be held no later than January 31, 2005.
Majorities say they would be willing to wait even "as late as December 2005" to transfer sovereignty to
an Iraqi government in order to hold direct elections (58% Mosul, 67% Baghdad, 77% Basrah, 84%
Ramadi, 90% Hilla, and 91% Karbala). No more than a third believes it is more important to transfer
power as soon as possible to an Iraqi government "if it means giving power to an unelected government"
(36% Mosul, 29% Baghdad, 17% Basrah, 10% Ramadi, 7% Hilla, 6% Karbala).
Large Majorities Support Basic Rights for Women
Large majorities in each of these cities support the right of
women to hold any job for which they are qualified (95-99%);
to vote without influence from her family (82-98%); and to
have the same civic and economic rights as men, such as
practicing trades or being a member in vocational and social
organizations (72-98%).
Support for Women's Right to:
(%overall)
hold any JOb quailf1ed for 97%
vote Without pressure 95%
equal CIVIC & econ nghts 85%
Most also support women having the same legal rights as men
(62% in Mosul and 76-91% other cities). Six in ten in Karbala
(61%) and larger majorities in the other cities believe women
should have the right to choose their clothing without the
government enforcing an Islamic dress code (71-96%).
choose style of 84%
clothmg
equal legal nghts 73%
Hold pol off1ce 71%
There is more of a divide on whether women should be allowed
to hold the same political offices as men. Majorities (57-74%) in Ramadi, Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul
agree, but majorities disagree in Karbala (66% vs. 32% agree) and Hilla (57% vs. 42% agree). Asked
separately whether the new constitution should require that "some positions, such as seats in the
legislature and ministries" be reserved for women, half in Karbala and majorities elsewhere agree.
Table 2. Percent Who Strongly Agree:
Baghdad Basrah Mosul Hilla Karbala Ramadi
The attacks are an attempt to incite divisions and civil 70% 85% 84% 91% 94% 13%
war in Iraq.
The attacks are an effort to disrupt the plan for 59 66 78 91 9\
transferring responsibility for our security to Iraqi
forces.
> The attacks are an effort by U.S. forces to 54 53 29 75 70
persuade others that they need to remain in Iraq.
The attacks emphasize the need for the continued 43 52 44 37 36
presence of Coalition Forces in our country.
The attacks are an effort to liberate Iraq from U.S. and 6 9 2
Coalition occupation.
3
81
6
80
Most See Attacks as Effort to Heighten Sectarian Tensions and Disrupt Transfer of Security to Iraqi
Forces
According to survey results gathered before the Ashura bombings, six in ten in Ramadi and eight in ten
or more in other cities strongly or somewhat agree that such attacks are attempts to incite ethnic and
sectarian divisions and civil war in Iraq (Table 2 above shows percentages that strongly agree). Similar
majorities also interpret the attacks as an effort to disrupt the transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqi
forces.
2

Many Suspect that U.S. Forces Are Involved In Attacks To Justify Need For Them to Stay
About two-thirds in Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul and fewer in Karbala (51%), Hilla (45%) and Ramadi
(43%) strongly/somewhat agree that the attacks reinforce the need for continued presence of Coalition
Forces. At the same time, large majorities (between 72-94%, 55% Mosul) believe that U.S. forces are
involved in the attacks in order to justify the need for their continued presence in Iraq.
These suspicions feed Iraqi expectations that the coalition forces will not leave Iraq voluntarily. Only
minorities (8-23%) believe that the U.S. will depart Iraq as promised. Majorities across the board think
they will leave only when "forced" or that they will "stay in Iraq forever."
Do You Believe the U.S. Will ... ?
42%
Baghdad
-60%
-
Basrah .,... .....
I Leave only when forced to go
I Stay in Iraq forever
I Depart Iraq as promised
Mosul
3

OPINION REPORT DISTRIBUTION LIST
Counselors-
(b)(6)
Governance-
Policy-
Operations-
CJTF7-
IMU-
IRI-
OPO-
IMN-
StratCom

(b)(4)

(b)(4)

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD
INFO MEMO
25 February 2004
FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: L.;..l(b....;_)(_6) _ ____,~
SUBJECT: Baghdad Focus Group: Don't Celebrate Regime Fall; Make & Keep Promises
Steve Moore ofiR1 bas presented another tight and useful focus group report. Two focus groups
(men and women) met yesterday. Key findings:
• Do not celebrate the April 9 fall of the regime. Any observation should be somber.
Names like "Day of Sorrow" were preferred. (DRH Comment: This suggests that a
somber ceremony commemorating Saddam's victims would be appropriate.)
• This group also said they want to see you "meeting with average Iraqis, listening to their
problems and working to solve them. Men and women want to see you on television
weekly.
• The physical scars of war matter. (DRH Comment: Destroying and removing war-
damaged buildings should probably move up on our priority list. Implode them and hire
Iraqis to haul away the rubble.)
ATTACHMENTS:
DISTRlBUTION:
(b)(6)
IRl Public Opinion Report: "One Year Anniversary of the FaiJ of the
Regime and Perceptions of Ambassador Bremer"
Stratc~m: ~ I
Gov~(bj{6)
IRl:
EXEC: Ia..']" b
Counselors: L-(b-)-(6_) ____ --.~

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD f fv {( ~ ..
INFO MEMO
DATE 21 February 2004
FOR: THE ADMINISlRA TOR
FROM: .__ l(b_)(_6) _ __,
SUBJECT: Iraqis Unlikely to Support GC as Interim Government
The attached analysis draws on public opinion polling to illustrate why Iraqis are unlikely to
support the Govenunent Council as an interim govenunent.
A 1T ACHMENTS: Government
COORDINATION:
Analysis of Iraqi Opinion: "Iraqis Unlikely to Support GC as Interim

Analysis of fpaqi Opinion
21 February 2004
Iraqis Unlikely to Support
GC as Interim Government
A number of polls indicate that the Governing Council is unlikely to have
much popular support as an interim government, even if expanded to include
more members.
While the GC enjoys some popularity in relatively tranquil areas such as
Diwaniyay and Hillah (IRI Poll Dec 11-18) ...
Fate of GC after 30 June
•olaSOivo
• Become a Senate
D Become a Joint Prolidoncy
DDKIDA
Baghdad BHhrah Moaul Dewanla Hilla Rarnedl Total
Page1 of 3

... the same poll shows a majority favor dissolution after 30 June.
After 30 June Covernlng Council Should ...
DK/DA
t%
Become 1 Joint
Prveldency
11%
DluoiYe
13%
Even this limited support is suspect because of the "patriotism effect,"
whereby Iraqis place confidence in nascent or suspect institutions simply
because they are Iraqi. That the "patriotism effect" may be working for the
GC as a whole is borne out by the low popularity of individual GC members,
only four of whom Gafri, Pachachi, al-Hakim and ul-Uloom have higher
positives than negatives.
Page2of3

Additionally, the pre-test (Baghdad only) of a new questionnaire to be fielded in
the coming days (results due 3 March) shows disapprovals around 90% when
respondents are asked about either the GC or an expanded GC as an interim
government (NB: Pre-tests, which are used to test the comprehension of
questions being asked and other technical issues, are much less reliable than the
final poll. They indicate general directions and likely outcomes. It is unlikely
that the final poll will show such high negatives as the pre-test.)
Drafted:~....l<b_)_( 6_) _ ____,~
P ... SoiS

~foUr~
Preliminary data from new State Department poll
Very large majorities think attacks more harmful than helpful
Security and safety are the most urgent issues in all cities but Mosul, followed by
Infrastructure and Economy and Jobs. Overall across the six cities, half have heard a great
deal or fair amount about the Ramadan attacks against the Red Crescent, the Al Rasheed and
the Iraqi police.
Vety large majorities overall say that the attacks against the following targets ate
more harmful than helpful
• international organizations involved in the reconstruction of Iraq (94%),
• Iraqi police (96%),
• foreign embassies (89%),
• Iraqi civilians (98% ),
• power and water systems (98%) and oil pipelines and refineries (98%)
Slightly smaller majorities overall think that attacks against civilian officials of the
CPA (80%), including with Iraqi civilians who work for the CPA (83%), are more
harmful than helpful.
. What is your opinion about the most urgent issues Facing your community currently?
(OPEN-ENDED, PRE-CODED] [INTERVIEWER CODE FIRST RESPONSE].
Baahdad Basta Mosul KiJ:kuk Hilla
General security and 61% 54 9 44 46 60
safety I crime
- Repairing infrastructure, such 13% 5 18 12 23 11
as electricity, ~s, power, water
-Economic 12% 22 56 19 17 18
issues I unemployment/ poverty
overan
48
13
23
People have differing views on whether certain actions taken for Iraq's liberation are more
helpful or more harmful for the development of our countty. In your opinion, do you
think the Attacks against U.S. and other coalition forces are more helpful or harmful?
Baghdad \ Basra Mosul Kirkuk Hilla helpful 23% 11!2 23 26 17 13 23
harmful 67% IH 65 60 75 82 66
OY.uall

Do you think the Attacks against inn:mati!2Dal QrganizatiQDII iDIQl:t~:d in R!;;QDI!ttlU:ti2n
have been carried out by:
Baghdad Basra Mosul Kirkuk Hilla Groups within the 10 11 5 6 12 9 9
-oman
count:cy
Groups outside the 33 18 21 35 25 13 26
country
mix 45 55 44 47 51 57 48
Remainder dk/ da
When totals do not add up to 100 percent, responded either declined to answer or said they
did not know.
Polling was conducted by the Iraqi "Independent Institute for Administration and Civil
Society Studies" (IIACSS) using Iraqi interviewers. State/INR/R paid for the poll, devised
the questions and ap;roved the methodology. They are double checking the data with a
special eye on Basra~

DPINIDN~ANALYSIS
January 29, 2004 M-13-04
In Key Cities, Iraqis Believe Security Has Improved; Most
Have Greater Confidence in Police than in Coalition Forces
In Sunni Triangle, Iraqis want Troops to Go Home Immediately
An Office of Research survey conducted December 3191 to January 7'h in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul,
Fallujah, Samarra and Karbala shows that urban Iraqis dijforentiate between threats to their personal
safety and larger threats to their country's security; they lack confidence in Coalition Forces to protect
them from either type of threat. Though some Iraqis see benefits from joint patrols of Iraqi and Coalition
security forces, residents of Sunni towns tend to feel more threatened than protected by Coalition soldiers,
which explains why they see Coalition Forces as part of the problem, not the solution. •
• Iraqis tend to fear general street crime
and low-grade explosions as the greatest
threats to their personal security. In
Karbala, there is particular concern for
large terrorist-type attacks, while in
Mosul, Fallujah and Samarra, residents
worry about violence caused by
encounters with Coalition soldiers. Most
Iraqis see the greatest threat to their
country's security to be sectarian or
ethnic conflict and large-scale attacks.
• Compared to assessments from last
August, considerably more in Baghdad,
Basra and Fallujah say that conditions
both for peace in Iraq and for safety in
their neighborhoods have improved.
• No more than 21 percent in any city say
the Coalition Forces are very effective in
"keeping law and order on the streets,"
and no more than one-third believe they
are very effective in protecting Iraqis
from "major threats like invasion and
civil war."
• Still, many in Baghdad, Basrah and
Mosul, and to some extent in Karbala,
endorse joint patrols of Coalition and
Iraqi security forces for the next six
months. Residents of the Arab Sunni
towns are less supportive of such
cooperation. In sharp contrast to opinion
elsewhere, majorities in Fallujah and
Samarra say they would feel safer if
Coalition Forces left immediately.
• Jobs, transfer of governance to Iraqis and
hiring Iraqi police continue to be seen as
the best ways to improve security.
• Findings from the third Office of Research survey in Iraq are based on face-to-face interviews conducted among I 2 I 2 urban
Iraqi adults, ages I8 and over, in Baghdad (N"'429), Basrah (N=2I6), Mosu/ (N'-'209), Fal/ujah (N=140), Samarra (N=I03}
and Karbala (N=I IS). The poll was carried out between December 3I, 2003 and January 7, 2004. The margin of e"or for
the entire sample is approximately ±4 percent, but varies among cities. Please see appendix for specifics and methodological
details, including a map displaying the location of the cities surveyed.

Street Crime Top Personal Threat; Residents of Sunni Towns Feel Threat from Coalition Forces
When asked which type of violence they consider most dangerous to themselves and their families (from
a list of options}, Iraqis in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Fallujah most often name general street crime.
Baghdad and Basrah residents identify low-grade ("street") bombs next, while those in Mosul and
Fallujah identify violence caused by encounters with coalition forces (Figures 1 and 2, and Appendix
Table 1). In Samarra, residents are as likely to name violence caused by encounters with coalition forces
as they are to name street crime. In Karbala, Iraqis are just slightly more likely to name large-scale bomb
attacks ("such as those against Iraqi police stations and international organizations") than street crime or
explosions from low-grade ("street") bombs.
Figure 1: Top 4 Threats to Pereonal
Security: Baghdad, Baarah, Karbala
••• 47%
Figure 2: Top 4 Threats to Pereonal
Security: MoiUI, SamaiTII and Fallu}ah
Baghdad
Mosul
1111111111111 63%
Basrah
Falluiah
Karbala 29%
Iraqis Fear Sectarian or Ethnic War Most for Country's Security
Except in Karbala, urban Iraqis worry most about the potential for sectarian or ethnic conflict to threaten
their country's security (combined, up to 55% in Mosul and 57% in Samarra) (Figures 3 and 4). Many
are also concerned about both large and small-scale bombings. In each city, about one in ten worries
about violence caused by encounters with Coalition Forces (up to 17% in Fallujah) or external threats (up
to 13% in Basrah; Appendix Table 2).
Figure 3: Top 4 Threats to Iraq Security:
Baghdad, Baerah and Karbala ·----31%
Baghdad
Figure 4: Top 4 Threats to Iraq Security:
Mosul, Samarra and Fallujah
Mosul
Basrah
Samarra
Karbala
II sectarian war
111ethnic war
•large bombings
• armed encounlers wlforces
25%
Fallujah
~----------------------------~2~----------------------------~

Some Sense of Improvement in Security Conditions and Neighborhood Safety
Despite concerns about these threats, considerably more in Baghdad, Basrah and Fallujah now say that
conditions both for peace in Iraq and for safety in their neighborhoods have improved (Figures 5 and 6
below). Currently, six in ten in Basrah and half in Baghdad believe that conditions for peace have
improved over the last three months. In Karbala, evaluations are more negative, with six in ten saying
conditions have deteriorated over three months' time; slight plura1ities in Fallujah and Samarra believe
conditions have worsened (see Table l below, and Appendix Table 3).
Iraqis are more positive about the safety of their neighborhoods. Six in ten in Mosul (63%), Fallujah
(61%) and Samarra (63%), and about half in Karbala (51%) and Baghdad (46%), report feeling "very
safe." But only a third in Basrah (31%) feel very safe (Appendix Tables 4 and 5). This increased sense of
safety may be linked to the return of local police to Iraqi neighborhoods. Seven in ten across all cities
express confidence in the new Iraqi police - more than levels of confidence in the new Iraqi army, Iraqi
ministries or the Governing Council (Appendix Table 6). No more than about a third in any of these
cities express confidence in Coalition troops to improve the situation in Iraq (38% in Baghdad, 32%
Basrah, 27% Mosul), and levels are particularly low in Fallujah (10%), Samarra (18%) and Karbala
(20%).
Figure 5. Conditions For Peace: Percent Who Say Improved Figure 6. Neighborhood Safety:
Percent Who Feel Very Safe
Table 1. Over Last Three Months Conditions for Peace Have ...
Baghdad Basrah Mosul FalluTah Samarra Karbala
01/04 01104 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04
Improved 51% 59% 38% 33% 34% 27%
Worsened 25 17 39 44 43 61
No difference 24 24 22 23 22 10
Office of Research survev. December 31 2003- JanuaiV 7, 2004
Coalition Forces Not Seen as Effective in Protecting Iraqis
While Iraqis tend to credit Coalition Force efforts to protect coalition troops and compounds (Appendix
Table 7), they are less impressed with Force efforts to prevent threats to Iraqis. No more than 21 percent
say Coalition Forces are very effective at "keeping law and order on the streets," and no more than a third
believe the Forces are very effective in protecting Iraqis from "major threats like invasion and civil war."
3

Many in Baghdad, Basrah, Karbala and Mosul See Value in Iraqi-Coalition Security Cooperation
Cooperation between local Iraqi and Coalition security forces does have some appeal as a way to improve
security. Majorities in Baghdad (86%), Basrah (89%), Mosul (63%) and Karbala (61%) believe that
increasing cooperation and joint patrols of Coalition Forces and the Iraqi police would be at least
somewhat effective for improving security. And residents in these cities do not want the Coalition Forces
to leave Iraq any time soon. Majorities (and a prevailing half in Karbala) say they would feel less safe if
the Forces were to withdraw immediately (Table 2).
When people are asked to consider the next six months and to choose whether Coalition Forces, Iraqi
security forces or joint patrols should take primary responsibility for larger security threats ("like civil war
and invasions"), opinions in these four cities are divided (See Table 3a and 3b). But on matters of local
security ("maintaining law and order on Iraqi streets"), residents in these cities narrowly prefer that Iraqi
forces take the lead. In Karbala, 44 percent prefer Iraqi forces over joint efforts or the Coalition alone
(18% combined, but 39% don't know).
In Sunni Triangle, Iraqis Oppose Security Cooperation and Say Troops Should Go Home
Residents of Fallujah and Samarra are less convinced than others of the benefits of increased cooperation
between Iraqi and Coalition Forces. These Iraqis are at least twice as likely to say that Iraqi armed forces
alone -rather than Coalition Forces alone or a joint Coalition Force/Iraqi security team - should have
primary responsibility for protecting Iraqis from both major and personal security threats. In fact, of all
cities surveyed, only in Fallujah and Samarra do majorities believe that they would feel "more safe" if the
Coalition Forces left immediately.
Table 3a. In Next Six Months, Primary Responsibility for Protecting Iraqis from
Major Security Threats Should Be ...
Baghdad Basrah Mosul Fallujah Samarra Karbala
Iraqi Armed Forces 50% 38% 58% 71% 64% 50%
Coalition Forces 7 8 12 4 9 14
Joint Iraqi-Coalition Efforts 42 51 27 19 23 26
Office of Research survev. December 31 2003 • Januarv 7 2004
Table 3b. In Next Six Months, Primary Responsibility for Maintaining Law and Order
on Iraqi Streets Should Be •••
Baghdad Basrah Mosul Fallu!ah Samarra Karbala
Iraqi Armed Forces 56% 53% 53% 67% 71% 44%
Coalition Forces 6 9 10 4 5 2
Joint Iraqi-Coalition Efforts 38 35 26 22 20 16
Office of Research survev. December 31 2003- Januarv 7 2004
4

Jobs, Iraqi Governance and Hiring Local Police Seen as Most Effective Means to Increase Security
As in other Iraqi cities surveyed previously, large majorities in this survey believe that training and hiring
more Iraqi police would be very effective in improving the security situation, along with transferring all
political authority to an Iraqi government and - above all - providing jobs to the unemployed (Table 4).
Six in ten or more across cities also believe that rehiring and retraining the Iraqi military would improve
security.
Table 4 •. Best Ways to Increase Security
% who say followina actions would be VERY effective
Baghdad Basrah Mosul Fallulah Samarra Karbala Klrkuk
01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 11/03
Creating job
opportunities for the 98% 97% 99% 100% 99% 97% 98%
unemployed
Transferring all political
authority to an Iraqi
!government
90 76 90 96 93 91 89
Training and hiring more 91 72 84 76 84 80 86
Iraqi local pollee
Retraining and rehiring
military officers and 87 57 85 82 87 83 73
soldiers from the old
regime
Office of Research survevs November 19 2003- Janua 7 2004
Hilla Diwanlya
11/03 11/03
99% 99%
83 83
92 92
55 55
Prepared by Dina Smeltz and Jodi Nachtwey (smeltzD@ state.gov; nachtweyJL@state.gov).
Issued by The Office of Research, U.S. Department of State (202-203-7932).
METHODOLOGY
Face-to-face interviews were conducted among 1,212 Iraqi adults residing in the cities of Baghdad, Basra,
Mosul, Fallujah, Samarra, and Karbala. Interviews were carried out between December 31, 2003 and
January 7, 2004. Please note that the size of the sample for each city is not proportionate to the overall
population.
A multi-stage probability-based sample was drawn, utilizing residential listings from Iraq's 1997
Population and Housing Census. Census sub-districts were utilized as primary sampling units (PSUs),
with 80 PSUs being selected using probability-proportional-to-size procedures. Due to the size of
Baghdad, the city was stratified by neighborhood to ensure that all city areas were represented in the
sample. Interviewers were given all address details for households at four sampling points within each
PSU. Five interviews were conducted at each sampling point. Within each selected household, one
respondent was randomly selected using the last birthday method.
5

The margin of error, asswning a 95% confidence level and the clustering effects of a multi-stage design,
is approximately ± 4% for the overall sample. The margin of error varies across the samples of the
individual cities as follows:
Q!y Samt;!le Size Margin of Error
Baghdad 429 ± 6.7%
Basrah 216 ± 13.3%
Mosul 209 ± 13.6%
Fallujah 140 ± 16.6%
Samarra 103 ± 19.3%
Karbala 115 ± 18.3%
Total 1212 ± 3.9%
IRAQ: MAJOR ETHNIC G
111111111 Kurd
11111111 SunniArllb
- Sunnl Arab/Kurd Mix
- ShlaArllb
- Shlo/Sunnl Arab Mix
- Sunnl Turkoman
r::::;:;;i] Sponoely populated
8 SURVEY CITIES
6

Appendix Tables
Appendix Table 1. Greatest Threat to Self and Famlh
Baahdad Basrah Mosul Fallulah Samarra Karbala
Street crime 47% 63% 45% 42% 38% 22%
Street bombs 26 20 13 11 11 19
Large bombings such as those
against Iraqi pollee stations and 9 4 6 5 3 29
International oraanizations
Armed encounters between Iraqis 7 4 26 26 38 9
and Coalition Forces and others
Armed encounters with religious or 1 1
tribal militia - -- 2 2
Revenge killings/Baath killings 3 4 3 5 1 --
Financial extortion 1 .1 2 2 - 4
Sectarian war 6 3 1 7 4 4
Ethnic war 1 - 1 1 1 -
Outside threats -- 1 - -- - 1
Office of Research survev. December 31 2003 - Janua rv 7, 2004
Appendix Table 2. Greatest Threat to Iraq
Street crime Street bombs Baahdad Basrah Mosul FalluJah Samarra Karbala
8% 11% 5% 13% 6% 15%
12 16 6 7 7 10
Large bombings such as those
against Iraqi pollee stations and 25 18 6 9 2 25
International oraanizations
Armed encounters between Iraqis 8 9 10 17 10 15
and Coalition Forces and others
Armed encounters with religious or 2 2 2 -- 3 2
tribal militia
Revenge kllllngs/Baath killings 2 3 3 1 5 1
Financial extortion 1 1 2 4 3 4
Sectarian war 31 26 36 26 45 6
Ethnic war 6 2 19 11 12 2
Outside threats 5 13 7 11 a 6
Office of Research survev. December 31 2003 - Janu8N7 2004
Appendix Table 3. Over Last Three Months Conditions for Peace Have ••.
Baghdad Basrah Mosul FalluJah Samarra Karbala Ramadi Naiaf Sulevmania Erbil
8/03 01/04 8/03 01/04 01/04 08/03 01/04 01/04 01/04 8/03 8/03 8/03 8/03
Improved 22% 51% 24% 59% 36% 25 33% 34% 27% 16% 15% 56% 58%
Worsened 53 25 58 17 39 63 44 43 61 66 71 18 9
No difference 24 24 18 24 22 10 23 22 10 17 10 25 23
Office of Research survevs Auaust 20- Seotember 5 2003 and December 31, 2003- Januarv 1 2004
Appendix Table 4. How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?
Baghdad I Basrah Falluiah
o8/o3 I 111o3 I o1104 I 08/03 I 111o3 I 01/04 oa103 I 01/04
Very safe 24% I 31% I 24%
~18% l 31% 37% I
Not safe Not very safe 1 I 42 I I 27
26 I 12 I 11 I I 17 12 I 11 I I 4 r 11
Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003- January 7, 2004
7

~ppendix Table 5. How safe do you feel in your neighborhood? I
I Mosull Samarra 1 Karbala 1 Kirkuk 1 Hilla 1 Diwaniya 1 Najaf l Ramadi I Suleymanla I Erbil I
I 01/04 I 01104 I 01/04 1 11/03 1 11/03 1 11/03 1 8/03 I 8/03 I 8103 I 8/03 I
Very safe 42% , 35% I 41%
Not very safe I 28 I 27 I 29 I 40 I 30 I 22 44 I 33 I 36 I
Not safe I 9 I 10 1 15 J 12 I 4 I 7 12 I 14 I 1 I 3 I
Office of Research surveys, Auaust 20- SeDtember 5 2003 and December 31 2003- January 7 2004 I
Appendix Table 6. Confidence in Institutions
% somewhat or vetY confident
Baghdad Basrah Mosul Fallu]ah Samarra Karbala
Iraqi POlice 82 89 80 74 72 71
New Iraqi Army 72 79 54 52 35 55
Iraqi ministries 60 64 43 54 36 51
Governing Council 62 67 33 27 30 57
CPA 42 41 31 10 14 27
Coalition Forces 38 32 27 10 18 20
Office of Research survey, December 31,2003- January 7 2004
Appendix Table 7. Coalition Forces Seen as Less Effective In Protecting Iraqis
% who Coalition Forces are VERY effective in the following activities
Baghdad Basrah Mosul Fallujah Samarra Karbala
Keeping law and order in 21% 17% 21% 5% 15% 16%
the streets
Tracking down criminals 15 11 14 5 12 11
Protecting Iraqis from 32 22 33 13 21 18
major threats
Working cooperatively 43 27 34 12 27 27
with Iraqi security forces
Protecting their forces 63 68 60 31 47 55
and compounds
Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003- Januarv 7 2004
Appendix Table 8. Actions Taken by Coalition Forces Seen as Less Effective to Improving Security
% who say following actions would be SOMEWHAT OR VERY effective
Baghdad Basrah Mosul Fallujah I Samarra Karbala Kirkuk Hilla Diwaniya
11/03 01/04 11/03 01/04 01/04 01/04 I 01/04 01/04 11/03 11/03 11/03
Immediate departure of 43 53 44 43 56 79 72 63 52 32 40
Coalition Forces
I
Increasing cooperation
and joint patrols of
Coalition Forces and the
lra_gl_police
- 86 -- 89 63 37 52 61 -- -- -
I
Increasing foot patrols of
U.S. and Coalition Forces 41 40 55 48 32 18 19 25 53 36 39
in Iraqi neighborhoods
- not asked In December Office of Research Survey, December 31, 2003- January 7, 2004
8