. , ~ -· . . ( - L · .. I ' • COALITION PROVISIONAL AlITHORITY ORDER NUMBER J DE-BAATIDFICAION OF fRAQJ SOCIETY Punuonl to my authority u Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority {CPA). relevant U.N. Secwity Council resolutions, and the laws and usage' of war, Recognjzing that the Iraqi people bave suffered large scale human rights abllSCS and depravation$ over many years at the hands of me Baa th Party, Noting I.he grave concern of Iraqi society regarding tbc threat posed by the continuation of Baath Party networks and personnel in the admmistration of Iraq, and tho intimidation of the people of Iraq by Bath Pu:ty officials, Conanw-' by the continuing threat to the 5CCUrity of the Coalition Forces posed by the Iraqi Buth Party, I hereby promulgate the following: . , Secttoa I Dbestah81hment of tlae Ba•th Part)' l) On April 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority discstabli$hed the Baatb Party of Iraq. This order implements that declaration by eliminating the party's structures and removing itS ICadcrship from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means, the Coalition Provisioul Authority will emwc that representative govemmeut in Iraq ii not threatened by Baathist clements rctumiog to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are accepcab1e to the people of Iraq. 2) Full members of the Buth Party holding the ranks of'Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), ' Udw Far' (Branch Member), 'Udw Shu'bah (Section Membor), and •uctw Firqah (Group Member) (togeth~ "Senior Party Members") arc hereby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector. These Senior Party Members shall be evaluated for criminal conduct OT threat to the security of the Coalition. Those suspected of criminal conduct shall bo investigated and. if dcer.ned a threat to security or a flight risk. detained or placed under house arrest. 3) Jndjviduals boldina J>O$itioos in the top three layers of management in every nation1l government ministry, affiliated corpotatfons and other govemment institutions (e.g .• univemtics and hospitals) shan be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Beath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01 11111111111 02393 ' ,. ' . ••. ,, ~ .) ~. ' - "' . ,. . ...... ..:.:. ' ~ and risk to sci:urlty. Any-such persons determined to·be fu11 members of the Baath Pa,tty sbnlt be removed from their employment. This includes those holding the more junior · ranks of 'Udw (Member} and 'Udw 'Amil (Active. Member), as well as those determined to be Senior Party Members. 4) DisplaY,s in govqrun~tbuildings or public spac~ Qfthe image or likeness · of Saddam H':l85ein or other readily identifiable members of the form~r rc;gime 9r of symbols of tll~ Baath P.erty or, the former regime arc hereby prohibited. 5) R~wardS shall be made available for in(onnatian leading to the capture of senior memben of the Baath party ~d lndivi~als ~omplicit in the crimes of the former r.egime. 6) The.Administntor of the Coalition Provisional Authority or his dcsignees may grant c:xceptions to the abov _ c guidance on.a case-by-case basis. Section. 2 Entry Into Force This. Ord~;rsball enter- into force on the-date of. signature. (;(t. ( ~ vvi- rl 16{0'.J L Paul Bremer~ Administrator CoalitfonProvi•iomJ i.\\J~ty t'\ ... : ~:.: ~. ~i.', •. t !· - t .· CP AJORD/16 May 2003/tll 2 '. 'ff• COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTIIOIUTY ORDER NUMBER 2 D~SOLUl10NOFENTITIES Punuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provi1ionaJ Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of' war. Reconfvnting all of the provigion~ ofGenem FnnJcs• Preedom Menage co tbe Jraqi People of April 16~ 2003, Recognizing that tho prior Iraqi regime ·used cemtin .government entities to oppress the Iraqi people and u instruments of-torture, repression and oonuption, kajfinrting the Jnstrucnoos1o the C,itizens oflnq regarding Ministry of Youth md Sport of May 8. 2003, J hereby promulgate the foUowins: Secttoa l Diuolwd Entitles Tho coritiea (the "Dissolved Entities'1 listed io me attached Annex. are hereby dissolved. Additional entities may be added to this list in the future. SecUoa l Assets ud Fhtallclal Obll1adoo1 1) All assets, including recoi:Jk and data, in whatevq: form maintained and wherever located, of the Dissolved Bob°'ties shall be hold by the Administrator of the CPA ( .. the Administrator'') on ~:alf of and for the benefit of the lnlqi people and shall be used to assist the Iraqi people and to support the recovery of Iraq. 2) All fimncial obligations of the Dissolved Entities~ suspended. The Adminianitor of the CPA wtll establish procedures whereby peno111 c laiming to be the bc:Deficiarios of sucb obligations may apply for peyment. 3) Penons in possession of assets of the Dissolved Entities shall preserve those assets, prompdy infonn local Coalition authorities, and i mmediately tum them over, u clirectDd by those authorities. Continued possession, transfer. sale, use, conversion. or concealment oFsuch assets following the dale of this Order is prohibited and may be punisbcd. er AIOll0/23 May 1003/02 I f • ~ 1 I r __ ;.;....-______ ................. '"..._ ......... _., .......... or:i.;:;··~uriuac;;ci.;-.i;.lil .. >SIEl>."C.:c=:r:it.;•::;.;":....vl:.:.i .. Z""C:.;;.i;..:.;··.-· 1.-~¥.n e.mplP~· ~Y a Di~olvcd Entity, in 11ny fohn. . ~r capacity~ r.CJ:naim: accoWitable tor acts committed during such employmen(. 4) A ~ationpaymentfilan81DQuntte be detettnined by the Administratorwm be paid to emplC?JCCS s. a. dismissed, except those who are Sen:i~r Party Me. ft!bers as ddined in·tbe A~~·s.·May· 16, 2003 Order o(tbe Coalition Provisional Autharity [)C ;.Baathifi~tion of.Iraqi Society ~ CPA/ORD/2003101 (4'Senior : Party Members") (Sec Section. ~6). S) Pension& being · pafd ~., or-on acGl)μnt of:servit;:o to, a Dissolved Entity ·before A. ptil l §. 200~ will . cOl,:tin~ · to>be .plicf. .fuehf~ to 'war wido· WS and disa.bled v.e~ acovided that-no-~~ pa)'IDCDr& will ht madci to any ~on who is a S-enior P~ Member {&ee·.&;eti~-l-61 · and tbaf tlte power js reserved tQ . the Administrator and, t9 fi.mqe baqi , gov~~~f:J t<> t~v.oke Qr teduce ~nsions- as a pe- nalty f'or past.or future .illegal conductor to madifypension atrm1ge;ments to eliminate ini-p.roper priVil!',g~ graqt~ Sy the Baathist re;gime pr for 4im:ilar reaspns. 6) Ncstwi~tandWglJ~Y:Pro~"i9 1l ctf •l'i~Qfd~~ <>T~Y oth~ Order. l~w. o~ regU'lauon, and ooiis~t - witlii ~e. A:dnii~~strator's. May 16, 20'0.3 Oider of the Pj)aliti9Jl ~ {> VisiQ,,W . Autb'.Qti'tY. ~&w.thifi~tiQn, of Iraqi S9C,ict}!. CYAIOROIJOO'.J/O'l, i:io· pa~ent, mclu~g , a teoni:nation or pension payment, will be riu'de t6 any peiSQ. n:whci·is·m:-.:was !t &nior Party Member. Any person holding the rank · Qndcr the.fonncr rcgit:ne of Colonel or above, OT its equivalent. wiU be deemed a Senior Part}" ~ember, prov.ided' that such persons may sec:k., _ under ptocedurcs to .be pfC$¢ri~ . ~o c5tablish to the satisfaction of the Administrator. that they WQre not a Seiii0r'Party Member. I ' t I r i CPA/ORD/'23 l)l[ay 2003/02 2 •• .. .. ·• .,, $st• ·3 -•<'""' - , '· tf.,..c 1 ~- _ _.. .. • .. __ ~ - :,.., J,_ · Section 4 J.nfQrmation The Administrator shQU prescribe procedures for offering rewards to person who provide information leading to the recovery of assets of Dissolved Entities. Section 5 New Iraqi.Corps The CPA plans to create, m the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the .fitst step in (?rmin& 11 ~ti9nal self-defense o~pabilw for a>~ Iraq. Under civilian control, that CctpS will De-professional, noo-politin.1, militarily effective~ and representative of all Iraqis: The CPA will pr6mulg8fe procedures for participation in the Ne\V Iraqi Corps. Sectiot:a 6 Other Matten 1) The Administratoi='1l1Ar, delegate bis powers and responsibilities with respect lo this Qrder as he dC~m:Une.s appropriate. Rcferehecs Jo the Administrator herein include such delegateS. 2) The Administrator may grant exceprions any limitations in this Order at his discretion. Sectfon 7 Entry Into f'orce Thia Order sllall enter into force on tbc _ .date of signatun::. ip ._( ~ ~ ""L~l·r L. Paul Bremer, Admivi$.tratX>r Coalition Provisional Authority CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02 l I I I t f I I I i , ' i l I ~ i I i ANNEX COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER J DJSSO.LUTION OF ENTITl.ES lnstitutiooa diaaolved·by the Ordertcfercnced (the .. Dissolved Entities0 ) are: The Ministey of Defonce. ll:ae Minmry oflnfonnation Tho Ministry of State for Military Affairs The Iraqi lnte!ligence Service The National Sccuaty Bureau. The Directorate of'NJtional Security (Arnn al-' Am} The Special Se.curity ~tion All cmtffies ~ated with oreomprising Saddam H\lssein's bodyguards to inc.Jude: -Murafaqin (Companions) -Rima~ al Khasa (Special Guar~ TI» following m.ilitur organiZ.ations: .. The Anny, Air Fo'rc~ Navy,. the Air Dcf'ellce Force, and other ~gular military services -Tile · R~ican. GUard. -'fhe speejai R~~lican GUIUJl -The Director.le qf:Militazy Intelligence -The:,(J Quds ~oro~ . -Emcqericr Forces (QUwat al Tawan) The following,paramilitaries: -Saddam Fedayccn -ea• . am Party Milid. a -Friends of Saddam -Saddam"s Lion Cubs (As~b ... Saddam), Other Organ~ons : -Tbe Presidential 0jwan -The Pt'tiidentia.l Secretariat -The RevQltrtiona'ry. 'command, P,uncil -The National Assembly -The YQllth Otpni~on ,(a\-Futu.wah) •National O~pie C0mtnitf¥· -Revolutionary, S~al , and Jlf~tional ~urlty Courts ' I l • I ' l ' ' i r ! I i I t CP.MORD/23.Ma)'· 2003/0l 4 AJl organi.zatioqs suborilinatetothc Dis5olved Entities arc also dissolv.ed. Additional org&nizatioos may be added to this list in the future. f t f I CP A/ORD/l3 May2. 0Q3/0i s ·----·-------------. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 3 (REVlSED) WEAPONS CONTROL Pursuam to my authority as Administrator o,f the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security CounciJ resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), Recognizing that weapons control is necessary in order to ensure a secure environment for the people of Iraq and to promote public order and safety, J hereby promulgate the following: Section l Definitions 1) "Coalition Forces,. includes any and all personnel, including contractors, from Coalition. Member States under the command or direction of the Coalition Provisional Authority or the Coalition Force Commander, 2) ' ''Criminal Proceedings law" means Criminal Proceedings Law No. 23 of 1971, as amended, including amendments contained in CPA Memorandum Number 3> Criminal Procedures, CPA/MEM/18 June 200, 3/03, 3) ... Firearms" mean automatic (7.62. mm {.308 caliber) and under) and non-automatic rifles, shotguns and pistols for personal use, and associated ammunition. Such fireanns are subject to licensing by the Ministry of Interior. Firearms do not include weapons re: ndered permanently inoperable, replicas, antiques or ceremonial weapons, 4) "l'raqi security forces0 include 8IllY and aH Iraqi personnel from the Iraqi Police Service, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Facilities Protection .Service, Iraqi Border and Customs Police or any organization whose mission includes physical security that may be established by the CPA or under Iraqi law subsequent to the signing of this Order. 5) "Iraqi Weapons Code 1992'' means the Law of Arms No. (13) of 1992, as amended by Law No. (15) of2000. 6) "Military Weapons" are a:oy weapons systems, ammunition or explosives or explosive devices of any type designed for use by any military forces but not including "Fir, eanns" as defined in this. Order, Military Weapons do not include weapons re. ndered permanently inoperable, replicas, antiques or ceremonial weapons. Military Wea,pons incJu.de"Special Category 'Weapons." CPA/ORD/4 November 2003/03 1 ., " 7) "Pen,al Code" means the Penal Code Law No. ( 111) of 1969, as amended, including Law (1) 2002 and CPA Order Number 7t Penal Code. CPAJORD/9 June 2003/07. · 8) aPublic places,, mean state-owned property, places of worship, holy sites, hospitals, schools, gathering places such as town squares and parks, streets and such other places that may be designated by the CPA, 9) "Special Catega· ry Weapons" are any cx, plosives, improvised explosives or iocendiary devices, grenades, rockets, shells or mines and any means of discharging such items, crew-served weapons of any kind, and Man Portable Air Defense Systems of any kind. Section l Relatio·o to Enstlng Law 1) Article 6.2 of the Iraqi Weapons Code t 992 is hereby amended to suspend the exemption set out therein for employees of the governmental and social sector. 2) Article 8.2 of the Iraqi Weapons Code 1992, concerning licensing requirements, is amended to allow possession of no more than 50 rounds of ammunition for any liceTised firearm. 3) ln all other respects, including the penalties provisions (with the exception of the death penalty) the Iraqi Weapons Code 1992 remains in effect unless specifically in.consistent with this Order, in which event this order will take precedence. 4) CP NORD/23 May 2003/03 is superceded by this Order. Section 3 Authorized. Possession and Use of Firearms and Military Wea. pons 1) The following individuals are authorized to possess and use issued Firearms and Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons: a) Coalition Forces, b) Iraqi security forces. and c) groups and individuals who have been authorized to c. arry weapOJlS in the course of their duties by the CPA or Commander, Coalition Forces or their duly authori. zed delega~es. CP A/ORD/4 November 2003/0J 2 ,. ~ 2) Private security finns may be licensed by the Ministry of the Interior to possess and use licensed Firearms and Military Weapons, excluding Specia] Category Weapons, in the , course of their duties, including in public places. 3) Individuals may be authorized to possess Firearms for personal use by obtaining authorization from the Ministry of Interior, as described in Section 5 of this Order. Section 4 General Prohibitions 1) Unauthorized possession, transport, distributio~ or use of Firearms or Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons, is prohibited. 2) Other than as provided for in Section 3, no person shall possess or use any Firearms o, r Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons, in public pl.aces. 3) Other than by Coalition Forces and duly authorized Iraqi security forces :whose duty position requires. the carrying of concealed weapons in the course of their duties, the carrying of concealed weapons is prohibited. 4) All sales of Firearms and Military Weapons are prohibited, except as authorized by the CPA. Section S Weapons Authorization and Licensing Individuals not otheJWise authorized to possess or use Firearms or Military Weapons by this or any other CPA instrument may apply for weapons authorization. The licensing requirements for weapons set forth in the Iraqi Weapons Code 1992 and administered by the Ministry of lnterio.r remain in effect. Firearms for personal use located in homes or places of business under rescinded Order Number 3 (CP A/ORD/23 May 2003/03) are subject to these licensing provisions. The Ministry of Interior shall issue procedures and establish timeJines for licensing such Firearms. Possession of unlicensed Firearms in one's home or pJau of business for persvnal use, as pennitted under rescinded Order Number 3, will continue to be authorized until the new procedures for liicensing such Fireanns become effective in accordance with a Public Notice to that effect. CP A/ORD/4 November 2003/03 3 ~ . ~ .. . .. •,• ' Section 6 Penalties 1) Firearms or Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons, possession or use of which is unauthotized, are subject to confiscation by Coalition For.ces and other relevant authorities. 2) Any person in violation of this Order may be detained., arrested., and prosecuted. If convicted, all lawful punishments may be acljudged, and the following terms of imprisonment wiU apply: a. For the conviction of unautho. rized possession, transport, dis1ribution, sa1. e, or use of a Military Weapon, excluding Special Category Weapons, a minimum tenn of imprisonment of 6 months and maximum tenn of imprisonment of life imprisonment. b. For the conviction of·possession, transport, distribution. sale, or use of a Special Category Weapo~ a minimum tenn. of imprisonment of 15 y~, unless the proviso at paragraph 3 applies, and maximum term of imprisonment of life imprisonment. Where a person may be convicted of another offense relating to the use of a Special Categoty Weapon, the mandatory minimum te. rm of imprisonment of 15 years, unless the. proviso at paragraph 3 applies, shall also be applied to that conviction. 3) The mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years is su'bject to the proviso that in excep~ional circumstances relating to the offender or the offense, the punishment may be reduced. The transport, distribution, sale or use of a Special Ca:tego.ry Weapon shall never consti. tute exceptional cirt:umstances. 4) Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section. sentences for convictions of offenses under this Order or che Iraqi Weapons Code 199.2 and which involve Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons, may not be reduced as a. result of mitigating excuse pursuant to paragraph 130 of the Penal Code. Persons convicted of committing tl'lese offenses shaJI not be eligible foT Conditional Discharge as set forth in paragraph 331 of the Criminal Proceedings Law. 5) For 1he putp<>ses of this Order, sentences of life imprisonment shaU mean the remaining natural life of the person. 6) Authorized officials of the CPA or Coalition Forces may grant a certificate of immunity from prosecution for offenses under this Order or the Iraqi Weapons Code 1992 to a person w.ho provides information that leads lo the apprehension and conviction. of persons in relation. to whom information is sought by the CPA and CPA/ORD/4 November 2003/03 4 ,.. ,, •· ; - .-· .. Coalition Forces, or that resu1ts in the prevention of a significant crime against public secwity, the CPA or Coalition Forces. Section 7 Administrative Instructions The interim Minister of the Interior, in consultation with the CPA Director of Interior Policy, may issue such Administrative Instructions as are necessary to carry out this Order. Section 8 Entry into Force r shall enter into force on the date of signature . .... 1~1\1~101 L. P u1 Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority •. CP A/ORD/4 November 2003/03 s COALmON PROVISIONAL Al::THORITY MEMORANDUM NUMBER 5 IMPLEMENTATION OF \VEAPONS CONTUOL ORDER SO. 3 (CP A/ORD/23 May 2003/03) A.clcnowledging, that the CPA, relying upon Coalition Forces, is obligated to take all measw:es in its power to restore and ensure, insofar as possible, public order and safety in Iraq; Recognizing, that while the Coalitio~ Provisional Authority generally seeks to protect diplomatic premises in~~far ~ ~~ tht'! cuTI:"eot ~~urity environment permits, it is not requiNd to protect dipfor'la~~ fac~lities beyond the general oblig~1tion to restore, and ensure as far as possible, public order and safety; Noting, that foreign. liaison offich.ls may brin,t? into Iraq and/or maintain their own security forces only in full coordination with and with the agreement of Coalition Forces, including compliance with the procedures established pursuant to CPA Order Number 3 on Weapons Control, dated 23 May 2003; Implementing CPA Order No. 3, :;ecrion 5, which establishes a Weapons Authorization Program whereb ¥ .n a-4!thorlzation cards (TWCs) in order to carry weapons, I hereby promulgate the follow~nr, Sec-tion ! J J t i":i 1 i;'j O~l . t "Foreign Mission Security Pe-.h -.:i:...~" ~··,\ ::r1.:; \. j ._.t.nirit: ~ersonnel '.f{ho are nationals of the country reprc;~c~r.- ~·.' t , .. : .. ~l r;:i ~-:n J :'!i<:>on :o:nission who are accompanying the mission a.r .. a .Pf'7i•;1ju1g s.ec1.11ity ~cIVice:s to such missions, (ii) employees of the United Nations or United Nations Specialized and Related Agencies designated in Annex..'\ ·;01:, ;1:·c JJtv :i:iiag se<"u:.ity services to the United Nations or the United Natiow•. ~~;:.~::i'.! L::!!:1 t"'..11( R~la•.xl Age11cies, aiid (iii) security firms authorized by the CPA to prn·;;; 1.f. ~·~..ui.ty service.> tv foreign :iiaison missions, the United Nations or tlw :_~J,;'.(/:I ·~~tic.~t& Specialized and Related Agencies. '"Small Arms and Defensive t/J·:t•·w1-·' -;~fnd ::::M.~Annsasdetir.!din CPA Order me u 3 . l din . ls "j. ' • • ·~ g plSto , Su''l'?t: ~>. ::. ·.~ •. ~l.~ ;;!; ;:.· .r.;: .YmnumtJ.on up LV an including 7.62mm ftlld Defet•< .,. ·-~'' :·-:-.. :•· i• c1 non-lethal weapons and t.ot i.:;c;;;:~··:-: · _;--:;x ... 1·-:!ir·~ c·;1:w--:~er1ed machine guns, ~~ct1on::? ~;·rpost• This Memorandum Spect . t' ,.. . . ' ~t ......... ", ... ' .... 1· . .... .i.. "·· .. ,~ .• ··" •. ·. ~-1;,.1 1mson truS:-.!(b.S, 11e ru . .. : - t• u 'ted Nations, and the United Nations Spedahzed and Related Agencies to enter into and execute contracts for security ~e-'."Vl~es .. and expressly pennits the providers of such services to petfonn tbo~i· •:'!I'~·' nw>. ar"' ner.cssarv t.o ensure _rrro~r security of foreign mission personne~ ~,.,; 1~::~ 'n·,~·;. 1; ·l:win~ the carrying of weapons. ~~~.-·:rton ~$ Authi>'." i ~:~.it .1 "'. ~~-~c~ir~·u C'.n~t .. acts Foreign liaison missicms ;n !~·;;~~ f!r.: ~·,e2c1>_; a11ihff'.ize and operations. 'Weapo.r::. ,.; t J•r :-i:lation Subject to the regulations. oi ', .: , :ir.•:: . .:::,. u"C l::.~ ~-.for~ .foreign. ~issio~ ~ecurity P ........ I so long as they .. · · 1 "· • 1· • · •• • • ·· -[ • • • ··h se,.., ··•·'· •Y ··'11n '"""""" etsu.u.&.MiiJ' t l<; •• :t ..... .._, '· ~· ... ,, .:.,, _ .. : .1...C .:."'4v 1.y._"'.._;,3: Y".lW .&.1.~t are hereby authorized to ciu:rr ~;me.ii ,~,tms ~-....r.d :~lcfo:1sive ·weapon~, \\'f.e:t providing security servicl'~S t.:.• :b·,·i ."1 l ... ;s,:"J: .,1h;.:l~:-.s, the United ·~fations and the United Nations Specialized : .. :· · ·.· . ' · :--.::-~ · 'l, :'•e~: r~.dlit~es, th~h personnel d th • an ell' operation&. UC l .d.:.. . ... : . , · S 1 .. • ·· • • · . ., · , · ·-- "'·'- .. - : · ... tn· 3 l · · .. fth · .. ,· .. v t Tu'',<.;" ..., CCh.lOllw 0 ell' facilities with armed personnel t') th:.: c ;J, A c)f foe-~dvising the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CPA office arlvisin~ :;·"~ .. · ;,:ii-'.ry of Interior. Any extant Iraqi law <1r t~r:..;.rv::. 1: .·: 1.1.fr~.;" • ·.,··tn ~his Mern~ .. ~mdmn is hereby suspended. ,.. ~;, .. 'h' 'I ls • '· \ . .. ,, lo·~.~ W "."' I f&vt-~ This. Memorandum shall ~11 ~. ; r in• · i --.d . : , ( ,. tnc date 0r' signature. L. Paul Bremer, Adminis1:i; •• . . Coalition Provisional Aut.h( ·d r· · CP J\1 :- M ... ,"L. I u ·~ .. l(J03/0S MEMORAN'DlJI\-i NUMB.ER S IMPLEMENTATION OF WEA.PONS CONTROL ORDER NO. 3 Security personnel audio.rized by the CPA may posse" Small Anns and Defensive Weapons to provide security for the following foreign liaison missions, the United Nations. and the United Nations Specialized and Related Agencies. their facilities, their personnel and their operations: ---·- Bulf!Bria Y.c".'l'!::t Tunis ~.;;;;.;,t;1=;;;;__-....._ ___ ~..;.;.;;_.-;....;_ ______ ... _______ China ~krr.~~c Turkey i--------.,..-----r--------·· ---·· --------i C2"A'Ch Reoublic 1'J~~b,~:'l:'l;;i:i;; UAE ~=.;:;..;:=-::.;;:;.ii:;.:;;;;.;::;:.;:;. __ ~--f-..:;.__;~~~~---~~----~-~~~~~--i De:omarlc • Pnlr.::~'.ne United Kin2dom. .... s.;;;;~2VD ........... 't _______ ...,._~~;~Jr~;1'.'!"... -· __ _ __ ... __ . rnited States France -:i :-i •~.--: c! ,___ _________ .. .. ····· ---·· -- ··---- --·------1 Germany i :•,.1 ':lania l ,_Grecce_,_ _ __...__ _____ -r.Lfi_~-~i:·;~~-· · ....... :-:=·· ... . '.. United Nations India !ki·ti:~1/Mont~negro (United Nations ! ! Specialized and Related ..._ ________ _...i ____ ... -·----······ ... _. _____ _j __ Agenc.;...i .... e .... s ---~------' Security personnel of additicr-~ ~;'.:'-:;.ons may be authori zec to possesses Small Arms and Defensive Weapow: ~-Y ·~::- r'PA oftice advisin@ the Mini' 16. World Meteorological 0 ·:;-- i: ,. · · ·-7 '" "'\~ ,. ·' .. COALITION PROVJSIO~A L .\L.: ~'HORrTV i\fE)10RANDUM l\ -Ul\'IBE. R 7 DEL EGA fl.OJ'\ \ > f ~ I. T HORITY UNDER DE-BAATHIFICA TlO/\ ORDER NO. l (CP:\rORHtl 6 ~ :la y 2003/0l) Pursuant to my authority as Ad lllin,s :rm~1 <.'f hl~ l..'oalition Pi·ovjsional Authority (CPA), and under the Jaws and usages of war, ar~i c ·) r. ~i -: 1cnl '' i:h relevanl U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003 ), Recognizing that the Iraqi peopk 11.!'· - .;:! ··; t.: ~ abuses and dep.ravations over many years Jt :h· :: 11.:.nd! of '. h.- ! Baarh P~lrty. Noting the grave concern of li:.iq. s0c1ct.:-:·.:pr~.fot.:i fr..: .kl'at posed by the continuation of Baath Party participation in e h:;: ll1..!J.;~ "'-'.:.,1.·, :.1u_..:!116 iu particular the education system, Observing that under lhe prior r..; giu;- :.:01•11! lr:.1q;.i m::J_y bl\ c bc:ccme afiiliati.:d with the Baath Party for · reasons not·prim..: ui1 ~ 1 e b!1;~ 11) tht>ir ideologica' heliefs, Recognizin. g that organizing an ... ~- ' j.) ~ ~:. !' 1 6 .: __ • ~-....c .:u 1:i.::di,;1. 1 s !In ,wg~n~ wsk that is necessary to put Iraq on the pa~ 1 : :r. ' , ... J_ ~ L·<.. :. · .} :·..; r:· ~ (•m o ad rcnc:w nl. Achiowledging that the Govern:ub : u..; .. c.i •. · • .:.s. ..;,·, •i.1.:J.:. .i Ht;i• \.. r N.itional De- Bnathification Com.mission in i.: t..:c ; .., ~ .h1~ •• .: .t~~ =~..: ;.;.; 11·t:, 'it.able environment that Y»ill sustain freedom and democrar.y for 1!.c l.r·:~i :><:cp!c. Recalling the steps already take .• .;.. :.. F ..... C· rd<... .:drn:..~r : , !Je-D:1athiftcat:on of Iraqi Society (CPA/ORD/16 May 20' , • 3 ~- } , ~ l hereby promul. gat.e the foltov. i . l~· ~ccrion .t ''•t' ~.~ h:h t l;. 1· .. J:.! I\: .-i .. y 1) The Governing Council i~ ~i.!: :'.Jy < .q:. ·; 1 ' ;..:~: ·t\:> ca _ ·ry out the de-Baathification of lraqi society consistent \V1tb L' P.~ Oc~cr ~"- · ,·,, :· •• t.: ..:.,'t. .. l cv.!>.stct.i -,•:: ~ h CPA Order No. I (CP A/ORD/16 May 200.:. :.> t ;, l).;;; J:>.011; l aud 2 l>f th.: .-Iigher NatioJ1al Dc- Baathi.fication Commission, rnaclt'. <'n f;•'Nernber 14, 21if13. are hert!by ratified. Notwithstanding such r:u _ .... . -"- ~ .J1 .. t..1, ~'-•t<>u t;-:k:.;11 b) th~ A,iministrntor pursuant to Section 1(6) of CPA l.1'. , ' .: ! "v 1 \~', :\ 1 .• i-:.l.1.'h, 1 \1 :~ ·~ ';::.11nc:il 2) To the extent practicable, fa .. : : ~ ·: '. : :;.~. :!· :b.'-:~ .!~ . of rheir ability to analyze information objectit ,., \ .. :i:: . : '" ·; _ ::i .: :i:. : .; ud.ic i ,)Uo dete.rminations. These factual determinations shc::J .: :: ;;_ :,;; •. 1 :;· -.;·:.~! =~·- • -·~fa F,Jidcs ~ md procedures to be established by the Goverr. .. n1 ·· .. •c. ;: ... ".i:.+· . ;~ ,,.:--~ : c :~~ion tl1rot1g:- ,o\1t Iraq. 3) The Governing Council, in 1~c .1~-i r ~ r· · · • ., !J'i-t~· :- ('onc: e:med Minister or equivalent official, may ~tablish > i;--'- : :_ .:;· ~: • . i.: ..... .:..1i·~ · ;i;o :~ ~.u:-.;:s fer ap?lication to particular professions or gr·::1.r:: ..> r' i·,-.d!··i~:..:a · ~ - :~u ch ;: >ro .. )tt.:dure.s may concern the process of making fa.en. · · .. . ~·= _ ::: :.1 .'!. ..: •• : :! ~~ .:ot.sequl:!·1ces of such determinari. ons. Consisten". '-'-'-i: .• t ,?,. ·;.-··~ ~.::-:.~ ! ·b,: <... ,,7-ning C\1:.:nc:, :>hall authorize the continued employmeut t..i u.r::..: :•: : .·;;~·:.:;/ ,b;.::b<..rged Jr3qi dd servants who were: a) held as a POW .J, L . 1, 2003; b) released and rcp,H. , ..... : ....... .. :·-! ··· · .. ~.~1.:111~er 4, ! 930 through June 2 c) granted 'Udw Fin1 .. , __ :... ' :1..1'.vi 16 r.: . .; GT rer release and repatriation to Iraq and because ( ... . . . ~I ! : .• _ " !~ r >l".J.~r POW. An Iraqi civil servant's cl:,_, . • '.~l.: ;:~:, i·: :·.•. ytii.:I! D :: 1~ dc-Banfl1ification policy under this provision may be ,, ' · i; " ; ' .1i-'ia: : ,_., u in~ntutbn i!;sued by the International Committee ol . .. , ::i·. !r r; ~' ~:end..::nt o r :~anization or government organization. !. · :i ••• Z:! [·.·....: :ud1if:~cliLm Commission determines that credible in ! ~ .~ ~ ' ~ i.' ~: ;!r, · 1qi civil sen·ant who seeks or has been granted an ex--=\~,. · . . .. t- . • .: ........ ~·•-~,,n -:.r rn1thv1 ity ""JS promoted to the rank of 'Udw Firqah' !:~ , . ,! • .! .. i:1 :-.c . ..>tatus as a fonncr POW, or that bis or her involvemt:t:, . n a: • ..: 3:.. .l;; I :t:: > .v-us · ;· : ~<.1.11pa t iblc with continued service as a civil servant, t!.'. T~ n~ ·.h... ! .... : : -·1aa• . J ficatio.n Coinrn.ission may deny or at any · time rescind ~:; . . . i ... ,.: . . ~ ... ! : •• , idt .. i 4) Any Iraqi citizen who is di:..i-.i-· . of the· exercise of the authc i .~ .. _,1 • .. . ... -\.,,. a) advance written notificz.~ . _ .· .. _ ... i· ·- procedures for appeah1~ 2 .... . . .! • ~..1., -·~ ., <~ : ... •• :.~ fL li~.:ni .. .;al .. ::i.iisl:·!d by the Higher National De-Baach1 I .; __ ,; ~ . '· "1 , , 7 • .,,... •: .. • 11 .. ~ i ' •~tpo:;e. 6) lf an appeal result.5 in an ~ n 1 ! . J pay from the date of dism i :>: : ··~ 1;. 7) following consultation wii:·, !'·c · .n· ... 1 · , • • ··m .. :. ,;ic .--\..tmrnw :ator may reinstate an employee if he conclu de ~ . ., 1.. . • ,1. ..; , ;_ .' ,;. ! i1 ci· -'.ii i'>cop.-.. M that failing to reins· tate the employee ..>- •• , • 1 _ • .... :. • 1:·11 ; !. ~!r. 8) The Governing Council si.:t,! .:.. .... J .. ~· exercising the authority cvr. significantly affect the nano · . .... ! ·- , , -1 :1.g-ct 1.: • 1 ·H.1. •1. t..-.; :\ • ..i.J.~~~: .>fF.1u'i!1.:::: l:.cfore :T :.~ : .... ~il. :1 u1 .. l rna nuer tl1at wHI .. . : 3 . ..... .~ · ~ .. ... k ~ .. . , '· ~I ·i :;1· ~~ .. . . '\i -~1 9) The Governing Council 51 respect to the use of de-B.1 1 ,•,.- • • :·:· ··:~ 1.1 :m·.· ;ue-a identified by the AdmiDistrator where the .• ·. :1 ·1 .• • ;1. · i~.nt.ot, ~ ) .-h i s ~ks i gnee~ with •1· ..• ·~• v-. r~.111 ~1 . iL· ..: n:. .i.ffected by the procedures may raise si;, . · · 10) The Higher National De· . ~: · to the Administrator of1 h ~ which the authority delega . the names and positiom oi . :• · · • i , as a result of this deJegatfo ' ,., • . 1 '1! ·• dismissed employee. . • .1. ~ •: ··n s i::1tl provide :noathly reports • •, _ .,.,, ::, • ,011 .,_.il r:lescribing tile manner in " '\ ":".;~:.'!. S.ui:h rcpon; :;hall iaclude • i·' ·1; • ·F-'tl frc • . .., ~position Ctf employment · ·· · ~'"ll11 :it1n1•s hir..:~ci t() replnce o . . • • • t :.:; •• CPA Order Nu. mber 5, E::. · (CPA/ORD/25 Moy 200.; . · 'i .. •' emora~ · m shal: .:· . 1 v-{. ; Brem , Administr • r Coalition Provisional Au: . ~ ·~· • >~ . . -~ ~ ·~ .. . ..... . . t-; t .-:.. .J - c. ... .. l . - ,! '· .. ,/ fM e ,,, • ,,... _ _ _ "!"" _ _ . .., __ .. ~--- ....... --,-·----- ........ ; ._, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 17 STATUS OF Tll£ COALITION. FOREIGN LIAISON MISSIONS, TIIEDl PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS Pursuant to my authority as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), Recalling that under international law occupying powers, including their forces, penoooel, property and equipment, funds and assets, are not subjece to the Jaws or jwisdiction of the occupied territory, Con.sciow that states arc contributing personnel, equipment and other resources to the Coalition in order to contribute to the security and stability that will enable the relief, ~overy and development of Iraq, Notmg that states arc sending Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel to Iraq, Co11.1ciow of the need to establish and confirm the status of such eo.Jition and Foreign Liaison Mi!3ion Pe~) in respect of the CPA and the local courts. I hereby promulgate the following; 1) 2) 3) 4) S) Section I Defiaitions "Coalition Pcrsooael" means all non-Iraqi military and civilian penonnel usigned to or under the command of the Commander, Coalition F~cs, or Ill forces employed by a Co&Jition State in.eluding attached civilians, as well as all non-Iraqi mUitary and civilian personnel assigned to, or under the direction or control of the Adminbtrator of the CPA. "Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel" means those individuall wno have been issued Foreign Liaison Mission personnel identification cards by the lraqi MinistJ)' or Foreign Affairs under the supervision of the CPA .. Legal Process" means any &JTCst, detention or Jega.I proceedings in the Iraqi couru or other Iraqi bodies. whether~ civil. administrative or other in nature. .. Parent State" mcaoa the state providing Coalition Personnel as pert of the Coalition in Iraq or dlc state providing FoRign Liaison Mission Personnel. '"Coalition contractors" m.eam non-Iraqi business entities or individuals not normally resident in Iraq supplying goods aad/or services tD oroo behaJ( of the Coalition Forces or the CPA under contractuaJ ammgemeots. CP AJORD/26 Jane 2003/17 6) 2) 3) 4} 5) "Coalition sub-i}ontractors" means non-Iraqi business entities or individuals not normally resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or services to or on behalf of Coalition contractors and in respect of Coalition or CPA activities under contractual arrangements Section 2 Coalition and Foreign Liaison Musion Personnel ) CPA, Coalition Forces and Foreign Liaison Mission. their property, funds and assets of shall be immune from Iraqi Legal Process. All Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personneJ shall respect the Iraqi laws applicable to those Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel in the territory of Iraq and the Regulations, Ordersf Memoranda and Publi<: Notices issued by the Administrator of the CPA. Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be immune from Legal Process. All Coalition personnel sha.11 be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their Pa.rent States and, they sha.11 be immune from local criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction and from any form of aJTCst or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their Parent St.ates, except that nothing in this provision shall prevent Coalition Forces personnel from preventing acts of serious misconduct by Coalition personnel. or otherwise temporarily detaining Coalition persoilllel who pose a risk of injury to themselves or othen, pending expeditious turnover to the appropriate authorities of the Parent State. In all such circumstances the national contingent commander of the detained person shall be notified immediately. In respect of those Coalition personnel who commit an act or acts in Iraq for which there are no criminal sanctions in the Parent State, the CPA may request from the Parent State waiver of jurisdiction to try such act or acts under Iraqi law. In such cases, no Legal Process shall be commenced without the written permission of the Administrator of the CPA. 1) 2) Section3 Contractors Coalition contractors and their sub-<:ontractors as well as their employees not normally resident in Iraq, shalt not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their contracts in relation to the Coalition Forces or 1he CPA. Coalition contractors and sub-contractors other than contractx:>rs and su~nt:ractors normally resident in Iraq shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations with respect to licensing and :registration of employees, businesses and corporations in relation to such contracts. Coalition contractors and their sub-i}ontractors as well as their employees not normally resident in Iraq, shall be immune from Iraqi Legal Process with respect to acts performed by them within their official activities pursuant to lhc terms and conditions of a contract between a contractor and Coalition Forces or die CPA and any sub-<:ontract thereto. CPA/ORD/26 June 2003/17 3) 1) 2) 3) l) In respect of acts or omissions of Cm Legal Process The immunity from Legal Process provided by the present Order to Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel as well as Coalition contractors, sub-contractors and their employees not normally resident in Iraq operates only in respect to acts or omissions by them during the period of authority of the CPA. Section 5 Waiver of Legal Immunity and Jurisdiction The immunity from Legal Process of Coalition personnel, Foreign Liaison Mission personnel, Coalition contractors and their sub-contractoa as well as their employees not nonnally resident in Imq is not for the benefit of the individuals concerned and may be waived by the Parent State. Requests to waive jurisdiction over Coalition personnel or Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be referred to the respective Parent State. Requests to waive the immunities with respect 'to Coalition contractors and sub- contractors and their employees not nonnally resident in Iraq as set forth in Section 3 of this Order shall be referred to the respective Parent Stare with which the contractor has contracted. Section6 Claim• Tiiird party claims including those for property loss or damage and for personal injury, illness or death or in respect of any other matter arising from or attributed to Coalition personnel or any persons employed by them, whether nonnalJy resident in Iraq or not and that do not arise in connection with military combat operations, shall be submitted and dealt with by the Parent State whose Coalition personnel, property, activities or other assets are alleged to have caused the claimed damage. in a manner consistent with lhe national laws of the Parent State. CP AJORD/26 June 2003/17 2) 'Third party claims for property loss or damage and for personal injmy, illness or death. or in respect of any other matter arising from or attributed to Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be submitted and dealt with. by the Parent S1Bte whose Foreign Liaison Mission persormel, property, activities or other assets are alleged to have caused the claimed damage, in a manner consistent with the national laws of the Parent State. Section 7 Entry Into Fon:e This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature. w.\. \~~ '(-z~") L Paul Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority CPA/ORD/26 June 2003/17 ;. ; ~. -=.......;~·~ - ~ ·~· r ~•~.-w ...... ...-.i .... •n--=ra•c:emznmm~n~=s=;y;;r:.c~gq;~&MtN~~nas;~s~:a::m .. mr: .. n•ar.im .. zv~ ~~w~'~' a#fE •~BE1E!':Z~~ ·~·--~~~...! .. . . : . ' .... . . ....:. . •, .. " . . ..- '" ,. . •.: ... ·:,. .;. ~ . .. .. - ' •' .. . .;_ .... :,.. .! ;r •• - • ,! ........ .. .. .. . · .... ' ' : .. ; . • • ... II - I, .1 • :0"' ,·'-:- I • .. . ~. . . " . ~ ; "": .. "' . ~ ( ' . ,~ ,.. .; ;i· ... .·. :.: ,• ~ . .. :~:· . .... . , . -"':• , . .. ! ., ., . . , .... I .. '• . ' .. .. . . . . ., ' . . " ... - ... : ,:r • t . - . . . . ·, • ' 1 11 , : roemben of the lnqi Civil Defense Corps and shall have the authority to dismiss such members on such grounds as he determines to be appropriate. S) The terms and conditions of service and otganizatioo.. including rank structure, of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may be further defined by Administrative Instructions, isaued by the Administrator of the CPA or a desi111ee, as may be considered necessary to give effect to the terms ofthia Order. 6) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may not; . !t. • .. · .. • - .. ,. LI. (a) be members of 1 political party, organization or asaociation; (b) participate in any activitjes of a political party, organization or association or rccnrit members for political parties or organizatiom; • (c) publicly st.ate any opinion of a political nature thal constitutes an etrort to indoctrinate members of the Iraqi Civil Defenae Corps or any other person with a political ideology or otherwise convince any person to adhere to a particular political ideology, { d) advocate racial, gender or ethnic hatred or intolerance; advocate, create, or engage in illegal discrimination based oo race. color, gender, religi~ or regional origin; or use> or advocate the use of; force or violence or other unlawful means for political purposes. whether internal or i.nlemational; or . i.. ' . -~J~' (e) participate in any manner in organizatiom or activities that involve~ · promote, or practice the conduct descnDed in Section 2(6)(c) and {d). ,... Nothing in this Section shall limit the right of a member of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps to vote in elections for political office organized on a I~ regional or national level. Violations may result in the removal of the member from employment in the .haqi Civil Defense Corps . • I !. Sectioa 3 .: · Authority or the Iraqi Civil Ddeue Corps •. 1) Member9 of the Iraqi Civil Defense Coips may, while performing their official dutiee, apprehend persom who (i) they witness committing or attempting to commit a criminal o~ (ii) have escaped after bein1 lawfully a:rTCSted, or {iii) otherwise interfere with their lawful activities. Pcrsoos ipptehended by the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps must be turned over to the Iraqi police or Coelitioo Fmces within twelve hours of apprehension or be released. Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may not interrogate, except under the direct t ., ."··· ,. CP A/ORD/3 September 2003/28 3 . . , .. , •. .. .. 'I -· n - .. .. 1.. ,t~ ...... .. , " . ~ . - ,, .. :-.... ... ... '" .. ;:· . , .. . • , . ' I i I I · .. I : I ! . I ~~ ., . . • ! . • • o I ·' . . ,. supervision of Coalition Forces, or otherwise detain penona except u provided herein. ~ :.-.; .. ; 2) When actioa under the supervision' of Coalition Forces_ the lnqi Civil Defense v, ·: ; : Corpe may limit accea to certain area aa reasonably nec:"llary co euun; 1he • security of penou or popeaty coo&ai.ned in or pwina through IUCh areu. - 3) Members of the lnqi Civil Defemc Corpe may, while porformma their official dutiea, conduct reuonablc sc:arcbea for weapons or otbet- danproua or prolul>itl!d itam (i) on persons or vehicles enterins or in demptcd area, (ii) on crimiu1 1ulp0Ctl incident to apprehension, or (iii) when 8ID1i.Ds under' the supervisi~ of Coalition Forces, in areas or buildings w.~ dan~ . or · prohl'bited itcm1. incl•a .ProJul>ited ·weapon.I, anJ ~Y beli8ved to exist. Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may cxm4uct reatoaable - searches at establilhrxl cbeclcpoims anywhere witbia ln!q md llt other locatiom to prevent IUCh itmm fiom being canied into, transported within, or out of designated area. . . · . , 4) Members of the lmqi Civil Defeme COJP9 may, while perfonnina official • duties. \ISC force against· pcraona or thinp as ia reuonabk IDd DCCalSmJ.under the ~tan~ However. ~ uae of force that may be likely to e11.-e deada oi serioua bodily UUUIY ~ not Permitted unless the men(ber IMIOOably believes that Uling 111cb f~ ia nCce&sary to: (i) procect birmelf or others ii'om the. · ~l 111e ot dcadJ:y fon:c or force likely to cause serioul bodily injury, (i.J) prevent the eecapo oC a p:rBOD suspected of cai:lluitting nwdar or wau1t 0 1"CIUlting in terioaa bodily Uijury, or (iii) dofend CoUidon, miDimy or govemorai.:t offica, aoveiument or st=.owncd ~ and fixed sitee under the dlrecltion met control of Coalition or governmcmtal au~ to prevent their de81r\Jctioo 0r incapacitation • , " . ' Secdoa-4 Fuadl9Dlng of tile Iraqi ClvU °"6te Corp1 t) The lmqi Civil Defeme Corpa shall operate under the authority of the Administmor of tho CPA and shall be subject to the supervision of Coalition Fon:a. Tho Administrator of the CPA may dolep&c Co tbs SCDior militmy . eommancb of Coalitioa Forces in Inq respon111>ility and authority Cm the mcruitin& training. cqenizatioo, and control of the lnqi Civil Dehllo Corpe. Thia 1aponnl>ility and IU'diority may be rcdelepted punuut to Soctioo 7 below .. I • I r • # • :.. 2) ~onal or tacticaJ command of uniu of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps ... '~ operating with Coelitioo Forces shall be vested in an officer of Coalition , J I .-. I I ' j ~ i d ,. I• 4 ·. .... I I - ~· ' i l . .:. ~'.; : ~ . .: . · .. • v, Forces designated by the senior military comm.Dder of Coalition Forces in Iraq pursuant to Section 7 below. -.. -·- 3) The Iraqi Civil Defense. Corps will not be deployed outside the tenitory of Iraq, except for training or exchange programs. • \o ,. '.~. :'..i., :,: .. : ~1; . ' " J:.i:i:. ; ~ .. _(•: . . 1) Members of the lnJqi Civ.il Defense Corps will be s. ubject to Iraqi law at all times and the civilian criminal courts of Iraq shall have jurlsdiction over off~cs alleged to ~,ve ~P: committed by members of the Iraqi Civil . . Defense Corp5,'.1 ~ AdminiStrator of the CPA may detennine that offenses .. ~;:~ alleged. ~ Qitve been,, QO~tte<\ by ir-~mbers of. the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps ·.~· {': while on duty may be submitted to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq in . .. · ~, ,:~ accordance with CPA , order Nu.mber 13 (Revised), The Central Criminal <;.ourt .. r',;.: of Iraq (CP A/ORD/13 July 2003/13). ·., · · ., .. ·'· ., ... •• •_,1. ... .. · .. "' 2) Members of tbc Iraqi Cml Defense Corps shall enjoy immunity from ·civil liability fol' acts or omissions arising within the scope of their duties and in the conduct of authorized ~ons to the · same degree as other govemmentaJ officials under the law of Iraq. - ~. ' •.. "" •• ~· .. • .-;<.:.. ' •' •"• ,."" h~I ; ... ,, · ···-~: · : Section 6 .• ... :;:{:..:~ .. "\ ;,' rf,,,;_ • ·: ,;._ I•."" . V.' I ;,,~-~~ ... :~~_. .. :Weapons :~·-::;_ , ' Y· · 1 • . h \· : !·~ .. . . The possession of weapotiS by members of th. e Iraqi CiviJ Defense Corps .is regulated by CPA Order Number~. Weapons Control Order (CPAIORD/23 May 2003/03). ;:·~;-~:.·~::. ;·:•· ·· .. .4'. ... •• '· ·• ~:: :::· ,.· • ·.:: ~ .. :-c7. ·~1 .:._.~~"~'r.'"'. "1 ~ ,': :'.~1 -; • '( Section. 7 · ·f ·:';!11l'4 :'·:, .:\ ~. ~-~ • '! •• - '-i:<-". ·. • ~ ·: Deletatton of Authority "· u •. .. •.. :~·, ·t· ·-.. ~ ~,r. 1 ::-:·~ The Adrninisb-ator of the Coalition ProvisionAl Authority may delegate · responsibilities under this ~, as determined by the Administrator, to the · ·: '" senior military cotDmander of Coalition Forces in Iraq. The senior military commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq may further delegate responsibilities . under this Order to tbOse under 'his command ..... 'I , ., .... •· • ••• ' - .. ' l ·- .. .'~ ~. ,;: ~:~\ /;~~~ :::~{ . . " . '• . '• . . . ~~; . , )'.: ... ~~ :-~~', Cl'A/ORD/3 September 2003128 s .• I I I • I ·i { ! l I ~· . ·1· · I• ! 'f I l· ··i . j ·I I • •f 'I ~ " ! :i ., r I I" ... . $ .• :. .... ·' ... ·"~·· '· ~. ·.~ . .. . ~ :h~r:-::~· .~ :.~ ":/ v-.f ~.:.. ... ,.~· ~ ~ ... "'."! .. ~· . -,..: .. ·:~".)".:'~ _. . :~ "' .~ " ' ... i '· ,I . ' "· - ··~ ·.: .~ .:;.· ''- "· ~··. ·" ~=:~;. · . '. . ·~ .. ,· I. ... ,.:- ....... . ( ! .. .. ; .~ .. ... ~:, : ~·. t{ ·~·· 1~ ' ?~ .. : \ :~ .f • .. :~. 'i\ . "'~ ~ ;:· ,' ... ~·· '.! .. .. .: ·~1~~: :,...~ ... :~~":, ... ..... 6 !S· ).': .. .... COALmON PROVISIONAL AUI".HORITY ORDER NUMBER 42 CREATION OF THE DEFENSE SUPPORT AGENCY Punvantm my authority u Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and under the lawa and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 148~ (2003), Recalling that U.N. Resolution 1483 {2003) celled upon the CPA to promote the wclfan: of the Iraqi people through the effective adminis1ration of Che territory, including in particular woddng towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability. Furtller Recalling that CPA Order Number 22 established a New Iraqi Army as the first step towards the creation of the national defense force which is essential to the security and stability of Iraq. Acknowledging that effective, centralfa:cd administrative and logistical support are vital to the success of the New Iraqi Army, I hereby promulgate the following: Sectlon l :Establbhment 1) This Order establishes the Dcfeasc Support Agency (DSA) u a civilian agency chmged with the administrative and logistical support of the New Iraqi Anny. 2) The DSA shall operate under the authority, direction and ccmtJOl of the CPA. 3) Tbc DSA shaJl operate pursuant to this order unless or until it is dissolved by the Administrator of the CPA {''the Administrator') or the internationally recognized, ~tative government established by the people of l:raq. Secdon 2 Duties I) The DSA shall be respon.n'ble for the following functions in support of the New Iraqi Army. a) Finance and accounting, including payroll, disbursements, and accounting for expenditures by the New Ira.qi Anny; b) Persoonel management; c) Training support; d) Recruitment; e) Procurement; f) Logistics support, including maintenance, supply, and transportation; g) Medical support; h) Legal affairs; i) Real p1operty management, including construction and repair of New Iraqi Army buildings and oversight of the management of military bases by their commanders; and - j) other duties in support of the New Iraqi Army as determined by the Administrator. 2) The DSA shall not eXercise any command authority or staff function over New Iraqi Anny military units, or be responsible for setting sceurity policy. Nor shall the DSA be resporunole for determining the requirements of the New Iraqi Army. 3) The DSA shall submit a quarterly report to the Governing Council detailing its prior quarter activities and plans for the following quarter. Section 3 __ .... _ ... ·-· .. ··--··-·--·-----·---~ Structure ___ .. - - ..... ,,/ __ . 1) The Administrator shall appoint a o· tor-General of the DSA. Until such appointment has been made, the A Director of Security Affaits (National Security anq Defense) shall serve.as · Director-General. ~.DifC'Ctor-General shall rePOrt di.rcctly to the A • • _ .. 2) The t>SA shall initially cons' ofsix·Dep~ents: a) Financial Management; b) Personnc:l Management, Recruiting, and Training; c) Procurement and Logistics Support; d) Real Property Management; CPA/ORD/19 SEP 2003/42 2 l e) Legal Aff.airs; and f) Medical Support. 3) The Director-General, with the approval of the Administrator or his designee, sball appoint the DUector of each Department. 4) The Director-General may establish, reorganize, or eliminate Departments by Administrative Instruction. Likewise, the Director-GencraJ may apportion, re- apportion or remove Department responsibilities by Administtative Instruction. Any such Administrative Instructions shall require the approval of the Administrator or his designee. S) Defense Support Agf:rlcy personnel shall be civilians and may include funner military personnel and civilian state employees. No person who was a full member of the Baath Party holding the rank of 'Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), 'Udw Far' (Branch Member), 'Udw Shu 'bah (Section Member), or 'Udw Firqah (Group Member) shall be eligible for employment in the DSA except with specific permission of the Administrator. 6) Salaries of DSA pcnsoimel will conform to the salary structure applicable to Iraqi government employees. Section 4 Administrative lustrocdons The Dil:ectcr-Oeneral may issue Administrative Instructions, not inconsistmit with I.raqi law or any CPA Order, Regulation, or Memorandum, as necessary to cany out the duties described under this Order. Secdon S Entry into Force This 'order shall enter into force on the date of signature. ii~~~~ Coalition Provisional Authority CPAIORD/19 SEP 2003142 3 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD FOR: fROM: SCIJJECT THE IRAQI GOVER:'XIN<.r COUNCIL THE ADMll\ISTRAT0~1\~<>1. ~otification of Intent to Prumulgah: On.for Regan.ling Local Govcmmemal Powers l'lca~c tind attached 1hc iinal version of a J)roposcd CPA Order regarding local govcmmi!nl a~lthorilies, which l plan 10 sign into law on April 5. The onkr clarifies the authoritil!s and responsibilities or local govcmm~nt organi;rations and officials. The issuance of l his order concludes ;:m extensive consultation procc::.s with uur gov cmors. CPA Go,·eniorate l'oordinators, 1mwincinl councils. the Ministry of Interior, and rhe fJovernorales Committee of the lrnqi Governing ('ouncil. C'PA appreciates all the views expressed in this proc.css and sought lo accommodate as ninny l)fthosc <-IS Wi.;"!rc consistent wilh the principal of decentrali ?.ation, a cornerstone of the TAL. CPA recogni/es that some disagreements about the proper balance between the cemer and the govcrnorates remain. The order, however. is a temporary one thaf would remain in cllect only umil umende whether internal or international 6) "Iraqi Armed Forces" means the military forces of Iraq organized for the purposes set forth in this Order, to include the Army, Air Force, Coastal Defense Force, reserve components (when established), Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force. and associated headquarters. 7) "Member of the Iraqi Anned Forces" means a person serving in any component of the Iraqi Anned Forces from the time of attestation until the date of termination of service. 8) ''Military Offense" means an act or omission described in Section 3 of the Code of Military Discipline. 9) "Serious Offense" means a criminal offense under the criminal Jaws of Iraq or the Code of Military Discipline that authorizes, in the event of a conviction, confinement for a period in excess of three months as a punishment. Section 2 Respect for the Rights and Freedoms of the Iraqi Peop· le The I.raqi Armed Forces and its members shall at all times respect the rights and freedoms of the Iraqi people enumerated in the Law of Administration for the State of ]raq for the Transitional Period and, when adopted, those rights and freedoms set forth in the permanent Constitution of Iraq. Section 3 Civilian Control of the Iraqi Armed Force The Iraqi Armed Fornes shall at all times be subject to the control of the Administrator and civilian Minister of Defence. Section 4 Purpose and Mission of the Iraqi Armed Forces l) The purpose of the Iraqi Anned Forces is the defense of Iraq. 2) The tasks of the Iraqi Armed Forces include developing a military capability during the. period of authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority in order to provide the basis for militarily effective, professional, and non-political anned forces for the military defense of the nation after transfer of full governance authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. 3) Except as provided herein, the Iraqi Armed Forces shall not be used to perfonn domestic law enforcement functions or for any other domestic purpose. 4) The Iraqi Armed Forces shall consist of the active and reserve units; and elements thereof, to include associated headquarters. The components of the Iraqi Armed Forces and their missions are as follows: a) Army b) Air Force c) Coastal Defense Force d) Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (temporary) e) Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (temporary?) Section 5 Command Structure l) The Administrator is the Commander in Chief of the Iraqi Anned Forces. 2) Command positions in the Iraqi Armed Forces win be held by Iraqi officers only. 3) The Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Anned Forces shall be appointed by and report to the Minister of Defence. 4) Joint HQ? 5) The Administrator or Minister of Defence wiH designate officers to command the various components and principal units of the Iraqi Armed Forces. The specific assignments of subordinate officers shatl be made in accordance with procedures established by Administrative Instruction issued by the Minister of Defence. Section 6 Administrative Inquiries I) The Minister of Defence may, by Administrative Instruction, issue such rules made under this Section for the convening of an Administrative inquiry to investigate any matter regarding the operation of any part of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Reports of such inquiries shall establish the facts of the matter, draw conclusions, and make any recommendations as may be appropriate. 2) An Administrative Inquiry may be convened by an officer of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or above who holds a command position with respect to any matter concerning a unit under his command and its operation or the Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces under his command, except that an Administrative Inquiry may not be convened to investigate a matter already under investigation as a criminal matter until such time as the criminal investigation is completed. In circumstances in which an Administrative Inquiry has been commenced and it discovers evidence of a Military Offense then it may refer the matter to a Disciplinary Officer in accordance with the Code of Military Discipline. Following referral of the matter to a Disciplinary Officer, the Administrative Inquiry will be completed in accordance with the rules governing such Inquiries. Section 7 Defense Areas The Administrator or the Minister of Defence may prohibit or restrict access by any person to any Defense Area and may make all appropriate provisions for the control and security of any Defense Area. In the event such prohibitions or restrictions limit access to privately-owned property. reasonable compensation shall be promptly paid to the property owner during the period of limited access. Section 8 Use of the Iraqi Armed Forces Abroad 1) The Iraqi Armed Forces shall not conduct or support military, peacekeeping, or humanitarian operations outside of lraq, or deploy in anticipation of conducting or support)ng such operations, except with the prior express approval of the Administrator or, following transfer of full sovereign authority to the Iraqi Interim Government, the approval specified in the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period or, when adopted, the permanent Constitution of Iraq. 2) Any such authorized deployment or use of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall cease, and all deployed forces shall be immediately recalled, when so demanded by two-thirds vote of the body vested with national legislative authority. 3) Nothing in this Section shaJ) limit the right of individual Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces to be sent abroad to participate in training, exercises, exchanges, visits, or similar non-operational activities. PART II TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE Section 1 Enlistment 1) The minimum age for enlistment in the Iraqi Armed Forces is 18 years of age. 2) Citizenship requirement? 3) Service in the Iraqi Armed Forces will be voluntary and for a set term of enlistment. 4) Suitability for service in the Iraqi Armed Forces will be determined on several criteria including, but not limited to: a) demonstrated physical ability; b) demonstrated minimum scholastic aptitude; c) the absence of evidence of human rights violations or war crimes; d) the absence of affiliation with the security and political control organs of the former regime; e) the absence of association with Extremist Organizations or Activities or other groups that use or advocate the use of violence for political purposes whether internal or international; t) provided, however, no qualified person will be denied the opportunity to serve on the basis of race, color, gender, religion, sect, tribal or regional origin. 5) Prior military service is not required, but persons with military experience will be eligible to join the Iraqi Armed Forces~ subject to meeting the applicable standards,. including the criteria listed in Part II, Section 1.3 above. No person involved in Ba'ath Party activity within the leadership tiers described in CPA Order Number 1 shall be eligible except with specific permission of the Administrator. Section 2 Rank Structure I) The lraqi Armed Forces will consist of commissi-0ned officers and enlisted personnel with ranks that may include warrant officers and non~commissioned officers. 2) The ranks of officers will, in ascending order, be: Tilrneez Daabet Mulaazem Mulaazern Awwal Naqeeb Raaed Muqaddam Officer Candidate 2nd Lieutenant 1st Lieutenant Captain Major Lt. Colonel Aaaqeed Aameed Liwaa Fareeq Colonel Brigadier General Major General Lt. General 3) The Administrator or Minister of Defence may, in accordance with Administrative Instructions. by instrument in writing, commission persons to be officers of the Iraqi Anned Forces at a rank to be detennined by the person conducting the commissioning. It shall be possible for personnel to be commissioned on entering the Iraqi Armed Forces at a commissioned rank above Second Lieutenant 4) The ranks of enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers and warrant officers will, in ascending order, be: t.S~ J_,l ~JC- ~\.j i.....a.;y:. Jun di JundiAwwal Naeb Aareef Aareef Aareef A wwal Wakeel Wakeel Awwal Private Private 1st Class Corporal Sergeant Sergeant 1st Class Master Sergeant Sergeant Major c,J.\jA J.Jl ~y. Muahhal Muahhal A wwal Warrant officer Chief Warrant Officer 5) The appointment of enlisted personnel and warrant officers wiH be made by the person authorized under Administrative Instructions issued by the Minister of Defence. It shall be possible for personnel entering the service to be appointed to an enlisted rank above that of Private. 6) Promotion of officers and enlisted personnel will be made pursuant to procedures to be established by the Administrator or Minister of Defence on the basis of merit established by reference to experience, demonstrated competence in the current rank and potential for exceptional performance in the next higher rank. 7) The Administrator or Minister of Defence shall appoint officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces at the rank of general or above. Following transfer of full lj~ J}~.;t~.J J)~.J governance authority to che lraqi Interim Government, the Council of Ministers or similar body shall appoint officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces at the rank of general or above and such appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the body vested with national legislative authority by simple majority of those of its members present. Section 3 Pay and Allowances l) Pay and allowances for members of the Iraqi Armed Forces will be established by and paid in accordance with Administrative Instructions issued by the Administrator or Minister of Defence. 2) Death and disability benefits for Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall be paid and administered in accordance with CPA Order Number 63. 3) A Member of the Iraqi Armed Forces will automatically forfeit a day's pay and allowances for each full or partial calendar day that the Member absents himself from his place of duty or unit without the permission of a superior officer authorized to grant such permission, and shaU in addition be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, including the commencement of Disciplinary Proceedings under the Code of Military Discipline. Section 4 Leave Members of the Iraqi Anned Forces may take leave subject to the needs of the service, upon receiving permission from a duly authorized officer. The period of leave and other relevant details are to be specified by Administrative Instructions. Section 5 Political Activities 1) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall not: a) publicly state or suggest any opinion of a political nature that constitutes an effort to indoctrinate members of the Iraqi Armed Forces or any other person with a political ideology: b) advocate racial. gender or ethnic hatred or intolerance; advocate, create, or engage in discrimination based on race, color, gender, religion, sect, tribal or regfonaJ origin; or use, or advocate the use of, force or violence or other unlawful means for political purposes, whether internal or international; or c) participate in any manner in Extremist Organizations or Activities. 2) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces may not hold or stand for election to political office or campaign for candidates. 3) A former Member of the Iraqi Armed Forces may not hold political office unless the individual has resigned his commission or rank or retired from duty at least eighteen months prior to serving. 4) Violations of the prohibitions contained in this Section may constitute a Military Offense under CPA Order Number 23 and may result in the removal of the Member from employment in the Iraqi Anned Forces. 5) Nothing in herein shall limit the right of a Member of the Iraqi Anned Forces to vote in elections for political office organized on a local, regional or national level. Section 6 Conflicts of Interest l) Members of the lraqi Armed Forces and thefr immediate family members shall not, directly or indirectly: a) Hold financial interests that conflict with the member's conscientious performance of duty; b) Engage in private financial transactions using non-public Government information or allow the improper use of such information to further any private interest; c) Solicit or accept any gift or other item of monetary vaJue from any subordinate, or from any person or entity seeking official action from, doing business with, or conducting activities regulated by the Iraqi Armed Forces, or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonpcrfonnance of the member's duties~ 4) Use public office for private gain; or 5) Conduct any private activity that might give rise to the appearance of a conflict with official status or responsibilities. 2) Violations of the prohibitions contained in this Section may constitute a Military Offense under CPA Order Number 23 and may result in the removal of the Member from employment in the Iraqi Armed Forces. Section 7 Conduct and Discipline 1) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall comply with the lawful -Orders of the Administrator, the Minister of Defence. and those superior in rank to them, according to regulations and the Code of Military Discipline. 2) Members of the Iraqi Anned Forces shall comply with the lawful orders of those persons who are not members of the Iraqi Armed Forces who may be placed in operational command over them from time to time in conjunction with their duties, according to regulations and the Code of Military Discipline. 3) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces are subject to the jurisdiction of the civilian criminal courts pursuant to the Criminal Procedures Code No. 23 of 1977, as amended from time to time~ for offenses under the Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, as amended from time to time, and to the jurisdiction for military offenses established under the Code of Military Discipline. 4) In circumstances where both the civil and military authorities have jurisdiction over an offense, the military authorities will have primary jurisdiction. In all cases, jurisdiction will be exercised, and allocated, as provided for in the Code of Military Discipline. Section 8 Weapons The possession of Military Weapons, to include Special Category Weapons, and Firearms by Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces is regulated by CPA Order Number 3, Weapons Control, as revised and amended (CPA/ORD/31 December 2003/03), which Order may be supplemented by Administrative Instructions. Section 9 Term and Termination of Service I) Volunteers for service in the Iraqi Armed Forces obligate themselves to an initial term of service for a period not to exceed 26 months, subject to a decision by the Iraqi Interim Government to continue the existence of the Iraqi Armed Forces following transfer of full governance authority. a) At the end of any tenn of service, a Member may extend service for a further tenn of 24 months, subject to agreement by the appropriate authorities and the needs of the Iraqi Anned Forces. b) No period of service shall be extended without the consent of the Member, except in national emergencies as officially declared by the Administrator or. following transfer of fuH governance authority to the lraqi Interim Government. according to law. c) Required minimum tenns of service in special situations, such as advanced training, may be specified in Administrative Instructions issued by the Minister of Defence. 2) Service in the Iraqi Armed Forces may terminate on the occurrence of one of the following events: a) Upon a determination that the Member's services are no longer required following the transfer of full governance authority to the Iraqi lnterim Government, without prejudice to the right of the Iraqi Interim Goverrunent to assume the command and control of the Iraqi Armed Forces and all on- going service obligations of its personnel. b) Upon a determination by a Commander in the Iraqi Anned Forces in the Member's chain of command, based upon credible evidence, that the Member is unsuitable for further military service in the Iraqi Armed Forces on the basis of one of the following: i) commission of a Serious Offense; ii) a poor disciplinary record; iii) medical unsuitability; iv) consistently poor perfonnance; v) failure to meet basic standards of performance; vi) unsuitability for military service; vii) commission of a Military Offense; viii) violation of Part II, Sections 5 or 6, of this Order. c) Within seven days of notification of tennination, a Member who has completed initial entry training may request that the decision to tenninate his service be confinned by the Minister of Defence. A detennination under this Section 9.2(c) shall be conclusive upon confirmation by the Minister of Defence, or upon the elapse of seven days from the time of notification of termination, if no request for confirmation is made. d) Service in the Iraqi Armed Forces shall also terminate upon: i) the granting of an application from a Member of the Iraqi Anned Forces for discharge based upon demonstrated need; ii) the granting of an application to resign; or iii) a determination by the Administrator or the Minister of Defence that such termination is necessary for the good of the service. PART III MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES Section 1 Requests for Local Support (in support ofMOI forces?) Section 2 Suppression of Rebellions (under MoD control) Section 3 Immunities and Defenses Members of the Iraqi Anned Forces shall enjoy immunity from civil liability and be entitled to the justification of performance of duty under the Penal Code for acts or omissions arising within the scope of their duties and in the conduct of authorized operations to the same degree as other governmental officials under the law of Iraq. For purposes of paragraph 40 of the Third Edition of the 1969 Penal Code. members of the Iraqi Armed Foccs are "public officials". Section 4 Termination of Use (2/3 vote of national assembly?) PART IV TEMPORARY AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH THE MUL TJNA TIONAL FORCE IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT EMERGENCY SITUATION WITHIN IRAQ Section 1 General Authorities for the Iraqi Armed Forces While Under the Operational Control of the Commander of Multinational Forces l) In light of the current emergency situation within Iraq, and consistent with lraq's stated desire to join other nations in helping to maintain peace and security and fight terrorism during the transitional period pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution I 51 l) and any subsequent relevant resolutions, all trained elements of the Iraqi Anned Forces shall at all times be under the operational control of the Commander of Multinational Forces for the purpose of conducting combined operations and providing other support within Iraq as provided herein. 2) The Minister of Defence shall continue to exercise administrative control over elements of the Iraqi Armed Forces that are under the operational control of the Commander of Multinational Forces. 3) In support of Multinational Force operations to provide security and stability to the people of Iraq, the Iraqi Armed Forces are authorized to provide protection for critical instaHations, facilities, infrastructure, and lines of communication and supply. 4) Operational or tactical command of units of the Iraqi Armed Forces operating with Multinational Forces may be vested in an officer of the Multinational Forces of rank superior to that of the commander of such Iraqi units. 5) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall adhere to rules of engagement or rules for the use of force as specified by the Commander of Multinational Forces. 6) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces under the operational control of the Commander of Multinational Forces may use force consistent with rules of engagement or rules for the use of force, as appropriate, applicable to Multinational Forces to execute their assigned missions and taskings. Section 2 Special Authorities for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps While Under the Operational Control of the Commander of Multinational Forces I) In support of Multinational Force operations to provide security and stability to the people of Iraq, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is authorized to perfonn constabulary and other duties, including the following tasks: a) patrol1ing urban and rural areas; b) conducting operations to search for and seize illegal weapons and other contraband; c) providing fixed site, check point, area, route and convoy security; d} providing crowd and riot control; e) disaster response services; f} searcn and rescue services; g) providing suppon to humanitarian missions and disaster recover operations including transportation services; h) conductingjoint patrols with Multinational Forces; and i) participating in otner activities designed to build positive relationships between the Iraqi people and Multinational Force authorities including serving as community liaisons. 2) The Commander of Multinational Forces may set the standards for manning, training. and equipping Iraqi Civil Defense Corps forces, as well as establishing their mission essential task list and operational employment. 3) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may, while perfonning their official duties, apprehend persons: a) whom they witness committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense; b) who have escaped after being lawfully arrested; or c) who otherwise interfere with their lawful activities. 4) Persons apprehended by the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps must be turned over to the Iraqi Police Service or Multinational Forces within twelve hours of apprehension or be released. 5) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may not interrogate individuals, except under the direct supervision of Multinational Forces, or otherwise detain persons except as provided herein. A member of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may stop any person for so long as is reasonably necessary in order to question him for the purpose of ascertaining that person's identity and movements or what that person knows concerning any recent explosion or any other recent incident endangering life or concerning any person killed or injured in any such explosion or incident. 6) The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may limit access to certain areas as reasonably necessary to ensure the security of persons or property contained in or passing through such areas. 7) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may conduct reasonable searches at established checkpoints anywhere within Iraq and at other locations to prevent weapons or other dangerous or prohibited items from being carried into, transported within, or out of, designated areas and may, while otherwise performing their official duties, conduct reasonable searches for weapons or other dangerous or prohibited items a) on persons or vehicles entering or in designated areas; b) on criminal suspects incident to apprehension~ or c) in areas or buildings where dangerous or prohibited items, including prohibited weapons, are reasonably believed to exist. 8) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may: a) Recapture premises, places, means of transport, or other things (the "subject premises"); and b) In connection with any such recapture, do any one or more of the following: i) Free any hostage from the subject premises; ii) If the member finds in the subject premises a person whom the member has reasonable grounds to believe has committed an offense, the member may detain the person for the purpose of placing the person in the custody of the Iraqi Police Service at the earliest practicable time; iii) Evacuate persons found in the subject premises to a place of safety; iv) Search the subject premises for dangerous things; and v) Seize any dangerous thing found in such a search. 9) A member of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may issue and compel compliance with any one or more of the following directions in relation to a person (whether or not in charge of a means of transport): a) Direct the person not to enter a designated area or direct the person not to enter a designated area unless the person consents to a search of himself, any items in his possession, any means of transport under his control, and anything in or on such means of transport; b) Direct the person to leave a designated area; or c) Direct the person to move from one place in a designated area to another place in the designated area. Section 3 Special Authorities for the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force While Under the Operational Control of the Commander of Multinational Forces l) In support of Multinational Force operations to provide security and stability to the people of Iraq, the Iraqi Counter~Terrorism Force is authorized to perform counter-terrorism missions, including the following tasks: a) conducting operations to capture or kill terrorists; b) conducting operation against suspected terrorist facilitators; c) engaging in reconnaissance missions and other information-gathering operations as necessary for mission completion, except that members of the Iraqi CoWlter-Terrorism Force shall not engage in intelligence activities; d) conducting operations to search for and seize illegal weapons and other contraband; e) conducting operations to rescue hostages; f) participating in other counter-terrorist-related activities designed to increase security and stability in Iraq. 2) Members of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force may, while performing their official duties, detain persons: a) whom they witness committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense; b) whom they reasonably suspect of being terrorists or terrorist facilitators; or c) who otherwise interfere with their lawful activities. 3) Persons detained by the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force must be turned over to the Iraqi Police Service or Multinational Forces within twe!ve hours of detention or be released. 4) Members of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force may not interrogate detainees, except under the direct supervision of Multinational Forces. Section 4 Immunities I) A Member of the Iraqi Armed Forces under the operational control of the Commander of Multinational Forces who is conducting activities authorized under this Order, and acting within the scope of his assigned mission or tasking, and operating consistent with applicable Multinational Force rules of engagement or rules for the use of force, as appropriate, is immune from Iraqi criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction and from any form of arrest or detention. 2) The Administrator shall have the exclusive authority to determine when a particular act qualifies for the immunities set forth in Part IV, Section 4. l above, and such determination is binding on all governmental, judicial and administrative entities within Iraq. Section 5 Termination of Authority The command relationships, authorities, and immunities set forth in this Part IV shall expire and cease to have effect upon termination of operations by the Multjnational Force operating in Iraq pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 15 I I, and any subsequent relevant resolutions. PARTV FINAL PROVISIONS Section 1 Existing Law 1) The lraqi Military Law Code Number 13of1940, the Iraqi Military Procedures Code Number 44of1941, the Code of Legal Notification of Military Personnel Number 106 of 1960, Punishment of Military Deserters Law Number 28 of 1972, and the Penal Code of the Popular Army Number 32of1984 are hereby suspended. 2) Any laws or regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Order are hereby suspended to the extent they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Order. Section 2 Effect on Existing CPA Orders, Regulations, and Memoranda I) CPA Order Number 22, Creation of a New Iraqi Army (CPA/ORD/7 August 2003/22), is hereby superseded. Any references in other CPA Orders, Regulations, or Memoranda referring to the New Iraqi Army or the Iraqi Armed Forces as established under CPA Order Number 22 shall be deemed to refer to the Iraqi Armed Forces as existing and operating pursuant to and in accordance with this Order. 2) CPA Order Number 28, Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, as amended (CP NORD/3 September 2003/28), is hereby superseded. Any references in other CPA Orders, Regulations, or Memoranda referring to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps as established under CPA Order Number 28 shall be deemed t-0 refer to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps as existing and operating pursuant to and in accordance with this Order. 3) CPA Order Number XX, Amendments to CPA Orders Number 22 and 28 (CPA/ORD/XX April 2-004/XX), is hereby rescinded. 4} CPA Order Number 23, Creation of a Code of Military Discipline for the New Iraqi Army (CPA/ORD/7 August 2003/23), Section l, definition of ·•commander of the New Iraqi Army,,' is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: "Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces" means the Iraqi officer appointed by the Minister of Defence in accordance with CPA Order Number 67> Section 4, Article 6(c). to exercise operational command and control of the Iraqi Armed Forces," Section 3 Administrative Instructions The Administrator and the Minister of Defence may issue Administrative Instructions, not inconsistent with this Order, prescribing au matters that are necessary or convenient for giving effect to or carrying out the purposes of this Order. Section 4 Entry in to Force This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature. L. PauJ Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority United Nations Security Council S1RESll51 l (2003) Distr.: General 16 October 2003 • Resolution 1511 (2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4844tb meeting, on 16 October 2003 The Security Council, Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Iraq, including resolution 148.3 (2003) of 22 May 2003 and 1500 (2003} of 14 August 2003, and on threats to peace and security caused by terrorist acts, including resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, and other relevant resolutions, Underscoring that the sovereignty of h'aq resides in the State of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, relterating its resolve that the day when lraqis govern themselves must come quickly, and recognizing the importanc~ of international support, particularly that of countries in the region. Iraq's neighbours. and regional organizations, in taking forward this process expeditiously, Recognizing that international support for restoration of conditions or stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of tlte people of lraq. and welcoming Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003), Welcoming the decision of the Governing Council of Iraq to form a preparatory constitutional committee to prepare for a constitutional conference that will draft a constitution to embody the aspirations of the Iraqi people, and urging it to complete this process quickly, Affi,.ming that the terrorist bombings of the Embassy of Jordan on 7 August 2003, or the United Nations headquaners in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, of the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf on 29 August 2003, and of the Embassy of Turkey on 14 October 2003, and the murder of a Spanish diplomat on 9 October 2003 e.re attacks on the people of lraq, the United Nations, and the international community, and deploring the assassination of Dr. Akila al-Hashimi. who died on 25 September 2003. as an attack directed aigainst the future oflraq, ln that context, recalling and reaffirming the statement of its President of 20 August 2003 (S/PRST/2003/13) and resolution 1502 (200J) of26 August 2003, Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security. 03-56391 (E) ~ 21ili:;:::as;;W..,.... S/RESIJSll {2003} Aeling under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of lraq, and underscores, in that context, the temporary nature of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional Authority (Authority) of the specific responsibilities, authorities. and obligations under applicable international law recognized and set forth in resolution 1483 (200.3), which will cease when an internationally recognized, representative government established by the people of Iraq is sworn in and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority, inter alia ttirough steps envisaged in paragraphs 4 through 7 and I 0 below: 2. Welcomes the positive response of the international community, in fora such as the Arab League, the Organization of the lslamic Conference, the United Nations General Assembly. and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, to the establishment of the broadly representative Governing Council as an important step towards an internationally recognized. representative governmen1; 3. Supports the Governing Council's efforts to mobilize the people of Iraq, including by the appointment of a cabinet of ministers and a preparatory constitutional committee to lead a process in which the [raqi people will progressively take control of their own affairs; 4. De/ermines that the Governing Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which. without prejudice to its farther evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period until an internationally recognized, representative government is estahlished and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority; S. Affirms that the administration of Iraq will be progressively undertaken by the evolving structures of the lraqi interim administration; 6. Calls 11po11. the Authority, in this context, to return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of lraq as soon as practicable and Nqu~stl the Authority, in cooperation as appropriate with the Governing Council and the Secretary-General, to report to the Council oa the progress being made: 7. Jnvites the Governing Council to provide to the Security Council, for its review, no later than 15 December 2003, in cooperation with the Authority and, as circumstances permit, the Special Representative of the Seerete.ry-General. a timetable and a programme for the drafling ofa new constitution for Iraq and for the holding of democratic elections under that constitution; 8. Resolves that the United Nations. acting through the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, should strengthen its vital role in lraq, including by providing humanitarian relief. promoting 1he economic reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq, and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local instirutions for representative government; 9. Requests that, as circumstances permit, the Secretary-General pursue the course of action outlined in paragraphs 98 and 99 of the report of the Secretary- General of 17 July 2003 (S/20031715); SIR£S1151l (2003) 10. Takes note of the intention of the Governing Council 10 hold a constitutional conference and, recognizing that the convening of the conference will be a milestone in the movement to the full exercise of sovereignty, calls for its preparation through national dialogue and consensus-building as soon as practicable and ~quests the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. at the time of the convening of the conference or, as circumstances permit, to lend the unique expertise of the United Nations to the Iraqi people in this process of political transition, including the establishment of electoral processes; I l. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the resources of the United Nations and associated organizations are available, if requested by the traqi Governing Council and, as circumstances permit, to assist in furtherance of the programme provided by the Governing Council in paragraph 7 above. and encourages other organizations with expertise in this area to support the Iraqi Governing Council, if requested; 12. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on his responsibilities under this resolution and the development and implementation of a timetable and programme under paragraph 7 above; 13. Determines that the provision of security and stability is essential to the suc~essful completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the implementation of resolution 1483 (2003), and a11tlf.orizes a multinational force under unified command lo take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for tb.e implementation of the timetal>le and programme as well as to contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure; 14. Urges Member States to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including military forces. to the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13 above: IS. Decides that the Council shall review the requirements and mission of the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13 above not later than one year from the date of this resolution, and that in any case the mandate of the force shall expire upon the completion of the political process as described in paragraphs 4 through 7 and lO above, and expresses readiness to consider on that occasion any future need for 1he continuation of the multinational force, taking into account the views o( an internationally recognized, representative government ofiraq; 16. Emphasizes the importance of establishing effective Iraqi police and security forces in maintaining law, order. and security and combating terrorism consistent with paragraph 4 of resolution 1483 (2003 ), and calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the training and equipping of h'aqi police and security forces; 17. Expresses deep sympathy and condolences for the personal losses suffered by the Iraqi people and by the United Nations and the families of those United Nations personnel and other innocent victims who were killed or injured in these tragic attacks; 3 SIR£Sl15l I (:!Oro) 18. Unequivocally condemns the terrorist bombings of the Embassy of Jordan on 7 August 2003, of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, and of the lmam Ali Mosque in Najaf on 29 August 2003. and of the Embassy of Turkey on 14 October 2003. the murder of a Spanish diplomat on 9 October 2003. and the assassination of Dr. Akila al-Hashimi, who died on 2S September 2003. and emphasires that those responsible must be brought to justice; 19. Calls upon Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to Iraq, arms for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists. and emphasi'zes the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region, particularly neighbours of Iraq, in this regard; 20. Appeals to Member States and the international financial institutions to strengthen their efforts to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and development of their economy, and urges those institutions to take immediate steps to provide their full range of loans and other financial assistance to Iraq, working with the Governing Council and appropriate Iraqi ministries; 21. Urges Member States and international and regional organizations to support the Iraq reconstruction effon initiated at the 24 June 2003 United Nations Technical Consultations, including through substantial pledges at the 23-24 October 2003 lntemational Donors Conference in Madrid; 22. Coils upon Member States and concerned organizations to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people by providing resources necessary for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq's economic infrastructure; 23. Emphasires that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IA.MB} referred to in paragraph 12 of resolution 1483 (2003) should be established as a priority. and reiterates that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 1483 (2003); 24. Reminds aU Member States of their obligations under paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483 (2003) in particular the obligation to immediately cause the transfer of funds, other financial assets and economic resources to the Development Fund for Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people; 25. Requests that the United States. on behalf of the multinational force as outlined in paragraph 13 above, report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress of this force as appropriate and not less than every six months; 26. Decides to remain sejzed of the matter. 4 Office of National Security Affairs January 14, 2004 Today 711/04 End State °""P<'Uon S0'1Ueign Iraq $overeivn Iraq .CPAGo11ama ~S·i.d MNF Sevate Infernal lntemaJ ••cutlly lnseeumy 5.,,.,. lntArnal . Partn....tilp and MNF pnal11e Insecurity Limited lraql capability Limited lraql relatlon$hlp capallllllv IW#~eJShlp wtth S-OK.fraql . Mol-MoO split Growing Iraqi Coec l 1:...r1 lral 1~1 {Al'lll ,...,, ,..,. , 82d 2al IO llNs CGn'olel• MNO(CSI 2 0l4 BHI ctiti ~ MN ~ ' ..... FPS - New Process and Timings e·'Ol ___ JAM . 'CM --~~. ~ AA ~····11 I 1!> ! C""'PlotoTO-' TOA, 02 Jan 04 2900S.. 7!IO~ 1 000,.,,....m. 2!IO Hot Vlild ! Volld•t. MSC' • fl'S coun1, I ! 15JonCM ! MmHy Al t1!tnQ!: : Mnfl'Y rt t¥oA' • De..,q,6~ IG S)'>len1 CoGty ' FPSW..-.Pdc:y : ! M.T 11.lln04 I FPS no ~Uw NlT TBA I t I litnS141L : ! ve.,.....FPSS.. I · ~Pay~ l I M Ll 12JM\Ool I I MSC• Pay FPS I : 01~04 · .... -~ I s:.is 01 ,,..ci. °" I I i I Mlfllaltlu l'.y Ff'll I >1""1tfo.4 ~·sPayFPS f tf) Of 6 3 As of 11 Jan 04 /CDC BN Equit, alent Fieliling Plan 12!XOI !• I l!Xcl l.wil 1 .. 1 1 ~ 1 l.v11 l l•• I t.-..1 NIA ... ............,., .... .,. ~ ... '" An"* ...... : ~ Red: clD~ SYRIA • !Uy! "*fim ICDC a• HQ (tocatlOM TBDI NIA/ICDC 801!. HQ db ICOC8N HQ ri3 ICOC8DHQ ~ 4 /CDC Capability· Ge11eration ..................... , - ~~~!l.O..dJ~~~~:::;::~ i?:==~ji===============;~ - ~~~~~~~-_,_~~~-.,,,C----'=i.&.~ ......... ..,.,.na.c.......,-..-.u< ......... '1..>C~ - ~~~....;C.~~~1--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~--~~~--........... --=~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~J.-~~-1-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~--~~----.,__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I - -== =r: - --- 1.--~~-.-~~.....-~~--.-~~~..-~~...-~~--~~--.-~~---. - - - • . - - • , ._._,. JCC Timel ine~· -----·--·····••11 Unit IOC&FOC No of JCCs 101" AA 4u. 10 82"" ABN 1AD MND CS MND SE •Subject to approval by 82"1 ' CG. 10 s • • • • • • • • Iraq Security Forces Assessment Team January 14 2004 Policy Framework Dimensions Macro-Structure Institutions Forces Roles Capabi'lities People Laws Command and Control (C2) 2 Current Stage Structure CPAJCJTF-7 supervision Institutions Mol. MoJ. MoFA developing, MoO being designed Forces i.- Roles Capabilities People Laws C2 IPS. IAF. ICOC, INIS, FPS, 08E being built. IAF battalions In trng: ICOC augmented to CF: IPS basic: law enforcement: FPS facillly protection; DBE border Patchy law enforcomont, ltd facility protection IAF small but deep. ICOC large but thin; DBE ltd Minister.; 1n Mot, MoJ MoFA. Ministers/CPA appoint olr1C1alslofficets in consultation MoO unoo.rway - Operating under CPA Orders & selected prev10us legislation CF In command excopl some IPS LE. partial Iraq! control l Structure Institutions Forces Roles Capabilities People Laws C2 ToA July 2004 TNA and Executive m1n1.strles control sea.inly sector Iraq Multlllational Sec.unty Partnership - NSC & NCA structuro Ltd MoO, Mol. MoJ, MoFA mgmVpohcy capacity. IMSP Contact Group?. IAF In progress: ICOC al FOC: IPS local police & spoclal unite; FPS, DBE stood up ICOC (mobili2ed) reserve component or IAF. IPS national law enforcement: some high end roles. Partial IPS IT1Ulll0pal socunty capability. Ltd IAF •ntemal sec:unty capablloly, esp ICOC TNA appointed mtmsl8f5 lraqt approved Head INIS, CHOO. IAF Commander, Oopubes. IPS ct\lefs. Transitional Admlnlstraltvo Law (Incl tMSF). IAF part of IMSF (US command). LE under lraqls • 2 Structure Institutions End state Sovereign state with permanent Constitution. Democratically elected Par1iament and Executive. NSC primary ~ecurlty policy decision maker. Ministries fully functioning. Forces Roles Dependent on decisionslresources or Iraqi Government (IAF 27 Bns +-ICOC 36 Bns ... JPS 71k capable during 2005) IAF to defend from extemat aggression; IPS LE and high end lntemal security; Domestic use of IAF restricted & rare. Capabilities IAF limited capability for external defense. IPS capable of handling majority of lntemal security. People Elected political leadersh1p. Iraqi appointments system. Laws Legislation passed by Par1Jament lntemallonal lreaties and security agreements C2 lraQ supporte.Q by enduring allied security arrangements. 6 Assessing Progress • Fortnightly reviews of security sector development against Strategic Plan • Monitoring of state of threat vector • Advisory consultations with National Security Committee of IGC and a small core group 8 3 COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE. TRAINING TEAM • Scope • Original Mission • Acceleration • Current Position • Transition Plan • 30 Sep and Beyond 1 • Overall Political Vision "The ultimate goal is a unified and stable, democratir c Iraq that: provides rep~ese1 ntative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms for all Iraqis and· a growing market economy; and is able to defend i.tself, but no longer poses a threat to the region." - - • Vision for Defense "Develop New Iraqi Armed Forces which are under political control, accountable to the nation and defensive in capability and intent. " CMA TT Mission "To man, train and equip nine Infantry Bdes with limited capability by Sep 04, a small coastal defense force, and the beginning of an aviation element in order to establish the foundation of the Iraqi Armed Forces run by /raqis.11 2 Endstate IAF comprising - Joint Force Headquarters - Land Component (27 Bns/9 Bdes/3 Regional Divs) - Maritime Component • Naval Squadron • Coastal Defense Regt - Air Component • Sqn of UH-1 • Sqn (·)of C-130 - SOF Component • ICTF (200) - National Reserve Component • Former ICDC • Tasks Man: screen, recruit (ethnic balance), establish structure, pay conditions .of service, selection of officer corps - moral component. Train: doctrine, schools, training base organized, professional mil education, general and specialist training - all ranks. facUities, training aids. programs of instruction. Equip: logistics, maintenance, storage, supply, infrastructure, training equipment, garrisons. Transition: to an Iraq MoD and Joint Mil HQ lnforma.tion operation to manage perceptions 3 0 Organizational Structure I o.p..i.y I ~- CG ~ ~ i!nlltled CG I Jlll'Cla•• C<>IS UiOs I ~;!.~J I c::r 11 PNl I I C1 c II Cl II Loge:.. cs c• 11 Cl II c!'.i.. II • .;'_, j ,...,. -- ·-· °"" l"lllM Comma Fa ca- Def-• Grouno t:nor .... ....... llKNKJnG _.. .. f1cilll ... Logltltlce ....,. Plans -- ... _ _.,. - L.,..nc.a ~.V-7~ Helot• .. - ""' ... ... M ....,lc'.ll T•11ning c....- ~ .U.nl ~ ""' CommD -.i.e ... ...... ....... -- ... ~--- ~· Ker l'WDMS rt .... Att FQOPS DSAl90U Dec- ltne<&tit ,.,. .. _ LHOo omc- ._, COfM'CI PllN ........ • Some Themes • Mor:al Component -values, ethos, attitude and culture. • Time - clear milestone=time driven schedule, but also need qualitative assessment - balance required. • Iraqi Owners, hip - what we do now is foundation for future success. • Certification - Hold on to the product to ensure success. 4 • In the beginnin1 g - 9 Bn • Establish recrolting - 3 stations; Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul 3262 recruited to date • Acquired materiel - Tables, cha/~, beds Uniforms, btanla ••:!, ! •1••!) •/!!t'P!( _,,,,,,,,.,.,.._aq . .-.: .... m .. 9.•·•' ct·t11•1~•u 41 .• J 5 • 6 • KMTB 8 Week POI CMATT oversees- contl"actors traJolng the ~A Units •AulH, Alghh &. ~""ecfoe~• ·&i.obl .. h~Wng Cflmol• •Equtpnwm i.a ... I matnleneftC.a •C1111lom.i- & COU11HI-. •L.aw of L;and CoPll~l (ttuman RJoht•) ·ROE •l'hyslcal fq(nlng •Fk'Wt Nd ·Drill and C•romony ·ul'.ldi H•lilptlon ·VV""Pan rfOl!t>, law of lond w- lr'oqlnatlo1' a!V:l -ptch ->1. - It ph)lalutly 1na menully pr e~reci to .,_gin ,_.,, ,.,.,... .-------..u. _______ ..., END STATE {OFFICER/NCO) • A loaderwllil pos-• .. , - l'<&Nla....,.UI IMdenJOllp elllla - Sltllla wM ~ IMdl!lg Jl(OC.clutft - sl.11 .. -ttJ> •-II unll llictle11, toc:ltnlq"'• """ P-•d"'9t 7 fl What we Realized • Situation has changed - security • Not the Afghan model - 400,000 trained military personnel pool - Existing military tradition Establish the Cadre First • Many countries. train Soldiers p,.. ww11 us Arm Mobr1r z.t1on • Few countries train Year Total Offi~rs Enlisted Men Leaders very woll HMO U6.065 16.624 149,441 •Focus on the leadership 1941 1,4S4,634 u.112 1.361,462 • Modified Objective Change plan to man, train, equip ... • 9 Army Brigades, C2 • Nucleus of an Army Air Corps • Nucleus of a Maritime element Vice 9 ba. tta/ions under original plan ... BY CREA TING THE LEADERSHIP 8 0 Leader Training • Make up front investment in leader development and professionalism - Use former Iraqi officers and NCOs - Three main ideas • Leadership principles for a volunteer force • Military role in a democratic society • How to plan, execute performance oriented training - Jordanian Army trains most officers needed - Coalition trainers train NCOs needed 0 Training the Larger Force ·- -~, - The Generic Model 9 0 Jordan Officer Training I Dec l Jan I Feb I Apr I May I Jun Jul -lndvcllon period is 10 days • NCOA Training I Dec I Jan Feb I Mar I Apr j May I Jun Jul '~----. I .....coc-a.HO 10 • BNMETL • Conduct tactical road march • Attack • Defend • Conduct movement to contact • Conduct cordon and search • Integration Training • Duration is 4 weeks. • Follows light .leaders course model. • Emph, asis on team building, development of SOPs, and plan/prep/conduct training. 11 • BNIBDEIDIV Advisor Support Teams • CMA TT has requested teams to support each battalion, brigade, and division of the IA • The objectives tor these teams ;nclude: - supporting leader integration training - training management - oversight of both individual and collective training - providing na;son support (for gaining Coalition HQ) • Officer PME •Jordan - 2 IA L TCs attending CGSC - 2 IA COLs attending NDU •Australia - 2 IA MAJs attending CG SC - 1 IA COL attending NDIJ • ftaly - 3 IA .officers pending assignment to PME schools. •USA - 1 IA officer pending attendance NESA 12 • ICDF Training • Basic Training with Army Recruits under current or modified contract with Vinell Corp assisted by additional Royal Marine NCOs for JCDR Company • Specialist Training at Umm Qasr by Coalition Training Teams (CTT) • Patrol Boat I Squadron CO Training abroad • Senior Officer Training (Lt Cdr and Above) requires specific course to be developed • ICDF Commander to Undergo Training with Army Equivalents 13 • Iraqi Air Co. rps, TBD r-------------- 1 1-- - ---------- - - - ------- .-------'------. r------'"----~ "-CKlrtwtt a ~•hi : ~ CT•Jll , !! ~: !'!!.t.,:~ ~ - ~ ~~~ - ~: S111 Uff.t, we .... -..~ • Aviation Training • Start small: UH-18 Helos; C-1308 Transports • Principle: A small core of good people, trained in Jordan to train the rest: - 6 Senior Leaders (full Colonels) - Experienced Pilots, Rear Crew and Maintenance Staff - Aviation support staff (Base Ops etc.) - Specialist aircrew and engineering training in Jordan • Support Staff coming from IA and train in Iraq • All selected by Interview at CPA 14 • IA - 2· 7 Battalions lsEPI locrl [Nov] ioEcl !JANI IFeB!iMARI IAPRllMAvl!JuNll JUL llAuGl!sePI Ll 2 6 9 9 - SYRIA Total !A. FadJltlu EOY 2094 27 Inf 8nl9 Pde Garrisons 1 Navia! Inf Bn Base 1 Naval Force FaclUty 2 Arrnv Air Corps L()(;atlona Depot fa<;lllty JFHQ 2 lraql Mlllu.r:y Audemles 12 Recru1Ung Station• 1 l3000 'Soldier T reln. lng Ba H 15 Iraqi National Defense Force bySEP04 jJFHo j I I I 1 JULYQ.4 i j ! Deputy CG for Capability ~~~~ lxXI I South I - "'"'°......._. ...... ... _ ~~ ~ ,.,._~-- ,. .... ........ - -...... .............. ~ -·- ...................... .....,.,.,._ - - -·- ~r• ........ -· - ·- - -- - a_ · - .. _ 16 0 Where do we need to focus? TRANSITION NOW CPA 1JULY04 IRAQI TRANSITIONAL i-----------.. GOVERNMENT OSA CMATT ----....-i Security foroH· HAND OVER PLAN IA/ICDC • • Role ofOMC • Continued focus on leadership • Recommendation will be to consolidate gains. • Addition of combined arms • Heavy brigades 17 • Transition Schematic hlJu/)'04 i----ys"°"-+ ' --, UIOcf 04 t110«os I I I I INSTITllTIONS OP'rttlona• ~! tM esten.tlal el...,,.nta of lhe IAF 11nd•r pollUut conltol, ac.covnt~ble to th• nation and dftenslve In capablllty and 1n1tt1r OP£ RATIONAL CAl'A811.ITY ll'_l_ 'T"-"£.l:/ S1111tolc fl nc!•t11.!r. •a unified and stab ... 11 pro•ld.a ••P'"• ntallve govetnment fo• the In.qi peosile: 11 unde rpinned I I I llY new and prolecfltd l~~I freecloms~ a Rlraqla 1't4ASE ' ,.._ • and a orowing -~•I llEHTOll U !R!!!H!l!!!lll!!Ulll economy; and It able to ~nd llself, b<,lt no lOflOat poM'S a thtUt to IN licy coordination and decision-making o Crisis management and decisions on the use of force o Seu'ing, budgeting, and resourcing capabilities requirements Key Rules: laws, Regul.ME) (Army Special Forces, OEF w/ pecial Forces. Middle East FAQ) LTtf ~JB-PBAO) Mr.r· I (OSD-P) (Middle East Expert. Extensive experience w/ Iraqi issues) Mr.[ j(CPA) (CPA Washington - POC for all CPA Security Forces - Police, Border Enforcement, Facility Protection Service) eaptr ..... __ ----lj(Admin> MG Eikenberry, PACOM J5- Team Leader cPf ~Aide) Mr. r joso Comptroller) Mrl: COIN Expert) KSpec Advisor OSD) (USMC retired -- ~r.j' !' ~CL \SSLFIED r J(FS-02) From: Jones, Richard H. (AMS) Sent: To: Subject: Thursday, December 18, 2003 10:18 PM ~ l(FS-02) FW: Egyptran assistance to Iraq r I Please pass a hard copy of this to David Gompert. Thanks. DJ --- - -original Message---- - From: Jones, Richard H. (AMB ) Sent : Friday, December 19 , 2003 9 :17 AM To: Casteel Ste ven W. (SE:S - 6 - Egyptian assistance to Iraq r Steve Casteel is our ac· tion officer for th• e Ministry of Interior, David Gompert is his counterpart for nat.ional security affairs and MG Paul Eaton is in charge of the coalition Military Assistance Tr aining Team . All could have a role in this depending on what type of training the Egytpians provide. I •ve copied Casteel and Eaton on this e - mail and wi 11 see tba t a copy of your incoming i s passed to Gompert, whose name doe an' t appear in my directory. Dick -----orig inal Mes saqe ----- From: r"° ~a in State), ,State sent: Thursday, Decembe r l 8 , 2003 10:29 PM To: Jones, Richard H. (AM B ) c-1 - sub j e ct : Egy ptian assistance co Iraq Dick: We've been working for some time to encourage Egypt to provide military and security force training to Iraq. President Mubarak and Defense Minist:er Tantawi have several times confirmed their willingness to provide assiutance. In the Oecember 10-tl OSD-led military coordination meetings held in Cairo, the E:gyptians reiterated their off et of =issist:ance and asked for help in identifying specific needs to be fulfilled. We've urged the GOE: to send Qn assessment team to I raq to discuss potential needs with CPA, CENTCOM, a:ld the GC, and ;-.'e ha·..-e four five Eg·/ ptia n gener als idea.t i fied. Embass:/ Cairo is p • imed co accompany such a team, and the mission would be led by OMC Chief Major General Guy Bourne. Assuming that this all makes sense Erom CPA's point of view, we now need a CPA point of contact who can facilitate such a visit and serve as a near term liaison with Embassy Cairo and the Egyptians. We• d appreciate your help either directly or by pointing us in the right direction. Regards - D UNCLA~SH ILD// Fr-om: ou ~ MFl.cn : DKMFIH EF LU0·1 Sent. 20.08.03 12/24/2003 Cc. COALITION PROVISIONAL /\UTHORITY(UC). AL lf'-{AQ COLLECTIVE( UC) Cc Precedence: Routine Sub1ect: RESPONSE TO GEl~MAN OFt=EI~ OF POLICE TF~AININQ Message Type_ Other-Organizational Extended Au th: ·16-58: 00 12/24/2003 (UTC) 19: 58'. 00 12/24/2003 (Chen1./Loca\) Security: This rnessage has been digitally signed and encrypted l ~TT U ZYUVV RUEHCAA8185 3581714-UUUU--l·H-IMFIUU Z NR UUUUU ZZH r~ 2416582 DEC 03 F M SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHRU/\M E MBASSY DERLIN INFO IRAO COLLECTIVE RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA RHMFIUU/HQ COA.LITION PROVI SIONAL AUTI I BAGHDAD BT ;. UNCLAS STATE 348185 { j I ·I c . O . 12950: NIA TAGS KJUS. KCRM, PGOV. GM, IQ SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO GERMAN OFFER OF POLICE TRAINING fINl s FOi~ DISCUSSl(}NS VVI 11 t CCJUN r1 l{l-'/\I~ rs IN I :r Sr-'ONDING I 0 Tl H::_ or-FEH C>F Tr{/\IN\NC',· r1 ll d \NCE:- K 13A~-;ic SKll I s 11-l {OGRAM CONDUCT ro BY lJf::S TO 1 . 'JDO us /\ND OTI 11 I~ IN I I HNA rJON/\L POLICE ( C IVPOL) ADVISOHS IN IF~AQ. CPA IS CONCENTRA nNG TRAINING r~FSC>Un.CFS IN lf~/\O /\ND Jt l~DAN IN AN E FFORT l C> BUILD UNIFOr~MITY OF rRAININU 1-\ND TC) L1 VI l _ OP PHOFESSION/\L ,_-: /\MA.I !/\OrRIF rt,,- , 'I Al·!r I l\!llT1 ['F UND~ I\ i'JO c., 1 Jl\I I Fii D I 'F R ::-;C1NN r I \JV\ I<- J /\I ~I .r\V ,A.IL AOL\ _ 1 u O LLIVl~ I..:. I l ~ .• lf'JlNC_, rt--t EREF-ORE. IT I~ ESSEN rt/\L Tl IAT ALL POLICE I 1-'.L\lNING ACTI VITIES BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WI rt--1 er/\ TO RC DUCE I •UPLICATION OF EFFOr{T AND ENSUf1..>rvJEN rAL /\ _ .I S r/\NCE DIRE C rt y Wll H 11 IF ( : 1 '/\MI NI!: ~ r-Rv OF IN I I 1 ~ 101~ I JNCI /\SSIFILO// l JNGl /\SS IF I ED// _ IN IH/\C.l, I J IS CHUCl/\L n 1/\-1 /\LL 'H:/\INING BE PL/\NNLn \NITH CPA ro PRf~ VENT THE STl~ENGTH 01· 1111 IR/\QI POL ICL I OHCES FROM Bf IN! D E PLETED SIGNIFICAN rLY /\T ANY ONl- TIME. - - I HE CPA RECOGNIZ E S AND AGR EES THAT SPCCIALIZ ED AND ADVANCED TRA INING FOR SELEC r OFFICERS AND UNITS. INCLUDI N G MANAGEME N T A.NO LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS. ARE F UNDAME N TAL TO /\N 1::- rFE CTIVE POLICE DEVELOPMENl PROCESS. CPA IS D E V ELOPIN G A SPE C IALIZED AND ADVANCED TRAINING PLAN, AND I S PRIORITI Z ING K E Y N EEDS SUCH AS COUNTEHTE RRORISM. INTE L L I G E N C E . OF~GANIZ E D CRIM E. FORENSICS. AND INTERNAL A F FAIRS - - CPA EXPEC I S I 0 F INALIZE A COMPr-tE H E NSIVE PLAN I OH S P E CIALIZED TRA INING BY THE E ND u 1 = .. JANUA F~Y 20tM. A t \NHICH rlM E I T \NILL S ECK roJ~E IGN CONTRIOUTIONS F on rH E SC SPE CIFIC E F FO I~ rs. \NE \NE:l..-COME GERMANV"S OFFER TO ASSIST IN PROVIDING SPE CIALIZED TRAINING . - ... O N CE CPA HAS COMPLETED 11 S I DEN T IFI CATION OF SPECIALIZED THAINING NEEDS. \NE HOPE YOU \NI LL. IN COORDINAl"I O N WITH CF'>A. O F l- EJ~ TRAININ G TH/\T ADDRESSE S n I OSE N EEDS. \NI 11- 1 THE UNDERSTANDING 1 1 IAT IT MIGl- n B E OFFERED IN YOUH HOME COUNTRY SO AS TO DRA\N UPON DOMESTIC EXPERT RESOURCES AND TRAIN E RS. AND THAT YOUR OFrE R INCLUOLS COVE RAGE o r ::: ALL TRANSPOR IA I ION AND ON--l HE-GROUND HOUSING AND LOGISTICS COSTS FOR THE IRAO I STUDE N TS. - - IN ORDER TO B E MOST EFFECTIVE . SUC I I TRAI NINGS• IOULD Bl? D E SIGNED IN COORUINATION \NI n I , I I E CPA TO E N SUH E n-tAT TH E TRAINING AND a ~n I E R ASSISTANCC I S CONSISTE NT \NITH OVE RAI I . GO/\LS, AND CAN R E EFFECTIVELY /\nSORBED ANO APPLIED BY-YI I E IRAQl POLICE. VVI Al so \NISH ro Hf 1rr.::R/\rt- OUI~ INll Hf Sf IN GLl~M/\N POI lCI 1 1 ' /\Ir-JI HS P/\1~ TJCll>/\ rtNO IN Tl II CPI\ LEU I l~/\ININO I f I C>l~T IN I~ 11..: I _l f\f J /\ND \NOUl D \Nf I COMf /'\N l l~IHU t l<_)N I 1 I ; I //H l H!> UNCI /\S~IFI C D// lrar1i Se~urity Forces Generation of Capability: Reality as of 20 Jan 2004 1 c·nc Polici· U onkr A rm ~ F:u:ilitic' Pro1cctinn l\lis~ion Tas~ Force Structure Ttaining ~ ~ ~ Ec1uipping 1 '.! ~ ~ Fielding Sustainability :! 2 ~ Resource~ 2 II KE't : NOTF.S: I. CPA ~n· ices Through CMATT 2. MSC lniliali\• e 3. Dc~ol\cd lo Minbtrics C PA Lrad c.rrr-7 Al>MSI CJn "Lc.11J 3 3 COALITION/IRAQi C2 - TRAN ITIONAL ARRANGEM. ENT IRAQI TR L AUTHORITY HQ COALITION FORCE IRAQ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL M.nisters of Defense, lntenor. Finance, Oil JL.stice and Foreign Affairs. Intelligence A;;11isor. l Coalition Commander a full member) NATIONAL JFHQ OFFICE OF ECURITY cd&i &id !!JON J OPER.ATlONAL COMMANDER COALrflON MILITARY ADVl ORY -SNG i 21 ii!! (NIA, ICDC) OP COM OPCON COO RD COALITION POLICE ADV! ORYTNG !St !Iii (Police, Borders) Joint Coordination Councilc=::> ·co-ords Local Gov. Arm~. ICDC Pohce. Borders, lnfruttucture Protection New Iraqi Iraqi Police ( Divisions Army- ervice Pr ~i ncial ) D1vision &&!dl:and NeJraqi r Brigades -Army Bngade -:: .. - .•. ---~. ·· .. ·. - NII .- • .. .. .-~::·::. . cw raq1 Battalions 0.::::::::::..Army Bngade ______ .::--- Iraqi Police ) entice Local 2 21 i!!JJ&lid PROVINCIAL LOCAL Notes 1) NSC provides a mechanism for co-oid and mt:ntonng by Coal1t1011 Commander 2)_ Iraqi Forces are delegated OPCON to CJF under the Securrty Agreement. 3). JFQ, once estabhsl'led. will prov1 Je ro-ord at Nat1onnl level with Coaltion HO. 4) As the Strategy of Local to Strategic 'handoff develops, and the Iraqi C2 structure ma:ures cor.•.ol .viii lie~ ·ogre s ~1vcly passed to the Iraq\ Transitional Authority via the JGC mechanism PCL Xl error Subsystem: IMAGE Error: Mj ss1ng[)ata Dperator: Roadl'Tl \-900)/NCOs • 100 man team ca. 11 • 33 tms could conduct 2 NCOs 4000 NCOs 4000 NCOs lcontrao.;t change (-26!i-Sl available tc:> assist in tram 800 man Bn month training fc:>r 33 bcu 1 \co111ract traln1119 IAF, !CDC, IBP, or as • IC:OC trng "' 1 mo IBP Bns exl '<.utecJ, nelng shadow officers in US units to • IBP trng ,. 8 wks. • Officen.INCOs coming S Ulll\ CO">l) executeC1 gain e111posure to • Officer/NCO ratio = on line Mar 04; Off/NCO l>Unk cosl} professionalism of US 1:5 trng complete by Jun 04 officerslNCOs • Tmg Facilities avail. Iraqi Soldiers -35,000 -8100 NIA :26,900 Potentially avails 26,900 to •Recruits are willing Any recruits diverted serve m other security elements to serve in other security elements from IAF to other s.ecurity clements could not tiy V1nneU could bee available to Co11tract terminates Jun rerminates Jun 1ra1n ICOC, IBP (capturoo above 04) 04) 1n "Iraqi Offlcers/NCOs" ro"") $609.342 mlllton saved in first year only. If dtvened, other sources must be found lo fond Construction $ , 466M (9 $181M $285M NIA Reallocate funds to ICDC, remaining 18 battalions of ttte IAF during year . 2 bases (Reduced to 3 Police, ISP and 3. mcludlng bases while maritime, air, relam1n9 Addllional $40M saved if military maritim~ . air, military academy not tuooed academy, an Equipment $756.932M $585.546M $171 .:.H36M NIA Realloca1e funds to ICDC, Police, IBP Total $1.6198 $1.0108 I $6 U~.:"A2M NIA Reallocate funds to ICOC, Police, IBP Annex A Team Membership MG Karl Eikenberry, PACOM J5 - Team Leader CPTr l(Aide) COLL j(J5, Middle East) Mr.r· ·· j(OSD Comptroller) CAP Tr l(J8-PBAD) Mr.r !(Spec Advisor DSO) (USMC retired - COLr l(OSD SO/UC) (Army Special Forces I COIN Expert) Civil Affairs - original member of ORHA as Chief of Staff} Mr.r lcspec Assist DSD) Lrc[' l(J5-ME) (Army Special Forces, OEF w/ Mr.r I< Spec Advisor DSD) 5th Special Forces, Middle East FAO) COL.j l(UK) Lrcr kJ8-PBAD) cot.t:·· l(UK-MoD) Mr.r lrn1u1 Ath ii.or. Gm,crnanc:-t> T i:.im • \J\ iwr 10 11.fini~tl) t"ll Oil ·1"""--"""'lr:-:--:~ t:>cni.ir dv1sor (0 Minl''ll') OI r ,~,rrl~ll) l.m ___ ....,1 "I \l11m.1~ ol the lntcri .. r Poh.::c \d\!1~or ---..----'GE'1 \Rel) Abadi. lrnq1 Arm.:J Fo~s l oun5do1 !or Iraqi f.:>r.:~s ........ --...:....:..;;_~ 1 lcJd ,,, c..urn) Fr in)., ln1ern.111onal, pro\ 1d 1ny training for Minisuy of Oil se<:uril}' ~-----.i..;,;. '- .;; c:n ;,;;•;,;; •1.;.,r INCC'I \tr .,...._..-----,! 1nu \tr ._r- _____ _,l 11.:ad CJ I '>c.:Unl) l<>r USl\IO \1 rr- !11.:dnd I '\ \ID lrdtli \llm\ll!r \Ir ' •'P fhllr:tn Ambassador\\ illiarn Oums. Assistanr Secretaf) of State for Near Eas1crn Affair; (i..:n.:r.ll \Iii-..: l.11.\...,,.n. 'i-..iLin~ I K .\mt) Lhi.:1 ,,,. i;;1.11T ( JI r:.; 1.1 G Ricartln "11nd1..:1. C'i'>mni.mding Genoeral. \JTF-7 \Iv fl.1ul l:a1<1n, Con1ma11kh' , , 1111 C5. VJ IT 7 BtJ I I l ••~ m I I 1 111111 llld,1 for Kcbu1ld1nc Iraqi H~c1rlci1~ I .. J:..,_ 11111111r.-:~l 11· l'ttm1n.111Jcr for /{.:l>uddm~ l1<1t11 Ori I I l f'!'t j I I 7 t< 'I H. 1>l.1n11in!; ulfo:,·r ~ u;:11.;1JI. I .\rm .. r IJl\l!>ILlll 18'1 '.\IP B11i;ad.: \dditiunal I tam tunt:ich: ( p \ \Ir \tr I 1l JI MG Run John~ori and 1111 .... ----~ I... h1cfor' Sm ff. P\10 CPA Di:partment of Border Enfor..;emcn1 cnmr \ d\ i~or • 1or Ad\tsor lor Na11onal Sc.:urir) J\ ffair~ 1 LP . .\ F. mfHi~s l'ro1ee11011 l!r\ic.:'\ CPA P"rr!Jc~l Management Offi(•e t P \ lt1lril'>lr11, 1 11r~ \..:~mil) t->r0h:d11in ( 11 11up e :I 1111r~tru c 1ure A.dv1c;or Gro\1p·H IW- "41lr 1 ll.iJr .1111, r.11111s11.:r uf ln1c11or '-m..---....,..,=-----1 Director o f l31>rder f'o ltct! o~ Ul\ 0 1 Uo rder Pollet! .;;;.i.i----"I'"""""::--' T ..isk force Shield ..;;;,;..;i...---r:----'' Iraq Reconsirucrion and Development Corps·Ministry of Science .i...---,.-1 lrnq Rccum lrucuon ilnd D~i.elopment Corps ....,,__ __ ... c =..:.... P:...;· S ccurtr)· Ad ,· i~or .-.-------I O aghd:tl.m~ I rt \,_ \I \J ll) I 1t..:ch (Re:>J'Or!!.1blc 1or JP\ 1n1111ini;J ~~~ (j; (IT.:,b tR.,.)PQn)tbl.: h>t 81 rJcr 1'.11wl tr,1111111.il 111,_.,._. r, ;;,: ,; - r ui:~l~ { R e~pon • 1bk• for IC'OC' 1ramin!t) .liill!iiii!!i~-W.CP \ Go\crfldn,c Tc.mi Jlliiir;;;a.i• {I'\ \IOl tP ltcc) l '\l> Cl'A \ JOI (Police) L' O IUI \I .\ l 0 ~O> \II' H.J1t.1)1,,n .:.: 1>1c<<:lor \ bilr PN\ m~.: lr.aq ... J.:r <;n ~ r3r.i R~t lh1g1d1.:r KJm11n Abdul 1\ttar ~d.Jwn. Comm:sndtr I" tJOl:. K.1r KuirC\:IN c 11 1 ~ ' 11.1,11 ll rx: ua11.1l1 •111 lbghdad C11:- lwncrl. Pubhc Safi:t) Cumm11tee Or ·,11 ..11 ~ \mir1 ;ind lloJm.:J B4J.Jw11 G.:u J;wf;ir Al'Jul Rul Ch1d Qfl•ot. .. c re: :P!ii : r !<. f'11h1.o.: 'iclllt>r •\J\IWr, Uaghd.ul P\llicc .<\1:.1J.:m)' 11 I I Pl I ,:!.,J i\IP CO, 18'1 \1P BDF. Baghcfod IH.1 t\frl ,\t>uul f(,i1111h111 l>m:ctor ol Plan~ RortJcr rolin· \Junth.:T).i B 11J.:1 ~it" COi ilillliiii .. • r.i41 Comm.mJi:r \lunthcry,.:i Border Sue tP I lh:I"\ (t>mma.nd.:r , I 1- FA ( 01 lf\.l r1111111 ml.:r C\lulam .. h.:h hordcr cro:.~inl! f. >Jc1lities Prokchun '>en ice (\I\ Ir I llf e;.;;.r;:_...,) \ STRA TF.GIC Pl.AN STATUS CHECK (as of 6 Feb 04) Summarv by Core Foundation Sec.uritv • ONSA update ongoing • MoJ plan being revised Essential Service- s • No plan update from Electricity • Oil revised (oil company plan)? • Rewrite ofTndustry & MineraJs orJgoing • OFF Milestones presented - awaiting Key Tasks Economy • Re-assessing SOE strategy in light of recent political decisions. Governance • No change to Database .. Strat Comms • Focus remains Governance - Electric, Education and Health campaigns will start when more resources currently working governance are available. Significant Reds Communications - Objective 2-5, Rcstmcturc lTPC and its Business Operations Assessed as RED as a result of current/likely resistance from the mjoisteriaf level. Allltough Dr. Haider al-Abadi bas agreed in principle to the establishment of an lnspeclor General, there has not been a corresponding Jevel of action. The san1c challenge applies for the appoin:uneut of a female de.Puty as recommended/directed by Ambassador Bremer. The second reason this objective 1s coded red overall is because the premise of restructuring the ITPC involves putting into ))lace external controls (auditinglfG) and a clivesture of business units (postal, transmission, networking, ere.) from the c.urrent stru. cture that have been or will very likely result in resistance from the Minister. Beyond the physical efforts required to spin~off individual units, it involves. perhaps more di ffkult intangible factors such perceived loss of power, control, and resources that have been slowed-rolled to date. The mechanisms, pJanning, and soon lhe resources, are in place and underway for each of the supporting tasks, but overall objective success will depend upon the ability to break through the barriers posed by the impact of the intangible factors on the mfoistcr. Transport - Objective 10-2,Enabte Iraqi Pon Authority (IP A) to administer a port of call with intennoda1 capabilities and inland container distribution. While Iraq-funded dredging and supplemental-funded dredging will commence in February, there has not been any maintenance dredging since September 2003, when Great Lakes Dredging Co. completed their work. This is partly because the Iraqi dredge fleet of 7 ships (6 ships non-operational, 1 ship operational) is in disrepair. Also, with 2 operational container cranes, limited waterside transpor1ation capacity is restraining the amount of goods coming through the Pon of Umm Qasr. In addition, because the cranes are not powered by tbe electrical grid, they arc relying on diesel-powered generators for the power supply- which has reduced crane movement capadty down to 70%. Each crane at Urnm Qasr moves 8 containers per hour, while the industry standard for the crane ranges between 20-30 containers per hour. Significant Ambers bv Trend Security MoT expect to have BIAP ready for commercial flights prior to Transition although this wi11 be conditions based, subject to security. Personnel No change to personnel issues rajsed 30 Jan 03. Justice will present to Exec Board 8 Feb 04. • Securil)• Obj 3, KT 2, ST 1 - B y mid-February, staff will be down to 7 Coalition personnel in the Ministry of Justice. No replaceme11ts ide11tifietl despite repeated req11ests, i11cl11di11g requests~hy-11ame of la•iryers euger to come to Iraq as justice advisors. • Sect1rity Obj 3, KT 4, ST 1 ·January 2004: Long-awaited contracted civilian prison experts are slowly beginning to arrive and being assigned duties as correctional trainers and facility-level adrrtinistrators beginning in the greater Baghdad area a.nd then expanding nationwide. Extreme lack of qualified Iraqi staff s11ggests ha11d-over of operational co11trol on J(1ly 1 cot1id have severe adl•erse co11seque11ces. 2 Security Obj 2, KT 3 - Create an EITective and Accountable Polioe System TJ1e CJV POL police J1a11e been .flOH' to arrive ilt couJJtry. 14 i11 Ja11uary. Recr11itme11t held 11p due to contract issttes a11d avuilability of Sttppleme11tal Budgetfimds. Discussion at the Jordan mee1ing is still ongoing and may impact this task. Some delays in trai11i11g due tire difficult)I of niovi11g i11ternatio11al trai11ers illto Iraq. 14 new trainers in January. The details of the revised way forward on international trainers is being worked out in Amman Jordan between MOI leadership and State INL. It will be directly linked and related to the Adnnan Palace move. Essential Services (Comms) Obj 2, KT 7 - Expansion of Wireless Capacity: Awaiti11g arrival of new CPA staff to fucilittUe project. Funding Security Obj 2, KT 1 - Develop and apply consistent vetting policies and processes: A review of options has been written by MOI policy and PRB f11ndi11g will 1101 f1111d tlte project. No 11ew funds lia11e been iJe11tified at tlris time. Security Obj 2, KT 3 - Create an Effective and Accountable Police System R.ecruitniellt /ield up due to co11tract issues a11d ject ratlter t1un1 as origilially e11visaged tts a sta11d-alo11e project) Essential Services (Water Resources) Obj 8, KT 3 - Develop fu11 range of Municipal Services and inclusive delivery mechanisms ...... : Development planning processes are still at an early stage but have the potential ofhi-lateral (DFID) capacity building and support. (DFID-MMPW S11pporl Project now ill abeyatrce, .but CSR P1·ojectfortl1comillg wliiclt can accommotltlte some of these requireme11tJ,) WitltdrawaJ of all UN expatriate staff lra111peri11g progress 011 global tec/Jnicn/ coordi11atio11. (New UN analysis underway for potential return; new UN Strategy Document highlights Urban Management and Planni11g as a priority input). 4 Essential Services (Water Resources) Obj 9, KT 4 - Capacity Building within the Ministry: Approximately 120 employees from the defunct Defense Surveying group are now under the Mo WR. This group needs to be retrained to operate and function utilizing modem equipment and techniques. This effort cannot be started u11til the 11ew Mo WR orga11itatio1tal structure is completed. IG lde11tified for selectio11 11111 was later selected by a11otlter Ministry. Essential Services (MoLSA) Obj l l, KT 3 - Convert Social Service Programs into Economic Development Tools: 76,629 jobs have been created under an initiative, the National Employment P-rogram, that seeks to create 100,000 new public work jobs. Over 150 personnel who were identified for jobs, but lacked tlte proper skills, started vocational training courses at the Baghdad training center (3 / 17 centers are open). 5 /l Develop Iraqi defense capabililies and oversight mechanisms. Key Task POC 1 January • 31 March (01) 2004 f April · 30 June (02) 2004 1 July· 30 September (Q3) 2004 ·Onwards Slatus Narrabve 4 Develop Iraqi defense capabilities and oversight mechanisms 1 tional Security System Development ) PJar. for national secunty A[>pOLrtl Secretary General (by policy/defeose strategy !'Ind early Apn 1 04) lnstltullons. Through interaction w1lh Iraqis e~pcrts in dosed seminars. NSAC and GC Security Committee. Appolni New Defense Minister (by 1 Ar>rl! 04) 2 DSA funcllons integrated Into MOD and JFHQ, partial move into new building March LTCr ~.., ____ _, Compos•llOO role and function of the NSAC being curity Develop Iraqi defense capabilities and oversight mechanisms Key Task POC 1 January • 31 March (01) 2004 1 Apnl • 30 June (02) 2004 1 July • 30 September (03) 2(1()4 ·Onwards Status Narralive acceptance Seek approval for MOD organization/mission/Policies 6 Consultation with GC Security Committee. Iraqi experts, strateoic seminars re NCA T 1.___.....,..._,..., r ""•sfer responsibility lo Iraq 10 anage, mak.ing payment thro h the banks lo individual accounts. Policy decision on routine stipend p{ogram and double.dipping.. Job matching program ln Iraq[ hands. 2 !OM registration fOOTIS in MOL possession and being processed 3 4 5 6 Develop Iraqi defense capabilities and oversight mechanisms Key Task POC 1 January • 31 Marcil (01) 2004 1 April - 30 June (02) 2004 1 July· 30 September (031 2004 • Onwaflis Status Narrative 3 • Iraqi Defence Capacity Building JFHO lead staff mov rnto M OD Annex (Mar) 1st Bde HO operational In Mosul (Jan) Draft !AF Force Development Plan 2 Define NIA employment concept 3 Bns 3 & 4 graduate (Jan and Feb) Pl & Coy Comds Cse (560) In JOR(lo Mar) Bn & Bde Comd and Staff Cse (138) in JOR NCO Cses (1250) at t;ttry Mar-Apr 8 Plans made for Integration of most military suppoct Into civil ecxinomy and ln confunctlon with other minlslries. Refurblshmenl underway or baslrig infrastructure to support eJ(pandecJ force, harmonised with graduation plan Train the Trainers Pr<>gramme (May-A1,19} May-Sep open haql Military Academy Selection of Mllitary Academy cad els 3" Snf Sta!f attend overseas s1aff colleges. Slvruary 07, 1004 Securit)' February \, 2004 MINUTES Meeting of the CPA Executive Board February t, 2004 Baghdad, Iraq General Kellogg called to order an Executive Board session to review Electricity and the Strategic Plan. ELECTRICITY SECTOR UPDATE: LtColr... lseoior Advisor for the Ministry of Electricity (ME), updated the Board oa the Ministry's Strategic Plan. (N.B., This oral update has not yet been incorporated into the CPA Strategic Plan itself.) r !briefed that four key tasks support ME's overaU objectives: a.) Improve generating capacity to 6,000 MW (from 3,200 - 3,500 MW in July 03) by July 1; b.) lmplement fully policy on allocation of electric.al power, through fair load shedding for domestic and commercial customers~ c.) Publish Electricity Sector Strategy document; and d.) Minimize sabotage and improve security. [""" !reported peak generation is at its highest since October and overall generating capacity has reached record levels with much Jess variability. The Ministry's generation capacity goal o( 6000MW seems achievable by July 1. Total demand is increasing with economic growth, but the current measure of7000MW should be met by year-end. The plan to increase generation is a three-pronged approach - add new generating plants, enhance the output of ex1stillg units through maintenance and rehabilitation, and increase imports. The MB, the C01:ps of Engineers and USAID/Bechtcl are now executing projects to increase generation. Add.itionally, Early Action projects funded through the Supplemental are being tasked through CPA 's Project Management Office (PMO) and wiU commence in February. Tbe Board heard tha. t load shedding will decrease as generation, transmission and distribution systems are strengthened. A revised allocation policy wilt be submitted for approval by the end of February. Revisions are necessary to account for the increasing level of generation, the growing demand from and importance of industrial sites, and speci fie political realities across various regions in Iraq. Reporting systems are being strengthened to enhance intelligence of power on/power off hours nationwide. The Ministry is making progress in distributing power to areas with little or no generation capacity. Ongoing projects to rebuild high voltage power lines and rehabilitate distribution systems in Baghdad are also contributing to more balanced and predictable load shedding. UNCLASSIFlED The Board noted the Electricity Sector Strategy document includes both a technical Master Plan and a "soft side" strategy for sustaining the Ministry post-CPA. The final consolidated document will be published prior to June 15. The appointment of an Inspector General by the end of . February is an important component to ME capacity- building efforts. The Board agreed that the infom1ation campaign should stress Coalition generating capacity goals are much higher than under Saddam, and that )ncreasi.ng demand is a positive economic indicator. It should also manage expectations with the most accurate schcduJe and rate information possible. ME is trying to familiarize Iraqi customers with their personal demand statistics by reading meters and issuing statements of usage. Payments from April to December 2003 have been forgiven, but the Ministry' s plan to begin actual bHHng in March 2004 raised concerns from some Board members who believed no billing should occur until electrical service is more reliable. LtCol r ~ountered that it was critical to have billing and collection mechanisms firmly in place before the June transition. Revenue would be nominal since rates wm remain at extremely low pre-war levels - no tariff increases or special fees are planned in the short term. [ r !advised a comprehensive electricity infrastructure security plan will be developed before t11e end of February. He noted that three meter readers already have been shot, and sabotage of electricity infrastructure remains a ctitical concern. The plan wilJ combine the efforts of the Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS), Coalition military forces and contracted security teams. Additionally, aH Force Protection Service (FPS) Transfers of Authority wi 11 be complete by the end of March. r boncluded that the Minjstry of Electricity has suJlicieot capital and seems Oil track for transition. The biggest challenge would be training its 42,000 employees in everything from turbine operations to senior management. CPA has been working toward this end with USAID and Bearing Point and hopes to develop a partnership with a western utility. STRATEGIC PLAN STATUS CHECK: r I Office of Po~icy Planning and Analysis (OPPA), reviewed the updated Strategic Plan. Most elements of the phm bad been updated aside from Electrici.ty. Mo I, ONSA, CJTF-7, Communications and Ministry of Industry were revising their updated plans. A new plan is being developed for the OFF program. Key findings of the updated plan included: • No tasks had worsened to Red • The strategic communications program remains focused on Governance; Police, Electric, Education anO!U.4 TlON 1!>45.0 USI\ KK AGRICUl TURE $2&.>,0 AUS GO/JH COMMUNIClff!ONS S!3S,0 USA. KK HO USJNG $130.Q Ust, KK T~chr\ i c:il LABO R ANO SOCIAL Af'PAlRS s1oe.o IJSll GQfJli Advisor O ISl'lACEMENT & t.ltGAA TION $105.0 PR'l' GO/JH EUUCATION $93 ,.!l USI\ GDIJ11 CE.NTRAL BANK $1611 rot A ~ WAl'ER R!: SOIJRCES $7:>.0 USA Kl< l!lGllER H lUC ATION USA 0 0/Jtl FOREIGN .o,A;AJRS u~ GO/ JB INOUSlRY & MINERALS USA Kt< TliADE USA, AR HUMAN RIGftrS I.Ill GOI JH E.. NVIEinistry by ministry, makes sense, based on comparative advantage. Similarly. tnegroup of countries that can and wjsh to support advisory work will vary from ministry to ministry. • Senior Advisers should make rec-0mmendations as to which countries should be involved. by ministry. and which should have the lead. From the plans, the Executive Board should assess the risks that: • lraqis m~ 'Y reject Coalition presence i.n some Ministries afl.er 1 July • Iraqis will value patronage appointments over merit appointments and tum over Ministry staff to a lower levcJ chau is healthy to Jong term success • Coalition home agencies will not support these personnel requirements These risks may be mitigated by early action to: 3 Version February 4 2004 • Plan with flexibility e.g. Iraqis may accept non·US or non·westem advisers • Champion a "new phase w. ith new requirements" for the .Iraqi effort, - using US State Departmcm . • UK FCO etc for liaison. Risk Management for Essential Services and Processes 9. As well as carrying out these assessments for a.IJ Ministries, it will be important to identify those individual Minisrries (or processes n•ithin all Ministries) where there is both a high risk of service interruption after l July and \\there this would lead to serious na.tional or international consequences. 10. The Board and the Administrator will decide which Minislrics or processes carry lhc most severe consequences of sen•ice failure. These Ministries are likely to include those responsible for Finance, Infrastructure, Security and some of the essential Public Services. The processes may include the establishment of secure mechanisms to pay salaries and to tackle corruption. 4 Version February 4 2004 ANNEX 2 EXAM.PLE OF TRANSITION MODEL FOR M l NrSTRY OF DEFENCE Cot\te):t • Ministry of Defense will be staffed with Iraqis n. o earlier than laJe March. For a ministry which has undergone such significant change, longer than three months of support in the form of mentoring wilt be necessary. • Visiting US Department of Defence Security Assessment Team discussed this issue with CPA Director of Security Affairs on 17 January 2004. Approach Suggested by Director National Secu r ity Affairs: • Provide a small number oftbe Iraqi MoD civil servants each a mentor (advisor). Place these as mentors to secoud or third tier ministry leadership. • Recruit these mentors Crom sitting or retired appropriate levels within respective coalition ministries/departments. Not to be contracted. • These advisors (mentors) need to be in place by late March/early April to minimize the chance they will be removed after June and provide the needed continuity through the transition period. • Provide advisors for key positions such as National Security Advisor, Finance, Acquisition, Personnel. • Move quickly to request personnel to fill these new manpower requirements. • Develop a central body to administer this program (reporting, adm.in/log support). • Use a lead country (UK) model with multinational advisory team (e.g. UK, Spain, etc) as 5 · · Build Justic~. Key Task - · · - · . - POC 1 January - 31 Marcil (01) 2004 1 April - 30 Juoe (02) 2004 1 July • 30 September (03) 2004 • Onwaros Status Narrative 3 Build Justice 1 • Establish independent judit:iary ProVlde ildv!ce regarding judicial independence and structure. Ctimtnal procedural rights, and other constilulionat advice as requtred. 2 Transfer administration .ind pay of judges from Ministry of Justice lo Council of Judges. Assess needs by March 1. Provide advice regarding Judioat Independence and slrucrure, criminal procedural rights, and other constltuUooal adl/Jce as required. Effect t. ransler by June 1. ..... r ___ __,jMoJ Provide advice regarding judicial independence and ~tructure. criminal procedural rigl'lts. anc:I other constilutlonal advice as required. Awaiting opportuniry to input re fundamental transitional law and constdution. Saturtla)'. ftbruor.v 07, 2004 Stcuriry Key Task 1 January • 31 Marth (01) 2004 2 0 Reform Judicial System Central Cntnina· 1 Court of traq seff. sufflClency; Incorporate CCC into Transitional law. with altemauve case referral mecMnism 10 enable referrals by either the Coalition or a designated Iraq!. Increase CCC throughput, Produce lestlmony frorn redeployed soldle.rn 11ia VTC. Add 30 Coalltlon lnvesllgators to assist In assembling eVldence for variQus ca.ses. 2 Physical security for cnmlnal courthousu; lde!llify for tortilli;;atfO(l or rel-xation appro,Wnalely t2 prtority courthouses by Feb. 21. Ascenain current FPS presence on courthouses by March 1. FPS TOA complete on March 1. Prepare to a. ssume FP·S payroif by April 1. 3 Judicial Re..,_ Committee: Complete initial wiling and reappointments by March 1. Build Justice POC 1 April , 30 June (02) 2004 1 July· 30 September (0.3) 2004 ·Onwards Status Narrative By June 30. CCC shcxild handle 10 investlgallons. 5 tnais pet' week PtOVJde such assistance as ne.r Iraq) gov't desires, Continue to provide evld. ence and testimony. Addition of 30 in11eSliQators wWd be Vf!IY helpful, Physical security for courthouses: TIW U.S. Mar&hals should amve by Aptil 1. lo begin a!lsessing oourthouses 10< seOJnty and rettimmeod fortlficatton plans or r. elocation. By June 30. the assessments aod SllCIJri\y recommendattons should be complete and Implementation begi.fn. By April 5, break ground on first priority courthous. e fortificalion projects identified ln prev1ous quarter. Throughout 1l11s quarter, continue 10 h1crease FPS force and presence to replace Iraq! police. Judoda1 Review COmm1 t1ee: All appeals rrom removal by tne Committee will be ad)udlcated b)' June 3o. The Comm.illee wi!J rematn available. during this quarter f0< special cases. review Continue lo fund and superinlend 1mpleme11tation 01 U.S Marshals' oovf!MU~e fonifloaUon and telocallOll plans. We are seeking to oonclude a mem0!'3J'ldurn of unde.rstanding with tile v.s. Ma1$11als service to supply 7 Iola! marshals. of whom 2 would WXk on courthouse security. S75M avalla. ble ffom supp, for courthouse and /udiclal security, Jumm1ttee fundiOl\S W'ltl 1>e assumed by Iraqi Judicial SupervillOfY Council. About 90% of estimated 850 judges and prosecutors relliewed. As ot' 2J'6/04, hearings have been held on 509. About 160 have been removed, ol which 141 have appealed. Pag' 16 o/31 St•c'lrit)' Key ' Task 1 January - 31 Mard'l (01) 2004 4 C-Ourt-appointed defense counsel: Work with Council of Judges and mointor court. s to ensure appointment or defense counsel for aH misdemeanor and felony defendants. 5 Training for judges and prosecutors to inculcate nonns of due process, human rights. and rule of law: During this quaner. classes from the International Law Assistance Consortium {II.AC) will be held regarding international humatl rights law (Feb. 28), judicial independence (March 19). 6 Establish organization in Ministry Saturtla,1•, Feb111ar')' 0(, 200.J Build Justice POC 1 April • 30 June (02} 2004 1 July • 30 September (03) 2004 · Onwards Status Narrative of judges as to Whom new evidence or complaints arise. Court-appointed defense counsel: Design and conduct lwo- or lhree- day training courses for defense counsel. Work with Council of Judges to design and implement mandatory qualification test. Court-appointed defense counsel; Continue training defense counsel, providlng advice to Council of Judges regarding qualification standards, seleclion processes. etc. CPA Order 52 promulgated in January enables the Council of Judges to Increase defense counsel fees and pay retroactive defense-counsel fees. which should Increase the number or de!endants represented. Appointments still sporadic but this should improve as rees Increase and amounts due for services already rendered are paid. Implementation beyond Baghdad will depend largely on regional Ministry of Justice perao!lnel. IL.AC courses already scheduled, attendees slaled. Training for judges and pn:isecutors to inculcate norms of due process. human rights. and rule of law: !LAC courses on intematlonal humanitarian law (April 10), intemational human rights law (April 30). One additional ILAC course on intemational humanitarian law will be held during this quarter. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Assistance Training program {OPDAT) Will conduct five •qufck-start• training courses on CPA directives. due pn:icess. human rights, and rule of law beglnnlng April 1. each with about 40 cnm1nal judges and prosecutors. Two U.S. Marshals should anive Devise a comprehensive training curriculum with the Council of Judges and begin to implement; OPDAT "quick-start" classes continue; ILAC am! other NGO classes lo continue also. By January 1. 2005. all 400 criminal judges and prosecutors should have· received at least some lrainnig. Continue providing technical We are seeking to conclude a Pagc/7ofJI Key Task 1 January - 31 Maid\ (01) 2004 ot JusUCl!l to prolll(!e personal secuoty for 400 criminal judges and prosecutOl'S: 500 PSO guards trained. 7 Expedite detention-lo-trial lime by consolidating police lock-up and pre-lrlal detentlon center$, hlring more court investigalor$, 8 Establlsh witness-protection organization ln Ministry of Justice: Conclude memorandum or uoderstanding with U.S. Mar.ihals to provide 3 marshals lo se! up thlsservtce. 9 Implement basic court-po{~ pnsons comm. unications Sy$1em. Sat11t diO'i Fd1r11ar)' 07, 200./ Bulld Justice POC 1 April - JO June (02} 200C 1 July - JO September (03) 2004 - Onward$ S!ah.1s Narrattve by Apot 1 to to help sel up Jud1c1at protection service lo Ministry of Justice. By June 30, \tle servire should be establfslled al\d protecting several dozeri Judges asS1stanoe. By January 1, 2005. all 400 !U<.tges and criminal prosecutDrs should be protected. memorandum of undersland1ng Wilh the U.S. Mal'S/131. S Sel'\llce ID supply 7 total marshals, of wham 2 wou~ wor1! on per&onal Judicial security. $75M a11ailanle from supp. ror counhouse and J udicial seC\Jnty. Continue· to shorten detention-lo· trial lime significantly· (on the o~t of Q()ll!)llJOlCnl 1Nl31lr Pr'l!ll lor CQa!!lloo 5l,pid 1s· 0c.'gln invos119atk>ns f'iQVlile · teocllnital ad\loc:e 31\d ejemQnt 31.i , ~lr.!1'l>fl9 eu'oiit~iit.1~ ~l JO F•Jt a:rl!JI JuN 1! ~t lri.1fbt-Q-0s 2 JUpto(lll ll!IW & proseculof\;;I ve~. rema•QI, 30, 1 ~tier JurKI 30 f•!IShed ado,i\;e IQ ttie lraqo JudlCial ralnilat.amen:s Suriet'<\$\ot\ CCMTirNlell, tl:il!C \WI M~cl> 2 • June JO. JRC n1101'kible ror new ell~, Cl)mml.s<;iOll co PU* ~fl(egffly ·~;uwtp" of l¢o!i8 etld$ !t2ll Jullel 30 AU ~ppeals rtso!VtO. JP.C d<>5o1Veo. b 1\tt\ioni iuwrned by lt;,qi Jlldic:ial Supt•J\l'dio<> O!mpletOit:k);, Coo!Jnue to 1mplemcn1 sectucy plan J~ruary 1. 200s· AJI 400 3,2.7 ""''ice l.O pt'Q\fde l)IHllOM.'11 ~ ~ (Sl!D(~ JIC""-11)' A1J11 ¢:.Ilse ·~iy. pRWi:lecl ... ~arm or , ~ I« juc!ges aod ~s ctlmlnal j(j(!ges ariu '400 ~ tlJdilU I) ;UlJP.) June.30 &-11 peeal &ectJ'•l:Y for ClMlirl.'ll 21.J S Mar<Jll, OQ1"1hou$U (shnoHd arr~ ~Y A(Y~ $76M i..:lud1n9 pliys'ic'al S10Mln~~;s, F'e!lf\laf)l 21 l de~1ify lix lort1lc:a00<1 Qt felQC(JIJOn COnl.1rue I!) lmptemtrt FPS and l.:n Clhse "8Clriy, pr O\lldetl It ~r""" ~c ~IJtPIQJCJl~'lOUSe ltMeu- with U.S M.arS/falf .Mit30 ~J>Jl~FPSQft•a~ctM~ . retu oss!!Ssnfents comple!~ 5 E~~n > .v.>$11y 10 lUS.I .~ ptofect "'1~sa (5~ atrfvi: 'by Aprl ~ (p'O~ ... llf;lll) W•oa ' 3.2.2 M3"''13h an.11;1>1$ lemllPJ'lllti prQl'eding 'Ml•~. $1.Jn forr11Wiletl piOgfall1 li«lledot rrogran'I 1) fer lrll1Q•le!m prOIQc:liotl, i>ciJdlng •t!IOc:alit'Jll ~al IU1I caP3l:l(y 1or flllon\t """ IS1 case& e Court ~!ld oofen.<;$ eoonsel 1 lo Bagtid;)(J {rl S2.1M fprovtltd i'1 tr:>ql NGO iiSSlsl&OliO. e 0 Jure 30· · cM"-"" OlllJft·~l1!>Qlllle<1 111lQ ·!uOO«I e&sr.rioe Dulldlng IJ'Qgra"1; Ja/Uaf}' I, 2005· Ally 3 2.4 10>•,11a!J,e.te ;l!f tl!b1y and. ~Jl!lf pia<$J. pl!J .l 18 OIJ00<.-11 C£riU, !LAC d.:-~ <;(luns.it av~•:illl« IO 31 (t!llllly ancf 1n1!lit!mK t maroa:uy q1SSJJo:;;ald Other support Prionlin ll!roug11 Ju f>l> JO. 2oo.I tfl 31) .. 200'4 s Sokfay rt.ll prooeny r1g1 11$ F ollow-on goals lhrobgh Januaty Ti!Tl"ll. M Old 1, 1005 June 3i), 2QO.I • Stral. '9tC J~n~riry 1, 2005 plan elemtnl 3 !1 .1 9 Central Cl\tnloal Coun •elf-sume1en1 3 (Ill pt;icn) OQmpo.ner eq,ulpmeN. /\prjl t: A.sse5l sbtus Cl ~ o..-n«sr.p, 1ec ~ll\lca1 1ra"11<19 fCCO'etred by ~Of <1 d~s09n.1ted lr;iql a:..NflOl'I a'1tl lraQl3, $1JpPOrt evlclelltiary l>nd S0111~ lr1·1c51iQat!Vi! Ju<>r.30 CCC~ lmeru plan 1t1a111me pl.ace). jllus , 8 pr\sons ln~\ed 10 dccrea~ "1/esl\jutiQn-lo--11\at lim& m pl;ln sJg~ to go>....-- reglorol) advl50(s-- T r:a~~J>Odilnes, 11, lml)kd'cjl'e ~-,,met11 l)nlVlclellirJsupP.) oeiwoen courtl!ou~. !Xifr». pri3qns prl$OllS communicICe . . 3.45 ~ystam QPlln11irl9 'wi:hOOl Coil!"Oll~ Page2 of 3 Ministry or Jusll ~ Co.tllJlon f>Ot11<>111tOI FIJTIOlng roqu)roo Olner suppor1 Tllll~ll J>e t!l!ough June 30, . 2004 Pr1 orl1fes lllrougti June 30, 200rdlld:l lC~lrl~~ri\lf115 ~tr~ J!JJWl('f '. ~· μ i.u ClPD,_T,Qll'lo.f l!Wf' ~llYOl'IO~ LJw IQf 17 fll®et j) IWO&~in. jlnCI • 1 ~ c:rilf\fW~iind I US"10) cvmrfell'!I ~~h \G, 11.A.Ceotnt! kl.~ fndepe:~e IOr .f!I )li fO crJmlnal jud!)~ and J)IO$e(:u\0<$, 10 1atl11•"1u '*'I.ii CPA dir®We:J, il'!11 dl/e ll t:llr114111';lt~ ti-.!~"1aNll ~ cmlP'Citd. 11.,i\C tr.if1.ll•~ fl'Jlot"ll JJUV\J90 10 lOf\, ~ OPD.AT '11Wc:k>t1.1!1 ' ttlil.q iJtt$lolis ccndticteQr~ K:tllld~. each Wilh~O ~miln.iJ lu<:ltlQJ "nd l"<»N:IJW•: ex>111p\llOfl ftOm l ~W ..,,,.,..., by 11'41(1! M OJ I'- OI J\Kllet , I llC!lbn Olfi<.~flOll!Off ... Ooi Tr.msla \ion suppotl M~b If> G;ueite pi!1nted kJ1rW,1l1dy w ~ lrom Sl:llo l><'pt "' C;»!,11(1'1~~ ~!Oaft1ll ~or·~~ltia 'Qlilclt.s!ac!"~ . c;oriiwel1anid COlll,,,.ercl.ij law . Gau:tte pul>l~ ""1h ro eo;t1Mn Wu1ibl'l!:e ~· ~~ ~ •~. Conlt!hlJIQll;ll (!Cll/lte t~~ldM I F!Aly lunc1Jo111ng CGUnMI a.ajalJle 10 an l!!lony ..i mi-a00< program"'"" ..rinelnal lime !i)!f11ficanlly, on the ordef of a mo11th ... 1~ Plan lormlAm:ed arod 1· l\Jty ~l'G coun· lmpl!!mentllloo inillated f!J< poea · pnsons cornruntcalioos 5ystem trcslatMneou$ collllllUnlcaUons comrrunlcatlor\S ~QOU<1~. police, prisons: $~em Opeloeeds 4,500 ~. 94,000 MW.floors. Develop and initiate infoonaliO!'l ca"11)illgn to support alloca~1on policy. Generation exceeds 4,200 MW and 90,000 MW-hours. Iraqi Government takes power. CPA dissolves. Task Status No. Now 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 A Strategit; Plan Key Tasks "Provide electricity serviees that 111eet 11atio11a/ 11ee1Js. " Recent Key Tasks Remarks Trend t Improve generating capacity to 6,000 MW (from 3,200 - 3,500 MW 4, 112 MW peak, 87,486 in July '03) by 1 July 2004 .. Generation for 28 Jan at MW-hours total. Fully implement policy on Focal points are t allocation of electrical power, Baghdad, southern through fair load shedding for govern ates. domestic and commercial consumers, . Publish Electricity Sector Strategy document. <==> Minimize sabotage and improve ontracted security for t se. curity. rebuilding transmission lines goes away in Feb and March. Expd Status June 30 A Crosstt•a, lk a11d StatHs lmprtJve, Generating Capacity ttJ 6,000 MW - - . . Task Status Recent Key Tasks Remarks No. Now Trend Expd Status June 30 Improve generating capacity to 6,000 MW (from 3,200 - 3,500 MW in July '03) by 1 July 2004. 1.1 A generation between January and generators now A t Bring online 900 MW of new June 2004. producing 64 MW. Northern Industrial site Increase capacity of existing units SOMO units now 1.2 A MW by June 2004 through A t (in place before January) to 5,000 maintenance and rehabilitation producing 145 MW. programs. Increase imports by 300 MW between January and June 2004. 1.3 A ¢=! Transformer repair/replacement required in Zahko. Work on new line from Kuwait beginning. Crosswalk tl' nd Stat11s Implement Fair ElectricityA/locatio11 Po./ic· E Task Status No. Now Recent Key Tasks Remarks Trend Expd Status June 30 Fully implement policy on allocation of electrical power, through fair load shedding for domestic and commercial customers. Rewrite, obtain approval and Policy revisions address 2.1 A prior to 29 February 2004. power, increased t publish revised allocation policy increases in available Accompany revised policy with industrial demand and information campaign. specific regional concerns. 2.2 A mechanisms and reporting systems survey of Baghdad t Improve intelligence-gathering Commenced detailed for power availability at the distribution system. customer !eve. I. 2.3 A governates primarily through t Enforce load shedding between Issues primarily in south. Ministry of Electricity channels. 2.4 A distribution systems and remote completed 24 Jan 04. t Improve Baghdad low voltage Ma'ari substation rehab controls. 2.5 A t Repair six key 400kV transmission One of six lines lines before June 2004. energized. Cross1•'alk a11d Stat11s Draft Lo11.g Term Strategy Key Tasks Remarks Task Status Recent No. Now Tr-end Publish Electricity Sector Strategy document. 3.1 A t Receive preliminary Bearing Point work before 15 Feb 04. Develop and publish technical Master Plan priorto 31 May 04. 3.2 A <==; 3.3 A <==; Develop and publish long-term strategy for the Ministry of Electricity prior to 15 Jun 04. 3.4 A <==; Establish the Ministry of Electricity Inspector General Office prior to 29 Feb 04. Work ongoing, concentration on transmission grid. Cost of service, billing structure, accounting practices. organizational structure. Looking at new , candidates. Expd Status June 30 Reviewed initial input. Crosswa· lk 011d' Status Minimize Sabo· tgge and l1nprove Sec11rity lask Status Recent Key Tasks No. Now Trend Minimize sabotage arid improve securHy. 4.1 A t Develop and implement electricity infrastructure security plan before 29 Feb 04. 4.2 A t Complete Transfer of Authority at FPS sites by Mar 04. Remarks Plan must combine E PSS/GJTF ~?/ contractor s. ecurity efforts. Verifying payroll for all MSC sites. Expd Status June 30 Status Report by Key Tll.\'ks Objective Key Tuk Security 1 Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment 4 Deter external aggression and subversion CotJtinue. (CJTF-1) Begin to transfer external ~ecurity responsibility rrom CJTF·7 to Iraqi Ministry of Interior. Border policy being further refined. Ar Ar border crossing online for Hajj influx. Objective Status Key Task Status Amber Amber Amber O CJTF-7 continued border security operatfons in December. Engagement wiU1 neighboring countries will lead to increasing cooperation on border eontrol. Hajj plan11lng continues to facilitate the movement of pilgrims. As of 1-25-04 4000+ people had been moved successfully across lhe border. Diplomatic efforts to discourage eJn between police and courts, and appointing more investigative judges. J'rid11r, J111111ar)' .UI, 2004 Objective Status Key Tasl( Status Amber Amber D Defense co'unsel appointments being made sporadically because attorneys not being paid and defendants not physically appearing in court (withjudges conducting ·initial appearances• by reviewing only the defendant's paper file). Efforts underway to redress both problems. Discussions undertaken with director of Judicial College toward accomplishing this task. Discussions will continue. Guarded optimism is warranted that reforms will be implemented in 2004. For example, the director has agreed to · ins'titute a new course on human rights for the current group of 32 students. Underway. Security remains extremely problematical. Ther.e ha11e been approximately 300 cr iminal trials in Iraq since the end of the war, 70 of which were felony trials. The pace has quickened as more investigative judges have been appointed·-34 in Baghdad, versus a prewar 12. Pal(~ 5 of JI Objective Key TasJc Develop ability to investigate and prosecute terrorism and Olflllnized crime cases. Objective Status lvatecf detention and prison facilities. Receive new equipment purchased and/or· donated for the traql Corrections Service (/CS) and assimilate new items Into operational practices. Specialized eq(lipmant and operational components, for example, inmate transportation services, are incorporated into dally operational activities .. Both purchased as well as donated vehicles and security equipment are arriving regularly and allocation to the required locations is on-going. r. ' Q.(J· · . I (!C. &' ~ l ti Tf! le!ltWt , I · #h PaKr 4 of.JI Objective Key Task Continue to recruit and train Iraqi offlcers to operate reactivated facilitie. s as weJI as actively involve the on·sile civilian prison expert. s in employee mentorship and directed training of leadership s, taff. Renovate a new headquarlers for the /CS and national department•level staff operations. Obje.ctive Status Key Task Status Re.novaticm of the new national · headquarters buildi.ng compleK for the Iraqi Corrections Service Is close to completion with a target completion date of 01FEB04. The training academy ls In operation and expansion of this process is in the developmental stag~ . 5 Establish Anti-corruption Program Coalition personrrel arrive In Iraq, identify and vet Iraqi staff, assemble curriculum, have law esfab/l'shing Commission on Public Integrity enacted by Governing Counc. 11 1 b&gin training and operations. Ambe.r D Draft order under discussion with Governing Council Anti-Corruption Committee. Personnel plan and tfmefine complete, but timing for arrival of personnel in doubt. I bl :f CUh J Sth~t -· f!ifji. ·~ · fJ' Frida)', Ja"""'J' JO, 20(}.I Pat:i• .·of JJ Objective Key Task Objective Status Key Task Status Essentia1 Services Amber 1 Provide Electricity Services that Meet National Needs 1 Improve generating capacity to 6,000 Megawatts (from 3200-3500 in July '03) by 1 July 04 Amber Amber D USACE work br,ngs another 90DMW (derated) additio(la/ geQeratlon online: SOMO Rehab: 270MW (nameplate} Nab: 126MW North Industrial Sites: 76MW Dibls 4/5 Rehab: 68MW Beljl Mobile Units: 184MW Befj Unit 2: 159MW Hilla New Unit: 2SMW Oudu.s 5161118: 172MW Bu.zurgan Nfiw Unil; 43MW Peak Generation averaging near 3,600MW. TFRIE is executing its projects while transitioning into the new Gulf Regi'on Division. Transmission line installation generally progressing well, new generation projects generally delayed. SOMO generators coming on line mid-January with 2TOMW . Spring MaintMance Program begins in late Feb with aver 60 unit.s offline for scheduled maintenance. Amber D 2 Pully implement policy on allocation of electrical power, through fair load shedding 3 hrs on/3 hrs off for domestic and cornmen:ial consumers Objective Key Task Further Improve compliflnce with the nafJonal allocation policy. Investigate methods of monitoring and enforcement. Continue . to develop .SCADA system to better control electrlclly distribution. · Continued /QIJd shedding. but with decreasing levels of 'otr time. Major improvements to begin ln APR 04. Start evaluation of results for SCADA rollout. Governorates provide sub-allocation p/a(1S for power to industry and residential customers in their areas. 3 Publish draft document of long-term strategy for Iraqi electricity sector The long-term strategy will continue to be retrnect. Projects Identified 'llnd selected by the CPA shall be planned Jn detail by the e:1ecutlng party, be that Bechtel, the PMO or other organltation, A transition plan for the Ministry of Electricity, encompassing organizational strvcture, training, staffing levels, fina11cial processes, etc, shall be developed. Objective Status Key Task Status Power allocation policy development continues for both commercial and residential customers. Monitoring and enforcement methods continue to be assessed. TFRJE Installation of a SCADA system In Baghdad will greatly improve. load shedding through rnmote control of switching statiotrs. This system will eventually be fnstafled nationwide. Amber O Beari11g Point personnel are conduGting flmmalal aod revenue analyses, personnel reorganization pla11s, bWi"g and collection systems. over.all cloatrical system l11yout plans. Minimize 'Sabotage and improve securf(y Amber D eo. Hf{ . . t , tJ • Mn ry v 1t Jin .n ~n~t ,.ri1laJ'• J1m11arJ' ln, 10il4 P1Jt:<' fJo/JI Objective Key Task Deploy Ministry of Electricity EPSS 'Power Police' to taJ ~ c1 u; 4Jt ,~111:.e Pagr T5of.H Objective Key Task Objective Status Key Task Status 10 Restore Economically-Strategic Transportation Infrastructure 2 Enable Iraqi Port Authority (IPA) to administer a port of call with intermodal capabilities and inland container distribution. Strengthen Water·side Cargo Transport Operations: Establish Port Task Force to coordinate suP'plemental funding. Restore grain facility to full operation. Reestablish full cargo handling capability by restoring two container cranes at Umm Qasr. \ Continued dredging at Khawr Az Zubayr. Complete perimeter fencing and .security lighting. Remove obsolete equipment and infrastructure to modernize port operati<;ms. Standardize crash/fire equipment at ports. Amber Amber D Strengthen Water-side Cargo Transport Operations: In early January 2004, Port Task Force, which consists of Mo T, Mol, PMO, USAfD, the military, and other organizations, will be ass. essing the Iraqi ports· situation and offering recommendations on port•related contracts. Currently, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Interior have agreed to standardize fire protection procedures and equipment at ports and airpo.rts. 4 Repair Roads and Bridges Amber D itllft!J.fhStlU ... 9:9' · • e ' e ~ Frida;·, Jan11ary JO, W04 Pag~ 16 of JI Objective Key Task Con(inue to Tes tart, identify, and repair critical roads and bridges. SfJift priorities from national system to include prlorltif!ts of the govemorates. Develop viable working relationship with PMO Develop staffing requirements based on the most efficient organization concept. Adjust number of personnel according to requi~ments. Continue to develop stable and dependable supply system for construction supplies. Objective Status Key Task Status 23 road and bridge projects completed. 112 projects currently un. clerway. Have to re-negotiate construction contracts because of increases in construction material prfces. shortages of supplies, security, and maintenance. Maintenance projects are negatively affected by problems in bitumen supply. f<'rilla;•, lil11t1a"}' . JO , !OOJ Objective K'ey Tas1' 11 Convert Social Service Programs into Economic Development Tools 3 Developing a national employment and training initiative 20 emp/Qym&nt centets up and running to help facilitatfl relationships between those trained and employers that partner with the center and training institute. National Employment and Training Center Established: 6 VocatiOnal Training Centers Rehabbed. 5, 000 customers trained. 100, 000 personnel registered for employment services throughout Iraq. On the Job Training begins for 10,000 personnel 500 Staff Trained (300 in Jordan) Labor Law roview sent out for draft and review Ministry establishes joint partne~hip with ILO OSHA established In Labor Pillar Ministry established Labor Survey departmen. l/staff trained. Objective Status Key Task StafU$ Green Amber D 76,629 jobs hOJve been cre.atccl under' an lfli(i, 1004 Objective Status Key Task Status Green Green Ambet O e.Statμs - on track for trading to begin in Q1 i.12123103 update - f1'pected opening reschedufed in 01 2004; we have expert from Philadelphia Stock Exchange coming in as an overs·eer in Ja.nuary. Ii. 12130/03 update - Reflects timellne movement to the right approximately one month. Ill 1/7104 Update-Assuming no unexpeet. ed holdups, trading could begin t'n tJ1e first week of February iv. 1126104 Communications system installe stries. 1. 12123103 update- No ownership transfer options at this point although the CPA continues to uslst the ministries to evaluate leases 2.12130/03 update - Revised SOE action plan in development. Work continues on addressln9 barriers preventing SOEs from standing up 3.1!1104 update -Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on current political constraints 4. 1126/04 Work continues. Pushing Iraq; Central Cement to apply for a ltOMM capital expenditure Joan tbrough SOE state banks Continued progtess of SOEs standing up to normal operating levels. Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on curront pofitieal constraints SOEs are · facing flard budget constraints and are taking steps to alfevfate pressures. These steps include the pvrsrJit of leasing of property of many of unprofitable SOts, 'Need to re.ev11tuate current SOE strategy based cm current political constraints Need to re-evaluate cu.rrent SOE strategy based on current political constraints. Based on financial reports from s1 elected SOEs conducted by KPMG and Talat Abu-Ghazaleh & Co. International (TAGJ), the Iraqi Ce11tral Cement Company (ICCC) a.nd Najaf Tire could have loan packages completed within the month. CPA is working with ICCC to apply for a $10 million capital lfXP~nditute Joan through Iraqi state banks. Fns (f)f/Yc .. a/ L'se 9n~1 Frida)'• Ja111111ry 30, 10fJ4 Objective Objective Status Key Task Key Task Status 2 Find sources for financing their short term working capital and investment requirements • (leuing). Amb, er O lmpfove monitoring system to track performance of SOEs. Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on cu"ent political constraints. 111 bidders are competing in a review process to lease 35 plants belongl11g ta 18 Ministry of Industry and Mineral SOEs. Of the 1, 11 bidders, 20 are foreign and 91 are Iraqi (many have opted ta form partnerships with internatiOJJal firms, a very positive step toward free enterprise). A committee process (in conjunction with Merchant Bridge consultants and IRDC staff) will whittle down the candidllK~ U of JI Objective Key Task Examine restructuring state owned insurance companies. Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on cul'J'ent political constraints Objective Status Key Task Status Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on cu"ent political constraints 4 Develop Restructuring Plan for SOEs Amber O Plan presented verbally to AMB Bremer. Follow on memo outlining SOE plan to be submitted by the end of the week 9 Lay Foundations for an Open Economy 1 Provide IG Staff Capability Jan Identify candidates for CPA Review Feb Select and install JG Develop and lmplemen. t Program Green Amber 0 Waiting for the Minister to Select Candidate 3 WTO Observer Status, Amber D Fa1 @ffici11/ l ~ •c Bnl;'J Frida)'. January 30, 2004 Pag~ l5of 11 Objective Key Task February 1: Relevant Iraqi Offic;a/s {RIO) in each ministry , named February 15: Initial meeting/discussion with each RIO completed The WTO accession process requires every type of Iraqi law that regulates any part of commerce be brought into compliance with what will be Iraq's WTO obligations. This will involve audit and revision of laws under the umbrellas of nearly all of Iraq's ministries including; but not limited to, the ministries of Trade, Finance, Interior , Transportation & Communication, Industry & Metals, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, NationJJI Standards, Oil, Justice, Culture, Central Bank, Public Works, and Planning. At the same time, much of Iraq's pre-waf law is not avai'labltt from any one central source. This is particularly true of regulatory law promulgated by the ministries themselves·· as opposed to statutory law promulgated by a legislature, or elcecutive. As a consequence, it wifl be necessary to have an Iraqi official within each ministry named to be the POC for information under audit, drafting of new laws, and for or_ganizing supporl within the ministry for enactment of the new laws. Objective Status Ke.y Tasl< Status Funding is in question right now and taslc may be deleted. Going to Geneva to submit letter for observer status the 18th of Jan. March 15: All relevant law and procedure assembled and translated As noted above, much of Iraq's pre-war law is not available from any one central source. Law from a myriad of disparate sources, including regulatory law promulgated ~y individual ministries will need to be assembled, after which much of it will need to be translated and put into an Frida)'. Ja1mar;r 30. 1004 Page Z6of JI Objective Key Tad electronic database. 10 Pursue National Strategy for Human Resource Deve1opment 1 Begin worf( to employ 100,0()() worl<.ers in Public Works p!Dgrams around the country. Conduct national survey. 11 1 Maintain and Strengthen Iraq's Science and Technology Base Energy Research and Development .~ 9fF .• e' 9 I ; ' "'' 9v1tlt1• ? J tff{) friJ11.y. Jt111tt1U)' _JO, 100J Objective Status . Key Task Status Amber Amber [J Amber Amber D Page 17of JI Objective Key Task Governance 2 Develop Civic Participation in Governance 5 Build capacity for civ;J society conflict prevention & mitig.,tion (CPM) Plan, approve, fund and implement programs; transition to Iraqi control Objective Status Key Task Status Amber Amber Amber D No progress 5 Promote Respect for Human Rights 2 Preserve doct{menJation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation Begin nationwide use of CPA document database and witness testimony collection programs. Train Human Rights Ministry personnel in this function. Amber Amber D Many documents and much evidence preserved. CPA has collected over 700 summaries of past abuse and has developed a database for documents, which is ready for training locals and Ministry personnel. Training on documentation and memorials completed. Reconciliation programs beginning. Develop and seelc international funding for memorials. Once Supplemental funding arrives complete pl;mning for Abu Gharaib memorial with NGOs and Minist!y. Kurdish Human Rights Ministers have proposed a mass gave memorial on the North, and NGO has proposed a mass grave memorial at Mahawil. We are seeking funding from international sources for these. Develop Truth·revealing process. Iraqis generally do not yet see the value of Truth- Reveafing Process. Educatfon efforts will continue. Funding ;s allocat~d for tfris under the Supplemental and UK desires to play a role if Iraqis desire such a process. 1 ,_,, r ICIZIJ ~se \ Ill)' r fjff' . . ti ' • 1.-riday, Ja1111tlTJ' .10, 1004 Page !8 a/JI Objective Key Taslc Bring counseling programs to Iraq. Strengthen local capacity. Objective Status Key Taslc Status P/'fysicians for Human Rights was .supposed to provide sl.(Ch counseling in Oct, Nov and Dec but cancelled.. We are seekin. g proposals to provide traiaing to Iraqis in counseling. 8 Promote Durable Solutjons for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons {IDPs) 2 Build national and local capacity to protect and assist refugees and /DPs. L.ocate permanent facility for Mfn;stry. Continue- to hire and train staff. Facilitate increasing responsiblllty for refugee and IDP policy making. Amber Amber D Interim building under rehabilitation - to be completed by February. Ministry still working to hlro adequate staff. Finalize locallons of four offices in regions of high refug. ee and /DP p(Jpulations. Open offices and hire initial staff. Funding from Portugal confirmed and available by lhe end of January. Ministry looking for location for Basrah office. ~ ~ ' 't' 9 I r o1 rcznr ? ., tt 1 ,1 •J 1:riJo)-. .la1111ary .10, }(){l.J Objective . Key Task Strategic Communications 2 Support Security with a robust communications campaign 1 New Iraqi Military communication ~nd information campaign Strategic eommuaications, especially Iraqi Media Network, to win popular support. (CPA) Iraqi Army Day (6 JAN 2004) 10 effort Objective Status Key Task Status Amber Red Amber D 3 Support Governance with a robust communications campaign 2 Constitution: .Support the pr:ocess by which the lr01qi citizens dev, elop their constitution. Materials production for Constitution campaign ramps up (late MAR 2004) Amber Amber D This Key Task is Phase /I of the cuffent' Strac Comms/Govemance Communications campaign. Once the initial efforts focused on participation and basic democracy education near completion, this effort will enter execution mode (about late April 2004) 4 Support Essential Services with a robust communications campaign 1 Electricity Campaign Reconc.ile task list to achievable objecti11es within currently shortened tjme frame. Refine plans Amber Amber D Currently reconciling task list to achievable objectives within a shortened time frame. Intend to use Governance transition plan as •shell" and refine Essential Services campaign from that ex. ample. Estimate plan completion NL T 1 FEB 04. frid11y, Jan11111·y .10, ]()fJ.1 Pllxe 30 of JI Objective Key Task 2 Education Cam,,.lgn Reconcile taslc list to achievable objectives within currently shortened time frame. Refine plans 3 Health Care CampaigfJ Reconcile task list to schievable objectives within currently shortened tim.e . frame, Refine plans Fritflly, Jan,,a1y JO, JINN Objective Status Key Task Status Amber D Currently reconciling task fist to achievable objectives within a shortened time frame. Intend to use Governance transition plan as •sfleU- and refine Essential Services campaign from that example. Es(imate plan completion NL T 1 FEB 04. Amber D Currently reconciling task list to achievable objectives within a shortened time frame. lnteJJd to use G. overnance transition plan as "sl1elr and re.fine Essential Services campa;gn from that example. Estimate plan completion NL T 1 FEB 04. Pt1~1! JI of 31 PENDING ACT ION ITEMS FROM THE JANUARY 25. 2004 BOARD MEETING: Member Attendees: Ambassador Jones (chair) Ambassador Greenstock COO Kellogg Ambassador Richmond MG Gallinetti [encral Figgures Regular lnvitees: Andrew Rathmell Andrew Dunn lnviree Presenters: E:\Ex.:cSec\b.cdloalll\Mmulcs 25 JAN 04 UNCLASSlFIED Page I of I LPS HAS SEE: l (CIV) Sent: To: Cc: Saturday, April 24, 2004 9 05 PM rx:cuti"e ~e~,t~4 ) , Smith. Frederick (SES-6) Subject: Order Tranferring ICDC to MoD On an action memo from OGC on this subject, LPB aslROVISIONl\L AUTHORITY BAG!IDAD f LPB nAS SEE~ -- - ---- .. ..\CTIO~ \IE:\10 FOR: FRO\!: SCBJEL'T: .\ L \ - \ April 2~. ~OQ.4 < t \ 1c..<; \ ~ ( '\/'f:"'e~ C~<:- K' '.re~ THE AD'.\ll~ISTR.-\ TOR l..i\.\ \\ .... ~ \ t'"\rtr c \..; \Jc:._ ~._j S'> i' \. ~ ... . ? Offici: of th"c.L"'V"\....'-1 ~-....._ .... ~ • '-L Order Tr:inst~rring the Ir-.iqi Ci\ ii De tense Corps ro lhe Ministry of Defense Cf { 2._J The .\tt::idwd Ord¢r tr:ins fers thr: IC DC to thr: >. (inistry of 01! t~ncc J..S 1.1 compon~nt of th~ lraq i :\rmeJ Forces. anJ amends CP.-\ Order >-rumbr:r 22. Creation of a .V~w Iraqi ..Irmy. J ~omponem of the lraqi Anned F0r..:es and to pro\ ide additional cbrifo.:ation \\ ith respect to the status ond authority of thl! lrnqi Civil Dcfon..;~ Corp:; and i!s m ~ mb~r::;, l h~reby promuJg~te rhe follO\\ ing: Secrit>n 1 Transfer I) rhe Iraqi Ci\·il Dct'cnsl.! Corps. w ini.:lude all assodatl!d personnel. fai.:ilities. and equipmenr. c:stablishi:d pursuant co CPA Order 'Somber 2~ is hereby tran::.f~rrcd to the '.\linistr: of Ot!frnct: .. i:s .i complrnc:nt of th~ Iraqi Armed Forces. CP .. . \./OH.D/2.! April 2004173 :!) As a component of the Iraqi Anned Forces, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps shall be subject to the terms of CPA Order Number 1~. as ametidcd; pro\'ided that in the event of :i contli.:r bet\\ccn the terms of CPA Order Numher 22, as amended. and CPA Order Number 28. as amended. the t¢rms of CPA Ordo;:r Number 28. as amended. shall go\'ern. 3) The transfer of administrative functions for the fraqi Civil Dd'~ns1: Corps shall be accomplished in ~ manner ~md on a timdine agreed to b) the interim :Vf inister of Ddence and rhc: st.!'nior military cornmamkr of Coalition Forces in [raq consist~nt \\ ith the M snislr: of Defence· s. capabi I ic: uo administer su~h responsibilities. Section :? Amcndmenc co CPA Order Number 22 Coalition Pro' isional Authority Order ~umber 22. Seccion 3. is hereby amendcJ by :Jdding a ne\\ Section 3. :-\rtide 5. as follows: .. 5) The- Iraqi Ch ii Defense Corps shall operate as a component of the [raqi Armed forces in a.;cord.:inLe with the terms of this Order. CP . .\. Order ~umber 28. as amended. CP:\ Order Number 67. and CPA Order Number 73: pro\·ided that in the ~v~m of a ~on tlict beC\\ ~en th~ reTm5 of this Order and CP . - \ Orda i'I umber 28. as amended. the terms of CP.-\ Order ~umber 28. as nm.ended. shall go\'em." Section 3 Amendments to CP-\ Order :\umber ::?S I) Coalition Prlwisional Authority Order >:umber 28. Section I. Article -L is hereby amended to reaJ in its entir~ty a.s folio\\ s: ··.+ J Tht! Iraqi Ci\'il Defense Corps is ;i .:omponent of the lraqi .·\nned Forces. The £raqi Ci' ii 01.!fensc Corps shall operate in ;.1ccordance with the terms of this Order. :is amended. CPA Ord~r Number ~~- as Jmended. CP.·\ Order :'-i\1mber 67. and CPA Order :--;umber 73: provided thar in the ~-.ent of a conflict bct\\.et:n thi: terms of this Order. as amended. and CP.-\ Order Nwnbcr ~2. as amended. the terms of this Order. as amended. shall govern:· 2J Coalition Pro\ isional Authorit~ Ord~r '.\:umber 18. Seccinn .::! •. .\rtick 4. is hereb~ dektL>d in its entirety and the exi:;ting Sc~ti0n :. Article 5. i:> h~r~b~ redt::signated as Sec[ion 2 . ..\nkk: 4. 3) Coalition Pro\ isional Authorit: Order '.'iumbcr 28. Section 2 • ..\.rtide 6. is hereb~ dekt~c.i in irs emireiy. CPA/ ORD/22 .-\pril 2004173 .., -i) Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 28. Section 3, is hereby am~nded by adding. a new Section 3. Article 5. as follows: ·'5) Notwithstanding Section 3. Articl~ -l above. members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps under the op~rationaJ control of a Coalition Forces officer may use force consistent with ruks of engagement or rules for the use of force applicable to Coalition Forces ro execute thefr assigned missions and taskings." 5) Coalition Provisional Authoriry Order Number 28. Section ..+. :.\rtid\! l. is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: ··1) The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps shall operare under the authority of the Administrator of the CPA. Subject to the! authority of the Adminiscrat establishing their mission e:;s~ntial task list (METL) and operational employment ... 7) Coalition Provisional Authority Order 'umbl!r 18 ~xisting Section+. ,.\nicks 2 and 3 are hereby redesignated as Section -1-•. -\nides 3 and .. f.. Nspeccivdy. SJ Coalition ProYisional Authority Order \:umber 28. Section 5. is hereb)· amended by adding a new Section 5. Anicle 3. as follows: ··3) ~ot\Yithstanding an~ other pmvision in this or any other CPA Order. Regulation. or \llemorandum or ~my provision in Iraqi law. Iraqi CiYil Defense Corps members acting within the scope of their mission or tasking and consistent \\ ith applicabl~ Coalition rules of engagement or rules for the use of force are immune from Iraqi CPA/ORD/:22 .-\pril 200..t/i3 . . criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction and from any form of arrest or detention. The Administrator of the CPA shall have the exclusive authority to determinl! when a panicular act was performed in an official capacity and consistent with the rules of engagement or rules for the use of force applicabk to Coaliti1.1n Forces, and such dc:tcrmination is binding on all governmental. judicial and administrative en ti ties \vi thin Iraq ... Section ..$ Entry into Force This Order shall ent~r into force on the date of signature. ( l~~L~ini~:.::16 Coalition Provisional Authority ~ CPA/ORD/22 April 200-4/73 COALITION PROVISIONAL /\UTI IORITY BAGllDAD INf'OMEMO April I 0. 200..J FOR: FROM: TllP ADM IN IS rRi\"l OR 1J David C. Gompert, Director. National Security and Defense A!:J~ SUBJECT: ICDC The tcnc has yet to be as.signed to the MnD. rhe plan has been to wait untjl the MoD has the capacity to take over administration. including pay1 which is currently done local!}• by rhc MSCs. It will be a struggle to get MoD systems up tr its placement in the MoD for as long as it exists and it i~ this undcr st~nding that we ha.,,c. developed collectively in the SlSG over the past few months. Unless 1 hc:ar otherwise from you, we wiU include the JCDC in the forthcoming CPA order creating the MoD. while keeping open the options as you indicate. UNCLASSIFIED Page I of 1 (FS01) --- ·-------- From: Sent: To: FIV Ministry ol Governance Cc: I Subject: Options for ICDC - Paper Out with Comments Amb Bremer comm~mted on _paper that he needed a meet111g wi~and.berore lhe Abizaid meeting_., copy of your paper In In your mailbox. r Execulive A ssistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat I J/21/2003 UNCLASSIFIED COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO FOR: THE ADMf.NLSTRATOR SUBJECT: Options for Lhe ICDC We must advance the decision point concerning the future destiny of the ICDC. I understand L TG Sancbez will return Saturday evening and GEN Abizaid will arrive on Sunday. This is an opportunity to discuss the altematives in preparatfoo for a decision. The attached paper is for your information, to prepare for those discussions. It identifies the options and provides our (Office of National Security Affairs) assessment of the options. The requirement to rapidly expand ICDC to augment our security capabililies, together with actions we will want these forces to execute during transfer of sovereignty wi11 challenge our capabilities. It will also require a significant investment of our resources in December and January. Our efforts wi\111eed to be guided by a common \•ision of the ICDC end state. The first of December will be timely to decide that question. MOI~ OPP and CJTF/CS have provided input and comment to this paper. There arc no disagreements on the facts. There are significant uncen.ainties relating to the readiness and availability of Iraqi forces (£CDC, NIA, headquaners and sustainment) in relation to the timing and local conditions of transition. For this reason, we will recommend. in a separate action memorandum. that CPA and CJTF jQintlyconduct a detailed, tact'icaJ-JeveJ analysis of the transition of security responsibilities in the urban areas which we will have to execute as we advance the transfer of sovereignty. ATTACHMENTS: as COORDlNATION: MOI, OPP, CJTFlCS UNCLASSIFIED Option 1A, ICDC as Component of NIA , "I National Command Authority .... J I I MoND J I r JFHQ I I ~ DIV DIV DIV ~ BOE !"I -Under authority of the MoND and JFHQ -Trained, equipped and supported by the NIA -Attached to NIA units in their local areas -Command and Control from divisional/Bde HQ -Full-time, active-duty security force -Primary mission: internal security. Operates in support of Iraqi Police in internal security matters \. " I !'-. ICDC ""' ... \. " Option 1 B, ICDC as Territorial Reserve / ..... National Command Authority '\. , I I MoND I JFHQ I I I I I r NIA NIA NIA ICDC DIV , DIV DIV (Reserve] -Under authority of the MoND and JFHQ -Trained and equipped by the NIA -Reserve units, activated only in time of need -Internal security mission (patrolling, fixed site security, convoy security, riot control, disaster relief and humanitarian missions) Option 1C, National Guard-Type Model National Command Authority Policy guidance, resource management I l , MoND Governors JFHQ Operational control Logistic support, training, equipping ICDC - Local in character - Under operational control of Govern orate - National Command Authority has ultimate veto. Policy guidance from and resourced through MoND - Trained and equipped by JFHQ - Mission: Internal Security Option 2A, ICDC Incorporated into the National Police Force /' ' National Command Authority \.._ / ..., Ministry of Interior -ICDC used as manpower pool for National Police Force. -Would require training as special police . -ICDC would not retain separate identity in the police force. -Not all ICDC would be selected or opt for the police force \.. , / .., National Police Force \.. , ....... ,~ ~ .. ' ..... ' .......... , ' -- ..... ~ '" ' ' ' ' r "' ,.. "' , ' ICDC ICDC ICDC \.. ~ \. ~ I.. , ICDC • Option 28, ICDC as Police Reserves ' National Command Authority ) r ' Ministry of \. Interior -Part-time police force, a ctivated in time of need -Under authorny of local oli.ce p - Would require training as p olice - This option, by itself, would c reate gaps in internal s ecurity capability ' \._ National Police Force J ,,.. ' Local Police ICDC • (Reserves) .. "' ,r \.. COt\LITION 1,ROVI.SIONt\ L !\UTI IORITY 8t\Gf IDAD INFO MEMO FOR: THE ADMlNJSTRATOR FROM: .... r _______ _.IActing Director, National Security Affairs SUBJECT: Options for the ICDC ATTACHMENTS: As Stated COORDINATION: MOI, OPP, CJTF/C5 UNCLASSIFIED C :\l>c•cu11 :1~111s a11J Sctting~\ sugara\l.ocal Settmgs\Temporary h1h:mc1 Pilcs'.OLK%6\T11msm1ll11l O.l I 12U.doc DRAFT November 19. 2003 2230 This paper has not been n.•ad nor conunented upon b y General Abizaid or Lieutenant General Sanchez DISPOSITION OF THE JRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS (JCDC) DRAFT ,• fa .. ~~ l \ /pf . r;; μ,~ ~ . Here ar~@tboughrs regarding bov .. · we might improve our overall program to train. equi advise the Iraqi security forces. My initial concept was to organize a new CMA rT iype orgamzation that would operate in support of MOI in a similar fashion to the current CMA TT operating in suppon of MOD. This a viable approach, but will require: a major investment in personnel and considerable time to stand up. As 1 looked more closely at the ex-1sting CMA TT and spoke al length with Paul Eaton, it became clear that Ute existing CMA TT is seriously under resourced to meet its objectives for the IAF. Creation of a new CM A TT would likely encounter the same problems, exacerbated by the requirement to resource both organizations. My recommcnda,tion would be to ecXpand the existing, CMA TT into an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) to support the, full range of lraqi security forces, including lA.F, !PS, BDE, ICDC, FPS and CT forces as well. The immeJjatc priority is to assist MOl with its requirements to train, equip and advise the rPS. I envision th ~ OSC asswning responsibility for the execution/implementalion of 1he MOl ~nd MOD programs. The MOI and MOD Senior Advisors would continue to work directly for CPA and after transition for the US Ambassador. Tbe Senior Advisors would continue to interface with the lraqi leadership and would provide policy direction to the OSC. The OSC would be responsible for executing th<; policy, not only by making sure chat equipment is properly ordered, recruiting is done and training is arranged, but would monitor and assist the Coalition forces to ensure the MSCs in the field are complying with the established policy as equipment is fielded, recruitment is done and training , and mentoring are conducted.r ~escribes it as the "meat in the sandwich" with the MOJ a11d MOD policy-makers on top and the MSCs on 1he l;muom. This will only work if properly resourced. Scaffing of the OSC must be sufficient to adequately support both MOD and MOI requirements. During the initial phas~, th.is staffing would by 11ecessicy be largely military. Frankly speaking, 011ly the military can adequately fill the void tbat currently exists, botb from an organizational and staffing perspective. However, it is essential Umt civilian police personnel be infused into the OSC as quickly as · possible to ensure that po lie y implementation, especially qualiry control of training ROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO January 11. 2004 FOR: FROM: THE ADMINISTRATOR ~/di David C. Gompert, Senior Advisor for National Security & Defense f((tJ ~ SUBJECT: A Thought on Kurdish Demands Regardin_ g IAF Operations in Kurdistan CC: Go' t:m; .mcc ._r ____ __,~ · OGC. C:v1ATT (MG Eaton) CO/\LITJON PROVJSJONAL AUT HORIT Y BAGllDAD January 6. 2004 FOR: FROM: MG Paul Eaton David C. Gorn pen, Senior Advisor for National Security & Gcfc nse ~ SUBJECT: Commissioning of Officers for IAF I would be happy to relieve Ambassador Bremer of the task of signing off on commissions, as CPA Order 22 permits. The process of finding. screening. recruiting and preparing officer candidates will remain as it is, principally your responsibility albeit with assistance from this office. I am partic'ularly eager to cooperate earty in the process with you in regard to selection of three-star generals: CHODS ano Commander of the /AF. However, you are running lhat process. cc:r....___ ____________ _____ -J COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD November 29, 2003 TO: ._L _______ __.IActing Director, National Security Affairs FROM: L. Paul Bremer, Admini~on \--Z.) SUBJECT: NIA Program Support for ICDC and Appointment of Fonner General Officers I want to be clear on two points concerning the understandings l reacbed in Washington on support for the expansion of ICDC and the appointment of senior leadership of the Iraqi security and armed forces. My agreement to the new relationship between CMA IT and CJTF was conditional on CPA retaining budget control within the tenns of the appropriation over all the components of the security program in the Supplemental appropriation, including all the funds identified in the Su, pplemental for the NIA I understand that sl1pport for the expansion of the ICDC to a total of 36 battalions will require approximately $124 million above the $76 million contained in the Supplemental; we will make those funds available by transferring provision either from the NIA Program or from elsewhere, depending on CPA overal I priorities and in a manner consistent with tbe temls of the appropriation. I will also retain the authority to promote office. rs within the NJA until such time as I deem it prudent· to relinquish tbjs authority to a duly constituted lraqi. I have agreed to consider recommendations for the appointment of carefully vetted former lraqi office.rs up to the colonel level for the NIA. Any appojntments of fom:ier general officers in any of the services (NIA or ICDC) wi.IJ have to be individually submitte. d for my approval after thorough vetting. Former general officers, who can sa. tisfy the restrictions of the De-Ba'athification policy, may be hired as civilians to filJ autho. rized civilian public sector positions in the security agencies, just as they may similarly be hired and assigned as civilians in any other agency. But, as · civilians, they are not entitl.cd to wear uniform, nor rank aor other military insignia and are not entitled to any privilege beyond that which is associated with the position for whicb they are hi. red. There will be some need in the future for simHar legal frameworks for all the Iraqi security forces, but a CPA Order (eventually forming the basis of future Iraqi legislation) delineating New Iraqi Army (NIA) aid to the civil authority is a priority now. COO RD INA TJON: Deputy Administrator and Chief P'olicy Officer. Office of General Counsel CPA-ok lJNCLASSlFIED """TIOtW. ~ IJl"WDsrry INDtr--~ ./Jcr~/,.._;.,-~ <~ 1\1\~be'UISE~ INOOST'RJAL COUEGE OF TiiE ~ FORCES • ' ~CIC ~196XJO ~"~~ ~,._;, ~ A,.& £~ - / r-" ~ . lJ-.. . r ..<-~: • F......L~~-1-c.oc.. ~ • ,l/'P~ /"" .• ",,,-~ I~ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTI IORITY BAGHDAD November 20, 2003 TO: ... r _______ __.I Acting Director, National Security Affairs FROM: L. Paul Bremer, Administrator Subject: NJA Program Support for ICDC and Appointment of Former General Officers I want to be clear on two points concerning the understandings I reach. ed in Washington on support for the expansion ofICDC and the appointment of senior leadership of the Iraqi security and armed forces. My agreement to the new relationship between CMA TI and CJTF was conditional on CPA retaining budget control with.in the tcm1s of the appropriation over alt the components ofthe security program fo the Supplemental appropriation, including aJI the funds identified in the Supplemental for the NLA. I understand that support for the expansion of the TCDC to a total of36 battalions will require approximately $124 million above the $76 million contained in the Supplemental; we will make those funds available by transferring provision either from the NIA program or from elsewhere, depending on GP A overall priori.ties and in a manner consistent with the terms of the appropriation. ~ ~ ,. μ.._. T-here seeR¥.HG-be-a -m+~'1mrd. ing-Tegarof fom1er general officers· · apaciiy.. ffthereis:a:desin: . to~:n bsmc, .I am op~.t().' • ~ •• ~ • Question: Should the regional bodies be tile provincial Pubfic S&fety Committees being set up to ensure oversight of tile police or should they be specially constituted under emergency legislation with a sunset clause? If so, they could overfap wit/I tile PS cltees. The currenl model en Visages CPA involvement but thss will phase out by July 2004. The structure of Public Safety (or Security?} Committees will hang off the Iraqi political structure (national government, to governorate/Provincial Council, to distnct. and city governance bodres) Coordination wlll take place with Iraqi ministries. security services and the Coalition at the national, provmoat and local (ma1or city) levels. The aim of the committees 1s to (integrate! [coordinate] pot1cy development and dec1s1on-makin9 on security and public safety related affairs. The committees would be under civilian leadership. Iraqi and coalition seounty forces would assist lhe civil power within the .appropnate legal framework (e.g. Policing legislation· Defense Aid to the Civil Power. bilateral defense agreement}. The Committee tasks are to coordinate political, economic. development. communications and security policies in support of nation building and national development with efforts to mitigate and manage violence. in particular to counter politically motivated violence from insurgents and terrorists. National Public Safety Committee The national committee can build on the GC national security committee and could ultimately form a cabinet committee, perhaps with a CF mtlii.ary advisor in attendance. ParticipatiGn should be by the civilian ministers from relevant ministries, not from security force personnel. They may be 1nv1ted to partiapate in meetings where their advice 1s required. Provincial Public Safety Committee The Provincial PS committee provides political and operational level direction of the COIN campaign in its govemorate as well as coordinating policy and resources on other public safety matters. The Cttee should be under local civilian control to ensure accountability and transparency (governor 3 PC representatives Joint Operations Center/Public Safely Ooerations Cent.er: The aim ls lo provide common commanel. control and communications arrangements for civil defense. facilities protection and police operations at governorate or at regional level. This will be supported by a national communications and command and conlJ'ol network. The Public Safety Mutual Aid Plan places a duty on governors to establish coordlnatlon arrangements amongst the Interior r-,1inistry services in their area. l.ssues • National-level (GC-CPA) - are the GC structures robust enough to use? Is CPA willing to share aecision- making on these matters with the GC? • MOI regional undersecreiary?- what place do the regional under-secretaries have in this model? • ICDC C2 to MoD'? - This model assumes that ICDC command and control is under the JFHQ and the MoD: although OPCON may be to CJTF-7 until some later date. NIA structures - lh1s model assumes there will be a suitaple NIA command level to interface at the provincial level. Jn fact, NIA basing may be such that some provinces have no NIA representation. DBE and FPS representation may be useful on the Provincial or dlstlict level. or perhaps just on the Operations Center. This will be especially true Where a province includes a border or major FPS assets (e.g. a pipeline} • Other ministries at Province level. At provincial revet, it will be valuable lo have Input from MoJ, MoHR but also from other ministries (e.g. transport, utilllies) Legai frameworks - The legal basis fOf security furce interaction and civ\l\an oversight needs to be laid down. • Party mllltias/intel services - In practi~. in some Iraqi provinces today, party militias and intelllgence services are a part of the local security structure (e.g. KDP. PUK, Sadr Bde). A pragmatic option would be to allow Provlnclal Councils to co-opt the local militia/party chief onto the committee anQ to coordinate security matte~. Phllosoph1cally, the CPA 1s committed to removing m1liba Influence and ensunng that the state has a monopoly on force. This argues for tne e> : I I - ... ... ... __ t ~--·---···-·---- . Chair: Pre-July. GC/Governor Post-July· Governor Provincial Public Safety Committee - · - - --· --- - ,. ·--..------.~-----.----......----'-- . l . I t t : Guv .. 3 PC ine1 nbt.;1:.. , PollcP ; MoJ ; : GC , CF MSC CO .... "'r'" - - ... _ .. -.r .. ·., .. -.,,. .. • .... ;.,.-~.,,,. ......... ct1ief J"' • .. - .... .,":;;. '\ .. '!;..,.,~ -. , .. •.1 ...- .·.::z,.e: .:+ .. ..- ....... !- - - ........ . -· ~ - : Civil socidy reps ! ..; ~ --- - .... , . ------··· ·---- ---·( DB£ j 1111nistries? : ·-· ·---- ----- -- • , Othet ; : IHDC rep? : -------------------- f Regional ministry/aid centers : r f•S'I · · - -· .. ---·------·---· · --------- ... ____________________ , -· ( Chair: Pre-July; ?? Post-July: MayOf? I District/city Public Safety Committee I Replicates Provincial Cttee at local level l<,~ue' · Nat1,)n.il-l•Nf'I (C_iC .:P~) • rv10i re _11r1 n2. ur 1 \k sec retar·y? • ICD: \_:2 :o '.foU':) • NIA st: .JC'.Uff'~ • DBF: 1F ,)~. • O~hc:r :1w :st: 1e~ a1 ?ru mice i(:vd • Legcil f1 an1ev;orr s • Party 1rnl1t1 as1intel ~erv1ces COALITION PROVlSIONAL AUTI IORlTY BAGtlOAD June 2 • .2004 FOR: THF ADMlNISTRA TOR r:ROM: David C. Gompert, Senior Advisor for National Securily Affairs SUBJECT; June 3•d Meeting with Minister of Defense Shalan This ..... 111 be your first official meeting with Minister of Defense Ha:zem Shalan al-Khuzael (short bio below). The minister will be accompanied by his close confidante, Fred Smith and I had a dinner and a far-reaching discussion with Minister Sha Ian and,.... bn Tuesday ~vening. While he has much to le:.im aboul runnfog t~~e ministry 3.lld military forces. Shalan is anxious to get involved in national security issues. He wants the Iraqi Armed Focce - s to work closely with the MNF-1, especially given hjs re< 'ognition that Iraqi forces are still deficient in many areas and dependent on U.S. and coalition fr1rces. He was particularly encouraged by a mcetfog b~ had today with General John Abii;aid. who assured him that coalition forces are ready to work with the lAF. includingjoiot pa.trob. Liaisqn officers, and staff officers in the MNF-1 headquarters. Shalan is highly skeptical about tl1e lCDC, although John t\bi1.aid gave an upbeat assessment on lht: ICDC"s dfccrivcncss in some art::-a.s. Sbalan is a staunch sc=cularist. He bristled u1)on bearing that we have hired several people who were recommended by the oa·wa Party and SCIRl; \Ve impressed upon him tb::it 1he ministry must be representative of all lraqi people and that people have been hired based on merit. fred and I stressed the qualities of Secretary General Bruska Shaways and the top generals and the importance· of shidding ci\ril servants from po!iticoJ change. While appearing to accept this. the Minister seems lO be under pressure from his si ith ihe other m1nisters, especially with 'Che 2 Minister of Interior. and the Director General of the IN IS during this period of national emergency. • Shalan will also be a key player in making the security partnershjp work. As the senior Defense official, he will be involved in the political coordinating mechanisms. The U.S. is serious about this being a pannership, and we look for active fraqi participation. • David Gompert will be available to assist Minister Shalan in any way possible until June l4rh. Fred Smith will be here until Jone 301 h. After that, the U.S. (and UK) will have an advisor team to provide assistance, along with Lieutenant General Dave Petraeus and the Office of Security and Transition to help man, train, and equip the Iraqi Armed Forces. Bio of Haum Sbalan Al-Khuza.el Mr. Shalan is Sheik of !he Ghazal Tribe. He earned his degree in economics and management from Baghdad University in 1972 and began his career managing the Kut Dewanyah branches of the Iraqi Rea I Estate Bank. He served as Inspector General of the main branch in Baghdad from 1983-1985. He was forced to leave Iraqi in 1985 because of his opposition to the former resime and managed a successful real estate finn in the U.K. He has been governor ofDiwaniyah since April 2003. He was born in 1947 in Diwanyah. COOR'DlNATION: None UNCLASSlfIED 2 ,. COALITJON PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD lPBHASSff· FOR: The Administrator FROM: David C. Gompert, Director of National Security Affairs SUBJECT: Iraqi Integration into MNF-I Command Structure Just as partnership is a compelling post-occupation political idea, unity of command is essential for operational effectiveness. In principle, both can be achieved by treating the Iraqis as an integral part of the coalition - "a principal partner" in the words of the T AL. Aside from the high-level consultat1ve mechanisms we have proposed to Washington, this partnership principle begs the question of how Iraqi units and officers fit into the new MNF-1 force and command structures. The option of continuing simply to assign Iraqi battalions to US and other foreign commands, as has been the practice during the occupation, will not suffice. Apart from lraqi resentment, such an approach could give rise to a shadow Iraqi command chain, through which direction would come from Iraqi Joint HQs to Iraqi units. Such dual direction is, of course, the most dangerous threat to unity of command. Lastly, only by involving Iraqis in the MNF-1 command and control structure in a meaningful way will we be able to build their C2 competence. CJTF7 is planning to assign Iraqi liaison officers to the MNF-l C2 structure. This is fine but way short of adequate. Two additional, more substantial steps are needed: • Iraqis should hold significant staff positions in the structure, just as officers from the UK and other coalition partners will I believe the Iraqis should have a deputy command position in either the 4-star MNF-I or the 3-star MNC-1 command posts, as well as deputy or other staff positions down the unified chain. • Iraqis should hold senior operating commands witbin the force structure. Initially, this should be at the brigade level, meaning that Iraqi bactafions are assigned to Iraqi brigades, not US or other foreign ones. As soon as possible, Iraqi divisions should appear in the force structure. Over time, the command structure will evolve toward one of greater Iraqi responsibilities and larger Iraqi structures as the Iraqi contributioa to the l\ifNF-1 it1creases and foreign contributions decline. These matters are not setcled in the design of the new command. But they will surface as soon as the command structure is revealed. Moreover, the creation of the HG. along with the . . introduction of an UNSCR calling for lraqi participation as "principal partners" in the MNF-1, will require that we craft an operationally and politicaUy sound. approach. l have not coordioated this memo with CJTF7, wanting only to . share rny view with you. But I will be airing these views withr j(CG, MNC-1) andf lUK, 1 will try to enlist his help in selling the approach to Talabani. Moreover, with alJ other militia essentially on board, Talabani should feel some pressure. After further reflection and discussion with colleagues who are dealing with other Kurdish issues. I remain of the view that it is best to try to settle the pesh T &R on its own merits. I wou1d prefer not to raise other demands (e.g., Kirlcuk, PKK. Koreans) while tryin8 to get agreement on the pesh. Nor do l 1hink it will be neci::ss.ary to offer any inducements (ETbil airfield, money) in order to get agreement. 'Ibis will leave the res.t of the Kurdish agenda to be tackled by others and ultimately by you. As you know, once we senlc on pesh T &R we will have a stronger hand on at least two issues: removing pesh from Kirkuk and Mosul. and applying pressure on the PKK While not eager to link pcsh T &R to other issues, I am prepared to carry any messages you wish. At a minimum, J could ti::ll Barzan) that you want to have a tou.r d'horizon within the next week. either in Baghdad or Erbil. Please let me know if you ha\•e additional guidance or want to discuss. CC: Governance~ .... -----=---''· crn• 7 (BG Sargeant)r joick Jones '--------'· COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO April 16, ::!004 FOR: FROT\t: SUBJECT: THEAD~ll~R David C. Gompert, Director, Narional Security and Defense Choice of Iraqi Chief of Staff for ~linistry of Defense l hop~ this is not too confusing. The charts at Tab C should help. ATTACHMENT: Charts UNCLASSIFIED Rank: MG Branch: Infantry Place of birth: Baghdad Nationality: Arabic Religion: Muslim Date commissioned to the arm)·: Nov. 27. J968 Date of Jast promotion: Jan. 6. 1997 Type of service: permanent Service status: continuous Rank in the 13aath p~rty: Not l~vel four Last position held: without position I the near reserve directorate Qualifications: Dartt Colleae B.Sc. Pakistani military academy a., , The college of literalure Mustansiriya Unwerstty . Ir.au o.-....onw.r ~-ltv M1li1ar)' science English language 1970 2001 Medals and decorations: Gallantl} McdaJ Um Al-Maaril medal Gallant') medal I 3 I Training courses: Qualified good during seven training courses Training Emphasis: l. information update 2. electronic warfare for staff officers 3. leadership for young officers 4. air defense for formation commanders, 5. staff o.fficers duties 6. tactics and fighting groups for company commanders Last positions held The unir The title. oosition The date he started 3'~ core HQ Administrative manager 1996 Militarv academy Dean 1996 Mili1arv academy Senior staff otlicer 1993 Trdininit directorare Suooortive branches staff officer 1992 Training direc1orate Emolovmen1 1992 War school 2"° core Scholl commander 1992 7111 core llQ Engineering supervision 1991 commission manat?er - The infantry d irectorn1c I " command olTiccr I 200 section 1989 (JN observers- courdin:irion Without position 1998 commission The annor directorate 2"" command officer 12"" section 1988 Army staff HQ According lo post 1987 Military academy Recruiting and organiz:a1ion 1987 teacher Military academy Training staff offit'ers 1q86 Militarv academy According to po.st 1984 The accusation against him in the law suit numbered according to act no. 1 of the article I 19 and according to the authority given to the minister of defense number 44 for 1941 tht legal procedures against him is stopped (3080/200 I) up fronted to the general attorney according to the letter numbered 2683 on Feb. 20. 2002 UNWEIGHTED WEIGHTED • Lower score is better • Weighted numbers are relative values out of a total of 10 • More weight to the future rather the past - - Military service numberr .... ____ _.. Rank: staff Lt. General Branch: Armor Place of birth: Baghdad Nationality: Arabic Full name:._[ ____________ ----" Religion: Muslim Date commissioned to the army: Nov. 6, 1959 Date of last promotion: Jan. 6, 1987 Type of service: permanent Service status: continuous Rank in the Baath party: Not level four Last position held: without position I the reserve directorate Quali ti cations: Col e The soviet union Staff 'olle >e Milit academv Mednis and decorations: The party medal Um Al-Maarilc medal l ligh deserve medal Gallantry medal The injured medal The Rfidain Medal. class 3 ) 2 I 4 1 I Graduation ar 1980 1971 1962 Training courses: Qualified good during three training courses and very good during another three training course Training Emphasis: I. communications betv.cen helicopters and ground units 2. staff training and leadership for armor 3. advanced annor staff officers training 4. maintaining and servicin~ at the battlefield 5. staff officers training coursl! 6. regiment commanders training Last positions held Tile unit The title, MSition The date he started The reserve directorate Without position 2001 The warriors directorate The head of the directorate 1999 The secretarv of armed forces Accordim~ to oosl 1993 The warriors directorate Wilhout position 1992 The 2"" core UQ Core commander 1987 The I '1 core HO Core commander 1986 The general c. ommaod of the: General se()fetary 1986 armed force:. The 7'° core llQ Core commander 1986 The 7111 cme HQ Core, commander 1985 The 2"0 core HQ Chief of staff 1984 The movements directorate Manai?er l984 lhc MOD llQ The general secretary of the 1983 ministrv ·rhc 121)1 armored div. Division commander 1982 Minister of Defense . Ali Allawi (Sh) S~okesman General Counsel ,___ Georges Sada TBD - lnseector General Secretary General TBD Bruska Shaways (K} I General in Chief I I I >- Milita~ Affairs Director 0.efenr;e Dires:tor PAO Director of Babekir(K) Polley . Admlnl1tratlon Georoos Sada TBD TBD I I I I Director General Dlrocfor General Director General Director General Acgulsitlon & Programs & Budget Communications & Personnel Sustainment TBD Intelligence TBD TBD TBD Chief of Staff lr:agi Armed Forces S/lawket (Su) Amer Bakr {Su) DeQut~ Cos De~urlCoS OQerations CaQabllities Daham Radhi Al-Assa/ (Sh) TBD I I I I CG Tr. alning Command CG 111 Division I I CG 3n1 Division l CG 5th Division II I cg Air 'Force Commander Coastal TBD Moustafa Qadir (K) Salem Al-Blaish (Su) Ahmed Al Katee (Sh) Kamal Abd AJ..Sattar (K) Defense Force TBD 3 21.04 Potential Top Tier Iraqi National Security Lead, ership· · INIS Shawani (T) National Security Advisor Rubaie (Sh) I DeQuty NSA Amer Bakr (Su) National Security Cahinet Commiittee I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------, : I Defense Interior Ali Allawi (Sh) Sumaidie (Su) Justice Shibli (Su) Foreign Affairs Zibari (K) I ~---------------------------- -- - ----- - ------~----'---------------- General-in-Chief 1 - Milita[Y Affairs Babekir (K- KDP) COS IAF Shawket (Su) 1 Potential Top Tier Iraqi National Security Leadership· · INIS Shawani (T) National Security Advisor Rubaie (Sh) I De12uty NSA TBD Natjonaf Security Cabinet Committee ~--··--·-~------···---·-----------·~--·-···---~--------·--------··-·-------, I 4 I I • • Defense Interior Ali AHawi (Sh) Sumaidie (Su) Justice Shibli (Su) Foreign Affairs Zibari (K) I ----------------·--------------·-----------·--- ~------------------ General-in-Ch· ief1 ..____ Military : Affairs Babekir (K- KDP) --------~ COS IAF Amer Bakr (Su) 2 COALITION PROV1SJONAL AUTHORITY BAGI I.DAO INFO MEMO March I 8. 2004 FOR: Tl-IE Al>MINlSTRA TOR FROM: SUBJECT: Advisory Team Terms of Reference for National Security Advisory Staff and Countcrterrorism Attached are terms of reference for the National Security Advisory staff. which will support the Jraqi Ministerial Committee for National Security. and for the Counterterrorism Adv,isory Team. Both will be wilhin my otlice, but will work with CPA. CJTF7 and Iraqi's across the full range of national security and defense. Both. are being fonned without delay. A'ITACHMENTS: TAB A - Terms of Reference for CT Advisory Team TAB B - Temls of Reference fo National Security Adviosry Staff CC: Policy Planning; CJTF-7; OGA; OGC; MoFA; MOF; Governance; MOl;L l Dick Jones UNCL,\SSJFIED Ministerial Committee for National Security Advisory Staff T enns of Reference Purpose: The national security advisory slatf suppons the work oflhe Ministerial Committee for National Security. Scope of Work • It coordinates the work of the various agencies and Ministries represented Qn the MCNS and others as relevant • lt prepares advance materials for MCNS meetings • It ensures that information is shared among and provided to all relevant agencies and ministries • Maintains awareness of implementation of policy and supports MCNS oversight of policy implementation • Establishes working groups representing various minjsterial and agency staff. as needed, to resolve and pursue specific topics. Composition or Group • Iraqi National Security Advisor (once named-r Jwill play role until then) • Senior Advisor to the Iraqi National Security Advisor (once named) • Iraqi National Security Advisory staff, seconded from other Ministries and agencies, plus specifically hired staff. if any • Specially assigned CPA staff dual-hatted to suppon this structure • Non-Iraqi participation e:-.1JCcted to decline over time Ministerial Committee for National Security Advisory Staff Counterterrorism Advisory Team Tenns of Reference Purpose: The countertcrrorism advisory team serves as a resource of countertcrrorism expertise for the various ministries, agencies. and government structures of Iraq. It engages in analytical and planning support on a general level and for specific issues and events. Scope of Work • Assess the ovcrall lhr\!at o Prepare analytical assessments that provide a comprehensive sense of the terrorist threat facing Iraq. These should address various forms of terrorism and the broad range of groups. o Both shon and long-term o Draw on Iraqi and coalition intelligence assets and other sources of information o Ensure that information is sbared among and provided lo aH relevant agencies and ministries • Develop countenerrorism strategy o Based on the threat assessment and working with relevant ministries and agencies. develop a response plan, drawing on historical and international experience as well as factors unique to Iraq. o Assess needs and capabilities to implement this strategy across agencies and ministries, including an IO campaigns o Identify requirements and mechanisms to meet them o Support as needed ministry and agency effurts to implement this plan • Prepare for Arbaeen and other specific events with high risk o In support of relevant ministries, develop preparation and response plans, including IO campaigns o Remain available for ministry and agency le<1dership and staff to draw on expertise • Other duties and effons as requested by ministries and agencies • Reg.ular briefings on work to date provided to MCNS Composition of Group • Specially assigned CPA specialists (team led by Andrew Rathmell and Jim Steele). • Specialists from other coalition countries provided in suppon of the initiative. This panicipation may be in person or through papers and short-tcm1 visits • Iraqi counter-terrorism specialists • Non-Iraqi participation expected to decline over time Structure • The Countcrterrorism Advisory Team will be a component of th~ Natiortal Security Advisory staff. Jn the CP/\ structure. it will fall under the ONSA, although individual CPA personnel will report to other organizations within CPA. • lt will be a\lailable to the MCNS. National Secwity Advisory stnff, aod ministries and agcncic- s of the lraqi government. as needed Time-Frame • Work will begin immediately. with Arbaeen preparation as a critical initial focus, even as broader work also commences. • Group's work is indefinite C01"\L.I l"ION PROV lSIUNAL l\UTI IORl I Y U.\(il !DAO I X F() '1E. MO .\tarch 9, 20 that noanimity should be required to declare wa(, owing to his fear that and a pro-Iranian member of the presidency could stymie mtional defense a~ainsl Iranian a$gression. I bave a11:,'lled thar unanimity is the right rule at least during the transition period, given th.e importance of nat~onal unity on any matter of war and peace and also the fact that the multinational force presence would Jeter such aggression. As you know, ~ is very worried about lranian·lslamist links and plots. On tactics, we should decide which individual lGC members to pre-brief and who should do it. Allawi should handle these. though I can help. ATTACHMENTS: Advisory Consultations; T AL Language UNCLASSIFIED Advisory Consultations between the Security Committee of the IGC and CPA/CJTF-7,: Re· port to the IGC on PrQgress Dr. Avad AUawi, Chairman of the Security Committee Fe.bruary ..04 In line with the November 15, 2003, agreement between the CPA and the IGC, David C. Gompert was appointed by CPA as senior advisor to help lay the groundwork for transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi transitional government with effective national security institutions. 2- Mr . ._r __ __.lhas met regularly with me and other members of the JGC Security Committee since his appointment. He and I serve as the heads of Lhe Advisory Consultative Group comprised of the Security Committee of the fGC and his team of senior officials and officers from CPA and CJTF-7. The group has based its work on a plan, suggested by Mr. ._r __ __.I and accepted by the Security Committee, which addresses concepts, principles, and plans 'for permanent Iraqi national security institutions. 3- Security is a key underpinning of sovereignty and a prerequisite for the success of a democratic, pluralistic lraqi state. Providing security is an obligation of government to the people of Iraq, who were victims of a regime that provided for its own security at their expense. 4- When the current emergency abates and the need for help from Iraq's friends declines. Iraq's security will depend on its own institutions and capabilities. Iraq will continue to fa.ce both external and internal security problems. Therefore, it will need capable armed forces and police under the civilian control of ministries of defense and interior. Moreover, Iraq needs mechanisms and able people of high integrity to provide for national security policy-making and civilian command authority over its armed forces and other security services. 5~ The group has reached conclusions on a number of critical issues concerning national security decision-making structures, roles and capabilities of Iraqi Armed Forces and internal se. curity forces, and the Ministry of Defense. 6- We must put past practices behind us and create new structures appropriate to Iraq's real security needs and new democratic ways, based on the Transitional Administrative Law. a future constitution, other laws and the trust of a well-informed public. 7- National security policy- and decision-making should be centered in a Cabinet Committee for National Security, chaired by the Prime Minister and comprised of the Ministers of Defense. Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice. and other ministers as appropriate for specific issues. B· The Cabinet Committee for Naltonal Security will be augmented by the chief of the defense staff. a national security advisor. and the head of the national intelligence service. who will be selected by and report to the Prime Minister_ 9· Civlhan control of the Iraqi Armed Forces is of critical importance. It would be under the authority of the prime minister of the government of Iraq, as commander in chief. and through a civilian minister of defense. 10· The committee has sought to define and mshtute merit-based recruitment of senior civilian officials and military officers for the Ministry staff. 11- In addition to the Minister. civilian control will be exercised by a secretary general, depury secretaries. and an Inspector general. The senior-most military officers will be the Chief of the Defense Staff and the Commanding Officer of Iraqi Armed Forces. The former W\ll be senior military acMsor to the Minister and to the Cabinet Committee. The latter will report directly to the Minister ot Defense 12-The purpose of the armed forces shall be the defense of the security and temtorial integrity of Iraq. The Iraqi Armed forces will be an efficient. capable. and modern volunteer force of modest size. II will also Include a reserve force that can be called upon to augment the regular IAF In the event of national crises. 13-The Iraqi police forces must be able to deal with the majority of foreseeable internal security problems. The police will therefore require a range of capabilities. to include quick response forces. 14-The head of government may assign selected elements of Iraqi Armed Forces to support the Ministry of Interior for domestic safety and security purpose. s only in extraordinary circumstances when threats exceed the capacity of Iraq's internal security forces to safeguard the state and the people of Iraq. 1Ji....:ftt'efe will be no militias and armed forces not under the comma -....._ structure of the Iraqi Government, except a~ provided by federal law. ) 16-Future discussions of the Security Committee will work through a range of other issues. These discussions will suppor1 the establishment of the MOD by April 1. However, the Committee's work will not be completed at that time, and it wiJI continue to meet to finalize critical issues. 17-As a chairman of the security committee I look forward to making a fun presentation to the governing council. I believe that David Gompert and Ambassadors Bremer and Greenstock, as well as some members of their staffs should participate in this meeting, which I hope will take place in the next 2-3 weeks. • Decisions to declare war shall be taken unanimously by the Presidency Council upon the recommendation of tr.e Prime Minister, and shall require the majority approval of the TNA. • Decisions to conclude peace, to use Iraqi Armed Forces internally during peacetime, and to deploy or use forces abroad shall be taken unanimously by the Presidency Council upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The TNA may veto any of these decisions by a two-thirds vote. • There shall be established a Cabinet Committee for National Security composed of the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Justice, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Other Ministerial level officials may also be included on an ad hoc basis. The Chief of the Defense Staff, Director General of the INIS, and the National Security Advisor will also participate. It shall be chaired by the Prime Minister and its role shall be to decide matters of national security policy. • There shall be established a State Council for National Security, composed of the Presidency, the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Justice, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief of the Defense Staff, Director General of the INIS, and the National Security Advisor. Other Ministerial level officials may also be included on an ad hoc basis. It shall be convened by the Transitional Presidency Council and its role will be to advise the Presidency Council on its decision-making. CO/\.LI r100! PROVISIONAL AUTI IORLJ:X.LC.S:. B/\Cil ID/\O l :"FO M E!\1 0 January 5. 200..J FOR: THE AD~ll)-; ISTRA TOR FRO\!: DaYid C. Gompert. Sewor .~d\'isor for ~auonal Sccunty & Defcn:-e SUBJECT: Discussion with lyad Alt1\\ 1 C'PA is reaJy to begin high-level national security consultations. and we cannot wait any longer for them lo start. We shoulJ press for agreement with Alawi on how to proceed. The National Security Committee of the GC has become an ac1h·e body, whe1her or not Alawi is in the chair. II is clear to me that this committee of 13 must serve as chc "large group" 10 which Alawi has referred. \\'c shouJd tell Alawi thal he and l shoulu present out plan for the ad\·isory consultations (attached) al the regularly scheduled meeting this Saturday. Alawi also\\ ants a .. small group:· as you know. l have conc!uucrnal Sccurit}' • i'\ at ional Ddensc • lntcmal Security Emergencies • Law Enforcement • Capabilities • Roles, '.\fissions, and Rcponin8 • Key Principles and Laws • Issues and Practical Steps 3. Ministry ot' Defense • Functions: Ci\ ilian and \.lilitary • Organizational S1ructurc • Policy-making. • Forces i'.lml infrastructure. • K~y Principles. Laws. and Regulations • Issues and Practical Steps .;J. Pcoplt• • Key Leadership Positions: Roles and Q~iali!ications • K~y Officials • Exchange of Ideas on fndivrdu:tls • Proc\!Ss ofRc<.·rui1ment, Tn:ining, Placement • ·'Good Go\em;mcc·· Principles, Laws, Regulations Week of Janu3ry l 0 Week of January 17 \.\'eek of January .2~ Week of January 31 Strategic Advisory Consultations Work Plan Page2 • · Issues and Practical Steps 5. Sertiug and \Jecting Requirements • Determining Needs • Costs: Fixed. Operating. Investment • AtTordabilily • Responsibilities • Key Principles, Laws, Regulacions • Issues and Practical Steps 6. further topics: • 111-dcpth MoD design. • Na1ional Security Jnfonnation Architecture • Regional Security Relationships • Staffing • Post 711 Advisory Suppon • Others as needed Weck of February 7 UNCLASSIJ·IED 2 COA LJTIO!"' PR< lV 11.\IONt-\ L /\ U rl IORJ I)' Bf\Cil llJ:\D l'.'l\FO MEMO January S. 200..i FOR: THE ADi'vtlNISTR.A TOR FROM: MG Paul Eaton, CG. CMATT SuBJECT: Officer Training lni1iatives - Jordan The following background material details the reasons behind training the N[A in Jordan, describes the consultation process with the IGC, and explains the decision to move for.\"ard with training before notifying the IGC. First, the plan to train in Jordan and to include Jordanian trainers in the Non Commissioned Officc . r training here in Iraq (Tadji) was briefed on two occasions to and approved by SECDEF (5 September here) and to OSD. Second, consult today with Mr. Slocombe reveals he did not inform Governing Council and according tor' I the first the GC heard of the initiati\.e was when [ briefed them two weeks ago. Both my fom1er Deputy Commander, BG Jon Riley ;ind I ha\'e discussed the overall plan and the Jordan initiative in several \'enues including K.DP and Pl!K, specifically including Messrs. Banan.i and Talibani. We registered no objections. I accept responsibility for failure to notify GC - my decision t.o pr6ceed \vith this plan approval was late August and [did not consider the lraqi political scene, yet did ha,·e to move quickly to get the plan to succeed. The rationale for selecting Jordan includes: Jordanian Armed Forces (J • .<\F) are professional. volunteer and have a British Army tradition. Man for man, they are the best manned and trained . .l\rab Anny. a reputation validated by over a dozen US Foreign Area Officers and British Anny Officers [ have engaged ror ad\·ice. American Embassy Amman concurs with concept. No language problem. Viewed as a positive initiative by t.hose Sunnj former officers l spoke to. Viewed as neutral to positive by those former Kurdish officers I spokl! to. Viewed neutral (but some negative body language) by those former Shia officers l spoke to (please note that these conversations occurred at Kirkush Military Training Base with recruited former Army leaders - recruit talking to Major General is not science). Jordan offered safe, secure environment for training. Jordan volunteered. Jordan offered insights into their culture, both civilian and militar}. Our troops will see their units in action. Jordanian military leadership ethos is"' hat I"' ant our troops to sec - Gen1.?rals engage in discussio11tgiYe .and take with officers far junior to themse1ves, in public and in front of foreign General Officers. How it happened: (\vent to Jordan 25 August to look into buying used military equipment and selective senior officer training opportunities (Major, Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel). The more I observed Jordanian officer behavior the more l was convinced that l had an opportunity to accelerate Iraqi Anny development in a substantial way and expose Iraqi officers to a good Army with good leadership in a rational actor state. As l continued to probe the senior trainer for the JAF, Major General Karaki, he sat back and asked, ''What do you want from us?" I replied, "L want you to train our leadersltip." We discussed numbers and the meeting broke up. We subsequently reengaged and crafted the plan we now have in place. lam convinced the King has essentially said ... Make it happen." We then got approval to execute and fund. The resulting training plan trains Platoon Commanders, Company Commanders. Battalion and Brigade staffs and selected Battalion and Brigade Commanders. Some of the latter will be drafted from ongoing interviews. I pick leadership, not Jordanians and ethnic distribution will mirror Iraqi demographics. Planned total number to be trained is 13 IO. in two groups. strong, and will graduate 18 March 04. The first group is on the ground 570 The Governance section notes that given the complexity of the Iraq-Jordan relationship, this training has the potential to post a significant political problem. Given that there is no adequate substitute location for this training. we are prepared to work with CPA to reassure the Governing Council members by: Assuring them that we wilJ vet Jordanian offic~rs that will be involved in training Iraqi officers; Providing details on the training facility's location as well as the scope of interaction between the Iraqi officers and the Jordanian population; Highlighting the involvement and supervision of Coalition forces; and, Emphasizing plans to expand training programs and facilities within lraq ATTACHMENTS: COORDINATlON: NONE E-mail from Mr Slocombe. dated I Sep 03. ll\iC LASS IF IED Page 1 of I _r_-==-_____.j(FS.02) From: Eaton, Paul Sent: Sunday, January 04, 2004 7:46 AM To: r ICGBRJ Subject: FW: NIA Acceleration Follow Up Flag: Follow up Flag Status: Flagged For attachment, -----Original Message----- From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) Sent: Monday, September 01, 2003 2:54 PM To: Eaton, Paul L SUbject: NIA Acceleration Paul- Amb. Bremer told the GC Security group today that he Intends to ask for the funds necessary to accelerate the NIA work, as outlined m the plans you have put forward. He said he ls prepared to ''bet on the come" and authorize some money to start preparation, in the expectation that his requests for funds will be approved in the supplemental. He also agreed when I said that if we are to do this. we can't wait until the end of the year to start construction on sties. and therefore need to rescind the $20M cut and add some more. He asked that we prepare a specific list of what needs fo be done over the next four months, by month as much as we cen do it, so he wih know what has to be authorized. (This is to confirm our hallway conversation; I have }ust read that Churchill's rule was that his sfaff was nof to implement any instruction of his unless it was either given, oc immediately confinned, in wnting. Not a bad rule, especially foc something as big as this.) I think he really appreciales the innovation and creativity you've shown in making this proposal, at once daring and practicaL Now 1t only remains to get $2 ,B and work a small miracle. We also need. to act soonest on what additional personnel we need - both for CMATI and for the US military contribution to training (including followup tralning for the units as they enter operational status) Wall l s. 2004 COALITION PROV !SIONA L J\U rHORITY BA.GllDAD l~FO ~IEMO January .s. 200-' FOR: ~STRATOR L__JPress Ortic~r. CPA Press Office SUBJECT: Iraq Army Day This memo is jn response to your request for information regarding Iraq Anny Day activities. On Monday. December 29, I received an e-mail message from Colr ladJressing a proposal for Iraq Am1y Day (January 6) activities he had recei\'ed from Capt._r ____ ~I J r ITF-7 10 n' lllfh' I \\he'\<;._: 1k~k I~ in 1h~ O(fii:.: Qf l;jtnk':.!iC r.,m .. 1'1.1k.11i.1ns ll.ll.,)l. ' F I "'s-.:1.:ti: su::,tgl..':.h:r·4.~Uli ,in~ pn .. •..;c:; .:<1\<..·r1'.-..: .1 f th<.: Ir tcfi \1 ;n~ ;;rt1h : i1l/l i I 1 l· i) ! I 1e1 , " 1 'n 111 i •• 11 ' ~~ • :- ··r· •1 .1\ I FRO~l: , , , 1 i: .: .... , 1· ... .un:,. '-' .i ...... rn_; ,!1·.itH dt..: d..: • , ' t ltl a •)f < F:11n!ly, Unh ~r-.il> s~rd~c:. S('ictntilic, fl!chnkal, ctt: ... ) ) .. ,' I... ~.Muu~t~r·:> U.fi1.:~ Financial :\ffoirs; \\ i th the Jocuml!nts Re~i-::rr:.H{t;H Offi· .! (_'()/\LI') 'JON )'[{( )\/ ISi< >NA L /\ u·111t >RI rY HA( ii II ) ,.\J) INFO l\ I EMO FOR: Tl fE ADMINISTR/\ r<>R FROtvJ; i i Da nccurity forces. Political conditions and a history of militOJry inh:rlcrcnce point 10 a nci:d to U\'01d ~·unecnlratton of power m the security sector. Also, it is a fair working a~sumption thm cabmet-styk go\crnmcnt will emerge rrom the Transitional National Authorny. kJ by a PM "ith constrnincd l'XCCutivc po" crs. This suggests a need for strong mter- mir.ii 511·frd 1mw1gnm::u.;u:icJ.~in~~~uppOTMn·n•Hioni.ll ~..:cunty - i.e .. an NSC-J1ke system. The start mg pomt \"lancfan.l or.imparllal11y an<.l.c9JJ£.giality.rcquircd or the office uml tu be cmulated by the staff. I k or Shi.' must be brond enough w understand aJ..lea. stJorei1,m P~9'-•IJWJlU.t1u11:;il..d~fe1¥.Je issue!>. ini:luJing both e" JHl\\ for three reasons: First. the bcst 11mc for ::m cffrctive nalional security advisor is at the ~outset when the system will still be forming "nd tht." 1.h1ng~rs of 1~;;ervice ~_!ld inter-min~lcrial po~itical rival nes ar1.' greatest. Second. the 111:'\.'d will become apparent soon a lier we begin the securi1y-insti1u1ion consull:1tions with the J.raqis In Janu~1ry. Third. 11 c~J take months to compktc a careful search. While there i~ or COllf~\.· .. ni,k that :m) prc-sdcctcJ mll iunal ~ur;\Ta<.J\ii~or " \foi1lu not be-ret:ilned by a new guvcrn1m:111 come June-July. an 1n1en111 rn1c . .1,:an al.kasU>lli.lpc Lhc po::.ition, int1.·r·m1111.~lcrial proccs!>, iln~ Slaff. As we focus on th\.' Jutks und •1u•d1fical1~ns or :i Dl.'li:nsc Mm1stcr, we will do ltkcw1sc in regard to an Iraqi n:i11onal security ;idv1sor. W11holll a go\'Crnm.en1 to serve, the person would work with me and \\'Ith lr:.iqi scc:llrlly 111111istr1e!i (MoD. MFA, f\fol. lnll"ll) in dc~1gn111g on NSC-l1kc system. so that something will be 111 place. pcrsonuhtics as1Lle. when a government i~ formed, We 1111gh1 ulso want to send 1he md1\'1du;tl 111 ,·~1m.l1d<1t1.·s to m1.·c1 < ·oml1 R10:1..·. Br1:111 S1:ow\:roli. Sci;urity forces. Political condit1ons and a h1s1ory ofnulitary u::ttcrlcrcnce 1)1.)mt 10 a necnal National Authonty. led by a PM '.l.tith constrained executive powers. This suggests a need tor stmng mtcr-mm1steria· I management and cabinet suppon in nation.al sceunty Le., an NSC'-hke system. The starting point would \X'. the appointment ofa national security a(h•isor (by thm or another name) to earn the lru~t of ministers, develop an 1n1eragency pulicy-coordmalion system., and ~gin ass~mbling a small, h.1gh-<:ahber staff. The p. It will not be C3S'}' in lraq - perhaps impossible c'(_Ccpt for former c"'itc,. Wh1k the national secunty aJ\'lsor would presumably not be a po\Jucian or at the level of minister, the nght one would add profl:ss1onal ~trcngth \() the nattonol security knt omc for an dfcetiw: nanonal ~curity ae a risk that any pre-selected national security adv1'or would not be rct;uncd by a new govcmml."nt come JunL ..... July. an mrerim one ca.n at least shape:" the position. 1ntcr-nu111•.t1.."nal process, und staff. As we focll!- on the duties and qualificat1ons of a. Defense Mm1ster. we "ill do likewise in n: ·gard to an Iraqi national sccumy advisor. W1rhout a gm1c:nuncn1 to serve. the p.:rson would work \\ •ith me (Ind with Iraqi .;ccurity mini~trics tMoD. MF A. Mol. Jntell) in dcsigmn.i; an NSC-likc sy:i.tem, :.o th:it something will be m place, personalities aside. when a govemmen! is fonncd. We might also want to send the indh• nJual or candidates lo meet Condi Rice. Brent Scowcroft. Sandy Bc:rger and olht'T'li who 'vc hc:ld the job. CC: Security lnstiturions Steering Group. Amb Jones. L TG (RHning a training program for future civil servants. Our objectives are to locate and hire competent and honest people and to provide recruits wub the nect:::;sary knowlcdgt! and skills to build an effective, non-corrupt, transparent, civilian Ministry of Defense that will be able to serve this country through the transfer of authority in July and beyond. HlRJNG r lamr lbnve done ~ubstantial outreach and compiled a dalahase of approximarely 200 names and biographical information. Many of these arc form1;1r mmtary, and we are gathering names of civilians. The next step is lt> produce a manning chart of the Ministry of Defense for the nc- 1 six months. based on the O'!ganization chart. This project is in process. The manning chart wil I tell us what jobs we need to hire tor - and when and will allow us to write up job descriptions for cuch, which we will need in the hiring procc..:;s. This plan is captured in lhe diagram below. This is imponam he;.-causc training must be rd:ucd directly to the functions of particular offices and jobs. It will not be: ~nough tn send the Iraqi« 10 a generalized training - they will also need more ia-depth training speci lie to their tasks. ACTION: Complete the manning table. write job descriptions, continue outreach. Begin interviews in late December. I 1J NCL.ASSIFIEO I> RA Fl UNCl.A$SrffED DRArr MOD Org Char1 --·- Manning Table c) I Job Descriptions I ¢ And Hires Interviews Recruiting and Outreach December 2003 January 2004 February 2004 T R.AIN l:NG Four types of training arc needed: J. Course Program~, Seminar s. Wfu·ks hot >~ a. General i. For all new employees - roles & responsibilities of MoDs in a democracy. ethics, strategy & policy, civ-mil, planning b. Specific i. Subject matter expen. in-depth, technical rraining (e.g., acquisittoo, pfanning and budgeting, strntegy and policy) 2. lnform;;rl T rairting aud Engagemctlt; 3. On-The-Job Training; 4. Comp uter T rainillg The timing and sequencing of the training program will be linked to the timing of !he recruitment and inlcrvfowing process. We \\'111 not, by February. have recruited all of the Iraqis that we will need; we will ~onunue t-0 bring them on boOlrd throughout the coming months. lh~ lraiuiag programs should be modularized and take place at rcguJar intervals to accommodate new eni.ronis into the system. The initial group is .:ilc;o only a small ponion of the flOOplc that tbc MoD w-ill C\'CntuaJly need beyond July, so it makes sense to create a training program that will continue after the TOA. 2 lJNCLi\SSIFIFD DRAJ.J' UNCLASSfFfED DRAFT Course Progr~ms, Seminars, Workshop'> General ('our:;;~s The first priority is to teach the new Iraqi civil servants how a Ministry of Defense is organized and run in a democracy. cthit:s of democratic public service, the principles of strategic analys_is, how 10 convert analysis into a national and defense stra1cgy, and how to translate thnt strategy into policies, forces, and resour,·es. Th~rc are a number of potential providers and locations for such training. The following table summarizes 1be selection of programs that we are reviewing. Formal Training Programs Number of Provld.er Location Course Time SlflfS Available Cost Len2th Availabilltv NESA Center Jan 04 2-3 (Jan) Ex.ec. \.\'ashington 21 days Apr04 TBD (Apr. Jul) so Senunar Jul 04 NESA Center Tailored Washington/ 14 days Feb 04 ('?) + THO -$300k P!ffil. Ba!Zhdad (?) Marshall Ctr. Gamusch JO days Feb 04; poss. 20 S-JSOk later DflD Baghdad TBD TBD TAD TBD Contractor Baghdad 14 days Fcb!March 04 THD - $2.SOk+ DCAF Baghdad ('!) 14 days May 04 (?) TBD TBD NESA Center Seminar Senior F:xc.-c. Washingwn 7 days May 04 2-3 $0 The curricula of 1hcse programs arc broadly similar. The highlighting indicates 1bosc programs for which CPNOSA wuu!d have signifa:ant input and control over the cui,Tlculum, timing, and specifics of the program, whereas the others are standardized. The tailorable programs are most desirable because we can ensure coMistenty and that we are getting the product that we want. 3 llNCLASSLFIED DRAFT UNCLASSWIED DRAFT Moreover, given our rimcframe, it makes most sense to have courses in Baghdad until at least April. Rerumme111/at.lon: Wt:.• :.honld not try to do everything : instead. we should ensure that e::1cb individual recei ve.~ th¢ proper four elements of training described .;1bovc. and it is probably simplest if all of the n:cruirs receive the !lame initial troirung in civilian Molls, ethics of civil service . .sm.1tcgy & policy, etc. We should 1herefore select one provider among the tailorable Baghdad options; NE.SA Ccnrer, Coni:ractor, or DCAF. But we should not ignore the standardized program~ . Select Iraqis shou1d artcnd courses like the NF.SA and Marshall. and some oflhc more senior Iraqis should attend NESA 's Senior Executive Seminars ACTION: Generate a set of n..-quircments (a SOW), review potential providers, de\'clop a program for the year 2004 (but concentrate on the first six months). Specific Courst>s The new lraq1 civil servants will require speci:lli..:.::d tr.iining as well. We should look to assemble courses 1ba1 correspond to the Groups in the org chart j so me of these mighc bl! combine.d into one c. ~0 1u s eJ. Courses in these areas may be on a smaller S<. ·:. ilc, bti three or four days in duration. and may be done either in or outside of Baghdad; the manning chart win provide us with th1; actuul number of people who need training in each atea. W1: arc just beginnins to c, xplore 1hrs. out some potential providers 111 each area arc~ l. Acquisition, Logistics, Infrastructure 2. Public Affairs - ?? 3. lnlelligt::m.:e Policy 4. Management 5. Defense Development 6. SU'ategic Policy 7. Fin::mcc - MPRI. SAIC. Vinnell - SAIC, ct al • Bcanng Pornt. Rl I. et al - MPRl, SAIC, NESA, ct al - MPRI. SA.IC. NESA, et al ·Bearing Point, RTI, et al ACTION: Complete the manning table. write job dcscriplions, research potential providers in each area. INFORMAJ~ TRAINl"NG A.NO ENGAGEMENT fa~ually imponam ~ ihc fom1al courses is a program to engage the llcw Iraqi civil servants, allow them tQ Qbservc how things are done in a democracy, have conferences w1th people from other nations. and "sodali7.c" them into tht: bro.Jdt:r international strategic community. It is especially ifl)llOrtant to bring together Iraqi:; and their counterparts i.n the! region There are a number of ways 1 0 do thi~. but a few ideas include: 4 UNClASS!FILO DR.'\FT lJNCLASSlflHD DRAFT Tours in th~ Wa$bington. D.C. arcu of nati rnos1 of their teaming pn the job. lt is impossible 10 transmit ull of the information in the timcframe available. and mo~1 people learn by doing. We bcljcvc that professionals from coalition states will need to be wori...-ing day-to-day with the Iraqis when they begin. This could bi: st.:iffcd either by contraetors, by coiilition civil servants, Qt both. Al th.is point. we are still working on determining th~ appropriate numb~r or protessionals that will he needed and developing a plan for how that might happen. AC1'JON: Write a plan for an OJT program. Jctcrmine nature of and resource rcquiremcnrs for such a program. COM P lJTl!:R TRAINf NG Jn the past, rraqi civil i-v.,V ~\:::;CJ (ii __ fROM: David C. Gompen, Senior Aisor for National Security & Dofcnse~~ SUBJECT: Briefing the I GC on Iraqi National ln!elligcnce Ser\'1cc. You are aware that a CPAJCJTF7 ad,·isory team com.lucts consultations with the IGC's Security Committee on concepts. principles, and plans for permanent Iraqi national security . institutio ns . These consultat1ons ha\c ,o,·ercd rnany critical issues concerning decision-making structures, roles, mission and capabilities of lAF and internal security forces, and the MoD. We expect a tonsultation with the full IGC '' ithin the nl!xt two'' eeks on the conclusions to uatc of work by the security commiuee. We have not, however. covered the lraqi Nalional Intelligence Service (INIS). except to sa~ that 1hc Director fii:ncral of the l'-.:IS ">h1mhl pro" illc uhj1.~tivc a->~i:>ssm c- nt.;; ,111d 1d• 1 1 .. 1 the Ir "I' 1'\!-. l , 1 _ ,1 · ' 1commith!cfor11ati1malsccurity :\ftcr u 1,1ft:1 r '.;-· 1 1 he IJ1.J .__ ______ ,_, I ha\c cond uJcJ that we :>houlJ no\\ consult wilh tbs: Lf'lll)llltl k e . folkmL:d hy ii" ! , 1 [1 < ll!l progress ,m~t principles con1.·1.·rnm~ the I~ IS "fhcri: i-;; gro" 111g '' I·'•, i; al'kHll lh'-" l '.\JS .. 1nJ a pcrccptilm 1!1.11 it li:ls h.:cn pbn111.:J ,ind fom1cd by us m h,;;1~111: '' r 1 I\. \ \\ hih.: nll Lim I! is iJ go. 1d lime lLl cnnsull on the !'-. l~. i l I!> hdtcr to do it in thc co111cxt of th..: larger national- .i:cu1 it> pol i'" ~ -lllak ing C1pp.1r..Jttb 1l•.1n tu \rc~t it .I'> J -;pcc1.1J .1~c • [ "t!I • ..- ·k All.t\' i's agn.:cm.-:nt to inlrnuuc.: l'.'..15 int1J the SL"Curil) i.:1.1mmitkc 111 lhc 11..:\I l \\'O \\ 1.'l.'l..~ • Without OG..-\ prc:scnt, I \\ill seek committee buy-in to the need .mV !SIONA L A LI n lORJ l'Y BAGI JDt-\D FOR: rRO\if: January .26. :!1)04 rHE:\D~1JNISTRATOR ;;! David C. Gompert, Scnior Advisor for National Security & Odens - Security Consultations Bcyunu CC St"Curity Committee The current process provides for: • Clul)c and fr~qucnt cons-ultations with Ayad Allawi, resulting in a clear sense of where "-'e agree, disagree. anu chairman. i!> hmtl lo :i~~~~s - The atlilu\.k of SCIRI is espct.·ially in~ru\:1-blc. • Limited to n0 exposure among non-committee. members. Hear in mind, though. th~1t mos! of tht.• GC 'dr:>1ty is on the Security Committee, P;.ich;.ichi being thl.! main c~ccptiun . • A suh-committc:i:: ("sm:tll g1011p'') oon"iisting of Alla·wi. Hakim. Chalibi, O:m:ani, ~111u Sh'-·1\.-.h Gh;ui. which has yet to meet nut will. Allu\\ i says, soou meet .md_:·makc qe<;\SiQJJS.." • In the .ibscnc1,; of ;m :1cl1\·c small group •• 111 ill-i.Jclinc. There 1s no n~ed to meel on this if you an: comfortable with our plan. ¥ C-'' ..cc .......... ~ ~ \'-'°"· i_ - ce: ~ r---~ ()0v~~ ..._Vt_ ""~ ~\- c; C{; I.' <2 vev' < '--J) ~~ t-- ck-~ \:cc~ et-' r'vJ~ \-\.c..: \-f"~ "7-1 ""ll ~ COALITION PROVISION/\ L /\U r1 IORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEit_~ January 26, 2004 FOR: THE ADM£NlSTRATOR II ( FROM: 'David C. Gompert. Senior Advisor for National Security & Defens1 SUBJECT: S urily Consultations Beyond GC Security Committee The current process pro,·ide for: • Close and frequent c sultations with. Ayad AIJawi, resulting in a clear sense of where we agree, disagree, and de r. Ailawi appears to agree with our positions but has made clear that the identity of CJNC can ot be settled yet. • Weekly 2-hour consul.tati s with the Security Committee. Full disclosure of our views lo all members of the Security C mittee, via participation. circulation of summaries, and my bilateral meetings. Thought ere have been no objecrions to our summaries. lhc acceptance of our posiiions b~ · thc commitlc oth1,;r than by its chaim1an, is hard ro assess. The attitui.l~ of SC1RI is especially inscrutable. • Limited to no exposure among no -committee members. Bear in mind, though, that most of the GC varsity is on the Security C irnittec. Pachacbi bl!ing 1hc main exception. • A sub-commillce Csmall group"') cor -isting of Allawi. Hakim. C'halibi. Barzani, and Slrcikh Ghazi.\\ hich hus yet to meet but will. ,. llawi says, soon mecl and~'make de~i.signs." • ln the absence of an active small group, ~ 1 ill-defined process for translating committee summaries into decisions and accions. I do bt that the GC ilself will ev~r be asked lo a.ct on a compktc blueprint rather. the results \\ii! ap ectr in various places. e.g., TAL. shape of MoD, ...1ppointm<.:nt of key officials. Going forward,r Jand I sugges1 the foll.owing additional steps: • Convince Allawi that there has been enough substance covered in the commiucc 10 date that it would be time!)! to hriefJbe GC, Ideally, he would invite me to.briet'a!ong ITTth him. though it would also be worth doin~ jfbe briefed alone- as well as reve-aling about how much he thinks has been decided. • Activate the small grol;ill and use it for decisions, including confinnation of the results to date. • Keep Pachachi and his camp well informed, even after his presidency. l will speak to both Pachachi and Allawi on these m:itters in the next two days. FORMATION OF 1Rll01 ARMED FORCES (PROPOSALS) Preparation by Office of Dr. Ibrahim .lll•Ushaiqer GC.Member l st Pro;eosal National Defense Council Minister for Finance Minister for Defense • l\'Iinister for Justice Minister for Internal Affairs Inspector General l\tlinister for Foreign Affairs . . Director of Inelegance I. The head of the Council is to be president or Prime Minister. "' The Inspector General is a member of the Council and nor a decision maker. 3. The name can be (National Defense Council) or (Supreme Defense Council. Battalion for Guarding Command HQs. I I Support Co. HQ. Company 4 Infantry Co's .. . • Howitzer Platoon Adm in. Platoon 1st Platoon M. MG. Platoon Transpo11 Platoon 2°d Platoon Mi 1. Eng. Platoon EME Section 3rd Platoon Notes 2. I. Battalion Commander= (LT. COL.) or (COL). Company Commander= (MAJ.) or (CAPT.). 3. Platoon Leaders = (r'1 LT.) or (LT.). • Notes on. I. We propose an office for each Dircclol'ate or General Directorate to be nuclei for their units. 2. To prepare allocations am] revenues according to the type of armament and materials that shall be decided 3. Comma11d for H.Q. Security is to be organized as follows: a. (Directorate for guarding I LQ. 's) temporary organization to be connected directly to CoS. b. The mentioned command is to be formed from the new battalions. c. After forming they shall guard themselves. d. The connection to CoS. wil I bi .. ·s. or Corps I Supply I l'crsorrnl Alim. ins. ( I Training OJJCrntions I Air Force I I I Navy Accounts"~ PX's Officers Admin. D. 0. Infantry D. 0. Mil. Ops. llQ Sccuril)' E. M. 11:.. Enlisted Admin. D. 0.AmooT O. O. Armament & Command Materials Survey & IJousing Mcdic~tl D. 0. Artillel)' & Oircctoratc Missiles o.o. Contracts"~ Sells Communications Legal Dircctorntc 0. 0. M ii. EnJ!. I-lost Commands I>. o. Org. & M. P. MiJ. /\cadcm)· r·1~uming GC SECURITY COMMITTEE MEETING 15 JANUARY 2004 @ 1400 DR. ALLA \VI: Discussed the meeting from last week ... discussed actions from previous meetings and discussed the working paper with the CPA. MR. GOMPERT: Started with two items: to provide the committee with key points from the previous discussion, which was procedural. Hereafter, these discussions will cover substantive issues and such s:ummaries will be provided at tbe following session. Also, invited the members of the GC Security Meeting to come to the KJvtTB. This wiU enable them to gain first hand knowledge of the training tbat is being conducted. MG Eaton explained the particulars of this visit. Stated this would be a good opportunity to speak to the I 51 Iraqi Battalion and gather their impressions and to also visi.l the officer tTaini11g with tbe 4th Batta.lion and have lunch with them. Ground time would be 4-5 hours. We will provide a series of dates. DR. A: LLAWI: Thanked MG Eaton for the invitation. M.R. GOMPE RT: Reference the National Security Decision Structure Policy (NSDP) ... this is the authority over the anned forces ... rhis is in effect from peace time to hostilities. External as well as the internal, into the policy decision making, has to be taken into account. The Iraqi people have to be given the confidence to accept these establishmenls. Offered a model for the NSP for the US and Ambassador Richardson offered the UK view. Our assumption is power, authority and capabilities would be distributed rather than concentrated. The ability of the cabinet to func.tion is crucial to policy making but not the entire cabinet. You need to limit it to the few who have security responsibility ... the core ministries within the cabinet. .. the Mol, MoD, MoJ, and the MFA. It bas to be flex.ible. It is important to have a formal structure but use it in practice. Countries with one system often find difficulties in management and authority. It is important that this committee receive essential advice. There are three principal advisors: the Senior Officer (uniformed) in the Iraqi MoD; the head of the national Intelligence Service; and the National Security Adv isor (who is a political advisor). They are not part of the decision making body itsel( Anther advantage of the National Security Adv]sor is tJ1e interrninisterial coordinate that tbis poS"ition can provide. This position place a critical advisory role and ensures coordination among the ministers and the ministries. A.MB .RICHMOND: There are three principal advisors in the UK: civil control: cabinet responsibility aud accountability for parliament. This is chaired by the prime minister and it always includes the MoD, MFA, MoFinance and others according to the need. They are advised by the Chief of the Defense Staff and individual heads of the serves and the head of the lntelligence Service. There is no National Security Advisor in the Briiish system. • MR. GOMPERT: Clarified one point ref the Chief of the Defense Sta IT. This position would not be the CG of the Iraqi Anned Forces. You reaJJy have two very senior officers within the MoD ... the Commander of the Anned Forces reports directly to the MoD. GHAZl AL YAWi: Stated the need to consider the role of the think tank group also . • JAAFARJ REP: Mentioned the three advi. sors and asked what position they take with the Prime M i.nister. MR. GOM.PERT: Explained the roles from each country. Further stated the National Security Advisor actually is a part of the president's office ... is a senior member of his staff. OTHER: Asked if the president or prime minister would be better off to have this committee attached to either? MR. GOMPERT: Very difficult question to answer. It would be best to view the prime minister as head of policy making. It is not always easy for the president and prime minister to work together on issues on national security. We need to be conc- emcd with how the people will accept these committees. Previously. they were oppressive. AMB RJCHMOND: Stated he had already informed the committee about his country's accountability to Parliament. Further went on to explain that no prime minister would embark on a major foreign advance without the approval of Parl.iament. MR. GOMPERT: Felt that selected officials who hold these positions of utmost importance would be basica11y politieians but they must also have tbe highest integrity, be impartial and be responsive to the director and the people. J AAFARI REP: Stated that both countries (US and UK) have long experience. Asked for views and recommendations in building national security ... looking for advice. M R. GOMPERT: The system ofpo.licy and decision making for the US is useful not only peace time but in crises and war time as well. Some-thing closer to the UK is better here because the American model bas a high concentration of decision making with the president. We have a federal system where internal security problems are addresses by local. state or federal authorities. With r· egard to civilian control over the military, we have national command authority. It must make sense· from the political point of view and the operation point of view as it forces them lo receive clear decisions. MG Gallinetti was asked to d.escribe this process. 'MG GALLINETTJ: As an example, he went from the low levels on up. LTG Sanchez is in charge of the special task forc.e comprised of all service members ... we are an here· to assist the CPA. CJTF7 responds to a hjgher commaa. d, GEN Abizaid, the Unified Combatant Commander. He is in charge of a geographical area in the world which includes Iraq. He reports directly to our Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense • reports directly to the President of the US. The Secretary of Defense a lhe principal cabinet mcmber ... he receives advice tbnn th~ Joint Chiefs of Staff (GEN Meyers). The Secretary of Defense has many civilians and military on his staff: This joint worki. ng relationship makes everything else work. each one of our military services .also has a senior military officer in cbarge and he reports lo the civiliaa head of that service. The senior military officer for the Am1y is the Chief of Staff. He reports to the Secretary of the Anny who is a civilian. MR. GOMPERT: There is a very simple line from the president or prime minister to the commanding officer in the field. It is very direct. clear and short and vice a versa. ~ Any soldier will tell you their president is their commander in chief (ClNC). MR. GOMPERT: Mr-mentioned the CINC. The term is used to make it clear where lhe command begins. We don't know if it is the right tenn for Iraq. lt is believed there is a strong argument to have the prime minister to serve as the ClNC'. his important lo have a system that will funclion well in peace time as well as war time. It should be your choice to have a presiden1 or prime minister. MG EATON: Illustrated one point of civilian control. Stated that if GEN Abizaid wanted to transfer an infantry squadron it would require penn:ission by the Secretary of Defense. MR . GO MPERT: Stated that internal sccurjty problems rested with Moland no! in the MoD chain of command. M:R.r I: Stated he \\ould give the committee a view of how the US models its law enforcement. He stated there arc thrc.c levels: federal. state and local. Fun.her explained the history of how the US came to these : levels. He further stated that whatever system Iraq builds the public expects to feel secure. MR. GOMPERT: We can do a better job in preparing and structuring. The originaJ work program only went out two months. Atter covering all principal topics we will come back to vou and go over them with further detail - , Meeting ended at approximately 1540. The meeting of the security committee on Thursday 22/01 1 2004. At governing council building in4:00-2:00. Summery l. Detennined the date for visiting the military college on 14102/2004. 2. The discussion for next week will be about the ideas to establish Ministry of Defense and National Security Agency. 3. Detem1ined the security forces that Iraqi people trust it inside Iraq. 4. the security forces should be establish according to the national laws and under the state supervision and the military forces should be under the civilian authority. 5. The Iraqi forces should be able 10 reassurance protec1ion by reassurance all the requirements of the civil defense. 6. This forces and agencies should be widely representing the Iraqi people. 7. Discuss the matter from economic side to form and distribute the allowances of defense and all other things that need financing. 8. The necessity of having good regionalism security relationship to achieve good opportunity to Iraq. 9. There is another chance to make Iraq part of the international society. l 0. ·The challenges that Iraq will face inside the society are mutiny, !errorism, extremism and civilian riot. I I. The possibility of making Iraq deal with the security matter and the role of CPA to assist Iraq in this aspect. 12. The army will be under the civilian control and there should be a decision not to use the anny for the security crisis unless there is especial crisis. 13. The Iraqi police should have high abilities to serve the Iraqi people. 14. Training cadres consisting of three. units. which arc able to confront the terrorism operations. 15. Dctcnnined the best Iraqi police officers in order to train them by C.P.A. 16. Determined the kind of control upon the border which depends on technology and intelligence or by increasing the number of the police figures. 17. Using the intelligence in leading and control. 18. Establishing the unites of quick involvement. Fast intrusion tbrces l 9. Dr. Ayad Alawi pointed out the following points:- A- Keep the army away from the interior task. B- Enlarge the security ability. C- The security institutions should do their role to manage the security. D- The idea of using the army in emergency cause sbould not be delete. E- Some members of the security committee will hold meetings concerning speed and presenting its ideas to the security committee. F- The importance of the first person presence or his represent for the importance of the discussions that will be. 20. The possibility of establishing an army which will not involve in politic. 21. Uni tied the police forces between the govemorates and the capital. 22. The necessity of forming anti- riot forces equipped with special equipments. 23. Find the youth leaderships and take advantage from the experie. nced leaderships. 24. Limitation the parts of the Am1ed forces by civil defense and develop the attack forces and develop the navy forces. 25. There should be no such an armed forces except stated in law. In t.he nam, e of God Most Gracious Most Merciful The Governing Council National Security committee Session #3 Session Date 01/15/2003 Minute of National Securitv committee meeting 011 01115/2004 The national security cornmittee has held its periodic meeting on Thursday l 5 Jan 2004 chaired by Dr.Ayad Allawi. head of the committee and attended by minister of interior for Iraqi side while it was attended by . Mr. David combert, Ambassador Rfrhmond, Mj·. '-::----,n.,:...M.::..: .a..,!..·j . -=0:.......J....:..to::..,n, MaJ""' I Mr.r' IMrL !for coalition forces and and Missr I as coordinators between the committee and coalition forces. • Dr. Ayad Allawi inaugurated the session welcoming the attendees, hinting that meeting will be divided into two parts; one is to be negotiated with the friends which are related lo work~ paper. After concluding the meeting with them there will be another meeting to discuss other subjects. • Mr. David Combert started talking as saying that he will preliminary tickle the work paper, and tl1e significant points summary shall be discussed to be distributed to you at the next meeting . The second point which is to be discussed with the esteemed member is that we will basically start a new mission that is how to deal with the officers and non commjssionef ; RT: We can do a better job in preparing and structuring. The original work program only went out two months. After covering all principal topics we will come back to you and go over them with further detail Meeting cnJeJ at approximately 1540. l. Divided the meeting in to two parts the first one with the CPA and the second is independent. 2. Submit a request to establish an Iraqi security establishments started from the base. 3. Sending an invitation to \"isit kirkush training base and disused maners with officers and soldiers. 4. The ways of applying the National Security police should be suitable to the country conditions in peace, war and crisis. 5. The difficult to apply tl1is police is:· a- The necessity to re·establish new security establishments. b- Give people confidence to accept this establishments. 6- Distribute the responsibilities of achieving the security to different sides so that the national security will not depend on one side. 7. The ministries that intended to the national security are ministry of interior, ministry of defense, ministry of justice and ministry of Foreign affaircs. 8. It is possible to add other ministries for the above mentjoned ministries represent the core ofthe national security establishments. 9. The necessity of having unified public form liable to be applied in an the aspects. l 0. According to the American system, the necessity of having committee consist of counselors in the leadership of the state. This committee will submit advice and consultations to the main committee. 1 l. The American system maybe will harmonize the Iraqi system. 12. The number of the counselors will be three. 13. The counselor will be part of the policy not a part of the decision process. 14. The necessity of coordinatmg between the ministries. L5. The civiJian control , the ministerial responsibility and the responsibility towards the parliament represent the majn of the British system. 16. Explain the British security policy whereas the. minister of the finance should be consider within the main core of the national security committee. l 7. Decide the policy according to preference to have premier and president or to have president only. 18. Submit the details of the active memo before the meeting so that the members of the security committee wi11 be able to discuss \vith the other political parties and work with the CPA to make the final form for the security policies. 19. Where will be the position of the three counselors in the mew Iraqi state structure? 20. The different between the American and the British system is having the finance minister because we have many decision required to be finance. 21. In case there is a president and premier there should be a coordinate between them especially concerning the national security affairs. 22. The premier does not need agreement to use the military forces outside the country but he needs the agreement of the parliament. 23. Put special criteria to choice the national security counselor, chief of intelligence agency and Chief of General Staff. 24. It is imponant to find a security system bam1onizes with the Iraqi circumstances. 25. Establishing an intelligence system in secularism Iraq. 26. The system should be depend on appropriate foundation so that m emergency cases will not turned into Dictatorship. 27. The civilian control the anny. 28. The higher commander should be a civihan. 29. The characteristic giving the authority to the premier is be responsible about the national security. 30. The role of premier in the leadership authority. Pagelof4 (GS-13) .__ _ _ __,!civ Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2004 7:47 PM To: r l(GS-13);r- ...----------lAUS) Subject: RE: FW: Advisory Consultations on National Security GC schedule-keepe~firms lhe new time and date ... .I asked her to personally reconfirm with each of the committee't> m~ceming the new time. They will likely meel in the small building (Chambers) due to t/'le # of attendees. Thanks. [ I CPA Liaison to the Governing Council Governance Team r I --onFal Message-- From: IC GS-13) sen EMonday, rua'l' 12, 2004 10,22 AM To: av Poucyr !(AUS) Cc:: CIV Subject: RE.: FW: Advisory Consultations on National Security Thanks ... will wait to hear back ref conflrmatlon for the Secretariat. Thx ... @ Let's keep these dates because they rcllcct the change from Saturday meeting times to Thursday al 12;00. We will have to confirm with GC Sccrclariat. m ean you confim1 with the Secretariat that the security committee meeting time n.:flecls this change this is per Dr. Allawi's instruction. nmnks r I -- Oripu1al Message--- From: l(GS-13) Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 10: 12 AM Tot"' ICIV PoUcy;L f(AUS) Subject: Rf; FW: Advisory Consultations on National Security Importance: High -- Really need something soonest on the dates ... have to rearrange calendar items. - 1/14/2004 Page 2 of4 Thanks bJis on for 0900. 13 Jan 04 and Jaafan 1s on for 1930. 13 Jan 04. Are you going with us. Will wait to hear from you. Thx.-© ----Orlg!naf Messaqe--- FromC Jav Polley Sent: Monday, January 12., 2004 10:04 AM To:~ I (GS-13) Subject: RE: FW: Advisocy Consultations on National Security Working on this with~ Do you k now whnt time the meeting wtihr.__ _ met;tings set up ~ > Th:1nks _,lis today'! Any other r ----or-nal Message---- From I (GS-13) Se~ Sunday. January 11, 2004 12:18 PM To CIV Policy Su ~ea: FW: ~: Advis. ocy Consultations on National Security L:J- Can tu ptlease answer my questions below? Thx. © --Or[gfnal Message -~-From:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--' Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2004 11:23 A.M ro:r KGS-13) Subject: Re: FW: Advisory Consultations on National Secur'ity r It :Jill out of the loop. Please talk with-in our office. ~r ___ _,lrGS-JJJ"..__r _____ ____. wrote: - Hi. Do you have a time for this meeting YfW~?--LlW!.!lll~l II, be at the GC Building? Also. I have these meetings orC !calendar for the following dates: 15, 22. 29 Jan and 5, 12 Feb Are these correct? WUI 1 t hear from you. Thx ~ -----Orl p.!!1al Message--· - From: I ( GBR) · Sent: Wednesday, Januaty 07, 2004 7:52 AM ro: Gompert, David c. (SES); Eaton1 Paulo. MG; Gatlinettl, Jf A. (O· J SJ;r J(GBR); casteel, Steven w. (SES-06) r I \ / 1'4/2004 Page 3 of 4 Cc:I.... I (AUS)i Smith, Frederick c. (SES); L lav Ministry of Gove! rnance;r lcGS-13) Subject; RE: Advisory Consultations on National Security Sounds good. Let us know times for Thursday 15th. r I Ofiic1: of Policy Planning & AJ1 alysis Coalition Pro11isional Authority - Baghdad R o u m e M. 31') cell: t-f DSN: ClV! ( i. -----Original Message-·--- From: Gompert, David C. (SES) Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2004 11:20 PM To: Gompert, David C. (SES); Eaton, Paul D. MG; Gallinetti, Joo A. (0 -8 ; GBR; Casteel, Steven W. (SES- 06)i GBR) Cc: (AUS); Smith, Frederl ick c. (SES)r E::::]OV Ministry of Governance; r "" l(GS-13) Subject: RE: Advisory Consultations on National Security LPB and I discussed this with Allawi today. He agrees that it is essential to get this underway and believes Iraqi side has much to gain from It. He and we agreed that the formal channel must be with the national security committee of the GC. Its meetings will be shifted from every Saturday to every Thursday to cause a better tum-out, given the importance of this - starting next, not this, Thursday. He liked our approach (attached). He appreciates the need for give and take, as well as the need for candor. He knows there are some sensitive issues for the Iraqis. We agreed that discussion of operational concerns - e.g., training abroad, personal security, status of IAF training - should be dealt ln a separate part of the agenda in order to ensure focus on the permanent fnstitutionar issues.&n! bsp; As we knew lie would, Allawi said we would also need a ·small group" to focus on issue and matters in need of decision. At first. he suggested that the "small group" would be he and I. I said that would not work on the coalition side· because we have several people on the team and others who may join from time to lime. I suggested Iha! he and I propose to the committee that it would be practical to have a sub-committee with whom we could get together as needed prior to full meetings, He seemed attracted to this idea and said he would get back to me to confirm and to suggest Iraqi participants. In any case, I would l.ike the following to be available for the first session next Thursdab Eaton}'"" lor ~ ovemance. In addition.c; pnd ~re most welcome. The first session w1 be devoted to (1) explaining the purposes and process, and (2) to provide an overview of the first topic: national security policy-making and command authority. One or two ONSA staff will also attend for note-taking and continuity. Otheiwise, I'd prefer principals-only. l/1412004 Page 4 of4 but I am open to discussion if anyone feels strongly otherwise. We will keep you posted about this. r --Original Message--- From: Gompert, David C. (SES) Sent: Monday, January 05, 2004 3:01 PM To: Eaton Paul D. MG; Gallinettl, Jon A. (0-8); (GBR); Casteel , Steven W. (SES· ·.----...,...,.-,=7-=--::-:----=---:---:--:---'( GBR) .,.....;:=----u.;AUS); Smith, Frederick C. (SES}; ClV Ministry of Governance;t"""""' --~ ,__,..---...~~=-' This is a heads up. I expect to reach agreement soon with Alawi, as chairman of the GC national security committee, to begin consultations on permanent Iraqi national security institytions. I f)ave a strong feeling that we will use the weekly (Saturday) meeting or this GC committee for these col'lsultations. We may also form a smaller group (perhaps a sub-committee) if the Alawi and I can engineer It My current thinking about participation from our side is this: • • • • Gen Eaton, s1rr j(or deputy)~ r- land I should ~ry meeting, large or small. Gen Gallinetti Fred SmlthC ~-~ r· !and ate most welcome to attend any mee 1ng · y wish. I\ may be essential for Gen Gallinelti orr:::=:J to attend certain sessions, depending on topic. There may be other (e.g., Judge Rubini) involved now and then. Cou!d we agree that principals should attend unless I am consulted in advance about having deputies attend? We'll get out the schedule as soon as we know it. Meanwhile, you might want lo pencil in Sarurdays. Meetings will run about two hours. Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Hotjobs: .X:!J1t;,Ltb.~SigDing ll,onus .:.. Swecps~akcs l/ 14/2004 Page l of I Gompert, David C. (SES) From : Sent: Gompert. David C. (SES) Monday, January 12, 2004 5:59 PM To: Eaton, Paul; Galli ~tti Jon A. C0-8): Casteel ._,sl;"te ..... v ... e~n"""W'""'..;.. · · ~~ J;i!luarv 11 , 2004 4:43 PM i:w: G~ Wa~1ona}~e~~~ri~ Commltee meeting notes High LJ.FYI ;;~-~rna1 Messal~~U~) Sent: Saturday, December 2.7, 2003 5:53 P ... M-----~ To: Smith, frederld< C, (SESr;· aton. Paull':: CIV Ministry of Governance; __ I CIV Policy Cc!L tGS-13)1 tcJTF7 POLAO) Subject: GC National security Comrnltee meeting not es Importance: High j(GBR);._L _____ _.l(FS-02); ~ r _ · ___ _, Meeting Notes GC NSC 27.12.03 Samir Sumaidy (Chair) Opening remarks Sumaidy: mentioned looking at Germans training Police rather than Jordanians. Chalabi: It costs more to train one Iraqi Policeman abroad than to send an Iraqi to Business school at Harvard. General complaints by NSC members of Police and Army training abroad and particularty in Jordan. Would like the GC to have a say in these training programs. Why the emphasis on training abroad? NSC would like to find out from MOI if the Police training in Jordan has commenced. They feel out the loop on this issue and believe they have not been informed particularly re the MQl/police traininc in Jordan. I said I would follow up on these queries - but that they should note that as an example one of the principles of IAF NCO training which is within Iraq is that coalition trainers "train the trainers" so thai training would be handed over to qualified Iraqi trainers in country. NSC resolution that a small c'tee be formed to draft report on security services training abroad - to be presented to the GC - c'tee will comprise Chalabi, Mohsen, Muhammadawai, Hakim and Talabani. The report wilt contain current training programs and suggested alternatives. Terrorist and Iraqi insurgent websites - promulgating information relating to terrorist activities and inciting terrorism were identified by Dr Sumaidy. Will forward to the CPA a list of these sites. The issue of cell phone contracts for Iraq was raised in the context that they could be easily used ' terrorist and insurgent groups to aid their activities. 1 Chalabi: Cell phones can be used to trigger a bomb - but also more widely used as a source of transferring information amongst terrorists. The ielecommunication Companies awarded the contracts are not Iraqi - they are likely to bring in foreign workers who could sympathize or participate in terrorist activities. As an example employees of Telco co's could pinpoint positions of VIP's and transfer this information to terrorist cells. Aslo error !hat there are pre paid cellphones - no subscription or awareness of background of cell phone users. Need to ensure eavesdropping or monitoring of phones done only through Iraqi law. Dr Hashim (Iraqi Islamic party llP): Cell phones can be used in this way against CPA but on the other hand they can be used to apprehend terrorists. Sumaidy: As a whole we do not have the security apparatus to combat abuses of cell phone and internet usage, I responded by commenting that there are two issues to look Into: the mitiga#ng security factors in the Te/co cell phone contracts with regards to eavesdropping etc and the question of vetting of Te/co employees who may have terrorist or Baathist sympathies. NSC resolution that letter to CPA, MOI and Min of Telecommunrcatlons that there be strict background checks on Telco employees - by seeking assurances from Telcos that these backgrounc checks be a condition of employment. Possibility of sanctions against Telcos if they do not effectively comply. Sumaidy: Issue of Personal Security for GC members - were promised radio comms and armored cars had nc received this yet. Produced a leaked memo from Min of Health which sets out provision of PSD for coalition personnel using Ministry funds and asked why the GC members, key partners in building democracy in Iraq were not receiving similar considerations re their personal security. NSC resolution re writing to MOI to request required PSD and related equipment. Sumaic:ly: Issue of stolen explosives and chemicals used to make explosives being sold openly on the market. Suggested that there is a buyback/seizure of ordnance and dual use chemicals. I briefed the NSC on the new Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs (MrC I and that he would be returning to Baghdad in early January where there will be an opporlunity for more detailed briefings on the way forward for the MoD. f updated the NSC on what had occurred to daf, re the Defence Support Agency - the creation for such an civilian entity to provide the administrati11 and logistic support functions to the /AF battalions as tl1ey graduated - the transparent and thorouf vetting, inle!Viewing and selection process used and that it was the beginnings of Defence institutic building and that the GC would be briefed/involved in the building of the MoD. On that note I mentioned the need for Senior leadership candidates for the MoO and mentioned the meetings we had in the past with some of the members of the NSC!GC on this issue and encouraged them to continue to be parl o'f this process of putting forward quality candidates fdr the civil service and mifitary leadership. I also brought up the issue of t/1e 2nd battalion graduation and their recommendation for a GC member to make a speech on the day with Amb Bremer. They put forw Sheil< Ghazi Yawir. (Note after the meeting Governance informed that Amb Bremer had asked Dr Pachachi as rotating GC president to make the speech - the NSC will be informed of that arrangement) Sumaidy: Queried the MoO budget - noted that was nothing in GC budget for Moo in 2004. I committed to following up on this question in relation to GC involvement in Defence Budget. Chalabi: Wants GC to keep informed of any contracting for Defence equipment - need to know of purchases. Wants to be involved in development of IAF doctrine and drafting. Several questions on issue of resignations from 1st battalion and the issue of pay and whether this was resolved. I infom1ed the NSC that the pay had been significantly boosted for the /AF in response to the (low) salary issue. Sumaidy: Asked about the C2 structure of Iraqi military and Moo and C2 of Iraqi forces after July 1. I responded by pointing out that of course the major operating principle is of civilian oversight of the military - I described briefly the Operational Commander of the JFHQ fits in with the civilian oversight of the MoD. On the second question I pointed out that these questions (C2 of Iraqi forces and coafiUon relationship) as they knew would be nutted out 1r1 the negotiations for the Security Agreement. Question re number of IAF (by SCIRI member?)-Chalabi immediately answered 36, 000. I pointed out that the plan is that the /AF have 27 battalions by September/October- that this was not a final figure but a foundation to build upon and that the growth of the /AF/its capabilities and so on will be up to the future democratically elected government of Iraq. Chalabi: Would Iraqi forces be part of the coalition? I answered by saying these were questions for the Security Agreement but that yes certainly in som form I expect that the /AF would be a partner (or part) of the coalition. The exact details ol the C2 arrangements need to be worked out and form part of the Security Agreement. Sumaidy: Made a final request that I find out about the arrest (by the coalition of Sheik Ghazi Al Hanash - a prominent tribal Sheik. r Director National Security rolicy National Security and Defence Affairs Coalition Provisional Authority - , I l~ celll ~(~!~~ercfal) .___ ______ _, 3 National Security Committee (NSC) I 0.01.04 Meeting Summary Atle.ndees: CPA/CJTF-7- Mr David Gomperl. A.mb Riclunondr Aylwin- Foster,['""' I co1 ·r----.....__ ___ ___.'--"-;;;;.....;;;;;.,;;;:I !MG Gallinetti, Bfj Mimster of lnlcrior Nouri Badran, lGC members including Or Jyad AJawi, Samir al Sumaidy, Deputies for: SCIRI. INC. Sheik Ghazi, Abu Hatem, Da'wa Par~-. Communist party, SoQgul Chapook lntroductions - members of the CPNC'JTF-7 consultation team introduced themselves. Dr lyad Alawi (cbafr NSC) discllssed the imponance of strategic issues and pcn11anen1 institution building up to the national decrions and requested Mr David Gompert 10 outline the work plan. Samir a. I Sumaidy welcomed the return or Dr Afawi and pointed out the urgent need for the: (technical) subcommittee chaired by MOJ Nouri Badran to deal with irnporumt operational security details. Mr Gorn.pert described tbe reasoning behind the work plan and was sure 1hat the NSC' was eager to discuss the role and missions oLmncd forces and the different security ministries. He proposed ro begin (in the next NSC meeting) with a djscus,sion of the top- level national security policy making, lop-level command of AF and the authorities for use of force. Mr Gompert pointed out rhat if we don't get the national Security policy making system and the National Command authority right, attempting to understand the roles oftbe armed services will be difficult. Jn that context we would give you aour advise on the strnctures and the MOD. Mr Gompert pointed out that our intent is to 1,1.·ork with you lo build the MOD over the next few months and that they would be briefed on the organizational structure and re-spect:ivc roles of civ;lian and military personnel in the MOD and JHQ. He added that he was in touch with individual mcnibers of the NSC to provide suitable candidales for positions within the MOD. Mr Gompen added that we need to IQok at mundane matters such as resource allocation and any other topics the NSC would wish to discuss in relation to the work plan, Mr Gompcn with the pennission of the Chair opened the floor to questions so that we could come to un agreed work plan and start on the meat of the program the following week. Dr Alan·i emphasized the NSC was responsible for the entire national security policy plan for Iraq and the work plan was an opening to begin the policy- not a canceling out of pre\'ious discussions. We can discuss details once you ha\•c had a chance to study. Members of the NSC made several comments that this was a well prepared worl;. plan, however it wai; imponant that the relationship between the CPA/institutions/JGC was discussed. The work plan needs e.Jaboration on this point. Moreover 1he military and insti\lttions hage 2 • Issues and Practical Steps 5. Setting 1tnd Meeling Requirements • Dctennining Needs • Costs: Fixed, Operating, Investment • Affordability • Responsibilities • Key Principles. Laws, Regulations • Issues aod Practical Steps Week of February 7 6 •' urthl!r toples. • rn depth MoD d«:sign. • N1>11onaJ security Information Architecture • Regional ~"'-curity Relationships • Staffing • Post 7/ 1 Advisory Suppon • As needc aid BG Sargeant (C5) + LTcr: IL re_ _ ~nd co1 (R Anticipate that we will stay for the ICDC BD CDR/XO agenda item only and grateful if you could send that agenda and confirm the start time. l/4/2004 Page 3 of3 • If you send it to the cc addressee above, everyone who needs it will get it and I wilt ensure that it gets to BG Fast and her staff r Lt Col C5 Strategy DSN: DNVT: Mobile: 1/4/2004 .. ' :."' 7\ <--~o/ ,:;.i FOR· FROM SUB.If.CT. CPA-Iraqi Consull;illerat1ng. hwcstmcnt • Affordah1hty • Rcspon-;1billt1cs • l\ey Principles, laws, Regulations • l~sur!> and Praclrc·isor? Strateg~ ' for Providing Security in a So~· ereig-n Jraq The Problem: As of July I, 2004. Iraq will be sovereign but not secure. Neither Iraqi armed forces nor the new Iraqi state will be fully capable ofhandUng t.he dangers they face: insurgents from the old regime, infiltrators, fanatical indigenous movements, separatlst impulses, anned militias, and possibly foreign interference (e.g., from Iran or Turkey). The need for large-scale US military power witl1in Iraq will persist until these dangers abate and/or the rebuilt state and rebuilt forces of Iraq match the need. To be effective, US forces remaining in sovereign b-aq '",11 need to be able to operate in ways that could be seen as compromising and offending Iraqi sovereignty, cspec1a\ly: (I) unrestricted movement; (2) command of Iraqi forces; aod (3) the detention of persons that threaten US forces and their m.ission. Yet, as CPA succeeds m creating a viable state and capable, civilian-controlled forces in the coming months, lraqi politicians and public may overestimate their ability to manage security - wanting US forces to stay but on unacceptably restrictive terms. A way is needed to rl!concile the effectiveness and relative safety of US forces with the reality and appearance oflraqi sovereignty after July L 111e Approacll: This connict between military freedom and effectiveness on the one hand and Iraqi sovcrei1;.'llty and pride on the other can be mitigated by forming a new coalition - or partnership -- of which Iraq itself is a charter member. Sovereign states have an inherent right to cooperate 111 self- defense. Recognizing the need to do so in the face of continuing dangers, the new Iraq will be no less so\'ere1gn for turning to others with the ability· and willingness to help !l. starting with the United States. Once this principle 1s agreed. it follows that fraq, tbe United States and other par!ners will need to assign forces to an integrated structure that is able. to act against enemies of the new democratic state. Instead of being asked to extend rights 10 a foreign power and presence, Iraq would be making possible the effective operation of a pannership to which it would belong. In essence. we and lraq would not be "we and they" but instead a single ·'we". More spec1(ically, this approach would call for creation of an Iraq M11/ti11ational Securi~v Parmership (IMSP) made up of Iraq, rhe United States, the UK, and any other state willing and able, in the eyes of existing members, to contribute to lraq·s security until it can do so on its own. The partners would set up a mechanism to provide ·'soft'' support- in particular the security assistance, advice. and diplomatic coordination that wi. ll be .needed after CPA is dissolved. Those panners willing to do so would also assign forces, intelligence. and resources to an /mq M11ltinariunal SecuriW Furce (IMSF). Current security conditions suggest that following arrangements are needed for such force: • Panners contributing forces should agree on aims, adversaries. and strategies of the IMSF and would maintain close consultations . on changing conditions. • As the. partner with the strongest military capabilities. assigned. the United States would provide command . • In addition to being a major force provider, Iraq would provide support, access and other cooperation needed for the IMSF robe effective. • Given the dangers facing Iraq, and the IMSF itself, unity of command 1s essential, and all assigned forces - Iraqi. US, and others - must be integrated. • Within the agreed aims and strategics. the lraqi, US and othe:r forces of the IMSF must be able to operate freely against opposing forces. .. • Iraq and its partners \Viii detain persons that resist or threat'en the IMSF. One of Iraq's special responsibilities \viii be to provide detention and processing. • Iraqi officers would be present at HQs and participate in operational planning. They would of course command Iraq units and might provide a deputy to the IMSF commander. They would share and receive intelligence. Just as the United States and others would not assib'll all national force. s to IMSF, Iraq would assign only those critical for success. Presumably, this would include the Iraq Army, the ICDC, and high-end internal security forces but not police oriented to fighting crime. Of course, the IMSF would need to coordinate operationally with any Iraqi security services not assigned. Thus, instead (;if demanding rights oflraq and carrying on what might look like continued occupation of a defeated country, the United States would join Iraq in a partnership aimed at assuring security. Looking ahead, the lli1SP and LMSF could evolve into a long-term security relationship among Iraq, the Uni ted Stales and othervartners - e.g., to give fraq enough protection to deter Iran and to djssuade Iraq from over-building its army and flirting anew with WMD. The IMSP and IMSF could be time-limited (e.g., 10 years) with a clause permitting withdrawal of any partner with one year's notice. An opt-out clause could reduce the danger of a post-7/l Jraqi government reopening the agreement. 7'i111il1g, Motlolities, a11d Risk The case for seeking these understandings with Iraqi leaders soon is strong: • Our leverage could decline as 711 nears - e.g., once an Iraqi defense ministry is created (April) and Iraqi Armed Forces (lAF) are built up. • Political uncertainty will grow as the transitional assembly displaces the GC. • It is best to know early on whether satisfactory post-7/l con ditions for US military presen, ce can be agreed. The first step would be for Iraq and the United States to agree on tht: framework, broadly but clearly stated; this should be done by. say, March 1. Next would be to get others to accede tha.t framework. [f we keep them closely informed, the British would be the first to do so and create th. e model. Only then would each of the members need to negotiate enabling detailed agreements with lraq to specify the status and needs of their forces. Of course. whatever is agreed now is inherently at risk when Iraq becomes sovereign. Legally, pre-sovereignty Iraq leaders cannot irrevocably commit their successors. But we can make it harder to undo later whatever agreement on the lMSP/IMSF is reached with the GC by having it (l) endorsed by the UN Security Council and (2) rea.flinned by the interim government appointed by the transitional assembly. Wrth Iraq as a willing and leading partner - perhaps co-sponsor of the resolution - any opposition in the UNSC would have little logi, c or effect. While the approach suggested here would put in the best possible light the need to be able to operate our forces with freedom and with control of Iraq armed for<:es, political actors in a sovereign Iraqi state may press to reopen the partnership agreement. However, faced with a ctirefully-cra fted, i.ntemationally-Jegil imized agreement to permit US forces to rcma~n and security threats 'tO be met -- and being able to point to the opt-out clause -- the Oedgling state. with all its other challenges, may choose to honor the framework. 2 Page I of) (GS·13) From: Smith, Frederick C. (SES) Sent: Wednesoay, December 03, 2003 11:31 AM To: r:J lcN Ministry of Governancer• I ctv · Cc: r l(GS-13):r• IGS-15 MCO Subject: RE: Snowflake· Response Status 1 llkef"I khanges Frederick C. Smith ~l.J..l.J~~- ...J atio11al Security Affairs ~--......., <..::B:.:;a"'l •1 hdall) OSN) '-----~ -----Original Message-- - - From:[*P' = p.v Ministry of Governance Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 11 :24 AM Tor'° l CIV ------ Cc: Smith, Frederlck.C. (SES);' rc'1 ICGS-13.);,_r6' ______ ""'"'lGS·15 MCO SUbject: RE: Snowflake Response Status Please see my edits.... Need to check though on the frequency of the meetings. Also, since I don 'l often go. I'd run it !>y Or.- r r· ....... ............. i . . ....... ..,,.nh• ·~ -·~., .... ••••••• ••• Director of the Governance Group Coal1tlon Provisional Authority Baghdad, Iraq ~~! ~:.""r ______ __, I. ~ ...... .................... . ---Ori!al Message---- from: ~ lav Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 11:10 AM To:f"»I ICJV Mini~ of Govemanc~ Cc: Smith, Frederick c. (SES)L1 SJJbject: RE: Snowfla111" To: CIV Ministry of Governancef"' 1 Cc: riUil l: ••i-•••.-•• ......................... ,~·*· ·*'··· ............ ,. ..... ~ .............. .. --- .·Ori9inal Message-m- From:r:-11• lcIV Sent.: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 11: 10 AM Torllti.I ICIV Mlnist~ of Governance ,..= 1161 ,,,_ _____ _ cc: Smith, Frederick c. (SES);r} kGs-13);r IGs-1s Meo Subject: RE: Snowflake Response Status How's this sound for a response - The Governing Council has organized itself in a number of standing and functional committees. Of these. the Security Committee has been among the most active. In these meetings, held bi- monthly with the CPA and CJTF-7 the proposal to reconstitute .units of the Iraqi Army has never been raised formally either by us or by them. It has. however, been discussed as one point of many in general discussion and has not been given serious consideration. The Security Commit.tee members on the whole seem persuaded that the physical difficulties (facilities and equipment destroyed and stolen by looters) have made the concept impractical. The last sentence may be 'reaching' - I defer to your judgment of how to read the SC's body 1/51 2004 Page 2 of3 language. r I ---Orlain:I M:c;saoe----- Fromf ~·1 lcrv Ministry of Governance Sent: Wenes ay, December 03, 2003 10:31 AM To: r-• tIV;;: GS-15 MCO Cc: Smith, Frederick C. (SES); i(GS-13) Subject: RE: Snowflake Response Status It's never been raised directly with the full GC. Within the Security Committee it has come up but~argurnents that there are no units to bring back has proved persuasive, Allawi's oped notwithstanding. And you;re right. He's never mentioned it again and it has not been part of his political discourse within Iraq. Curiuoser and curiouser ... My sense is that the GC would support the SC's views on this subject. ····~·-·····-····-········· .................................... . rw" I Director of the Govern a nee Group Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad. lrao ~;! ~J ..... : _ · _______ .... I .. ,.. .. * .. ~ ...... ·---- ......... ·----Original Message----- From:f1iii'• I CIV Sent: Wednesday1 December 03, 2003:;54 AM Tor··· IGS-15 MCO;._t:_61 ____ _.lc:rv Ministry of Governance Cc: Smith, Frederick c. {SES)r..__~ ____ _,!GS-13) Subject: FW! Snowflake Response Status Importance: High This is a Rumsfeld query - came to us as a "copy sent to" with no tasker - guess I should have known better. It says, "Carl Levin keeps asking if you have asked the IGC what their thoughts would be if the CPA decided to reconstitute units of the Iraqi army, using people, some below rank such as lieutenant. with mo.stly enlisted personnel. I told him we wer already hiring back former Army individuals as policeman, border patrol, 0 etc. He said now, he's ta/king aoout actually bringing them back in units." I am not aware of any formal discussion with IGC members on this subject. Has there been? What did they say? It has come up very informally in a couple of conversations when IGC rnembers asked me what I did at CPA at reception, iftaar - I found them to be ·uncertain' probably of mixed view - for sure, nobody gave me a pitch one way or the other. Then there was Alawi's oped -which he never mentioned when we spoke to hlm the other night even though I talked him through the whole ICDC- NIA expansion plans. li5!2004 Page 3of3 [ ~OriFal Message- From: _ ICE-6) Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 9:21 AM To:r"' lav Cc: Executive Secretary Subject: Snowflake Response Status Mr. r· Could you please let us know what the status is. of the response to the SECDEF snowflake (subject is IGC). Response to SECDEF is requested by 6 Dec 03. Thank you, ._r-1 ___ ___,IYNl, USN Admin Assistant Office of the Executive Secretariat Coalition Provision.al Authority 1/5/2004 FOR OFFfCfAL f:1SE ONi~ ~I' THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1 COO OEF'ENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON , OC 2030r t OOO MAR 1 6 ?iXJ4 MEMO.R.A.NDUM FOR: AMBASSADOR JERRY BREMER SUBJECT: Iraqi National Security Structure and Team l support the CPA plan for the roll-out of the new Ministry of Defense and fraqi National lnteHigence Service, jncluding CPA's recommended selections for the top three positions in the Ministry. A1i Allawi appears to be the best choice for the position of Minister of Defense. Another important decision will be choosing his replacement at the Ministry of Trade, to insure that food importation and distribution continues to work well. The National Security Committee {NSC) looks lik!! a good way to teach security decision-making in a democracy. Both the National Sccunty Advisor and tbe U.S. advisor to the NSC :!Te key appointments. cf: General John Abizaid ,. FOil ornH~ usF. O?tL\ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTI IORITY BAGHDAD ACTrON t\'lEMO March I 5, 200..J FOR: THE AD~/J)STRATOR FROM: David Gorp~n. So.:nior Advisor for National Security and Defense SUBJECT: Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) We have amended the draft INlS Charter (Tab A) per your comments. Sorne additional amendments have been made based on recommendations from Governance, Jus1ice and the OGC. The Charter states that INI S may not arrest or detain individuals. (Your decision 011 rhis has been communicated to the NSC.} As outlined in the Action Memos of February 14 and March 8. I will use the attached Chaner as the basis of advisory consultations with th~ IGC Sc(;urity Comminee to present the INIS. Tab 13 is the drnft CPA Order delegating authority to the IGC to adopt the Charter c:stablishing the JNIS by 1 April. The Order ,~;11 be signed after consultations on the Charter with the lGC Security Committee, but p6or to submission of the Charter to the IGC. Our aim is to issue the Order around March :'.!3, have the fGC adopt the Cha11er by April l, and announce the cs1abl ishment of the INIS on Apri I 2. a long with the creation of the Committee on National Security. The memorandum appointing the interim Director General should be signed once the IGC has promulgated the requisite statute establishing the tNJS_ The identit) of the interim Director General will be announced with ihe rest of Iraq ·s national se~urity team on April 3. RECOMMENDATION (l):That)Ou approve the draft INIS charter, as amended. and au1horize final ~oordination with capitals_ (An~ fun.her r~visions will be brought to your attention.) Approve: μ.-~lS Disapprove: Approve with modification: ____ _ RECOMMENDATION {2): That you approve the plan to consult with Iraqis and delegate authority 10 the IGC to ndopt the Charter by I April Approve: ~(3(1 ~; Disapprove: Approve with modification: ____ _ ATTACHMENTS: TAR A (TNlS Charter): TAB B tDrall CPA Order) COORDINATION: Mo! --ok: M oJ .__~ __ __,! - o,k; OGC',_r _ __.I-ok: Govemanc.:--- ok CC: OG/\ UNCLASSIFIED Ne.w Iraq Agency to Hunt Rebels Page 1of3 a!bt' ~c\tr !fork €\mes y t1 n1E-~ _ orn .January Jl, 2004 New Iraq Agency to Hunt Rebels B)' EDWARD WONG B AGHDAD, Iraq, Jan. 30 - The lraqi :authorities, with the help of American intelligence agencies, are creating an jntelligence service het:e that will focus on rooting out guerriUa .fighters, especiaUy those from outside the country, Iraqi and American officials said Friday. The service will employ some former agents of Saddam Hussein's security apparatus and will probably receive financing from the American government, the officials said. Many oflhe agents will work in the border towns oflraq to identify foreign fighters who have slipped into the country and will monitor their activities, said Ibrahim al-Janabi, a senior member of the Iraqi Governing Council's security committee. The service will employ 500 to 2,000 people, he said, and is expected to be formed well before the Bush administration transfers sovereignty to an Iraqi government on June 30. · The Cen· tral Intelligence Agency is taldng the lead in. helping put together the new service, American officials said. The CJ.A. has close ties to the Iraqi Na1ional Accord, an opposition group founded by fom1er Baath Party members who worked fron.1 London and Jlordan to try to overthrow Mr. Hussein's government. The head of the group, Jyad AJawi, beads the Governing Council's security committee and met in December with the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, at C.1.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., to disc.uss the new intelligence service, officials said, Mr. Janabi, also a senior official in the group, is a leading candidate to head the new service. The formation of an intelligence service is a very delicate matter here because of the deadly history of Mr. Hussein's secret police force, the Mukhabarat, the main instrument of domestic repression. The agency dissolved after the ouster of Mr. Bussein in April, and many senior officials Oed to neighboring countries. "Under the Saddam regime, the entire structure of Iraq was built on security," Mr. Janabi said as he sat in his office in a building once used to train Baath Party officials. "The mentality of the people revolved around this security." The new service's projected focus on foreign fighters could help allay public fears of a return to those days. Mr. Jana bi said fewer than 5 percent of the workers in the new agency would be recruited from the ranks of the Mukhabarat and other security forces that operated under Mr. Hussein. They wiH be vetted to weed out those guilty of human dghts crimes, he added. He insisted that their connections, knowledge and experience could prove invaluable. file://C:\ WJNNT\ Tcmporary%20Intemet%20Files\OLK6EA \New%20Iraq%20Agency%20t... 2/l /2004 New Iraq Agency to Hunt Rebels Page 2 of3 Tbe creation of the new service comes at a time when American and Iraqi officials are trying to detem1ine the significance of the role played by foreign fighters in the insurgency. Their numbers might not be large, but some officials say the most devastating attacks - the suicide car bombings - appear to be the work of such fighters. Some Iraqi officials, including Ahmad Cha1abi, a Governing Council member with strong backing from the Pentagon, say they oppose the new effort out of fear that it may empower dangerous members of the old security forces. Mr. Chalabi's party, the Iraqi Nationa· 1 Congress, has long competed bi. tter1y with the Iraqi National Accord for backing from the American government, which helps explain the clash between the two over the new service. Another point of contention is that the Iraqi National Congress condemns the participation of former high-ranking Baa th Party members in any aspect of public !if e, and especially in the .new security forces. Mr. Cbalabi is heading a committee on the Governing Council in charge of . Purging senior Baathists from the government, and recently unveiled a. new set of laws intended to do that. Organizers of the new intelUgence service "are recruiting former Mukhabarat officers in other countriesj people who went into exile after the war and who are now coming back," said Entifadh K. Qanbar, a spokesman for Mr. Chalabi who sits in on meetings of the Governing Council's security committee. "We should vet them before. they're recruited." Mr. Qanbar said American agents had recruited several such people in Jordan. Though he insisted that some recruits had taken part in the "oppression of the Iraqi people," he said be could not provide evidence to back that assert1on. He added that the creation of the new intelligence service was being conducted in secret and that it might be viewed as illegitimate under the new sovereign government established after June 30. As plan11ed now, the service will fal1 under the Ministry of the Interior, whicb supervises many of the new security forces in Iraq, including the police and the border patrol. Nouri Badran, nead of the ministry and an official in the Iraqi National Accord, sharply criticized the Baatbist purges at a news conference this week He said the "so-called dc-Baathification laws" put into effect in May by L. Paul Bremer m, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, had wrecked the country's security forces. "We lost a lot of people with long experience, with all kinds of experience," Mr. Badran said. "We had to let them go." Securing the borders is crucial because "now there are indications of foreign inte!Hgence activity and attempts to in.filtrate Inqi institutions,'' he added. "We need intelligence agencies to get infom1ation on the terrorists that are coming into the country." There are varying estimates of the number of foreign fighters in Iraq. Mr. Janabi, the senior official at the Iraqi National Accord, said he believed that there were up to 5,000 such fighters in the country, with less than a fi.fth of those carrying out the operations and the rest involved in linancing, recruiting and other logistical activitlies. Many were coming across the Syrian and Saudi borders, he said, and some from Iran. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, a spokesman for the occupation forces, estimated that ther:e were a total of file://C:\ WINNT\Temporary' CJTF -7, CENTC OM FROM: TO: HEADQUARTERS COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY SECDEF WASHDC SECST.l\TE WASHDC NSC WASHDC INFO: USUN XXXXXXXXXXXXX HQ CPA XXXX E.O . . :2958. !.2 ;'0'7 ;'03 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI TRANSITION: TIMELINE AND DOCUMENTATION er Z.SSIEUi'D B'i ~ M.ii A ~ S~ 'blGR JOt'l e6 FOR RS1 '\COPi!O 1 . 5 ( B MB3 B ) 1. ) Summary . Based on the schedule set fort.h in the November 15th Agreement between the CPA and t.he Iraqi Governing Council (GC), the Fundamental Law, the Security Agreement (s), and an instrument finally transferring governance authority to and recognizing the full sovereignty of t.he transitio nal Iraqi administration will be negotiated in the coming month s. Thi s cable sets fort.h considerations t.hat should be taken int.a account during this process . An additional agreement should confirm conuni tments made by t.he Iraqis in t.he Fundamental Law and the Security Agreement(s) . A new United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) could further clarify international expectations rega rding the transition of governance r e spons ibili t.ie s and the continuing obligations o f the concerned Member Sta tes. End Sununary. Fun damental Law and Security Agree ment(s) DECLASSIFIED B Y OLIS D P DATE 25 J(J/\/ 0 9 FOIACASE# 0 7-F · / 0 / Q 2. (U) Based on the November 15th Agreement, the Fundamental Law and Security Agreement (s) are to be prepared and executed at the outset of the transition process. Drafting of the Fundamental Law and approval by t.he CPA and the GC is to be complete by February 28. The Security Agreement (s} are scheduled to be finally approved by March 31, 2004. The Fundamental Law will, inter alia: (1) enshrine the basic principles of fundamental liberties and democracy; (2) set the structure and process for electing and appointing both the Transitional National Assembly and the Transitional National Administration (TNA); (3) outline how the Transitional National Assembly and Tran. si tional National Administration will govern Iraq; and (4) adopt basic principles of federalism in defining the relationship among the national government. and the governorate and local levels of government. It may also include a Statement of Development Strategy (and related covenants) , conf inning Iraq's comrni tments to continue developing its governing institutions in accordance with appropriate socio- and macroeconomic frameworks. 3. Additional steps to brace the legitimacy, durability and immutability of the Fundamental Law may be advisable. While styled as a Fundamental Law, it would be approved and presumably signed by the GC and the CPA- en ti ties that will be dissolved when governance authority is transferred. Under international law, the Fundamental Law would therefore set forth political commitments, rather than binding legal obligations. CPA believes that t.here are strong arg· uments for making compliance with the Fundamental Law an international obligation owed, at least in part, to the United States, although this approach requires additional review. (Note: As discussed below, a new UNSCR may be a more effective way to confirm the binding nature of the Fundamental Law. End Note.} Furthermore, compliance with the Fundamental Law (and satisfactory development of governing ins ti tut ions) could be linked to disbursements of United States assistance from the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (the "Supplement.al"). 4. The Security Agreement ( s) will be comprised of, inter alia: (1) a status of U.S. Forces agreement (SOFA}; (2) a military technical agreement (MTA); (3) acquisition and cross-servicing agreements; (4) protection of U.S. Forces from the International Criminal Court; and { 5) non- proliferation commitments. With respect to the SOFA and the MTA (which should authorize robust force protection and anti-terrorism operations), the agreement (s) should enable other Coalition members to accede to the agreement ( s) and benefit from the authorizations, privileges and immunities therein. As with the Fundamental Law, the CPA believes that additional steps should be taken to ensure that the Security Agreement ( s) is an international obligation owed to the United States and other participating Coalition members. 5. (U) Following execution of the Fundamental Law and Security Agreement(s), a Transitional National Assembly ~ill be selected on May 31, 2004, and the Assembly will elect a TNA sometime in June 2004. Once a TNA is elected and operational, the CPA will transfer all remaining governmental authority to it, thereby ending the occupation (on or about June 30, 2004). June 30th Documents 6. } The CPA's transfer of all remaining governmental authority and the recognition of the TNA's sovereign status will likely take the form of an agreement. Immediately following the execution of this agreement, the United States and the TNA should execute a separate agreement ' that ratifies or otherwise confirms the commitments made by the Governing Council in the Fundamental Law and the Security Agreement. This sequencing will support the position that the agreements are binding under international law by virtue of having been freely concluded by two sovereigns. 7. Within this or a separate a. greement, the United States and the TNA will need to address several other issues. In particular, they will need to: (1) specify the details of resuming diplomatic and consular relations (possibly including matters relating to a new U.S. embassy); {2) waive all claims arising out of the war and the occupation of Iraq by the Coalition; (3) transfer any Oil-for-Food contracts that were transferred to CPI\. by the United Nations; and (4) confirm and clarify that certain CPA Orders will continue in effect. In addition, responsibility for managing t.he Development Fund for Iraq and approving disbursements from that Fund will need to be transferred from the Administrator to the appropriate TNA officials. 8. ( ) CPA is reviewing the types of claims for which it will seek waiver. CPA favors seeking an Iraqi waiver for claims arising out of the most recent conflict, the occupation (including acts of the CPA) and, perhaps, the first Gulf War. It may also be appropriate to raise specific U.S. claim issues, such as the 1990 settlement agreement compensating victims of the attack on the u.s.s. Stark. A New UNSCR 9. ( ) A United Nations Security Resolution, invoking Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, could clarify the legal effect of the Fundamental Law and the Security Agreement{s). Such a resolution would augment the legal authority for a continued foreign presence in Iraq and would demonstrate that the post-occupation role of the United States is internationally und.erstood and accepted. Nonetheless, CPA acknowledges that an UNSCR presents obvious risks, inasmuch as certain Security Council members may view this role as inconsistent with Iraq's exercise of "full sovereignty". Comment 10. ( ) Comnent. Sequencing these negotiations will present certain challenges. The first agreements may require some of the most politically difficult concessions for the Iraqis to accept, and they will be negotiated with a body that is scheduled to dissolve and whose members are running for office. Furt. hermore, the TNA will be asked to revisit these agreements through a ratification or confirmation document within weeks of its formation. Nonetheless, a new UNSCR could facilitate acceptance of these agreements by Iraq and the international community and the United States will be able to leverage the Supplemental and its ability to improve the overall secu. rity situation. Moreover, the United States is unlikely to be alone in wanting the new government of Iraq to commit itself in a binding way to the timeline set forth in the November 15th agreement. End Comment. BREMER ._L ______ __,tNovcmber 29, 2003 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM - O'ESJGNING STRUCTURES FOR COUNTER· INSURGENCY ANJ) FOR THE TRANSIT£0N The immediate focus of the CPA must be upon building Iraqi force.s and security institutions to counter the insurgency. lt is vital to be olear about the roles of Iraqi and Coalition Forces (CF) and to create workable command and conrrol and oversight structures. Al the same time, it is important to design inst1tuuons that will not challenge the civilian government, oppress the population or facilitate political fragmentation. We should envisage three phases of operation. First, the period up to transition when CF forces will have primacy. Second, the period from transition when ln1qi forces will have primacy. Third, the period after the 1 cmcrgency when the Iraqi security sector can "return .. to a stable state. The Emergency Pcriod1 Key steps that need to be taken to defeat the insurgency include: • Coordinated command and control structures at national and re. gional 1evels2 ; • Mobilization of a reserve force (ICDC) and use of the NIA in jntema 1 security; • Extra resourcing for specialist police units; • Rapid build-up of internal sec'urity intelligence capabilities; • Use oCCf'IMNF for mtemal and border security; • [Limited security cooperation with "compliant'' milttJas]; • [Emergency powers legislation]. Unity of Command and Effort: CoordJnathrn; conun:rnd and control structnres We need unity of effort to prosecute the COJN campaign. Overall. we need to build command and control structures that wall combine pohbcal accountability with command efficiency. During the emergency period. , it will be important to rci11force these systems with additional coordination mechanisms between Iraqi security forces. CFIMNF and Ira.qi political institutions at the national, provincial and local levels. It may even be desirable to appoint. a single Commander for an security forces during the emergency penod. At the national level, we need a cabinet-type system or National Security Council.! which will be at the apex of a National Command Authority. The MoNSD will give strategic guidance to the JFHQ, which translates this into operational diz:cction through a national Joint lnlelligencc/Operntions Committee (JIOC). Direction goes down to the NIA JIQs at the division/brigade levds who conduct operations in support of the IPS. Coaliiion forces would remain rn the. bac.kgrnund, with links into this chain of command. Policy coordinatjon at the regional and local level should be provided by expanded Provincial Council Security Committees. Committee members would include the Governor, members of the Provincial Counc1l, the poJice chief. local NINJCDC commander and representatives of other key services (intdligcnce, Department of Border Enforcement [DBE]. local faciHtics Protection 1 n1c 1cm1 "emergency" is used to remind us that '''C arc building l. raqi security structures to deal with a temporary ~lh.asc ofoperalions and to keep us focused on building s1ru1:1urcs fonhc longer term when stabilhy is ;ich.icvcd. - Examples of success mdudc llnggs and Bourne in Mal:iyu, Harding in Cypl"!,ls and ("rca.~y io Omnn. It did not go well in Palestine 47-48 and hus been d11licuh in Bosma (lfi~h rep/Com SFOR). The Commamlcr of .ill :.ccurity forces has lo have authorily to direct m1cll1gcncc (as in MaJaya when pohcc Special Branch bad primacy) 1 Including reprcscma1io11 f1om MoNSO, Mol. MFA and the uniformed scr,iccs. ._r_e _____ __.tNovember 29, 2003 Service [FPS], key ministries such as transportation). The lo-cal MSC commander and (up to the transition period), the Govemorate Coordinator would also be members. The Security Committees would be supported at the operational level by regional JIOCs. These would operate 24/7 at national, provincial and local levels to coordinate and direct operations that bring together Cf'/MNF, NIA, [PS, ICDC, intelligence services, FPS and DBE. Security force roles and responsibilities There are f'ive entities tliat will be employed to achieve · internal security: the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) a. nd the New Iraqi Army (NfA); intelligence services"; Coalition Forces/MNF. • IPS. The CPS should have primacy not just for routine policing but also• for internal security. To enable the CPS to deal with the emergency period, we have i) adopted a relatively centralized command structure and ii) are accelerating plans to develop specialist capabilities (e.g. anti-terrorist branch, police intelligence1 armed response5 and public order units). The IPS is being established as a national force with local accountability. Coordination with other security forces needs to be operationali7..ed via regional and local JJOCs. • ICDC. Locally recruited ~nd deployed, the ICDC will have 36 battalions by the time of transition. Initially envisioned as auxiliary troops, the JCDC will be able to perform tasks at up to company level. Missions will involve patrolling, cordon and search, fixed-site protection. check points, and convoy escort.6 Until the IPS develops nation-wide and robust capabilities, the ICDC provide a buffer between the IPS and the NIA, which will only come into action in extremis. Tbe ICDC should come under the NIA command and control structures and transition into an army reserve force. It needs to be made clear that the JCDC is a reserve force that has been .mobilized under national authority for the emergency period. • NIA. The NIA will have three divisions by September 2004. It is being designed for external defense but, during the emergency period, needs to help counter internal security threats.7 It is important to enshrine this role in legislation (e.g. a 'Defense force Aid to tbe Civil Authorities Act".) The NIA brings two types of capabilities to bear. First, it can rapidly deploy fonned units to provide a quick reaction capability. Second, it can bring to the table its C3 and logistics assets. • Intelligence. Intelligence collection, fusion and analysis are critical. Standing up effective and accountable intelligence services8 is a priority; it is equally important to focus upon intelligence coordination at all levels. A Joint Intelligence Committee is required at the national level; coordination needs to cascade down to provincial and local levels via JIOCs. J The Depanmcnt of Border Enforcement will be crilical for border security. It needs ro be 1n1egra1ed into coordination and intelligence mechanisms. lnfrasrructure security \Viii be vital for economic development and political stability. The Facilities Protection Service (FPS), along with a well regulated private security sector, wi II be important actors. ~The MoJ 's Special lnrerveution Unit should be the focus of effort for a national executive action capability. ~ !CDC tasks currently include maintai.ning public order and disaster re:;ponse. It is a priority 10 ensure !CDC receive appropriate public order training and equipment and that this role be handed to specialist IPS units as soon as feasible. Disaster response should be led by the Civil Defense Organization. 7 Our assumption is the MNF will have primary responsibility for Iraq's external defense. 8 Whilst police and military intelligence will exist within the Mal and MoNSD, 1t may be u~eful to have separate internal security and foreign intelligence services. 2 r116 ' !November 29, 2003 • Coalition Forces/MNF. CF/MNF shou}d be able to focus on the most demanding countcr- terrorist operations and to back up Jraqi forces should law and order break down. It will also be important for CF/MNF to bolster l.raqi forces with advisers and liaison staff. Militias The original CPA objective to DDR sub-state militias may no longer be feasible. Offensive actions will continue. against non-compliant militias. Compliant militias may however be integrated into the Iraqi security sector. If this approach is adopted, however, it should be on the basis of a clear political-security strategy rather than as an ad hoc response to short-term operational requirements. 3 UNCLASSIFIED f'Oit Oflf'lCIAL U3f': ONLY Nov 27, 2003 Contents Contents ............................................................................................................................... 2 Ex ecu ti ve Summary ............................................................................................................ 3 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 5 2 Security Sector Reform Best Practices ........................................................................ 7 3 Situational Assessment. ............................................................................................... 9 4 Elements of the Iraqi Security Sector ........................................................................ 11 5 Governance & Accountability ................................................................................... 16 6 External Assistance ................................................................................................... 18 7 The. Way Ahead .................................................................................................................... 19 ANNEX Conflict Assessment ...................................................................................... 21 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICVcL USE O?fLY 2 of23 UNCL!tSSlf'J£D FOR OFFfCh'tL USE OMLY Nov 27. 2003 Executive Summary (1 page text exec suml Actions Defeat insurgents and terrorists Actim1: Security architecture 10 run the emergency should be creL1ted as soon as possible. Actio11: Deploy other security forces, negotiate cross-border agreements and apply diplomatic pressure to support DBE border control efforts. Ac:tio11: Clar(fy structure and powers of provincial security committees during the emergency period. Actio11: Develop a11d implement policies to ensure that security force arrangements for the emergency period do 1101 militate against 1/te CPA 's longer term vision for the Iraqi securiJy sector. Build Iraqi security force capacity Action: Policy decision required on the use qf NIA for internal security. Action: !CDC should be factorecl into the key actions coucer11ing the NIA. Action: Iraq public perceptions of the !CDC and NIA sltou/([ he manages into a professional. nation-wide force. Acti · fi'Olt Orl"ICtA:L USE OKLY 7 of23 U?JCL'\:BS£FEED FOR OFA:CfAb USE OMLY Nov 27, 2003 • Focus on building capacity for process issues, such as how governments can formulate and implement security policies more effectively. ~fGLASSEFffiD FOR OfFJCIAL USE OlffiV 8 of23 UfqCLA99ffi'HSD FOR OPFlCIAL US£ O?tLY Nov 27, 2003 3 Situational Assessment Iraqis face five types of security threat: foreign invasio'n; crime (especially orga. nized crime); political violence (terrorism, insurgency and civil unrest); state violence; and conupt and highly politicized securiit'y sector institutions. The new Iraqi security sector needs to be built so that it will protect lraqis against all of these threats. Whilst the immediate focus of the CPA is to field Iraqi security forces, it is just as important to design new institutions that will not challenge the civilian government, oppress the population or dispense justice and security in a sectarian or conupt manner. 3.1 Priorities On the assumption that MNF will defend Iraq against external enemies, the threat of foreign invasion is a low priority for Iraq's security se.ctor in the coming [five years]. Political violence, crime and the design of institutions that will underpin the civil government are the most important short-term issues. 3.2 111e emerge11cy peri0 FOft OFFICIAL us:e ONi:Y Nov 27. 2003 ANNEX Conflict Assess, ment4 Conflict is a nom1al and healthy part of any political process. The conflict l'hat is of concern here is that which finds expression as large-scale violence. The aim of a country conflict assessment is to identify and prioritize the most important causes of violent contlict to allow effective intervention by national mstitution _ s or by intemlltional partners. A systematic conflict assessment. would ensure that CPA and Iraqi policies arc addressing not just the symptoms but also some of the root causes of violent conflict in Iraq. One model that may be useful in Iraq is that developed for USAID's conflict assessment process. This model seeks to help decision makers address conflicts at four levels. Motive (root causes) Most individuals do not engage in or support large-scale violence. Many may however have lat:ent motives for supporting or engaging in violence. Griel•a11ces arc those underlying factors that make people angry and willing to engage in violence. They can include ethni.c and religious divisions, poverty, environmental scarcity, disputes over land or other resoucces. Greed is another type of motive. Violent conflict can be beneficial for connict entrepencurs who constitule a war economy. These entrepeneurs have a vested interest in instability from which they can profit (handi1ry. crime, smuggling. drugs. control of natural resources. protection rackets). Means (factors that facilitate mobilization & expansion of violence) An intention to commit large-scale v.iolence remains latent unless tbe means arc available. These include money, weapons. recruits, organizational networks and external backmg. Without some combination of these means, then lalent grievances will remain une.,pressed. Opportunity (causes due to oohtical or social instilut1/wuld designate a11d t.>mpower a 'security sector coordi11ator, ·produce an integrated strategy. and pursue rhe illlegrated planning process that we have begun. Policy cmd planning needs to be coordinated al staff level between SAINSD, MO!, MOJ. MFA and CJTF-7; building Iraqi capacity.for instance, by establishing the NSAC. • Uuild Public Safety and Justice Capadty. F1trthe1" rapid dcvelopm\'.:nl of ministry capacity is critical to security and stability. Front-line targets such as police recruiting and training, and re-opening of courthouses are important, but the ministries lack the stafT to build capacity for policy, management and administration, while also conducting operations. We sholild provide the stc~IJ and infrastructure for both ministries to accelercue their programs. A11 accelerated program of mi(/ am/ seflior level staff recruilmellt, using both Iraqis and expatriates, should be implen1e11tedfor MOJ and MOJ. Essential Servic.es: • Set Up Project Management Office and Issue Contracts Funded from the Supplemental For delivery of essentjal services. electricity in particular ~ the most important task is to ensure that the PMO operates in an effective. timely way to get necessary contracts in place by January. Next year 's goals for power output wiJJ otherwise be at risk. • Shift Oil for Food Contracts to the Ministries by the end of November. Essential services, especially electric power, have the largest volume of outstanding contracts. Their timely delivery will be key to keeping the fall maintenance program and infrastructure projects on schedule. You should be prepared to inten1e11e to ensure the smooth transfer of the o\•er $3 billion of OFF materiel to CPA control. UN CLASS IFJ ED UNCLASSIFIED Economy: • Prepar ePolky to Liberalize Refined Oil Product.Prices We need to plan for and soon implement fuel price Uberalization. We are currently repeating the mistakes ofRussiau policy makers in 1991; Slibstanti:il resources are being wasted on implicit fuel price subsidies ($4.9 billion per year). We need to develop a policy. discuss it with the GC. initiate a program of public awareness, and prepare to increase prices for gasoline and diesel as early as January 1. 2004. • Implement a Program to Charge and Collect for Electricity Businesses and households need to pay for the cost of power so as to reduce demand and tbe need to allocate power through rolling blackouts. We need to start designing and setting up an electricity regulatory regime and hilling and collection system, including the instaliation of additional meters. and create a pricing structure to recovery costs in preparation for hilling in the first half of 2004. • Monetize the Public Distribution System (PDS) for . Food Program The PDS is to be monetized by July l, 2004. To meet this deadline.. ·we need to design a progrwn to distribute payments. begin making changes in the foo. d supply chain, begin discussing the new system within the GC. and initiate a public discussion of the new system within the next 90 days . • Start to Corporatize State-Owned Enterprises. While less politica11y sensitive than privatization, the process · Of operating SOEs on a commercial basis (corporatization) is an essential first step and has important economic efficiency consequences in its own right. We need to continue to develop plans for restructurin• g and corporatizing SOEs, including for the oil and electric power industries. and decide a common policy 011 severance packages and buyouts for employees. • Ensure Successful Completion of Currency Exchange. We need to continue to manage the process of bank note conversion; and to encourage, monitor and support, as necessary. cemral bank intervention i11foreig11 exchange auctions. to preserve the value of the new currency. St1·ategic Communkations: • fmprove Strategic Communications. Maintaining Iraqi support - through honest, clear and timely c.ommunication - and winning further international support are vital to aU that we a.re trying to do. There is broad staff consensus, y ou should formally authoriz e Strategic Communications as C) The !CDC is a security force that is designed to !be capable of undertaking military operations such as patrolling, identifying and preventing or reacting to IED and VBIED attacks; cordon and knock operations; fixed site security; routefconvoy security; disaster response; and crowd and riot control. CPA is the Executive Agent for budgeting and poHcy planning for the ICDC. The Commander of Coalition forces is designated by CPA as responsible for recruiting, training, organizing, and controlling the ICDC. ICDC forces are trained by and operate under dfrect operutional control of the various Coalition divisions. CJTF7 FRAGO 1121 released on 22 November directs the acce.leratcd training of 36 battalions (approx. 40,000 personnel) no Luter than April 04, as compared with the previously planned endstate of 21 battalions. This expansion is CJTF7's top priority for standing up Iraqi security forces. The DoD FY04 supplementa1 includes $76 million for the !CDC. Divisions are using bridging funds for ICDC salaries. subsistence, O&M and other costs through approximately mid-January, when funds from the supplemental are projected to become available. lCDC battalions are opcon to their respective Coalition divisfon HQs but will be given increasing command and control responsibility as they become capable of handling it. The numbers of ICDC battalions assigned to each Coalition division have been de. termined on the basis of span of control concerns for division commanders. Once New Iraqi Army battalions begin to come. under CJTF7 operational control beginning in April 04, this control problem will become increasingly complex. The,refore, CoaJition divisions have been directed by CJTF7 to train JCDC to operate independently so CJTF7 can absorb the New Iraqi Army battalions. The following table- shows the number of battalions and brigade HQs that each Coalition division has been given responsibility for creating: Division # of Bns (NLT A1>r 04) # of Dde HQ (NL Tend- Jan 04 lAD 7 2 101'1 AA 5 l 410 8 2 82ABN 6 ') MND(CS) 4 2 MND(SE) 5 1 3COSCOM 1 0 Rocruitit1 g and Training ICDC forces are recruilcd largely by US forces who are designated by their division commanders ~,.:ith this responsibility. • Instructors currently come from the ranks of division units. • CJTF7 is preparing an RFF for drill sergeants from US-based units to provide supplemental rrJiocrs to assist it in mec1ing i1s objecti\!e of standing up 36 battalions of rcoc. Typically, units will target certain towns or cities and will attempt to gain puhlicicy to attract recruirs either as part of patrols or as specific recruiting events. • In the 81 ABO. 2-5 Field Artillery conducts "roadtrips" to screen rccruils. For 3ACR. 2HWB has recently performed 1he same mission. • The 101"1 operates a Veterans' Employment Office in M c ·- CD 0 ~ u ;; Cl) c u > Cl) c 0 :::J =LL C: CD "' 0 ...... "' ·- c: Cl) .., - .... cu ·- ::J c: ·- ...... cu u -0 s... ::J .... - Ii.. 0 ... 0 "'u Contents 11111 • The Current Situation • What functions? • What Services? • Subordinatio, n • Coordination • Oversight • Plan until July 1st • l. ssues post July 1st Current ca acities • INIS • Military Intelligence Capacity • MOl/Police • MOJ • Militias • CT Units • Political Parties' Intelligence •1111 ' ,.>:>U.i I ./' ~ p bl 1i r7Z:: \ ro ems ~V..·.~··j •1111 • INIS being set without coordination • CPA & CJTF-7 activity driven by the short- term requirement • No tradition of civilian apolitical intelligence in Iraq • Political parties aimed to use Intelligence Services for their political purposes. • Lack of suitable person, ne, I + vetting , pro1 blems • Various entities with Intel . capacity exist that were meant for short term existence Goal •1111 GOALS: Design policy, structures and build apolitical, civilian Intelligence services. Establish legal framework for the services that would guarantee resp, ect for huma, n rights and democratic principles Create an Oversight mechanism for the Services Intel Functions 11111 • Cou. nterinteUigence • Active • Defensive • Mil. itary Intelligence • SIGINT • COMSEC. • Foreign Intelligence • Political • Economic • Military Princi les •1111 • No duplication of functions • One, clearly d, etermined national authority for ea, ch function • No concentration of powers under one Ministry • Coordination between services • Clear tasks and requirem1 ents Division of Functions •1111 • Cl INIS MOI • CT INIS MOI • Internal threats INIS MOI • Fl political - INIS/Mll Liaison Coalition • Fl economic None • MILINT J2/Mil Int Service MOD - Tactical J2 JFHQ - Operational J2 JFHQ - Strategic Ml Service MOD • SIGINT Ml Service MOD • COMSEC Ml Service MOD • Vetting Ml MOD Subordination 11111 • A service is headed by a Chief • Chiefs are appointed by the Cabinet with the Minister's proposal and Parliamentary Committee's approval • Th, e Minister has oversight of the use of Services budget • The Minister has no right to interfere i1 n the operational matters of the Servic, e • The Ministry sets requirements to the Service which are then approved by the NSC • Searches, phone intercepts, etc need a warrant by a Judge Coordination •1111 • There· is an Intelligence Coordinating Staff under the NSC • The Services cooperate and coordinate regularly though the NSC (policy) and its Intel staff (ops) • Services have an obligation to pass on intelligence to the National Authority of the corresponding function • There are National Requirements for the Services set by the NSC • There are National threat assessments • The Chiefs of Services attend the NSC meeting's • The Prime Minister is responsible for the national security in general, the Ministers are responsible for their field •1111 • Executive • Parliamentary • Judiciary • Executive by the Cabinet and the Minister • Parliamentary by the Oversight Committee • Judiciary trough the warrant system Executive 11111 • Statutes of Services • Budgets • Audits • Setting the requirements • Overseeing the fulfill' ment of requirements • Appointing and relieving the Chiefs • Ministerial appointments of Deputy Chiefs Parliamenta •1111 • Budget approval • Approval of the appointments of Chiefs • DraJting of re, levant legislation • Overseeing general with human rights an1 d democratic principles by the services Judicia •1111 • Warrants for home searches, communication intercepts (i.e. legal Human rights violations) • Trials of intelligence officers committed crimi. nal offences Ombudsman •1111 • Investigates, all claims by Iraqi citizens on violation of their rights by the Services • If violation is i, dentified presents the case to the court • Reports to the Parliament •1111 • Th. e Serv· ices are apolitic, al • The Services honor human rights • The legislation an· d the statutes of the Services are public documents • The names of the Chiefs of Services is public information • Th· e Service's members : have, no political party affiliations Situation Jul 1 2004 •1111 • INIS operational • J2 IOC · • MILINT IOC • MOI & MOD officials (m' in 3+3) trained for Intel policy/oversight • Coordination ce, 11/NSC min1 im, al Intel . staff w· orking • Basic princi1 ples in the Fundamen1 tal Law Action to achieve this •1111 • Select and train INIS lea1 dership • Select and tra. in key person1 nel for J2/MILINT • Select and train Intel personnel for MOI &, MOD • Start national co· ordination cell/NSC Intel staff • Set up a vetting d .epartment at the MOD/MOI • Draft regislation i. ncluding, relevant part o· f the Funda, mental Law on1 oversig: ht and coordi· nation • Consultations with Iraqi lead, ers on Intel Services: democratic principles, oversight, functions. Policy level --+ Op level --+ National Intel Structure •1111 lRAQl INTl.i:LUGENCE SERVICES r---------~--------------·-~···--·-------------- ------ ---------------------------------------------• ' ' ' PM or PRESTO ENT INTERIOR DEFENSE FOREIGN l\UNISTER MINISTER MINlSTERR -- -----• . ________ _,_ . r- - - - - ..__ _______ __, ' NATIOl AL r-- ------·-.-----' : 'Security • Defense 1 : I I For Pol l ~trategy SECURITY I I I I COUNCIU Strategy 1 : I Strategy I I I I ~ ----------------· ·-----1------- . N'I planning ----T----- --------1------· ------ ------ --- I ClllEF of DEFENSE • INTERNAi~ • - - - - - - -I - - S . fl.:CURJTY SERVlCE fNTEJ, SERVICE MIL1NT SlGfNT - - - 1 J2 I I ! I I ~---------- ·--------------~------~----------------~ NSC (now NSAC) (: strategy, national threat assessments, plans, security priorities) n= Civil Service d..eJmmand-linc = Military = Coordination -- - ~--------------------------------J Iraqi Intelligence Services Structure, Functions, Oversight ENOSTATE CONCEPT TABLE OF CONTENTS II PRESENT SITUATION 5 INIS 5 Militias S Miiitary fotelllgcmtl' Capacity 5 I ntcllij!encc runctiou) uudc.!r Mor 6 MW 6 Ill IMPLEMENTATION AND DIVISION OF REQUIRED FUNCTIONS 7 '4.1 Tbc issue ohoforcement 1 3.2. DM$lon offuncCions 1 J 2 I COUNTERINTELLIGENCE(CI) 8 3 I .l Cornmun11:Jllonssccurity (COMSEC) and S1gn.:ils lntclh~cncc tSICINT ) 8 3.2 4. Cl In ln.1q1 cmbass.ics and consulaics (f oreign Cl1 9 3.3. Foreign Intelligence and/or Military lotelllgence 3 3 J. Ocfrmttonsklass1ficat1on 10 3 3 3. lntclhgcncc Diplomacy (liaison) IO 12 IV SUBOROINA.TION AND COORDINATION 13 SU BORDINATION 13 COOROI N,\TION 13 V OV. ERSIGHT 15 ISSUES 17 DfVISION OF FUNCTIONS 19 . DEFINJTJONS 20 2 SUMMARY This paper: • presents the functions required of the Iraqi intelligence services: • proposes what Intelligence Services are needed in Iraq; • proposes what functions should be offered by individual services; • proposes a subordination, coordination and oversight system The following text offers a framework for the development of Iraqi Intelligence Services. An attempt has been made to address those issues that require executive (or parliamentary) level decision-making. Proposals have been made with regard to the experience of several \Vestem and East-European post-communist nations. 3 I INTRODUCTION A well balanced, apolitical and weU~targeted intelligence services structure with a functioning national intelligence cycle is needed to achieve good intelligence. The current critical security situation in and around Iraq has forced the Coalition Authorities to actively deal with everyday urgent jntelligence gathering and execution issues. As of early November 2003 there has been no Government-wide effort to plan for the structure of Iraqi intellige1Jce services, define their functions and inter- relationships, nor has much thought been given on establishing the oversight machinery of I&SS. This paper attempts to start such a process. According to current plans Iraq will have a rather limited direct defense capacity. Being surrounded by several potentially hostile neighbors and facing si!,'Tlificant internal security threats, good intelligence is critical for Iraq in yeaTS to come to take preventative measures in foreib'11, internal and defense policy-making. Iraq's security cannot be protected without a system of intelligence collection and a reliable mechanism to channel it to the decision-makers. It is therefore in the interest of Iraq and all its partners to turn serious attention to the establishment, organization, coordinatlon and quality of its I&SS. Long-term planning of the I &SS is one of the keys to the sc,curity of future lruq. The primary functions or l&SS are to co!Ject, process and disseminate the information required by State leadership to apprajse the internal and external security sit11ation and to make necessary policy decisions. Because of the secret nature of any intelligence work there is always a dilemma in the democratic world of effectively protecting and pursuing national security interests without violating basic human and political rights of the citizens. Various oversight med1anisms have been \'l'Orked out to balance between these two vital but at times contradictory interests. Especially in Iraq where there is a long tradition of secret soc1et1es, political persecution and misuse ofl&SS purely for the political aims of the leadership, a rapid build-up of civilian l&SS, civilian control and oversight is needed. At the same time Iraq cannot afford weak I&SS facing tremendous current and funire se. curity threats. A successful buildup of professional and effective bul civili:an, ethical and apolit1cal !&SS in lraq is one of the cornerstones of creating environment fbr a long- lasting democracy in this country. 4 II Present Situation Right now, responsibility for intelligence work is being snared among different ministries, Coalition entities and CJTF-7. WIJile t'his must suffice in the immediate term, the overlaps and undercoverage that sucln an arrangement creates is hardly ideal in the long-run. Ultimately, Iraq's intelligence services must be consolidated under two ministries (the MoD and the Mol), with clearly-defined roles for the services subordinate lo each. INIS Work has started on creating an Iraqi Central lntelligence Service. The CIA has taken the lead in tJ1is and so far little is known on the planned func(ions of this Service. Currently it seems to emphasize short-term counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency collection a, nd security operations as well as counter-intelligence operations. Members of former lraqi services have been used as operational assets and agents. Militias There is special counter-insurgency battalion created under CJTF-7 guidance in the ICDC framework .It consists of G-5 militia and intel personnel. Each party has given I 08 troops. The intelligence ca acity of all these · ' · JLOlloi!.l...u,i~th.e battalionof sorts. There are hints that this battalion would be attac'hed to the INlS. There are Int sharing arrangements between G-5 militias and CJTF-7? Military Intelligence Capacity Intelligence components are planned for the JFHQ of NlA (J-2),ICDC staffs (tactical level, C-2), MoD (oversight, requirements, analysis). This planning is iaking shape under CJTF-7 C2, CM.A IT and OS A lead. Currently various military task-forces and units (i.e. C2, TF 12 t) under CJTF-7 command conduct counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations and tactical and operational intelligence collection. These units and task-forces do not have a plamwd fo.ture . in sovereign Traq as independent services. It is however most probable that most of their functions and some of their assets will be handed over and merged into the emerging Iraqi Military Intelligence apparatus. A handover plan needs to be developed. 5 Intelligence functions under M.0 1 A criminal intelligence unit and a counlcr-terrorism unit are planned in the national Police structure. The criminal intelligence unit will act as the national center for criminal intelligence policy and operations against major criminal threats. The unit wiH host the link to Interpol and other intelligence sharing arrangements (e.g. Arab Interior Ministries. Europol). The anti-terrorist branch is a specialist unit that will serve as the nativnal cente. r of expertise on terrorism and will lead major terrorism opernrions. So far not. much has been achieved in practice. ("The full development of a criminal intelligence capacity will take us way beyond July 2004") The proposed structure of the MOI foresees a "Central Intelligence" whid1 will not be under the <:01111-ol of the MOJ but would su ort the MOl in · · d opera h · es ti on or tscusslon ut it seems that the logical place for the omestic lntellii;ence Service (INIS) would be as an independent Agency under the '---±¥1~...:: ~ 11Wervi sion anport of known or anticipated user requirements, e. dissemination and integration-Delivery of intelligence to users in a suitable form and the application of the intelligence to a1mropriaie missions, tasks, and functions. f. evaluation and feedback-Continuous ass. essmcnt of intelligence operations during each phase of the intelligence cycle to ensure that the commander's intelligence requirements are being met 14 Budgets should be tied to the requirements and the corresponding volume of work required by the Cabinet. The budgets of intelligence age11cies shoultl he presented in one litte of the slate budget muler its respective. ministr}' s"ch as that of the JNJS tmder t:he MO! etc. At the same time. it wo111<1 be pruosition member d) The Parliamentary Ov~rsight Comruittee has a say in approving Budgets. b) Do not allow poUtlcal party affiliations for Security Service members. 4. The Internal Security Scn·icc and the Intelligence service will be under different ministries. 5. The Services will not be departmencs or incegral part~ of Ministries but independent Agencies. 6. Then.• will be a Military Intelligence Scrvkc su1>p<>rting the Defense Forces. l'he Strategic lnteJUgcncc coUectjt)n (cspecfally lllJ MIN T) for \lilitary is done by the civil Intelligence Service 7. Tbt' 1-Jcud of Executive hall an overall responsibility for National Security but does not have direct command line to the Scn·kcs. Hefshc has a coordinating function through a National Security Committee (with or without a central Iotcll machinery) and command line to tbc Ministers. 8. The Ministers' oycrsight over their 1·cs1>ective Services consists of purtidpation in Budget ap1>l"oval, right for 3udit, approving certain higher 1>0S ts. participation in the tasking and npproval ()f priories. Tbc Minbter has no rigbt . to interfere in operational activities nor to give direct orders 'to the Chiefs of Services. 9. All 11unemancl'. l'ODJDlS intercepts i:aod similar aclivities by the Services conc~rning lraqi citizens will need preliminary appr()val b~ · a Judge. There will be a judicial oversight and a system for . all citizens to appeal to either a. court or to an Ombodsman regarding vioJ.ations of thcjr rights by the .'it'r\"iCt'\. 10. The members of tbe Parliament ha\·e no ex officio access to operational mes of the services. 18 DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS INIS: MILITARY lNTELLIGENCE SERVICE J2 \OUNTER-INTELt.rGENCE Cou nler Espionag~ Counter-Terrorism lntd Corruption Intel lnlemational Crime/Money Laundering Intel Vetting/Screening (Civil Service) Strategic MILINT foreign Cl (Embassies) SlGJNT COM SEC Threat assessments Information Security Vctting./Screening ( Mili1ary) Tactical and operational Mf LINT Mil comms security Mil Tndustry SecuritylCI C'YPhers 19 DEFINITIONS Military intelligence Intelligence on any foreign mili«ary or milicary-rclarcd siruation or activity whkh is significant to military policymaking or the planning and conduct of military operations and activities. Also called ML Counterintelligence lnfonnation gathered and activities conducted co protect against espionage, other intelligence activities. sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or clements thereof. foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Counterespionage That aspect of counterintelligence designed 10 dl~tect, dc:-lroy, ncutraliz.e, exploit, or prevent espionage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organi:t:ations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities. Information security The protection of information and jnfonnation systems again~t unauthorized access or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or minsit, and against denial of service to authorized users. Information security includes thost: measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. lnfonnation security is composed of computer security and communications security. Also (;ailed fNFOSEC. Strategic intelligence (DOD) Jntdligcnce that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater kvcls. Operational intelligence (DOD) lntclJigcnce that is required for planning aml conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. See als~1 intdligence; strategic intelligence; tactical intelligence. Tactical intelligence (DOD) Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. Also called T ACINTEL SIGfNT =signals intelligence A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination alJ communications intelligence, electronic intelligence. and forei8n instrumentation 20 signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. lnte\ligence derived from communications, electronic. and foreign instrumentation signals. Security clearance An administrative determination by competent authority that an indi..,.·idual is eligible. from a security stand-point, for access to classified information. Communications security The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications. or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Also ca.lied COMSEC. Communications security includes: cryptosecurity, transmission security. emission security. and physical secudty of communications security materials a,nd information. a. cryptosecurity--The componc!nt of communications security I.hat results from lhe provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use. b. transmission security--The component oJ communications securhy that results from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interceprion and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. c. emission sec ,urity--The component of communications security that results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from cryp10-equipmcnt and 1elecommun. ica1fons systems. d. physfonl security--The component of communications security Lha.t results from all physical measures necessary 10 safeguard classified equip.menl. material, and documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. Int elligence cycle (DOD) The process by which info:nnation is conve1tl!d into intetligence and made available to users. There are six phases in the cycle: a. planning and direction- Detem1ination of intelligence requirements, development of appropriate intelligence architecture, preparalion of a collection plan, and issuance of orders und requests to information collection agencies. b. collection-Acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. c. processing and exploitation- Conversion of collected information into forms suitable to the production of intelligence. d. analysis and producrion-Conversion of processed information -into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and tbe preparation of intelligence products in support of knO\vn or anticipated user requirements. e. dissemjnation and integration-Delivery of intelligence to users in a suitable fonn and tl1e applicarion of the intelligence to appropriate missions, tasks, and functions. f. evaluation and feedback~Continuous assessment of intelligence operations during eacb phase of the intelligence cycle to ensure thal the commander's intelligence requirements are being met. See also intel I igence. 21 OBJECTIVE: Develop a coordinate11M 7W·2·1J I TURN-IN 3. SEND T0:1'9"' II N21S 4 DA TE MA H~AIAL REQUIRED fYYYYMMDDJ 8. REQUEST FROM1 OPBO er:" BAGllDAD 9. ENO ITEM DENT 1. REQUEST NO. 2. VOUCHER NO : ~~~E~ 1~~~ETS 5. DODAAC ,6. PRIORITY 1. ACCOUNTING/FUNDING DATA 9a. NAME/MANUFACTURER 91> MOOR ~c . SERIAL NO •CODE ISSUE nJRN·IN 10 PUBLICATION 11 JOB ORDER NO. /./1111111/ flA'T-FaJr w .. ar .111d TMr f,X .f.R~.31 l.Tl.lllmil \C06472 R·Rl'pf16 ACTION* ACTION" 200.:i()(i l(I REOUESTED COLUMN COLUMN DA FORM 3161. DEC 2000 PREVIOUS EDITION MA'{ BE usrn. USAPA VI 00 TELEfONEMAS { TELEGRAMAS ELOSEGUI-TOLOSA DIPJ..01"\A OE .ttONOA BOINAS ELOSEGUI CASA FUNOAOA EN 1858 S. A. TELEFONOS: BOINAS 1143 67 OT 20 - !il43 ti7 05 66 FA)(: &43 67 36 78 20400 TOLOSA (GUIPUZCOM • ESPAflA RARRIO USABAI... SIN • APARTAOO 1 I E!OINAS ELOSEGUI, S.A - :!A>'OO TOlOSA (Gu1Pu 1 1 057 11-85 beige 6 s/embl. 11 " t. 57 630 7,66 4.825,80 '{/ OOOo )f"I I 1 058 M-95 beige 6 s/embl. 175 7,66 !.340,50 ~ !f, .;; 0 0 06<'01 15~0 M-85 beige 6 s lemb l • 11'5 .. t. "::; 70 7,66 536,20 0 ,...,, ('"" ~. 1560 M-85 beige 6 slerobl. 11 '5 .. t. A) 35 7 .. 66 268' 10 ~ . Or>~ )C. '55? M-85 neqra s/embl. 10, 5" t . 52 6 7,66 45,96 0 ~ - 007! 00 ... 0 552 M-85 negra s/embl. 10, 5 .. t. 53 10 7,66 76.60 ~ 007 1001055l. M-85 negra s/embl. 10,511 t. 54 36 7,66 275,76 .. < 0'>7 1001055 5 M-85 negra s/embl. 10, S" t . 55 48 7,66 367169 8 N 0071')() "556 M-85 s/embl. 10. 5 .. t . 56 48 7,66 367,68 ::> negra 0 00? 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US TOMS TARIFF": 6505.Ql).10.90 C"_U'1E : 2,88 M3 ·ICT WE!GHT: 315 K'GRS. , -. ,_ WEIGHT: 360 ~GR£ • .... ,..., .. · .. •-., .... o .. r .. -_,,.e>..,z=-.,c:.!oo . ,. c: .. '"" ---.-· ..... .., -"'i A !:: ~ OF" 1EFEC T ~ ' ' 'IDT :c ~ C ' IA()Ol\JGA I .,, ~p[ C GLJ : ~ ~ 00 3~ Q43 67 01 20 1Y. 00 34 Q43 673 678 F 1' E'I=" • ADDRESS: · ien:'' OF " ' - · 1~L :::;:r ir 1 -r & DE E' ~ E "'4 1 ... C-4 1T IAL • GHDt\[ , I RAC' ~ PORTES EMBALAJES BASE IMPONIBL~ " CUOTAWA " CUOTAR.E. I.VA A.E s TOTALIVA TOTAL FACTURA I I f~t[~~t~ { 8.0SEGUl-TOLOSA 01 PL.OMA OE MO NOR BOINAS ELOSEGUI CASAFUNOAOAEN 11!58 S. A. TI::l.El'OHOS BOINA5 M3 67 01 20 - M3 87 OS 66 F#JC; IMS 67:M18 20400 TOLOSA IGUIPIJZC04) ESPANA B.o\RFMOU~BAI., SIN APAFITAOO 11 M1n1stry of N~~ional Secur1t~E~NS Republ1can Pres1dent1al Palace ')Q335 Baghdad !RAO t IF.: fl Cf"1flAl · IW~ 8 9ll 8AChllfl.CAYA 1010$A 0 DE. I A VASOOffl.. 1<>lO~ CIC. o Hi!IP'"l'O AMr~K:•~<> TOlOSA 9 Cl}ll'U7CQANC) TO(IJSA { 0 SAHlle,_0£~ TOtO.S:A - 2 t.I ( '-:':'"'Cl L CIFIDN! _J 3 N.. FACT\JRA I FECHA FACTURA I 4751 I os- 1 o-2r103 I FOAW. De PAGO BUl.TOS C~EQUE RECieo FACTUPA CODIGO ARTICULO CONCEPTO TAI.LA CANTID.t.D PRECIO t'-!PORTE i .. .. z I PORTES I EMBALAJES BASE IMPOll/IBLE " CUOTAl- V.A " CUOTAR£ TOTAL IV.A TOTALFACTURA lVA R.E I I Appendix A Ministry of Defence Minister of Defence ... ------io-----"'"'I General Counsel Secretary-General Chief of Defence Force Acquisitions. Log1sltcs Infrastructure • Acquisition ·Logistics • Infrastructure •IT PublicAf1a1 lntelhgence Policy • lnfoJTTlation •Intel Operations Requ1rements & Assessments • Press Liaison • Intel Research • Civ/Mil Relc be met? Are three separate services desirable, or essential? How shouhl the services be structured and fit within a single architecture? How should their roles, missions, and interactfon be defined? How should their accountability to pojjticaJ authority, their acceptance by the Iraqi people, and their compatibility with Iraqi democracy be ensured?~ 1 Other forces ,...,m also likely be rcqu1n.-d and established. However, these three represent the largest categories of necessary anned organizations. 2 In addition co capabilities IO use force, i111elligence capaciiy will be ctilical to Sllpport all three needs. If intelligence arms are distributed among the several security services, they should be closely linked to one another in an intelligence community. If they are not distributed among the security services, they should be linked to those scr..-ices to ensure effective support. In any case, they should be under finn political e onr~ol. 13 Criteria: While the chief measure of success of designing tllese forces will be lheir effectiveness in meeting threats, how they are structured and to whom they report will be a critical to both their effectiveness and their legitimacy (and thus the legitimacy of the new state). Accordingly, consistent with the imperative of effectiveness, alternative approaches should be tested against the following criteria: 1. Public acceptance. Neither police services nor the military nor internal security forces will be effective without public trust and cooperation. Thjs requires that the structures established, to the extent possible, avoid association with past repression~~ a difficult task given tbe history of police, internal security services, and parts of the anned forces, as well as the ministries to whom they reponed. 2. De-conce11tMtion of power. Responsibility for the three functions, and thus control over the capabilities to perfom1 the1nt should be sufficiently diffuse to guard against their exploitation for political gain, let alone for posing a threat, direct or Implied, to the development of a democratic, pluralistic lraq. 3. Coordination. The services required to perform the functions of police, internal security and national defense must be structured, connected, and overseen in ways that ensure the flow of infom1ation, the operational suppon for one service by another, and the avoidance of gaps or unwanted redundancy in capabilities and jurisdictions. While public acceptance bolsters operational effectiveness. de-concentration could impair it. At the same time, de-concentration is important for public acceptance. Coordination is, of course, mare important the less concentrated security responsibilitjes and capabilities are. Possible Structures: Basically. there are two different architectural approaches: 1. Dyadic. A distinction is made between internal and external forces. The [raqi am1ed forces (IAF) would report to the MoD and have tigbtly circumscribed back-up roles in internal security. The Iraqi police service (IPS) would be the sole internal security force: it would have two branches, one for law enforcement and the other responsible for conducting paramilitary operations insurgents and other severe internal security threats. Under this option, the police would have to repon to the Mof. 2. Triadic. ln addition to the lPS and IAF, a separate force is maintained to combat insurgency, domestic terrorism, and other severe internal thn:ats to national s!ructures, stability, aml the state. This internal security force {ISF) would report to the MoL Ther are two sub-options in this approach: the IPS could repon either 14 to the Mol or the MoJ, because its role would be law enforcement rather than that plus internal national security. The lirst option provides for easier operational and mtclligence coordination. particularly beiween the two police branches perfonning law ~nforc .cment and internal sei;urity missions. At the same time, with the IAf coolined to cic:tcmal security, it would rlacc control over all internal security capab'ilitics Llnder one ministry (Mol). which has a dark history and association in the minds of the lraqi people. Although the rSF branch could be drawn down as internal security improves, its integration witJ1 the IPS could create a single source of domestic anned power and a temptation for !JORDn Allpst 1003121 l other building that is reserved or set apart, used or otllerwise controlled for defense purposes, by designation under section 10 of this Order. "Extremist Organizations or Activities" are organizations or activities that advocate raci~ gender or ethnic hatred or intolerance; advocate, create., or engage in illegal discrimination based on race, color, gender, religi~ or regional or national origin; or use, or advocate the use of force or violence or other unlawful means for political purposes, whether internal or international, "HeavyWe-apons" are weapons tiring ammunition larger than 7.62~ machine guns, crew-served weapons, anti-tank weapons (such as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs)), anti-aircraft weapons (to in.elude shoulder fired missiles and AA guns), indirect fire weapons (mortars and artillery pieces)., armored vehicles or self- propelled weapons, high explosives and explosive deyices (including mines and hand grenades}, ·'Member of the New Iraqi Army'' or "Army" means. a person serving in the New Iraqi Army from the time of attestation until the date of termination of service, '~ew Iraqi ArmyH means the military forces of Iraq organized for the purposes set forth in this Order including all components of the national armed forces of Iraq, specifically including the ground forces recruit~ trained, and organized as the first step in the process of creating a military defense force for the new Iraq. Unless. the conteJtt clearly requires otherwise, all references to the "New Iraqi Army'' are · references to any ele:ment of .the natio. nal defense forces of Iraq; "Serious Offense" means a criminal offense under tb. e criminal laws o:flraq or the Code of Military Discipline that authoriz.es, in the event of a conviction, confinement for a period in excess of three months as a punishment. ''Small Anns" includes shotguns, pistols, and rifles that fire ammunition up to and including 7 .62mm. Secdon l Existing Law The ks.qi Military Law Code Number 13 of 1940, the Iraqi Military Procedures Code Number 44of1941, tb. e Code of Legal Notification ofMilitary Personnel Number 106of1960, Punishment of Military Deserter.s Law Number 28of1972, and the Penal Code of the Popular Army Number 32 of 1984 are hereby suspended. CP A/ORDn A:a2ust 2003/22 2 SectloG l Tbe Miiiion ud Commalld StrKtan of t•e New lr•ql Anny 1) There is hereby establ:iahod the New Iraqi Amy u tho first step toward the creation of the national defense force of the new Iraq. The New Iraqi Army is an establiabment inteoded to provide a capability in support of the security of~ during the period of the CPA's authority. The continued existence of the New t1'84i Army beyond the period ofCPA's authority is subject to a deci&ion by the future internationally recognized, representative government, established by the people of Iraq. 2) The mission of the New Iraqi Anny and of the national defense forces generally i.a the military defense of the nation, includina defcnae of the national territory and the military protection of the security of critical installations, facilities, infrutructure, lines of the communication and supply, and population. The tub of the New Iraqi Anny and of additiooal units of the national defense forces of Iraq include developing a tniliwy capebility durina the period of · authority of the CPA in order to provide the bruit for militarily effective, professional, and non-political armed forces for the military defense of the nalion after the conclusion of the CPA's tenure. The New lraqi Army shall not have, or exercise, domestic law enforcement fimctiom, nor interVene in the domestic political affairs of the nation. Tub oft.he New Iraqi Anny wm also in<:lude partieipatioa in domestic rdief operatiom a.saociated with natural or man-made di1uters and humanitarian relief missions. 3) Command poaitiom in the New Iraqi Anny and ui Other clements of the oatioo.al defeme fed in CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01 shall be eli11"ble except with specific permission of the CPA. RANK STRUCTURE 6) The New Iraqi Army will consist of commiuioncd officers and enlisted personnel with ranks that may include warrant officers and non-commissioned officers 7) The ranb of officers will. in uoending order, be: ~ ~ Tj}mccz Daabet t-.Jj.. Mulaazem ,.;p.. ,Jj Mu1aa.zem Awwal ~ Naqeeb ~J Raacd ~ Muqaddam Officer Candidate 2nd Lieutenant 1 tt Lieutenant CapaUn Major Lt. Colonel CPAIO'Rl>f7 Aap.st 2003/?2 5 Aaaqeed Aameed Liwaa Fareeq Colonel Brigadier General Major General Lt. General 8) The Administrator of the CPA, or a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly to the Administrator and to whom authority bas been specifically delegated in writing by the Administrator under this Section, may, in aocordance with Adminilttativc ln.structiom, by instrument in writing, commission persons to be officers of tho New Iraqi Army at a rank to be determined by the penon conducting the commissioning. It shall be possible for personnel to be commissioned on entering the New Iraqi Army at a commissioned rank above Second LieutcnanL 9) The 1"IDkl of enlisted penonnel, non~iooed officers and warrant officers will. in M<:CD;. Muahhal Warrant officer J)c>;. Muahhal Awwal Chief Warrant Officer 10) The appointment of enlisted personnel and wamnt officers will be made by the person authorized under Administrative Instructions issued by the Administrator of the CPA, or by a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly to the Adminiltrator and to whom authority has been specifically delegated in writing. by the AdminiaU'ator for this purpose. It shall be possible for penouneJ entering the service to be appointed to an enlisted rank above that of Private. 11) Promotion of officers and cnli5ted personnel will be made pursuant to proccdurcl to be cstablilbed by the Administrator of the C-Oalitioo Provisional Authority oo the buil of merit established by reference to experience, demonstrated competence in the current nmk and potential for exceptional performance in the oext higher rank. ~~ ~ CPAJORDn Aaptt 1003/ll 6 PAY AND ALLOWANCES 12) Pay and allO'NIDCm for member& oftbe New lnqi Anny will be determined by aa Admin.i1cntivc ~ 13) A Member of the New Iraqi Army will automatically forfeit a day's pay and allowmcca fOI' each full or partial calendar day dW the Member absents himself from his p1acc of duty or unit without the permisaioa of a auperior officer authorized to grant such permiaion. and shall in addition be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, including the commencement of Disciplinary Proceedings under the Code of Military Diacipline. LEAVE 14) Memben of the New Iraqi Anny may take leave subject to the needs of the service, upon receiving permission tiom a duly authorized officer. The period of leave and other relevant details are to be specified by Administrative lnmuctions. TERM AND TERMINATION OF SERVIC~ 15) Volunteen for savice in the New Iraqi Anny obligate chemseJves to an initial term of .ervice for- a period not to exceed 26 months, 1ubject to a decision by an internationally recogniz.ed, repraeotativc govemment, establiabed by the people of Iraq, to continue its cxisteDce ooce such government wumes the responsibilmcs of the CPA and to the proviaioas of Section 6 ( l 6)(b) and ( c) below. At the end of any tenn of service, a member may extend service for a further term of 2• months, subject to agreement by the appropriate llltborities and the interests of the service. No period of aervice shall be ex1ended without the consent of the Member, except in national emergencies u officially declared according to law. Requmd minimutn tem1S of service in special situations, e.g. advanced training, may be specified by Administrative lnattuctioo. 16) Service iD tho New Iraqi Anny may terminate on the occurrence of one of the following events: (a) Upon a deu:nnination that the Member•19ef'Viccs are no Jonger requiRd following lhe transfer of authority by the CPA to an mterDaliooAJ.ly recogniz.cd. rcpaeaeutativc government, established by the people ofJraq, without prejudice to the ngbt of an intemationally recogniz.cd. representative government io Iraq, established by the people of Inq,, to assume the command and control of the New Iraqi Anny and all on-going service obligations of its penocmcl; CP AIO'fU>n Aapst lOOJ/ll 1 (b) (c) Upon a determination by a commanding officer, hued upon credible evidence, that a Member of me New Iraqi Army i1 unsuitable for further military service in the New .lraqi Anny on the basis of one of the following: (i) commission of a Serious Offense (ii} a poor disciplinary ~Ord (iii) medical unsuitability (iv} coosistently poor pcrfonnancc (v) faJlUIC t.o meet basic standarda of performance (vi) bebavioT which is discriminatory on the basis of gender, race, ethnic or regional ori&in, religion OT tribal affiliation (vii) unsuitability for military service (vill) commission ofa Military Offeue (ix} violaiiom of Section 9 ofthit Order (relating to political activity) Within seven days of notification of tennination. Members who have completed initial entry training, may request that the decisioo to terminate their service be con.firmed by tho Adm.iniattator of the CPA or by a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly to the Admini&trator md to whom such authority is specifically delegated in wri rill& in respect of this Section. A delemlination under this clause (b) shall be conclusive upon confirmation by Administrator of the CPA, or by a civilian metnber of the CPA reporting directly t.o the Administrator and to whom such authority is specifically delegated in writing with respect t.o this Section, or upon the elapse of leVetl days from the time of notification of termination, if no request for confirmation is made. Service in the New Iraqi Anny shall a1ao terminate upon: (i) the granting of an application &om a Member of the New Craqi Army for discharge based upon demonstrat.ed need; (ii) (iii) oo the granting of an application to resign; or 1 detecm.inatioo. by the Administrator or his delegate that such termination is necessary for the good of the service. er AJOIU>n Aapat 1003/22 8 Secdon 7 Weapoa1 The poacsaion of Heavy Weapons and Small Arms by Members of the New Iraqi Anny is regulated by CPA Order Number 3, W eapoo.s Control Order (CP AIORD!23 May 2003/03), which Order may be supplemented by Adminiatrativc Iosttuctions. Sectioa 8 Admlnbtratlve hqulrtes l) The Administrator of the CPA. or a civilian member olthc CPA reporting directly to the Administrator and to whom such authority is specifically delegated in writing. may. by Administrative Instruction, issue such rules made under this Section for the convening of an Administrative Inquiry to investigate any matter regarding the oper.tion of any put of the New Iraqi Army. Reports of such inquiries shall csiablish the facts of the matter, draw conclusions. and make any recommcndatiom u may be appiopriat.e. 2) An Administnuive Inquiry may be convened by an officer of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or above who bolds a command poaitioo with respect to any matter concerning a unit under bis command and its operarioo or the Members of the New lraqi Anny under his onmmand, except that an Administrative Inquiry may not be convened to investigate a matter already under investigation u a criminal matter until mch time as the crimina.l iovestigatioo is completed. In circWDltancea in which an Administrative Inquiry hu been commenced llDd it discoven evidence of a Military Offense then it may ref er the matter to a Oiaciplinary Officer in accordance with the Code of Military DiJcipline. Potlowina teferral of the matter to a Disciplinary Officer, the Administrative Inquiry will be completed in accordance with the rulet governing such Inquiries. Secdon 9 'Politic.I Act1vltlet Members of the New Iraqi Army may not (a) be members of a political party, orpnization or association; (b) participate in any activities of a political party, organjzation or association inctuding the recruiting of memben for political pe.rties or organizations~ (c) publicly stale or suggest any opinion of a political nature which includes cifons to indoctrinate members of me New Iraqi Anny or any other person with a po1itical ideology or otherwise convince any pet'SOll to adhere to a particular political ideology; or CPAIORDn Aupat 1003/ll 9 ( d) Activitie$. participate in any manner in Extremist Organizations or 2) Nothing in this Section shall limit the right of a member of the New · 1raq1 Army to vote in clcclions for political office organi.7.ed on a local, regional or national basis. Section l O Delenae Areu The Administrator of the CP ~ or a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly to · the Administrator and to whom such authority is specifically delegated in writing. may proluoit or restrict access by any person to any Defense Area and may make all appropriate provisions for · the oontrol and security of my Defense Area. In the event such prohibitions o.r restrictions limit access to privately·owned property, reasonable compensation shall be promptly paid to the property owner during the period of limited access. Section 11 . Admln&tradv'e hstructio. ns The Administrator of the CP~ or a civiJian member of the CPA reporting directly to the Administrator and to wh ''Commander of the New Iraqi Army'" mcC11 the Iraqi officer appointed by the Administrator of the CPA to commmd Ibo New Iraqi Anny, "!McipJinary Proceedings .. means the investigation into, bcai.ng of and the decision rcacbed, under ma Code ofMJlirary Discipline m reapect of an allegation of a Military Offense and includes any appeal of any web decision. CP AIORDn Aqan 2003/13 1 "Elements of Military Offenses" means the elements of the Qffen9e1 ~uired to be proved to the required criminal standard before a member of the New Iraqi Army can be convicted of a M.ilitary Offense. ••Junior Disciplinary Officer" means either the officer of at least Captain in rank who at the time of any part of the Disciplinary Proceedings in respect of an allegatioo under thi1 Code of Military Di&cipline commands the company or equivalent unit, or battalion or equivalent unit of which the Accused is a member. or the officer of at least the rank of Captain who is appointed, in accordance with the provisjons of this Order. by an officer in cormnand of a Bris•de to be the Junior Di5ciplinary Officer of the Accused for the Disciplinary Proceedings • .. Member of the New Iraqi Army"' mcam a penon 9Cl"Ving in the New Iraqi Army &om the time of attestation until the dare of termination of service. "Military Court" mcam a civilian court with a civilian judge who ha been appointed u a Military Judge pur3U11Dt to Section S of this Order, .. Military Judge .. meana a civilian judge with jurisdiction over Military Offemes in accordance with the provisions of this Order, "Military Offense" means an act or omission deacribed m Section 3 of this Code of Military Oilcipline. '"New lnqi Anny"' means the military forces of Iraq orpnittid for the purposes set forth in this Order including all components of the national armed forces of Inq, specifically including the ground foroea recruited, trained, and organiz.od u the first step in the procea of crcatins a military def enae fo~ for the new Iraq. U1Jless the context clearly requires otherwise, all refetencCS to the "New Iraqi Anny" are references to any element of the national dcfcn.sc forces of Iraq, K$enior DiJciplinary Officer" means either the officer of at lcut Lieutenant Colonel in rank who at the time of any part of 1he DUciplinary Proceedings in respect of an allegation under this Code of Military Ditcipline commands the BattaJjon of which the Accmed is • member. or the officer of at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel who is appointed, in accordance with the provisions of this Order. by the Commander of the New Iraqi Amy to be the Senior Diaciplinary Officer of the ACCUICd for the Disciplinary Proceedings. CP AJOR.Dn Aapat 1003/13 2 SJ:crJONl MILITARY JURISDICTION l} Membca of the New Iraqi Army are subject to thu CodoofMilitary Discipline at all times from the date oftheit attestation until the date of termination of service. 2) A Member of the New Iraqi Army who ii sub.equently determined to have been ineliaible for acrvice in the New Iraqi Anny remaina subject to the Code of Military Discipline until discharged. 3) All Members of the New Iraqi Army will remain tubject to the jurisdiction of the civilian courtl wtu1e serving u Membert of the New Iraqi Army; provided, Members of the New Iraqi Anny enjoy immunity from civilian criminal proteCUtion or civil liability for acts or omdliom arilina wilhin the scope of their duties ad authorized operations to the same degree u other governmental officials. SECTION3 MILITARY OFFENSES l) Any Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military Discipline who commiU any of the following ahall commit a Military Offense and shall be liable on conviction to any punishment laid down in Sections 10 and 13 of thia Order. (•) (b) ( o) (d) mimMtment of Members of the New Iraqi Anny of inferior rank; causina or engaging in a m.turbmlcc or behaving in a disorderly manner, behaving in an insubonlinato manner; strikin& a Member of the New Iraqi Army or a member of anothet armed force of superior rank or civilian instructor placed in authority over the 8CCUled.; ( e) while on aentry duty either (i) engaging in misconduct, °" (ii) faili.Da to do the Member•• duty. (I) m.obcying • lawful order; (S) drunkeunesa if, owing to the influence of alcohol or any drua, whether alone or in combination with any other ci:n:.umaWx:cs, the Member ii: (i} (ii) unfit to be entrusted with bis duty. unfit to be entrusted with any duty which the Member was · reasonably aware that he could be called upon to perfon"n. CP A/ORD/7 Aapst l003l2l 3 {iii) {iv) behaving in a ditorderly manner, or; behlrving in any manner likely to brina dilC'l'edit on the New Iraqi Anny; (h) ableuce without leave; (i) avoiding the performance of a duty or negligently perfonning a duty; (j) making a Calle stlltement coMeming my official matter relating to the New Iraqi Army; (Jc) 0) fighting with another Member of the New Iraqi Army; willfully or by neglect damaaing or uuaing damage to or the J oss of any property of the New Jnqi Anny; (m) (n) c:ondUct to the prejudice of good order or mHitary discipline; behaving in a manner likely to brina diJcredit on t.be New Iraqi Army. The Elements of the Military Offi:nleS are contained in Annex A to this 2) Order. 3) Any Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to tha Code of Military Discipline who commits a civilim criminal offeme shall be guilty, by reason of so doing, of a Military Offense against thil Section and liable to trial, and oo conviction., to any punishment under the provisions of thia Order. 4) Any Member of the New lrDQi Army subject to thia Code of Milicaiy Oiaciplinc or any 01hcr person who by the law of war ii subject to trial by a Military Court for any crime or offeme qain.st the law of war who commits a violation of the law of war as adopted by lnlq «recognized as customary international law shall be guilty, by reason of so dams. ofa Military Offense against this Section and liable to trial, and on oonviction, to any punishment under' the provisiom of this Order. In the event tho law of war convention or treaty was adopted without specifying the pen•lty for violations or otherwise fails to specify the criminal penalty, the maximum penalty ahall be the maximum penalty specified for the most c109ely analogous offenae under the civilian criminal code. SECTJON4 DISCIPLINARY OFFICERS 1) Junior Diaclplinary Officers have jurisdictioo over all Military Offenses c;rcated under this Order, with the exception of the Military OtJemcs created under Seotions 3(3) or 3(<4), in respect of Members of the New Iraqi Anny below the rank of Lieutenant CPAIORD/7 Aupst lOOl/13 4 2) An officer in the New Iraqi Army, not below the rank of Captain ma.y be appointed in writing as a Junior Disciplinary Officer by an officer in command of •Brigade to be the Junior Oileiplinary Officer ofth«: accused in ~t of the allegation of the commission of any Military Off ensc. 3) Senior Diaciplinary Officers have jurisdiction over all Military OffeDSe$ created under this Order, wiih the exception of the Military Offenses created under Sections 3(3) or 3( 4). in respect of members of the New Ir.qi Anny in the rank of Lieutenant and above, so long as the Senior Disciplinary Officer it at least one nmlt above the Accused. Senior Disciplinary Officen have juritdiction over all appeals of decisions of Junior Disciplinary Officers. 4) An officer in the New Iraqi Anny, not below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel may be appointed in writing es a Seoior Disciplinary Officer by the Commander of the New Iraqi Army to be the Senior Di.ciplinary Officer of the accuted in respect of the alleption of the commiaion of any Military Offense. SECI10N5 MILITARY COURTS AND MILITARY JUDCES I) Military Courts have jurisdiction over those Military Offenses CTCated under Secti011J 3(3) and 3(4) of this Order. 2) Military Judges have jurisdiction over thox Military Offenses ettated under Sections 3(3) and 3 (4) of this Order. 3) In circumstanca in which allegations against an Accused involve Military Offensea undeT both Section 3(1) and Section 3(3) or 3(4), then tho Military Court and Military Judge to which such matters arc ref erred will have jurisdiction over Military Offen.aca under Section 3(1) in addition to those under Section 3(3) or 3(4). 4) Military Judgee will be selected. from 1itting civil jud&ea. The SenioT AdVisor, Ministry of Juatice, in coordination with the Interim Minister of tho Justice will appoint such civil judges, as he may deem appropriate, to be Military Jwlps on a standing baia who will sit es Military Judpe when a Military Offense is refened to them in accordance with the provisions of this Order. S) A civil court in which a Military Judge is conducting Di.ciplinary Proccedinp in respect of a Military Offeme will be deemed to be a Military Court for the duration of those Disciplinary Proceedings. CP AJORDn Aqut 2003123 s SECTlON6 APPELLATE COURTS ln circumstances in which a Member of the New Iraqi Anny bas be.en convicted by a Military Court then the appellate comt to which any aweaI is made will have jurisdiction over any Military Offense referred. Appeals will be made to the appellate court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from the trial eourt. SECTION7 ARREST I) Any Member of the New Iraq1 Anny subject to this Code of Military Discipline found committing a Military Offense, or teaso11ably suspected of committing a Military Offense:, may be ~ted in accordance with the provisions of this Section~ 2) A Member of the New Iraqi Anny subject to this Code of Military Discipline may be mrested by (a) a Member of the New Iraqi Anny of superior rank, (b) by a civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused, . ( e) by a civilian po11ce officer acting within the office. r's authority, or a Member of the New Iraqi Army serving in a provost position. 3) A.$ soon as possible, but in any event no later than 24 hours following arrest, the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Army must be informed of the reasons for ' bis arrest. 4) Within 24 hours of arrest, unless the exigencies ofoperational circumstances prevent i~ a Disciplinary Officer must be informed of the attest and must consider the necessity of retaining the Member of the New Iraqi Army in arrest. The Disciplinary Officer shall order tho release of the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Army unless. he reasonably believes that if released: (a) (b) (c) the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Anny will absent himself or flee disciplinary proceedings; there is a risk that evidence will be 1~ tainted or destroyed; or the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Anny will commit further Military Offenses if rel~ 5) If, in accordance with Section 7(S) of' the present Order., the Disciplinary Officer shall have detennined that the member of the New fraqi Army under arrest shall be further retained, the period of sueh further rete:ntion shall not, unless the exigencies rimand; Bxtra duties to a maximum of7 days; Stoppages of pay in respect of damage or loss C81lsCd by the aet or acts which formed the basis of the Offense charged, n<>t exceeding 14 days' pay. 7) A Senior Disciplinary Officer may combine those punishments listed in 'Sections l 1(6)(a) and l 1(6)(d), cx. cept that no more than 28 days pay may be taken from the convicted Member of the New Iraqi Army in respect of a11 the Offenses dealt with by the Senior Disciplinary Officer at one hearing. 8) A reprimand and extra duties may be combined with any other punishment not otherwise excepted under this Section. SECTION12 APPEAL FROM DISCIPLINARY OFFICER 1) An Aecu&ed w11o has been conrictcd by a Junior Disciplin81)1 Officer of a Military Offense wider Section 3(1) <>f this Code of MilitMy Discipline shall be entitled to appeal to the Senior D.isciplinary Officer. An Accused must submit the appeal and any supporting eviden. cc in writing 1to the officer in command of the c'Ollvicted member within 14 days of the Disciplituu:y Hearing. 2) An Accused who is an officer of the New Iraqi Army who is convicted! by a Senior Disciplinary Officer of a Military Offense under Section 3 (1) of this Code of Military Diso. ipline shall be entitled ta appeal to the Commander of the New Iraqi Army or the senior Commander of tbe New Iraqi Anny. An Accused must submit the appeal and any supporting evidence in writing to the . officer in com.mmd of the convicted member within 14 days oftheDisciplinary Rearing. SECTION 1l REFERRAL FOR TRIAL BY MD..,ITARY JUDGE 1) In the case of an allegation of a Military Offense under Section 3(3) or Section 3(4} the Disciplinary Officer wt.11 refer the allegati~ to)gether with all available evidence relating to the alleg.,.Uon, to a Militaey Judge for consideration. CPA/ORDn August 1003123 10 2) Where an investigation into an allcgatjon of a Mililary Offense under Section 3(J) discovers evidence of additional Military Offcmes Wldcr Section 3(3) or Section 3(4). the Disciplinary Officer shall terminate the investigation and refer the allegation, together with all available evidence. to a Military Judge for consideration. 3) lo accotdanco with Section 8(3) of thit Order. where tbeR are allegations against an Aoaued involving Military Offenses under both Scctlon 3(1) and Section 3(3) or Section 3( 4) the Disciplinary Officer shall, if lhc Disciplinsry Officer considers it in the intel~ts of justice for the matten to be tried together, refer all allegations, togcthel' with all available evidcnu, to a Military Judge. 4) Tho Military Judge will investigate and otherwise deal with the allegation of the Mili1ary Offemc referred in accordance with thia ScctioD in the manner applicable for civil Offen.tea laid down in the Iraqi Law of Criminal Procedure 1971 u amended by lr8qi law 8Dd by CPA Orden. SECTION 14 PmflSBME."ITS BY MILITARY JUDGE The Military Judge will apply the sentences appropriate to the civil Offense ch&rpd under the provisions of Section 3(3) or Section 3(4), except that in determining the appropriato level of sentence within the sentencing range for the Offente. the Militmy Judge may conaider the impact that the Miliary Offense bad on good order and discipline within the New Iraqi Army. SECTION 15 APPEAL FROM MILITARY JUDGE 1) A1J Accu.sod who bu bocn convicted by a Military Judge of a Military Offense shall be entitled to appeal in accordance with civil procedures. 2) The court hcarina the appeal will consider the matter appealed in accordance with the applicable law and p-ocedure for civil Offenses laid down in the haqi Law of Criminal Proc:edxae 1971 with amendments and u amended by CPA Orders and the Third Edition of the Iraqi Penal Code 1969. with amendments and a amended by CPA~ SEcnON 16 SUSPENSION OF IRAQI LAWS The Iraqi Military Law Code Number 13of19-40, the Iraqi Military Procedures Code Number 44of1941 . the Code of Legal Noti6cation ofMilitmy PerwonneJ CPA/ORD/7 Aapst l003nJ Number 106 of l 960, Punishment ofMiliwy Dcsel1en Law Number 28 oi" 1972. and the Penal Code of the Pop:dar Army Number 32 of 1984 have been suspended under' CPA Order Number 21 entitled Creation of a New Iraqi Anny. SECTIONJ7 ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS The Administrator of tbc CPA or a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly to the Administrator and to whom such authority ia delegated may issue Administrative Instructions not inconsistent with thi1 Order, prescribing all matten that are necessary or convenient for giving effect to or cm:ying out the purpoeea of thit Order. SECTION 18 ENTRY INTO FORCE Tbil Order shall enter into force on the date of ligoamre. CPAIOR.Dn Allplt 2003123 12 (a) ANNEX A XO COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 23 CREATION OF A CODE OF MJLlTAR.Y DISCIPLlNE FOR THE NEW IRAQI ARMY ELEMENTS OF MILITARY OFFENSES CREATED UNDER SECTION 3 mistreating in any way Memben of· tbe New Iraqi Army of inferior rank; 1. 2. 3. 4. S. Elements: an act that amounted to mistreatment; and the a. ct was committed by a Member of' the New Iraqi Anny of superior rank (hereinafter in this subsection "superior~ .. ) on a. Member of the New .ltaqi Army or a member of another armed force acting wi1h the New Iraqi Army of inferior rank; and the superior rank (accused) knew the victim was inferior in rank; and the. superior rank (accused) deliberately carried out the act; and the superior rank (accused) knew that the act amounted to mistreatment ''Mistreatm~nt .. means unwamm~ harmful, abusive, rough, or other unjustifiable treatment which, under all the circumstances; {a) results in physical or :mental pain or suffering, and {b) is unwarranted, unjustified and unnecessary for any lawful pUipOse. (b) causing or engaging in a disturbance or behaving i:n a disorderly manner; Elements: 1. the accused EITHER {i) caused a disturbance, OR (ii) became involved in a distwbance, OR (iii) 'behaved in. a disorderly manner; and 2. the accused acte..d in such a manner deliberately. CP .A/ORD/7 August 2003123 13 (c) l. 2. 3. 4. behaving in an insubordinate m•n•er; Elements the actions OR words of the accused were insuboTdinate, insulting or disrespectfW to a Member of the New Iraqi Army or a member of another armed force of superior rank (hereinafter in this subsection ~·superior nmlc.") or a civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and the actions OR words of · the accused were used in the presence of the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and the accused knew that the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the ICCU5Cd was bis or her superio. r or civilian instructor pl~d in authority over the accused; and the accused deliberately spoke or acted in such insulting or disrespectful manner. (d) striking a Member of tbe Iraqi Army, a member of another armed force acting wltla die New Iraqi Army of superior rank, or cl~an Instructor placed In authority over the accu.sed (hereinafter In this subsection " superior") 1. 2. 3. 4. Elements the accused struck a Member of the New Iraqi Army, a member of another armed force acting with the New Iraqi Army,, or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and the accused bad no lawful excuse for striJcing the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and the ~sed knew that the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused was his or her superior or ·civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and the accused deliberately struck the superior or .civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused "Strike" means an intentional blow, and includes any offensive touching of the person of the superior, however slight. (e) wblle on sentry duty either (I) en&&&inl In misconduct, or (U) falling to do the Member's duty; Elements 1. the accused was on sentry duty; and 2. the accused ETIHER CPAIORDn Aucust 2003123 l4 ·. (i) (ii) deliberately engaged in mis.conduct, OR the accused failed to carry out a duty whether dclibem. tely or by neglect. (f) disobeying a lawful order 1. 2. 3. 4. Elements an order was given to the ace.used; and the order was lawful; and the accused was aware of the order having been given to him; and the accused : deliberately or by neglect did not dbey the order. (g) dnmkeaa.ea If, owing to the lo. Rue11e~ of alcohol or any drug, wbetller alone or In combination with any other clrcumstan~ tbe Meblber is: · (I) unfit to be entrusted with bia duty, (ll) unOt t.o be entnuted with any duty which dt. e Member wu reuo11ably a:ware tllai Ile could be called upon to perform; (Hi) (Iv) behaving in a disorderly manner, or; be•avtng In any manner likely to bring discredit on the New Iraqi Army; t. 2. Elements the accascd knowingly took alcohol OR drugs; and as a result thereof the accused SITHER (i) was unfit to be entxustcd with his duties. OR (ii) was unfit to be entrusted with any duty that he was reasonably aware he could be called upon to perfonn, OR (iii) (iv) behaved in a disotderJy manner, OR behaved in a manner li~ly to bring discredit on the Defence Force. (h) absence wltboat lemve 1. :Z. 3. 4. Elements a.; a~ was required to be at his pla.cc of duty; and the accused was not at his plaeo of duty; and tho accused later-returned to his place of duty; and the accused did not have permissi. on or a reasonable excuse for "being away from his place of duty. CPA/ORDf'1 Au1u1t 2003/l3 JS (l) 1. 2. 0) 1. 2. 3. (k) 1. 2. 3. 4. (I) 1. 2. avoldlng tbe pedormance of a dufy or negligently pe. rl'orrnlng a duty Blem en ts the accused had a duty to perform; and the accused was aware of that duty; and, EITHER ( i) th1' acoused didl not pcrf orm that duty; and {ii) the accused did not perfonn the duty either deliberately or by . neglect, OR {iii) (iv) the accused per:foaned the duty to a poor stand~ and the acauscd performed the duty to a poor standard either deliberately or by neglect makl11g a false statement concerning a11y official matte. r relating to the New lrsql AYmf Elements the ~used made a statement about official New Iraqi Anny matters; and the statement was false in a significant way; and the accused knew that the statement was false at the time he made it. without reasonable e~case., fighting with •notber Memb. er of the New Iraqi Army; . Elements the accused was involved in a fight; and the accused's involvement in the fight was deliberate; and · the fight was with another Member 0£ the New Iraqi Anny; and the accused did not have a reasonable excuse for fighting. willfully or by neglect d•m•glng or causing damage to or the loss of any property of the New lr11ql Army; Elements the accused lost OR damaged property of the New Iraqi Army; and that loss or damago resulted from El111ER {i) the deliberate acts, of the accused, OR (ii) the neglect of the accused. CPA/ORDn Aueu•t 2003/13 16 (m) 1. 2. 3. conduct to tbe prejudice of good order or mllltary dlsclpUne Elements an act or omission by the accused; and such act or omission was likely 10 prejudice good order or military discipline the accused was aware, at the time of such act or omissio. n, that the same was. likely to prejudice good order or· military discipline. (iD) 1. 2. 3. behaving In a manner likely to bring dlscrecll't on tbe New Iraqi Army Elements an act or omission by the accused; and su. ch act or omission caused discredit to the New Iraqi Army; and fhe accused was aware, at th. e time of such act o.r omission, that the a.ct or omission was likely to bring discredit on the New Iraqi Anny, CP A/OR.Dn Aupst 2003/?J 17 UNCLASSIFIED ' PERSONNEL METRICS RESOURCES METRICS Police Officers Currently Rehired 61,240 Current # of Operational Patrol 2.45.4 Vehicles Police Officers Currently On Duty QB,416 CPA Determined Patrol Vehicles 7,775 Endstate Police Officers Fully Trained and 4,012 % of Operational Police Vehicies 32% Fullv Eauirmed vs. Endstate Police Officers Completed ilP 4,058 Trainina IPS Uniforms on Hand 81 ,598 Police Officers Completed CPA 0 Aooroved Academy Training IPS Uniforms Endstate 237,064 CPA Determined PoliOe Officer 79,794 % of Uniforms on Hand vs. 26% Endstate Endstate CPA Determined Police Officer 86% Endstate Pistols On Hand 18,335 Pistols At Endstate 79,027 INFRASTRYCTURE METRICS % of Pistols On Hand vs Endstate 23% Current # of Operational & Open 427 Rifles On Hand 24,355 Police Stations MSC Determined Police Station 480 Endstate Rifles Required al Endstate 26,0.63 % Open Police Stations vs. Endstate 89% % of Rifles On Hand vs l§ndsfate 93% Current # of Operational & Open Jails 146 Hand Held Radios On Hand 4,004 MSC Determined Jails Endstate 130 Hand Held Radio Endstate 26,, 340 % of Open Jails vs. Endstate 112% % of Hand Held Radios On Hand 15% vs, Endstate Current # of Operational & Open 12 Vehicle Radios On Hand 521 Prisons MSC Determined Prison Endstate 24 Vehicle Radio Endstate 7,705 % of Open Prisons vs. Endstate 50% o/o of Vehicre Radios On Hand vs 7% Endstate UNCLASSIFIED, , COALITION PROVISIONAL AurBORITY ORDER NUMBER 26 CUATION OFTID. DEPARTMENT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT />llnuanJ to my authority • Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under the Jaws md usasa of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, includin1 Resolution 1483 (2003), hcognizing that border controls are essential to the establishment of a free and safe Iraq, Recognizing that previous border functions were earned out by five different government entitict within the former Iraqi regime, and that the former lnlqi regime often used thc.c functions u tools to ~ the interest.I of the lnqi public, R.ecognizUrg that it ia dcsinble u aoon u possible to restore tho normal transit and movement of people and commercial goods to aod from Iraq, Recognizing that aucb transit must be restored in a way that protects the security and safety of the Iraqi public people and others lawfully p.raent in Iraq. I hereby promulpte the following: Secdoa I .E1tablbbmeat of die Department of Border Eaforcement J) There shall be established the Department of Border Enforcemenl for lnq as a department within the Ministry of the Interior. 2) The Depertment of Border Enforcement will monitor and control the movement of penom and goods to, from, and across the borders of Iraq. 3} The Depctm.eot of Border Enforcement ahall conduct its activities coasistent with all applicable CPA Regulations. Orders, a.od Memoranda, including CPA Order 16 reganting the Temporary Control of the Inqi Borden., Ports and AiJports, 1111d all Iraqi laws regarding immigration, emigration., customs md quarantine, including the Customs Law of 1984, unle11 specifically suspended by the CPA. Secdoa '2 R.espoasibillties of the Department of Border Earo.-ce:ment I) Full authority, Iraq by the CPA, or an intemation.aJ te:rritory with border control formalities. CP A/ORD/26 June 2003/16 .s 2) In exercising the discretion set out in this Order, an officer ,hall consider whether the entry of the person poses a substantial risk to the people or interests of Iraq or in the , ca.5e of a person who has established that he or she is an Iraqi national. whether entry should be denied because of security or military necessity; 3) A pen;on denied entry under this Order may appeal to the Senior Advisor of the Ministry of .Interior and the Interim Minister of the Interior for a review of the case. The detennination of the Senior Advisor of Ministry of the Interior, in coordination with the Interim Minister of the Interiort will be final. Sedfon 8 Notice to Depart 1) Where an officer, upon examination of a person, is of the opinion that it would be contrary to the present Order to grant entry, to the person. or to extend the permit of a person, the officer may, as appropriate; a) allow that person to leave lraq immediately; and/or b) serve that person with a Notice to Depart (hereinafter ''Notice") within a specified period. 2) A Notice must specify: a) that the person must depart Iraq within a specified period; b) the reasons why the Notice is being served; c) that the person may object in writing to the Senior Advisor of the Ministry of Interior and the Interim Minister of the Interior within a specified time to this Notice, or give reasons why the Notice should not remain in force; and d) mat timely compliance will not have adverse consequences for the return of a person who otherwise complies with entry requirements. 3) Where the Senior Advisor of the Ministry of Interior or the Interim Minister of the Interior receives written objections from a person under this Order, the Senior Advisor of the Ministry of the Interior shalt, in coordination with the Interim Minisler of the Interior-: a) consider these promptly; CPA/ORD/26 Jane 200'3/16 6 b) promptly determine the fair and law;ful resolution of the matter; and c) advise the perso. n in writing of the decision. Section 9 Revocation of a Permit 1) An officer may revoke a person's pennit if: a) the · circumstances that fonned the basis of the approval of the person's application for the permit no longer exist; b) the person breaches a prescribed term of the pennit, or another person required to comply with a condition of the permit has n.ot met that condition; c) the presence of the person in Iraq is, or wou.ld be, a risk to the health, safety or good order of the Iraqi community; or d) the permit should not have been granted because the application for the permit was . in contravention of the present Order or other applicable law. Section 10 ldentiticati. on aod Seizure of Documents 1) Persons shall comply with the instructions of an officer regarding their identification if they a) seek entry into Iraq, b) make an application for the renewal of a perm.it, c) after being arrested or having been reported to a. police officer. or other CPA or Coalition Force security personnel, or d) are subject to dq><>rtation under this Order. 2) For the purpose ofidentification, an officer may: a) search persons or vehicles whom the officer believes have not revealed their identity or who have hidden on or about their person documents that are relevant to a decision as to whether they may be granted permission to enter Iraq, and may search any vehicle that conveyed the persons to Iraq_ and their luggage and personal effects; b) search persons whom ihe officer · reasonabty believes have committed, or who are in possession of documents lb.at may be used in the commission of an offense, and search any vehicle that conveyed the person to Iraq and their luggage and personal effects; CP A/ORD/26 .June 200'..l/16 7 c) examine at a port of entry or any other place in Iraq, for the pwpose of this Order or relevamt directives, any travel document -0r any other document or object purporting to be any of those documents or objects that is, or is about to be, imported into or exported from Iraq. 3) An officer may seize and hold at a. port of entry or any other place in Iraq any object or document jf the officer reasorulbly deems this necessary for the discharge of the functions of the officer under this Order. 4) An officer may seize and bold any object or document if the officer reasonably believes that it bas. been fraudulently or improperly obtained or used, or that . such action is necessary to prevent its fraudulent or improper use. 5) An officer shall provide a written teceipt to any individual from whom he seizes an object or document unde. r this Order. Section 11 Search of a Person 1) An officer may, without a wanant, search a person who seeks entry to Iraq. 2) The search o( a person must be made by an officer pursuant to the present Order and must be made on reasonable grounds. 3) No person shall be searched by a person who is not . of the same sex. and if y promulpte the following: Section 1 Establlsbment of th~ Fadlldes Protectio:a Service This ordet establishes the Facilities Pmteetion Service (FPS). The FPS is an organi7.ation of train~ armed, uniformed entities clwged with providing security for m:inistty and govemoratc offices, government infrastruc· ture, and ' fixed sites under the direction and control of governmental ministries and govern.orate administrations. Sectlon l Organization of the FPS I) Go'Vetn.mental employees employed by the ministries or g:ovemorates are eligible to serve in the PPS. The FPS may also consist of employees of private securigy,1 firms who are engaged to perform servic4=S for the ministries or govemontes through eon.tracts, provided such private security firms and employees are licensed and authorized by the Ministry of Interior as provideO in Seotioo· 7 herein. Persons wh0: have participated in Ba1 ath Pany activity within the leadership tiem descnbed in CPA Otdet Number 1, De- Baathification of Iraqi Society (CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01) may not serve in iM FPS in my capacity except by the ~s grant of an exception by the Coalition ProvisionaJ Allthonty, CPAIORD/4Septcmber l003/27 1 2) Minist.an and beads of governoratc administrations shall determine the need for FPS memben at locations unda their supervision. Each ministry or govemorate edministration is responsible for ensuring the FPS branch undCT its supervision is sufficient to proleCt key aites for which it is TCIJ>ODSible, with the additional suppon of police or other forces iD times of emergency. 3} Miniseries and govemonuc administrations arc responsible for the funding of FPS members assigned to their agency. Ministries and aovemoratc administrations arc respoDSil>lc for the supervision and control of the FPS force assigned to their govcmmental agency. consiatent with the standards and regulations established by the Ministry oflnterior. . 4) Governorate• will establish RegiooaJ Operations Centers to coordinate the operationa of FPS guards and to ensure their proper integration with poUce and other cmeTflC1lCY services. S) The Ministry of hlterior will establish standards and tni.nina for the FPS including ltaDdardl and training for private security firms performing FPS duties purl\Ulllt to conncta. Pursuant to lb.is Order, the Ministry of Interior will issue FPS Administrative Instructions defining the standards for dress, training, certification, md deportment All mcmben of the FPS whether contracted or employed directly by the governmental agency are required to comply with the Administrative Instiuctions issued by the Ministry of Interior. 6) FPS organiatiOOI may be known by different names including. for e. xample .. Electricity Police," "Diplomatic Protective Services. .. or "'Oil PoU ce" but each will have only the specific powers and authorities granted in this Order. 7) Members of the FPS may not paticipate in any manner in organizatie>ns or activitiet that advocate racial, gender or ethnic hatred or intolerance; advocate, create, or engage in illegal discrimination based on race, color, gender, religion, or regional origin; or use, or advocate the use of , force or violence or other unlawful meam to achieve internal political goals. Violations may result in the rcmova1 of the member &om employment in the FPS or the withdrawal of the authorization for the member' to perform FPS responsibilities as a member of a private security firm. Section J Aadaorlty of tile FPS 1) Members of the FPS may, while performing their official duties, apprehend persons who (i) 1hey witness committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense, (ii) have escaped after being lawfully u:restcd, or (iii) otherwise CPAIORD/t Sepeetlliber 1003117 2 interfere with their lawful activities. Penons apprehended by the FPS must be tumed over to the Iraqi police or Coalition Forces within twelve hours of apprehension or be released.. 2) Members of the FPS tMy, while ped'onning their official duties, conduct reasonable searches for weapons or other dangerous or prohibited items of persons entering or within the governmental property or offices they a:re securing, criminal SU$pCCtS in 1heir custody, or vehicles . entering or within the governmental property or offices they are securing. 3) Members of the FPS may, while performins officia1 duti~ use force against persons or things as is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. However, the use of force that may be likely to cause death or s«ious bodily injury is not permitted unless the member reasonably believes that using such force is necessary to: (i) protect himself or others from the imminent use of deadly force or force likely to cause serious bodily injury, (ii) prevent the escape of a person suspected of committing mlllder or assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or (iii) defend ministry or govcmorato offices, government or state-owned infrasttu~. and fixed sites under the direction and control of govemmental ministries and govemorate administrations, to prevent their destruction or incapacitation. Section 4 JurisdlcUon I) Members of the FPS will be su~ject to Iraqi law at al] times, and the courts of Iraq shall have jurisdiction over offenses alleged to have been committed by members of the FPS. The Administrator of the CPA may determine that offenses alleged to have been committed by members of the FPS while on duty may be submitted to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq in accordance with CPA Order Number 13 (Revised), The Centnal Criminal Coun of Iraq (CPA/ORD/13 July 2003/13). 2) Members of the FPS shall enjoy immunity from civil liability for acts or omissions arising within the scope of their duties and in the conduct of authorized operations to the same degree as other governmental officials under the law ofhaq. Section 5 Weapou The possession of weapons by members of the FPS is regulated by CPA Order Number3, Weapoos Control Order(CPAJOJID/23 May 2003/03). CP A/ORD/4 September 1003127 3 Section 6 Licensing Private Security Firms Private fums may provide contract FPS guards to ministries or govemorates under license from the Ministry of Interior. Members of the FPS from private security firms will be integrated into Govemorate coordination structures. Section 7 Admlnistntive Instructions The Administrator of the CPA Of' the Minister of the Ministry of Interior, in consultation with the CPA Director of Interior Policy, may issue Administrative Instructions consistent with this Order, prescnbing all matters that are necessary or appropriate for giving effect to or carrying out the purposes of this Order. Section 8 Eatry lnto force L. Paul Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority CP A/ORD/4 September 2003127 4 IRAQI SECURlTY FORCES RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR INHERENT R IGHT T. O TAKE ACTION NECESSA_RY TO DEFEND YOURSELF, YOUR UNrr, AND OTfiER SJ:~AITY FORCES. l. ~IVILIANS : Treat Civilians w11h Dignily and Respect cMllan casualtles. Make every elforl lo a wold 2, COALITION FORCES: Cooperate with Coalilion lorces and obey their commands. Do not avoid oi run Coalition checkpOints. Do no! alrn. weapons a1 CoalibOfl Forces 3. USE OF DEADLY FORCE: Deadl'f loroe is that force wtiich ooe reasonably ooiie11&s will cause d11111h or serious bodily harm. You may use NECESSARY FORCE. up IO and llldud1ng deadly force. agaJOs1 persons on Ille t:Jllowing orcumsmncev. 1. In salf-deferue, b. In defense ol -,wr unit, or other Seamty Forces, e. To pte'tl)nl MllQJS OlleFISe$ againsl persoos, d. In delenae ol designallld propeny end 1nfras1ruciure 4. GRADUATED FORCE: When possible, use a gradualed response to hostile persons. The loll. owing a. re some techniques you may use II approp11ate. a. fil:!M; verbal wamings lo HALT in nelfve language b ~ physieally restrain, block access, pr de1a1n c. §HQW: your weepoo and demonstrate lntrJnt tp use 11. d SHOO'r; lo remove I . he lhraal ooiy where necas.sary. UNCLASSIFIED 02 October 2003 c yil,Jl:ll ~ t,,All ~I $.I} ,.J.lil L.. j~~ ~_,_;>JI ~.Jb J~ ~~)'I ol\ <) ~ ~J:I )' .4lal ~l,i '11 ~ .h.!U.i.a._, ~,~ ~ el.i.ul :,;I.All &Jllal "':'l!>,.,.._.I fjl • .!\ ,_;UllJlial ~~~ .I .~.).l...11.J ,l.uJ'JI i.)1 •~"i f e" .).'.II ~-U. i .2 .i;J..)J~ ,,. \...a ]41 ;Ull ~""i .,) ,isl.-..JI .,.illal.J ~~~I (.F-~ ,4 " .l.11 rt.a..ij'JI ~ •~1 ~ :rU..Jll .6 i.,;Jl.o u.-"ll1 ".,i ~ i1.ll1 o-""'w...11_, .u~,,._i1_, ~I ..:.."l.J~ ~ ua.)JI ~ l..o.W:.J .4J.J~I .ri.....il• ~ •.)tr..ll .... .,i,U ~I _;1:,..-y1 -.1 • I ..)G-;~1 ~ ~ vo ,•.,All U-..r J.a:'-1 • ..- • ~_,ill • ....iall > urG>••ll.J ~I .J ~I JM.I .(;'. .~I...;~ ~I ~.JJ_,.;.JI I.Jill ~I ,.a t.JZ.J. ~.J , ~-f, . ..Ji~ ul ~ ~:~I , 7 4..,i~ .JI ~ JW'I .,...,U.... ,_ W' u-a~"J I vo c::LJI ;;j~ u,,,_ ~I , t...WI i.:.w:.....ll JI u-ali..:."lll . ~I ~ _,....n... ("-lo.,...!JI) ~!.;a.JI vo'JI IJ_,i t)I .4'1.....l1~i....1_,.i...1.a; "' ~ u~' 2003 ,J,,"lll ~"" ..,.."\!11 . ~ c:il:l'JI <.:>" _;_,a...._;#.. .~1 ~ IRAQI SECURITY FORCES RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR INHERENT RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO DEFEND YOURSELF. VOUR UNIT, AND OTHER SECURITY FORCES. 5 IF YOU MUST FIRE YOUR WEAPON: (1) Fire only aimed shots. (2) Fire wllll due regard for the safety of Innocent bysla.nders. (3) Fare 110 more · iounds than neoes.saiy (4) lmmed111lely report incident and request a531Sl8nce. 6 CROWDS: Control CMlian crowds. mobs, 01 no1&rs 1nlel'fenng W1tt'I &laill!'f f'oro.ts wilt\ 1he mmll!llm ne<»ssaiy flliltlQ When O«:llmsla noes pennrt, allan¥>t ltle ~ Slaps IO axilltll aOW'ds a. Gtve ve.rtial waming!>IO HAL r b. Use a show ol force, illdudtng riol coo!lol formalloos. c. Detain V!Olenl olfende1s and those inoting violence d. Us.e reasonabie force ~cessal)' Ullder ll1e circumstances and proporuonal to the tl"lreat 7 DETAINEES: Yoo may stop, detain. search, and disarm persons as requlrell to accomplish your mission or prot&et persons or designated propeny. Oe1arnees will be tumed over to the lraql Police or Mlllll\fY Police as soon as possibl&, Delaiflees wm be treated humanely. UNCLASSIFIED 02 OdOOer 2003 _,!1,;all ~ o.,111 ~I ~l,i eli.113 r..>lil L.a jw"i ~,J»J1 ~-'"' "Ja.il rl.b'lrl ,.lA ~ ~ Jof-J:1 'i .4l-1 ~l,i ..,, u:- _,1,ilti.ia._, ~,i.!l......i.l .:p J~I ~.If+ ll.J ..:..'l/~I ~ .:.,,..i1 ~._,;;JI .~I <:F- et.i.ilt • I .c.;,;..i ~I .::.l_,i JI ,~ i.;P fU~ . .,.. .va~l~~r~~ ·I':: -~· ~· JI wWI ~IC>- ell.1ll ... ~ t~~ i_,il1 ~1 ,ut:M'llt ~ :~.;..11!1 i,pill A .), ~l.,rll ~._,;;JI J):all ~ .'-'.ll ·ct.>ta...11 ~I • "--o")..11 u"f.....ll ,Ui,ul ~I ~~ _;tlt"il~ , I .JU.I _,I ~I Jo.a,~ ~l :ei.111 ''°" .iJJ~I ~ JMi ~I i.Jlj"i :JUll ~I .(;'.