sEc.Bi~sl!: .
1 000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WAliHINGTON, CC 20)01-1000
•
14 Octobor 2002
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: UN fmpectiom of 1nq
When the US started down the inspection route at the UN, tbe purpose wu 11ot to &et
· entangled in a cat and mou,c game with Saddam Hilsaein, but to see whedlci- the Security
Council would support an inspection regime that could bring abollt disarmament. Por that to be
achievable. the regime would have to allow the UN to pt clarity ra!ber quickly on whether the
Iraqi leadenhip bu had a. cbanae of hcan and.ii actUally 'Willing to give up 'lbc weapons that h
has sacrificed so much to~-
An inapection regime that is not capable at achieving clarity at all, or can't possibly
produce it in leas than a year or ao, is Iraqi's best hope of infli~ting a stnlegic defeat on tho US.
n is useful ro r=call that lhc purpoac of entering into UN negotiations wu to 1est the UN's
scrioumcss regarding Iraqi WMD, not TO indulao a fantasy that we could delign an inapection
~gi:me tllat will allow ua to score a quick checkmate against Saddam Hussein againlt hi& will.
The cxcrudatin& process of negc:n:iatin& inspection modaliticl ~di to obscure certain key points:
a The UNMOVIC in1pcc:tors cannot be expeaed to outmaneUYer Iraq'1 biahly ·
experienced denial•and~n cxpc:ns to prove cilbcr (l) tblt Jnq poae.ae&
WMD or (2) that Iraq is patently and umcuonably blocking the inspections.
c Iraq won't commit tlagant obmuction unlela UNMOVIC can catch Saddam Husseill.
as it wae, with his pants down. The Iona history of ,veapcm.1 inlpccti0n1 in Iraq cells
ua that this is highly unlikely, ClpCCially in the first ~ or so.
o Several former in1pecton wam that. even under UNSCOM (the pmt Desm-Sumn
iQSpeetion regime), the in,pccton wen: only once able - with extraontinary luck. wit
and agressivencss - to come close to pulling off a real StupDIO inlpcction.
a Iraq hu had more than half a. decade to improve ill denial-and-deception tecbmque1.
And UNMOVIC today ii a notably weaker arpnizadoo, staffed c:ntimly by UN
em.plo)'OCI. .
c Even with the stronger provisions the US i1 teying now to add to the UNSC
resolution, UNMOVIC can by no mean• be counted on to prove that Iraq ia lying or
to force Iraq into a clear-cut obstruction.

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a To ~ i1 seems unrealistic to think UNMOVIC could prove either proposition in less
than 12 mon~ and then ia a danger, after fivo or six inapectionl that prove to be
•dty holes," that die US woUld be pressed hard (including perhapa by Hans Bl.ix) !O
aceept haqi declaraliona at face valoe. In OCbet wardl, months of failing to •casch"
Saddam Husac:in ii lilc.ely to dlange the subject on the world it.age away from Iraq's
ctcdi'lrility 1111d onto the e.mbanusing faihlre of tbc US to make 1he caac that Iraq hu
WMD.
a The only reasonable goal of any in1pCCtion Jegime i1 to monitor the disarmamait of 1
government that is eoopcnling in ,oocl faith. No matter bow muscular, inspections
cannot disarm a large oountzy like Iraq ~ die 1ovc.mment. 11 alcilled at hiding an. d
cheatini and is ddetmined to do so.
Tbe only chance of ~Ying clarity within weeks, or montba, tither than yem,. ia:
c Optimiltically, if Saddam Hualdn COllf'eues IQ freely in a new declantion mat
me UN can conclude that he haa had a ia.1 chanp of heart~ or,
.
c;i Jf chc Iraqis either declare that they have nothing, or declare ao little tbat the UN
can conclude that they '" lying blatantly and thc:refoie decide that inspections
would be pointlu1. h ia important to note that Dlix hu ~y said that he doea
not now have the information to '°11Cludc that the Iraqi• would be_lyiu& even if
they declare that they have nothln&-
Any other Iraqi action cxpoaea the US to riab of Jons delay,. ID the wont cue, the
officials of UNMOVIC • eager to avoid a war - could declaR, Iraq m couipllanc:e wbeD it ii not.
5imply bcc;ause they have been un1uccea1ful.
As months go by, danpn will grow:
l) That the clarity of purpose that you have shown tho American people wl the world
c:ould become blumd.
2) That IODle new criais in Xoru. or between India and Pakistan or bctwccn Palestinians
and Israelis could ge& out of CODtrol and mako action more difficulL
· 3) Our growing international coalition could unravel if people In the region begin to
conclude that once again Saddam. Will slip away and that the US i• a not • country on
whom to stake one's future. Or,
. .
4) That Saddam could covertly ctispcne some of his WMD gpahilitiet or bia UAV1
wjth terrorist groups or Iraqj slcopor cells.
In addition, Saddam's preparation& to uae weapao1 of mus dcstrUCtion can be expec1ed to
advance daily. His preparations to maw Israel into a conflict would likely move forward 'IJolith
time. US military cffecaiveneaa will peak at a ccnain point and then. decline. It ia difficult to fr"/
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·
'0NFIBENfMt
to maintain a large foree in fightin& trim while wating for UN impecton to find aomethiJ11. At
some poiat it will make Sen.IC to .atand qown.
>J noted. our negotiations aim to give the UNSC the oppmtunity 10 eltlblish its teleVance,
its scri011&nesa of purpose. If the UNSC is unwillin1 to endone an inspection maudlre meedn&
minimum necessary standardl, then the UN has not riaen to 1he challePgc. It may well be beaer
if the US inapection imtiati vc ended as a noble if unrt.ali2ed effort to set tho UN to meet its
responsibilities than if it enc:k with UNMOVIC inspectOB having spent ID0Dtbi ill fruitleu
seaxches in Jraq, .seeming to confinn Iraq's contention that it has no WMD.
Given the well-known hi&toJy of 1JN inspections of Iraq, the US must be caieflll not to
agree tD a new inJpcction regime that fail, to tako account of the past iMpecti.OD regime's failutea
and Inq'.c having "gon_
e to achoo] on u1" on tbil subject for ova- a decade.
The world should be nsmindcd that me US made. a luge conceuion when. we did not insist
on ieviving UNSOOM. So if we poaidon it ript, we should be 5"11 cleatly within the boundl of
reasonableness tO require the following meaaurcs to bohta' the CIDialtly wealc UNMOVIC
regime:
c Pint end foremost: That a falac declaration is by itself a "material bRacb." If Iraq
makcl a patently false declaration, the UN should not procccd with mrpec;tiona. for it
would be clear then that tllaC ii lacJcin& the ,ood faith and cooperative attitude
necessary to rnala: inspection& work.
.
Q That we be able to talce Iraqi so~ out of the country with their faaulioa. to be
interviewed in sec~ conditions be of inumidadoo.
a That indMdual P-5 manbm can:
1) Dcsigoare sites to be inspected and indivi~als to be interviewed.
2) Appomt our nationals u mcmbeR of any inspection team. Thia is esacntial
not only to IX}' to keep the Iraqis honeat but to keep Blix on tho right track.
3) Specify the conditiOnJ under wbich inlpcetiona and iiltcmnra would be
canicd . OUL
a That fraq be prohibited from du'Catenin, or attacking the aircn1't of UN member
states enpged in air apc::rations over tho entire country of lraq.
roviliolil be in an UNSC reaolution that we offer or i
(b)(1)
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~~:-:.:---=--:-:-:-==-!T:::--=-;t:'-;::-:-:::-:::=~==:::,icr.=-::--:=-=-::::--z:==~_jWhat · we need to 1ry to avoid i, to be in a state of iupection • year or 10 Wecb ago, you set guidelines that deserve mcndan:
c The US will not allow iuelf to Jet sucked into a "quaaaure of negadlliona,"
or a "mud pir of diplomacy.•
c The US 1oal 11 lh~ UN it not to pt merely the 'betl . "CIO!udoD p0111'ble. but to
adue\'C a ra~lueion thal actually~ the standard& appropriate to die ct=al
and to the. goal of achievinc ditmnament. ·
a In ·my view it i1 far bettcc to have med but failed to set an acceptablo
resolution lhan to e,rec to an inadequaae rcsoluti011 dw will trap us in an
• endleu inspection game with Saddam ijuucin and Hans Blix. ·
What~ aim to acc:ompliab recarmna lnq. the WMD ocxua.to •~ apomon of tem>rim1
· IDd the bioadm- war on teaoriam hinges on our inaistinc that the UNSC rcsohltion meet a
minimum - albeit hi&h - 1tanda,i.
DDIW.
Very Respectfully.
,·
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60NfliNTIAL