. • ...,7 :61112Allwatonswww...- • ' 3 ///8 COAL WON PROVISIONAL AUTI-IORITY BAGHDAD MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld Cc: Paul Wolfowitz Dick Myers John Abizaid Doug Feith John Craddock Keith Kellogg Reuben Jeffery FROM: Paul Bremer, Administrator " SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Elements This is in response to your memo of November 10, 2003 regarding Iraqi security elements. I have designatedp44 to advise me on the planning for and current status of the Iraqi security forces. His background in-successfully dealing with terrorism/unconventional warfare as well as his experience in organizing and training indigenous police and military forces makes him uniquely qualified. 110 will work with CENTCOM to address the questions raised in your memo. I have as ed John Abizaid to appoint a deputy toMito ensure full coordination between CPA and CENTCOM. They will establish a reporting mechanism that provides a weekly status of the following: • The key leadership in each of the Iraqi security services • The force structure (personnel and equipment), command and control, and training as measured against established milestones to achieve the desired end state for each of the Iraqi security services. • The operational capability of each of the Iraqi security based on its defined mission • The vetting of members of each of the Iraqi security services • The spending profile for each of the Iraqi security services 1 I I I I 1 I I 1 I ge 002 b)(1): (b)(5) : (b)(6) Page 003 (b)(1) (b)(5) (b)(6) Page 004 (b)(1). (b)(5): (b)(6) COAL! HON PROVISIONAL Al/1110M TY IA( !DAD November 19, 2003 MEMO TO: Secretary Rums feld Cc: Paul Wolfowitz General Dick Myers General John Abizaid IA/tk FROM: Paul Bremer, Administrator SUBJECT: Pay, Benefits, and Administration of Iraqi Security Forces After extensive review of job comparability by both senior Iraqi civil servants and a team of specialists from the Pentagon, a new government-wide pay scale was adopted on September 8, 2003. Set out in CPA Order Number 30, it includes all grades and ranks of the vat iuus Iraqi security iknteS. It also provides for pay increases based on both longevity and grade. A survivor benefits policy has been approved to compensate families of members of the security foices killed in the line of duly. The Ministry of Health has adopted a policy whereby members of the security forces are provided free treatment for all line-of-duty injuries. While these policies apply country-wide, misunderstandings continue to occur in the field. A clear policy regarding compensation for members of thc security forces that are disabled in the fine of duty needs to be formalized. We ate closely monitoring the impact of the cut tent compensation scheme for all of the members of the. security forces, particularly those engaged in hazardous duties, to determine whether they are sufficient to attract and retain guanty pet sonnet. If changes arc needed, we will make them. Regarding administration of pay, I do not concur with the proposal to postpone the transition of funding from CENTCOM to CPA. Administration of pay for most of the mciactl, of the security forces has been a CPA responsibility for some time. lit niy Judgment, it makes sense to transition from MC of CERP funds to regular budget funding as scheduled. This will also force conformity with the new pay scale. Implementation of a centralized system that can be more readily adopted by the Iraqis is essential as we transfer control. I do not sec any nexus between recruiting and twining and the payroll system. (_"•-_' ' -- SEeRE-T- TO: GEN John Abizaid Jerry Bremer DATE: November 12, 2003 CC: Paul Wolfowitz General Dick Myers FROM: Secretary Rumsfeld SUBJECT: Pay, Benefits and Administration of Iraqi Security Forces Have we come up with a rational pay and benefits scheme for Iraqi security forces? We need to ensure that the forces are adequately compensated to ensure morale and retention and that their families will be compensated if they are killed or disabled. We also need to reward longevity of service and have graduated pay that rewards increases in responsibility. At the same time, we need to move toward equilibrating pay and benefits across north, south, and central sectors. I'd like an update from CENTCOM on where we are with this process to come up with something that makes sense. I also understand that administration of pay for the Iraqi security fuices is scheduled to transition from CENTCOM to CPA on December 1,2003. I think we should postpone the transition in light of last week's decisions to expand the number of forces. We are unlikely to make progress expanding recruitment and training amidst a major administrative transition. 4.146 ' , REPT• DRAFT WORKING PAPERS 0,11 1 4 t Aj X04091 /03 — • • MEMO TO: Jerry Bremer Doi Zakheim GEN John Abizaid FROM: Secretary Rumsf DATE: November 12, 2003 CC: Paul Wolfowitz General Richard Myers SUBJECT: Increasing Funding for Iraqi Security Forces It is my understanding that Si billion has been transferred from the UN Escrow Account to the Defense Fund for Iraq account. Since security is our top priority. let's set aside $600 million of that to continue and expand training and equipping activities for generating Iraqi internal security forces. New funds need to be made available quickly. We can't afford a pause in funding to train and equip forces; without Immediate increases US commanders will he unable to increase recruiting and training forces in line with new end- strength targets. There is also an urgent need to provide forces with cold weather gear and other essential equipment, and to improve training. I'd like GEN Abizaid to report to inc on his funding plan for using the money most effectively to expand recruitment while improving training and equipping of the force. "1. 4 1reitr•P•— DRAF1' WORKING PAPERS X04089 /03 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE i coo DEFENSE PENTAGON OAS)14NGT ON DC 207:10-100C) : 1:tvi SI7NA. Ai t y ' t.'111F No% ember I 7. 21)03 10 I hinald Rumslcld ('( Paul Woltimit7 Doug (cith I IjuI Bremei PR1IN I. Retftic -n)1 tery III t: 113.11.( I N'oti reque.ted inliwinalion en the doelopment of grioance (All,: in e,- ,ach Iraqi pra hcrch cittiens engage ck ith the t iovertimu Council PA is in the proeess of de 'Iopuigi comprehensise program to assist the governing council in its outreach efforts to the Iraqi people. A needs 3ssessment IN currently being eonclucted and polentiall %%ill include the t011ius it: • Or ientanois irainny and skills des elopment to existing and incoming tit :tall on their 1;iles and dimes I he It:Jinni!: .1toukt he .3%ailahIe to hoth poi solidi and committee .1031 s. • .1s1.1 the e.A.ibl‘.1iiiig outrcueh vOitei?. in h t the IS ,!,critorates, this Nhotati Itaminr on con..10o,111 , t‘I'‘I‘'‘'s and 011)/dniallOn Ith nanOnal and inl;a1 '20% Clain CPI al/ Own t • Assisi ( C members in their public outreach eflitru. including the development of strategies tiir media relotions. • Assisi the kg to mieract and ekellaqc intorniatioflu, oh ClfitClis. CI \iisooety orgatu/attons. and pillincal associations thiinrghout the eighteen governorates. I 'SA ID oc.il t iovernance Program is currently active in In or the IS governorates_ and may a resource ter IRI NIA as they best determine ho % to hest assist GC members in their outreach &oils (TA is etirrentb, %. calorie. %kith the region.; to identify what e‘actly is needed to reluansli and equip constituent office,iiid lo seLlire the appnipriaic tinidiny to pro‘..ide these needs Page 1 of MO) l(P02) From: Sugar Adam J (CIV) Sent: Monday, November 17,2003 10•48 PM To: Executive Secretary Subject: IMPORTANT FOR TOMORROW MORNING Importance: High Amb McManaway has called a last minute Intel meeting for 0830 tomorrow. Someone may want to run up to C2 in the morning k ver fy everyone knows about it and will be there. Requested attendees OGA - notified Gen. Fast (her office notified) Steve Casteel - email sent, didn't answer phone FBI - notified ISG - message should be passed 11118/2003 e011 PX1): (bX5) )age 012 bX1):(b)(5) 1:. coA Li {'l(..)\ pRcIvisio .4 9 , Elettrii•• S) 311i C (c LoR LT) BA(jll DA 1) 10 November 2003 MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM: Paul Bremer SUBJECT: Strategy for Iraq's Political Transition (b)(1), 1 4(d) (b)(1), 1.4(d) (b)(1). 1 4(d) Although 20 of 24 C(. members support our proposal to cnoose delegates to a constitutional convention through thc usc of indirect "local elections," it is now clear that they are unwilling to force that option on the religious Shi'a members of the Council.(bX1) (b)(5) 14(d) (b)(1), (b)(5): 1.4(d) (b)(1). (b)(5), 1 4(0) (b)(1), (b)(5) 1 4(d) (b)(1): (b)(5), 14(d) we have been working to synthesize this notion into an overall political plan that is compatible with our objectives. What has evolved is an alternative way forward that would include the drafting of a transitional constitution or "basic law" by the GC (in coordination with CPA), the conduct of direct elections to fill the legislative and/or executive bodies created by that transitional constitution in late summer or early fall of 2004, and the recognition of a fully-sovereign Iraqi Transitional Government shortly thereafter. The transitional constitution would be unamendable, arid would include a sunset provision and a clear timetable for the drafting of a permanent constitution. In accordance with the provisions of the transitional constitution, the new government would initiate a process for the drafting of a permanent constitution by a separate body to be directly elected by thc Iraqi people. This would be followed by popular ratification, national elections, and the first Iraqi government under its permanent constitution. 1 his alternative would meet many of the concerns about the political timetable raised by members of the GC over the past few months, and would be consistent with our own interests as well. It would give Kurds and Sunnis worried about Shi'a domination the ability to ensure that basic freedoms are protected and that federalism is established in Iraq for at least the period of the transitional constitution. It would meet the requirement of the religious Shi'a that Iraq's permanent constitution be drafted by a directly-elected body. (b)(1); (bX5); 1.4(d) (13X1); (bX5); 1.4(d) While ideally we would wait until a permanent constitutional process were complete before ending the occupation, this proposal is the best alternative course of action available to us. The transitional constitution option would ensure an honorable end to the occupation under the desired timeframe. We would recognize a fully sovereign Iraqi government only after establishing a transitional constitution respecting democracy and human rights, and after holding the first free and fair elections in Iraq's history. While there is a risk involved with holding national elections this early, we could mitigate the dangers by making certain that the transitional constitution protects individual liberties, establishes the separation of powers, and presents a clear timetable for the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution. During this period we would use the time to identify and nurture potential national leaders. In parallel to this process, we would need to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements with the GC. These would grant authority to the Coalition to continue to station forces in Iraq to conduct stabilization operations, and would govern the management and expenditure of U.S. taxpayer funds for Iraqi reconstruction. We would try to include these agreements in the transitional constitution. Once the transitional constitution is complete, we would also consider returning to the United Nations Security Council to obtain a third UNSCR. This resolution could endorse the transitional plan, and could make explicit reference to the timelines specified in the transitional constitution for establishing a process by which Iraq would write and ratify a permanent constitution. OXIMbX5); 14(d) CC: Secretary Powell Dr. Rice COALI7 ION rRovisioNAL .AuTrioRiTv ACH D 9 November 2003 MEMO FOR: Donald Rumsfeld. Secretary of Defense FROM: Paul Bremer, Administrator SUBJECT: Restriction of Sources for Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Contracts It is our intent to limit the competition of Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction prime contracts to firms from the U.S., Coalition partners with troops or personnel in Iraq, and Iraq, Currently, our Coalition partners with troops in Iraq are the following: Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Dentnark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador. Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy. Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine. and United Kingdom. Japan and Singapore have civilian personnel serving in CPA. I am requesting your assistance in coordinating this recommendation and taking actions necessary to implement it. Accomplishing this result will require determinations to exclude firms from(I) non- coalition countnes; (2) those signatories to the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement that are not Coalition members with troops or personnel in Iraq; and (3) countries that have signed Reciprocal Procurement Memoranda of Understanding with the Department of Defense. These determinations will have to be published in the Federal Register or Federal Business Opportunities and provided to the Congress 30 days prior to contract award. In making this decision, the following was considered: • Applicable statutes and policy — on The Buy American Act does not apply to construction in Iraq. o The Balance of Payments Program (BOP?) has been waived by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the purchase of construction materials from Operation Iraqi Freedom Coalition Member nations or from Iraq for procurements for the reconstruction of Iraq. BOPP requires the use of domestic construction materials in DOD construction contracts performed outside of the United States. o Acquisition of products, services, and construction for the reconstruction of Iraq arc subject to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA). Thc TAA provides that companies from countries that have signed the multi-lateral Agreement on Government Procurement (listed as "designated countries" on attachment) will have the opportunity to compete for contracts Additionally, companies from countries with which DOD has reciprocal procurement memoranda of understanding will have the opportunity to compete as well (listed as "qualifying countries" on attachment). o On June 16, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized Operation Iraqi Freedom Coalition Member nations that arc not "designated countries" or otherwise eligible, and Iraq to participate in Iraqi reconstruction procurements (see attachment). The Competition in Contracting Act (C1CA), FAR 6.301, and the Supplemental Appropriations Act require that Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund ("IRRF") contracts be subject to full and open competition unless one of the seven statutory exceptions applies. • Limiting contract awards to U.S. firms only - o There is no legal requirement that restricts CPA contracts for Iraqi reconstruction to US prime contractors. o The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act requires that IRRF be used for the "purposes" of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), but does not subject the IRRF to the provisions of the FAA or its implementing regulations. If the FAA were applicable, it would place numerous restrictions on the use of foreign contractors. • Limiting contract awards to firms from U.S.. Coalition partners with troops or personnel in Iraq, and Iraq - o The "Public Interest" exception under CICA would allow restriction of sources to U.S., Coalition partners with troops or personnel in Iraq, and Iraqi sources. It requires Secretariat level approval and 30 days notice to Congress prior to contract award. o DOD must coordinate with the USTR to exclude designated countries' firms from the contract competitions. Since the TAA implements the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement, restricting CPA contracts for Iraqi reconstruction to sources from the US, Coalition partners with troops or personnel in Iraq. and Iraq and excluding other TAA sources presents political and international ramifications. o Limiting sources to prime contractors from the U.S„ Operation Iraqi Freedom Coalition members with troops or personnel in Iraq, and Iraqi contractors would greatly facilitate the continued cooperation of the coalition members. o The risk is that our procurement plans could be delayed by the staffing actions necessary to restrict the pool of competing contractors as proposed. On the other hand. I believe that Congress intended to ensure that relief and reconstruction contracts are awarded in a manner that will facilitate our ability to accomplish the mission in Iraq, by fostering the cohesion of our Coalition members. • If no action is taken — o Offerors from all designated countries, qualifying countries, Coalition partners, and Iraq will be eligible for award of prime contracts pursuant to executing the work envisioned by the Emergency Supplemental Appropnations Act (Pub. L. 108-106). If you concur with our recommendation to limit competition for prime contracts to firms only from the U.S., coalition partners with troops in Iraq, and Iraq, request you refer this recommendation to the White House to push USTR for quick coordination of the justification. Once you give us the go-ahead, we will submit the justification to USTR within 7 days. Finally, the list of "coalition partners with troops in Iraq" will require careful vetting. Our current list is attached. 'Tr r 4 Auk iijk dej .tv jai/ CP 1\ 3 i\ s-41-1 20 20c6 MEMORANDUM FOR AMB L. PAUL BRIER . GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID SUBJECT: Prosecuting Iraqis for Security Offenses Against Coalition It is important that people who attack Coalition forces in Iraq - or who are caught in possession of Manpads. RPC.is or other special category weapons - arc prosecuted and that the trials are prompt and fair. The prosecutions should help discourage these acts, if the trials (and sentences in cases of conviction) are well- publicized. The fairness of the process will help instruct Iraqis as to good practicc. We need to ensure that the offenses are clearly explained, carry appropriate penalties and are known to the public. As for whether security offenses against the Coalition are tried by Iraqi or Coalition tribunals, I can see some advantages to our taking on the task ourselves. We should be able to move promptly and give the prosecutions appropriately high priority. I know there are arguments for letting the Iraqis do it, but I am concerned that the process seems to be moving so slowly. Please let me know what your plans are (coordinate btwcii the two of you)) for get ing timetable, and with whom in c arge. Please also address the issues involved in detaming — peo[ife-WhO-are convicted, -who - should hold them and where and what happens alter we recognize an Iraqi government. I would like at least a preliminary response quickly. .3„-w 0 I 13- o Irefer.I' CLASSIFICATION WASH FAX COVERSHEET SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CABLES TIME TRANSMITrED (LOCAL) TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL) FROM: Donald Rumsfild OFFICE/DESK Samar' , of Micmac PHONE NBRPXO) SUBJECT: INFILTRATION FAX NBR: DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: PAGES: 2 (including cover) i i HOLD FOR NORMAL Dun, HOURS/ROUTINE, ..._ ,F- 7—' IMMEDIATEJUR6ENT ' NOTE: Furnish after duty hour contact telephone number fur each addressee requiring after duty hour delivery. TRANSMIT TO • ___ .. — AGENCY INDIVIDUAL (NAME) OFFICE ROOM NBR PHONE RBA CENTCOM GEN ABILAID CDR CPA J. BREMER .-- REMARKS: X1/4003-113 - NU I•UK I HER DlS.1KliiiirlON BY CABLES For Cables. Return copy of transmission receipt to OSUCCB WASH F AX OPERATOR (b)(6) SECDEF CABLES (bX6) CECRET CLASSIFICATION • 6441alkilff. to November/7; 2003 TO: Gen. John Abizaid Jerry Bremer CC: Gen. Dick Myers Paul Wolfowitz Doug Feith LTG John Craddock FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 1 — Ak SUBJECT: Infiltration RE.116,04 Lle_1-)ez1 / 4 / With the large inflow of people into the Iraqi security forces, it is pretty clear we are going to have some get in who should not be there. I know the vetting problem is a tough one, and we can only do the best we can and get on with the job. However, knowing that the forces are likely to be infiltrated despite our best efforts at vetting at the outset, it certainly argues for seeing that we have counterintelligence activities in all of the elements. I would be interested in receiving a report sometime about how that is coming. Thanks. DHR:(111 110703.3S Please respond by t11 -241 6 3 x04003 /03 RET Q3\ kL3-OZ CLCRET CLASSIFICATION WASH FAX COVERSHEET SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CABLES TIME TRANSMI 1. 1 ED (LOCAL) TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL) FROM: Donald Rainsfeld OFFICE/DESK: Secretary of Defense PHONE NBR: (bX6) SUBJECT: ASSASSINATIONS FAX NBR: DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: PAGES: (including cover) 1 I l HOLD FOR ' l IMMEDIATOURGENT NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE NOTE: Furnish requiring after duty hour contact telephone number for after duty hour delivery. each addressee TRANSMIT TO AGENCY INDIVIDUAL (Now) OFFICE ROOM NBR PHONE NBR CENTCOM GEN ABIZAID CDR CPA J. BREMER REMARKS: X04004-03 - NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION BY CABLES For Cables: Return copy of transmission receipt to OSD/CCB WASH FAX OPERATOR SECIDEF CABI,F,S1(bX6) SEC REIT' CLASSIFICATION FrCRET November/7', 2003 TO: Gen. John Abizaid Jerry Bremer CC: Gen. Dick Myers KElAba) Paul Wolfowitz Doug Feith LTG John Craddock FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld SUBJECT: Assassinations I just saw this list of assassination incidents. I had not seen it pulled together that way and was not aware of the pattern that seems to be evolving. John, I would be curious to know what you think we can do about it and how we ought to approach it. Thanks. Attach. 11/7/03 JFCOM CoCom c-mail to Sulk( DHR:dh I 0703.4S Please respond by 11 I ) D 0 4 0.0/03 ereeffler1€04,9044.4001110F414 1 S Iraq. Ita,(ji. Ss; a4ittation:Wcap. :KEY IRAQI ASSASSINAT1ON;INCIDEN_Tp. (MAY 03.4MESENT)t(.61 - - fs" 7 Jun: Deputy pice: t !cfJIki `(al-Basra r h); 29 Aug: SCIRI chai rrttpAskim (an-Najar 20 Sep: IGC (Baghdad) 9 Oct: Police Chief Raheed 24 Oct: Police-Chiel Abu Rashid (al-Arnarah) 29 Oct: Deputy Mayor kern,. . (Baghdad) 3 Nov: Local Councilman Khaleefa (Baghdad) 3 Nov: Judge Shuwaili e(ari;Najat) 4 Nov: Judge (Mosul) _J assthitlôñ LooatiOns ASSESSMENT:'FRLs rho .s,kiikelkehind assassinptigns with Crimitial„ elements.haVingatessp*iegteAtinvolvement..iLlitfOct -;ea_rly Nov increase in assasififratelaniAikelyiattributed to F.1412s tlesire:to intimidate_ Iraqis working with_4oalitiOn,and undermine reooristructionLsecurity efforts ... lower-level officiale l icittei'targets than higher-ranking GC members. (S/IREL) 33113003 7 Nov 03 Page I of I •cT/ (bX8) v From: RSS - SecOef CablesESO oyxey Sent: Thursday. November 06, 2003 2:27 AM To: Executive Secretariat CPA, NIST ORHA (E-mail). (b)(0) (b)(6) Subject: Bonuses CIV, OSD; Bremer, Paul; 1 001 Ctassification: UNCLASSIFIED Ladies and Gontlemon. Please forward the attached note from Secretary Rumsfeld to Amb Bremer. Please confirm receipt Than you. Respectfully. MAJ pX0). 1 I q):'2003 November 5, 2003 TO: Jerry lireniet CC: Paul Wollowitz Doug Feith FROM: Donald Rumsfeld-A, SUBJECT: Bonuses Here's a suggestion that we offer bonuses to Iraqi police to capture terrorists and other wanted individunIs. You may want In wash around the idea. Thanks. Atiech 10/13/03 Maguire lir to SecDef MIR dh I l9501-16 Please respond by MAGUIRE OIL COMPANY lanta• i74 I-i7 WIMAI4CANCI Towrio r rA, I' A,CSA •Nobe. I ioi In.4111111 (11, MUM( 4000 711I70-2 I Of C.414V 14 MAIWIPIL, rmsalear41 41.-AINVY MIMI. ' , ICI 4414slocAl REIbIlieV C. COX. entfitO•ril V. D. 1 , 1-PIJFINOV.4•4, vme PA/stna4r October 8, 2003 Via Feda the Honorable Donald 11. Rumsfeid Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington. flU 20301- 1000 Dear Don 1 enjoyed meeting with you just before you sat down for dinner at the book festival gala in Washington last week. The President, his father, and kb Bush have all been to our home in Dallas. Since under the leadership of President Bush and you. the United States was able to win quickly the substantive part of the war, it is important that the peace does not slip into a slow Vietnam. With the huge number of terrorists and criminals trying to stir up unrest in Iraq in order to undermine the U.S, efforts, I made the following suggestion to President Bush at the dinner. which I hope you will also consider: A generous cash award program for the various Chiefs of Police and perhaps another program for the police tinder the Chiefs that will reward capturing the terrorists and criminals. The Iraqi police apparently have a low standard of living to start with co ri penerooc sopplemtntal cash award program, in addition to some type of honor program, could he quite effective and would probably save a number of American lives. I mentioned this idea to Kay Bailey Ilutchin.son and she thought it should be pursued. Keep up the good work! Yours very truly, Cary M. M 1-11TC CMM:jsg U16733'6103 01X6) From: Sent: To: Subject: NageImann. Sarah, CIV, OSD Thursday, November 13, 2003 8:39 PM Executive Secretariat CPA Snowflakes c ;2 Sig"lf/Ai i snownake.Turkey's Snowflake.Iraqi Role in !re... Security Eteme... Ciassification: As requested, here is the latest As a bonus, I'm also attaching here the provided to the Boss. urkcy snowflake. ecurIty snowf1ak that came out the same day. Hard copies were sn <> <> 0 3 4 , eef445 1113eftErtiee- November 10, 2003 TO. Gen. John Abizaid Jerry Bremer CC: Gen Dick Myers 'Reuteo Teri Paul Wolfowitz Doug Fenh LTG J. Keith Kellog (Ret.) LTG John Craddock FROM. Donald Rumsfeld SUBJECT. Iraqi Security Elemenrs The U.S. is going to put a great deal of money and stake a lot on being successful in developing the Iraqi security elernents—arrny, border patrol, civil defeniie corps, site protection and police. Therefore, I need to have a single individual we can go to who will keep track, on a continuing basis; of what is taking place with respect to each of those activities in Iraq. A teportng mechanism will need to be designed so we can monitor regularly and so we are assured if anything is starting to go off track or lag. The kinds of things we will need to track on at least a weekly basis include: - How we are doing in assuring appropriate leadership for each of these organizations—leadership is key, - Paanioning iici,d saute rot cach a Chase orgamcilii tow und uncierstAnttuag ho W We will avoid creating kcal militias. - Agg,regate data to show what is working and not working. Knowing the rhythm for eaeh Ar rtemnents in teTTOR of their training cycles. For example, with the police, some go our with 8 weeks training and some with 4 weeks Thine with 4 weeks' training will be brought back in to get the additional 4 weeks at some point. We need to know the phasing. - We will nezd to monitor and assess training procedures and the numbers of trainees, to assure our etforts are adjusted among the four security services to ftt. the evolving security situation on 'le ground. -7) -Gtellareiefragarleite - We need clarity as to the types of assignments each of the four organizations will undertake. - The names each element will be called and how ought we to talk shout them. Do we want to use "national guar" c.n rAntity)c, hiatcad of "crvil defense") - How well arc we managing the vetting proems? Cart it he improved? - Are wr tIcvaUpLig approprinic vouravtintelligence cnpa fitipc In alert us when vetting failed. - Who is responsible for each activity) How well are they performing? Who is the z•Ilaiti nf romm/nd for each element and now nreglit they evolve over time? How are costs beirg managed? - Are we meeting our targets? - Other. How do you recommend we approach this? Possibly the new COO of the CPA, General Kellogg, can wort with General Sanchez to zuake a recornmendation. OliIt ID705.65 Please respond by 11 1 4 7-1/J 2 - 3?) •N3relkiet Lye COAHTIO PROVLSI(r....11. AL TI1ORI I BAG 1.11)A D 19 October 2003 MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeid FROM. Paul Bremer SUBJECT. Muqtada al-Sadr Mr. Secretary: Following up on our conversation yesterday, I thought you should see OP most recent analysis of thc threat Muqtada al Sadr poses to the coalition in his area of operation (the Shia heartland). **Stability is the sine qua non of our success in this region. The challenge posed by Muqtada al- Sadr now dominates the political and security situation in our region's Shi'ite provinces and directly threatens the success of our mission. As both the GCs and I have reported in detail. Sadr's baleful and destructive influence is now felt in all five provinces of thc Shi'itc Heartland, from al-Wasit to Najaf. His actions in Karbala, which have sparked a crisis costing the lives of three American military personnel and several Iraqi police, very nearly took that city from our gasp. at least for a short while. It is no exaggeration to say that his growing influence threatens to undo all the progress we have made here since May. Permit rue to restate my strongly held view that Sadr and his twelve senior aides, listed in the warrants referring to the death of Ayatollah al-Khoie, should be arrested for murder. Until Sadr and his henchmen arc behind bars, we will know no peace in the Shi'itc Heartland. It is abundantly clear from his actions and statements that his ultimate purpose is to achieve supreme power in Iraq in a manner similar to that employed by al-Khomeini in Iran 24 years ago. Like Khomeini, Sadr believes in the doctrine of "wilayat al-Faqih," or the rule of Islamic religious scholars. The longer we leave him unpunished, thc greater his prestige grows in the eyes of the fanatical minority already devoted to his cause, and the greater is the intimidation and tear felt by thc vast majority of Shia who hold him in disdain. Moreover, our own prestige in the region will continue to decline so long as the Shi'ite majority believe that we are afraid to punish Sadr for his crimes. The primary motivating idea of Shi'ite Islam is a profound demand for justice, a demand that the Shi'ite faithful believe is often ignored in this world. Unless justice is seen to be done with regard to Sadr, we will never be able to establish true stability in this region of Iraq.- CC: Secretary Powell Dr. Rice General Abizaid ttilwr 30. 21013 (b)(6) 1 ( I- 1(( \ I I) 11,1,1 I • • '1 " • I 1 I I II, .1 s:'1: • ' '11 , 1 • LOA,. 14- 7 , 7(/ • /Li rEyrt 1,4-Cc" VI OFFICE OF OPINION ANALYSIS RESEARCH \S. Iraqi Public Has Wide Ranging Preferences for a Finn rc Political S stem ii.' HUhc r ;;; h kill • 1:1, • .:1 • ..• I %:(.' r • • I :a , . • • a, !. •i-j; • ; ..oh;s, I ,:.1h1. e • N., 7 17.1.4 V. • on,:- • paru,..• Ir. ii• • ;0:.t.:,! 1.,1%;:nces fht - flame ses. trust Key Findings • II.1‘11• • 4.11 L. • ...1st:AM 3 • .iisk I, XII.. • ii.(.r kl: . • I Ilk ISO% \1..):orlts....• . . Ilt5 •• I . sse.. et:. Ay . 11;.1 .11r1.s.,/, iI Mk! LE' . , t10:1 ant: But 11 -4,4:• Mk! . . • n‘... • . • e .% , 1.111111; .e.:tariass o7 et AL, ...:c:r•ts Strong Consensus on Value of Free Elections and Fair Representation . • s. , • I ..• Ifht • 1,4 .11111 ' S . • • • .15).5 . —1.i ,'• "..i 10:1— : \ 1.1 • .5, -, a • ,,1 1., -,., • - .!I 0' • _ ttt‘i $LL.k to.% I 1...tilt I. /11.4 Nchtliol t I. Ani.1.11. ..111,!.. MA11 , 1 I ,1 ,1 I tod 19816. • it4a1Stirr, Ate. z!s- e • Some Groups More Welcomed Than Others N •ii .• 11.• 1," 1 .1 Ili 11 1 1 . 1 , • 1 ' • • •LI:i • , 0 , 111rik • "Itc• IP, a;N;rt., I .- mr.6 Irot • 1 . , . 1.,., . .1.0p4.4- 1 ,. . 1, ,..• 1,:sicts 1" I. • ,5 • , i ii,_: . • 11 1 .1.. :1... , .1•11. 1. •• s1, 1 , i .. , .1 1 1 1 . .-";.... I . ' • 1,:; 1:I II./ IL: ,.. 1 . 1 1 1 Will r 1. ,..'7 .‘ .. \ L....t. : ,, 5l., , ;1‘'. ..1 Ansi 4. lit .•....: • :.1%.:•:1 4 I: • . .....• . I '1.. t. • ' . I ',. 4 pritIl .11 ..,- .• ..,;••i, CtIr. ... . ••.;: .! I' ,.: .1: : 2 •• i.. • . ...... 11!111.:'2. "PI, " :1 - 'I, •••• 311,1 I' , - ii,. i• t, • . .t..' .fltt,.' • • I. • Nsolop... I 1..1 oli. I ./ I ..... 4 ,6 •16• 1.1..113.. I I OW II alp 1.'0.4 01,1141111 .1111.in, • • I.• .44. I 411311ph. •••r•t, /Is •alle•116.4f11.6 •1•41 I .1 --7 - 7•1111111MINICT•ME 1 , •••••••• dr4i .66 ....W.., 4.11.14,14440•croarr-r-r, r,A46— . __ .- ..orr, Amy, .sa ...,I Wide Ranging Preferences for Future Political System • . •. ... • 1 ,1•II • II," ti • : • ,, I I I • • 3• 1 ' .1 PagC1 • .•-1,1:r.,1•-• • • .11 • .1-1 • ct 1- . I 1;.U1, • r1rlr'ics.11 '441414,..41• , •:Lov V•I e•-. - 414. • 11111111111ff 34. - Appropriate Role tor Religion Differentiates Preferences .s1 •. I' &AIN 41 /4 . 7 i I til j .%'• l• POI .1: •.; ••\ " h. . • I .411 ;11. , ,, • • a -, l. • . s.4 :.:..•• • .. ...• ,•' %%h.!: ,in! • ri. ,,n _ • • i: •uprort ror .1 11141 !.. • . • `: ' I • 1. I .1: ••..I. • - • .0 ; i•-•••••., ....142 • . Table 1 Support for Political System oy Support tor Various Political Values' 1. , • , 1,:l" I 1.5 I• 1k. ;.,,1 •1 tiI /CillsoCr e% 'lit el I/claim:rat and Islam 58% %rs Ibl4IflkSUR _ \AL.' ,, .. 15i • '"1 .5 i• . • \, • l• .iriwr : • Parties Distrusted as Legacy of Past 1. si Mali a . .' Ott'•• 1 ',.1•*I'llst; lin. 1.. I.1 1•ItI11',,, Ill Lilo trust 14.4 .: •! %, ,Lvatcci ; ; 2 per,,ra . V,1•••,:r,d.‘ 1.:71;•.• ,•:;. .•••,.p1 • . '1: • amon, a% crag,. 1, ? fig .111.i '5, 'P. 111.1,.: . iiPr.1!I•111• • illi111',.:111, ;ii ••• , 1/1,5 51,. • e' 10i "0 "I. ust Iraqis Want Leaders with Expertise and Compassion Sectaiian Affiliation Less Important 1:1. jS, • . 0 . po, • ,'1 1,4 • .11'. 1:.1.1,• Ae• sinL e L ., . :1 1 • WI ..111 ,..1 pcop I igiire 4. :;:‘• : •,. sa' • •:,• 111•.: 'i ll'. • , r, . 0:11,‘,1• t 1 5•.rit, C11.1.,:m:tli ,,• •. .1 111: .1•.1 : 1 , 1. ,C NI. U.. isis,,just.. 111, ."111.1 `Ls —ILL.1 *, ..,,:•.1•11. 1 I . .. 2 :IC •,. it • .1 • • :.5.• ;in.! t l.Uf 4 low. i.e.'s I g oder ' 04,1'11114 14 , 11..11.4 , f'.I h.:11, 44d. k ilhadt. 1 Al1 ` 611/. \ A/ 41 %I/1..04..114...41,J 1 r141 91.. 41'. _ I Ably ,2. %miss' *.taia 1111liatimi I)N 4 11% " Nt111111 ).• , h New Leadership Not Yet Known to Public 1.11 I. o‘1‘.; • . . .• • .4* 11“..!I I..0Li • 1.3,11 , ...t...1 1:1 ,111: I t"... ..n s• , • • 2' , • ri it s\ • Lit.'.1 t .st:.:: • .11 10 lie•• :.j.c !lot 114:41.1 MET:Ito. 7 ,1••••••.. o! • 111,p, Alt:: nett po : i • 1,. flLr\ ••1!. V.:31 in. r.i-, pubk :II I.1••.-- :I .• :/". • ;.. i•.:.)11' • 44/14 I:. 0,1. .ti .' • . ‘11001,..•: .IU ' r, . 4„. „ • ••:••• I I .•; • *;:j 101 I I •. -i• IIN•111 41)/1•"•4. ' Pt • %. t b .1 :I ' s. li'1011, • ,1.1i•:LIiIiI.J nt.:3 ..ir.rk)Jd &CIA; 11,.:114:1 orler.,. juts: /MI! ;•, the ()filo: .,1 • %." -ftik1111 I. .11-t , .t..tn 1 -4 • • 7.11:11g illt:SC Ci. anti tn rnLi tr..hicratc ut • .! .• • , .1!:.t• • : itar:tat:. • Z . • •• t • ." • - • irt* •i;"- • r • )4t. .1 , . .11l7:7•144. 1I 2rp%.ai •1.,111. I ..,,• rni. 1, %pawn 77- 1 • _, r —_ • Governing Council Considered a Positive Step. but Its Independence is Questioned ' .', 0 101.11i: • . 1:11.11 • r " . 6 , .1.1.11$1. 1111111 t , •• 1 1 ••1111, 11 71:11% tilt • • • .t..1 • , I •••2.1. • \ 'f.4 C .soc '`.; • • ... , •11.11• II, • • • • at... , 11.1! vont ai‘ ‘.1 • •••.:.% ....••• • At rlu. - clic,. 4 .1 I.' .*' • .1 ..; l it ito.••I ratt.III.• •e....11 I lit.akctip II! Ct.. s•tit ii. :Mt Stliini agc I. "•• ••••• . • , 0/ • A "•:):: • .‘ • I. I 4 'n .! ..L .;•‘ ; . • • V .1 kUi•-. ..‘ that 111: kurt.t• . oft: '• •• 1•••trati. resitt•ait thrt ',heft I. !..0 ' .104 l/I • .. 11113: '100. I I." ' t ort 11 4 .. 1 s ari. ..% 1 -11. a.. • ":. • 1. • •' Sithl ‘1;..1 .%.1,1111 snip, ; 41.M: ,• :01.11 :hi% I% .1 /wit ,40)./ it It di 01 .; .4% • 41,1 • g I ( Kr;:..;.if )q.tnrwoi oi ..711.:-:.s17,•—‘0;:i IHODOLOGN 111h.v J.! 2_ .e Su r% e): I ;nt,:r. co• •• liaghdac \r,a1. liasrrh. Rat111.1d \ And 'i;". n ItarCr.,:... to oar.. parto.y.no:In Tr: •iaol% inuui t 444 aduit• resodon,.: .7. :M.: .1.01 I rhol si. ottani.' Intervieo. oer: carr.ed out o•crr:1 .1% X') 114,7!. .7* .1. ringing from xio ,o . ccted ietused 1t1 naloto-•:.t,re r000lfrnolit‘ -olr, ed %mirk :,•rs drawn. ut,:i/..r..4 residential fisting. iroom Itatf• IVO l'opoilriaor, am: ( en•rs cn.us sub-dtitrut• act: utilsted a• prima) sampOng unit, Si. %%ono sto PSI • hocing •4::t7,14:t4; 11')11111 probalmilt)-p:oportion,r1•10-.,/c ptoxedure• Due tu soie of Itaktiodakl. th4: kit) vs40, stirtotiedh to enitare that 41! ir irc. Acre tepreseiftec •io Acre giwil uUr‘tdtess details fort hou.:hold, at four %I/uplink: po;nis %%Him ca...a l +st. 1 -:•4; outcrviet•N *AC% t:tindu.:(1 cd at 4:adl Aimpl tag point Within e..1%; II s,ctd 11014•014.i..1. 4.1Ie 4.71% indent V. .is : ,41t7w.:1d U%111V. ;as: h;rt)ida) methot: M: 11131 a... of design. l• appro•oilmo,•,, saiiip.e. III It ;1,1 ,„ liii, :1„ ic•:l am; ,.:11•toring. ettio:ts •o: r rnult.-sirge • ,. • -.erall nipkI :le airrgon ot error %ate% across the sample Sin %tar& uf Error Ij 14:14.111 \ am! Ranordi 11\11 4",, 3 f.:1 •Co **_•1. 111,1:1..1 oirl .i141 4111/ 14.44, 3 , ; In-depth Ititcr‘te%t,: Apprumonatel) :tot itt-JcPt:; '11::.1c.• • •••:..: i;ameti tout in Ii4g141 .24. 41at• karhata. .o.o: Saimaa noon loolgiol) August . " : 4 to September 2o. Quottons asked ano„: o,:;• rtionsok. tos•arot 1%4. image. ( Nuornorrok:e. tiie tiooerning I Itaq.• It:•;•orosient. J •11; 4.1 1111::1 .111L: t4t.fliC1i rtflhi J;24:44 :h zolio.ri:ofor mkt iel.g:oot.• Fas ., miont ! i 's the goner-mows.iii Baghdad Vrer . to% s Acre carried fw reNtst.n,c ra;;; as 9" pcto:nt • p..7.c;at a•i Ott remtic.: an ufban aresis within netu cot August 2A in September 4 7.7!usce to parttc:palc .n the stud) ProkoLit -r'4%eil ' 41111 1 ;4: v. 4% Jading axn.n. dataL ii.us tbs:cs.ts tsere uith?ed •{1 prima!) s.,711... :ill mut.. Psi toi.,; or 122 Psi . ssere dtosen its:ng probabtlit- xoportioni.-to-ilic methods \ o ,;‘ , s ii. hold. ri s :onstuctcdi eua locsitton Inter% I%t: j ;c:ount suicrcs, ..t.i.(s lor ca,:h PSL 11'utun each seIca househ,..c. ...espfint.:en:s cc .e.ected using c:•., is • . 'As:Cubs! I 07 the results bascs: iin apprommatel) saftr.: ,•nc san ..1) owl to sontidence that the niarg:n of error :s I I 11111 II )1 \ 1.1I.1 I Qui, 1 11111. '11,1., .1 141 1/1 :10il• I a"..t1.1% 1.1.0111g I 111114V Kole 111 ,,,,, • k" — asisikW - :_111•111 tootieria; AP. _11111111111111111111111 "d" I • 11,1, I i(,..:11,111.11 iiii Num."! 1..1 lilt In111%14.11 ot1 ti 111U• 1[11111111% iii Emus 4: I LIlii .1.1% 11111r111 111 0 1, • _ r ' • . . • 1 1 • 4$14.11.111% I a lilt 2 C.e.illeep Stlir•• 1111 rad Aseel I ‘pecitql Muth+. th'; "r•tc•-r • ' I '1“:1. _ 39% _ 4 • • 29 I 10 c • • I . • • 1 • • I IA II 1 se •• 6 %pp. nIh IIIn Petit rVSt lor Point. AI %..ti•till). mew,. 411010 • . . :1 111. ..... ..t. ii iii• • . .. .• . .. r .... _ t*. Ile. _• I.. • • r . Ill • . . N. .ier. .. . - III , t. 'ete. e . ; • 11 I mute .801ith.11“ Ill rt.11111‘ 41 rafts% 1.• 14cp,4•01, Ilic •ctsi 'We - .2eatsodsoilloft1makti 12*. M1111111111111111111111.111111 04 ,41 1 4.444 1 1 1 L 4i- - -tAa01 66-*-Alogia*INIIIWILir k pp. nth% I .11)1, 1.1‘ I 14%1.41 NI..st it m.o.!, •••• :1,1 .s:•I ."•111) ir ' Don't knum Nii Kopon%. h4 .:•1•.: • 'tirrieniii% I u.:1111.4 i;.;it.it.iliCt N.ati.W.1111, 1.4111.-rthip ( hit acIt - Jew 4. S,y1..1411% ..Ztlf • • 111.11...1 - 1.111. N4.4 I J. I v.04.1,11111 I h• r ii la rlsilt UP* )1% Anal %pl. 111,11 /Z al.I. !Hp", 1.411.% oti ‘I 'V.( 11.4104/11• Ili. 411 • .L ‘1, 1.1.111 1: . 11110mit ge 048 b)(1) (b)(5) (b)(6) r age 049 b)(1) : (b)(5): (b)(6) ge 050 b)(1).(b)(5): (b)(6) Page 051 b)(1) : (b)(5): (b)(6) ge 052 b)(1): (b)(5), (b)(6) Page 053 (b)(1) • (b)(5) • (b)(6) Page 054 (b)(1): (b)(5): (b)(6) Page 055 b)(1): (b)(5): (b)(6) ge 056 b)(1): (b)(5): (b)(6) Page 057 b)(1): (b)(5): (b)(6) Page 058 survive with ' investeki .si tiqed !els than I 1.o r s per mont1i7 Yi.s, we need r:o• Int way we do it new 1 Am the "Godfother" of the I f.,1). Avn 14.c3t the "::islu Sti.kers" wt.cie man "lust ni Asiity" Aviation :rats :nee hem jclievc Le Aiiit was ac tt in May 19RO. 1 lie tar knows how to o cf. 1icher:0..1s. Our Army r.eees 5 pilots pt' r sea: for raft tjlAll: art ;(- .1:1( 1:; M ; honte.lit.11 three in the imit that IL 5 lir: 7e1 :() the A114 . :03. IS :1:an IN% Li 1)1105 3.C1 Seat. :LW% •%,•A‘ 1 ti,viit out Cf Kota soonest. fteptace them with tipc .1 ! tl. 4111:(Iliw Cie Guard after South Kotea 13::S it can cr7t:, L'1 ir$ t .1n41it. 1v...1i eApOn$ Oenel modern arms .) fiuhec.rlectcc: A ;tits In Irani how, plet Mon WI apons Sot.th Koica's Alt Forec can 30...-1;,c pi t‘iir:,:nt ad ttliQut micl and taro plareling system 14.1101k out "%zit X..:1'..a'st.o:nu.r.:.41Ar.ft eontre: and wir Acirrwe. ikkncer Etviol..ons. one to: cad: Corps. 'this wir. curve 3 SPe•liti 01'11a:ions fotcts:cc.-J;ting. support; and traiLing tace for 11::u.re :cade:s. ( let thy stvces ocst of the KiPtcan ii:VA! down. — • ANC-T-V1 • ...- t a 1 ( j 03 /0 2-q- i( October 27, 2003 TO: Gen. John Abizaid Jcrry Drcmcr CC: Gen. Dick Myers Paul Wolfowirz Doug Feith FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ( 4„ SUBJECT: Ramadan Artactre,d is a paper of interest on Ramadan. 'Thanks. Attach. 10/10/03 E-mail on Ramadan in Iraq 107703. 2 Please respond by U17895 /03 Subject: for dr A: ramailart in trara4nAblic ink Panipsi&D for Ltaq-ray trip oborrmatiorts Date r 1 rs z a •0 In twit- Fro ' b)(6) U14J CT Ramadan l 41irl Hamadan is one Of the most bay 1Abstirn holders, focusing on sac-Pace and prayer. This saadloe a mandeeted In eirroci day Moscp,• and en neareen in providing tor PIO, "o->oml bleintrtn riamaden eve yeer begin• or GV.7 Oolotili, end andel as ZeiTO Novena". RaMaOar a a period 01 incroaseb retiooue otiservanc_et faattnii and celebvetons TA raiding tor molt dszens (aixeie s yows old. erd weiv ['Awned *m3 vety elderly) Deqin al daybreak land end If darkiCrot even %SW 34 itla ant faldwed. Thir Issing le /011CW•11 by nioht-tong ming ceiebrsttoris with Oat last meal luta before diron Poodle vall be out In tba crews )kno to Only to Sit t3 041 tr,idi. In shoo me thereon. codews et be protiamallt If vett be the ftrst airs the yenoue reitotous nornmunatos *lc be able in obsirve this rsooknis oixesion noanty eelicL it air con stfeints (npoiNso by Sm.d*rno raga, * HE WENDATION Ms * 30 V" h*°'• .103 toPelfertol the metoritY oI, S/C 0111,0n mliftery en to wound in Iraq have met Rernacien, ft. recontreennec Cat a heOldeior lactshest on Os history of Ramadan Its cuitoms, especied manors In behave:if Of ttra clime and Instrvcscrit for the outliers 0', how lc row', to or perocpare 1, ) wedges eluabona be peppered end cltsoltxesd In al refinery piesonnel Ind contractor Peral'','ila isRue WO ...id 0.1.1, 21 demaean 10 D• aedenased rowww,wil dit•rionity *tic 1/All, Ithe irstith who,* In Mtn Fart 0,.•• ,:stabrettons were controlled by Saddam This makes Coalbon reeved for and undrevenrAng of Ce Importance and holiness of Sas rue rAarogituul lot hos Iraqis eseenle Becctse Co raaanicelebetr ; CW 3 CtOrrIcIIIII 00th day tot days, the ertpnleaket ten heiterre triennia doling the day, and iikpity to pa Wee dIfidpitned ml regto Thus 3,eatIng Ve potential for Increased run-g rat coalidon milnary. Thera wig be leas tank Arid movement during the day apti biecev. e cetetuseone ere herd vas, *Arnow, family and Moods and Ran IhrouphotA the nvoht curlew violation, eli be m i. nurnor,A,• Seissary •nd senlyno•um Monte ....011n••••••II Ian:tosses Cr sbasnese frern thsit *OW ompiey•••• II IoN be IMPortant for Jiif Cvetton nailfory to under/land In**, Clvelomt and kr he Commend to determine new proceiceges/rtaiee to, rerelorce currant pr000dureaMegutattons] for the Matary arid awe public For imam*. I Ii conadarad annimary shows and dIst.spactu to pat. mete or Vito,* v. publt durinfj Co day ugh* hours or CO rut CPA and the Confrviand snoold Woe that the C.omornmant or lief/ Linde: Saddam pnnvded fw Ikvesntcekvbrabona tor the pow. II is LrnpnrtantitCI n•nd diatributinn taS• am , 2rovxonl the 1, 041110n1 3.. 1 liming oi this finliday Os aodnton to 'ninon rnatenals tor Sur military and contact employees Pubic Servoce Annokag*Wienta over tastable lel/view end radio outlets, se wee me printed media, cetekeno to. the public Ina naouial.ons' tor Ma lime pained will be important In pirranang ri:strudarstarxings and Poiret* WIQIIICIOS We rscommend cat theme PSAft be done by env/mewl Of the 17/overran° Ca. Mil of yenta 1140 Pew anforcamern offictels Wnero :rpen)erittee. I I recommonded Inot 00•411csn OIIII•ery woe% •40, Forma Iserlorshet stO/Or•Itt so !not toonitIto, rnotow-y r‘en rt• ,e•t• enh r‘• tow' aispotste In tot, imporlarvi holiday oriebralons ma maim miltary unera may elao wish to boat some CO ebniticet Imes *AT the torimspoopl• however. the inctroaied ciatebraeont and gathelifigS Offer Increased oppontrotes for I.rmctsl IICIft40•C •••••—•-r. PLJP. C INFORMATION caNIPAIGhl r Oft a tA0 00•Orsilbant from the Iraqi Public at Large The ',Wowing Is a compilation ul corTifflanlil arid Insights ehered by a cross section of list* people- men a-id wornon. piolestliOnals. acadenits, current and former oftkee a, and orcknry citrons from venous ;eves of Naos socto-econnmto Sphere colkeled deep Blighdad Jtly 5-11 Mk hew Secec r n contain', D. strongeill end noe1 Oen repeated perspeceVee and ideas presented by My contacts The Iraqi people an, vol I IA • a 1 cont7-L!2 ertromey oonfused and paddy elftamed about whet is ()clog oo They ire not Inferooted In totereng to 'mho. Sports news or Nstory. Our public rsastiocs cembettan mold to peo-Iterani and Inithiur It mu* argot al **genial* ol awl eatql population. Including alias Sunni, Kurd victims, enmnols. Beldhlet. rtOrmel people, and folfgoos Wisdom The honleered hes shilsod winning ea hoer* and maws or las temp people and tepoolng bralmsashrog and atooldos Saddarrik regime enacted cs.iring his twee at M. Currant tiources of accurate mionnalon am limcad and itior Many rumors and much cilsInloimation are noadng around Baghdad and throughout Iraq. It Is onkel to provide accurate and up-so-date iniormadon about ti.sausSon vi trap and plant to she mune Tpae can seedy be nicIllihrd by ladllaang a public infoansillon eamoingn vie nbdia. television. navelwort. and Moot knotrouuty flitsrs a common ben of oommumcalpons Incounvy. Beicouie of the electriody stsdiSon. att Wee tonna of nods are stietnrist to inspired this inionialksn. Ti', Iraqi people are sentry singer to hew official informtton Matted ce mune or mittoettaneout telt I / The Pee* ant eager 10 fie about the Wino* of Saddam and his handronen. heating and enoveng °Moat documents. Wcesding secur.ty documents. dasacing throe Crimes wogld prow* oonagte h eeen oo for he pecipa of Iraq that crimes were cznimniod and welife QO & 10&Q May 10 C041141011 PIOT 01111 (71,111A.1 1 behavior of the past 'aglow 2) It is critical to provide fa Iraq, people treh mformaiton about IN& Planning, 9Pefallone. afid 47da7e. on Pa Progress of the ocPA. reconstniction, political process and situation reporis Pt tie YarloUl sesiort 3) IT is Important to proYlde concerto inlormaison about O's goals *4th. 0CdA. not lust's, trbefato the Iraq, people and dovaiop a democracy 4) Prima* .nlorrnatron about salary ;eve* 10 reausure p00911 01 Co future, lo give people bore that Vary can one clay Ova ln a novfni that can Pa paid through a mortgage, oil have an acceptable lobs Oh acceptable sa/ancie and tha alloy to provide ler shelf tepemee 5) Show the people what e01 be done k Iraq Iv in future. Using Eastern Europe es an ceample. esplatn hOer to*. tempt. have advanced irom almost nothing. 8) Croft ad 1,8Q. people hopo. 701 Soddy. s old collo:wee hey wet Inv better antirAtl be 'meted leo, It they 11)9 esihtt,g a10U(u Nier, 7) 3hun tin Iraqi prom new nureurn Iraq hal proonsearti In Via racing pain, fie Ire000nti mey angry. Ihe hire( euendern Cr "mg, !nor sultanate* process., then lovel of orgaresabon and lack of chaos.. The people in the roe of Iraq, unaware of the poorest n he North. should to shown MOMS, Is manta& tel tare Ines can and all gat batter. Ii atirrunery imivrtn.nt Wi wet enrItIvr•vr wit kaqi noofilo trawl Swirsom &I to ...two taml.. ho* he idiwe Com, arid g.try. Ceoce &gam). iho haul people only heal turmoil and Mow • few personal alone% thus ill importun in thaw Vie fultmegnItxts or Sadden. airocilyes. 9) Explain Saddam's bad intentions, plots. and any and how he made Oro Iraqi people suffer in order to make 1111.71 believe ea UN embargo the main came for tnew etinortrig. Show Man it was not the faun of the inteensiloeue community or V. embargo, but Saddam who rem to Name 10! Weapon* of mess OestruebOn were owned and used try SiOdant. a FVOVIM tact So 0 you SSgt, USAF NCO1C. USDP Executive Secretariat r°41 This may contain information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 10/22/2003 xi. 2o 103 MEMORANDUM FOR AMB L. PAUL BREMER GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID SUBJECT: Prosecuting Iraqis for Security Offenses Against Coalition It is important that people who attack Coalition forces in Iraq - or who are caught in possession of Manpads, RPGs or other special category weapons - are prosecuted and that the trials are prompt and fair. The prosecutions should help discourage these acts, if the trials and sentences in cases of conviction) are well- publicized. The fairness of the process will help instruct Iraqis as to good practice. We need to ensure that the offenses are clearly explained, carry appropriate penalties and are known to the public. As for whether security offenses against the Coalition are tried by Iraqi or Coalition tribunals, I can see some advantages to our taking on the task ourselves. We should be able to move promptly and give the prosecutions appropriately high priority. I know there are arguments for letting the Iraqis do it, but I am concerned that the process seems to be moving so slowly. Please let me know what your plans are (coordinate between the two of you) for getting such people prosecuted, on what timetable, and with whom in charge. Please also address the issues involved in detaining people who are convicted, who should hold them and where and what happens after we recognize an Iraqi government. I would like at least a preliminary response quickly. t = t U17375 /03 Page 098 :b)(5) Page 099 (0)(5) Page 100 (b)(5) OCT 17. 201)3 9:32AM O. 52 LPB HAS SEEN 4:33 PM 03101 7 - TO: Jerry Bremerr GEN John Abizaid CC: Paul Wolfowitz Doug Feith GEN Myers FROM: Donald Rumsfel(*, DATE: October 15, 2003 SUBJECT: I talked to Cohn Powell today. He raised the subject of troops f1i Pakistan and Bangladesh. Given the flap between the Governing Council and 'Thzkey, the question is, will the Governing Council request troop from Bangladesh and Pakistan, or are they going to oppose having any Muslim troops in the country? (b)(5) (b)(5) Let's discuss this. Thanks. 12}iitita2 101543.02 Please respond by: U17226 /03 October 14, 2003 TO: (7C: Jerry Bremer Paul WuIfownz Doug Feith Dt'utztId Rums!'c1d I . (.7 i( .. SUBJECT: Business Development Committee Mt reeollection have Qin.. ,ori of a business development cominatee. Is a designed to t: stabil NI I ground rules to rapidly approvt: and foreign compartiec to work in Iraq? II sem% it, me lhat v.:: need l u )1, :d permission for N.% ">. to facilitate that to get some stimulus to the economy and also provide model, l'or Itaqi inbinesses. Any time:gilts? 'Minks t 'HP Pleme revond by t" ()diIher 13, 20113 TO. Jerry liImcT FRON1! R11111•1 .,:i . 131Et: I': (.ism;. .\ Attached is a memo he ; (1,m't you Inke Cramer sent me, which 1 found inicresiiq intd compelling. 1001,, oi it and tell ine t%hat you thinl,. 1.4e s talk about it. Regards, Attach )3 (J.trne,r mem, : (ma) : Serernbcr 29. 2.003 Ms Secretary As I look at our problems in Iraq plice them 13 three major categones. Szcunty, Sui.eveignty, and Time Avadab. .e. Fe: what it's worn he are r.y bnef thoughts starring with the Time Available. r - fr Time Ayailable: It alpearii :hal mos: of the projects *c have planned foi Iraq arc on a time table to be completed it. a yei - ix or e9S. This is excellent considiTing the magutude of the task tic:AV:Cf, when viewed in thr. same sandbox as ,loraing Presidential election. that time 'able is :oo short. By March. we r eed to ha‘.e. at least, the appearance of completion cr near cotnpletion of major asks. In other words, tet's deNclop a six month strategy of -near completion" for those areas mat are the tr.o5t padcally volatile. I.e., government. and secuntyi aw enforcer-Jen:. lt we take this approach and attack with robust. deolicauxt Tiger Tcabis *e can achieVC remarkable results by March. believe that any cecisien af'.er March, no r now good or io* viable, will be cnucized as 'an Adzninistration iletts- ,en made under duress and pres:o.ne". Sovereignty; 1 bet'cve ferry Bren-Tr's 7 step plan for government is ,o) -teal and correct but :t is too slow arik%ar can c4e a half-axp no*. Continue w th Jerry's Filar but by Decerrbe r declarc the Cnrrzninee of 2P a "Provisional Goi.e.inir.ent.- The Prov;sional Govcrnrocnt would remain under the oversight of the C S but would nave increased powe: and aulhorit such as A budget. (whrch is • lsible and auditable), nom:hal:on and approval of Reconstruction projects, and poontizr.ticro of. security areas (to include selection of restaUorung ioeat Ats of the new Iraq: Army) etc Provisional statts v. title keeping us in charge give; tern a rnentle of real tiuthosity more irrportsuiCy a voice in their own future and makes them &reedy responsible for its outcome. > Security: TAC up.)dular apprown with both the National Police and tclmt Amy There are 18 Provisional areas in lrag (I/ provinces plus Baghd: d). The • :".• %:".• three Kurdish proi inces axe not a sect.nty problem. so the focus should be the remaining 15 /multi are) begin a pr3grarn that upgrades and provides inclividuai training to police and regidur Array (one infantry battalion per _ province) in 5 provinces per quarter. The trairt.ing won't be great, but it w II be sufficiert. completion of each f provinces. put the U.S. Forces Into garnson and only use tnern as emergency reactor. forces. Let the Iraqi police and Army be trie Nisth:c securty force. C mtracr this effort. make it a turn key operation with award 'en for achieving the desired time table. Use a pro.'en contractor s,:.ch as MYRI. to does this type thur.g world-wide, on son r otace with superb results After the contractor has Imished each of the five pi- co.:tic:es, place 3 small COSIVAgen: a.' U.S. military advisors with each Amy corripar.y. and each police detachment. The advisors would he responsib!, for \ their collect% e tramir g gained thmut. ,h day opezations. If we do this. by end of March u el': hoe a erect:bit governmental structure that :5 recomzable to the Iraqi pee9/e and w e'll het.e Iraq faces on the security effort or the two-thirds of the country. A:I of this is doable. 1: sirr.ply means that we need to: Sharply fcc.is our effort, change from the ttgntly centralized over controlling process we now hoe. anti filially we need tc trust that the Iraqis ("An do this. As 1 stated previa :sly T.E. Lawrence had it right.' It is better that they ao it imperfectly than that you do it perfectly. For i: i their country and your bine here is limited." Over to you, itnalks for Me opportunity to correspond. cc"-- 1VC) October 15. 21103 )• .1;1) . ur;iitcr icn. r, John Miiitid Pop, 1-eoll 1),matil Ittunsivld Si 114, 0 AnIt ,s4ri r: , 071111 the 4 i1 theIrt :11:11.). I.k J' .s 1 V. ,illtIOT if %%e utiaid ;:.%nsider 41 t •.S. di % ision reCr4111 .1110 ii II .1 %,1 forii Ler ••4 ,14.!iersl:t en. quarter 1. his %%mid he a strntitius e hot II %%mild 1r%1⁄4 It about HI brigades atinuatr%. Evenii‘,‘: did half th.d. %,%.ndit Iv .1 z:ooLl \• I let' mid II, ism,* I kat is %Wit! trained at: artri trom reertny.,l1bi ioriner soldiers. in Croaila tta. tun:, • I, Pit vi* It sr, 11,(1. ). - ..tot hr i4, 20u3 10. R.ct,t,cit CC: Jerry 'hefty wouowitt FROM. Donald 1. as atea.T4 the &be Arena a 4ciagJ alL plysei lot r. sa pow ‘. that is satianatta (sou:. awls a; to wart b) i turfy avasklulary of am that have tot beta ttals etapotreret ea:c1 the W aal= "fa A Qaiart Iraqi potax force. PtiValy WOW asal Cylrippael. WA, 1:14 a/r3)o MO JON A.Men =Waal We pafOITINST. Zech a iceVaic Iera•le deeled •Aceemeeteepbel, e de vg:ea i4 Gcatmilieg Mc badectU ye repateft !Oat lera,kada4 renames laca ia, coolC bc arc fcs $2 Me 4.) ex, at zog tan coplosyd Laygtusi, dose te, lac sisal:ow alau arc wok& otat thasc dm art oc :Se bcaL staba.2y stria &a L.este.r7 urayaskel s-g•rahm4 qualst-• te:c.Pri :marl uern2av a El Saa•-agtof Octg a pcnod gfictg acauggoat •atutc AO* tatalgcata Arra) Lcuir co the beg! i up.dly Turco* etc tuie .o...:udati ,f , araCi) • ! fOrtimat panne foci Marvels- UM : baa ben meg tettrt la 191 13 rgsma4cau ittacas =WA * kieritatatoa to slop Cac dwace at PAL.; fcur =was Oa cato Sitialcisa mom areal torp wastratitlat ID OK UtatO6 Slat* fa bow tioviti so ban* to Ott U S an1 lino:hi:as fog gout ems. A NCO. et•Powercgf Salvt•SOrSt tsc country gm peau Lithi 19IS cad r fut. sacbcpaSsrt, Jcr.comazy los nausa a prtf,cresi 444 • c.ocase ts Toc4• tLLj Air ra ,e bat) Its u,r va:laa 1oFO Sone Ica our Luc tag" fruf agna our (b)(6) Uctoher IS, 2903 .1vm lircmer CC: Paul Wilifo‘t ;/ Doug rcith FR( )NI: Donald Rum, teld S : TEC I Article Attadieti it; article by a protessor from NatienalI. eaw UniveNtty that Ifound t. itelk.-1;rii: I think there i., merit to some cif his thoughts. 111.4.h. r;trovrz . ' led Si. re' kpr;Illi 1,1' iuhiiiiiiji 141 I Vigil ivpilm, lb U si a //7"--6/2./c)c6- ' , .. .„1 .N1011ANI 31 CNI 1,012 AMR I i I<( )NI I 4,;.11;11,4 I. 1:L;1111, I licik:r Sc,:reinr\ I J 1 ( I It:11'11,141n Fut I -- -- )11 r 3 ri it' alias:1101 t% as klone Atati. It may ix. of some %Ise ‘ . 11tir ( PeP.PonfIcl. though We\ 1.1):1‘ 4)1 ail ) (/ o ,11%/%1C1.1110:1: , ti 2003 • Ramadan 4:••• tht: ,,t \;11..litn And \ IU and A t.litatut.tatt, ehmige; lsOvivtior I: ill.: do ut .1.1 III% I t. 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Ow day in ‘‘11 . 1t:li tt:vt. -akti I Pic Outan N11111,3inmati, t fl It .fin Or I . iS I halib;g1Vitig tNt+...110‘ct 2 tvilt tII 111 4111.%itt the tlittki .t thrve day Itoltkistv vckbratitigthi old ktilinmAtlar- both im 01% e itt:r.. alet Prevared I. .CDR ISA NrsA: >age 122 b)(1); (b)(5): 1.4(d) age ILS D)(1): (b)(5): 1.4(d) 0 3/ 06 - .Z5 11:32 AM TO: Jerry Bremer CC: Paul Wolfowitz FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DATE: October 2, 2003 SUBJECT: I received your memo on the training of the police from October 1. Abizaid's real concern is not with who does the training. He agrees that civilian police experts should do that. His convein ib dust the CPA lacks the resources and administrative capacity at the present time to adequately support the activity - the police, the training and the like. Even those already on duty. Their equipment is old and inadequate. They need police cars, radios and the like, 1 am convinced that engaging Abizaid fast is the right thing to do. Thanks. Di4R:azn 1 00203 43 Please respond by; • .FROM S.7f EA AMSA 7003 00/ET P,..8,No eieopesc,-: -eepowieelsoma. 9244 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October 2, 2003 MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET EIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHAIRMAN OF THE JO/NT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUBJECT: Iraq Stabilization Group (U) Pursuant to our conversation, in order to strengthen interagency support to the Department of Defense and the Coalition Provisional Authority and to help pzepare for the next phase of the reconstruction effort in Iraq, we are creating several interagency working cells. These cells will be responsible for Iraq-related issues across a broad range of areas. 444-- Earh e'en will be chaired by a Deputy Assistant to the President and will focus on the following: • politics/governance (Bob Blackwill) • cuuuter-terrorism/jihadiat activities (Fran Townsend); • economics (Gary Edson); and • media/message issues (Anna Perez). 40;4. I ask that each of you provide an appropriate representative to these cells at the level of Under Secretary. -4144— Frank Miller will continue to chair the Executive Steering Group (ESG) which coordinates support to daily activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. 41b)t-i- Condoleerza Rice Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs CONFI AL Claccifie Reason- ezza Rice ;.I AR!! \ I CA ApSA on/sT.71.4.,No.61Anossn77 P 3 Rich Armitage Paul Wolfcwitz Steve Hadley Lewis Libby Joel Kaplan iohn McLaughlin Pete Pace . Ambaasador Jerry Bremer Reuben Jeffery COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD October 9, 2003 MEMORANDUM TO: CITF-7 Chief of Staff- MGen (Set,) Ion A. Gallinetti, USMC USACE Iraqi Provisional Command - BC Robert L. Davis, USA SUBJECT: Kuwaiti Generating Equipment Any information provided from Washington on potential availability in Kuwait of portable (3-5 MW) generating equipment is to be routed to CPA and not to be directly discussed with the Government of Kuwait. Patric F Kennaly Chielcif Staff OCT. S. 21.)3 I %FA1 C. P.E F. 2 0210°9-?2 MEMO TO: Secretary Romsfeld FROM: Paul W011owitz CC: Ambassador Bremer Genera l Myers General Ablzaid SUBJECT: Your Snowflake on Electrical Generators DATE: September 23, 2003 Dori, We contacted Brent Scowcroft's office, who identified the Kuwaiti gentleman you spoke with as Mr. (h)(6) We got in touch with Mr. (b)(6) avai d he explained that there were several 3-5MW portable generator, . c in Kuwait and other nearby countritta and they could be transported to Basra, if we needed them. gave us the name of the Minister of Electricity in Kuwait who woul be se point of contact .1(bX6) (b)(5) C\rc. (S.6 rj ( _ / S Or. 8. nO3 1.37FM NO / • = 12.2. OVP. September 2003 TO: Gen. John Abizaid Jerry Bremer CC; Gen. Dick Myer' Paul Wolfowitz FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld SUBJECT: Electric Generators As I think I mentioned to one or both of you, I was told that Kuwait. Bahrain and other countries In the Oulf have five-megawatt portable, movable electric generators that would light up a whole city. They are there in the region, they are not being used, and if we went to them and told them we needed them, they could be available. I was told this by a fellow from Kuwait in a meeting Brent Scowcroft had. Please tell me what we can do to help you track that down and figure it out, if in fact it Is something we ought to take advantage of. Thanks. DRIV.46 orikent Please respond by 1 01 3 1 03 A,•_,`,\ 4 10VineirmoitimPittel9il SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON. DC 20301-1000 OCT 9 2003 MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY COMMANDER, US, CENTRAL COMMAND SUBJECT: Clarification of Guidance • This is to clarify previous guidance, issued on 2I2025Z JUL 03, subject, "Radiation Sources in Iraq." • USCENTCOM is responsible for locating, packaging, transporting and securing any radiation source material that is not properly contained, adequately secured, or in the positive cu.itudy of trained personnel. CPA should assist, as appropriate • USCENTCOM is authorized and encouraged to use Iraqi Ministry of Science and 'technology (MoST) personnel to suppon expeditious act-vitopliblonciit of this mission. CPA andfor LISCENTCOM should provide oversight in these instances. • The radiation source material should be transported to Tuwaitha, Location B and transferred to Task Force Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which will package and prepare the material for removal from country • This is a priority tasking. Loose radiation sources must not be' left unattended and susceptible to acquisition by forces with interests iniminal tn thr inte.rests of the US., the Coalition and Iraqi people. U16831'0/03 i I ) ))Aki NO. 353 2 071017-12_ 1 October 11, 2003 TO: G. Dick Myers Paul Wolfowitz Doug Feith CC: (en. Abizaid Jerry Bremer LTG John Craddock FROM: Donald Rtunsfeld r Ol\• SUBJECT: Meeting on Campaign Plan I would like to schedule a meeting, where we have plenty of time for Abizald and Bremer to jointly present their campaign plans. I would prefer it on Friday or Saturday of this week, or if needed, on Monday of next week. We need to allow sufficient time for good discussion — at least 2 1/2 hours. Thanks. ONIA 10150345 Please respond by U17224 /03 )300, 1-'22- coAuTtoN pRovisioNAL nun ioRrry BAGI1DAD October 4, 2003 FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM: L Paul Bremer III. Ailgisl tr t" 1 SUBJECT. Update on Iraqi Media Network (IMN) Activities I wanted to advise you on a number of steps we have and will be taking to make !MN's TV programming more appealing to viewers, more professional in its approach, and more directly supportive of CPA objectives. Among the recent developments: • On Thursday, October 2, IMN began the first in a series of half-hour programs entitled, "Meet the Minister." Minister of Culture Mofeed al-Jazacri discussed his goals in preserving the cultural history of Iraq and trying to revitalize Iraq's artistic and cultural communities after years of repression. Future segments will cover all 24 additional Iraqi ministries. • This weekend, we send an initial contingent 0116 IMN employees Los an intensive two- ( week training session at Dubai Media City on the art and craft of television production. Training will take place at state-of-the-art facilities in Dubai, with the active support of thc government of Dubai. • We are also currently hosting a multi-functional team of specialists from Dubai who are helping us select future trainees and assessing local conditions, so that all of the training our people receive in Dubai is tailored to our existing facilities and equipment. • Also this weekend, we are having a first-ever gathering of IMN station managers from across the country. The purpose will be to explain our new programming strategy, and to discuss topics such as local program origination. • Plans for a new programming schedule arc on track. Special Ramadan programming will begin on or about October 26, when Ramadan begins, and, at the request of the Secretary of State, a virtually all-new lineup of programs will debut on November 23, when Ramadan ends. That accelerated "re-launch" of IMN will replace the one we'd originally been planning for January UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED • In addition to new programming. the "new !MN" will feature an expanded program day; new-look, new concept newscasts; more and better public affairs programs; more and better public affairs announcements; new faces, and a whole new on-air "look-and-feel." • As an integral part of that, IMN TV will also take on a new name - "Al Iraquiya." It literally means "The Iraqi" - as in "The Iraqi TV." The name was chosen deliberately to stake out the same ground as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya -- as a major regional TV broadcaster. • .[he network will have a new logo, depicting two rivers - the Tigris and Euphrates - and a uniquely Iraqi Arabic font, in blue and steel gray. The logo and color scheme will infuse every aspect of promotion and advertising. • We have engaged the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency for a publicity campaign aimed at generating excitement about the new programming. It will be timed to peak for the re-launch in late November. • In addition, we've hired an Iraqi survey firm highly recommended by the State Department to conduct two highly-focused random sample audience surveys for us, the first over the next two weeks, before Ramadan and its new program schedule, and the second in December, after all of the foregoing has taken place. Our purpose is to determine if our improvement strategies have worked, and make more changes if they haven't • We have also commissioned propagation field studies designed to reveal the actual signal strength of IMN transmitters in the South, where powerful Iranian cross-border signals have been a concern. Armed with the results, we will know if we need to beef up our own transmission capabilities in that region. • We plan a similar field strength survey of the entire country to ensure we are getting our signals out loud and clear nationwide. • Later this month, my Director of Strategic Communications will be heading to Mosul and points north to ensure that IMN signals will be restored in the north, where Saddam Hussein's propaganda from Baghdad was not welcomed. He will he co-coordinating with the 101'` Airborne, whose leadership has taken an active interest in TV and radio transmission. • We believe the UK government is on the verge of allocating some $20 million US in order to beef up program production and transmission in Basrah and expand spoils programming nationwide targeted at young males a particularly critical audience segment. • We are making progress on re-starting the Iraqi Satellite Channel, on the Arabsat direct- to-home satellite. Satellite distribution is what has made Al-Jazeera such a powerful and influential channel. It's important Co understand, however, that going up on this satellite will mean substantial outlays of funds - perhaps up to an additional $20 million dollars UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED per year because the program rights we have purchased to this point are for terrestrial broadcast only. Those contracts will he adjusted upward if we reach the larger audiences tuning in on satellite. • Eventually, however, we will have to be on satellite. Satellite dishes are constantly sprouting on Iraqi rooftops. We estimate that in 18 months time, Iraq - like most other Middle Eastern countries - will be a satellite TV market. We need to be ready well in advance. • There are other challenges ahead: expanding news and public affairs programming in Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah, expanding programs and public service announcements on governance and civil society, and beginning the information campaign in advance of the constitution-writing and electoral process. We believe that exposing these advances to the larger Arab world will have a profound impact. Arabs watching other Arabs go to the polls will inevitably raise the question. "Why not her e?" . • Finally, and significantly, we have announced on the Defense Contracting Command's website our intention to re-compete the IMN contract currently held by SAIC. The objective is a "world class radio and television network" to be established by the end of calendar year 2004. The successful contractor must "include the assurance that indigenous Iraqi personnel arc schooled, coached, practiced and proven in the principles and techniques of their craft" - and ensure "IMN leads all mass media in providing comprehensive, accurate, fair, and balanced news and public affairs to the Iraqi people," I will keep you advised of significant benchmarks. Cc: Secretary Powell Dr. Rice UNCLASSIFIED