UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00416
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: LPBREMER
DRAFTED: LKHALIL
CLEARED: MOSULLIVAN, TFITZGERALD, BGWEBER
VZCZCBGI286
PP RUE- KJCS RUSHC RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUCAACC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB 40416/01 1271007
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
F 0E1007Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0E35
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIOR:TY C795
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000418
-11V41.1944-1414- '
STATE FOR NEA/N3A, PM FOR PMAT
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, PTER, MARR, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1078: May 4 Governing Council Meeting with
Ambassador Bremer on Fallujah
447 , a44. Summary: On May 4, 2004 Ambassador Bremer and LTG
Sanchez briefed the Iraq i Governing Council (IGC) on the
current situation in Fa.Llujah per their request. The IGC
voiced alarm and criticism over the decision to form the
Fallujah Brigade. On May 3, the Governing Council had
issued a statement on Fallujah (text :Al para 8). End
Summary.
2. 16196M4. Ambassador Bremer met with the full IGC on May 4
in a stecial session regarding the situation in Fallujah.
He ben by explaining to the council the circumstances
under which the Fallujah Brigade was formed. Due to the
desire for al: involved to find a peaceful solution, the
Coalition implemented a unilateral ceasefire and decided to
consult with local leaders before it would resume offensive
military operations tc root out insurgents. Based upon the
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00418

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 03418
recommendations of the local imam, the Marine commander
worked with local leaders to form the brigade and install
General Salih as head of the brigade.
3. +NW* Bremer reassured the 1GC that the Fallujah
brigade was an auxiliary unit which was not part of the
Iraqi Armed Forces. It was formed under exceptional
circumstances and it would be dissolved immediately upon
completion of its mission. It was not envisioned to be a
model for dealing with future security problems in Iraq.
4. 4.6.6Q4.-LTG Sanchez then reported that May 3 was the
first peaceful day since sustained violence had erupted in
Fallujah. The Marines would maintain operational control
and oversee the leadership of the brigade. Bremer,
acknowledging that there had been problematic information
that had come out on General Salih, announced that General
Latif would be installed above him.
5. .419191#)- Many IOC members reacted negatively to the
formation of the Fallujah brigade, the Shia
representatives in particular. They stated that it not
only set a bad precedent for solving security problems, but
it also compromised efforts to get other local militias
under control. It rewarded insurgents and terrorists for
their violent acts.
6. -Wrii144- Governing Council members reported that Iraqis
were fearful that the Ba'ath party and Saddam Hussein might
be reinstated into power and warned that this impression
might further sectarian strife. Other members questioned
why other provinces could not form their own local force to
provide for their own security in a similar way.
7. 44.16:16). Bremer reacted very firmly to the talk about
reinstating Hussein and exaggerations that it would
inevitably lead to sectarian strife. He stated that the
United States Government had not sent its forces to die in
Iraq in order to reinstate the previous regime. He
welcomed the notion, expressed in the IGC's May 3
statement, that Iraqis should have more responsibility for
their security. But as events of the past month had shown,
the Iraqi security forces were not up to the task of
quelling the violence in Fallujah. Coalition Forces were
forced to use creative means to end the insurgency with
little bloodshed. He concluded by noting that this new
force would be put to the test. If it proved unable to
disarm combatants, and kill or capture insurgents, the
Marines would need to step back in to do the ;ob. Bremer
warned the GC that, if this scenario were to unfold, he
would be looking no those who opposed the creation of this
UNCLAS BAGHLAD 00418

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 0018
new force to support action by the Marines fully.
S. ;U) The IGC had issued a statement regarding the
Fallujah force the Previous day. Begin text:
The best way to serve security in Iraq is to support the
position of the Ministerial Committee on National Security
and its aim, within the orientations of the Governing
Council, to strengthen peace and security in Iraq in
general and in Al Fallujah in particular. Subsequently,
the Governing Council supports the position of the
Ministerial Committee not to consider the force that was
formed in Al Fallujah part of the New Iraqi Army.
The Governing Council condemns and cautions against any
attempts to go into the direction of relying on forces that
spilled the b:ood of the Iraqi people under the former
regime, especially the forces of the Republican Guard,
Saddam's Fedayeen and the remnants of tne defunct regime.
The Governing Council emphasizes again the need for an
Iraoi solution to all the security problems and stresses
the importance of consulting with the Governing Council and
with its security committee in these matters.
End Text.
BREMER
ET
#0418
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD C0418

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: JCSTER
DRAFTED: MSCHROEDER
CLEARED: JNORMAN, JWEAVER, TBEESON, KBACKES, PRILEY, JAORESTO
VZCZCBGI340
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB #0424/01 1271950
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061950Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0843
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0803
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 00C424
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EFIN, ETD, EPET, PGOV, PHUM, 12
SUBJECT: CPA 1088: ADMINISTRATOR'S WEEKLY ESSENTIAL
SERVICES REPORT: APRIL 24-30, 2004
1. Summary. The Essential Services Report is one of
four administrator's reports produced weekly by CPA-
Baghdad. CPA-Washington distributes all four
administrator's weekly reports - Security, Essential
Services, Economic, and Governance - witn graphics via
email. The Economic, Governance, and abridged versions of
the Security and Essential Services reports will be posted
after 48 hours on the CPA website, www.cDa-iraq.org. The
full Security and Essential Services reports remain
sensitive but unclassified. Headlines of paragraphs 3-3
ref1ect goals in the coalition provisional authority
strategic plan. End summary.
2.011:0104 Highlights
-- The seven-day average ;April 24-30) of peak electricity
production was 4,070 MW.
-- Since May 2003, CPA has reinstated 344,102 cell phone
subscribers.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424

UNC:AS BAGHDAD 00424
-- The Ministry of Cil met the coalition Provisional
Authority goal of 15 days of supply of fuel nationwide for
kerosene.
Provide Electricity Services chat Meet National Needs
3..1-1 3480}-. CPA tasks: Improve generating capacity to 6,000 MW
by June 1, 2004; fully implement policy on allocation of
electrical power; publish draft of long term strategy;
minimize sabotage and improve security.
The seven-day average (April 24-30) of peak electricity
production was 4,070 MW, an increase of 5.5 percent from
the previous week. On April 26, peak production hit a high
for the week at 4,374 MW. The spring generator maintenance
of several units has recently been completed, which is
contributing to the increase in cutput. However,
maintenance will not be finished for several weeks.
-- The seven-day average (April 24-30) total production of
electrical energy was 80,703 MWh per day, an increase of
3.5 percent from the previous week. On April 29, the total
hours of electrical energy peaked for the week at 85,144
MWh.
-- This past week, an average of 405 MW (12 generators) of
generating capacity was on forced (unplanned) outage, and
an average of 1,429 MW (29 generators) was on scheduled
outage. 5 (400 Kv) and 9 (132 Kv) transmission lines are
currently out of service.
-- The following chart presents the daily electric power
consumption broken down among the North, Central (including
Baghdad), and South regions. Per day during the reporting
period, the North, which represents 35 per cent of the
total population, consumed an average of 810 MW or 21
percent of total power consumption. The Central region,
which represents 44 per cent of the total population,
consumed 2,394 MW or 63 percent of total power. The South,
which represents 17 percent of the total population,
consumed 599 MW or 16 percent of total electricity
consumption.
Reconstruct Communications and Postal Systems
4..+6 , 18€4- CPA tasks: Build Iraa's First Responder Network;
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424
establish independent regulatory agency; upgrade Iraqi
telephone and postal company (ITPC) network for
interoperability; build transmission component data network
for Iraq, including international gateways; restructure
ITPC and its business operations; upgrade and modernize
postal systems; upgrade ITPC outside plant for increased
subscriber capacity and use.
-- Since May 2003, CPA has reinstated landline telephone
service for 178,840 subscribers in Baghdad. Flooding at
telephone exchange centers during the past week and
subsequent repair prevented any new subscribers.
Furthermore, cell statistics were not available this week
because of the holiday.
-- The following paragraphs delineate the number of
landline and cell phone subscribers in Iraq, and compare
them to pre-war estimates. The chart below shows the
number of active landline subscribers in April 2003, the
current number of active landline subscribers, the number
of landline subscribers reinstated post-conflict (since May
2003), and the number of formerly active landline
subscribers who remain without service (excluding the three
Northern governorates).
-- The three major cell phone companies in Iraq (Asia
Cell, Iraqna, and Atheer in the North, Central, and South
respectively) continue to enroll new cell phone
subscribers. Currently, in Mosul, Sulaymaniyah, and
(irkuk, there are 153,000 cell phone subscribers. In
Baghdad, there are 134,030 cell phone subscribers; and in
Basra, Al Kut, Amarah, Samawah, and Nasiriyah there are
45,102 cell phone subscribers. Two legacy companies, Sana
Tel and Korek, operate in Sulaymaniyah and Arbil,
respectively. Sana Tel has 12,000 subscribers. Korek's
total is unavailable at this time. Cell phone subscribers
total 344,102.
-- There ar now 761,440 active landline telephone
subscribers in Iraq, compared to 833,000 subscribers pre-
war. The total number cf telephone subscribers in Iraq,
including the cell phone subscribers, is 1,105,542, which
is 32.8 percent greater than the number of active landline
subscribers pre-war. Cell phone service was very limited
pre-war.
-- The penetration race the number of active landline
telephone subscribers as a percentage of the population) is
2.94 percent (using an estimated population of 25.9
million).
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424
-- The following chart shows the percentage of operational
telephone subscribers compared to the number of active
subscribers in April 2003.
-- The following map and table show the penetration rate
for cell phone users based on current availability from the
cell phone companies. Note: the map and table only
includes areas where cell phone service currently exists.
Improve Quality and Access to Healthcare
B. -(4.01M#)- CPA tasks: Develop health care organizations,
management, and infrastructure; train health care
professionals; secure system; public health;
pharmaceuticals logistic support; strategic communications.
-- The Ministry of Health (MOH) continues to operate a 24
hour Operations Center with connectivity to its facilities
throughout the country. The Ministry is coordinating the
reopening of the hospitals in Najaf and Falluja and is
preparing to address any medical issues arising from
displaced persons that may occur in Falluja or other areas
of the country. CPA officials met with the Marine' medical
contingent and validated the requirements for reopening the
Falluja Hospital. They established direct links for
coordinating military and medical assistance to the Falluja
area.
-- The medical situation in Falluja remains stable. The
MOH is able to respond to medical needs in the event combat
action intensifies or there is a need to evacuate non-
combatants from the area. The MOH is assisting the
coalition in planning for the evacuation contingency along
with Ministries of Trade, Public Works, and Transportation.
-- The work on the shortages in pharmaceuticals across the
country continues. Delivery of the initial $5 million
purchase should begin within the next few weeks. The
befense Logistics Agency Procurement Team conducted "hands-
on" training on the $13 million purchase from international
sources with, deliveries arriving in-country by the end of
the month. Intermediate solutions to resolve procurement
and distribution problems have been initiated with the
creation of special teams focusing on pharmaceuticals and
appliances. Long-term plans include integrating drug
requirements at the user level into a comprehensive demand
driven model. This will help match purchased medical
supplies and pharmaceuticals to she demand. The third
emergency purchase of approximately $10-15 million in
pharmaceuticals will fill the critical needs as determined
by the governorates.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424
-- The Minister cf Health presided over a ribbon cutting
for a state-of-the-art Emergency Room in the Baghdad
Teaching Hospital in Medical City. The 22 bed emergency
room was upgraded and equipped through a cooperative effort
between the Ministry of Health and the Italian Red Cross.
Provide Food Security for All Iraqis
6. (. 1 3.1341i- CPA tasks: Enhance capacity of Ministry of
Agriculture; assure supply of inputs; strengthen research
system; ensure adequate stocks for Public Distribution
System (PDS); monitor food security; hand over
administration of system in the north; initiate reform of
rations basket; environmental initiatives.
-- The Ministry of Trade (MOT) and World Food Program
(WFP) are combining their separate procurement actions into
a comprehensive, integrated Allocation Plan that will
schedule the timing and entry corridors of the PDS focd
commodities over the next several months. The allocation
plan will take into consideration population statistics and
ration needs, logistics issues, and security concerns.
-- Temporary shortages occurred recently for rice and tea.
Rice was delayed in arriving at Umm Qasr (several ships
have now arrived) and there were some problems regarding
offloading that are being addressed. Procurement actions
necessary tO address the September/October 2003 draw down
of tea stock levels delayed the delivery of tea by one
month. CPA is addressing these shortages by making up
arrears of rice in subsequent months and by adjusting the
per capita ration of tea. In May, rice will begin to be
stockpiled throughout the country and the same for tea in
June. Other isolated shortages, for example in Nasiriyah
in the Governorate of ChiQar, occurred because of
transportation security concerns. These are being overcome
by assigning security to truck ccnvoys.
-- Capacity building continues under several initiatives,
as the CPA and MOT prepare for the handover. These include
1) procurement; 2) establishment of a logistics unit, which
is oeing done in conjunction with WFP support in Rome,
while setting up a facility in Baghdad; and 3)
communications, to set up a high frequency radio link
between Baghdad, all governorates, all border crossing
points, and at UMT Qasr. Based on these initiatives, CPA,
WPP, and MOT will develop an outline of key future actions
to guide investment decisions and work planning after the
handover.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424
-- The following chart shows the current PDS stocks and
scheduled commodity arrivals as a percentage of total
requirements from April until transition on July 1, The
CPA goal is to provide sufficient ration stocks for July,
plus a three-month buffer. On the graph below, 100 percent
of opening stocks in each commodity category indicates that
this goal has been achieved. CPA has procured substantial
additional shipments of most food basket commodities; they
are not shown as these shipments will arrive after July 1.
-- Note: Oil for Food (OFF) unconfirmed contracts are
those contracts for which a valid letter of credit exists
but no shipping documentation has yet been received by the
Oil for Food coordination center. As OFF contracts are
fulfilled they are replaced by MOT and WFP procurement.
Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure
7. 4.68.4.- CPA tasks: Production/exports; product supply;
security; structural reform.
-- The graph below shows the daily crude oil production in
Iraq over the past nine months. The dashed black line is
the current production target goal of 2.5 million barrels
per day (MBPD).
-- For the week of April 24-30, the estimated average
total crude oil production was 2.43 MBPD (,46 MBPD in the
south and 1.946 MBPD in the north). The average crude oil
export for the past 30 days was 1.55 MBPD. The average
price received for crude oil exports was approximately $26
per barrel.
-- Three small civilian boats attempted to attack the Al
Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal (ABUT) and the Khwar Al Amaya
Offshore Oil Terminal (KAAOT) on April 24. One boat
(headed for the KAAOT) was intercepted by the US Navy and
blew itself up before reaching the terminal. Two boats
approached the ASOT and were fired at by security
personnel. These two boats exploded away from the
terminal, knocking out power to ABOT and damaging a
Japanese tanker that had just arrived to begin receiving
crude oil. The Japanese vessel sailed away, and exports
began again on April 26.
-- Crude production in the south was impacted as a result
of the April 24 suicide boat attacks on the offshore oil
terminals. Since crude exports from the Al Easrah Cff shore
Oil Terminal were interrupted, the crude tanks remained
full, and production had cc be reduced. Production has
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424
since improved.
-- The following table shows the four main fuels in Iraq
(diesel, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas [LPG], and
gasoline), the estimated total national daily demand for
each, and the percentage of fuel supply that is on hand
(weekly average) out of total demand. Liquefied petroleum
gas is down because the South Gas Plant was down for four
days due to power problems, but is operational again.
-- The graph below shows the total daily supply (domestic
production plus imports) for each of the four refined fuel
products as a percentage of estimated domestic demand over
the past six months.
-- Completed repairs of the 22" pipeline (Bayji to
Mushada) on April 25. A faulty valve in the south and a
damaged pipeline in the north have reduced crude oil flow
to the Daura Refinery. GRD RIO and Iraqi Pipeline Company
personnel are addressing the concerns and will provide
estimated completion dates soon. Daura Refinery has enough
crude on hand to continue to operate through April 30
without additional crude oil supplies. However, crude is
still flowing into Daura from the south, although at a
greatly reduced rate.
-- CPA received the Federal Aviation Administration waiver
required to begin the Aerial Surveillance Mission. AirScan
contractors arrived in Iraq on April 30 and will advise CPA
once the first mission is scheduled.
-- Fuel distribution throughout Iraq remains difficult due
to security. There is a backlog of trucks in the North
because of the dangers of traveling south and high stock
levels ur. North preventing downloading.
-- The chart below shows the days of supply on hand as of
April 30 for each of the four main fuel products in Iraq.
The CPA goal remains to have 15 days of supply (DOS) for
each fuel on hand nationwide. CPA met this target for
kerosene.
Restore Economically-Strategic Transportation Infrastructure
8. -(41.045 1) -CPA tasks: Enable the Iraqi CAA to run a civil
aviation system, which will support the country's air
transport needs; Enable Iraqi civil aviation to prepare for
international commercial aviation and cargo service; enable
Iraqi Port Authority (IPA) to administer a port of call
with intermodal capabilities and inland container
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424
distribution; enable Iraqi Railroad Railways (IRR) to
provide domestic and international passenger and freight
capabilities; reform civil service at Ministry of
Transportation.
-- The MoT and CPA-South personnel assisted in preventing
Maersk, the port manager and operator at Khawr Az Zubayr,
from withdrawing on short notice from Khawr Az Zubayr. The
CPA is negotiating a letter agreement for a short-term port
management/operations agreement with Maersk.
-- Stevedoring Services of America (SSA), port manager at
Umm Qasr, indicated that the congestion at Umm Qasr's Inner
Anchorage, caused by several vessels being held in the
"Smuggler's Box," has rendered this anchorage area unsafe.
The military is facilitating a reduction of the number cf
vessels currently held in this containment area.
-- The MoT and Iraq Port Authority (IPA) moved the
floating crane Himreen, from berth 14 to Umm Qasr's South
Port, thereby clearing the North Port berths of 12-19 to
facilitate dredging. The ship Victoria Island will dredge
the berth face from berths 12-19 to increase the depth to
12.5 meters.
-- The CPA met with Coalition Forces (CF) stakeholders to
identify and coordinate military and civil security
requirements for Baghdad International Air Port (BIAP),
which must be adjusted to support the recent changes to the
military footprint at the airport. Participants included
CF users of BIAP - e.g. Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF;,
First Armored Division (1 AD), First Cavalry Division ;1
CD), and 447th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG) - and other
entities such as Custer-Battles, which currently provides
security fcr the airport. The croup developed a proposed
strategy for the coordination or security concerns and
activities, and clarified the security support to be
requested of the MoT. In parallel, the aviation team will
refine the MoT's plans to enhance contracted security
services.
-- The CPA met with the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority
involved with ground support at BIAP - e.g. passenger,
baggage, and cargo handling - to identify and define the
agreements under which their services are provided.
Participants in this discussion included SkyLink, Royal
Jordanian, and DHL. The subject agreements have been
tentatively identified.
-- The CPA initiated the development of an integrated
program to support reconstruction cargo traffic, which will
UNCLAS BAGHDAD C0424

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424
be managed by the Program Management Office at several key
Iraqi airports, including Baghdad, Basrah, and Mosul. This
program will specifically address ground handling support
and related services, specialized airport-based security,
and, where needed, enhanced air traffic management
capabilities.
MoT staff met with Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
Director General Fakhir to ensure chat the CAA continues to
support the current effort cc provide on-the-job-
familiarization (0JF) to select Iraqi controllers through
the RAAF contingent at KAP tower, and technical training
to Iraqi communications engineers on Aeronautical Fixed
Telecommunication Network (AFTN) systems to be used at BIAP
and other key facilities.
BREMER
BT
#0424
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00424

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: SLNORWOOD
DRAFTED: RCONES
CLEARED: SCARPENTER, AGLOVER, JJOHNSON, TFITZGERALD
VZC2CBGI345
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB 40425/01 1271951
ZNR UULTUU ZZH
R 061951Z MAY 04
PM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0848
RHEHNSC/WH:TE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0808
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
BT
UNCLAS SECT:ON 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000425
CDNOITIVE
E.O. :2958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PROV, PHUM, KISL, KDEM, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1089: ADMINISTRATOR'S WEEKLY GOVERNANCE
REPORT APRIL 24-30, 2004
1. .44pEobi} Summary. The Governance report is one of four
Administrator's Weekly Reports produced weekly by CPA-
Baghdad. CPA-Washington distributes all four reports -
Essential Services, Economic, Governance, and Security -
with graphics via e-mail. The Economic and Governance
reports and abridged versions of the Essential Services and
Security reports will be posted after 48 hours on the CPA
website, WWW.CPA-IRAQ.ORG. The full Essential Services and
Security reports remain Sensitive but Unclassified.
Headlines of paragraphs 3-7 reflect goals in the Coalition
Provisional Authority Strategic Plan. End Summary.
2. 4.6.aig+ HIGHLIGHTS
The CPA is supporting the United Nations (UN) in
meeting the significant logistical and operational
requirements for the implementation of the Independent
Election Commission (TEC) nomination process.
The UN-sponsored nomination process will be conducted
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425
May 2-1.5 and lead to the creation of an independent, non-
partisan, neutral and professional body, with the exclusive
authority to conduct all elections required by the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
Transition to Sovereignty
3., .(1:4)44.- CPA Tasks: Support Transition
CPA co-sponsored a public forum on Iraq's Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL) at the Baghdad Convention Center
as part of a Town Hall Meeting on April 25. The forum was
the latest in a series of meetings in Baghdad and across
the nation. Over 150 Bachdad residents from all districts
of the city and all ethnic and religious groups were
present along with three members of the Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC;. Two dozen journalists from Baghdad's local
press corps participated as well as representatives from
international media outlets. Debate was vigorous but
cordial and marked by knowledgeable and thoughtful queries.
The Baghdad Provincial Council met and selected a
first, second and third choice for Governor on April 29.
It was a very closely contested, multi-ballot contest. The
first choice is Louay El-Erris, a businessman and engineer
who was Director of Technical Engineering at Iraqi
Airways. All three nominees accepted the results and gave
gracious speeches thanking the Provincial Council for its
decisions. This is the conclusion of a process which began
several weeks ago with 65 candidates applying for Governor
based on strict qualifications advertised by the Provincial
Council. CPA will now consider the nominees, and is
expected to choose one as Governor soon.
Develop Civic Participation in Governance
4. 4&‘64. CPA Tasks: Develop indigenous polling capacity;
Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become
important participants in the political process; Develop
local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and
participate in political life; Participate in political
life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral
participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for
civil society conflict prevention and mitigation.
The following graph from polling conducted in November
2003, and February and March 2004, indicates that interest
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425
in politics among Iraqi citizens has increased
significantly in the past six months. The largest increase
in political interest is from Iraqi women, from 30 percent
of respondents last November to 53 percent in March 2004.
The same polling also indicates that more Iraqi
citizens would consider voting today than would have
considered voting six months ago.
CPA co-hosted the student forum for students from
northern universities at Lake Dukan. All major ethnic
groups were represented, but Arab participation was below
expectations. Security concerns led groups from Basra and
Ba'qubah to cancel their participation, and two Arab
students from Mosul backed out to protest Coalition actions
in Mosul. Participating students from Dohuk, Arbil,
Sulaimaniyah, Mosul and Kirkuk engaged in discussions about
ethnicity, life on either side of the Green Line, and other
issues.
CPA officials met with the Democracy Dialogue Activity
(ODA) team, the Local Governance Project (LOP) team leader,
and Salah ad-Din Governorate Coordinator Mark Kennon in
Tikrit on April 23 to discuss the democracy dialogue
programs in the Salah ad Din Province, where the 65 DA
team members were recruited to reflect the diversity of the
Population. It was noted that women are especially
interested to join DDA dialogues and take active roles in
disseminating information they learn through dialogues.
CPA conducted a workshop for 20 non-governmental
organization (NG0s), providing assistance in understanding
the requirements of Order 45 governing Iraqi NG0s. Order
45 requires that applications be submitted by May 1.
CPA has begun disbursing funds to the NGO, Jump Start
International (JSI), for clearing and cleaning buildings,
and demolition where necessary. This will enable JSI,
which already employs more than 1,000 Iraqis, to increase
its workforce fivefold within three months. The Baghdad
Beautification program, executed through the US Army, is
also employing Iraqis during the next three months in
projects to beautify public spaces including parks,
sidewalks and traffic circles throughout the city.
More than 120 women attended a LGP-sponsored women's
conference in Al-Ref aaee on April 23. Conference topics
included the TAL and the mandate for 25 percent female
participation in the legislative body, legal rights of
women, families and children and local societal problems,
including status of health services, public (municipal)
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425

UNCLAS BAGHZAD 00425
services and marriage problems. Health topics received the
greatest attention and participants noted that the town had
a new clinic but without any qualified staff.
Representatives of the Advisory Committee on Women's
Affairs (ACWA) met with Ambassador L. Paul Bremer on April
30 in Baghdad to discuss security, the economy and the role
of Iraqi women in the political process. During the
meeting, Ambassador Bremer advised the nine members of the
Committee to share their concerns about elections and the
future of women with UN Representative Lakhdar Brahimi.
The ACWA was formed in December 2003 as the political arm
of the Higher Council of Women. The group's mission is to
mobilize women to take an active role in the emerging
democratic structures embodied in the November 15th
Agreement (Transitional Administrative Law, Transitional
National Assembly). Municipalities and Public Works
Minister Nesreen Berwari leads the ACWA.
The Salah Ad Din Women's Committee received a CPA
grant to open an office. More than 50 women from Tikrit
have come tocether as the result of a Local Governance
Program Civic Dialogue forum and have founded an
association to benefit local women. The NGO will initially
focus on developing the organization and writing proposals
that will enable it to offer services to women in the Salah
Ad Din Governorate. During preliminary meetings, the women
expressed an interest in activities such as driving
lessons, media projects, working with disabled children,
language and computer classes, and the establishment of a
fitness center for women.
The Kurdistan Women's Union has received approval for
a CPA grant to offer computer and internet courses fcr
women in Arbil. The grant will provide computers and
equipment. The courses will provide the women with
marketable employment skills that will help to minimize
gender inequity in the workplace. This project targets
women who hold a bachelor's degree and have English
language skills. The participants will be placed into
beginning, intermediate, and advanced groups depending on
their level of computer competency.
The National Democractic Institute (NDI) held a three
day training course for women in Baghdad on public speaking
skills. Among the 28 participants were activists, party
officials, journalists and a city counselor.
Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425
5. (3CU) CPA Tasks: Support creation of National
Independent Electoral Commission; Promote scopes of work
and operational linkages between national, regional, and
local level election administration authorities.
-- The CPA has been working with United Nations (UN)
election counterparts to support the significant logistical
and operational requirements for the implementation of the
Independent Election Commission (IEC) nomination process.
The May 2-15 nomination process, sponsored by the UN, will
lead to the creation of an independent, non-partisan,
neutral and professional body, with the exclusive authority
for the conduct of all elections required by the TAL. The
IEC Board of Commissioners will be composed of seven Iraqis
of high professional standing distinguished by their
personal independence and -
.11agment. Through this
transparent nomination process the UN is inviting Iraqi
citizens and organizations to nominate qualified persons to
serve as Election Commissioners and to nominate qualified
persons to serve as the Chief Electoral Officer who will
lead the Electoral Administration.
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
6.+44840i. CPA Tasks: Educate cn human rights issues;
Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness,
and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to
investigate and address past atrocities; Establish Iraqi
Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities; Incorporate
human rights into laws; Develop role of independent human
rights NGOs and media; Establish a human rights ministry
Upon the resignation of the Minister for Human Rights,
Mr Abdul Basit Turki, the CPA appointed the Deputy, Mr
Bakhtiar Amin, Acting Minister.
The CPA has completed a review of 20 boxes of evidence
material for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (1ST) provided by
Indict, aUK non-governmental organization (NG0).
CPA, in conjunction with the :ST, is coordinating
analysis of the documentation collected thus far by the
various groups in Iraq for use in forthcoming trials, to
locate missing persons, and to build a historical record of
the crimes of the former regime.
The refurbishment of office space dedicated to
Ministry of Human Rights staff within the Abu Ghraib prison
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425
is nearing completion, and two Ministry lawyers have begun
visiting the prison on a regular basis. The first formal
visit to prisoners and their families is scheduled for May
4.
Over the past year, the CPA has identified 250
suspected mass grave sites and forensically assessed more
than 40 of these sites. No exhumations have been conducted
to date.
PROMOTE DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR REFUGEES AND :NTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS)
7. 4.000}.. CPA TASKS: Facilitate the return of refugees
and IDPs; Build local and national capacity to protect and
assist refugees and IDPs; Develop and implement a process
to resolve property disputes, through the Iraq Property
Claims Commission.
Transition of authority to the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration (MoDM) is scheduled for the
first part of May. The Advisory Office is working
intensively with the Ministry on final issues, such as
locking in key appointments, and finalizing the agreement
on the organizational structure.
On April 22 the Lebanese government returned 310 Iraqi
detainees being held in Beirut. A return of 600 Iraqis
in Lebanon - both failed asylum seekers in prison and
others living in Lebanon freely - was planned for early
April but was delayed due tc security reasons. Through
coordination among Iraqi and coalition partners in Lebanon
Jordan, Syria and Iraq, and the International Organization
for Migration, the Iraqis returned to Iraq safely on April
24.
The Baghdad IPCC offices have received more than 1,100
Claims since opening on March 15. More than 25,00C forms
have been distributed.
In northern Iraq, Sulimaniyah, Arbil, Kirkuk, Salah ad
Din and Diyala provinces have opened IPCC offices and have
accepted more than 500 claims. The nahuk office is
scheduled to open on the May 15.
The Mosul IPCC Office which opened March 30, 2004 has
been visited by approximately 1,250 claimants, mostly from
Mosul. To date, the office has completed 213 claims,
including the oldest that date back to 1975 and the most
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425

UNCLAS BAGHIW3 00425
recent to 2002.
In central Iraq, the Babil IPCC office is open and
providing claims forms. Wasit, Karbala, Anbar and Najaf
are addressing security concerns and are on hold for
starting offices. Qadissiya has obtained a building and is
locating staff. These offices are expect to open in mid-
May.
In the south, the Basra IPCC is expecting to open on
thelOth of May. Three regional offices outside Basra are
expected to be open by late May, assuming the security
situation allows freedom of movement for staff and office
supplies over that period.
BREMER
BT
#0425
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00425

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
Mg 0 6 2004
APPROVED: CSLANEY
DRAFTED: RJCNES, JOSTER
CLEARED: PJAMISON, MWISE, ESCHMULTS, ARATHMELL, DTESSLER, DBRANNAN
VZCZCBGI349
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB #0426/01 1271951
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 06195IZ MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUSKJCSISECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0852
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0812
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 0? 04 BAGHDAD 000426
cmicrl:vr
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PTER, PINR, PGOV, PROV, PHUM, KISL, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1090: ADMINISTRATOR'S WEEKLY SECURITY REPORT:
APRIL 24-30, 2004
1. 4, 604.-SUNNARY. The Security Report is one of four
Administrator's Weekly Reports produced by CPA-Baghdad.
CPA-Washington distributes all tour weekly reports -
security, Essential Services, Economic, and Governance -
with graphics via email. The Economic, Governance, and
abridged versions of the Security and Essential Services
Reports will be posted after 48 hours on the CPA website,
www.CPA-Iraq.org. The full reports remain sensitive but
unclassified. Headlines of Paragraphs 3-7 reflect goals in
the Coalition Provisional Authority Strategic Plan. End
Summary.
2. 467 164W4- HIGHLIGHTS
-- Coalition and Iraqi security forces are working to
develop an auxiliary force in Fallujah. This will be a
temporary unit integrated with Coalition Forces, comprised
primarily of former Iraqi soldiers living in and near
Fallujah whc have volunteered to assist the Coalition in
restoring order to the area.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426
-- The Iraqi Civil Defense Corns planned and conducted its
first missicn independent of Coalition Forces, which
successfully targeted counterfeiters in northern Iraq.
ACHIEVE A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT
3. +00N* CPA TASKS: Assist in the Establishment of Basic
Law Enforcement; Complete the Neutralization of
Destabilizing Threats and Influences; Assist in the
Establishment of Iraqi Armed Forces - Field and Equip :CDC
and IAF; Maintain Territorial Integrity of Iraq; Eliminate
Munitions Caches, Unexploded Ordinance, and Excess Military
Equipment; Maintain Freedom of Movement along Commercial
and Military Lines of Communication.
-- Meetings between CPA and Fallujah government officials
continued to encourage a political solution to hostilities.
CPA officials visited Fallujah this week to discuss
surrender of weapons, suspension of hostilities,
facilitation of humanitarian assistance, and continuation
of infrastructure reconstruction.
-- The First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 ME?) continued
operations in and around Fallujah. During the unilateral
cease-fire this week, Marines were attacked by insurgents
inside mosques and private residences and responded in
force, including use of air and tank support. I MEF is
working with the Ministry of Defense to create an auxiliary
force in Fallujah. This will be a temporary unit
subordinate to I MEF comprised primarily of former Iraqi
soldiers living near Fallujah who have volunteered to
assist the Coalition in restoring order to the area. When
established, this battalion will conduct patrols in
Fallujah with I MEF and other Iraqi Security Forces in
order to isolate foreign terrorists and criminals of the
former regime. It will be dissolved when regular Iraqi
forces take over security responsibility in Fallujah.
-- In a recent public opinion survey conducted by Oxford
Research International, Iraqis have identified lack of
security and unemployment as leading causes of instability.
In addition, most Iraqis polled increasingly view the
Coalition Forces as "occupiers" rather than "liberators."
Creation of the auxiliary force in Fallujah is expected to
immediately employ 600 to 1,110 personnel, to put security
of Fallujah more directly in the hands of those who live
there, and to create stability that will foster job growth
by allowing more relief and reconstruction programs to
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426

UNCLAS BAGHDAD G0426
proceed.
-- On April 24, several Coalition servicemen were killed
in an explosion while attempting to board a suspici ous
watercraft near the Basrah at-sea oil terminal in the
Persian Gulf. Two additional boats exploded near moored
ships at Iraq's main oil terminal in the Persian Gulf.
This was the first attack of its kind in the Persian Gulf
Theater since Coalition operations began. The high profile
style of this attack and the car bomb attacks on police
stations April 21 may indicate that terrorist organizations
connected to al Qaeda are operating near Basrah.
-- Iraqis in the Najaf area expressed their concern that
weapons were being stockpiled in schools, mosques and
shrines. Coalition officials declared that this would not
be tolerated, and that restoration of these holy sites to
places of worship must begin immediately. Operations
against the Sadr militia that is scattered throughout
south-central Iraq were limited to cordon and search
operations outside the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.
-- The chart below represents the status of Iraqi Armed
Forces (IAF) personnel as a percentage of each branch's
authorized strength. Current authorized strength for each
branch is listed on the left side of the chart. These
numbers will change depending on assessment of domestic and
regional security issues. This week, the Iraqi Army has
lost approximately 100 personnel assigned to duty. Some of
these soldiers have been sent for retraining, some were
killed or injured in the line of duty, and some have been
removed from the Iraqi Army for actions supporting the
insurgency.
-- The ICDC planned and conducted its first independent
mission on April 27. Three cordon and search operations
targeted counterfeiters in northern Iraq, and resulted in
detention of two individuals and confiscation of
identification card counterfeiting equipment.
-- Four battalions of the Iraqi Army are now conducting
their normal training and leave cycle. Three new
battalions have been staffed by cadre and are preparing to
train new recruits.
-- The following chart depicts significant insurgent
activities reported throughout Iraq. Significant
activities (SIGACTS) include reported attacks using
improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne
improvised explosive devices (VBIED), mortars, rocket
propelled grenades (RPG), and improvised rockets. This
does not include small arms fire, hand grenade attacks, and
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426
other hostile activities. This chart includes those
actions affecting Coalition operations reported and
documented through Coalition Joint Task Force-7. The dark
line indicates daily totals, while the red line indicates
the seven-day centered moving average, which "smoothes" the
trend. Continued hostilities in the west account for most
of the SIGACTS variance this week. This may be due to more
carefully documented violations of the cease-fire through
daily reports in Fallujah.
PUBLIC SAFETY: DEVELOP INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE EFFECTIVE IN
PROTECTING SOCIETY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
4. (CCU' CPA TASKS: Develop and Apply Consistent Vetting
Policies and Processes; Establish Governance Framework for
Internal Security; Create an Effective and Accountable
Police System; Create a Facilities Protection Service; Form
she Iraqi Civil Defense Corps; Reconstruct Civil Defense
Organization and Establish Mine Action Programs; Develop
Effective Border Security; Develop Emergency Management
Command and Control System for Iraq that can Coordinate
Police, Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Medical Assistance in
the Event of a Natural or Manmade Disaster.
-- The Ministry of :nterior and the CPA Office of Security
Cooperation have begun the process of Iraqi Police Service
tIPS) reconstitution in order to re-equip and retrain the
IPS, and to replace operatives who performed poorly or
defected in the last two weeks. The initial reconstitution
efforts will introduce a new IPS code of conduct and
disciplinary code and create a new collective training
program.
-- The IPS, Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), and
Facilities Protection Service (FPS) are the lead civilian
agencies for maintaining order within Iraq. The Ministry
of Interior is responsible for training all law enforcement
personnel, and for operations of the IPS and DBE. The FPS
is managed by each Ministry. The chart below shows the
status of Iraqi civilian law enforcement personnel as a
percentage of authorized strength. This week, the number
of IPS operatives assigned to duty has again dropped by
more than 100 operatives because of IPS performance
assessments following the past two weeks' activity.
-- The FPS completed transfer of authority, requiring each
Ministry to be responsible for hiring, payment, and
operational management of personnel assigned to it. The
Ministry of Interior continues to be responsible for
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426
training and transfer of FPS guards between ministries as
needs continue to be defined. The Ministry of Finance is
assisting other ministries with payroll transacticns, to
ensure guards are properly paid until modernized banking
systems are in place. While the transfer has been largely
successful, CPA advisors are working with Iraqi officials
to identify and resolve payroll issues for approximately
fifteen percent of the FPS force. The FPS has begun to
create ten regional commands which will monitor, certify,
and assist local FPS sites to ensure consistency of
operations among ministries.
-- In January 2004, the Ministry of Interior provided the
Baghdad Police Department with equipment and training to
begin compiling and distributing crime statistics. Trained
statistics information officers now reside in the East
(Rusafa) and West (Karkh) divisional headquarters and in
the Baghdad main headquarters. The chart below depicts
murder rates as recorded by the Baghdad Police Department
from May 2003 to February 2004. Comparisons to other
cities must be made with extreme caution because of
differences in reporting accuracy and legal definitions.
The statistics information officer at Baghdad Police
Department discussed his beliefs about the prevalence of
under-reporting. He believes that the percentage of all
crimes not recorded is between 10 and 25 percent, but
almost all murders are reported. Note that manslaughter,
deaths due to terrorist actions, and Iraqis killed by
Coalition Forces are not included in the totals. Therefore
this represents only domestic crime, and is not reflective
of overall safety. Crime statistics will continue to be
collected and analyzed by the Baghdad Police Department and
Coalition advisors.
BUILD JUSTICE
5. 4, 664H -CPA Tasks: Establish Independent Judiciary;
Reform Judicial System; Improve the Penal System; Establish
Commission on Public Integrity; Solidify Real Property
Rights.
-- The Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) was created
as a model court for Iraq, to try cases of national
importance and to showcase new rights accorded criminal
defendants. Since its creation in July 2003, 154 cases
have been referred to the CCCI. Until this week, cases
were referred by CPA advisors, but now the CCCI is also
investigating cases referred by other Iraqi courts. The
CCCI will eventually handle up to ten investigations and
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 30426

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426
five trials per week. This week the CCCI tried four cases.
Because the recent security situation has in some cases
prevented the Iraqi Correctional Service from transporting
prisoners, not all trials began as scheduled.
-- This week, the first of six judicial trainfng sessions
was completed. This program is designed to train judges on
norms of due process, rule of law, human rights, judicial
independence, ethics, developments in international law
over the past 35 years, and CPA Orders. Each five-day
session will train approximately 30 judges.
-- New criminal defendants' rights include the right to
defense counsel at all stages of criminal proceedings.
Training for judges on how to implement and enforce these
rights was included in the sessions that began this week.
Training for court-appointed defense attorneys will begin
later in May.
-- In calendar year 2004, Baghdad courts have adjudicated
(dismissed, convicted, or acquitted) over 16,000 criminal
cases, including misdemeanors and felonies.
-- CPA officials are initiating plans to make detainee
processing more transparent. Individuals detained by
Coalition Forces are now being posted weekly by name at
Coalition information centers across the nation. This
week, 323 detainees were released from Coalition custody.
This number includes some who were transferred to the IPS
for criminal processing. Coalition Forces detained 434 new
individuals over the same period.
-- Iraqi court liaisons are working with Coalition
security officials to review case files of detainees.
Currently, 68 cases have been referred to the CCCI and 512
cases have been referred to the Iraqi Criminal Court.
Photographs depicting several U.S. soldiers apparently
mistreating detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex were
made public this week. Many U.S. officials have condemned
these actions. Through an investigation of the situation,
six military personnel have been charged with criminal
offenses. An update to media representatives and tour of
Abu Ghraib will be conducted May 5. The visit will
include an update from Major General Geoffrey Miller on
changes, a tour of the detention facilities at Camp Ganci
and Camp Avalanche, a tour of the detainee hospital, a tour
of the unoccupied interrogation facility, and a tour of the
family visiting center.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426
DEVELOP IRAQI DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AN: OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS
6. t95ti+ CPA Tasks: Develop National Security System;
Develop National Defense Institution; Build Iraqi Defense
Capacity; Develop Ministry of Defense Headquarters
Infrastructure; Enable Ministry of Defense Standup; Consult
with Iraqis for Ministry of Defense Standup; Support State
Department Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation
Activities; Plan for Post-CPA Transition.
-- Iraq defense capabilities continue to grow. The
largest member of the Coalition, including domestic
security, is Iraq. Total Iraqi Security Forces number just
under 200,000 people. U.S. military presence is
approximately 138,000 strong during the current troop
rotation. Other Coalition members, 33 other nations,
contribute approximately 25,000 troops. The chart at right
represents the percentage of forces participating in the
Coalition by these three groups.
-- Iraqi officials, CPA, and Coalition Forces are
developing a plan to disband militias and integrate their
members into Iraqi society and security forces.
-- The Ministerial Committee on National Security, which
includes the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Finance,
Justice, the National Security Advisor, and the Iraqi
National Intelligence Service Director General, has been
established and is meeting on a reoular basis to address
the current situation in Iraq.
ENABLE IRAQ TO BECOME A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
7. -41100, b+. CPA Tasks: Develop Iraqi Foreign and National
Security Policy Options; Build Iraqi Foreign and National
Security Policy Capacity; Reform Iraqi Diplomatic
Representation; Resolve Refugee and Internally Displaced
Person Issues.
-- The CPA will transfer authority to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on May 12, marking another significant step
toward Iraqi sovereignty.
-- Foreign Minister Zebari continues to focus on
strengthening Iraq's relations with its neighbors. The
Minister is scheduled to travel to Kuwait, Cairo, and Tunis
over the next several weeks.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00426
BREMER
BT
#0426
NNNN
UNTO:AS BAGHDAD 0 04 2 6

-44444-P-4-4 211 iTIAL USUN NEW YORK 01060
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
VZCZCBG0733
00 RUEHGB
DE RUCNDT #1060/C1 1272338
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 0623382 MAY 04
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE C694
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMED:ATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGB/CPA BAGHDAD 0045
ST
COKFIEADNTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001060
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2014
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IZ
SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: MNF-IIG RELATIONSHIP KEY TO RESOLUT:ON
.dleaosoi•-.3pri44—epreei—(44.
1.444. Summary. "Informal informal' discussions May 6 to hear
Council members' views about concepts for the next Iraq
resolution produced no headlines, although clear markers were
laid on the imperative of calibrating correctly the
relationship of the MNF to a sovereign Iraqi government
(IIG). Members stressed that the linkage between the MNF and
the IIG, including the command arrangements for Iraqi forces,
will reflect the credibility of the IIG as a sovereign
entity. All agreed that the main purpose of a resolution
should be to give a clear signal that the transfer of
sovereignty was genuine, with visib:e Iraqi ownership of the
political process: Such differences as were aired were
nuanced and not ideological. Russian Charge Konuzin narrowly
raised the issue of UNMOVIC and IAEA, asking for a report so
that the Council could react; only Brazilian Permrep
Sardenberg otherwise made mention of UNMOVIC. End summary.
U.S. - UK thoughts on elements
2..1.01...Ambassador Cunningham led off the discussion by noting
C 9NFIDENTIAL USUN NEW YORK 0106C

CQYFIDENTIAL USUN NEW YORK 01060
that we continued to flesh out our approach, and that the
resolution should be narrowly confined to those political,
security, and economic elements which were "must do" points.
The resolution should support and reinforce Brahimi's efforts
and progress on the ground cn the electoral process. We
could not predict when there would be progress politically,
and we needed to pay careful attention to getting the timing
of the resolution right.
3. UK Permrep Jones Parry outlined broad categories for
discussion:
-- The end of the occupation, the CPA, the Governing Council,
and the commensurate assumption of power by a sovereign Iraqi
government. This should be a fundamental political statement
that the situation had changed.
-- The political process, although much remained tc he
determined, and an endorsement or blessing for the structures
of the new Interim Government of Iraq.
-- The MNF: perhaps the most complex issue, given that SCR
1511 authorized the MNF through the end of the political
process (i.e., constitutional elections) yet there was also
the view that the transfer of sovereignty meant that a "new
face" was needed. There was no fundamental incompatibility
between Iraqi sovereignty and foreign security forces
operating on Iraqi soil. The MNF would also encompass a
dedicated force responsible for UN security. Iraqi
capacities would need to be developed as well.
-- The future UN role, which should be consistent with what
the Iraqis want and the UN's capacities, with key priorities
acknowledged (e.g., elections and constitutional drafting;.
-- Last, "other" subjects, such as the arms embargo,
financial arrangements with respect to the DFI, and the rule
of law.
MNF - IIG Relationship as a
Symbol of Credible Sovereignty
4. -+@+ -Ensuing discussion broadly focused on the linkage
between che MNF and the IIG, and how the relationship of
Iraqi forces to the MNF and the IIC would reflect the
credibility of the IIG as a sovereign entity. All agreed
that the main purpose of a resolution should be to give a
clear signal that the transfer of sovereignty was genuine,
with visible Iraqi ownership of the political process. That
C ONFIDENTIAL USUN NEW YORK 01060

C ONFIDOUTIA hp USW NEW YORK 01060
said, sovereign status of the IIG would have :o be reconciled
with the situation on the ground, and the MNF's authorization
would have to be defined in that context. Brazilian Permrep
Sardenberg noted that, while governmental power and
responsibility were indeed different concepts from
"sovereignty," a sovereign government, to be credible, must
exercise some genuine power. Algerian Permrep Baali made a
similar point: the situation on the ground must reflect the
sovereign status of the IIG, and thus an invitation for the
MNF to operate would "make sense in balancing the
relationship between sovereignty and the continued task of
the MNF." Philippines DPR Mercado also sought clarity on the
relationship, adding that an invitation from the IIG would
serve as an indicator of its exercise of sovereignty. Russian
Charge Konuzin seconded the desire for an invitation from the
IIG.
S. f4+. German Permrep Pleuger also stressed the relationship
of security to the political framework and the credible
transfer of sovereignty. While Coalition forces were
essential to the provision of security, "security could not
be entirely in the hands of the MNF," What forces would
constitute the MNF, and what Iraqis, if any, might be
included? The IIG should have control over its own forces
and the police, for otherwise the situation effectively
ccntinued as the status quo, but with a different label, he
added.. Chilean DPR Maqueira asked bluntly whether the MNF
wculd respond to the IIG or not. How would the MNF's status
be defined vis-a-vis the IIG?
6.4C4 Pakistani Permrep Akram also had questions: would the
MNF authorities be the same as in SCR 1511, or different --
and if so, how? In addition, who would command Iraqi forces?
If the IIG's powers were limited "too much" then they would
not possess "effective sovereignty." Separately, why not a
Blue Helmet operation to protect the UN? Baali raised the
command structure as well, adding that, "in an ideal
situation," Iraqi forces would be placed under the 110. He
acknowledged that a mechanism to ensure force action "in a
coherent way" would be imperative, or the consequences would
be disastrous.
7.-t64.-French Permrep de La Sabliere stated that the IIG must
have a say in security arrangements, although it would
clearly be critical to avoid any criticism of the Ne\TF on the
part of the IIG. But the IIG must exercise governmental
authority over Iraqi forces, and the MNF should not be able
to take a decision on the use of Iraqi forces absent the
consent of the IIG, he added.
8.(.0). On the duration of an MNF mandate, all possibilities
C orrIDDUTIAL USUN NEW YORK 01060

CON2IDEINTIAL USUN NEW YORK 01060
were raised. Konuzin said that authorization should be for
one year with a possibility of extension or renewal. Pleuger
said that the mandate should offer a "clear perspective" to
the Iraqis on its prospective duration, and thus should not
go beycnd the December 31, 2005 target date for
constitutional elections. La Sabliere agreed that the
prospect for foreign forces' withdrawal should be visible at
the end of the process, but argued that any authorization
should end with the elections by January 31, 2005 of the
Transitional National Assembly, which would constitute the
first "legitimate government," but leaving the door open to
renewal upon their request.
9. -tet-More broadly on the sovereignty and authorities issue,
Pleuger acknowledged that the II G would be limited in certain
areas of authority until elections could take place, but
asked who would supervise those limitations. Would a body of
judges be appointed to do so? The Coalition clearly could
not. For example, who would manage the prisons, of
particular importance given recent revelations, and into
whose custody would current detainees be remanded? These
were politically important issues that would influence
percepticns about the credibility of the IIG's sovereignty.
(Beali also obliquely raised the prison issue.) In the same
vein, Akram underscored the need for compatibility between
the legal situation and the situation on the ground, which
should be consistent. Any resolution would have to be
careful to neither under- nor overstate the reality.
Cunningham made clear that the IIG would be sovereign, but
agreed that, as a caretaker government, there would be limits
on its authorities. The HG wculd not have the capacity to
address security, and should not address long-term
arrangements that exceeded the scope of its tenure.
10.-(4). Cunningham also agreed that the optics of the
relationship between the MNF and the 110 would be key, and
that it would be quite complex to calibrate the relationship
correctly. The worst outcome would be a breakdown in the
coordination process over disagreements, but there were ample
precedents that that could be avoided. He also noted that
the TAL provided for a continued presence of the MNF, and
outlined the ccncept for protection of UN personnel through a
dedicated force of 1500-2000 forces, responsible for
protection of UN facilities, personnel, and movements. A UN
Blue Helmet operation outside MNF unified command was neither
feasible nor desirable, and the SYG had made that clear.
- - - -
UN Role
- - - -
C ONPIDEN? :AL USUN NEW YORK 01060

L
T r A L USUN NEW YORK 01060
11. 444.-Konuzin said the UN's role could only be defined
based on a request from the as a sovereign government,
with which Pleuger agreed. Others stressed that the UN
should play a central role in the political process, and
grappled with the question of a broader role beyond the
political priority. SYG Annan would have to be consulted,
and the UN's current capacities would have to be determined
in light of the security reality. Ambassador Cunningham
stressed that the UN had a leading role in the political
process, and that there was a role beyond the political
process that we would like to see the UN play as well. The UN
could now focus cn the key political tasks without large
numbers of people, allowing us to move beyond the "as
circumstances permit" rubric of SCR 1511. La Sabliere
agreed, saying that the Council should reflect political
assistance as a priority, and wait tor the situation on the
ground to determine the scope of the UN's other
contributions.
Other Issues
22. 44Q.. Konuzin advocated for an international conference as
a stepping stone to validating Brahimi's work. He also
proposed that UNMOVIC and IAEA present a report on WMD,
opening the door for a Council discussion and decision on
their future activities. Only Sardenberg also raised
UNMOVIC, simply wondering whether now or later would be more
appropriate. Cunningham responded that it was not necessary
to address the issue of UNMOVIC and LAEA now.
Next Steps
:3. -(44-Cunningham made clear that the Council would need to
be flexible in charting a response to the unfolding political
process. While Konuzin had argued for a separate resolution
welcoming the IIG, with subsequent action to come later, we
would need to see how the process unfolded before making
determinations about how best to proceed. Council members
agreed to continue discussions informally in the same format
in the next week.
NEGROPONTE"
3T
01060
NNNN
CQNFIiiENTIAL USUN NEW YORK 01060

BAGHDAD 00414
Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: RJONES
DRAFTED: JVANREST
CLEARED: SCARPENTER, TWARRICK, TFITZGERALD
VZCZCBGI239
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB 40414/01 1261740
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 051740Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0825
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0785
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
BT
-19...46.6.—W-4..4..SECT/ON 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000414
STATE FOR NEA/NGA
E.O. 12958: DECL:05/04/14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, KISL, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1070: FUNDING FOR POLITICAL PARTIES
1. 464-Summary: Since the liberation of Iraq, there has
been an explosion of political parties. At last count,
more than 200 have emerged on the political scene. Many of
them purport to represent the ncw "silent majority" in
Iraq: the non-sectarian, non-ethnic, moderately
nationalistic mainstream. Several of these organizations
have demonstrated the ability to grow into sustainable
organizations and many of them have begun to come together
in coalitions in order to have a better chance at electoral
success. Unlike many of the established parties, however,
which have benefited from foreign sources of funding and
weapons, the newer, more centrist parties lack resources
and basic technical assistance. None want to be militias;
almost all want to see the militias of the parties shut
down. Technical assistance for parties is being funded
through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED; from the
'04 Emergency Supplemental Act for Iraq. However, there is
little direct funding available for political parties'
BAGHDAD 00414

gECROT BAGHDAD 00414
operating expenses and election activities, which is a
serious concern, given the well-funded Islamic parties with
which they will compete. This policy should be changed to
permit direct funding of emerging political parties. End
Summary,
2.114...Since liberation, the International Republican
Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI)
have documented the existence of well over 200 political
parties in Iraq. Together they represent a broad spectrum.
There are moderate Islamic parties, nationalist parties,
parties based on tribal affiliations, liberal parties and
others. Among them are those smaller parties that
represent the now "silent majority" in Iraq. These parties
seek to represent those who wish to see a united, non-
sectarian, non-ethnic Iraq. Some of these parties have the
potential to become sustainable organizations and have to
cooperate with like-minded parties. However, these
political parties need support and assistance on a variety
of levels, including basic organizational and election
preparation skills. The National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), through funding from the '04 Emergency Supplemental
Act of Iraq, has provided IRI and NDI with approximately $6
million each for an 18-month program to train Iraqi
political parties in all aspects of party organization, to
help them prepare for elections and to become lasting
organizations. Both organizations are concentrating their
efforts cn newly emerging parties, and none cf their funds
are specifically budgeted for direct support for operating
expenses and/or campaign activities.
3.44.4 U.S. policy with regard to overt direct funding for
political parties was set in 1961 in the Foreign Assistance
Act. Section I16(e) of the Act authorizes development
assistance (DA) support for "studies to identify, and for
openly carrying out, programs and activities which will
encourage or promote increased adherence to civil and
political rights," thereby allowing DA funding for
democracy and governance assistance, including political
party assistance. Section 116(e) concludes, with the
following caveat: "None of these funds may be used directly
or indirectly, to influence the outcome of any election in
any country." USAID, however, broadly applies Section
116(e) to the democracy and governance prcgrams it
provides.
4. In 2003, USAID established a Political Party
Assistance Policy in which it afforded greater flexibility
to the Institutes for providing parties with commodity
support. Such support is governed by two principles: (1)
that programs support representative, multiparty systems;
.SRP— ADT BAGHDAD 0 04 14

3 2CREI BAGHDAD 00414
and (2) that programs not seek to determine election
outcomes.
S. The guidelines for the policy state that: (1) USAID
programs must make a good faith effort to assist all
democratic parties with equitable levels of assistance; (2)
Commodity support valued at $50,000 or less may be provided
annually to each political party that qualifies for
assistance; (3) Political ;arty assistance should be
suspended for a reasonable time period prior to voting.
6.10)0 The policy lists several prohibited activities.
These include providing commodity support valued over
$50,000 to any individual party and providing cash grants
to any political party. However, the policy includes a
waiver procedure if such support is determined to be in the
interests of U.S. foreign policy and the funds involved
include Eccnomic Support Funds (ESF), Freedom Support Act
(FSA), Assistance for Eastern European and Baltic States
(AEEB), cr Transition Initiative (TI) funds. No waiver is
possible for use of DA funds. At this time, no such waiver
has been sought either by CPA or the Institutes.
7. 44* In the past, and in very few instances, the NED has
provided direct financial assistance to democratic
political party coalitions, but under strict guidelines
that prohibit financing of campaigns or candidates for
public office, or individual political parties. At this
point in Iraq's democratic development, NED could not
provide such funding since coalitions are only in the early
stages of formation. In addition, NED does not have funds
for such an endeavor and would likely have to receive
Congressional approval before doing so.
S. 4.10.4..At present, /RI and NDI's programs are focused on
helping newly emerging parties with technical preparations
for upcoming elections and to nurture organizational
infrastructures. Both Institutes have set up offices in
Iraq and have been working with a wide variety of political
organizations to provide them with training and
consultations. Iraqi parties are eager for this type of
assistance but several new and promising Iraqi democratic
political parties have expressed concern that they cannot
compete against already well-funded political
organizations, such as SCIRI. For the moment, neither
:nstitute has plans, nor funds, to support a given
coalition of parties as it is still too early to determine
which parties might prove themselves viable.
9. 4.04-CPA Regional and Governorate Coordinators have
identified efforts believed to originate primarily in Iran
EGflT BAGHDAD 00414

EDC2CT BAGHDAD 00414
to back parties whose policies and activities appear
inimical to democratic values and United States interests.
By whatever means they are funded, their presence on the
ground is a reality that causes grave concern for the post-
June 30 world.. It is an essential United Scates interest
to have emerging, genuinely democratic parties able to
compete for votes against anti- or non-democratic parties
backed by Iran.
IC. 464-As one emerging political party leader, 'Abd al-
Aziz al-Yasiri, put it, "What is the difference in Iraq
between a big party and a small party? A big party is a
small party with foreign financing and guns." Some
political parties, including a number represented on the
Governing Council, have reportedly turned to corruption and
selling influence to finance their activities, an obviously
unacceptable alternative.
11. 4.4. Some parties will reject USG funding on the ground
that it taints their independence. Others would accept
funding only if it were secret. There should be a level
playing field that does not disadvantage emerging
democratic parties that we support. However, it is in the
long-term interest of the United States to encourage Iraq
to adopt a policy that requires all sources of funds to be
disclosed, including foreign funds.
12.4.64-It would be inconceivable to have invested as much
as the United States has in Iraq only to have emerging
democratic parties squelched by Iranian-backed parties
whose democratic credentials are demonstrably open to
question. .Direct support for emerging political parties
should be an important tool in Iraq.
BREMER
BT
40414
NNNN
0 @REIT BAGHDAD 00414

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00412
Laser].:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER
CRAFTED: DRAFTED: DNASH
CLEARED: CLEARED: SMILEY
VZCZCBGI202
00 RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNDT
DE RUEHGB #0412/0I 1261037
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 0510372 MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0821
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0781
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NY 0030
ET
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000412
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PREL, EAID, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1069: Daily SITREP #9 - Accelerated :raqi
Reconstruction Program
1.The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is
implementing an accelerated reconstruction program to
rapidly and visibly improve the daily lives of citizens
in seven key cities. This effort includes previously
funded quick start work plus protects that are being
selected and funded now which will result in additional
immediate, mid-term and long-term projects.
2.AIRP Ramadi/Fallujah Team: The Marine Engineering
Group (MEG) advertised and is ready to award three $5COK
Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity contracts for a
total of $1.5M dollars. MARDIV is continuing to work
with MEG to develop scopes of work for all approved
projects.
3.AIRP Baghdad Team: The AIR? team is drafting task
orders for a Design-Build contract for the following
projects: Al-Rashid Sewage Improvement Program and Al
Sadr/9 Nissan Sewage Improvement Program for a combined
total estimated cost of $854. They are also developing a
draft task order for a second landfil: in scuthern
Baghdad for an estimated cost of $35 M.
MAY 0 5 2004
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 0C412

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00412
4.ARP Bacuba Team: The AIRP team drafted a statement
of work that combines the three Water Sector projects
(wastewater collection system, rehabilitate water
distribution network, and landfill) in Baquba into a
single contract task order for the Design-Build
construction contractor. The Regional Program
Coordinator and AIRP team leader completed their site
visit today and provided copies of the task order to the
CPA and military representatives for review and comment.
5.AIR? Mosul Team: The team extended the existing home
loan program by $2 Million. The Qayarra Refinery
Renovation of Bitumen Plant contract ($400K) can proceed
with signature by the successful contractor and then
award. Various other projects are in the solicitation
stage. One team member remains on-site to oversee the
execution and contracting of the initial $20M.
6.AIRP Samarah/Tikrit Team: The AIRP team has provided
on-site support in Tikrit with three members to date, who
are assisting with development of scopes of work. Nine
project scopes of work were completed and submitted for
bids. An additional ten are being processed for
solicitation and are expected to be ready in another one
to two days. The military command reports that all
available resources, including Civil Affairs and other
military engineering assets, are committed to managing
previously funded CERP (Commander's Emergency Response
Program) projects.
FUTURE PLANNED ACTIONS
7.The AIRP team will monitor and report on all CERP and
R3P (Rapid Regional Response Program) plans, as well as
the Supplemental Appropriation projects. R3P funds will
be spent on projects to benefit the Iraqi people in
accordance with UN Resolution 1483. Commander's
Emergency Respcnse Fund (GER?) funds are required for
emergency requirements that, in the determination of the
Commanding General/CMATT, require immediate response to
deal with the current situation. The team is currently
collecting data on these programs.
8.AIRP Ramadi/Fallujah Team: The MEG will award initial
contracts and further develop scopes of work for
additional contracts. AIRP team will develop initial
scopes of work for the larger water and sewer projects by
next week.
9.AIRP Baghdad Team: The Team expects to have task
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00412

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00412
orders completed by close of business today and will meet
tomorrow with 1st and 5th Brigade of 1st CAV, Baghdad
Central, Corps of Engineers, and USAID to review and edit
the :ask orders and finalize them for contracts for
planned award on Sunday.
10.AIRP Baquba Team: The Team is proceeding to award to
the Design-Build construction contractor. Assign the
Regional Program Coordinator to Baquba to provide on-site
coordination and assistance. Expect first road project
to commence on or about 15 May.
11.AIR? Mosul Team: The Team continues to develop
executable scopes of work for solicitation.
12.AIR? Samarah/Tikrit Team: PMC will assist with the
urgent and large AIR? workload. Desired engineering and
contracting support alternatives will be selected and
implemented. Additional support, including contracting
officers and engineers, will be on-site this week.
BREMER
BT
#0412
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00412

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00405
Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: COS IPC
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: FROG
APPROVED: DPITTMAN
DRAFTED: JBUZBEE
CLEARED: TFITZGERALD
VZCZCBGI145
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB #0405/01 1252024
2NR UUUUU ZZH
R 042024Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0808
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0769
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 00040S
SENS:TIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1067: Democracy Dialoguers Charge Coalition
Forces with Humiliating Iraqis, CPA with Ianoring the
Average People
Summary:
1. -(41%) -Summary. In a May 2 meeting with visiting CPA
North Regional Coordinator, participants in RTI Salah ad-
Din's Democracy Dialogue Activities (DDA) criticized
Coalition Forces for abuse of detainees, aggressive
searches of homes and people, plodding convoys that snarl
traffic, and alleged disrespect of Iraqi culture and
tradition. The activists said that CPA did not reach out
to average Iraqis and had not brought true democracy to the
country. One cautioned that "Iraq is about to explode"
because of unemployment and opposition to occupation. RC
responded that Coalition military leaders wanted to ensure
detainees were treated with respect and that those
responsible for abuses would face criminal charges when the
evidence warranted it. Coalition Forces had to respond to
security threats and tried to avoid damage to homes and
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00405

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00405
cars, but sometimes damage was unavoidable, and sometimes
soldiers might cause offense without realizing it, she
said. She added that CPA was reaching out to Iraqis across
the country, and as a result of her own travels, she was
made optimistic by the evidence of people working together
for the future. End Summary.
2. -(-sei* A dozen facilitators in RTIis DDA program came
from across Salah ad-Din to meet with visiting CPA North
Regional Coordinator at the CPA office in Tikrit on may 2.
Although the program participants are outspoken grass-roots
advocates of democracy, the rule of law, and other goals
shared with CPA, they devoted nearly all of the session to
criticizing CPA and Coalition Forces for a variety of
perceived failings while touching only briefly on the
promotion of human rights and women's rights. (Note:
Recent phctcs of abused detainees may have fueled the
confrontational atmosphere, although the complaints ranged
across a wide spectrum of military and political issues.)
Aggression, Destruction and Humiliation
3.4431344.). In response to concerns about published photos of
abused detainees, RC said that abuse was unacceptable and
that criminal charges would be brought against those
responsible when the evidence supported it. In addition,
LTG Sanchez had asked for a broader review of the treatment
of detainees in order tc ensure that they were treated with
dignity, she said.
4.-(4).ER44- One participant from Tikrit raised the issue of
aggressive searches of homes, damage to cars in the street,
and humiliation of Iraqis during searches. Americans would
not accept these conditions in the United States, he said.
Iraqi police should conduct any searches that are
necessary, and they should have search warrants from
courts, he said. Another participant added that as a
result of unemployment among former government employees
and anger at perceived military abuses, "Iraq is about to
explode."
5., 9. ,t1t RC responded that 1St ID Commander, MG Batiste,
took these concerns seriously and tried to minimize
problems, but that Coalition Forces had to deal with
security concerns when they arose. That included returning
fire when they were attacked and pursuing wanted personnel.
In response to concerns expressed about slow-moving
convoys, she said that convoys had been attacked in the
past and that soldiers were only ensuring their own
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00405

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00405
security when they forbade other vehicles to pass.
Talking to All, Developing Women's Role
6.4setsi A Samarra journalist who participates in the
program said that CPA had failed to give Iraqis the rights
enjoyed in the West. "Why not give us true American
democracy?" he asked. RC responded that democracy was not
perfect anywhere, but that CPA and Coalition Forces were
contributing to the development of democracy in Iraq. In
response tc the charge that CPA talked only to elites in
the government and ignored average Iraqis, she said that
CPA was reaching out to all levels of society and at the
same time was working with government councils in order to
develop democratic institutions.
7.40%4 -RC agreed with a participant from Tuz about the
importance of promoting human rights and women's rights and
encouraging women's participation in the political process.
"We must be able to hear the voices of women we're working
with in the provincial councils to increase the number of
women, helping women to become politicians."
Iraq After June 30
8.441004 -Regarding the immediate future, RC said that
nations that had been hesitant to establish a presence in
Iraq before June 30 will begin to arrive after an Iraqi
government assumes sovereignty, and at the same time
Coalition nations would maintain a strong presence. The
United Nations was still developing plans for Iraqi
elections leading up to a permanent constitution, she
added. One idea under renewed discussion was the convening
of a consultative congress to advise the interim
government. Regardless, she said, "Iraqis will govern the
country themselves. UN partners will be able to help."
9..W464 RTI Tikrit Team Leader Suhair Al-Mossuli told the
group that the DDA program could help by creating bonds
among people at different levels of society. RC added that
evidence of such cooperation gave her hope. "When I travel
around the region, I'm made optimistic by seeing people
work together." She said she understood that the
participants' concerns and questions represented the
concerns of Iraqis they worked with in democracy dialogues,
and likewise she urged them to explain the views of CPA and
Coalition Forces when they had these discussions.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00405

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00405
10.1TMPI—Comment. The sharp tone of the exchange was a
departure from previous discussions with participants in
this program, who tend to focus more on building democracy
than on perceived misdeeds of Coalition Forces and CPA.
The recent publication of photos of abused prisoners no
doubt contributed to the confrontational atmosphere. We
believe the discussion offered a useful opportunity to
clear the air and expect that the participants will follow
the RC's request to explain our perspective in their
discussions on the future of Iraqi democracy. End Comment.
BREMER
BT
#0405
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00405

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00408
Laser::
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
MAY 0 5 2004
DISSEMINATION: EXEC
CHARGE: FROG
APPROVED: RJONES
DRAFTED: JKWESTON
CLEARED: JWARL:CK, ALORENZ, FMARCH, EENGELBREKTSSEN
VZCZCBGI163
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNDT RUEHC
DE RUEHGB #0408 1252128
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 0421282 MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0814
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0775
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK YY 0026
INFO RUEHC/UN SE COLLECTIVE
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD C00408
.NO ITI VE
STATE FOR NEA/IR RRAPHEL; IO/PHO GSOUTHERN
USUN FOR AHILLMAN, AMB KENNEDY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, PINS, PTE, EAID
SUBJECT: CPA 1064: Oil-for-Food: Goods'
authentication/verification post-June 30 and new UNSCR
language
1. .144B444- Summary. Continuation of Oil-for-Food goods'
authentication services -- currently performed by the
Cotecna company -- requires reconsideration in advance of
Iraq's June 30 sovereignty transfer date. Many Iraqis have
expressed strong opposition to any follow-on authentication
procedures and would prefer to return to normal commercial
practices. The new Security Council resolution under
interagency discussion provides an opportunity to remove
strict requirements for independent authentication which
were imposed to prevent sanctions violations but did little
to control corruption. Such a modification would also be
in keeping with stated Iraqi desires for greater economic
autonomy. We recommend new procedures for remaining OFF
contracts that include audits and external verifications.
End Summary.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD C0408

UNCLAS BAOHDAD 00408
IRAQI SENSITIVITIES
2.408Wil—Iraqi officials in Baghdad have argued against
retaining authentication services post-July 1. They stress
that the current Cotecna service is unnecessary, costly and
subject to corruption because goods are verified as
delivered at the border, not at the end destination in
Iraq. They further emphasize that Iraq should return to
normal commercial practices; third-party authentication,
while necessary when Iraq was under UN sanctions, would
hinder their efforts to stand-up internal capacity to
handle receipt and verification of OFF contracts.
TECHNICAL ISSUES
3.4reliM- Extending the authentication mechanism would
require additional steps and commitments by CPA and/or
Iraqis, most of which would prove cumbersome. The existing
authentication database, currently hosted by UN Treasury,
would have to be maintained - whether in NY or elsewhere;
additionally, each Iraqi Ministry would require access to
this database which would be difficult to accomplish. Any
amendments to existing OFF contracts would need to be
transmitted to the database administrator fcr entry.
SUPPLIER CONCERNS
4./7.9EMi* A preliminary survey of OFF suppliers indicates
that many would not/not oppose discontinuation of the
current authentication mechanism. Suppliers that have
traditionally been viewed negatively by Iraqi Ministries
due to shoddy products or unreliability in past OFF phases,
however, might raise concerns about a "changed" system. We
believe any such concerns would likely be small in number
and manageable.
5.-(416€4- Communicating to suppliers a shift from
authentication to verification could be accomplished via
the Coordination Center website, as well through UN
Missions in New York. A transition pericd, beginning in
early June (or as soon as a resolution is adopted), would
allow sufficient time for the message to be conveyed to all
suppliers.
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION
6. +iiNA14-. We support a system for OFF and other contracts
that provides for independent audits and verification of
deliveries to warehouse, silos, and other sites. We have
preliminarily discussed with the Board of Supreme Audit a
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 03438

LNCLAS BAGHDAD 00408
verification system; under this proposal, BSA would employ
an outside audit firm on contract to "spot-check"
deliveries and audit contracts and inventory records. The
independent verification should provide reassurance to
suppliers that the procurement process is transparent and
reliable. It will also ensure a higher level of
accountability.
7. 46644. We recommend that any new Security Council
resolution eliminate the requirement for independent
authentication, as such a requirement would likely result
in the continuation of Cctecna. In its place, we suggest
language that would provide for a system allowing
independent audits or verification based on normal
commercial practice. Such language should also allow the
IIG to assume contracts without amending letters of credit.
BREMER
ET
#0438
NNYN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00408

E ONFIBONTtAL BAGHDAD 00409
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
MAI 0 5 2004
APPROVED: RHJCNES
DRAFTED: TFITZGERALD
CLEARED: SBUCCI, EUSHER, ?BOYNTON, BMILLER
VZCZCBGI166
CO RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUCAACC RUCND7
DE RUEHGB #0409/01 1252132
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 042132Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0815
RHENNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMED:ATE 3776
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NY 0027
BT
CONFIiiENTI*LCECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000409
2.0. 12958: DECL: 05/03/14
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, MARS, PREL, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1063: May 3 Emergency Action Committee
Meeting: Assessment of Current Situation in Najaf and
Maysan
REF: A) BAGHDAD 372/CPA 1024, B) STATE 97324, C) STATE
98140
1. 4414. Summary. At the May 3 Emergency Action Committee
(EAC) meeting, CPA and CJTF-7 reviewed the current security
situation in all seventeen provincial posts according zo
four criteria: CPA mission activity level; threat level;
security posture; and post sustainability (Ref A). They
focused specifically on the current situation in Najaf and
Maysan, where the level of recent attacks had risen
sharply, calling for a more detailed breakdown of the non-
essential contractor staff at those two provincial posts
order no determine whether they should remain. In
addition, the LAO sought to achieve a standardized
definition across all 17 regional posts of essential and
non-essential personnel. The EAT also decided to recommend
C 0N7IDDNTIAL BAGHDAD 00409

o NrI DDNTIAL BAGHDAD 00409
that Administrator Bremer consider getting out in front of
the story of U.S. soldiers having abused detainees at Abu
Ghraib prison. The group thought that Ambassador Bremer's
emphasis on the fact that the story was emerging because
the soldiers had already been investigated and charged with
criminal offenses might help calm public sentiment. List
of meeting attendees is at pare 9. End Summary.
2.4Q4-Deputy Administrator Ambassador Richard Jones
chaired an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting Monday,
May 3, which covered several agenda items: 1) whether the
threat posture for AmCits in Iraq needed to be raised in
the wake of the attack on Western contractors in Saudi
Arabia (Ref B); 2) what to do about the severely negative
press reports about the mistreatment of detainees at the
Abu Ghraib prison; 3) a review of the security and
sustainability status of all 17 regional posts; and 4)
options for CPA's Office in Najaf and Maysan as the
security situation in those locales has deteriorated. The
EAC first considered the security situation in Iraq with
respect to the terrorist attack on civilian contractors in
Yanbu, Saudi Arabia. Jones noted that U.S. civilian
personnel in Iraq were already operating at the highest
level of security posture. He and the committee considered
whether another warden message to AmCits in Iraq might be
warranted in the wake of the Yanbu attack, but ultimately
agreed that there was nothing more to be gained with a new
one, having just encouraged Americans in a warden message
the week before to urgently review their personal security
situations (Ref A).
3. -*+-Governance Director Scott Carpenter cautioned that
all his Iraqi contacts had warned that the headline stories
of the U.S. soldiers allegedly abusing Iraqi detainees at
Abu Ghraib prison were going to have a strong impact on
Iraqi public opinion and make the security situation for
Americans in Iraq much worse. Ambassador Jones noted that
this was actually an old story - the events in questions
had occurred months ago and an investigation had begun as
far back as January 2004. The photographs running on
Western and Arab news programs over the past few days were
apparently part of the evidence collected in the criminal
investigation. Jones asked whether Ambassador Bremer
should address this issue on Iraqi media. Strategic
Communications Director Robert Tappan stated that Bremer
had a weekly Iraqi TV availability, providing an
opportunity as needed. He pointed out that IGC member Dr.
Mowaffaq al Rubaie had been on Iraqi TV pointing out that a
few bad apples did not tell the full story of the U.S.
presence in Iraq.
CONPID3NTIA1 BAGHDAD 00409

T I BAGHDAD 00409
4. 444--Deputy Chief Operating Officer SG Ed Usher noted
that some of the soldiers had already had their cases
investigated by the military equivalent of a grand jury.
The group concluded that it would be good for Ambassador
Bremer to use Iraqi media to emphasize that justice was
being rendered and those found culpable for criminal
actions would be punished. The Office of General Counsel
would be consulted cn exact language for the Administrator
to use. UK Military Adviser to Ambassador Richmond Ian
Blanks added that the accusations against British soldiers
for similar allegations of abuse of detainees were also
being thoroughly investigated. Steven Smith, CPA Chief of
Staff, suggested that Ambassador Bremer might point cut
that all prisons where detainees had been held in Iraq were
being investigated for any signs of abuse.
ASSESSMENTS OF PROVINCIAL POSTS
5. The EAC then reviewed the current security
assessments for all seventeen provincial posts to determine
whether any actions, were warranted at this time.
((BACKGROUND NOTE: CJTF-7, CPA Office of the Director for
Infrastructure and Operations and the Regional Operations
Office have compiled assessments of each of the seventeen
provincial posts, focusing on four elements: level of the
CPA mission activity (defined by the CPA Governance
Office), level of tnreat (defined by CJTF-7), security
costure (defined by CJTF-7 and Regional Ops), and
sustainability of the post (defined by Regional Ops and
KBR). Each element is coded red (severely restricted
operations), yellow (restricted operations), or green
(unrestricted operations). Each element has different
criteria for determining color code, such as ability to
continue reconstruction and development tasks (CPA mission
activity), enemy ability to conduct coordinated attacks
(threat level), co-location with CJTF-7 military support
unit (security situation), and days of supply of water,
food, fuel (sustainability). Each post has or is in the
process of developing an evacuation plan, which will
ideally be coordinated and rehearsed with its nearest
military supporting unit. End Background Note.))
6.4‘.). EAC members took note that the threat levels for
Tikrit, Babil, Basrah, and Nasariyah had one from amber to
red in the past week, while Baqubah, Mosui, Kirkuk, Al
Amarah (in Maysan Governorate), al Diwaniyah, Ramadi,
Karbala, Najaf and Wassit had remained red. RSO Bill
Miller observed that Najaf had endured eight mortar attacks
in the month from March 12 tc April 12, but had experienced
C 0NrI0ENTIAL BAGHDAD 00409

CeFrIDCHTIAL BAGHDAD 004 09
34 more hits since April 12, including several more rounds
that morning. However, logistics for several posts had
moved from amber to green as the supply routes had improved
and KBR convoys were operating more steadily.
7. 444..Ambassador Jones asked whether the EAC should
consider removing non-essential personnel and selected
contractors. from Najaf and al Amara in Maysan in
particular. In Najaf the essential personnel could rely
upon logistics support from recently co-located U.S. forces
there. EAC members determined that the PSD in Najaf would
still be needed, but more information was needed on the KBR
contractors to determine which ones could be pulled out.
General Usher noted that many of the KBR cooks and other
support personnel were locals who could simply be
instructed not to report for work.
S. +64- In Maysan, COL Frank Boynton of the Regional
Operations Center noted that the Governorate Coordinator's
Office in al Amarah had begun to take more frequent and
more accurate mortar fire from a closer range. He said he
would be meeting with !(BR management after the EAC to
review the status of its personnel in the reqions. Jones
requested that Boynton obtain greater specificity on the
types of personnel at critical locations so that a
determination could be made soon on their need to remain or
not, especially for Najaf and Maysan. The EAC urged COL
Boynton to develop a standardized definition on essential
and non-essential personnel throughout the region to
simplify EAC decision-making on drawdowns. The group
discussed improving HF radio communications at several
regional posts. Radios had been installed at four new
locations, but technical difficulties at three of them
meant they were not yet fully operational. The
instructions in Ref C came in after the May 3 EAC meeting
and will be addressed at the next one.
ATTENDEES
9. (0) List of Attendees:
--Deputy Administrator Ambassador Richard Jones, Chief
Policy Officer
--General Ed Usher, USMC, Deputy COO
--Colonel Frank Boynton, - JSMC, Chief of Staff for
:nfrastructure Directorate
--Colonel Steven Bucci, USA, Military Assistant to CPO
--Joe Adamczyk, Deputy Director office of Regional
Operations
BAGHDAD 00409

BAGHDAD 00409
--Andrea Reidy, Director, UK Coordination Office
--Colonel David Homer, Deputy C-3, CJTF-7 (UK)
--Ambassador John Holzman, Chief, Transition Team
--Paul Boyd, U.S. Consul
--Bill Miller, RSO
--Scott Carpenter, Director, Governance Office
--Stephen Smith, CPA Chief of Staff
--Dean Pittman, Deputy, Governance Office
--Colonel Thomas Husband, Director, Office of Special
Investigations
--Robert Tappan, Director, Strategic Communications
BREMER
BT
#0409
NITNN
0 OrrIDSUTLAb... BAGHDAD 00409

E. -
, F.C.STAT 98' 4 72
(b)(1)
SEC.STATE

eft 01 WI 1.9 SECSTATE 58140
10. (U) Mlnisraze cons:aerea.
POWELL
BT
#8140
NN
C 0 Nr IDENTIAL SECSTATE 98140
o

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00403
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: COS IPC
DISSEMINAT:ON: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LPEREMER
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: DNASH
CLEARED: CLEARED: SMILEY
MAY 0 4 2004
VZCZCBGI022
CO RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNDT
DE RUEHGB 40403 1240803
ZNR UULUU ZZH
0 030803Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0785
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0805
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0766
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NY 0025
2T
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000403
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PREL, EAID, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1062: Daily SITREP #7 - Accelerated Iraqi
Reconstruction Program
1.The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is
implementing an accelerated reconstruction program to
rapidly and visibly improve the daily lives cf citizens
in seven key cities. This effort includes previously
funded quick start work getting underway currently plus
prOjects that are being selected and funded now which
will result in additional immediate, mid-term and long-
term projects.
2.The plan includes reconstruction projects to be
executed by Coalition Military Commanders, the Program
Management Cffice (PMC) and governorate coordinators.
This new money is in addition to projects already
identified as part of the $18.4 billion U.S.
reconstruction and relief effort as well as funds
provided in Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
and Rapid Regional Response Program (R3P) categories
funded by DF: funds.
3.The PMC was tasked to coordinate the development and
execution of the seven-city reconstruction plan.
Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program (AIRP) teams
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00403

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00403
composed of representatives of Coalition Military
Commanders staffs, CPA Regional Governorates offices, and
PMO have visited the seven high priority cities and
compiled a prioritized list of projects. Ambassador
Bremer approved the following initial additional DFI
funding allocation for the seven cities: Baghdad ($40M),
Baquba ($20M), Tikrit/Samarah ($42M), Ramadi ($35M),
Fallujah ($35M), and Mosul ($20M). The AIRP teams have
worked closely with local government representatives to
ensure that the prcjects and their respective priorities
reflect the true needs of each community.
4.The plan is complete and the work is continuing on
previously funded work and commencing next week on newly
funded projects. This work has all been harmonized with
the work funded by the Suoplemental to ensure a
coordinated approach to the reconstruction of these
cities. CPA Program Management Office (PMO) was tasked by
Ambassador Bremer on 22 April to oversee the development
and execution of the plan to accelerate the
reconstruction effort. Joint teams consisting of CPA,
PMO, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation
(moPDC) and CJTF-7 members were formed to identify
unfunded high priority, high impact projects that can be
executed immediately in addition to other previously
funded work underway in each city.
5.The teams visited the seven Iraqi cities to meet with
the military and city leadership and obtained their most
pressing current reconstruction concerns. The teams
developed proposed protect lists, integrating
requirements from various scurces including: projects
funded by the FY04 Supplemental Appropriation, CPA local
projects, Ministry of Planning and Development
Cooperation projects provided to potential donors, and
the lists of projects planned by local military
commanders for their area.
PROJECT EXECUTION PROCESS
6.In addition to developing a prioritized listing of
•oro)ects, the joint teams developed for each project a
pre_iminary execution strategy. Wherever possible, the
responsibility for project execution was retained at the
fie...d command level to simplify the execution process and
to reinforce the field commander's position in the minds
of the community. For projects that were considered too
large or too technically complex, the PMO was assigned
execution responsibility using DPI funds. Upon receipt
of the approved project listing on 1 May, the execution
plan was reviewed and revalidated. The proposed project
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00403

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00403
list was sent to field commands for execution on 2 May.
7.The CPA contracting office is actively supporting
field commands to either award contracts that exceed the
warrant authority of military contracting officers or to
assist local contracting officers in awarding contracts
within their authority. In addition, the CPA contracting
office is assisting in contracting procedures and
coordinating CPA regional contracting officer assets.
8.As directed by Ambassador Bremer's 22 April 2004 memc
of direction, PMO has established a Regional Program
Coordinator organization cc coordinate, track, and report
the execution of these projects.
BREMER
BT
#0403
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00403

4
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00404
Laser].:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
MAY 0 4 2004
APPROVED: DRAFTED: POWERS
DRAFTED: AUTHORIZED: RJONES
CLEARED: CLEARED: RSPEER, EXECSEC, GWOLFE, JOSTER
VZCZCBGI029
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC
DE RUEHGB #0404/01 1240902
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030902Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0786
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0806
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NEC WASHDC 0767
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000404
E.O.: 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, KSPR, PREL, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1061: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PM0) REPORT
FOR MAY 1, 2004
1. Summary. This is the fifth in a series of weekly
reports documenting the activities of the Program
Management office. The status of programs and upcoming
challenges for ?MO, with an emphasis on accelerated
reconstruction, are at the end of the report. End Summary.
2. The 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan
provided funding for reconstruction projects. PMO tracks
the progress of funds from appropriations until final pay-
out including OMB apportionments, CPA commitments, and
obligations. (Note: for these purposes, to commit is to
reserve funding, and obligation occurs with award of the
actual contract. End Note). The current status of each
sector, as reported to the Interagency Group on
April 29, is as follows:
Security and Law Enforcement
Of :he 62,976 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $1,576 million were committed and
$710 million were obligated.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00404

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00404
Electricity
Of the $2,536 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $1,824 million were committed and
$1,191 million were obligated.
Oil Infrastructure
Of the $1,701 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $1,366 million were committed and
$455 million were obligated.
Justice, Public Safety, and Civil Society, (Including
Democracy)
Of the $1,276 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $676 million were committed and
$282 million were obligated.
Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance
Of the $259 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $37 million were committed and
$32 million were obligated.
Roads, Bridges, and Construction
Of the $270 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $211 million were committed and
$8 million were obligated.
Health Care
Of the $512 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $31 million were committed and none were
obligated.
Transportation and Telecommunications
Of the $467 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $219 million were comm:.tted and
$22 million were obligated.
Water Resources and Sanitation
Of the $816 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $510 million were committed and
$41 million were obligated. Commitments went down this
week due to a pullback of funds pending a reallocation of
water project priorities.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00404

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00404
Private Sector Development
Of the $136 million total apportioned and approved by the
CPA Administrator, $54 million were committed and
$15 million were obligated.
3. Construction. Last week PMO awarded $19 million in
task orders in the Transportation and Communications Sector
for construction of village roads in nine Governorates.
This brings the total value of FY04 Supplemental-funded
pro7;ects under construction to slightly more than $1.5
billion. Work continued at the four existing New :raqi
Army sites (Al Kasik, Tadji, Umm Qasr and An Numahniya).
Premobilization activities were underway on the recently
awarded contracts for new bases at Tallil and Kirkuk, with
additional phases of construction at Al Kasik and Tadji.
4. Construction Security Impacts. Fewer laborers reoorted
for work due to security concerns. On 11-12 April, the
period of Arba'een, the number of Iraqi workers at four
labor intensive sites dropped to 20% of March employment
highs. Since then, the number of Iraqi laborers increased,
yet remains steady at 35% of the March highs. Work never
stopped at any of the sites and some of the reduction is
directly attributable to issues unrelated to security.
Compared to early April, security has improved and PM°
placed approximately $50 million of additional construction
this past week.
5. Non-Construction. During this reporting period, the
CPA-Contracting Activity awarded a total of 68 contracts
valued at $110 million. Of these 68 awards, 61 Involved
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) dollars valued at
$17 million and included purchases of police uniforms, riot
gear and weapons in the amount of $2.3 million. Seven
awards were made using Supplemental dollars and included
the purchase of vehicles for Iraqi forces and uniforms for
the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. A total of $14.4 million
was awarded this week under the newly established "Iraqi
Set-Aside" program. This program requires that any
contract valued at $500K or less must be awarded to an
Iraqi firm. Additionally, CPA awarded a contract valued at
$1.6 million to an Iraqi firm for the purchase of riot
police gear.
6. Non-Construction Security Impacts. Due to the security
situation in Iraq, many freight forwarders have suspended
all trucking/transportation services from Aqaba, Amman,
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00404

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00404
Kuwait and Dubai/UAE. Many other items of ecuipment are
also held up at points of entry into Iraq. As an example,
shipments held up in Amman include exchanger tubes and
turbine, parts for the Ministry of Interior. ?MO and CPA
continue to work with other coalition forces and
transportation firms to find alternate ways into the
country.
7. Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program. Last week,
we continued to target areas in :rag for accelerated relief
and reconstruction. The goals of the program are to
identify key locations that offer the ability to
immediately start useful projects and employ Iraqi labor.
Cur initial review recommends near-term projects worth
$252 million. Projects will be funded with DFI using the
best vehicle of execution to include Commanders Emergency
Relief Program (CERP), Regional Rapid Response Program
1R0P) and PMO contracts.
BREMER
ST
#0404
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00404

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00399
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
MAY 0 3 2004
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER
DRAFTED: CRAFTED: DGOMPERT
CLEARED: CLEARED: RTAPPAN, TFITZGERALD
VZCZCBGI995
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB #0399 123.824
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021624Z MAY 04
PM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEP WASHDC 0781
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0801
RHEHNSC/WEITE HOUSE NSC WASEDC 0762
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAO COLLECTIVE
BI
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000399
•1 1,6iiirmipiWiLEP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, PGOV, PINS, PTSR, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1058: Public Guidance on Fallujah Auxiliary
Force
(U) The following guidance has been agreed between
CPA/CJTF7 and Iraqi ministers.
2. 4449M140.The goals cf Iraqi and Coalition authorities in
Fallujah are clear and unchanged: restore government control
and the rule of law in the city; take custody of all heavy
weapons; and eliminate the foreign terrorists and Saddamist
criminals that have committed atrocities. Every effort is
being made to achieve these goals without military
escalation. Several initiatives are underway.
3. 4411114,14.0ne such initiative is to assemble ex-soldiers
from the Fal:ujah area and to use them as an auxiliary unit
under Coalition command and control to help restore order
and achieve our goals. We call upon the people of Fallujah
to cooperate with this auxiliary unit of Fallujan ex-
soldiers in securing the city and isolating foreign
terrorists and Saddamist criminals.
4. 4.6fil64.-This is a temporary unit assembled for the special
UNCLAS BAGHDAD. 00399

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00399
conditions of Fallujah. It is not a part of the Iraqi Armed
Forces.
5.446454 -As conditions permit, regular Mo: and MoD forces
will take over security duties in Fallujah.
6. 44664—When no longer required, the auxiliary unit will
be dissolved.
BREMER
BT
40399
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00399

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00401
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINAT:ON: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: RJONES
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: CWARD
CLEARED: CLEARED: DGOMPERT, TF:TZGERALD
VZCZCBGI006
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUCNDT
DE RUEHGB #0401 1232047
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 0220472 MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0784
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0804
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 07E5
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0016
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000401
MAY 03 L- JC4
E.O. 129E6: N/A
TAGS: PINS, ?TER, PGOV, PREL, MARR, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1059: Consulting on Themes of Security
Partnership
Ref: Baghdad 400/CPA 1056
1.14349434- Summary. After months of consultations, we have
reached a common assessment with the :raqis on the major
threats facing the country in the years to come. We also
agree in genera:, it not in detail, that Iraqi security
forces are not capable of dealing with those threats and
that therefore Coalition Forces will be needed in large
numbers after July 1. Most Iraqi interlocutors are
comfortable describing the new relationship as a
partnership, though they have not articulated their view of
what :hat means. The next step is to begin to inform Iraqi
thinking about the nature of the partnership. End summary.
2. 4aaw4. At a recent meeting with David Gompert, Senior
Advisor for National Security and Defense, Ayad Allawi,
chairman of the IGC security comm:ttee, proposed a path for
consultations on a security partnership with sovereign Iraq.
Allawi is a strong supporter of a security partnership and
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00401

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00401
would like to begin these discussions as soon as we are
ready. He intends to assist by hosting a series of dinners
for informal discussions between Iraqi and Coalition
national security leaders and opinion makers. This
mechanism was used in prior consultations and proved very
useful. Allawi recommends that we also use the Ministerial
Committee on National Security (MCNS; as a means of more
formal consultation. At the end of May, he proposes to
report to the Iraqi Governing Council on the results of the
consultations and on conclusions reached on the Iraai side.
Handled right, his process represents an opportunity to
shape Iraqi views on the partnership without compromising US
positions.
3. 4.09-V. urge that U.S. national security officials
consider visiting Baghdad in the next month to participate
in this discussion. This not only will demonstrate that
Iraq will be treated as a partner, but will also facilitate
a broader exchange of ideas and establish the contacts and
relationships that will be important for this partnership to
function effectively.
4. 4.64434-See reference cable for CPA input on partnership
themes that could form the basis for U.S. participation :In
such discussions.
BREMER
ST
#040:
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00401

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00399
Laser1:
ACT:ON: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
MAY 0 3 2004
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: DGOMPERT
CLEARED: CLEARED: RTAPPAN, TFITZGERALD
VZCZCBGI995
RR RUEKLICS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB #0399 1231824
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021824Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0781
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0801
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC C7E2
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000399
CENCID
E.C. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, PGOV, PINS, PTER, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1058: Public Guidance on Fallujah Auxiliary
Force
1. (U) The fallowing guidance has been agreed between
CPA/CqTF7 and :raai ministers.
2. 44844 The goals cf Iraqi and Coalition authorities in
Fallujah are clear and unchanged: restore government control
and the rule of law in the city; take custody of all heavy
weapons; and eliminate the foreign terrorists and Saddamist
criminals that have committed atrocities. Every effort is
being made to achieve these goals without military
escalation. Several initiatives are underway.
3. 4cmaii} One such initiative is to assemble ex-scldiers
from the FaIlujah area and to use them as an auxiliary unit
under Coalition command and control to help restore order
and achieve our goals. We call upcn the people of Fallujah
to cooperate with this auxiliary unit of Fallujan ex-
soldiers in securing the city and isolating foreign
terrorists and Saddamist criminals.
4. I5SM*p This is a temporary unit assembled for the special
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00399

UNCLAS 3AGHDAD 0099
conditions of Fallujah. It is not a part of the Iraqi Armed
Forces.
5. 4449iii.1- As condit.ions permit, regular MoI and MoD forces
will take over security duties in Falluah.
6.4.W.119W.} When no longer required, :he auxiliary unit will
be dissolved.
BREMER
aT
#C399
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 0C399

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00401
Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: RJONES
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: CWARD
CLEARED: CLEARED: DGOMPERT, TFITZGERALD
MAY 0 3 4
VZCZCBGI006
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUCNDT
DE RUEHGE #0401 1232047
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 022047Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0784
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0804
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0765
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0018
B7
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000401
• I TI VU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PTER, PGOV, PREL, MARR, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1059: Consulting on Themes of Security
Partnership
Ref: Baghdad 400/CPA 1056
1. Summary. After months of consultations, we have
reached a common assessment with the Iraqis on the major
threats facing the country in the years to come. We also
agree in general, if not in detail, that Iraqi security
forces are not capable of dealing with those threats and
that therefore Coalition Forces will be needed in large
numbers after July 1. Most Iraqi interlocutors are
comfortable describing the new relationship as a
partnership, though they have not articulated their view of
what that means. The next step is to begin to inform Iraqi
thinkino about the nature of the partnership. End summary.
2. .tewmt At a recent meeting with David Gompert, Senior
Advisor for National Security and Defense, Ayad Allawi,
chairman of the IGC security committee, proposed a path for
consultations on a security partnership with sovereign Iraq.
Allawi is a strong supporter of a security partnership and
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00401

UNCLAS BAGHDAD C0401
would like to begin these discussions as soon as we are
ready. He intends to assist by hosting a series of dinners
for informal discussions between Iraqi and Coalition
national security leaders and opinion makers. This
mechanism was used in prior consultations and proved very
useful. Allawi recommends that we also use the Ministerial
Committee on National Security (MCNs) as a means of more
formal consultation. At the end of May, he proposes tc
report to the Iraqi Governing Council on the results of the
consultations and on conclusions reached on the Iraqi side.
Handled right, his process represents an opportunity to
shape Iraqi views on the partnership without compromising US
positions.
3. *OW* we urge that U.S. national security officials
consider visiting Baghdad in the next month to participate
in this discussion This not only will demonstrate that
Iraq will be treated as a partner, but will also facilitate
a broader exchange of ideas and establish the contacts and
relationships that will be important for this partnership to
function effectively.
4. +MRS"' See reference cable for CPA input cn partnership
themes that could form the basis for U.S. participation in
such discussions.
BREMER
BT
#C4C1
NN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00401

CON7
_
,D _ITIAL BAGHDAD 00400
Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS MAY 0 3 2004
DISSEMINATION: EXEC
CHARGE: ?ROG
/1
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: ONSA/CWARD
CLEARED: CLEARED: DGOMPERT, TFITZGERALD, BATHHURST/CJTF7, RJCNES
VZCZCBGI002
00 RUEXJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUCNDT
DE RUEHGB #0400/01 1232031
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 022031Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEP WASHDC IMMEDIATE C782
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0802
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0763
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0016
BT
11:).... .SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000400
E.O. 12958: 5/2/2014
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PGOV, MARR,
SUBJECT: CPA 1056: Dialogue on Themes of Security
Partnership
Ref: Baghdad 348/CPA 998
-ellm.9Trdree-tril En.1145 tXECUT
13 (E U-),.
1. 4443ii+. Summary. CPA appreciates positive response from
Washington (via SVTS) to the approach to partnership-
building suggested in Ref A. With an increasingly
responsible national security leadership and the creation of
the IIG less than a month away, CPA intends tc begin
informal dialogue with various Iraqi interlocutors on some
themes of partnership ;below). Key Iraqis are comfortable
with the concept of a partnership, but want to hear about
and discuss what it means. End Summary.
2. 44341iii.). Beginning such a dialogue will increase Iraqi
confidence that we mean Iraq to be a :rue partner, and will
help to deemphasize a ncontractualv approach in favor of one
based on common purposes and effective consultative
machinery.
CCNFIDEN7 :AL BAGHDAD 00400

corriDru7 :A: BAGHDAD 00400
3. (U) As key Iraqis visit Washington and US officials
visit Baghdad in the weeks tc come, we urge that these
themes be reinforced.
4. 444...Themes of Partnership:
Common Goal: A secure environment for the development of
Iraqi democracy.
Full Iraqi Sovereignty: The II G will exercise full
sovereignty on behalf of Iraqi people. Seeking and
receiving international help in providing security is a
sovereign prerogative and responsibility.
Multinational Partnership: With the encouragement and
mandate of the UN, the United States, United Kingdom and as
many other countries as possible should join with sovereign
Iraq in forming a security partnership in pursuit of the
common goal. Thus, a foreign Coalition is replaced by a
unified partnership with Iraq at its center.
Leadership: rn this partnership, Iraq and the United States
will take the lead - Iraq by virtue of its sovereign
responsibility and scale of contribution and the United
States by virtue of its contribution and global standing.
Responsibilities: As leaders, Iraq and the United States
each have critical responsibilities:
Iraq: assign forces to the MNF-I and officers to its command
and control structure; operate Iraqi police operate in close
cooperation with the MNF-I; continue to improve police and
military forces; provide adequate funding and support to
man, train and equip Iraqi forces to a high standard;
provide intelligence to its partners; uphold internal
security laws; and provide the MNF-I the support and
latitude it needs to succeed.
The United States: provide large combat forces to back
internal security and deter foreign aggression; provide
training, advisory and other assistance in manning,
training, and equipping Iraq police and military forces;
command the MNF-I; provide intelligence to its partners; and
use its influence to urge neighboring and other countries to
foster security in Iraq.
Effectiveness of security operations: The partnership
relies on effective operations of security forces. This
requires capable command and control of both police and
military forces, as well as close coordination between the
two command-and-control chains. Within the partnership:
C ONn•IDErTIAL BAGHDAD 00400

CONFID-DNT:AL BAGHDAD 00400
Iraq's MoI
is responsible for police operations; the unified
command of
MNF-I is responsible for military operations;
Iraq's MoD
is responsible for providing high-quality forces
to the MNF-
I and officers tc the MNF-I unified command.
Partnership policy guidance, consultations and decision-
making: Like any military force, the mNF-I will need
guidance on broad objectives and missions. This guidance
should be shaped by the partnership, based on a common
assessment of the threats to Iraq's democratic development
and a common view of how to defeat those threats.
Thereafter, a contact group, consisting of high
representatives of major partnership governments and the
Commander MNF-:, should consult on any changes in objectives
cr missions and on especially sensitive operations. In
addition, the Commander ?'4F-I will convene a council to
ensure close coordination with MoI and MoD. (Note: CPA
appreciates the difficulty of balancing the need for clear
guidance to .F-I with the need for unity in the
partnership. This question requires extensive reflection
and debate within the USG. The purpose here is to stimulate
that debate in preparation for questions sure to be raised
by our Iraqi partners.)
Information Sharing: Two-way sharing of intelligence and
other information will be essential for the strategic,
operational and tactical effectiveness of the partnership.
Key Iraqi officials and officers will have access to needed
information. As Iraq develops its ability to protect
classified information, this sharing will be
institutionalized.
A Common Approach in the Region: The policies of Iraq's
neighbors will have a large effect on creating a secure
environment for its democratic path. The partners will
cintly expand and deepen regional security cooperation,
gain stronger regional support for defeating terrorism, and
dissuade and deter those who would impair progress toward a
secure democratic Iraq.
Growing Iraqi Responsibility: The partners are committed to
cooperate in the enhancement of Iraqi national security
institutions, police forces, military forces, intelligence
capabilities, and other instruments of security. The United
States will continue its effort to this end. For its part,
Iraq will take increasing operational responsibilities as
its institutions and capabilities grow. Via this dynamic,
Iraq's leading role in the partnership will expand. Even in
the background, the United States will do whatever is
necessary to ensure the success of democratic Iraq.
BREMER
BT
CONrIDDKTIAL BAGHDAD 00400

.C•••-E3'''44-•":""'-"-:::= I I BAG:AD D C 4 C 0
tz . 4 0
NIINN
E, 1:1 L BAGHDAD 0 0 4 0 0

BAGHDAD 00398
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: COS IPC
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
MAY 0 2 2004
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: RNEUMANN
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: DTESSLER
CLEARED: CLEARED: TBARTLETT CSUBETANCE),
ADEATON
VZCZCEGI949
PP RUEHAM RUEHC RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB #0398 1230534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P C205342 MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0042
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 080C
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0761
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 078C
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
Corr: DOKTIAIBAGHCAD 000398
E.O. 129E8: DECL: 05/01/14
TAGS: ?GOV, PREL, PTER, KCRM, JO, IZ
SUBJECT: OFF BY AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE
CLAOCIFIDD E 3==n ron ronn:oN =Inc aorno NEUMNII
474144-arshrE44441-4—i•B4-4.14Q-441 14-1-
REF: AMMAN 3301
1. 44-CPA/MFA works closely with Jordanian Liaison Mission
chief Demiye Hadad on the issue of Jordanian detainees in
Iraq. Hadad has emphasized to CPA/MFA the sensitivities
among many groups in Jordan about this subject, and CPA/MFA
continues to provide information on detainees as requests
arise. We also continue to remind Hadad that all detainees
are treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. In
addition, the Jordanian Liaison Mission is in contact with
the ICRC, which has access to detainees.
2. 444-According to CJTF-7, there are currently ten
Individuals who have identified themselves as Jordanian
nationals in Coalition custody. CPA/Ministry of Justice
reports there is one Jordanian national in the Iraqi
Corrections system. This total figure of Jordanians in
custody contrasts greatly with the allegations of a
Jordanian parliamentarian that there are 1000 missing or
C 1 ç L BAGHDAD 00398

C 0 I' I 3.4J ); detained Jordanians in Iraq (REF A).
BREMER
ET
#0398
NN
BAGHDAD 0 0 3 9 8
3AGH- 2,AD C0398

CON7IDD:ITIAL BAGHDAD 00397
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: :PC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC
CHARGE: ?ROG
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: SCARPENT
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: GOVERNANCE/
CLEARED: CLEARED: TFITZGERALD
VZCZCBGI939
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNDT
DE RUEHGB #0397/01 1222054
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 312054Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0778
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0798
RHEHNSC/WH:TE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0755
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3014
ST
C ONFIDENTIAIY MAY 0 2 2004
SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 300397
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, KISL. IZ,
SUBJECT: CPA 1055: CPA MEETING W:TH ADNAN ?ACHACHI
REF: BAGHDAD 00395/CPA 1052
1. Summary. On May 1, Iraqi Coverning Council (IGC)
member Adnan Pachachi discussed the Erahimi Plan for the
interim government. Despite his own personal agreement with
the plan, Pachachi noted that the overwhelming majority of
those consulted by both he and the IGC thus far believed
that the government should be chosen by a council of Iraqis
formed through a national conference. Pachachi also
disagreed with Brahimi's proposed ban on the interim
government's President, Deputy Presidents, and Prime
Minister from running for office in the January 2005
elections. When asked about his own preferred candidate for
a Shi'a Prime Minister, Pachachi stated that he had heard
three names mentioned as possibilities - SCIRI deputy Adil
Mehdi, Mehdi al Hafez (Pachachi's former deputy and the
current Minister of Planning), and Minister of Defense Ali
Allawi. End Summary.
2.4'64. On May 1, CPA Director of Governance Scott Carpenter
C ON:IDECT :AL BAGHDAD 00397

CQ/7 IDZMTIAL BAGHDAD 00397
met with Adnan Pachachi to discuss issues surrounding the
establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG).
Pachachi indicated that the IGC had held three formal
consultation/outreach meetings to date. Thus far, he said,
the majority of Iraqis with whom the IGC had met felt that
the new government should be chosen by a council of Iraqis
to emerge from a national conference. Pachachi stated that
he personally supported the broad outlines of Brahimi's
plan, but he felt that the Iraqi public would demand a
broader role be given to a larger consultative assembly. He
noted that he had made the argument tc Iraqis that there was
not encuch time to convene a national conference prior to
June 30. Accordingly, he proposed that an alternative means
of granting the assembly greater powers, and thereby gaining
it greater acceptance among Iraqis, would be to give it
legislative authority (though all legislation would need to
be initiated by the Cabinet), and the mandate to have a vote
of confidence in the interim government in July. Pachachi
emphasized that most Iraqis did not support the idea of a
purely advisory council without any real substantive role.
3.4G4.. The conversation moved on to discuss the current
Cabinet. When asked, Pachachi indicated that a number of
current ministers were doing excellent work, and should not
be removed from office on July 1. He recommended retaining
the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs,
Planning, Water Resources, and Municipalities & Public
Works. He also strongly recommended keeping the current
Minister of Education in the Cabinet, but perhaps moving him
to the Ministry of Health. He also gave an endorsement
(though not as strong as those given to the others) to the
current Minister of Electricity, a Pachachi appointee.
4.444-.0h the mechanisms for forming the IIG, Pachachi
recommended that the President, Deputy Presidents, and Prime
Minister be selected first. The PM could then play an
active role in helping to put together his Cabinet. He said
that the bulk of the IIG's power should be exercised by the
Cabinet, but that the Presidency should also have the
ability to veto or approve major Cabinet decisions. The
Presidency should oversee the Cabinet's work, but without
interfering in the day-to-day operations of the government
5. When asked about Brahimi's suggestion that members of
the IIG pledge not to stand for elected office in January
2005, Pachachi objected. He argued that it would be
especially important for the President, Deputy Presidents,
and Prime Minister to be political figures, and that it
would not be wise to ban them from running for office in
January.
C 0 4IDE T 1 1.. L BAGHDAD C0397

CCNrIDEYTiAL BAGHDAD C0397
6. When asked about specific candidates for PM,
Pachachi, noting that his remarks were premised on the
assumption that the PM would have to be a Shi'a Arab, said
chat he had heard three names mentioned as possibilities -
SCIRI deputy Adil Mehdi, Mehdi al afez (Pachachi's former
deputy and the current Minister of Planning), and Minister
of Defense Ali Allawi. (Comment: In previous meetings
Pachachi had expressed his support for Adil Mehdi; he was
more ambiguous in this session. End comment.)
7.4.9*. Comment. Pachachi's comments suggest two possible
challenges with carrying forth the Brahimi Plan as currently
envisioned. The first concerns the role to be played by the
consultative council. It may be necessary to give it a
number of substantive authorities to make it popularly
acceptable - even if these authorities do not include the
right to select the interim government or to legislate. T he
second potential problem is Brahimi's preference that
members of the IIG not stand for office in January 2005.
Not surprisingly, Pachachi agrees with many of his fellow
politicians on the IGC that the IIG should not be purely
technocratic, and that at the very least members of the
Presidency and the Prime Minister should be political
figures. End Comment.
BREMER
BT
#C397
NNNN
OYFIDDrTIAL BAGHDAD C0397

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00394
Laserl:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: :PC COS
DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
HAY 0 2 26C4
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: RNEUMANN
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: PDOUGHERTY/
CLEARED: CLEARED: AMORRISON
VZCZCBGI916
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHGB #0394/01 1221441
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011441Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0772
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0793
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHD 07E4
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE /
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDiD 000394
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, KDEM KWMN, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1051: BAGHDAD TOO HALL MEETING: DIALOGUE ON
THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATINE LAW
1. Summary. A public forum n Iraq's Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL) was eld on April 25, 2004 in
1
Baghdad, the latest in a well attended series of meetings
here and across the nation. - 'vet 150 Baghdad residents
from all districts of the ciliy and all ethnic and religious
croups were present, along wi.h three members of the Iraqi
Governing Council (:GC). Two dozen journalists from
Baghdad's local press corps c vered the event, as well as
representatives from international media outlets. Dozens
of citizens actively question-id IGC members Dr. Mahmoud
Othman, Ezzedine Salim, and Aimed al-Barak on individual
rights, federalism, civil riglits and liberties, the current
security situation, equal protection under law and the
process for creating a permanent government. Debate was
vigorous but cordial and marked by knowledgeable and
thoughtful queries. :GC memblrs were generally
constructive and informative ith their comments, but had
no qualms about contradictinc and criticizing the CPA,
including one statement by Dr. Othman, severely criticizing
the Coalition's security p:an. End Summary.
2. Panelists. The followinobraqi Governing Council
i
UNCLASI BAGHDAD 00394

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00394
members served as panelists and spoke on key elements of
the TAL:
-- Dr. Mahmoud Othman, a Sunni Kurd who held various posts
in the Kurdistan Democratic Party in the 1960s and whc
founded the Kurdish Socialist Party in London, focused on
the rule of law;
Ezzedine Salim, a Shia and head of the Da'wa Islamic
Party based in Basra, focused on decentralization.
-- Ahmed al-Barak, a Shia and head of the union of lawyers
and human rights league in the central city of Babylon,
focused on individual rights; .
3. Audience. The audience consisted of a diverse cross-
section of Baghdad society, including officials from all
jurisdictional levels of councils Provincial, Regional,
District, Neighborhood), women, business people, academics,
lawyers, members cf Non-Governmental Organizations WGO's,
and sheiks. Audience members were vetted by CPA staff and
selected based on attendance at other democracy-building
events. Participants at this meeting were generally well-
versed on specifics of the Transitional Administrative Law,
its substance and procedures. This was somewhat expected,
as a large portion of the attendees were locally-elected
officials in Baghdad.
4. Setting. For security reasons, organized by CPA's
Baghdad Central Office, the event was held at a conference
room in the Baghdad Convention Center, within the Green
Zone. Audience members were provided Arabic language event
brochures and a booklet on the TAL. Over 40 domestic and
international press outlets were represented and the event
was broadcast live on Iraqi Media Network (IMN) as well as
taped for future broadcasting and other distribution by IMN
and the Armed Forces Network.
S. The Moderator, Gorges Bakoos, a member of the Iraqi
Reconstruction and Development Council IRDC), began with a
description of the agenda as well as the ground rules for
the question and answer period of the event. He gave a
general overview of the various 'tenets" of the TAL and
introduced the panelists.
6. Dr. Mahmoud Othman focused on the legitimacy of the
TAL. He discussed the development and agreement on the TAL
as a historic shift from rule of one person to rule of law
and an abandonment of the heritage of the Hussein Regime.
The fact that Iraqis across the spectrum of religious and
cultural beliefs could agree on the TAL was an
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00394

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00394
accomplishment. He closed by noting that while there were
shortcomings in the TAL which must be addressed, Iraqis
themselves would resolve any and all issues.
7. Ezzedine Salim discussed decentralization of authority
as a guarantee against a return to tyranny, particularly
the local councils that have been established by local
communities. He noted that these administrative units,
divided geographically, would minimize any dictatorial
moves by a higher jurisdiction, protect the rights of
minorities, and provide for better services, as local
government was more attuned to the needs of the local
community. He urged that there was a role for a federal
government to address national level issues that required
one product or service, such as one army, one currency,
etc. He pointed out that Federalist states were the most
stable and offered the best model for Iraq; federalism in
the region actually dated back to the Ottoman Empire.
6. Ahmed al-Barak discussed individual rights and noted
that under Saddam, Iraq had a constitution which covered
human rights but was useless. Assurances were needed to
guarantee real human rights, and that was what was being
developed through independent courts and elections. He
also pointed out that equal treatment under the law,
including travel, peaceful demonstrations and freedom of
speech had been codified, as had economic guarantees such
as social security and jobs. He closed by noting the New
Iraq would respect people for their humanity regardless of
race, ethnicity, gender or nationality.
9._ Questions and Answers. During the auestion period,
auaience members asked questions or made statements on:
-- The make-up of the interim Iraqi acvernment after the
June 30 transition and standards for its membership. All
three IGC members said that the IGC, CPA and the UN were in
discussions on this issue and hoped to have a plan in May.
-- The overall legitimacy of the TAL. One audience member
noted that the TAL was created under an occupation and not
voted on popularly. Mr. Salim replied that the TAL was a
start in the right direction, especially in this period of
transition.
TAL Article 61(c). There was criticism of this article,
which contained a perceived "Kurdish veto power" (via
referendum) over the draft permanent constitution.
TAL goal of 25% female Assembly. Dr. Othman said it was
a worthy goal and that he hoped that the country could
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00394

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00394
surpass the 254' target.
-- Concern with Arabic and Kurdish being the official
languages (as Iraq would cease to be an "Arab" country).
-- Concerns over restoring properties as well as legal
rights for people who had fled the former Regime. The
discussion was in favor of addressing these concerns, which
were echoed by all IC members.
-- Overall security concerns. Dr. Othman described the
Coalition's security plan as terrible and said that he was
anxious for Iraqis to reclaim control of security duties.
10. The Moderator encouraged those present to attend the
next Baghdad Town Hall meeting on May 15, 2004, which would
focus on the make up of the interim Iraqi government and
the electoral system for choosing the :raqi National
Assembly. He assured participants that the meeting would
be broadcast on IMN TV so that the people all over Iraq
could hear their opinions. He also noted that IGC and
Coalition authorities would receive their written comments
and questions.
BREMER
BT
#0394
NNNN
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00394

C nripPmk7 IAL
BAGHDAD 00395
Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS
DISSEMINATICN: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG
MAI 02 c004
APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LBREMER
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: GOVERNANCE/
CLEARED: CLEARED: RJONES, SCARPENTER, TFITZGERALD
VZCZCBGI928
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNDT
DE RUEHGB #0395/01 1221815
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011815Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0775
RUBHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0795
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHMC 0756
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0012
ET
"'
... r...66.41.4.41. SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000395
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, KISL, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1052: SHIA CAUCUS AND THE IIG
CLAO3IrIDD AtICACOADO:1 L. rAUL Dn=mn III ron R=ACONC 1,1
444••••Zeiliet••4B4..
1.-00*-Summary. Recent CPA conversations with Supreme
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) deputy Adil
Mehdi and Iraqi National Congress (INC) leader Ahmad Chalabi
suggest that the Shia caucus is developing a unified
response to the Brahimi Plan for forming the Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG). This response is likely to focus more on
the composition of the government than on the process by
which it is chosen. The Shia caucus (perhaps excluding Dawa
leader Ibrahim Jaafari) is likely to present a unified
position to Ayatollah Sistani for his approval before
submitting it to the United Nations and CPA. This unified
position will almost certainly include a proposal that Adil
Mehdi become Prime Minister under the ZIG. The Coalition
should encourage UN Envoy Brahimi to consult with Sistani as
soon as possible to promote his vision of a technocratic,
non-partisan interim government. End Summary.
2. Over the past few days, CPA staff have had separate
detailed conversations with Adil Mehdi and Ahmad Chalabi
concerning the Brahimi Plan for forming the I:G. Both men
cotIDSPITi AL BAGHDAD 00395

co:: BAGHDAD C0395
appeared willing to accept the general outlines of the plan.
(Though Chalabi noted that there was still a desire among
some to have an expanded Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)
choose the presidency and Prime Minister. In a May 1 meeting
Bahr al-Uloum made the same point to Ambassador Bremer, and
so the idea is still alive.) Both disagreed vehemently,
however, with the idea that the leaders of the new
government should be technocrats free of any political
affiliation. Both affirmed their view that the Shia caucus
;and even the IGC) would be capable of developing an agreed
list of candidates for the various posts.
3. 4E+-Both men indicated that the leading Shia figures had
been in touch with the religious authorities concerning a
coordinated response to Brahimi's proposals. Mehdi said
that he had discussed the Brahimi plan in Najaf with
Mohammed Ridha and Ayatollah Mohammed Said al-Hakim, and
that they had agreed that the composition of the new
government would be the key factor in judging its
acceptability. Chalabi volunteered that the Shia caucus of
the IGC had been approached in recent days by
representatives of Ayatollah Sistani, who (Chalabi claimed)
was eager to agree on a unified approach to the Brahimi Plan
together with Iraq's leading Shia politicians before making
his views known publicly and to the UN.
4. wi.r.p.). If such a unified Shia position develops, it is
highly likely that it will endorse Adil Mehdi as Prime
Minister (though this unified position is not likely to be
endorsed by Jaafari, who is not part of the Hakim, Mehdi,
Bahr al-Uloum, Chalabi Shia inner circle;. Mehdi has
already indicated to CPA officials his desire to serve as
Prime Minister. Last night, Chalabi declared that Mehdi
would receive his endorsement as well. Adnan Pachachi has
twice told CPA that Mehdi was the best Shia candidate for
Prime Minister, and Mehdi himself claims to have the support
of the KG? and PUK (though CPA has not received confirmation
of this directly from Barzani or Talabani).
5. -Eel -Leaving aside the fact that the Brahimi Plan appears
to envision a Prime Minister whc does not have a clear
political-party affiliation, CPA believes that Mehdi would
be the best of any possible Shia Islamist candidates.
Mehdi's instincts are far more moderate than those of Abdel-
Aziz al-Hakim or Jaafari. He is a brilliant analytical
thinker and an effective advocate who has shown an ability
to work well with individuals across the political spectrum.
The chief problem with Mehdi as Prime Minister, of course,
would be the extensive ties that he and SCIRI have with the
Iranian government. Mehdi would also be likely to bring
Ahmad Chalabi into a leading ministerial position in the new
BAGHDAD 00395

GOKr:DEKTIAL BAGHDAD 0039S
acvernment (unless Chalabi were chosen to serve as Deputy
President).
6. 115+- In his May I meeting with Ambassador Bremer, Bahr al-
Uloum threw an entirely new idea on the table. He argued
strongly for a Shia President because this would be a great
symbolic gesture to the Shia, who have been out of power for
a hundred years. He said he recognized that the Prime
Minister would have more power, but the "Shia people" would
be greatly swayed by seeing a Shia President.
2.-€0* Comment. The recent conversations with Mehdi and
Chalabi suggest that the IGC is likely to work within the
framework of the Brahimi Plan to achieve the outcome they
most desire - an interim government dominated by some cf the
leading political forces and figures. :f the Shia caucus
does not receive Sistani's support for their efforts, we
have little to fear. If Sistani does support the Shia
caucus in any particular formula, the political pressure on
the UN and CPA to accede to his demands will be difficult -
if not impossible - to overcome. It is therefore critical
for the Coalition to head off any possible bargain within
the IGC that might gain Sistani's support. The most
important step will be tc encourage UN Envoy Brahimi to meet
with Sistani or his representatives as soon as possible, so
as to give him the opportunity to make a case for a pre-
dominantly technocratic, non-political interim government.
In addition, the Coalition will continue its efforts to
consult widely with other IGO members to determine where
they stand and promote Brahimi's vision. Bahr al-Uloum's
idea of a Shia President will not get much support from the
politicians. But he may be right that such a move would
garner support among the public which might be less
concerned about the intricacies of the day to day running of
the government and more attracted to the symbolism of cne of
their own "taking the salute". End comment.
BREMER
BT
#C395
NNNN
BAGHDAD 00395