S. HRG. 108–867
U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
APRIL 20, 2004
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JACK REED, Rhode Island
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BILL NELSON, Florida
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JUDITH A. ANSLEY, Staff Director
RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Democratic Staff Director
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C O N T E N T S
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
APRIL 20, 2004
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense ............................................. 8
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ........................ Grossman, Hon. Marc, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs ................ Page
31
33
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U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2004
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD–
106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chair-
man) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Allard, Sessions,
Collins, Ensign, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clin-
ton, and Pryor.
Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff director.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional
staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Regina A. Dubey, re-
search assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Pa-
tricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff mem-
ber; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic
staff director; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, mi-
nority counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and
William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Bridget E. Ward,
and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members’ assistants present: Jayson Roehl, assistant
to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Derek J. Maurer, assistant to Senator Collins; D’Arcy Grisier, as-
sistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J.
Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assist-
ant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator
Akaka; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; William Todd
Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, assistant
to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton;
and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,
CHAIRMAN
Chairman WARNER. The Armed Services Committee meets today
in another of its series of hearings on the worldwide threat situa-
(1)
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2
tion, with emphasis on Afghanistan and Iraq. We welcome our wit-
nesses: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; General Rich-
ard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and
Secretary Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs.
Each of our witnesses is very well qualified to discuss the full
range of the topics before the committee today. All have been deep-
ly involved in the planning for post-conflict stabilization and recon-
struction activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan. General Myers
just returned Sunday from a trip to the region, visiting our troops
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We look forward to the testimony of
our witnesses.
Colleagues and friends, the past few weeks have been particu-
larly challenging for our Nation. We are ever mindful of the risks
our troops face every day, those of the coalition forces, and the sac-
rifices made by the families and the communities that support
them, as those who have been removed from power seek to delay
their inevitable defeat and as terrorists lash out at the loss of an-
other area in which to train and spawn terrorism throughout the
world. We mourn every loss of life and salute those who serve and
their families for their bravery, their commitment, and their sac-
rifices.
The timeliness and importance of this hearing cannot be over-
stated. We are at a critical juncture for coalition operations in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. I returned, several weeks ago, from a trip
to both of those countries. The brilliant military victories achieved
by our Armed Forces, together with the coalition partners, have
presented an opportunity to fully defeat violence and terror in Iraq
and Afghanistan. These are nations whose previous rulers had per-
petrated violence and terror not only on their own populations and
their neighbors, but throughout the world.
The cycle of violence that has gripped this part of the world must
end if we are to win the global war on terrorism and make America
and our friends and allies a safer place. Deviation from our current
course will only embolden those who are intent on bringing about
instability and anarchy, not only in the region, but elsewhere in
the world.
We have achieved extraordinary success in a relatively short pe-
riod of time in Iraq. Saddam Hussein and the threat he posed are
gone. The future is hopeful for the Iraqi people. We must continue
to send a strong message of resolve to the people of Iraq, to our
troops, to our coalition partners, and to the rest of the world, that
the United States will stay its course and get the job done.
As President Bush stated last week, ‘‘Now is the time and Iraq
is the place in which the enemies of the civilized world are testing
the will of the civilized world. We must not waver.’’
President Bush has set a course that calls for the direct turnover
of political sovereignty to Iraqis on June 30, 2004. It is critical that
we end our status as an occupying power and give Iraqis an in-
creased stake in what happens in their future and the Nation. This
date was endorsed by the United Nations (U.N.) Special Represent-
ative Brahimi. Mr. Brahimi and the U.N. are playing an important
role in the transition to sovereignty and will continue to play a crit-
ical role in helping Iraq on its path to democracy. This committee
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3
will learn today, from this distinguished panel, further details on
that operation.
The President’s appointment yesterday of a trusted international
statesman and current U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., John
Negroponte, as the first Ambassador to a free and democratic Iraq,
is another important step in this process. I have had the oppor-
tunity through the years to know Mr. Negroponte quite well and
have the highest personal regard for him.
Continued U.S. commitment to the June 30, 2004, transition date
is of enormous importance to the Iraqi people and to the region. It
will be the day that Iraq takes its place in the community of free
nations and the day the Iraqis assume a greater degree of respon-
sibility for their future. The coalition forces, however, will remain
on standby status and involve themselves in the security of that
nation.
A free democratic Iraq means defeat for the forces of terrorism
and instability in Iraq. Clearly, the recent surge in violence in Iraq
is related to the imminent transfer of sovereignty. Those who fear
democracy are trying to delay its arrival. Those who incite terror
realize their days are numbered. Opponents of a free democratic
Iraq are desperate and will become even more desperate, unfortu-
nately, in the days to come.
We will be prepared for more violence as June 30, 2004, ap-
proaches. We must not waver in the face of terror and intimidation.
Our troops, members of our coalition, and the people of Iraq need
the continued strongest support of the Congress of the United
States.
Many countries shared in the military effort to liberate Iraq.
Other nations, not involved directly in the military, have joined in
the rebuilding of Iraq. A total of 38 nations are now involved in
this overall endeavor. I welcome the increased participation of the
U.N. in the political transition process. I applaud President Bush
for his consistent efforts, efforts that began in September 2002 at
the U.N., to build and expand the coalition of nations who have the
courage and the conviction to fight tyranny and terror in order to
make the region and the world a better, safer place.
As our Nation is focused on developments in Iraq, we must not
lose sight of ongoing developments in Afghanistan. The U.S. and
coalition forces continue to eliminate remnants of al Qaeda and the
Taliban regime that harbored them. North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) forces are taking increasing responsibility to provide
security and reconstruction assistance across many parts of the
country. The recent donors conference in Berlin secured commit-
ments from the international community to provide the assistance
Afghanistan will need to recover from decades of war and oppres-
sion.
A constitution has been approved and elections are scheduled.
These are important steps on Afghanistan’s path to full democracy.
The future is finally hopeful for the people of Afghanistan, but
challenges remain.
Speaking for myself personally, as a consequence of my visit
there I remain very interested in our witnesses’ view on how we
can help Afghanistan to conquer a very serious drug trade, which
is growing, not diminishing, at an alarming rate.
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The hearing today is an opportunity to review current policies
and future challenges. I hope our witnesses can provide insights
into a number of questions, among them the issue of the $700 mil-
lion. I will also put the details of the briefings that this committee
received, and it was on a bipartisan basis, with regard to the use
of those funds in today’s record.
[The information referred to follows:]
SUMMARY OF DOD BRIEFING TO SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE STAFF ON
PRE-WAR EXPENDITURES IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
• Congress made available to the Department of Defense $17 billion in September
2001 and $14.2 billion in July 2002 to support the execution of the global war on
terrorism. Funding was appropriated to ‘‘respond to the terrorist attacks on the
United States . . . and to deal with other consequences of the attacks . . . including
for the costs of . . . providing support to counter, investigate, or prosecute domestic
or international terrorism . . . and supporting national security.’’
• The authorities were broad and provided the basis for Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. On an ongoing basis, there were discussions,
briefings, and hearings with Congress on the execution of these supplemental funds.
• By July 2002, in the course of preparing for a contingency in Iraq, CENTCOM
developed rough estimates of $750 million in preparatory tasks.
• DOD Office of the Comptroller reviewed CENTCOM’s request. The Comptroller
recommended funds be made available to activities that were executable and con-
sistent with authorities included in the supplemental appropriations for the global
war on terror.
• In August and September 2002, $178 million (DERFI) was made available to
support CENTCOM including funding for communications equipment, fuel supplies,
humanitarian rations, and improvements to CENTCOM’s forward headquarters.
• All investments were designed to strengthen our capabilities in the region or
support ongoing operational requirements.
• No funding was made available with Iraq as the exclusive purpose.
• Congress approved an Iraq Resolution on October 11.
• Consistent with congressional statutory requirements regarding military con-
struction activities, $63 million in notifications were delivered to Congress October
15. After October 25, more than $800 million was made available over the following
months to support Iraq prepatory tasks. Many of these tasks were those identified
by CENTOCM in July. These plans were consistent with both the global war supple-
mental appropriations authorities and the congressional authorization for use of
military force against Iraq.
Chairman WARNER. Our committee records show that on Feb-
ruary 13, 2003, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J–4 briefed the com-
mittee staff. Later, on February 23, 2003, then-Department of De-
fense (DOD) Comptroller Dov Zakheim briefed the staff. Lastly,
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
Comptroller provided a classified briefing on April 4, 2003.
The questions regarded the use of funds, that is operations and
maintenance (O&M) funds, to do what is predominantly military
construction (MILCON) type functions. We have in the committee
records, for the inspection of our members, a classified document
dated April 4, 2003, detailing those expenditures. Nevertheless,
Secretary Wolfowitz, I hope you can elaborate on that issue.
Further, the questions before the committee today: Are current
troop levels in Iraq, as recently requested by General Abizaid, suffi-
cient? Do our troops have sufficient equipment and correct equip-
ment to carry out and complete the mission? How will the Iraqi In-
terim Government be formed and how are Iraqis reacting to the re-
cent U.N. proposal? What role will the U.N. and other international
organizations play in the reconstruction of Iraq after the transition
of sovereignty? Will the U.S. seek a U.N. Security Council resolu-
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5
tion to cover the next phase of activities, political and military, in
Iraq?
What are the details that we have at hand with regard to the
all-important status of forces agreement which spells out, hope-
fully, or will, perhaps coupled with a U.N. resolution which I be-
lieve will be forthcoming, the exact relationship between the new
transfer of power to an Iraqi government and the utilization of our
troops and those of coalition forces for further security?
I now recognize our distinguished ranking member, Senator
Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator LEVIN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in
welcoming our witnesses this morning: Secretary Wolfowitz, Sec-
retary Grossman, and General Myers. These three witnesses, rep-
resenting as they do defense policy, diplomacy, and military plan-
ning, provide us an opportunity to explore a number of important
issues relating to Iraq and Afghanistan. I join you, Mr. Chairman,
and every member of this committee in expressing our gratitude to
our troops, who demonstrate such constancy and courage.
This would be an important hearing no matter when it was held,
but events of the last few months have made it even more crucial.
Today’s hearing takes place in a month that has, tragically, seen
more U.S. military deaths from combat in Iraq than any other
month since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is a month
that has also seen an outbreak of insurgent violence in Fallujah
and elsewhere in central Iraq, consisting primarily of Sunnis and
foreign jihadists, and militia resistance in several cities in southern
Iraq, consisting mostly of Shia.
Despite the obvious setbacks that we have experienced, I believe
that we can succeed in bringing peace and stability to Iraq. It will
help to achieve that goal if we are willing to learn from our mis-
takes. The first step is to recognize that mistakes were made, and
that may be the most difficult step of all.
Our uniformed military always conducts after-actions, lessons
learned reviews, so that the mistakes that have been made are not
repeated in the future. That practice needs to be followed by the
civilian leadership of the executive branch, including both the De-
fense and State Departments. For example, instead of merely toss-
ing off the continuing violence as a ‘‘tough period of days,’’ there
should be an assessment as to whether we adequately planned for
the possibility of post-Saddam chaos.
Most expert commentators agree with former Army Chief of Staff
General Shinseki that we did not have enough troops in Iraq to
deal with the situation once the Saddam Hussein regime had fall-
en. The looting that took place and the damage to government
buildings and public infrastructure that resulted might have been
avoided or been of less severity if General Shinseki’s advice had
been heeded instead of his being disparaged by the civilian leader-
ship.
Most experts agree that it was a mistake to totally disband the
Iraqi army beyond, of course, removal of dedicated Baathists and
Saddam loyalists.
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Most experts agree that the de-Baathification program went be-
yond what was needed to assure that the Baathist leadership was
not maintained. As Mr. Brahimi stated last Wednesday, ‘‘It is dif-
ficult to understand that thousands upon thousands of teachers,
university professors, medical doctors and hospital staff, engineers,
and other professionals who are sorely needed have been dismissed
within the de-Baathification process, and far too many of these
cases have yet to be reviewed.’’ The fact that the widely disliked
and distrusted Mr. Chalabi was put in charge of the de-
Baathification program wa a mistake that still needs to be cor-
rected.
The restriction of the U.S. military to a minor role in planning
for the stability phase or Phase IV of Operation Iraqi Freedom, as
General Franks described it to Chairman Warner and me several
weeks ago, was, in my judgment, clearly a mistake.
Despite all the talk about the Iraqi security forces being the larg-
est force in Iraq and the ones who would soon be the first line of
defense against the former regime elements and jihadists, the fact
is that there has been a failure to adequately train more than 4
percent of the Iraqi police until now. Surely there are lessons to be
learned from that.
Perhaps the greatest mistake was the failure to appreciate the
importance of securing international support through the United
Nations before initiating hostilities against Iraq. The United States
was unable to convince the other members of the Security Council
that Iraq posed an imminent danger and we cut U.N. weapons in-
spections off before they were concluded.
The difficulty following the war in obtaining broad international
support, including troops and police from Muslim countries, is the
result. The price we are paying is an extremely high one.
Even before our troop rotation, we were providing more than 80
percent of the troops in Iraq (a figure that will rise with the im-
pending withdrawal of the Spanish and Honduran troops) and, al-
though it is difficult to ascertain the extent of contributions of
other nations, we are providing far in excess of 80 percent of the
financial assistance for Iraqi Iraq reconstruction.
After keeping the U.N. at arm’s length throughout the occupation
of Iraq, the President finally recognized the central role of the U.N.
in finding a way to an interim government which will be accepted
by the people of Iraq. When asked last week about the Iraqi entity
to whom sovereignty will be restored on June 30, the President
said ‘‘That is going to be decided by Mr. Brahimi,’’ a quite reversal
of the prior posture of the administration towards the U.N., and
long overdue.
Formal U.N. involvement in the transition to a new interim Iraqi
government as our full partner would help provide essential legit-
imacy in many parts of the world. U.N. endorsement of a process
of selecting an interim government and authorizing a multinational
force after the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty might also open the
door to troops and police officers from other nations, including
Muslim nations, and to NATO involvement in Iraq. Some nations
will, however, require a more formal role for the U.N. in the con-
tinuing political development of Iraq as a condition for their par-
ticipation or continued participation there.
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Conversely, a failure to give the U.N. a major and formal role
after restoration of sovereignty would make it difficult for a num-
ber of nations to keep their forces in Iraq, not to mention attracting
new troops and police.
I visited U.N. headquarters in New York last Friday and met
with U.S. Ambassador Negroponte and with the British, French,
German, and Pakistani ambassadors as well. I attended a Security
Council meeting at which Ambassador Negroponte reported to the
council on the efforts and the progress of the U.S.-led multinational
force in Iraq.
I met with Secretary General Kofi Annan and in the course of
our meeting he expressed his disagreement with statements in the
press that the U.N. would choose the people who would make up
the new interim government. He said that the U.N. would hope-
fully help produce a process by which the Iraqi people would choose
their leaders, which is very different from the U.N. choosing them
and far, far different from the United States and the coalition occu-
pying powers choosing them.
In response to my question to him about a plan B if Mr. Brahimi
is unable to help produce a satisfactory consensus by June 30—in
other words, if there is no credible, broadly supported government
to whom sovereignty by that date can be restored—Secretary Gen-
eral Kofi Annan said that there is not enough time to come up with
a plan B, so the only alternative would then be to extend the exist-
ence of the Iraqi Governing Council.
I know the administration intends to stick to the June 30 date.
But the task of putting together the pieces of a sovereign govern-
ment which the various factions of the Iraqi people support, by an
artificial and in a relatively short time, is a massive one.
If the U.N. does not have the pieces together by June 30, the
worst thing we could do is to attempt to restore sovereignty to lead-
ers that appear to be our choices instead of the Iraqis. Even greater
chaos and possibly civil war could result. So while the administra-
tion does not want to talk about the possibility that the U.N. does
not succeed by June 30, I hope the administration has a plan for
what they will do in that event because the possibility is a real one.
We cannot repeat the lack of planning which marked the post-Sad-
dam period.
For our military, one of the thorniest issues is whether a new
sovereign Iraqi government will be able to change the status of our
forces or will a prior or new U.N. resolution assure continuity. A
gap in the ability to do what is required militarily is unacceptable.
Other key issues for our leadership include:
How many U.S. troops will be required to ensure stability
in Iraq in both the short and long term?
How will the forces of nations like Spain and Honduras,
that plan to withdraw their troops from Iraq be replaced?
As for Afghanistan, which has received significantly less atten-
tion since the start of the Iraq conflict, 2004 started with good
news as the Constitutional Loya Jirga was completed and NATO
decided to expand its role there. However, the last few weeks have
seen a number of challenges to the government of President Karzai
from regional warlords and their militias. Additionally, NATO na-
tions have not fulfilled requests for more troops and the narcotics
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problem in Afghanistan seems to be out of control. What specific
plans are there to address these real concerns?
Finally, I would note that questions have been raised as to
whether Congress was adequately informed and involved concern-
ing the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars for construc-
tion activities in preparation for war with Iraq. As our chairman
noted, our witnesses need to address that matter.
I look forward to our witnesses addressing these and many other
vital questions of concern to our committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin.
We will now proceed to hear testimony. Your statements pre-
pared which have been submitted to the committee will be a part
of the record. You may address those parts that you think perti-
nent for your opening statements.
At the present time, the committee intends to have a brief closed
session following this open session in room 222 of the Russell Sen-
ate Office Building.
Secretary Wolfowitz, you may kindly proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of
the committee: I have quite a long prepared statement which I will
submit for the record. In the interest of time, I will just summarize
and read some portions of it.
I would like to begin, though, by citing what a Marine company
commander wrote to his father as this Marine prepared to lead his
troops into action in Fallujah recently. I quote: ‘‘This battle is going
to have far-reaching effects on not only the war here, but in the
overall war on terrorism. We have to be very precise in our applica-
tion of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks. There
will be no shock and awe. This battle is the Marine Corps’ Belleau
Wood for this war.
‘‘A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are holed up in Fallujah.
It has been a sanctuary for them. The Marine Corps will either re-
affirm its place in history,’’ this company commander wrote, ‘‘as
one of the greatest fighting organizations in the world or we will
die trying. The Marines are fired up. I am nervous for them,
though, because I know how much is riding on this fight. However,
every time I have been nervous during my career about the out-
come of events when young Marines were involved, they have al-
ways exceeded my expectations. ‘‘God bless these great Americans,’’
he wrote, ‘‘who are ensuring that we continue to fight an away
schedule.’’
Let me add, God bless these wonderful Marines and soldiers and
all the members of our Armed Forces. Our prayers are with him
and with all of our people, military and civilian alike, currently
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are making America and the
world more secure by helping the Iraqi and the Afghan people
build free and prosperous democracies in the heart of the Middle
East.
Whether members of active duty, Reserve, or National Guard
units or civilians, these heroes embody the best ideals of our Na-
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9
tion, serving so that others may be free and so that our children
and our grandchildren can be more secure. We thank them all for
the sacrifices they endure.
We also owe a profound debt of gratitude to the roughly 19,000
men and women from our 35 coalition partners, who are also serv-
ing the cause of freedom in Iraq. We would be remiss if we did not
acknowledge the contributions made by civilians from a wide as-
sortment of nongovernmental agencies (NGO) in Iraq and with the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). They have recently become
a particular focus of terrorist attacks.
One heroine, Fern Holland, who quit practicing law in the
United States in order to go to Iraq and help improve the lives of
Iraqi women, was brutally murdered a few weeks ago for the work
she was doing. Though it is small consolation to her family and
friends, she wrote to a friend that if she died she would die doing
what she believed in.
Finally, I would like to thank the members of this committee and
Congress as a whole for their continued strong support for our
members of our Armed Forces.
Mr. Chairman, a little over a year ago we all watched the statue
of Saddam Hussein fall in the heart of Baghdad. On that day, some
25 million of one of the most talented populations in the Muslim
and Arab world were liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of
the last 100 years.
According to a theme that one hears often these days, the world
is full of bad guys and Saddam Hussein was just another bad guy.
Any time that I hear Saddam Hussein referred to in that way, I
know that the person making the statement really does not under-
stand who Saddam Hussein was and is. During my career I have
had the experience of working up close and personal with some
truly bad guys—Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, President
Suharto of Indonesia. To paraphrase someone else on a very dif-
ferent occasion, I knew Ferdinand Marcos; Saddam Hussein was no
Ferdinand Marcos.
Saddam Hussein was more than just another bad guy. He insti-
tutionalized and sanctioned brutality on a scale that is simply un-
imaginable to most Americans. He ruled by fear, creating a society
in which the ideal citizen was a torturer or an informer.
I have traveled to Iraq several times since liberation. I have spo-
ken to hundreds of Iraqis, both there and here in the United
States, and one of my strongest impressions is that the fear of the
old regime still pervades Iraq, a smothering blanket of fear woven
by 35 years of repression, where even the smallest mistake could
bring torture or death or fates worse than death, like the death of
one’s children or the rape of one’s relatives. That fear will not be
cast off in just a few weeks or even just a year or two.
Saddam Hussein began weaving this blanket of fear from the
very beginning. In 1979 when he formally assumed power as presi-
dent, he had a sweeping purge of top Baathist Party leaders. At a
meeting of the Iraqi National Assembly, Saddam, with tears run-
ning down his cheeks and puffing on a cigar, talked about the con-
fession of disloyalty they had received from a top party member
and then continued one by one to name other guilty colleagues.
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One by one, guards dragged these people out of the meeting.
Then Saddam asked top ministers and leaders of the party for their
first loyalty test. They were required to participate in the firing
squads that executed those he had identified. He did not stop
there. He had videos made of the whole event and distributed
throughout the Middle East, so that people would know what kind
of a man he was.
Implicating members of his regime in his worst crimes and en-
suring that his potential victims understood that his threats were
to be taken seriously, in doing that Saddam Hussein applied the
techniques that any FBI agent will tell you are the techniques of
a gangland boss. But he did it on a national scale and as the head
of an internationally recognized government.
One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq almost
defies belief. Scott Ritter, the former UNSCOM inspector and an
opponent of the war, described a prison in Baghdad whose stench
he said was unreal, an amalgam—I quote—‘‘of urine, feces, vomit,
and sweat.’’ Where prisoners were howling and dying of thirst. In
this prison, the oldest inmates were 12, the youngest mere tod-
dlers. Their crime—being children of the regime’s political oppo-
nents.
I recount these stories to illustrate what one writer has accu-
rately called the density of evil that permeated Iraq. In very many
ways, its effects are also like a torture that does not end. Such evil
and fear are so alien to our own American experience that I think
it is necessary to talk about it to understand the plight of Iraqis
today, if we are to have a proper understanding of one of the most
formidable challenges still facing us.
Because, Mr. Chairman, this is not just history. I did not tell
these stories in order to educate people about the past. It is the
present. When we use this rather anodyne term, ‘‘former regime
elements,’’ to describe the people that we capture and the people
that are organizing much of the fighting in Fallujah, my view, the
more correct term would be ‘‘the torturers and killers of the old re-
gime.’’
One example—and I would like to submit the full classified state-
ment for the record, Mr. Chairman. But this is an analysis from
the Defense Intelligence Agency of one branch of the former Iraqi
Intelligence Service called the M–14, the so-called Special Oper-
ations and Anti-Terrorism Branch. ‘‘Anti-Terrorism,’’ it is Orwell-
ian. This branch specialized in kidnappings, hijackings, bombings,
and assassinations. It was a terrorist branch.
These people are in the field today. As that report says: ‘‘Former
Iraqi Intelligence Service operatives from M–14 have been involved
in planning and conducting numerous improvised explosive devices,
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and radio-controlled im-
provised explosive devices for anti-coalition attacks throughout
Iraq.’’
It goes on to say that: ‘‘cells of former M–14 personnel are orga-
nizing and conducting a terrorist IED campaign against coalition
forces throughout Iraq. The explosives section of M–14 prepared for
the invasion by constructing hundreds of suicide vests and belts for
use by Saddam fedayeen against coalition forces. The Iraqi Intel-
ligence Service established a campaign that was purposefully de-
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11
centralized so that attacks could be carried out in the event that
cell leaders were captured or killed.’’
It goes on to mention that: ‘‘Given their high level of skill, M–
14 tactics, including explosives, are likely to be sophisticated.’’
I would like to submit the full—I do not have page numbers; it
is about a seven-page document, and the detail is stunning in my
view.
Chairman WARNER. Without objection, Mr. Secretary, that will
be done.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Given that kind of presence, it is not sur-
prising to me that we get accounts like this one that came recently
from the Marines on the battle front. I guess I should always say
that first reports in war are frequently wrong and even second re-
ports can be wrong, and I do not know whether this is a first, sec-
ond, or third. But it strikes me it is probably true.
The Marines reported a fire fight in a small village northeast of
Fallujah called Karmah. They basically stumbled across what
seemed to be a large enemy position. The enemy swarmed in attack
on the Marines. The result of a very intense fire fight was over 100
enemy killed in action.
The significant thing, which I am looking to confirm, the report
says upon termination of hostility the local townspeople ap-
proached the Marines, thanking them for their action, because the
enemy had taken over their town and had been effectively holding
them hostage.
I can confirm more reliably, Mr. Chairman, that a similar situa-
tion prevailed in the town of Samarra further east in the area of
operation of the Fourth Infantry Division, which is now run by the
First Infantry Division, a situation not as bad as Fallujah but in
some ways perhaps emblematic of the Fallujah problem. General
Odierno of the Fourth I.D. about 2 months ago undertook a cordon
and search operation where they closed off the town and systemati-
cally went after the anti-democratic forces that had been organiz-
ing and terrorizing that town. I have heard different estimates
ranging from 200 to 700 enemy captured and detained, but what
is in no disagreement is that once those people were gone Samarra
was a different place, and indeed it has been a different place dur-
ing the violence of the last few weeks.
Jim Steele, who is a retired Army colonel with incredible bravery
and also incredible expertise about police forces in third world
countries—he has been in Iraq for the last year—he gave a report
about a recent visit to Samarra. He said: ‘‘It is a different place
from what it was during my last visit in December. The number
of active police stations has more than doubled. The attitude to-
ward the coalition forces was much improved as well. Sammara is
an excellent example of local and regional cooperation. In fact, dur-
ing the recent fighting the police in Sammara performed well.’’
This is from a report from Major General John Batiste, the com-
mander of the First Infantry Division, which now took over from
General Odierno. He said: ‘‘We stood up a security working group
in Sammara in advance of the April 9th to 12th Arbayeen celebra-
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tions to keep the peace and, if necessary, respond with firmness.
There was some violence on the 12th of April in Sammara, but
Iraqi security forces were part of the solution and the violence was
contained. I am using the Sammara model throughout the region.’’
I mention all of this, Mr. Chairman, because, as bad as the situa-
tion is in Fallujah—and I do not in any way mean to minimize it—
I think the enemy that we are facing is an enemy that rests on kill-
ing and death and terror, not an enemy that has genuine popular
appeal. We have to work on our side on improving the belief of the
Iraqi people in their future and the belief in what we can do for
their future, though we also have to work to overcome the fear that
these people implant.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Iraq has been a free
country for a single year, after decades of systematic abuse. A year
after its liberation, it is important to pause and consider what we
have accomplished together with the Iraqi people. The indisputable
fact is that, after 35 years of unimaginable horrors, Iraq has seen
the beginnings of a tremendous transformation for the better in the
12 months since its liberation.
For 35 years, the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and Saddam’s
personal fiat. Baathists suppressed dissent through murder, tor-
ture, and arbitrary imprisonment. Iraqis had no real rights, only
temporary privileges subject to the whims of Saddam and his sadis-
tic sons.
Today Iraqis have an interim constitution that contains assur-
ances of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of the
press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement—provisions that
are highlighted in that chart on my right.
Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for lifesaving
medicines were used by Saddam’s regime to buy the means to end
life. Money marked for hospitals went to rebuild palaces. Many of
Iraq’s hospitals and clinics that did remain open served as ammu-
nition or command bunkers. Today health care spending in Iraq
has increased 30 times, that is 30 times, over prewar levels and
children are receiving crucial vaccinations for the first time in
years.
After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq’s economy was moribund due to
state control, rampant corruption, and the systematic misallocation
of resources to palaces and weapons and to the favorites of the re-
gime. Today the Iraqi economy is starting on a path of recovery, even though the full effect of the $18.4 billion that Congress pro-
vided is only just starting to be felt.
This is still, I would emphasize, an area of great concern to us.
But we are making progress in the face of years of neglect. It is
that progress which the enemy seeks to stop today and which we
must make increased efforts to accelerate.
For 35 years, Mr. Chairman, Iraq’s oil revenues helped to build
Saddam’s palaces and line his pockets and those of his cronies.
Today that revenue goes to the Development Fund for Iraq, where
it helps to build a new infrastructure and a new future for the
Iraqi people. At 2.5 million barrels per day, Iraqi oil production has reached its prewar levels and a total of $7.5 billion has been gen-
erated for the Development Fund for Iraq. That, I would add, is on top of roughly $8 billion from past revenues out of the Oil for Food
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program, so that Iraq has contributed $17 billion approximately of its own resources, $16.9 billion to be precise, to the reconstruction
effort already.
After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq’s dilapidated power plants were
in a state of unimaginable disrepair. Saddam corrupted the Oil for
Food program and diverted the wealth of the country for his own
power and comfort. Today power generation has surpassed prewar
levels and is more evenly distributed throughout the country.
For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for
Saddam’s cult of personality and Baath Party fascism. Today that
fanaticism no longer pervades the national education system.
64,000 secondary school teachers and 5,000 school principals and
administrators have been retrained in modern teaching methods.
Endless references to Saddam in the textbooks have been removed
and coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools.
After 35 years of genocidal repression of Iraq’s Marsh Arabs, the
historical marshlands of southern Iraq were on the verge of extinc-
tion. A lush ecosystem the size of New Jersey had been converted
into a barren desert by Saddam’s vindictive attempt to destroy a
people, the Marsh Arabs, whose history goes back thousands of
years. Today the marshlands are gradually being restored and that
ancient culture is being revived.
For 35 years, the Iraq people’s only link with the outside world
was the poisonous propaganda of Iraq’s state-run media. Today
Iraqis have a wealth of independent news sources, including 170
newspapers.
For 35 years, Iraqis had no voice in their government or their na-
tion’s future. Today more than half of the Iraqi population is active
in community affairs and one in five belongs to a nongovernmental
organization.
I read in ‘‘The Guardian’’ of London that recently in the over-
whelmingly Shia province of Diyala in southern Iraq 17 towns held
local elections using ration cards in the absence of registration
rolls, their first genuine elections ever, and in almost every case ei-
ther secular independents or nonreligious parties outpolled the
Islamists.
Perhaps most important, in the year since Iraq has been liber-
ated no new mass graves have been filled with the bodies of inno-
cent Iraqi men, women, and children capriciously murdered by a
brutal regime, and the torture rooms and execution chambers have
been shut down for good.
Despite all the uncertainty and violence caused by the enemies
of a free Iraq, it is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic improvement
and anticipate much more. According to a recent Oxford Research
International poll, despite all the difficulties that are correctly de-
scribed in Iraq today, 56 percent of Iraqis said their lives were
much better or somewhat better than a year ago, and a full 71 per-
cent expect their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from
now.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am not here to paint
a rosy picture or to view this through rose-colored glasses. There
are enormous problems. Some of them are indeed the result of
what General Petraeus, who recently commanded the 101st in Iraq
and will be going back, by the way, to perform a crucial role in
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14
building Iraqi security forces—General Petraeus called it the man
on the moon phenomenon. That is to say: You Americans can put
a man on the moon; how come my electricity does not work? How
come the sewers are not fixed? How come everything is not perfect
after liberation?
I believe that it is critical not only for the concrete benefits that
come from employing people and fixing their basic services, I be-
lieve it is also critical in terms of maintaining faith and confidence
in the United States, that we have to speed up this reconstruction
effort. We are trying to understand—Senator Levin referred to les-
sons learned. One of the lessons we are trying to learn is the road-
blocks that have made it slower than I believe is acceptable to get
projects moving.
Some of those roadblocks are unavoidable. They are the inevi-
table result of an insecure situation. Some of them are self-imposed
red tape or in some cases I think legislation. I hope we can work
together with Congress to eliminate both where they are unneces-
sary obstacles.
We have a strategy. It has three basic elements. The first one in-
volves building capable Iraqi security forces. The picture there is
mixed. We have lessons learned, important lessons learned from
the last few weeks, but I believe on balance it is one of the most
critical elements. But Jim Steele, whom I quoted earlier, also re-
ported visiting police stations in two critical sections of Baghdad,
in Adamiyah and Sadr City, late at night during the recent dis-
turbances and was, frankly, surprised, but pleasantly surprised, to
find the chief of police there on duty and working.
One of the problems is, through our slowness in getting equip-
ment into the field, many of these Iraqi police were outgunned by
the militias that they faced. That is a problem we can fix. In fact,
if I were an Iraqi policeman I guess I would be asking, why did
you not fix it sooner? We are moving to fix it as rapidly as we can.
The second element involves nurturing Iraq’s capacity for rep-
resentative self-government, with the aim of creating a government
that the Iraqi people will feel is theirs and that moves us out of
the position of being an occupying power.
Can someone put up the chart, please, that shows that process.
[The information referred to follows:]
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16
I would emphasize it is a process. Things will not change over-
night on July 1. While many think July 1 will be a magical date
on which CPA will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to
a new Iraqi government, it is actually, like the process in Afghani-
stan that was started in Bonn in December 2001, just one step in
the process.
Already, free Iraqis have been assuming responsibility for gov-
ernment functions for quite some time. Iraq now has a functioning
judiciary. At the local and provincial levels, elected assemblies are
up and running. I think this is important: The July 1 transition is
just one of three important steps in the future. It will be followed
by the elections to establish a Transitional Government in January
of 2005. Let me emphasize, elected, not appointed by the Ameri-
cans, not negotiated by Ambassador Brahimi, but fully elected,
early next year.
That government in turn will be replaced by a permanent elected
government under a constitution at the end of 2005.
The third element of the strategy, Mr. Chairman, involves the re-
construction of Iraq’s infrastructure and the restoration of essential
services to provide better lives for Iraqis and put people back to
work. Again, this is an area where we have to speed things up. I
think things are speeding up and there is no question that the in-
fusion of money that Congress provided last year is starting to be
felt and will be felt on a larger scale over the course of this cal-
endar year.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, at the same time
the Iraqis are undergoing a significant transition we will be
transitioning from the CPA under Ambassador Bremer’s leadership
to a new American embassy led by one of our most distinguished
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17
career diplomats, John Negroponte, our current Ambassador to the
United Nations, as was just announced yesterday.
We have been working closely with our colleagues in the State
Department. An example of extraordinarily good cooperation, I
have with me retired General Mick Kicklighter, who has been
working on these issues for the Defense Department, and Ambas-
sador Frank Ricciardone, doing them for the State Department. We
sometimes are not quite sure whether they are the Bobbsy Twins
because we always see them together, but they are here and they
are a resource.
Chairman WARNER. I wonder if they would stand up.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If they would stand up, I think it would
be helpful. They deserve at least some recognition for the extraor-
dinary work they have been doing. [General Kicklighter and Am-
bassador Ricciardone stand.]
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, in my testimony I give de-
tails about the timeline in the Transitional Administrative Law on
these three phases. I think it is important to understand that there
are three phases and that July 1 is not an all or nothing kind of
date.
I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of government
that will result from this process, any more than I could have pre-
dicted in December 2001 what would result in Afghanistan from
the Bonn process. The Iraqis will decide to establish the exact pro-
visions of their permanent constitution and who will emerge as the
leaders of a new Iraq. Particularly after 35 years of what they have
been through, it is a complicated task.
But Americans, of all people, should understand that democracy
does not guarantee specific outcomes. It opens up ideas for debate.
One need only look back to our own Constitutional Convention to
be reminded that any attempt to establish rule for the people and
by the people will involve uncertainty and controversy.
Throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and East
Asia, new democracies have emerged in the last 10 or 20 years in
countries that had no prior historical experience of democracy.
They are all different. None of them are perfect. Neither are we.
But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be a light years im-
provement over what that country has been like for the last 35
years.
Let me say one more thing here. I think it is wrong to assume
that Iraqi Arabs and Kurds and Christians and Turkomen, some
of the most intelligent people in the world, are incapable of achiev-
ing what Lithuania or Korea or the Philippines or Indonesia or
Croatia or other newly emerging democracies have accomplished
over the last couple of decades.
Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted
themselves impressively well for a nation so long exposed to
Saddam’s unique level of sadism. I guess I would say, well, if some-
one is sitting there saying, what on earth is he talking about when
we read these scenes in Fallujah or we read about Mr. Sadr, let
me just give you one example.
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We did not read about the massive Arbayeen pilgrimage. I do not
know the estimates. I think roughly a million Shia pilgrims on the
road for that celebration, very emotional celebration of the martyr-
dom of Ali. We anticipated, we were afraid of massive violence dur-
ing that event. There was no news because there was no violence.
The Shia of Iraq on the whole have conducted themselves with
incredible restraint in the face of repeated provocations, both from
the Zarqawi terrorists, from the former regime killers, and from
this small-time gangster Mr. Sadr.
I do want to recognize that we have disappointments with the
performance of security forces. We are learning lessons from that.
I cite three in particular at length in my testimony. The first is the
need for stronger leaders. The second is that Iraqi security forces
need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to feel and to have their
friends and relatives feel that they are fighting for Iraq, not for the
Americans. That is one of the reasons why General Abizaid and our
commanders were those who were pushing so hard to accelerate
the transition to a sovereign government. That is the reason why
they found, and I felt with them, that this label of occupying power
was not a good one to hang onto for another year and a half if
there was any way to avoid it.
Third, and this is our responsibility, Iraqi security forces need
more and better equipment and they need it faster.
Mr. Chairman, I have some comments about Afghanistan. I will
be happy to discuss that in questions. I would like to stress that
I think the American people need to know what their forces are ac-
complishing in Iraq and in Afghanistan, that the efforts of our
service men and women are transforming the lives of 50 million
people, overwhelmingly Muslims, and transforming two regions
that have for too long accommodated despotism and terrorism, to
the detriment of its people.
Both our friends and our enemies, and our friends particularly,
in Iraq and Afghanistan need to know that this country has the
will and resolve to accomplish our objectives. I suppose it is worth
highlighting for the international audiences that the debate in this
country seems to be about whether we have enough troops or
whether we should have more troops, not about whether we should
abandon the people of Iraq or the people of Afghanistan. That is
an incredibly important message. It is one of the most valuable
messages we can deliver, because it builds confidence in the people,
it encourages people to cooperate with our troops, and it will allow
us to defeat this ugly enemy sooner rather than later.
Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I think I am going to ab-
breviate here. I do want to say that there are quite a few myths
out there and I cite some of them in this testimony. It is a myth
to say that the June 30 date for the transfer of sovereignty is com-
pletely arbitrary, and even more of a myth to say it is driven by
the demands of U.S. electoral politics. There are very good impor-
tant reasons in Iraq for doing it, and I would note that in fact it
was our friends in the United Nations, particularly France, that
were most critical when we established the Governing Council that
Iraq needed a sovereign government, not an American occupation.
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19
Chairman WARNER. Mr. Secretary, I think we can probably per-
ceive the benefit of your additional points in the exchange we will
have on questions.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let us do that. If I could just conclude,
Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one impressive quote from Gen-
eral Jack Keane in his retirement, because I think this is a mes-
sage to the world. The General said that: ‘‘The foreign terrorists,
the Baath Party sympathizers, the extremists who wantonly kill
Americans and innocent people from many nations have no idea
what they are up against. They think they know us,’’ General
Keane said, ‘‘because they have heard of Lebanon in 1983 or Soma-
lia in 1994 or the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. They think we are morally
weak and we will lose our resolve.
‘‘But their knowledge is superficial and their understanding is
shallow. To understand America and Americans,’’ General Keane
said, ‘‘they need to understand the Marne in 1918 or Tarawa in
1943 Omaha Beach in 1944, or the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They
need to understand that a Nation that produces Alvin York and
Audie Murphy, John Pershing and George Marshall, Chesty Puller
and George Patton, Randy Shugart and Gary Gordon, produces he-
roes in every generation. They are out there now performing every
day.’’
The General concluded: ‘‘Our enemies are cunning, but they are
ignorant, and their ignorance will be their undoing. They do not
know our will, our courage, or our character.’’
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. God bless those wonderful men and
women who serve our country so well, and I thank this committee
and Congress for the support you give them.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: As he prepared to lead his troops
into action in Fallujah, a Marine Company Commander took time to write his fa-
ther, a retired marine. ‘‘This battle is going to have far reaching effects on not only
the war here,’’ he wrote:
‘‘But in the overall war on terrorism. We have to be very precise in our
application of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks. . . .
There will be no shock and awe. . . . This battle is the Marine Corps Bel-
leau Wood for this war. . . . A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are
holed up in Fallujah. It has been a sanctuary for them.
The Marine Corps will either reaffirm its place in history as one of the
greatest fighting organizations in the world or we will die trying. The ma-
rines are fired up. I’m nervous for them though because I know how much
is riding on this fight. However, every time I’ve been nervous during my
career about the outcome of events when young marines were involved they
have ALWAYS exceeded my expectations.
God bless these great Americans who are ensuring we continue to fight
an ‘‘away’’ schedule.’’
Our prayers are with him and all of our people currently serving in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan. They are making America—and the world—more secure by helping the
Iraqi and Afghan people build free and prosperous democracies in the heart of the
Middle East. Whether members of Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard units,
or civilians, these heroes embody the best ideals of our Nation—serving so that oth-
ers may be free—and we thank them all for the sacrifices they endure.
We also owe a sincere debt of gratitude to the roughly 19,000 men and women
from our 34 coalition partners, who are also serving the cause of freedom in Iraq.
We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the contributions made by civilians
from a wide assortment of NGOs in Iraq who have recently become the target of
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20
terrorist attacks, such as Fern Holland, who quit practicing law in the United
States in order to go to Iraq and help improve the lives of Iraqi women. Ms. Holland
was brutally murdered for the work she was doing, and although it is small consola-
tion to her family and friends, died doing what she believed in.
Finally, I’d like to thank the members of this committee for their continued sup-
port to the members of our Armed Forces.
IRAQ: 35 YEARS OF UNIMAGINABLE TYRANNY, ONE YEAR OF PROGRESS
A little over a year ago, we all watched the statue of Saddam Hussein fall in the
heart of Baghdad. I remember watching the live coverage of that historic moment.
Iraqis, eager to start a new page in their national history, enthusiastically tried to
pull the statue down with the limited resources available to them—a length of rope
that did not even reach all the way to the ground. Eventually, a group of U.S. ma-
rines saw what was happening, and aided the Iraqi effort. Working together, the
Marines and Iraqis brought down that symbol of oppression and provided an image
that will be etched in our collective memory forever.
On that day, 25 million of some of the most talented people in the Muslim and
Arab world were liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of the last 100 years.
According to a somewhat popular theme these days, the world is full of bad guys,
and that Saddam Hussein is just another bad guy. When I hear Saddam Hussein
referred to that way, I can only conclude that there still exists a lack of real under-
standing of Saddam Hussein. In my career, I’ve known some bad guys up close and
personal, people like former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos and former Indo-
nesian dictator Suharto. To paraphrase a famous vice-presidential debate, I knew
these men, and Ferdinand Marcos was no Saddam Hussein; Suharto was no Sad-
dam Hussein.
Saddam Hussein was more than just another bad guy. He institutionalized and
sanctioned brutality on a scale that is simply unimaginable to most Americans. Hus-
sein ruled by fear, creating a society in which the ideal citizen was an informer. The
superintendent of the Baghdad policy academy told me that he had spent a year
in jail for having made a disparaging comment about Saddam—to this best friend.
In such a Republic of Fear, friendship itself became a weapon.
I have traveled to Iraq several times. I have spoken to hundreds of Iraqis, both
in Iraq and here in the United States. One of my strongest impressions is that fear
of the old regime still pervades Iraq. But, a smothering blanket of apprehension
woven by 35 years of repression—where even the smallest mistake could bring tor-
ture or death—won’t be cast off in a few weeks’ time.
Saddam Hussein began weaving this blanket of fear from the very beginning. In
1979, one of his first acts as President was a sweeping purge of top Baathist lead-
ers. At a meeting of the Iraqi national assembly, Saddam tearfully talked about a
coerced ‘‘confession’’ of disloyalty from a top party member, and then continued to
name other guilty colleagues. Guards then dragged these people out of the meeting.
Then, Saddam asked top ministers and leaders of the party for their first loyalty
test—he called on them to form the firing squads that executed those he’d identified.
Saddam had videos of the whole event distributed throughout the Middle East,
so people would know what sort of leader he was. Implicating members of his re-
gime in his worst crimes and ensuring that his potential victims understood how
seriously to take his threats, Saddam Hussein applied the techniques of a most bru-
tal gangland boss, but on a national scale and as the head of an internationally rec-
ognized government.
One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq almost defies belief.
Scott Ritter—the former UNSCOM inspector and an opponent of the war—has de-
scribed a prison in Baghad, whose stench, he said, ‘‘was unreal,’’ an amalgam of
urine, feces, vomit and sweat’’; a hellhole where prisoners were ‘‘howling and dying
of thirst.’’ In this prison, the oldest inmates were 12, the youngest mere toddlers.
Their crime—being children of the regime’s political enemies.
General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was recently re-
turning from a trip to Iraq, and stopped at Ramstein AB, where he was told about
some Iraqi businessmen who had recently passed through on their way to the
United States, to the Texas Medical Center in Houston, where they were to undergo
surgery to repair some of the damage inflicted on them some 10 years ago. When
Iraq’s economy was falling into shambles, Saddam’s way of placing blame was this:
he ordered that a few merchants be rounded up. With flimsy evidence, they were
found guilty of destabilizing the Iraqi economy and were sentenced to lose their
right hands. Black Xs tattooed on their foreheads branded them as criminals. The
amputations were filmed, and the video—as well as the hands—were sent to Sad-
dam. In a Houston doctor’s office, one man was quoted as saying: ‘‘You spend your
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whole life doing and saying the right things. Then someone comes and cuts your
hands off for no reason at all. It’s a torture that never ends.’’
I recount these stories to illustrate what one writer has called the ‘‘density of evil’’
that permeated Iraq. In very many ways, its effects are also like a torture that
doesn’t end. Such evil and fear is so alien to our own American experience that I
think it’s necessary to talk about it to understand the plight of Iraqis today, if we
are to have a proper understanding of one of the most formidable challenges facing
us right now. Even though Saddam’s regime is gone and he himself has been cap-
tured, the fear of Saddam and his henchmen is still alive in the minds of Iraqis fac-
ing the difficult choice of whether to cooperate with us and with other brave Iraqis
to build what they call ‘‘the New Iraq.’’ Until Iraqis are convinced that Saddam’s
old regime has been permanently and irreversibly removed, and until a long and
ghastly part of their history is put to rest and overcome, it is only natural that that
fear will remain. That history of atrocities and the punishment of those responsible
are directly linked to our success in helping the Iraqi people build a free, secure
and democratic future.
The people of Iraq have much valuable information that can help us root out the
remaining Baathists and help Iraqis find justice. To the extent that people of Iraq
are willing to take part in the civic and political institutions that will constitute a
new Iraq is linked to their understanding that the Saddamists are finished, and will
never again return to power in Iraq.
Convincing them of this truth—that Saddam and the Saddamists are finished—
will continue to require investments in our time and our resources to continue to
build trust among the Iraqi people.
Iraq has been a free country for a single year after decades of systematic abuse
by a regime of murderers and torturers. A year after Iraq’s liberation, it is impor-
tant to pause and consider what we have accomplished together with the Iraqi peo-
ple. For amidst the episodes of violence and tragedy of the loss of innocent life in
suicide bombings, the good news of what is happening in Iraq often gets obscured
or ignored. As one soldier recently wrote to the Houston Chronicle, ‘‘The reality is
we are accomplishing a tremendous amount here, and the Iraqi people are not only
benefiting greatly, but are enthusiastically supportive.’’
The indisputable fact is that after 35 years of enduring unimaginable horrors, in
the year since its liberation Iraq has seen the beginnings of a tremendous trans-
formation for the better:
For 35 years, the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and Saddam’s personal fiat.
Baathists suppressed dissent through murder, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment.
They tortured children in order to coerce their parents, and raped women to punish
their families. Iraqis had no real rights, only temporary privileges subject to the
whims of Saddam and his sadistic sons.
Today, Iraqis have an interim Iraqi constitution that is the most liberal basic gov-
ernance document in the Arab world. The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)
contains assurances of:
• Freedom of Religion
• Freedom of Expression
• Freedom of the Press
• Freedom of Assembly
• Freedom of Movement
The TAL guarantees equal rights for all citizens of Iraq regardless of ethnicity,
denomination, or sex. It acknowledges the Islamic character of the majority of Iraqi
society and, at the same time, affirms the right to freedom of religious belief and
practice for every Iraqi. It provides for other fundamental pillars of true democracy,
including separation of powers and an independent judiciary, rule of law, fundamen-
tal civil rights, and civilian control of the military. This constitution emerged from
an often heated, but ultimately healthy, political debate, one that would have been
impossible a year ago—and one that is still impossible in many areas of the world.
Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for life-saving medicines were
used by Saddam’s regime to buy means to end life. Money marked for hospitals
went to rebuild palaces. Many of Iraq’s hospitals and clinics that remained open to
the public also served as ammunition or command bunkers. Today, health care
spending in Iraq has increased 30 times over its pre-war levels, and children receive
crucial vaccinations for the first time in years.
After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq’s economy was moribund due to state control,
rampant corruption, and Saddam’s misallocation of resources to palaces and weap-
ons and to the favorites of his regime. Today, the Iraqi economy is on the path of
recovery and prosperity. Unemployment has fallen, inflation is a quarter of what it
was before the war, and the New Iraqi Dinar has become the most heavily traded
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currency in the Middle East. This is before the full effect of the $18.4 billion in re-
construction grants you helped provide the Iraqi people is felt. This is still an area
of great concern to us, but we are making progress despite years of neglect. It is
that progress which the enemy seeks to stop today and which we must make in-
creased efforts to accelerate.
For 35 years, Iraq’s oil revenues helped build Saddam Hussein’s palaces and lined
the pockets of Saddam and his cronies. Today, Iraqi oil revenue goes to the Develop-
ment Fund for Iraq, where it helps build a new infrastructure and a new future for
the Iraqi people. At 2.5 million barrels per day, Iraqi oil production as reached its
pre-war levels, and oil proceeds to date exceed $7.5 billion and are projected to be
$14 billion this year.
After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq’s dilapidated power plants were in a state of un-
imaginable disrepair. What electricity was produced was diverted to Baghdad in
order to reward Saddam’s cronies and punish the people whom Saddam despised.
Today, power generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distrib-
uted, and new, modern power plants are being built.
For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for Saddam’s cult of person-
ality and Baath party fascism. Today, that fanaticism no longer pervades the na-
tional education system and its teaching materials. 64,000 secondary teachers and
5,000 school principals and administrators have been retrained in modern teaching
methods, and 72 million new textbooks will be distributed before the end of the
school year. To date, coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools.
The Iraqi people have clearly demonstrated their preference for the new educational
system, as school attendance this year has surpassed pre-conflict levels.
After 35 years of genocidal repression of Iraq’s Marsh Arabs, the historical
marshlands of southern Iraq were close to extinction. A lush ecosystem the size of
New Jersey had been turned into a barren desert by Saddam’s vindictive attempt
to destroy a people whose history goes back thousands of years and make of them
an example to warn anyone who would challenge his rule. Today, the marshlands
are gradually being restored, and that ancient culture is being revived.
For 35 years, the Iraqi people’s only link with the outside world was the poisonous
propaganda of Saddam’s state-run media. Today, Iraqis have a wealth of independ-
ent news sources. One hundred seventy newspapers are currently published in Iraq,
and the Iraqi Media Network reaches more than 80 percent of the Iraqi population.
The market in satellite dishes is booming.
For 35 years, Iraqis had no voice in their government or their nation’s future.
Today, more than half of the Iraqi population is active in community affairs and
one in five belongs to a non-governmental organization. Ninety percent of Iraqi
towns and provinces have local councils, which we think is a pretty good sign that
the Iraqi polity is moving in the right direction. Recently, in the overwhelmingly
Shia province of Diyala in southern Iraq, 17 towns have held local elections—their
first genuine elections ever—and in almost every one secular independents and non-
religious parties did better than the Islamists.
Perhaps most importantly, in the year since Iraq has been liberated, no new mass
graves have been filled with the bodies of innocent Iraqi men, women, and children
capriciously murdered by a brutal regime, and the torture rooms and execution
chambers have been shut down.
Despite all the violence and uncertainty caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, it
is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic improvement in their everyday lives and antici-
pate much more. According to a recent Oxford Research International poll, despite
the difficulties we all read about 56.5 percent of Iraqis said their lives were much
better or somewhat better than a year ago. Despite the prevalence of alarmist
quotes depicting some Iraqi ‘‘man-on-the-street’’ lamenting the good old days under
Saddam Hussein, only 18.6 percent of those polled said they were much or some-
what worse off than a year ago. A full 71 percent expect their lives will be much
or somewhat better a year from now.
Moreover, the Iraqi people are expressing their optimism with their feet. Despite
the continued threat of violence in Iraq, and the horrific terrorist attacks against
Iraqi civilians intended to derail progress in Iraq, as several thousands of Iraqi refu-
gees are returning to their homeland.
THE COALITION’S STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE VICTORY IN IRAQ: CAPACITY BUILDING
Despite the violence of recent weeks, we need to continue to move forward on all
fronts implementing the coalition’s strategy to set conditions that will ensure a free
Iraq that is stable and at peace with its neighbors. Events of the past month have
taught us several lessons learned that have influenced our policy decisions. These
lessons include:
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• The importance of local initiative for fast action: local commanders should get
a special allocation of reconstruction funds.
• The importance of Iraqi leadership and the need to intensify our efforts to
train and develop Iraqi leaders
• We need to cross-attach coalition and Iraqi liaison officers, and more
heavily embed coalition trainers and mentors.
• We need to continue to recruit vetted former senior (Colonel—Brigadier)
Iraqi officers for the Iraqi Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense.
• We need to speed police advisors and specialized trainers to police sta-
tions and academies.
• The importance of having an Iraqi rallying point and looking for ways to
shorten the process by which Iraqis quickly create a government that embodies
Iraqi nationality and sovereignty.
• We need to continue to install and highlight an Iraqi chain of command:
new defense minister, commander of the Armed Forces, chief of staff, new
interior minister.
• We need to carry out de-Baathification process in a way that is non-puni-
tive to those with clean records.
• We need to strengthen the legitimacy of an Iraqi interim government and
the constitutional process.
• We need to focus the Iraqi media spotlight on political activities of lead-
ing Iraqis, including Governing Council members.
• We need to continue to encourage local elections.
• The importance of equipment and support and the need to accelerate the
equipping of Iraqi security forces.
• We need to rush delivery of critical items (weapons, ammunition, vehi-
cles, radios)
• We need to upgrade required items in light of current experience.
• We need to enhance protection for security forces and police fixed sites.
Our strategy involves three interdependent lines of operations to build indigenous
Iraq capacity and transition responsibilities from the coalition to Iraq rapidly, but
not hastily. While these lessons to be learned from the violent events of the past
few weeks affect the way we pursue these three lines of operation, these are still
the three key elements that will bring success in Iraq.
The first element involves building capable Iraqi security forces to achieve stabil-
ity. Accordingly, we have redoubled our efforts to recruit, train, equip and, most im-
portantly, mentor Iraqi security forces—Police, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Army,
Border Police, and the Facilities Protection Service. Over the next few months our
aim is to certify the ability of these forces, that they are ready to assume greater
responsibilities from coalition forces. Similarly, through technical assistance and
mentoring by U.S. prosecutors and judges of their Iraqi counterparts, we have been
helping to build the capacity of the Iraqi criminal justice sector: the Judicial Review
Commission has reviewed and vetted all currently sitting judges and prosecutors;
the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, established to deal with those who have commit-
ted the most notorious crimes in Iraq, is investigating and trying cases; and every
pre-war local criminal court in Baghdad is open, fully functional, and every week
more cases are set for trial or tried as compared to the week before.
The second element involves nurturing Iraq’s capacity for representative, self-gov-
ernment with the aim of creating a government that the Iraqi people will feel is
theirs and that moves us out of the position of being an occupying power. While
many think that July 1 will be a magical date on which Coalition Provisional Au-
thority (CPA) will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraq govern-
ment, it is actually just one step in a process. Already, free Iraqis have been gradu-
ally assuming responsibility for governmental functions for quite some time. Many
Iraqi ministries report to the Governing Council rather than the CPA. Iraq now has
a functioning judiciary to provide equal justice for all. At the local and provincial
levels, elected assemblies are up and running. When the Interim Government as-
sumes office on July 1, its most important task will be to prepare the way for elec-
tions to establish the Transitional Government in January of 2005. That govern-
ment in turn will be replaced by elections for a fully constitutional government at
the end of 2005.
The last element of the strategy involves the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastruc-
ture and the restoration of essential services that are providing better lives for
Iraqis and putting people back to work. Iraq has tremendous potential. It has well-
educated and industrious people. It has fertile land and water resources and it has
abundant natural resources. Our strategy aims to put Iraq on course to realizing
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that potential and to setting conditions for Iraqis to reap greater prosperity in the
future.
LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
Although the progress the Iraqi people have made in their climb up from tyranny
has been both encouraging and impressive, significant challenges still remain.
Security in Iraq
When planning the military campaign to liberate Iraq, this administration and
the combatant commanders chose to launch a campaign that emphasized speed
rather than mass. The astonishing speed of this military campaign enabled us to
avoid many of the nightmare scenarios that were predicted before the war. Lest
anybody forget, in part thanks to this war plan we managed to avoid most of the
horror scenarios we feared going into this war:
• Iraq’s oil fields were not turned into an ecological and economic disaster;
• Massive destruction of dams and bridges was prevented;
• Large-scale refugee flows were not generated;
• There was no humanitarian crisis from food or medical shortages;
• No friendly governments in the region collapsed because of the pressures
of a protracted war.
• Iraq’s neighbors did not intervene, nor did Israel;
• Ethnic conflict did not break out in mixed populations in northern Iraq
or elsewhere; and
• There was no ‘‘Fortress Baghdad’’ with street-to-street fighting and heavy
civilian casualties.
The avoidance of these calamities was not by accident, but rather the result of
careful planning.
Because we did not wait to mass half a million forces in theater before launching
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam was not able to organize the large-scale urban
warfare campaign about which so many military analysts warned. The historically
unprecedented speed of the campaign may have led many Iraqi forces, such as the
Fedayeen Saddam and Mukhabarrat, to disperse throughout the country rather
than stand and fight in the streets as anticipated.
In order to destroy the last vestiges of Saddam’s tyranny, it was always necessary
that we defeat these forces. The current violence is not an issue of reconstruction
planning, nor is it due to a lack of forces. Overall, the decision to emphasize speed
rather than mass was a deliberate choice, recommended by the Combatant Com-
mander, General Franks, but approved by the President and the Secretary of De-
fense and concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Like all choices it involved nec-
essary tradeoffs, but overall it has saved lives and helped to avoid terrible humani-
tarian and environmental disasters.
The timing of the current violence was not entirely unexpected. President Bush
warned that we could expect increased violence in the months leading up to the
transition to Iraqi sovereignty. We knew that the enemies of democracy in Iraq
would do everything they could to disrupt the transition to sovereignty. This expec-
tation was confirmed when we intercepted a letter from Abu Musab Zarqawi to his
Al Qaeda colleagues in Afghanistan. In this letter, Zarqawi expressed disappoint-
ment that previous mass attacks were failing to shatter the unity of the Iraqi peo-
ple. He advocated stepping up attacks to kill large numbers of Shi’a in order to pro-
voke a sectarian civil war in Iraq. Some of the recent violence, including the attacks
on Shi’ite worshippers in Karbala and Baghdad during the Ashoura holiday in early
March which killed 140 Iraqis, bear Zarqawi’s hallmark.
However, the same political situation that is driving such attacks also is a source
of optimism for the Iraqi people and their coalition partners. Zarqawi recognized
that the fast-approaching turnover of sovereignty would further weaken his cause,
saying:
‘‘With the spread of the [Iraqi] army and the police, our future is becom-
ing frightening. The problem is you end up having an army and police con-
nected by lineage, blood and appearance to the people of the region. How
can we kill their cousins and sons and under what pretext, after the Ameri-
cans start withdrawing? This is the democracy . . . we will have no pre-
text.’’
Zarqawi’s letter strongly suggests that we are seeing an upsurge in violence pre-
cisely because the terrorists and extremists in Iraq believe we are winning and that
their time to derail democracy in Iraq is running out.
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U.S. Government Transition after CPA
We face another daunting challenge as we execute the transition from the Coali-
tion Provisional Authority to a sovereign Iraqi government bolstered by a U.S. em-
bassy less than 90 days from now. Fortunately, planning for this transition is well
underway within the Defense and State Departments. LTG (USA, Ret.) Mick
Kicklighter and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone lead Transition Teams for the two
Departments, and they have worked hand in glove with the CPA and Defense and
Army staffs since early January to make the transition a success. They have formed
an Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) and provide the State and Defense
leadership for drafting an Operations Plan for the transition. Experts from 16 sub-
ject matter sectors (such as Security, Human Resources and Personnel, Facilities,
Finance, Medical and Health Services, etc.) from State and Defense coordinate close-
ly to draft the highly detailed, time-phased plan. The ITPT as a whole meets almost
daily, with sector leads meeting with their teams more often as required. General
Kicklighter and Ambassador Ricciardone meet several times each week to ensure
that planning and implementation of the plan are on track.
Transitional Administrative Law
While the ITPT sets the course for the U.S. Government transition, the TAL es-
tablishes a clear way forward for drafting and ratifying a permanent constitution
for Iraq and the election of a government in accordance with its terms. This political
transition is scheduled to evolve over three phases:
• Phase I (June 30, 2004)—Iraqi Interim Government
• Phase II (January 2005)—Iraqi Transitional Government
• Phase III (January 2006)—Iraqi Government under Permanent Constitu-
tion
According to the timeline laid out in the TAL, the Iraqi Interim Government will
take power on June 30. This Interim Government will be selected by procedures
being developed through intensive consultations among Iraqis, led by Ambassador
Brahimi, the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Advisor on Iraq. We believe the ideas
put forth by Mr. Brahimi are promising and we look forward to more details from
the U.N. CPA officials will remain in close contact with Mr. Brahimi, members of
the Iraqi Governing Council and other Iraqis as these procedures are completed in
May. The Interim Government will serve until the Transitional National Assembly
(TNA), is elected in either December 2004 or January 2005.
The TNA will then elect a three-person Presidency Council comprised of a Presi-
dent and two Deputies, who will appoint by unanimous vote the Prime Minister
and, on the Prime Minister’s recommendation, a Council of Ministers. The Prime
Minister and Council of Ministers must obtain a vote of confidence from the TNA
before taking office. Together, the TNA, the Presidency Council and the Council of
Ministers will comprise the Iraqi Transitional Government.
In addition to being the legislature, the TNA will also draft a permanent constitu-
tion for Iraq, which will be submitted for popular ratification by October 15, 2005.
Elections under this new constitution are to be held by December 15, 2005, and the
newly elected government, operating under the permanent constitution, will take of-
fice by December 31, 2005.
The TAL provisions relevant to security arrangements also provide the appro-
priate framework for implementing our security strategy in Iraq. Article 59(B) of the
TAL states that Iraqi armed forces will be ‘‘a principal partner in the multinational
force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to’’ UNSCR 1511. Article
59(C) states that the elected Iraqi Transitional Government ‘‘shall have the author-
ity to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the mul-
tinational force,’’ and that ‘‘nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations
. . . under UNSCR 1511 . . . which will govern the multinational force’s activities
pending entry into force of those agreements.’’ Perhaps most importantly, article
26(C) ensures that CPA orders and regulations ‘‘shall remain in force until re-
scinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.’’ This
includes CPA Order #17, which provides SOFA-like protections for Coalition Forces,
and will stay in effect until an international agreement is negotiated with the sov-
ereign Iraqi government.
Now, I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of the permanent govern-
ment. Iraqis will decide to establish the exact provisions of their permanent Iraqi
constitution, or who will emerge as the leaders of the new Iraq. After 35 years of
totalitarian dictatorship, it is a complicated task to build new political institutions
and it cannot happen overnight.
Americans of all people should understand that democracy does not guarantee
specific outcomes, it opens ideas up for debate. One need only look back at our own
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26
Constitutional Convention to be reminded that with any attempt to establish rule
for the people by the people, there is always a great deal of uncertainty and con-
troversy, right up until the ink has dried and even afterwards. We should not expect
Iraqis to achieve immediately what we and the British, for example, have labored
to accomplish over the course of centuries. Throughout the world, particularly in
Eastern Europe and in East Asia, new democracies have emerged in the last 10 or
20 years. They are all different and none are perfect. Neither is ours. But even an
imperfect Iraqi democracy will be an improvement light years beyond what that
country has endured for the past 35 years.
Let me say one more thing here. I believe it is wrong to assume that Iraqi Arabs
and Kurds, some of the most intelligent people in the world, can not achieve what
Lithuania, Korea, and other newly emerging democracies throughout Eastern Eu-
rope and East Asia have accomplished in the past 20 years. Since the liberation of
Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted themselves extraordinarily well for a nation
so long exposed to Saddam Hussein’s unique level of sadism. In a remarkably short
period of time, Iraqi leaders, for all their diversity, have shown they are learning
the arts of political compromise and that they are dedicated to their country’s unity.
Iraqi Security Forces
One institution we are focusing intently on is the Iraqi Security Forces, whose
performance during the spike in combat activity over the past 3 weeks has been
mixed. At least half of the security forces stood their ground and in Fallujah some
ICDC units fought bravely and well. Other units did not face the enemy, avoided
contact altogether, and a small proportion cooperated with the enemy.
Our disappointment with the security forces has to be tempered with realism.
Overall, they were not capable by themselves of deterring or withstanding the re-
cent attacks, and that fact should not surprise us. We have been fielding Iraqi secu-
rity forces as fast as we could, but we never intended for Iraqi security forces to
take over responsibility for Iraq’s security on June 30, much less April 5. Our plan
was and is for Iraqi forces to develop strength, capability, and experience under the
security umbrella of the coalition, while the coalition retained overall security re-
sponsibilities. Recent events provide lessons we can apply to increase the impact of
what we are doing.
The first lesson is the need for stronger leaders in the security forces. We will
build on the leaders whose units fought and we will replace those whose units did
not. We will integrate Iraqi officers with coalition forces and we will embed coalition
officers with the Iraqi security forces. This cross-attachment provides liaison, which
produces mutual confidence, and it also helps us develop Iraqi leadership. Similarly,
we need police advisors and specialized trainers to get down to police stations
around the country to provide confidence and set the example.
Second, it is clear that the members of the security forces, most of whom are Iraqi
patriots, need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to understand they operate under
an Iraqi chain of command, and that at the top of that chain of command is a law-
fully constituted Iraqi government. The chain of command is being put in place now.
A defense minister has been named, along with a commander in chief of the Armed
Forces and a chief of staff. A new interior minister has also taken office. We need
to fill in the rest of the chain, but Iraqis in the security forces can see today that
there are Iraqis at the top.
The other and harder part of creating a national rallying point for the security
forces is the creation of an Iraqi government. This is one of the important reasons
to maintain the momentum of the governance process, including not only the June
30 transition but the important steps beyond.
Third, the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment. We had not
planned for them to be fully equipped at this point, but some of our ICDC units
were outgunned in recent action, so we are relooking the equipment requirements.
We have also incurred some delays in equipping the Iraqi security forces. Part of
the delay has been caused by challenges in the contracting process and we hope
those problems have been fixed. We need to make up some of our lost time, but any
delay is unacceptable.
The greatest factor in the mixed performance of the security forces was an intan-
gible: fear. The fear of becoming a casualty is doubtless ever-present; almost 300
members of the Iraqi security forces have been killed and almost 700 wounded. But
fear of the future is a much greater factor. The enemies of a democratic future for
Iraq have so terrorized the cities of central Iraq that many members of the security
forces doubt that they or their families can be protected from the retribution that
may follow their participation in operations alongside the coalition. The intimidation
is crude but often effective, especially in a society in which keeping your head down
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27
was an essential survival technique for over 30 years. That fear takes time to over-
come.
The enthusiasm of Iraqis to go into combat alongside the coalition is also colored
by their perception of our commitment to the new Iraq. If they sense that we will
not see them through to a new constitution, an election, and strong Iraqi institu-
tions, we should not be surprised to see them melt away or even work a deal with
those who would shoot their way to power. That is why it is so important in this
time of stress to show that our commitment to their freedom is rock-solid.
Afghanistan
We also confront challenges in Afghanistan where the United States, its coalition
partners, and NATO have committed to helping the Afghans build a moderate,
democratic, and representative government. Despite some setbacks, Afghanistan has
made enormous progress on several fronts.
In January of this year, the Afghan people reached a critical milestone when they
adopted a constitution laying the foundation for strong democratic institutions and
guaranteeing civil liberties such as freedom of religion and equality between men
and women. The Afghans have made steady progress in disarmament, with 40 per-
cent of the heavy weapons around Kabul secured. A nation-wide heavy weapons sur-
vey is identifying all remaining heavy weapons in the country for removal by June
2004. The Afghan Ministry of Defense will likely meet its goal of 9,500 Afghan Na-
tional Army troops by the summer. The 7,646-strong force has already contributed
to the success of Coalition stability operations in the south and east. The army al-
lowed the central government to respond effectively to the recent unrest and fac-
tional fighting in Herat and Meymaneh. With the more than $2 billion that you helped provide, the President was able
to commit personally to accelerate progress in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and se-
curity. This commitment has allowed us to increase the number of Provincial Recon-
struction Teams throughout Afghanistan. The coalition recently established its 13th
team in the southern province of Oruzgan. We hope to set up three more in the
south and east by June of this year. Countries leading PRTs include the U.K., New
Zealand, and Germany. These teams play an active role in defusing regional ten-
sions among rival warlords, engage in public works projects, and help provide secu-
rity for reconstruction activities through presence patrols and assistance to local po-
lice and security forces, among other things.
Operation Mountain Storm is underway in the south and east, where al Qaeda
networks and the Taliban continue to threaten stability and reconstruction. We are
following up these combat operations with focused reconstruction and humanitarian
assistance. One vehicle for this focused reconstruction and humanitarian assistance
will be the Regional Development Zone, which will be rolled out in the less devel-
oped and more insecure regions.
We are improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and enhancing co-
operation in counterinsurgency operations along the Afghan border with Pakistan.
In 2003, we established a Tripartite Commission made up of U.S., Afghan, and Pak-
istani authorities that meets regularly to share military intelligence and address
common security concerns.
We are actively engaging NATO countries to expand their security presence in Af-
ghanistan. NATO recently completed an operations plan for expanding the Inter-
national Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul and Konduz. We are lobbying
NATO countries to contribute the resources necessary for this expansion.
FALSE PESSIMISM ABOUT THE IRAQI TRANSITION
But while it is important not to view the accomplishments in Iraq and Afghani-
stan through rose-colored glasses, some critics seem to have given themselves over
completely to the darkest of pessimism. To some, all progress in Iraq is illusory,
every silver lining has a cloud.
It is important to address and correct the misperceptions about developments in
Iraq. The American people need to know what their forces are accomplishing in
Iraq, how the efforts of our servicemen and women are transforming the lives of 25
million Iraqis for the better, and transforming a region that has for too long accom-
modated despotism to the detriment of its freedom starved populations. Both our
friends and our enemies, in Iraq and Afghanistan, need to know that we have the
will and resolve to accomplish our objectives.
For example, some say the June 30 date for the transfer of sovereignty is com-
pletely arbitrary, driven more by the demands of U.S. electoral politics than by ac-
tual conditions in Iraq, and that therefore the deadline should be extended. The
choice of an early date as opposed to a later date was not arbitrary at all. If you
will recall, our original plan envisaged a sovereign Iraqi government only at the end
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of a multi-step process of drafting a new constitution and holding elections by the
end of 2005. The President decided to shorten this timetable, for two key reasons
having to do with our strategy in Iraq.
First, the Iraqis seemed to hold back from taking responsibility as long as the
CPA was in total charge. A shorter timetable was seen as a necessary incentive to
prepare the Iraqis for sovereignty. For without the sense of urgency and account-
ability that a fixed deadline imposes, Iraqi leaders have been unable to resolve the
difficult issues required to conduct elections and shape a new government.
Second, an early end to the occupation is essential to our political strategy to de-
feat the terrorists. A sovereign Iraqi government will be better able to marginalize
its extremist opponents politically while coalition forces defeat them militarily. As
the letter from Zarqawi demonstrates, such a transformation is the worst possible
scenario for those who oppose the emergence of democracy in Iraq. They fear it, and
that’s why they are trying so hard to derail it.
Moving ahead is important to inspire Iraqi confidence that the transition is mov-
ing forward and that their country will not be occupied indefinitely. But it is impor-
tant also to make clear that coalition forces will not leave on July 1—there will still
be threats to security in Iraq. But, on July 1, Iraq will be governed by an Iraqi gov-
ernment. This is in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Iraqi people. In a
recent public opinion survey, 60 percent of Iraqis said that U.S. and other coalition
forces should remain in Iraq for more than 1 year, until security is restored, or until
an Iraqi government is in place.
Some say the transfer of authority to Iraqis will not be genuine, that it will only
be symbolic. This is also not true. On July 1, an Iraqi government will be given re-
sponsibility for day-to-day governing of Iraqi state affairs. Iraqis will control all 26
ministries with strong U.S. support. The Iraqi Police, Border Patrol, and Facilities
Protection Forces—80 percent of the Iraqi Security Forces—will be under the new
Iraqi Interior Ministry. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Iraqi Army will, for pur-
poses of operational control, be under the unified command of the Multi-National
Force Iraq, commanded by General Sanchez. However, administratively they will be
under the command of the Ministry of Defense. These arrangements are similar to
those utilized in Germany and Korea during the Cold War, put real power into the
hands of our Iraqi partners, and go beyond any token symbolism.
Some say that we are in Iraq with an ‘‘illegitimate’’ coalition that is just window
dressing for this administration’s unilateralism. However, the Coalition’s mission to
reconstruct Iraq has been an international effort from the start. Thirty-four Nations
besides the United States have forces on the ground in Iraq, spearheaded by the
two multinational divisions led by the British and the Poles. These 34 nations in-
clude Britain, Japan, and Italy—three G–7 countries—plus Poland, South Korea,
and many others. Jordan and the United Arab Emirates are training Iraqi police
forces. Over 70 nations participated in the Madrid Donors’ Conference, pledging be- tween $14–19 billion dollars for Iraqi reconstruction, including significant pledges
from the World Bank and IMF.
Thirty-four of our closest friends have troops that are bravely fighting alongside
us in Iraq. British, Italians, Bulgarians, Thais, Poles, Danes, Estonians, Ukrainians,
and Spanish have been killed while trying to advance freedom and democracy in
Iraq and it is wrong to denigrate their efforts. Perhaps most significantly, more than
250 Iraqis have died in the line of duty fighting for a free Iraq since June 1.
Some say that just as we should have waited for the United Nation’s permission
to go to war, we should bring the United Nations into Iraq today. This is a mislead-
ing statement, as this administration has made a significant effort to involve the
United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq. The Coalition’s ongoing efforts in Iraq
have repeatedly received the endorsement of the UN. U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion 1483—passed May 22, 2003—supports the formation of the CPA and an Iraqi
Interim Administration. UNSCR 1500—passed August 14, 2003—welcomed the es-
tablishment of the Governing Council. UNSCR 1511—passed October 16, 2003—au-
thorizes a multinational force under U.S. command. All three of these resolutions
were unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Security Council.
The administration has worked closely with the U.N. Secretary General through-
out the past year. Before his tragic murder by terrorists, U.N. envoy Sergio Viera
de Mello was instrumental in establishing the Iraqi Governing Council. Since then
we have welcomed the proposals of the new U.N. envoy, Lakdar Brahimi, regarding
the creation of the Iraqi Interim Government. Since the tragic bombing of the U.N.
Headquarters in Baghdad last August—which Zarqawi boasts was his doing and
which was clearly aimed at driving out the U.N.—security for the U.N. has been
a major challenge. However, the U.N. representative for Security Coordination’s Of-
fice has been in Baghdad since mid-January. A U.N. Election Commission headed
by Carina Perelli has in Iraq this month. Ambassador Brahimi has already con-
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ducted two important missions to Iraq and we look forward to his return next
month.
Some say the recent attacks against Coalition forces by Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia
signal the start of a major Shi’a uprising that would pit Iraq’s Shi’a—who are a ma-
jority of the population—against the coalition. In reality, however, Sadr does not
have widespread support in the Iraq Shi’a community. A recent ABC News poll
showed that only one percent of Iraqis named al-Sadr as the National leader they
trust most. Last week in Najaf, Iraqi residents of that city distributed leaflets
against Sadr that said: ‘‘We don’t want anyone, whoever he is, to surround himself
with armed bodyguards and return us to an era of slavery for the Iraqi people.’’ Im-
mediately after al-Sadr urged his followers to attack U.S. forces, the Shiite clerical
establishment issued a statement calling for Sadr to stop ‘‘resorting to violence, oc-
cupying public buildings, and other actions’’ that make him an outlaw.
That is what Muqtada al-Sadr is, an outlaw. He does not represent a ‘‘legitimate
voice’’ in Iraq, but rather a threat to the legitimate rule of law in Iraq. Immediately
after the liberation of Iraq he ordered his followers to begin taking over the mosques
of moderate Shiites. He has been indicted by an Iraqi judge for complicity in the
assassination of a prominent moderate Shi’a cleric, Ayatollah Abdel Majid al-Khoei,
in April 2003.
Muqtada al-Sadr’s reliance on armed gangs to deny Iraqi men and women their
basic freedoms, his use of intimidation and possibly murder against his political ri-
vals, and his imposition of vigilante law and illegal courts are incompatible with the
New Iraq that most Iraqis want.
Some say we have no plan for the scheduled transition to Iraqi sovereignty on
July 1. Such statements ignore the progress made in our discussions with the U.N.
over the last 2 months. U.N. envoy Ambassador Brahimi just announced on April
14 his general concept for the Iraqi Interim Government that will govern from July
1 to early 2005. That concept is the product of weeks of consultation by U.N. and
coalition officials with Iraqis. Ambassador Brahimi remains confident that the proc-
ess of setting up an Interim Government could be completed in a relatively short
period of time. It is worth recalling that some permanent members of the U.N. Secu-
rity Council complained that CPA’s plan was moving too slowly to sovereignty.
As for the shape of the U.S. presence, the Command and Control relationships
are in the process of being finalized. DOD will create the Office of Security Coopera-
tion (OSC) that will be headed by General David Petraeus. OSC will consist of the
Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) and the Civilian Police Advi-
sory Training Team (CPATT). General Petraeus will have authority and responsibil-
ity for effectively using available resources and for recruiting, equipping, training,
and positioning the Iraqi Security Forces.
Some say the new Iraq will be dominated by the Shi’a majority that will inevi-
tably establish an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq. Although the eventual shape of
the permanent Iraqi government will be for the Iraqis themselves to determine, thus
far events on the ground are cause for cautious optimism. Over the past 2 months,
17 local elections have been held in overwhelmingly Shiite provinces in Southern
Iraq. In almost every case independents and representatives of non-religious parties
did better than the Islamists.
In addition, certain key provisions of the TAL suggest Iraqis have already chosen
a more tolerant course. First, the TAL reflects a unanimous consensus of the Gov-
erning Council that includes Shi’ite representatives, Sunni Iraqis, Kurdish Iraqis
and others. These Iraqis embraced a democratic form of government that reflects
the principle that there shall be neither the tyranny of the majority nor tyranny
of the minority. The rights, beliefs and practices of all Iraqis are protected.
The TAL also achieves a reasonable balance with regard to the role of Islam in
Iraq, combining clear guarantees of religious and other freedoms with recognition
of Islam’s role in Iraqi society. Article 13(F) states that ‘‘Each Iraqi has the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such
matters shall be prohibited.’’ Article 7(A) states that ‘‘Islam is the official religion
. . . and is to be considered a source of legislation.’’ No law may contradict ‘‘the uni-
versally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the [individual]
rights’’ granted in the TAL. The exact meaning of this will of course have to be
worked out in practice. But it incorporates the view that the ‘‘universally agreed te-
nets of Islam’’ are compatible with democracy and individual rights.
Some say this administration is leading the American people into another Viet-
nam-like quagmire that can never be won. As Senator McCain, former Senator Fred
Thompson, and many others have pointed out, that comparison is more emotion
than analysis. In Vietnam, the Communists were an entrenched movement, with a
strong nationalist credential, external support from two major Communist powers,
and a friendly population in many parts of the country. In Iraq, the extremism in
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the Sunni triangle represents a small minority of the Iraqi population seeking to
restore the regime of terror that gripped Iraq for more than three decades—plus an
admixture of foreign jihadists and Iraqi extremists, some of them associated with
Al Qaeda. While we do not know how much these groups work together—and while
their long term goals may diverge—they are united in the common purpose of de-
feating us and preventing a free Iraq from emerging. They offer no positive vision
to Iraqis but only visions of death and terror.
One possible resemblance with the Vietnam experience, however, is the enemy’s
hope that it can shape perceptions here—demoralizing the American people as well
as our servicemen and women in the field. That was a decisive factor in the outcome
in Vietnam. That is why Senator Kerry’s strong statement that America must stay
the course in Iraq is so important. That is the message, we in Washington, must
convey on a bipartisan basis not only to our own people, not only to our servicemen
and women, but also to the Iraqis, both friend and foe.
It seems that this message is starting to get through to Bin Laden’s associate
Zarqawi. In the same letter I quoted previously, he lamented that America would
not be pushed out ‘‘no matter how numerous its wounds become and how much of
its blood is spilled.’’ That is an accurate description of this country’s courage and
staying power in a just cause. Conveying that message can shorten the conflict.
CONCLUSION: ONLY ONE OPTION—TO WIN
Finally, some say there are no good options in Iraq. This is not true. In fact, there
is only one option in Iraq—to continue moving ahead and helping the Iraqi people
build a free and prosperous democracy. This will not be easy. Only the most naive
person would think that. It will be a long road. After the abuse it has suffered, it
will take time for Iraq to catch up even with the new democracies of Europe and
Asia, much less long-established ones like our own.
But Iraqis recognize these challenges and embrace them as a revolutionary oppor-
tunity to build a free nation and to better their lives. Recently, Nesreen Berwari,
the woman serving as the Iraqi Minister of Municipalities and Public Works said:
‘‘On April 9, 2003, Iraqis were offered the opportunity to begin to dream their fu-
ture. Before April 9, 2003, we were not allowed to dream. We could not imagine life
with the kinds of positive challenges we face today.’’ Minister Berwari’s optimism
persists even though she recently survived a second assassination attempt on her
life which killed her bodyguard.
From the start of the global war on terror it has been clear that we would have
to face many difficult challenges and endure many sacrifices in order to ensure the
safety of our citizens and our way of life. But as Minister Berwari suggests, these
should be seen as positive challenges not as excuses for inaction or retreat. When
has it ever been the American way to back down from such a challenge?
Last October, in his farewell speech, General John Keane aptly described the
American character in the face of challenges such as we face today in Iraq. General
Keane said:
‘‘I want to tell you something about this war against terror we are fight-
ing in Iraq and around the world. The foreign terrorists, the Baath Party
sympathizers, the Islamic extremists who wantonly kill Americans and in-
nocent people from many nations, have no idea what they are up against.
Their strategic objective is the political and moral will of the American
people. They want to destroy our confidence. They think they know us be-
cause they have heard of Lebanon in 1983, or Somalia in 1994, or the
U.S.S. Cole in 2000. They think we are morally weak and we will lose our
resolve. But their knowledge is superficial and their understanding is shal-
low.
To understand America and Americans, they need to understand the
Marne in 1918, or Tarawa in 1943, Omaha Beach in 1944, or the Chosin
Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a nation that produces
Alvin York and Audie Murphy; John Pershing and George Marshall; Chesty
Puller and George Patton; Randy Shugart and Gary Gordon; produces he-
roes in every generation. They are out there now . . . performing every day.
Our enemies are cunning, but they are ignorant and their ignorance will
be their undoing. They do not know our will, our courage, or our character.’’
Last summer, a colonel in the 101st Air Assault Division told me that he ex-
plained the job in Iraq to his soldiers like this: He told them that what they’re doing
in Iraq is every bit as important as what their grandfathers did in Germany or
Japan in World War II or what their fathers did in Europe and Asia during the
Cold War.
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Those soldiers are helping to reshape history in a way that will make America
and the world safer. Like the joint effort to pull down Saddam’s statue a little over
a year ago, our troops are supporting the Iraqi people in their effort to overcome
their tyrannical past and build a better, more peaceful future.
Needed Enhance Authorities
One of the most important ways in which Congress can support the global war
on terrorism is to support three special authorities we have requested:
(1) $500 million to train and equip military and security forces in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and friendly nearby regional nations to enhance their capabil-
ity to combat terrorism and support U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghani-
stan. It is critical that this authority include security forces because the ter-
rorism threat in Iraq is inside its borders. Security forces—not the New
Iraqi Army —play the primary role in confronting this threat.
(2) The Commanders Emergency Response Program ($300 million) to en-
able military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humani-
tarian relief and reconstruction needs. This has been a remarkably success-
ful program. With quick turnaround projects averaging about $7,000 each,
commanders not only help people in their operations area, but also gain
their support in defeating terrorists and building themselves a better fu-
ture. As we have already done in fiscal year 2004, we propose to expand
CERP to Afghanistan, as well as to continue the program in Iraq.
(3) Increased drawdown authority ($200 million) under the Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act, to provide additional help for the Afghan National
Army. During this pivotal year, this authority is critical for advancing de-
mocracy and stability in Afghanistan. During my visit to Afghanistan, ev-
eryone I met gave very high marks to the professionalism and competence
of the ANA.
The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget does not request specific appropriations
for these three authorities, and therefore the Department would need to reprogram
funding to use them. This underscores the importance of Congress increasing the
Department’s General Transfer Authority (GTA) to $4 billion—which would still
represent just one percent of total DOD funding. Higher GTA also would give us
a greater ability to shift funds from less pressing needs to fund must-pay bills and
emerging requirements. As we have seen in the past 3 years, such requirements
have become a constant feature of our military programs.
This administration looks forward to continuing to work with the Members of
Congress to help support our Armed Forces throughout the world who are doing
their part to make American and her people more secure. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Well, Mr. Secretary, we on this committee
have the highest regard for General Keane. I hope he is doing well.
General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, mem-
bers of the committee. Once again I thank you for your unwavering
support of our Armed Forces and, more specifically, our men and
women in uniform as they fight this all-important war on terror-
ism.
As Chairman Warner said, I just returned from visiting Iraq and
Afghanistan. Certainly, the spike in violence that we have all seen
in central Iraq over the last week is a challenge, no doubt about
it. We mourn every coalition soldier that we lose.
But I can assure you today that we are as firm as ever in our
resolve to help create a free, prosperous, a democratic Iraq. The
violent minority, a small marginal minority, cannot be allowed to
defeat the hopes of the Iraqi people. This is no popular uprising.
This violence is a desperate attempt by frustrated, isolated groups,
such as the insurgents in Fallujah described by Secretary
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Wolfowitz and Sadr’s thugs, to derail the progress that we are
making.
According to recent polls, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, the major-
ity of Iraqi people want Iraq to succeed and their are positive about
what the future holds, thanks in large part to the efforts of our
service men and women. I know you all are as proud as I am of
how well they are performing. They are so tremendously dedicated.
They understand their mission very well. They also understand
what a huge difference they are making.
The contrast between our troops and the anti-coalition forces
they are fighting could not be greater. In Fallujah we have seen the
enemy unload weapons from ambulances, use mosques as operating
bases, deliberately put children in the line of fire as human shields,
and attack innocent civilians indiscriminately by firing mortars
into marketplaces. Our service men and women, on the other ex-
treme, are going to extraordinary lengths to conduct the most hu-
mane operations they can. That means at times we accept greater
risk in order to avoid civilian casualties.
Make no mistake, we are hitting the enemy very hard and we
are devastating them. But our troops are also very compassionate.
Their strength of character in the end I believe will be a major fac-
tor in determining Iraq’s future.
I see the same thing in Afghanistan as well, with 12 Provincial
Reconstruction Teams now working on security and civil affairs for
the Afghani people.
Let me close by sharing a letter that a member of my staff re-
ceived from a private first class. This young man enlisted after 1
year of college. In fact, he was in college on an ROTC scholarship.
But because after September 11 he saw an opportunity to make a
difference, he is now serving in one of the more dangerous areas
in central Iraq.
He describes how he went on a mission to look at the structural
integrity of some of the bridges. In the course of the patrol, they
talked to many of the Iraqis, especially the children. They had
their medical corpsman take care of the children’s medical prob-
lems. By the time they drove off, everyone in the town was smiling
and waving at them.
I will quote, and here is what he said: ‘‘What I am trying to say
to you guys is this’’—and ‘‘you guys’’ are his parents. ‘‘We are mak-
ing a difference here. An area smack dab in the infamous Sunni
Triangle, known for its ruthlessness, is gradually, patrol by patrol,
becoming safe and free.’’
‘‘Patrol by patrol,’’ that means we still have a long way to go in
this war, beyond the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, as Secretary
Wolfowitz said, and elections in Afghanistan. But let us not forget
that our troops are making a huge difference every day, and they
know it.
We are truly blessed with amazing men and women to do this
important work, and I include in there their families and for the
Reserve component, the Guard and the Reserve, the employers who
support them so well.
Again, I thank this committee for its strong support.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Grossman.
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STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
committee, thank you all for the opportunity to testify before you
today. Senator Warner, I thank you for putting my full statement
in the record, and I am pleased to summarize what I have to say,
I hope in a short way.
Before I begin, let me add my voice to the committee’s and to my
fellows here at this table to pay tribute to all of those, military and
civilian, who are today serving our country around the world and
specifically in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
I also want to thank the committee for their support of the State
Department, because without your support and without Congress’s
support we would not have been in a position a year ago, 2 years
ago, to do what we have had to do in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
I will talk a little bit more about that. But I thank you in the very
beginning for the strong support of Congress for the Secretary’s
goals in making the Department an effective institution.
I also would like to say, as you did, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Levin, that we are delighted with the President’s nomination yes-
terday of Ambassador Negroponte as our first ambassador to the
new Iraq and we look forward to his confirmation hearings and his
confirmation by the Senate. We thank you for your words of sup-
port to Ambassador Negroponte.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, in your letter of invitation to me
you asked me a series of questions about how the transition was
going to go between the CPA and a new embassy. I wanted today
to take a few minutes to talk about where we stand in that transi-
tion and try, as specifically as I can, to answer your questions.
First let me say that in my view we have the guidance we need
about how to do this. We have the direction we need about what
we are supposed to do. As I hope to convince you, we also have a
plan about how to move forward between now and June 30, July
1, so that a U.S. embassy and a United States ambassador rep-
resenting the United States of America are there to represent us
in Iraq.
Our guidance obviously, Mr. Chairman, as you have quoted,
comes from the President. Our central commitment, he said last
Tuesday, is the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people on
June 30. It is important that we meet that deadline.
Our specific direction, as you can imagine, comes from Secretary
Powell and he has set as the goal of the State Department to make
sure that we are ready to take on this responsibility on the 1st of
July. I might also say how proud we are of Lieutenant General
Kicklighter and also Frank Ricciardone who are spearheading this
effort for us. Now Ambassador Negroponte will come and join us
and add effort and add focus to this, to the effort that we are mak-
ing.
I can tell you that the Secretary’s involvement in our transition
planning continues daily. We send to the Secretary each evening a
report on what has gone on during the day to move issues forward.
We are also sending him a weekly consolidated summary. To exe-
cute our plan we have obviously been working closely with all of
our interagency colleagues, not just DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff
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34
(JCS). We have consulted with Congress, with our allies, with our
coalition partners, so people know what it is that we are doing and
how it is that we are moving forward.
As an early step, one of the I think very best ideas of Ambas-
sador Ricciardone and General Kicklighter, the transition planning
team sent out very expert people to Iraq to try to tell us what were
the main sectors that needed to be dealt with in this transition.
They came up with 15, 16 sectors that we are now moving forward
on every day. These sectors are broken down into individual tasks
or milestones. Every one of them needs to be accomplished.
Although we list on our major charts 15 or 16 of these mile-
stones, in fact the sectors relate to more than 500 milestones that
we have. Just to show you that, we have a series of charts that we
are using to make sure that those with the responsibility to do
these jobs are doing them. Senator Warner and Mr. Levin, I would
invite members of the committee or members of the committee staff
to come and have a look at these. They are all on the web and at
the State Department on our classified systems, and people are
welcome to come and look at them at any time and see how it is
that we are doing.
There is responsibility, there is a completion date, there is a de-
sire to get these things done, and we intend to do them. It is obvi-
ously a living document. New issues come up each day. New re-
sponsibilities have to be assigned. But we are doing our very best
to keep to this plan.
I would like to take today, of these 15 or 16 items, 4 of them just
to talk about briefly. First, let me talk about people. State Depart-
ment officers, as both Ambassador Wolfowitz and General Myers
know, have been in Iraq from the very beginning, with General
Garner in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assist-
ance (ORHA) and now under Jerry Bremer in CPA.
We have 170 people in Iraq today. Like Secretary Wolfowitz and
General Myers, we are also immensely proud of our people’s work
that is being done in Iraq. I can tell you that they have come from
dozens of Washington agencies, dozens of missions overseas, for-
eign service, civil service, from brand-new officers to sitting ambas-
sadors.
The question we are asking ourselves now is how big will this
embassy be on the 1st of July, and one of the questions you asked
me in your letter of invitation. We the State Department have so
far announced positions for 142 Americans employees and 155 lo-
cally-engaged staff. In addition, Secretary Powell has written to all
of his cabinet colleagues asking them to identify the contributions
that they wish to make to this embassy, and to date he has re-
ceived 10 replies for requests for a presence in our mission in
Baghdad, for a total of 254 Americans and 280 locally hired person-
nel, looking forward to the fiscal year 2005.
Long-term, because these 10 are not the only people who will
look for representation at the mission, we look for a total of be-
tween 350 and 400 permanently assigned Americans from probably
12 or 15 cabinet agencies that will serve under the chief of mission
in Iraq. I would also note that a number of people who work at
CPA today we hope will also move under the embassy and allow
us to continue with the great expertise that they have developed.
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I can also report to you that, of this announced 142 positions for
our new embassy at the State Department, we have had over 200
bidders on these jobs. We have not had any problem at all enticing
people to be assigned to Iraq. Of the 142 positions that we have
announced, we have assigned 97 people, another 32 are pending,
and we will have all of these people assigned well in time to meet
our obligations.
We also, Senators, are starting to begin the process to hire lo-
cally hired people, Iraqis, which is a big challenge, as you might
imagine. But we have hired our initial Iraqi employees and they
are undergoing training here in Washington so they can help us
then hire more.
Mr. Chairman, one of the questions that is around and was in
your letter of invitation was what is going to be the responsibility
of the American ambassador there, given the obviously large mili-
tary role that will remain in Iraq after the 1st of July. I can tell
you that the American ambassador, once confirmed by the Senate,
will carry with him to Iraq a letter from the President, as all our
ambassadors carry letters from the President, that spells clearly
his authority.
It will say that he, as the chief of mission and personal rep-
resentative of the President reporting through the Secretary of
State, will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination,
and supervision of all United States Government executive branch
employees in Iraq, except those under command of a U.S. area mili-
tary commander or on the staff of an international organization.
Of course, as Paul and I have talked about a lot, our ambassador
and our military commanders will need to work very closely to-
gether. We do this around the world. We will be able to do this suc-
cessfully in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, the second of these areas is security. Obviously,
our top priority is security. It was our top priority before the last
couple of weeks. It remains our top priority and we have already
begun the security upgrade of the planned interim embassy build-
ings and have selected a site for a future new embassy compound
based largely on security features.
We have 32 officers from the State Department’s Diplomatic Se-
curity Service already in Iraq to define the mission security re-
quirements and begin to meet them, as well as to help protect CPA
officers and visitors. Deputy Secretary Armitage and our Assistant
Secretary for Diplomatic Security were in Iraq over the past few
days to continue this consultation.
Iraq is, not just for our military colleagues, but for us as well and
for all of our civilian colleagues, a dangerous place to work. Our
people know that, but it is worth saying out loud. Protecting our
people in a wartime environment is difficult, it is expensive, but we
will continue to meet our responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman, also in terms of a building, I have laid out in my
statement our plan for creating interim facilities for the 1st of July
and then our plan for building an embassy after that. I just want
you to know it is there and I am glad to talk about it and we are
glad to consult about it at any time.
Then finally is the question of finances, how much is it going to
cost and do we have the money. Let me just share with you the
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36
current thinking on the financial resources needed to ensure a
smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad, and if I could just empha-
size as much as I can that the costs I report to you today are a
snapshot. They are where we are on April 20, because we have
some responsibilities to meet and we believe that they will be cost-
ly, but we can meet them.
In order to open an embassy on the July 1, we have to, as I said,
meet basic security needs, technology needs, housing needs, for our
people. So far Congress has provided us money with which to do some of this job. In fiscal year 2004, we have $97 million for an
interim embassy facility and interim operations. In addition, we ex-
pect to have available, in the fourth quarter, a portion of the oper- ating expense budget appropriated to the CPA—that is about $198
million—and pursuant to the fiscal year 2004 supplemental, up to
one percent of the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund which could be transferred, which is about $184 million.
We are also now working to determine the joint mission costs, which I would say to you are going to be in the range of $500 to $600 million for the balance of fiscal year 2004, and how we will
allocate those costs among the various embassies. In addition, we
are trying to figure out and look for the amount of money that we
need to move forward to operate our mission in 2005, which could
be on the order of a billion dollars.
We are working closely with CPA, with the DOD, the Office of
Management and Budget, to refine these estimates. We look for-
ward to providing you as accurate information as we can and we
will consult with you and your colleagues before anything is made
final.
Mr. Chairman, I have talked in my statement a little bit about
Iraq’s transition to sovereignty, but I think Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz, with his charts and comments, has made many of the
comments that I would have wanted to, and also about the Iraqi
Interim Government.
Might I just jump, if I could, to talk for a moment about the U.N.
Security Council, since both you and the ranking member had
raised this issue. Obviously, we are looking to go for another U.N.
Security Council resolution. Both President Bush and Secretary
Powell have discussed this. We are now in a conversation inside
the administration about what kind of resolution might be appro-
priate, how to go forward with it, when to go forward with it, and
the possible elements of that resolution.
As you both said in your statements, the new resolution should
extend a hand to this new Iraqi government. It could also deal in
regularized reconstruction activities, including the future of the De-
velopment Fund for Iraq; deal with the continuing need for security
to enable the Iraqi people to complete the political process. It could
encourage other nations, as you both said, to get involved on both
security and reconstruction efforts. A new resolution could struc-
ture a role for the U.N. in this new political framework, particu-
larly in supporting progress towards elections.
Mr. Chairman, you both, and the ranking member, talked about
Afghanistan. Let me just be brief, if I could, about those two issues
since I think they are extremely important and we do need to keep
paying attention to them. We have tried to pursue a policy in Af-
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37
ghanistan that has to do with increased security, reconstruction
and economic growth, and the growth of constitutional, democratic,
and effective government.
These things are all related and as we move forward on one and
have success on one we believe that they will have positive outcome
on the others. As you both said, the challenges in Afghanistan re-
main daunting and we need to pay particular attention to them.
You asked me, in your letter, about elections. President Karzai
announced that elections for the presidency and the lower house of
parliament would take place in September, and we are doing all we
can to support the U.N. effort to help the Afghans have a success-
ful election. This announcement is consistent with Afghanistan’s
new constitution, which said that these parliamentary and presi-
dential elections ought to be held together.
As you said, there was the Bonn agreement, there was the loya
jirga of 2002, the constitutional loya jirga of 2004, and we believe
that we can make progress here toward these elections.
The U.N. reports that about 1.8 million Afghans have registered
to vote as of last week, with registration so far focused on urban
centers, and the number will rise significantly as people reach out
to other Afghans. I would say just parenthetically that 29 percent
of registered voters are women and that percentage is steadily ris-
ing, and over the past 2 weeks women have represented 39 percent
of those registered.
Finally, a word about narcotics because, as you say, this is a very
important challenge to what we are doing in Afghanistan. The nar-
cotics production and trafficking is probably the single most serious
threat to our common mission in Afghanistan and, just as you and
the ranking member said, all indicators point toward a significant
increase in poppy cultivation this year, and we should make no
bones about that. This is a real challenge that we are going to have
to deal with.
We are working with President Karzai. I know that you saw, a
couple of weeks ago at the Berlin conference, he called for a ‘‘jihad
against drug trafficking,’’ and we are doing all we can to fight this
problem with him.
Mr. Chairman, in the carve-up of responsibilities in Afghanistan,
the United Kingdom has the lead on counternarcotics initiatives
and between the United Kingdom and the United States, we now
have a very comprehensive strategy to try to deal with some of this
problem. The United Kingdom’s efforts started this month and ours
will start the beginning of next month. We have put about $40 mil-
lion extra into a government-led eradication program. We are train-
ing teams to do eradication. President Karzai has set the goal of
eradicating 25 percent of the crop this year and we want to help
him succeed in meeting that goal.
Just let me end by saying that, although we have talked a lot
about Iraq here and Afghanistan has come at the end of your state-
ment and at the end of my statement, this is something we are
paying tremendous attention to and I would be glad to talk about
this and anything else in the question period.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. MARC GROSSMAN
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to come before the committee today.
Before I begin, I would like to pay tribute to the men and women who are serving
their country and the cause of freedom in Iraq. Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary
Armitage and I are immensely proud of the Americans—civilian and military—who
demonstrate the highest degree of dedication, determination and courage as they
work to bring security, democracy and prosperity to Iraq. I also want to thank our
many coalition partners for their steadfast support.
Thank you also for your support of the State Department.
I know that you saw the President’s announcement yesterday of his nomination
of Ambassador John Negroponte to be the first Ambassador to the new Iraq. We are
delighted.
Before coming here today, I read closely the letter of invitation from the commit-
tee. You had these questions: How are we going to ensure a smooth transition from
CPA to an Embassy? How are we going to put in place the right people, resources
and organizational structure to do the work of the American people, without inter-
ruption, on July 1?
To what kind of Iraqi Government will the American ambassador be accredited?
What powers will that government have and how will it be formed? What is the role
of our coalition partners, the United Nations (U.N.) and the international commu-
nity in the weeks and months ahead?
These are the right questions. They are the same ones that we are working
through. We do not yet have all the answers. As Secretary Powell said earlier this
month to your colleagues here in Congress, ‘‘Creating a democratic government in
Iraq will be an enormous challenge, but Ambassador Bremer—with the Iraqi Gov-
erning Council, the United Nations and our coalition partners—is committed to suc-
cess.’’ What did the Secretary say next? ‘‘When the State Department assumes the
lead role this summer in representing and managing U.S. interests in Iraq, we will
carry on that commitment. We’re already thoroughly involved, and we will succeed.’’
We have the guidance we need, the direction required, and a plan for a successful
transition in Iraq. I am pleased to report today on what we are doing to establish
effective American representation in, and support for, the new Iraq.
GUIDANCE, DIRECTION, PLAN
Our guidance comes from President Bush. He repeated it last Tuesday night.
‘‘One central commitment’’ the President said of our mission to liberate Iraq, ‘‘is the
transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people. We have set a deadline of June 30.
It is important that we meet that deadline. As a proud and independent people,
Iraqis do not support an indefinite occupation—and neither does America.’’
The President went on to describe that day: ‘‘On June 30, when the flag of free
Iraq is raised, Iraqi officials will assume full responsibility for the ministries of gov-
ernment. On that day, the Transitional Administrative Law, including a bill of
rights that is unprecedented in the Arab world, will take full effect. The United
States, and all the Nations of our coalition, will establish normal diplomatic rela-
tions with the Iraqi government. An American embassy will open, and an American
ambassador will be posted.’’
Our specific direction comes from Secretary Powell. The Secretary has set the
State Department in motion to support the President’s goal of a smooth transition
on June 30.
After the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council
signed the November 15 Agreement and established the June 30 transition date, the
Secretary called Ambassador Francis (Frank) Ricciardone back to Washington to
head our transition team. In his first day on the job, Ricciardone went to the Penta-
gon to meet with his counterpart as the Iraq Transition Team leader for the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD), LTG (ret.) Mick Kicklighter. Ricciardone and Kicklighter
head one interagency team.
Our interagency team has established a cell in Baghdad under Ambassador John
Holzman. Ambassador Holzman works on transition planning and implementation
in immediate consultation with CPA Administrator Bremer and CJTF–7 Com-
mander General Sanchez.
The Secretary’s involvement in our transition planning continues daily. Each
evening we send the Secretary a consolidated summary of the Department’s transi-
tion-related activities for the day. The notes demonstrate a broad range of inter-
agency, bilateral and multilateral requirements, and highlight issues to solve and
those resolved. We also provide the Secretary a more in-depth weekly report that
highlights key challenges and the steps we are taking to address them.
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So, following the President’s guidance and Secretary Powell’s direction, we have
developed a plan to get us to—and through—June 30.
To execute our plan, we have and continue to work closely with our interagency
colleagues, and we consult regularly with Congress and coalition partners in Bagh-
dad, in Washington, and in capitals.
TRANSITION FROM CPA TO EMBASSY
We are proceeding in close coordination with our interagency colleagues and with
CPA. This chart demonstrates our path forward.
As an early step, the transition planning team established teams in key sectors
which we thought critical to ensuring a successful transition on June 30. We also
sent assessment teams to Iraq to examine the situation on the ground and report
their findings.
These sectors are listed on the chart behind me.
Each of these sectors is broken down into individual tasks or milestones that need
to be accomplished. The sectors actually represent more than 500 milestones. Be-
hind these milestones are individual tasks.
Responsibility for each task has been assigned to a particular agency or office, and
target completion dates have been established. As you can see, there is a great deal
of green in the individual tasks’ matrix. This is a living, working document.
In the personnel sector, for example, there are 26 individual milestones that have
been identified to date. All but four are ‘‘green,’’ indicating that they are either com-
pleted or on schedule. On the chart, however, the personnel sector is still yellow.
We are going to remain conservative in our planning, recognizing that there is no
room to ‘‘round up’’ in this exercise.
We at the State Department are glad to brief you or your staff on any of the tasks
represented here. Let me offer full access to our Transition Planning Team intranet
website to any of your staff willing to visit us in the Department of State and use
computers with access to our intranet.
Today, I would like to spend a few minutes going into some detail on our planning
and progress in four key sectors of transition planning: people, security, buildings,
and money.
PEOPLE
State Department officers have been in Iraq from the beginning, alongside Jay
Garner and ORHA and under Jerry Bremer and CPA. We have more than 170 peo-
ple in Iraq today. These men and women have come from Washington and dozens
of missions overseas, Foreign Service and Civil Service, from our newest Junior Offi-
cers to sitting Ambassadors. We are proud of their professionalism and sense of
service.
How big will our new Embassy in Baghdad be?
The State Department has announced positions for 142 American employees and
155 locally engaged staff.
In addition, in January of this year, the Secretary asked his Cabinet colleagues
to identify contributions their agencies might offer in Iraq. To date, 10 agencies
have requested a presence in Embassy Baghdad for a total of 254 American and 280
locally hired personnel for fiscal year 2005. Long term, we estimate a total of 350–
400 permanently assigned Americans from some 12–15 agencies, other than State,
will serve under the Chief of Mission in Iraq.
A number of CPA staff will continue after July 1 in a temporary capacity under
Chief of Mission authority to ensure the continuity of the transition process and
support Iraq reconstruction efforts. The transition team, working closely with CPA,
is currently identifying the number of staff that will carryover.
Thanks to the eagerness of so many State Department people to volunteer for
service in Iraq, we have made excellent progress in assigning them to the future
Embassy. More than 200 people have requested to be assigned to the new Em-
bassy—many of whom have already served in Iraq. Of the 142 Foreign Service posi-
tions announced to date for Embassy Baghdad, we have formally assigned 97 peo-
ple. Thirty-two more assignments are pending.
We have also already begun interviewing for the local hire positions, and have
hired our first employees. These first hires are undergoing training here in Wash-
ington in order to prepare to help us hire others for service in the Embassy. In the
short run, however, pending the Embassy’s ability to bring on all the direct-hire
Iraqi personnel that we ultimately will need, the Embassy will rely on Iraqi and
third country staff now under the U.S. Army’s ‘‘Logcap’’ contract to provide many
basic support services.
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We have heard questions about the role of the American ambassador, given the
large military presence that will remain in Iraq after July 1.
The American ambassador, once confirmed by the Senate, will carry with him to
Iraq a letter from the President—as all our Ambassadors do—that spells out clearly
his authority in Iraq. It will say that he, as the Chief of Mission and personal rep-
resentative of the President, reporting through the Secretary of State, will have full
responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States
Government executive branch employees in Iraq, regardless of their employment
categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military com-
mander or on the staff of an international organization.
Of course, the Ambassador and the military commander will have to work closely
together to ensure that their respective operations are fully coordinated and best
serve the interests of the United States in Iraq.
One last comment on State personnel. The response from the professional men
and women in the State Department has been exemplary. Many of those who have
asked to serve in the new embassy have already served in Iraq over the past year.
Without the additional personnel made possible through congressional support for
the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, we would have been unable to provide this kind
of support to CPA, or be in such good shape heading for June 30.
We look for your continued support to ensure that new requirements like Iraq are
permanently funded to ensure the personnel resources remain available to respond
to crises.
SECURITY
Our top priority is to keep our people safe. This is a dangerous mission. We have
already begun the security upgrade of the planned interim Embassy buildings, and
have selected a site for a future new embassy compound based largely on its secu-
rity features. We have 51 armored vehicles in Iraq and another 98 are on order.
These vehicles have already saved American and Iraqi lives.
Thirty-two Diplomatic Security (DS) staff are already in Iraq to define the Mis-
sion’s security requirements and to begin to meet them—as well as to help protect
CPA officers and visitors.
There are difficult questions related to security still to be answered. The Deputy
Secretary and Diplomatic Security Assistant Secretary Frank Taylor were just in
Baghdad to keep trying to answer these questions.
Iraq is, and for some time will remain, a dangerous place to live and work. Pro-
tecting our people in a wartime environment is difficult and expensive, but we must
continue to spare no effort or expense to meet this challenge.
BUILDINGS
Director of Overseas Building Operations Chuck Williams traveled to Baghdad in
February to complete plans for interim and potential permanent mission facilities.
We have identified a building in the green zone to serve as the Embassy from July
1 until a more permanent facility can be established. This building, which we refer
to as the temporary Chancery, is already under renovation and will be ready for oc-
cupancy in advance of the transition.
The temporary Chancery will serve as the office of the Ambassador and a limited
number of staff. In addition, until we build a new Embassy compound, we will con-
tinue to use the former Republican Palace, where CPA is currently located, for most
non-public operations, and we will continue to use the current residence that is
being occupied by Administrator Bremer.
Most embassy employees will be housed in trailers currently being occupied by
CPA personnel. We have already contracted for an additional 75 trailer units to ac-
commodate 150 personnel to ensure that we have adequate and appropriate space
to house our staff until permanent facilities can be established.
The location of our temporary and potential permanent Embassy sites are noted
on this photograph of central Baghdad. We have begun the planning process to de-
velop a new American Embassy facility.
FINANCIAL OUTLOOK
Finally, I would like to share our current thinking on the fiscal resources needed
to ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad, and the continued operation of
the mission thereafter.
I need to emphasize that the costs I report to you today are only a snapshot.
In order to open an Embassy on July 1, we must meet basic security needs and
must make an investment in technology and communications equipment. Congress has provided in fiscal year 2004 $97 million for an interim embassy facility and in-
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41
terim operations. In addition, we expect to have available the fourth quarter portion of the operating expense budget appropriated for the CPA ($195.8 million), and, pur-
suant to the fiscal year 2004 supplemental, up to 1 percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, available for transfer ($184 million).
The State Department must be prepared to cover both its initial start-up and op-
erating expenses, as well as follow-on costs from the CPA to assure continuity of
operations. There are significant challenges in the funding demands that we are
working are way through, and it is clear that we will need to make sure that all
agencies cover their respective share of joint costs.
We are now working to determine those joint mission costs which may be in the range of $500–$600 million for the balance of fiscal year 2004 and how those costs
will be allocated among agencies. In addition, we estimate that the costs in fiscal year 2005 to operate the U.S. mission could exceed $1 billion. We are working close-
ly with CPA, DOD, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to refine these
estimates and will provide you as much accurate information as quickly as we can.
We will consult with you and your colleagues before anything is finalized.
IRAQ’S TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY
Let me speak briefly about the political process in Iraq, and the restoration of
Iraqi self-government on June 30.
Here, too, our guidance and direction is clear. The President, on the night he an-
nounced the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 19, 2003 said: ‘‘We come to
Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious
faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and
restore control of that country to its own people.’’
The plan for restoring Iraqi sovereignty is laid out in the November 15 agreement.
That agreement, signed by CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council, called for a Tran-
sitional Administrative Law, encompassing a basic bill of rights for all Iraqis. The
agreement called for the selection of an interim Iraqi government to oversee the
preparation of national elections, and the transfer of governing authority to the in-
terim government by June 30, 2004. The agreement established a timeline for na-
tional elections, the drafting and ratification of a new constitution and the election
of a government under that constitution by December 31, 2005.
There have been changes since November 15. But the basic framework and
timeline still holds.
TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The first step was the Governing Council’s unanimous agreement on the Transi-
tional Administrative Law (TAL) nearly 2 months ago. This marked an important
achievement. As Secretary Powell said on March 8, ‘‘Just imagine the impact that
this document is going to have, not only in Iraq but in that part of the world. The
rights of all citizens, to include women, committing this Arab nation to democracy;
a free and independent judiciary; the military firmly under civilian controls.’’
The TAL provides for equal rights for all Iraqis, without regard to gender, sect,
opinion, belief, nationality, religion or origin. It confirms Iraq as a single state with
Federal structures, affirms civilian control of the Iraqi security services and the
independence of the judiciary. Finally, the TAL establishes the general framework
for national elections by January 31, 2005, the drafting of a permanent constitution
by August 15, 2005 and the transition to a constitutionally-based post-transition
Iraqi government by December 31, 2005.
THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Following the U.N. Secretary General’s February 23 report and the signing of the
TAL on March 8, the Governing Council on March 17 asked the U.N. to return to
Iraq to advise and assist on forming the Iraqi Interim Government and preparing
for elections for the Transitional National Assembly. On April 5, Ambassador
Brahimi returned to Iraq to resume intensive consultations with Iraqis for this pur-
pose.
As President Bush said last Friday, ‘‘We welcome the proposals presented by the
U.N. Special Envoy Brahimi. He’s identified a way forward to establishing an in-
terim government that is broadly acceptable to the Iraqi people. We thank the U.N.
and Secretary General Annan for helping Iraqis secure a future of freedom. We’re
grateful that Mr. Brahimi will soon return to Iraq to continue his important work.’’
In our consultations with the U.N. and Iraqis, we have made clear that while Am-
bassador Brahimi and Iraqis will chose the specific formula for the interim govern-
ment, there are fundamental criteria that must be met.
First, the interim government should represent the diversity of Iraq.
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Second, it should not have a law-making body. The structure of the government
should be effective, simple and, in order to avoid deadlock in the interim period,
should not be overly large.
Third, the process of selecting the government should be as simple as possible.
Fourth, the interim government should have the necessary authorities to lead
Iraq into the community of nations, undertake agreements to push forward eco-
nomic reconstruction, and prepare the country for elections.
We were pleased by the sketch Ambassador Brahimi provided of his proposed way
forward and believe his idea fits well with our vision.
Ambassador Brahimi envisions establishing by mid-May an interim government
led by a Prime Minister that also includes a President and two deputy presidents.
A council of ministers would report to the Prime Minister. An Advisory Body, se-
lected in July by a National Conference, would serve alongside the Executive but
have no legislative authority.
We look forward to further discussions with Iraqis and in New York with the Sec-
retary General as we consider the way forward. We also look forward to Ambassador
Brahimi’s return to Iraq in the weeks ahead to continue consultations with Iraqis
countrywide.
I would also highlight Ambassador Brahimi’s statement regarding the central im-
portance of elections. We agree. In fact, the call for national elections in early 2005
was a key part of the November 15 agreement.
In this regard, we are grateful for the continued work of the U.N. election team,
headed by Carina Perelli. The team has been in Baghdad since late March and is
working closely with our officials and experts to accelerate election preparations. As
Ms. Perelli has said, the timeline for elections by January 2005 is very tight. A top
priority remains establishing an independent Election Commission as soon as pos-
sible. We look forward to further discussions with the U.N. on the way ahead.
UNSCR
President Bush and Secretary Powell have both discussed a new U.N. Security
Council resolution on Iraq. We are considering what kind of resolution might be ap-
propriate and are looking at possible elements that would be in the resolution. For
example, a new resolution could extend a hand to a new Iraqi government. It could
deal with reconstruction activities, including the future of the Development Fund
for Iraq and with the continuing need for security to enable the Iraqi people to com-
plete the political process. It could encourage other nations to get involved on both
the security and reconstruction efforts. A new resolution could structure a role for
the United Nations in the new political framework, particularly in supporting the
process towards elections.
JULY 1
So, as I sit before you on April 20, what do I think Iraq will look like on July
1? There will be an American ambassador, running a large but recognizable Em-
bassy. His highly experienced deputy chief of mission and country team will include
representatives from a broad range of USG agencies. There will still be more than
100,000 U.S. troops on the ground, helping provide security and train Iraqi army
and police forces. When the Ambassador drives off to call on Iraqis, he will be meet-
ing with the Prime Minister and the President of a sovereign Iraq.
But our work will not be complete. Iraq will still be in transition; elections will
need to be held; a permanent constitution will need to be drafted; economic recon-
struction will remain unfinished. The United States is committed until we reach our
objective—a democratic, prosperous Iraq governed by a duly-elected, representative
government, at peace with itself and its neighbors.
We have guidance; we have direction; we have a plan. We are already executing
that plan.
AFGHANISTAN
I would also like to take a moment to address your questions regarding the politi-
cal developments in Afghanistan and the threat posed by increased levels of poppy
cultivation and narcotics trafficking.
On the occasion of President Karzai’s visit to Washington in February 2003, Presi-
dent Bush joined President Karzai in reaffirming their common vision for an Af-
ghanistan that is prosperous, democratic, respectful of human rights, and at peace.
The two Presidents pledged to work together to ensure that Afghanistan is never
again a haven for terrorists.
The Secretary of State has worked closely with others in the Cabinet—and with
support from Congress—in making the President’s vision a reality. When he was in
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Kabul last month, the Secretary repeated our long-standing commitment to rebuild
Afghanistan and help establish a democracy that the international community and
every Afghan can be proud of.
With guidance from the President and direction from the Secretary of State, we
have developed a three-fold, integrated plan for Afghanistan. Carried out under the
guidance of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in Kabul, our strategy focuses on secu-
rity, reconstruction and good governance.
• Improved security will create conditions for accelerated reconstruction
and stronger government;
• Reconstruction and economic growth will boost stability and confidence in
the government by giving Afghans a stake in a peaceful future and evidence
that their leaders can deliver on their promises; and
• The growth of constitutional, democratic, and effective government will
create a political arena for the resolution of differences and discredits those
who would return Afghanistan to the violence of the past.
While the challenges in Afghanistan remain daunting, we have made real
progress on all three tracks of this strategy.
On the security track, the Afghan National Army is already deploying to regional
hotspots, reasserting the role of the central government, and the Afghans are well
on the way to fielding 20,000 newly trained police officers. We and our friends in
NATO will continue to contribute on the security front. Just last month in Brussels,
NATO reiterated that Afghanistan would remain its number one priority.
On the reconstruction track, we are continuing to focus on rebuilding the road
network linking major cities as well as on building schools, clinics and irrigation
systems, and creating the environment for investment, job creation and economic
growth.
With respect to democratic governance, I am happy to report that Afghanistan’s
regional leaders are beginning to focus less on their militias and more on how to
compete in a democratic political process.
Let me now briefly turn to two specific areas that the committee noted in your
letter of invitation: elections and counternarcotics.
ELECTIONS
Last month President Karzai announced that elections for the presidency and the
lower house of parliament would take place in September. This announcement is
consistent with Afghanistan’s new constitution, which calls for ‘‘best efforts’’ to en-
sure that Parliamentary and Presidential elections are concurrent.
Afghanistan has already passed three major milestones on the road to constitu-
tional democracy:
• The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 set an agreed framework for po-
litical reconstruction.
• The Emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002 inaugurated a representative
government, with President Hamid Karzai as President and all major eth-
nic groups represented.
• The Constitutional Loya Jirga, on January 4, 2004, approved Afghani-
stan’s first nationally mandated constitution in 40 years—a constitution
that Afghans can be proud of and that can provide a solid foundation on
which to build the functioning elements of a stable democracy.
Elections are now the fourth major milestone, and we are committed to working
with the Afghans to ensure that they too are successful.
The U.N. reports that 1.8 million Afghans have registered to vote as of last week,
with the registration effort focused on urban centers. The number will rise signifi-
cantly in coming months with the onset of Phase 2 registration where registration
teams fan out into every district—to reach men and women of every ethnic group
of Afghanistan. U.N. data show that many Afghans are traveling significant dis-
tances to register—a sign of the people’s enthusiasm for democracy.
About 29 percent of registered voters are women, and that percentage is steadily
rising as the registration process continues. Over the last 2 weeks, women have rep-
resented 39 percent of those registering.
Meanwhile, efforts are underway to register political parties, pass an elections
law, and put in place the necessary logistics and security to carry out the elections
in September. A massive voter education effort is also moving forward.
Some 350,000 Afghan men and women have participated in civic education meet-
ings and millions of posters and leaflets have been distributed. In coming months,
over 1,200 civic education workers will be in all provinces working side by side with
partners in the NGO community.
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Most Afghans have never voted and have had no direct exposure to democracy,
so this will be a learning experience for the country. It is essential that the election
not only perform the function of selecting leaders, but that it set the stage for future
elections by giving Afghans an authentic experience of democracy. Equally as impor-
tant is providing a credible electoral process that the world can point to as an un-
qualified success. This requires dedication and resources. The U.N. estimates that $224 million will be needed in all, of which approxi- mately $160 million has been provided or pledged to date. The United States ac- counts for over $50 million—almost one third—of what has been contributed to date.
COUNTERNARCOTICS
Narcotics production and trafficking is probably the single most serious threat to
our common mission in Afghanistan. All indicators point toward a significant in-
crease in poppy cultivation since last year.
We continue to work closely with President Karzai and members of his govern-
ment, and they are firmly committed to fighting the drug industry in their country.
Two weeks ago President Karzai called for a ‘‘jihad’’ against drug trafficking. He
views drugs as a key factor in supporting corruption, the warlord militias and other
key challenges facing Afghanistan. As he said at the recent donors conference in
Berlin, ‘‘the fight against drugs is the fight for Afghanistan.’’
We are working closely with the United Kingdom, which has the lead on counter-
narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan. We have a comprehensive strategy that in-
cludes integrating eradication, building law enforcement and interdiction capacity,
and alternative development. Crop eradication initiatives supported by the United
Kingdom are underway in coordination with provincial governors. Next month the United States will begin implementing a nearly $40 million cen-
tral government-led eradication program, using a 150-member eradication team that
will manually destroy poppy crops. An additional three 150-member teams will be
trained and deployed by mid-June. Combined with the eradication conducted by pro-
vincial governors, we are striving for a goal of destroying 25 percent of the crop this
year.
In Afghanistan, too, we have guidance and direction from the President and Sec-
retary of State. We have developed a plan in cooperation with our many allies on
the ground to help build an Afghanistan that is prosperous, democratic, respectful
of human rights, and at peace. We will stay the course to ensure that Afghanistan
is never again a haven for terrorists.
With that I will be pleased to take your questions. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
We will now proceed to a round of 6 minutes for each member.
My question is going to come down to one sentence after I make
a preliminary observation. What is the status of the American GI
on the morning of July 1, 2004? I am going to assume that there
is an Iraqi Interim Government in place following the procedure
that you have alluded to today. I would like to know, what is the
probability of the status of forces agreement likewise being in place
and what are the guidelines that will be followed in writing that
up?
By way of background, I make the following observations. We are
using interchangeably now the terms that on July 1, 2004, there
will be a transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government. Oth-
ers, including the President, have said there will be a transfer of
sovereignty. Well, the word ‘‘sovereignty’’ can mean everything.
So I would like to know, who is going to give that GI the orders
and what is he expected to do? Now, we have the Transitional Ad-
ministrative Law (TAL) which says as follows: Iraqi Armed Forces
will be, ‘‘a principal partner in the multinational force operating in
Iraq under a unified command pursuant to United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1511.’’
So I go to that, and that is very generalized. By the way, that
was dated October 16, 2003, and an awful lot of developments have
occurred since that time. But it generally says, authorizes a multi-
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45
national force under a unified command to take all the necessary
means to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in
Iraq, and so forth and so forth.
I think this has to be updated and clarified, and to the extent
that you can advise this committee this morning—and I put the
question to all witnesses: Who is going to give the orders to the se-
curity forces on June 30, 2004, and should there be a difference of
views between, say, the U.S. military commanders as to what
should be done to meet whatever contingencies may arise on June
30, 2004, and thereafter, who is going to reconcile those differences
between the professional military and a brand-new government
that will have been in office for but a day?
Mr. Secretary, can you lead off?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will and I am sure that General Myers
and Ambassador Grossman can supplement here.
The question you ask obviously is a crucial one. We have spent
a lot of time studying it. I would emphasize it is not a unique situ-
ation. We went through transition to a sovereign government in Af-
ghanistan, as I noted earlier, in December 2001. We have been op-
erating with our forces in Bosnia with a sovereign government
since the Dayton Accords of 1995. Indeed, if you look around the
world there are many, many countries where you have sovereign
governments and American forces under American military com-
manders, not the least Korea.
Each one of these cases is different. In the case of Iraq, the prin-
cipal authority is in fact the authority that you cited, provided
by——
Chairman WARNER. I beg your pardon? The what is?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In the case of Iraq, the principal authority
is the authority in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, which
creates a multinational force to provide for security in Iraq until
a permanent constitutional government is established, which would
be the end of next year; and that that force is under the command
of an American commander.
As you also noted, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)
has the Iraqi Governing Council placing Iraqi forces under that
command, as part of that command. In fact, Iraq is one of the most
important, if not the most important, members of that coalition
force. That provides enormous authority and discretion to our com-
manders.
Should there be another U.N. Security Council resolution—and I
think Ambassador Grossman can comment on the likelihood; I
think it is very likely—we would, I assume, either continue that
authority or specify it in any further detail if it were necessary or
useful.
Further, we have CPA Order No. 17, I believe it is, that goes into
more detail about the rights and privileges and immunities that
pertain to foreign forces providing for security in Iraq.
Finally, after an elected government, transitional elected govern-
ment, takes power, takes office next January, and only then——
Chairman WARNER. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. We can get to
January. I am still worried that, say there is a major insurrection
that occurs early on in July and our military commanders have to
decide to the extent that force must be applied. We have seen re-
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46
cently in the Fallujah operations where there has been some honest
differences of opinion between members of the Iraqi Governing
Council, the current governing body, and our military commanders
as to the timing, the quantum, and the use of force.
Fortunately, as you say, Fallujah may be taking on a brighter
status here if these negotiations continue to be fruitful. But given
military operations, you cannot sit down and deliberate over an ex-
tensive period of time what to do. You have to react and react very
swiftly.
If you are going to give them sovereignty and at the same time
our military commander, as I believe you are saying, has the au-
thority to make those decisions as to how to apply force, I see a
basic conflict of interest here.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. But Mr. Chairman, the issue, as I think
your comment correctly implies, is political, not legal. We have that
issue today with a different legal framework. The use of force in
someone else’s country has always got potential political ramifica-
tions and political controversy. We have had this on numerous oc-
casions with President Karzai’s government in Afghanistan, and
the answer there is you have to be prepared to discuss, to nego-
tiate, and also at the end of the day to use the authority that is
granted to us.
That I would say describes the way we are proceeding in
Fallujah. It is the way we will have to proceed until such time as
Iraq is fully in control of whatever forces are there.
General Myers, do you want to?
Chairman WARNER. The safety and welfare of the American GI
may be at risk in a matter of hours if there is indecision and a lack
of, I think, specific authority as to who can make what decisions.
General, can you address this?
General MYERS. Sure. I do not think I am going to say anything
different than what the Secretary said, but there is nobody that be-
lieves, Iraqi or coalition, that on July 1 the security situation is
going to dramatically change. It is going to be what it is and it is
going to go over the transition.
Chairman WARNER. Right. Let us hope it improves.
General MYERS. Certainly, certainly.
Chairman WARNER. That is a goal.
General MYERS. But from June 30 to July 1 we do not—there is
not going to be a change to the security situation, nor in the re-
sponsibility of the coalition forces, as outlined in the U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1511, which is the basis for our action even
today and will be the basis for our action in the future, if we do
not get a new U.N. Security Council resolution, and I will let Sec-
retary Grossman speak to that.
The way we have structured our military forces for the post–1
July period is to have a partnership with Iraqi forces that goes
from the tactical level all the way up to the political level in Iraq,
to the ministry of interior, to the ministry of defense. The command
and control, the command post that we will have set up, will be in
partnership with Iraqi security forces, and that is the way it is set
up.
I do not see a problem with our authorities right now, given the
TAL, given the CPA mandates, and the U.N. Security Council reso-
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47
lution we just talked about. Our forces will have the authority and
the wherewithal to do what they need to do to provide security, as
they must, for Iraq.
Chairman WARNER. So irrespective of the word total ‘‘sov-
ereignty’’ or power turn over, General Abizaid or his deputies can
make the decision to use or not to use force in their own judgment?
They may consult the government, but it is their decision as to
how, when, and where to apply force?
General MYERS. That is correct. As I said, I mentioned the word
‘‘partnership.’’ As we proceed down this path, we want this to be
more of a partnership.
Chairman WARNER. But partners disagree and you cannot have
a lot of disagreement.
General MYERS. Right. But I said in the end—or I was going to
say, in the end, Mr. Chairman, we are going to have to do what
we have to do.
Chairman WARNER. Secretary Grossman, do you agree?
General MYERS. We think we have the authority to do that as
well.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Just as we do in Afghanistan, for exam-
ple, or in Bosnia.
Mr. GROSSMAN. I have nothing to add except to say, as both have
invited me to, I certainly believe we will be seeking a new U.N. Se-
curity Council resolution, and one of the elements of it will be to
see if we cannot just maintain our authorities under 1511, but see
if we can get others to join us in carrying them out.
Chairman WARNER. So we transfer sovereignty, but the military
decisions continue to reside indefinitely in the control of the Amer-
ican commander; is that correct?
General MYERS. That is correct.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers, what options are you looking at should we need
an increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq?
General MYERS. We have done a scrub of forces that could be
available essentially immediately, in the next few weeks to the
next couple of months, in case we need more forces. We have a fair-
ly extensive list of those forces and the support that goes with
them, and in the closed session I would be happy to talk in a little
bit more detail. But we have done that look. That has been pre-
sented to Secretary Rumsfeld, and we are going to continue to re-
fine that list as we look at those forces.
Obviously, we have set ourselves some administrative guidelines
to try to protect time home back from overseas and so forth and
we are looking at that. But we do have forces that have been iden-
tified.
Senator LEVIN. Has the Third Infantry Division been alerted
about the possibility of an earlier redeployment to Iraq than had
been earlier planned?
General MYERS. Sir, I will check. Senator Levin, I will check. I
do not have that list in front of me. Like I say, I will do it in the
closed session. I do not think so. I do not think the Third I.D. has
been alerted.
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48
Senator LEVIN. Now, prior to the war there was a joint staff as-
sessment as to the number of U.S. forces that would be needed or
expected to be needed 1 year after the commencement of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. What was that assessment?
General MYERS. The only assessment I know of is that there was
an assessment done by Central Command, I think before combat
operations began, which had in September 2003 said: Here is what
we think the troop strength is going to be. This is from the field
commander at the time, and as I recall that number was some-
where around 60,000.
I do not know—I will tell you personally I did not believe that
number was correct, and I do not know that many of the Joint
Chiefs believed that number was correct. But that was the number
on a chart that I recall. I do not know how long that was the num-
ber that anybody was standing up to. That is the only number I
can ever remember seeing, sir.
Senator LEVIN. When you say you did not believe it was correct,
you mean that it was too low?
General MYERS. I thought it was too low, sure.
Senator LEVIN. Secretary Wolfowitz and Secretary Grossman, the
U.N. is attempting to work out a process through Mr. Brahimi
where the Iraqis will reach a consensus on the form of the entity
to whom sovereignty is to be restored on June 30. It is important
that that deadline be met. I think everybody acknowledges that,
since it has now been set and it is very clearly the expectation. But
the challenge is immense in order to put the pieces together and
to get a broad consensus in Iraq among its people for such a sov-
ereign government.
We are talking about a sovereign government, a government to
which sovereignty is going to be restored. It is going to make criti-
cal decisions about who will draft a constitution for the people of
Iraq and other critical decisions.
Now, I asked Kofi Annan last week if the pieces cannot be put
together by June 30, then what? Is there a plan B? He said there
is no time for a plan B; the only alternative would be for the Gov-
erning Council to continue until an interim government, which has
broad support of the people of Iraq can be put together.
Now, we hope that Mr. Brahimi will succeed in putting together
that consensus. But if he does not, does the administration have a
plan for what to do?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Levin, I think it is important to
understand what this interim government is empowered to do and
what it is not——
Senator LEVIN. I wonder if I could just interrupt you, because my
time is running out. If you could just——
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is not in fact picking the people to write
the constitution——
Senator LEVIN. I do not care. I am not asking you what is in the
plan.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Its main role is to establish a framework
for elections so that the government, the transitional government
that comes in in January, is an elected government.
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49
Senator LEVIN. I understand that. But that plan for a govern-
ment will draft a constitution, the government that it drafts the
plan for. But my question is——
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, it will not. It will provide elections for
a group that then——
Senator LEVIN. I agree, I agree with that. My question to you is
this: If the pieces cannot be put together by June 30, does the ad-
ministration have a plan for what it would then do? That is my
only question. Either you have a plan or you do not.
I know you do not want it to happen. Nobody does. Ambassador
Brahimi does not want it to happen. Kofi Annan does not want it
to happen. Everybody wants that interim government to be estab-
lished by the people of Iraq, presumably, that will have the broad
support of people. But if the pieces cannot be put together, my sim-
ple question is does the administration have a plan?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There are certainly ways to proceed if it
cannot be done by July 1. But the reason for keeping so much pres-
sure on July 1 is, as I said earlier, it will improve the security situ-
ation in the country enormously if people stop thinking of them-
selves as occupied, if they have some confidence, as we have been
able to build out of the Bonn process in Afghanistan that Mr.
Brahimi also led, the sense that there is a road to full and complete
elected constitutional government.
But this is a 6-month interim appointed group based on a con-
sensus that hopefully Ambassador Brahimi will be able to distill
out of his many discussions in the country.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. It is important not just because it
will devise a plan for elections for people who will draft a constitu-
tion, but for the reasons that the chairman and I have mentioned
before, is that a sovereign country may be able to change the status
of forces. Those are our forces and we have to make sure that they
have the military authority to act and that if we put in place a sov-
ereign government that means that they presumably would have
sovereignty to decide what troops can do in their own country. That
raises significant issues. I do not want to go beyond what you have
already said.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Actually, Senator, that sovereignty is lim-
ited by the U.N. Security Council resolution that arranges for the
security issues, as I said to Senator Warner.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. One other question. In response to
my request from November of last year, Under Secretary Feith
promised in February that he would provide me with numerous
documents produced by the Office of Special Plans and the Policy
Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. I have still not received the
documents that he promised and I would ask that you intervene
and get me those documents with him.
But relative to the Feith office, in August and September of 2002,
Under Secretary Feith presented a briefing to the Secretary of De-
fense and then after that it was presented by Under Secretary
Feith to the National Security Council staff and the staff of the
Vice President, and this is relative to a relationship, the extent of
it, between Iraq and al Qaeda.
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It was a briefing which was very critical of the CIA, disagreeing
with the CIA’s assessment that there was not a strong relationship
or a clear relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq.
My question to you is this: Were you aware of the fact that that
briefing was being given to the staff of the National Security Coun-
cil (NSC) and the Office of the Vice President and that the CIA was
not aware of the fact that the briefing was being given to the Vice
President, the Vice President’s office, and to the staff of the NSC?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I can no longer recall whether I was
aware or not. There is nothing unusual, Senator Levin, about dif-
ferent staffs in the government discussing material, and the mate-
rial under discussion was in fact material generated by the CIA.
The issue was how to assess various intelligence reports produced
by the CIA. Essentially the same briefing was presented, I believe,
previously to a collection of CIA analysts.
Senator LEVIN. It was a very different briefing in a very critical
respect.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There was one slide that was different,
Senator; that is all.
Senator LEVIN. That one slide was highly critical of the CIA.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That one slide listed some assumptions
that Mr. Feith’s staff thought were at issue. One of those assump-
tions it seems to me in fact has been proven out to be wrong. That
was the assumption that, because bin Laden was a secularist—ex-
cuse me—an Islamist and Saddam a secularist, they were incapa-
ble of cooperating. We have since seen evidence—in fact, there was
evidence, it turns out, in the sealed indictment of Osama bin Laden
issued in February of 1998 that said that bin Laden and Saddam
had concluded an agreement not to attack one another and to co-
operate with each other.
So I think it was perfectly appropriate to ask the question
whether one should analyze these reports on the basis of an as-
sumption which in fact has turned out to be a false assumption.
Senator LEVIN. But you were not aware, in any event, of the
fact—you do not remember whether you were aware that the brief-
ing to the Vice President’s office and the NSC staff was being made
without the knowledge of the CIA?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it overstates it to—first of all,
there is nothing unusual about staff talking to each other. The only
thing——
Senator LEVIN. I am just asking, you do not remember whether
you were aware of it? That is my question.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I do not remember, but it is also not the
dramatic event that I think you are describing.
Senator LEVIN. There were additional slides to the one that you
made reference to.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. One additional slide and I think I have
described it.
Chairman WARNER. We thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you
very much.
Senator Allard.
Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the panel for giving us an update this
morning. There have been some who have suggested that what is
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51
happening in Iraq has a lot of parallels with what was happening
in Vietnam, Secretary Wolfowitz. For the life of me, I feel I do not
see hardly any correlation at all. I am curious to know how you re-
spond to those who try and characterize our efforts in Iraq as that
similar to what happened in Vietnam?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I am with Senator McCain. I think there
is no comparison at all, except I guess it is important to say that
our soldiers fought with enormous courage in Vietnam as well and
the enemy’s people would be better off today if they had won.
But I think, as I have said in my statement, I think one enor-
mous difference—and I hope the killers out there, the enemies of
democracy in Iraq, have gotten this message—is that the debate in
this country is not about whether to abandon Iraq; the debate is
about whether to keep 135,000 troops there or to add more troops.
That is really where the issue lies.
The other huge difference is that, without being an apologist for
Ho Chi Minh or his Viet Cong, they at least made credible preten-
sions to doing something for the Vietnamese people. The people
that we are fighting in Iraq today are a combination of killers who
abused and tortured that country for 35 years and newcomers,
some from outside, some from inside, like Mr. Zarqawi, who makes
abundantly clear in this infamous letter that we captured that his
goal is simply destruction and death, and indeed he thinks that the
goal in life is to worship death and be willing to sacrifice yourself
for martyrdom.
He sees democracy as the enemy, makes no pretense in fact of
doing anything other than bringing chaos and instability.
I think it is important, not only in analyzing the problem we are
up against, but I would be much more concerned if I thought we
were dealing with a genuine popular uprising. I do not want to—
again, I want to be sure not to put on rose-colored glasses. There
is a lot of broad dissatisfaction, especially in the Sunni Arab com-
munity, partly with the pace of progress—and the terrorists have
done their best to slow down the pace of progress—partly because,
after all of this historical experience, I think Iraqis believe that it
is winner take all and if the Shia take all now the Sunnis will be
abused. It is partly misunderstandings, frankly, more misunder-
standings than actual fact, about the de-Baathification policy.
We need to work harder and we are looking precisely at how to
work harder to win back the Sunni moderates. I think they are,
again, I think the overwhelming majority of that community.
But the basic enemy, the enemies of democracy in Iraq, are just
killers.
Senator ALLARD. General Myers, if you read the papers and lis-
ten to the TV, I think the impression that tends to come across is
that we do have a lot of battles and a lot of conflicts going on in
Iraq. I was over in Iraq about a month ago. I saw a lot of good
things happening around Mosul and a lot of the other towns that
I was visiting, a lot of reconstruction, a lot of positive things.
What is happening now with the conflict? Just put a general pic-
ture over there. I have always perceived that north and south was
pretty much settled and our real problem was the Sunni Triangle.
So I would like to have you comment about what we are seeing
now on TV today and reading in the papers.
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General MYERS. Well, in the last couple of weeks what we have
seen are really two different events inside Iraq. One was Sadr and
his militia, which is fairly small, sent out or rose up in several
towns in the south. All those towns, with the exception of al-Najaf,
where his headquarters is, are back under Iraqi and coalition con-
trol. Coalition forces and Iraqi police are on duty in al-Kut,
Nasariya, and the other cities where there were uprisings.
These were small and easily contained because Sadr is increas-
ingly being marginalized. He is not a popular figure with most
Iraqis. He is preaching violence against the coalition. He has come
out against the Transitional Administrative Law, which the Iraqi
Governing Council has approved. My view is he will continue to be
marginalized.
But he is in al-Najaf and Iraqis are negotiating and dealing with
him right now, as well as some negotiators from the CPA and Am-
bassador Bremer.
The other fight was the fight that Secretary Wolfowitz described,
which are these extremists, which by the way if you compare and
contrast with Vietnam, they are not fighting for an ideology. They
are fighting to disrupt progress. They have no ideology other than
to go back to the terror of the former regime, if that is an ideology.
So as to why they are fighting I think is an important question
when you try to compare it to other events.
This occurs in the same area as you pointed out, where we have
had a lot of our instability. Fallujah has been the heart of that. We
have been in Fallujah from time to time and then we come out. As
you remember, we went in because of the atrocities on the
Blackwater Security personnel, the four personnel that were killed
and later burned and then hung on the bridge.
We went in because we had to and to find the perpetrators. What
we found was a huge rats nest that is still festering today, and
needs to be dealt with. Right now we are dealing with it through
negotiations and through a ceasefire. I will say that the ceasefire
is only on the side of the Marines that are in Fallujah. It is not
on the part of the folks in Fallujah that are the extremists and so
forth. They are still firing. They are using—just I think it was yes-
terday or the day before, a Red Crescent, the equivalent of the Red
Cross, ambulance trying to get into Fallujah was stopped and
weapons were found inside. They are trying to resupply themselves
with weapons and ammunition. I mentioned the mosques and the
schools and using women and children. They have done that. That
was all out of Fallujah.
So that area is still very, very hot, and that extends into Bagh-
dad, by the way. Sadr City is still a problem area, although it is
relatively calm today compared to when Sadr was—those uprisings
were going on, about a week ago.
In the north, interestingly enough, with events in Fallujah there
were lots of demonstrators in Mosul. The demonstrators were dealt
with by the Sunni, basically the Sunni government in Mosul and
the Iraqi police in Mosul and the Civil Defense Corps. So it is a
very different picture in the north right now, relatively stable, eco-
nomically doing quite well.
It is the central area that has remained the problem, and I could
go into it, but I do not want to take any more time. Part of it is
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going to have to be dealt with by military force in my judgment.
Obviously, a big part of it has to be dealt with, by making sure we
have a strategy that enfranchises the Sunni population, and that
is being worked very hard. I spent a lot of time on that particular
subject in Iraq just recently.
Senator ALLARD. Thank you for your response.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to conclude with this brief statement.
This last Saturday I happened to participate in a welcome home for
Bravo Company of the 244th Engineering Battalion in Fort Collins,
Colorado. This is a local unit. The report that came back from our
troops verifies pretty much what you were saying about the morale
of our troops in Iraq. They were very proud of what they were
doing. They were building a lot of infrastructure and they felt like
they were really doing something to improve the country because
they were improving the infrastructure, sewer and water and
roads, and providing an education there.
One of the comments I think that was made at that was: there
is a lot of pride and a lot of good morale, people feel good about
what they are doing. They are professional soldiers, but they em-
phasized time and time again: The American people need to stand
behind us.
So I think that that is a message that they need to know, is that
we are very proud of what they are doing and we are standing be-
hind them. Thank you.
General MYERS. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair-
man.
General Myers and gentlemen, we all do stand behind our serv-
ice men. But we have some responsibilities to find out about the
policy and where it is going that is requiring the presence of those
service men and women.
Mr. Secretary, I must say I found your presentation here this
morning somewhat disingenuous. I was here when the administra-
tion made the case for going to war and the case for going to war
was the threat that the United States was facing from nuclear
weapons that were going to be provided to al Qaeda by Iraq, and
here we have your statement is all about the human rights viola-
tions.
Everyone knows that Saddam Hussein is a brute, despicable, de-
plorable, murderer. I will include in the record the State Depart-
ment’s filing about human rights violations around the world,
about what the Chinese are doing to the Tibetans, what the North
Koreans are doing in terms of torture, forced abortions, infanticide,
what the Burmese are doing, and the rest of the world. I want to
make that as a part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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There was not a word in this presentation about the weapons of
mass destruction, in this presentation here this morning.
Now, Mr. Secretary, you were one of the principal architects of
war with Iraq. It has been on your agenda since the end of the Gulf
War, 1991. It is now clear that Iraq was high on the agenda of the
administration from day one, even though the outgoing Clinton ad-
ministration made it clear in the briefings during the transition
that al Qaeda was the most serious threat to our security.
Dick Clarke, the former counterterrorism czar, wrote that when
he raised al Qaeda in the first meeting of the deputies in April
2001 you, Mr. Secretary, said: ‘‘I just do not understand why we
are beginning by talking about this one man, Osama bin Laden.’’
At every stage, even after September 11, it seems that you treat-
ed al Qaeda as less than a main threat, as a diversion from the
real priority, which was Iraq. In his book Bob Woodward says that
the administration diverted resources from the war in Afghanistan
to plan for the war in Iraq.
Now, we have in the newspapers this morning, the Washington
Post, ‘‘Al Qaeda intends to strike, officials say. U.S. intelligence
community believes al Qaeda is intent on launching terrorist at-
tacks in this country some time between now and the November
election.’’
Are we not paying a high price and is not the world paying a
high price because of the administration’s obsession with Iraq?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Kennedy, actually I welcome the
opportunity to correct the record on some of these things, although
I would have preferred you had not used that word ‘‘disingenuous.’’
I am trying my best to be candid with this committee and with the
American people.
But the notion that an invasion of Iraq has been on my agenda
since 1991 is simply wrong, sir. Until September 11 I thought the
problem of Saddam Hussein was something that should be dealt
with by Iraqis, although I was consistently critical of the lack of
American support for those Iraqis who were prepared to liberate
their own country. We will never know, because history unfortu-
nately only tells you what happened on one course of action, but
we will never know whether some of our problems today might
have been avoided if at earlier times we had enabled the Iraqis to
do the job for themselves.
Second, Mr. Clarke’s book is just full of gross inaccuracies. He
has Secretary Rumsfeld attending a critical September 4 meeting
that the Secretary was not even at. He has the Secretary in the
Pentagon on a secure videoteleconference, a rather dramatic, mem-
orable moment, when the Secretary did not turn up until an hour
later. He puts quotes in my mouth that are about 165 degrees op-
posite of anything I could possibly have said. He is simply wrong
when he says that I dismissed the threat of al Qaeda or the threat
of terrorism.
To the contrary, Senator, one of the concerns I had, I have had
for many years, was the question of who did the World Trade Cen-
ter in 1993, the most serious act of foreign terrorism on American
soil prior to September 11, which it turns out was done by the
nephew of the man who was the mastermind of September 11.
There is a straight line from 1993 to the tragedy of September 11.
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I was concerned that this was obviously not just a rogue bunch
of misfits operating out of a mosque in Brooklyn, that there was
international expertise behind it. When I served on the Rumsfeld
Commission in 1998, we asked for a briefing from the
Counterterrorism Center, I did, on who was behind it because it
seemed to me, correctly, that if we are concerned about missile at-
tack on the United States we also need to think about a terrorist
attack on the United States.
[The information referred to follows:]
I was fully aware that the Department was using some of the funding that Con-
gress provided to respond to the terrorist attacks on the United States, to provide
support to counter domestic or international terrorism, and to support national secu-
rity to finance unfunded global war on terrorism requirements for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). In July 2002, CENTCOM identified over $700 million of re-
quirements that it said that it needed to fight the global war on terrorism to include
potential preparatory tasks for a possible war against Iraq. After reviewing
CENTCOM’s request, we considered some of requirements as being necessary for
the broader war on terrorism, which Congress authorized. Prior to the passage of
the joint resolution by Congress in October 2002, the Department limited the fund-
ing for CENTCOM’s requirements to those projects that were designed to strength-
en U.S. military capabilities in the region or to support ongoing military operations.
Thus, we considered these projects to be dual use in nature, that is, projects that
would benefit overall global war on terrorism operations by improving military capa-
bilities throughout the areas of responsibility for CENTCOM.
The Department fully funded requirements identified specifically for global war
on terrorism military operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan
and other areas of the world. Given the military successes in Afghanistan, the over-
all costs of military operations for global war on terrorism did decline. In August 2002 costs were about $1.5 billion and in September costs had declined to about $1.0 billion. Some of these savings were applied to CENTCOM’s $700 million request.
Congress recognized the decline in global war on terrorism operations and rescinded $244 million of Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) resources in the Fiscal
Year 2002 Emergency Supplemental (Public Law 107–206).
Senator KENNEDY. Why did we have the diversion, because my
time is going? Why did we have the diversion, then, of funds, if we
are going after al Qaeda?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Because they are part of the single con-
flict.
Senator KENNEDY. Why are we not going after——
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. When Mr. Clarke errs, he says there is
not a shred of evidence about al Qaeda and Iraq. Excuse me. He
was in charge of counterterrorism——
Senator KENNEDY. No, but I am talking now about—
Secretary WOLFOWITZ.—when that secret indictment was issued,
and he was in charge of counterterrorism, Senator Kennedy, when
Saddam Hussein for 10 years harbored Abdul Raqman Yassin, who
was the only bomber from the 1993 World Trade Center event who
is still at large. His lack of curiosity about why the Iraqis were
holding a man who was responsible for what in the 1990s was the
most serious act of foreign terrorism on the United States is a mys-
tery to me to this day.
Senator KENNEDY. We will take all the criticisms that you have
of Mr. Clarke. Can you tell me why the administration diverted
funds, though, when we were beginning to target Osama bin
Laden, had him evidently effectively trapped in Tora Bora, and then the administration diverted $700 million out of that to go to
begin the process or advance the process in terms of Iraq? If so,
how much responsibility do you bear in that?
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65
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to set
the record straight. We did not divert funds. We were——
Senator KENNEDY. My time is up, but I am addressing the Wood-
ward issue.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would be happy to put it in the record.
We were very careful in making sure that we applied money to the
broader war on terrorism that Congress had authorized, and we
specifically withheld funding for those projects that were specifi-
cally Iraq-related until after the joint resolution passed Congress.
We were very conscious of Congress’s authority in this area and we
tried as scrupulously as I know how to live up to our obligations.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I
will submit for the record these points that I would have made.
Chairman WARNER. Correct. Did you have adequate time to reply
to the important question raised by Senator Levin, Senator Ken- nedy, and myself about that $700 million?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If I could have a few more minutes, I
would——
Chairman WARNER. I will give you a minute or 2, because it is
very much on the minds of all of us.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In the course of—that $750 million num-
ber comes from a set of tasks that CENTCOM put together in the
summer of 2002 as things that they would want to have in the
event of an Iraq contingency. The DOD Comptroller looked at this
list with a view to those things that were consistent with existing
authorities in the settlement appropriations, the global war on ter-
ror, and to distinguish between those and things which would be
Iraq-specific, as I said. Based on that exercise, in August and September of 2002 $178
million was made available to support CENTCOM’s global efforts,
including funding for communications equipment, fuel supplies, hu-
manitarian rations, and improvements to CENTCOM’s forward
headquarters. All the investments were designed to strengthen our
capabilities in the region or support ongoing operational require-
ments. No funding was made available for those things that had
Iraq as the exclusive purpose.
On October 11, as you are well aware, Congress passed the Iraq
resolution and, consistent with Congressional statutory require-
ments regarding military construction activities, we did notify Con- gress about $63 million in MILCON. After October 25, some $800
million was made available over the following months to support
Iraq preparatory tasks consistent with that joint resolution.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins.
Senator COLLINS. Secretary Wolfowitz, all of us share your admi-
ration and your gratitude to the men and women who are serving
in Iraq. They are the best that our country has to offer. That is
why I am increasingly concerned about the strain that we are put-
ting on our reservists and our guard members, their families, and
their employers.
Now, Secretary Rumsfeld testified recently before our committee
that only 7 percent of the Guard and Reserve have been involun-
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66
tarily mobilized more than once in the past 13 years. I have to tell
you that has not been our experience in Maine at all. I have talked
to numerous guard members and reservists who have been de-
ployed three times in the last decade.
To illustrate my concern, I want to tell you about the specific ex-
perience of a specific Reserve unit. That is the 94th Military Police
(MP) Company. This unit has been deployed 2.5 of the past 4 years.
They spent 9 months in Bosnia. They have now been in Iraq for
more than a year. They originally were scheduled to come home
last fall. Then the Pentagon changed the policy to 1 year boots on
the ground, so their tour was extended.
That year expired on Easter weekend and they were literally on
the bus to their plane to take them back to the United States when
they got the news that once again they would be extended. I have
to tell you that this has been devastating to the families and de-
moralizing to many of the soldiers who serve in this unit.
General Abizaid testified before us last year that one of the most
important things for any soldier to know is when they are coming
home when they are employed in a combat zone. He went on to
say, ‘‘We owe those soldiers the answer as to when that might be.’’
Well, the answer has changed time and again, and I am very con-
cerned about what the impact is on these troops, their families, and
their employers.
I have three questions for you. First, does not the fact that we
are repeatedly deploying the same reservists and the same mem-
bers of the Guard over and over again suggest that we do not have
the right mix of skills in the Army? Second, are you concerned that
changing the rules and extending deployments repeatedly, plus
having a very high rate of deployment, is going to hurt our ability
to retain skilled soldiers such as those in this unit? Third, is the
Pentagon considering any extra compensation for the members of
units that have been involuntarily extended beyond the year that
they originally thought they were going to have? Actually, it is
even longer than that because of the change in policy last fall.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will ask General Myers to comment also,
especially on that last question. But the issue you raise is a very
important issue. We have been, even before this came up with your
unit, your military police unit from Maine, we knew we had a big
problem because of a decision that was really made I think 20 or
30 years ago, that we would have—it is basically a Cold War mili-
tary, that could not go to war unless we are in a condition where
the Reserves were mobilized on a massive scale.
From that flowed a decision to take certain military occupa-
tions—and military police, which is the unit you are talking about,
was one of them—and put them almost exclusively in the Reserves.
As a result, I think the unit from Maine was deployed to Bosnia
as military police. We need military police in every one of these,
whether you call it peacekeeping, which is not Iraq, or stability op-
erations or low intensity war, which is what Iraq is.
If you are part of that 7 percent that is mobilized more often, it
does not matter to you that it is only, ‘‘only’’ 7 percent. I think the
Secretary was clear about that.
General Schoomaker has put together a plan that will move
100,000 positions, shift them from the Active Force to the Reserve
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67
or from the Reserve to the Active Force, so that we can begin to
cover these needs in a more balanced way with the Active Force,
so that we are not constantly going back to the same well on re-
servists for certain occupations that do not exist. Military police is
one, civil affairs is another. That is going to take some time, but
it is a major part of the fix.
The second major part of the fix is to increase the effective size
of the Army. Now, I said ‘‘effective size’’ because what General
Schoomaker’s plan is is focused with about a 30,000 temporary in-
crease in Active Army manpower to work through a plan, as I
think you have been briefed but it is worth repeating, that will add
at least 10 active brigades to the 33 in the Army now, and if we
get to that point of 10 and think we should go further he has a
plan to go to 48, which would be a 50-percent increase in the num-
ber of active combat brigades in the Army with this roughly 30,000
personnel increase. That 30,000 increase will be mostly temporary,
particularly if we top off at 43.
There is no question it would be nice right now to have a larger
Army. The problem is if we decided now or a year ago to have a
larger Army, you cannot just—these people do not just walk in. It
is not like hiring for a check-writing organization. You have to
grow the units, and once you have grown them if it turns out that
you have built up something you do not need then you go through
the pain of the 1990s of demobilizing people who you recruited in.
So it is something the Army and the civilian leadership under-
take with some care. I think we have a good plan here that gives
us a chance to get more combat power into the Army, and if we
ultimately decide a permanent increase is necessary we can do
that. But none of that, I am afraid, helps your wonderful people
from Maine.
On the question of—let me ask General Myers to speak to that.
I certainly want to look into whether there are things that we can
do on the compensatory front. General Myers?
General MYERS. Senator Collins, your first question, does a re-
peated deployment mean we have the wrong mix? As Secretary
Wolfowitz said, absolutely. We are not structured for the security
environment we are in. To put a little texture on the 100,000 that
the Army is going to be restructuring, they are going to take down
field artillery battalions, air defense battalions, and turn them
into—and others, but those are two of the primary ones—and turn
those into military police units, transportation units, petroleum
distribution, water distribution units, the kind of units that are in
very high demand, and also put more of those in the active force.
That work has already started. It will continue for the next 4 or
5 years as we rebalance. It is a very important part of it.
Retention. Clearly, this unit has worked very hard. MPs are in
high demand. I can remember right after September 11 the MPs
that showed up at Fort Myer, where I live, to provide additional
security for the post, and there were some active duty for a while,
and then pretty soon some Guard and Reserve, and sometimes
forces that were not trained to be MPs that were retrained to come
up there and help.
So clearly we have to do a better job with this whole mix. The
retention issue is huge. I would only say that as we look at recruit-
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68
ing and retention this mission is so important that I think these
people, besides being disappointed, their families being tremen-
dously disappointed, and their employers being disappointed, what
they are doing is so important that I hope that that along with
other incentives will convince them to stay with us.
This is an important time to serve. I think they realize that.
They are terrific men and women, as most of these MP companies
are.
The third point was extra compensation, and absolutely, we are.
Within our authorities, we have authority for providing extra com-
pensation and for those that are going to be extended past the 1
year. We call it, boots on the ground in Iraq. There will be addi-
tional compensation.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, gentlemen, for your service and for your testimony.
I agree with what has been said both by members of the commit-
tee and Secretary Wolfowitz that, and all of you, that it is impor-
tant to look back so that we move forward with success. But I am
sure that all of us also agree that the emphasis has to be on look-
ing forward and moving forward with as much success as we can
achieve in Iraq and more broadly in the war on terrorism.
The second thing about looking back is that if you spend too
much time looking back at the various paths that you took to get
to where we are now we may lose sight of the fact that we are all
heading in the same direction, that as we focus on the now and the
future in Iraq I see a very heartening consensus emerging, cer-
tainly among the American people and particularly in the Amer-
ican political leadership community. I think we ought not to hold
ourselves back from seeing that, because it is a source of strength.
I have not heard anybody in a responsible position, certainly no
one on this committee, call for a withdrawal or a retreat from Iraq.
Whether that is because we feel, as I do, that the war was a nec-
essary and noble undertaking in pursuit of our values, our security,
or whether we feel, whether some feel that because we are there
now, departing hastily would cause chaos in Iraq and the region,
endanger American security, embolden the terrorists—everyone in
a position of authority in American government, regardless of
party, wants to win in Iraq, and it is very important for observers
not to be confused either by the very healthy questioning that goes
on at a hearing like this or by the crosscurrents of an American
political campaign.
We are together in this. It is important that the American men
and women in uniform understand that we are not only behind
them—of course we are; they are our sons and daughters, our
neighbors, our brothers and sisters—but that we are behind them
in a quest for victory.
It is very important also that the rest of the world, including par-
ticularly our enemies in Iraq, understand that. I was very pleased
that Senator Kerry in a statement last week made quite clear that
no one in the world should be under the impression that the out-
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69
come of the American election this November will alter the basic
thrust of American policy on Iraq.
That policy has drawn closer. People have moved. As you said,
Secretary Wolfowitz, the debate now is not over whether to with-
draw troops; it is how many troops to add to secure the situation.
There has been debate over, as we look back, about the extent to
which we should have and could have involved the United Nations
or NATO. The fact is we are involving the United Nations now and
trying to involve NATO more.
So that consensus is important through all of the comment and
controversy to recognize, because it is a source of our strength, and
it is very much in line with the quote that you read from General
Keane.
I want to ask a few questions. First, I want to say, General
Myers, that I was heartened to hear that the administration, the
Pentagon, is looking at alternatives for sending more troops into
Iraq in the short term, because as we approach June 30 and the
period afterward leading up to elections obviously our enemies, the
fanatics, the terrorist insurgents, the Saddam remnants, will seek
to disrupt the movement of progress and freedom, and it is very
important for them to understand that. I am encouraged by that.
I understand, and I also took heart from the President’s state-
ment at his press conference last week, that there are discussions
going on with NATO about the possible increased NATO involve-
ment in peacekeeping. I should say not increased, but NATO in-
volvement in peacekeeping. It has not been before, either on the
borders or in the section of Iraq now overseen by the Polish forces.
Secretary Wolfowitz, can you give us any update on that, on
those discussions with NATO?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would be happy to. I want to thank you,
Senator Lieberman. You have shown extraordinary leadership on
this issue over more than 10 years. What you just said about the
message to the Iraqi people and to the enemies of democracy in
Iraq, that they should not confuse debate in this country as a lack
of will, is a very important statement.
I was in Najaf last July and I was struck at both the level of con-
fusion about our politics, which I think I could straighten out, and
the level of paranoia about whether we would abandon them as
they, I think with some justification, felt we had done in 1991. On
the latter point, the question came in the form of: Are you Ameri-
cans just holding Saddam Hussein as a trump card over our heads?
It sounds like paranoia, but if you have been through what they
have been through it is not so paranoid.
I was delighted a couple weeks later when we could tell them:
Well, we have the two sons and we are after the father. It was a
huge event in December to have captured Saddam Hussein. It will
be an even bigger event, frankly, Senator, when a new Iraqi gov-
ernment has the legal authority to try him and bring him to jus-
tice.
Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As early as December 2002, I spoke to the
NAC in Brussels and proposed a range of possibilities for the alli-
ance role in Iraq, including the use of NATO collective assets, the
provision of support services for those allies who would participate,
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and, most of all, a NATO role in postwar humanitarian and stabil-
ity operations.
The alliance did decide to play a role. It has provided planning
and other support services for the Polish division which is in the
critical central-south area, to include force generation, planning,
and communications support. We have 17 of the 26 allies with us
and 7 partners.
We are asking NATO to look at ways it could expand its con-
tribution, including to assume leadership of that multinational di-
vision currently led by Poland, to possibly provide an additional
multinational unit led by NATO, and to provide additional logistics
support for coalition operations. Of course, any decision in that re-
gard would be a political decision that would have to be taken by
allies.
I do think in this regard, a successful transition to a sovereign
government in July, hopefully another U.N. Security Council reso-
lution might ease some of the concerns, at least of some of our al-
lies, about joining in that kind of consensus decision. NATO, as you
well know, is an organization that operates on consensus and there
are limits to what it can do when only—only—17 of 18 or 19 mem-
bers are supporting something.
But I think it has already made a big contribution. We would
like to see more.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you.
General Myers.
General MYERS. Senator Lieberman, can I just add onto that? In
terms of Afghanistan, I think NATO has over 6,000 forces in there
and they are responsible, sir, for the security in Kabul. They are
doing a very good job of that. They want to expand their respon-
sibilities. They have the ambition to expand their responsibilities,
in Afghanistan by establishing some NATO-led Provincial Recon-
struction Teams. There are a couple right now. There is one led by
the Germans. We are in discussions with the Italians on another
one. New Zealand has one. The Brits have one.
We are looking at others. It remains to be seen whether they will
have the resources to do that, but that is their ambition. That is
what we are in discussions on with them. It is a long way from Eu-
rope, but they understand the importance of that and I am optimis-
tic, as Secretary Wolfowitz is, that beyond their role of providing
the force generation capability for this Polish division in the center-
south region of Iraq, that perhaps they can play a larger role in
the future.
Senator LIEBERMAN. That is very encouraging. I thank you all.
Remember—there have been discussions about comparisons to
Vietnam. Remember that there is a doctrine, a military doctrine
that emerged from Vietnam that bears the name of the current
Secretary of State, the Powell doctrine. Generally applied, it is to
make sure that we do not ever go into combat again without all
necessary forces.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you. My time is up. I do want to say that
I hope the committee will focus on the end of Secretary Wolfowitz’s
statement where he calls for three enhanced authorities, which I
would guess that we will all agree on one, for $500 million to train
and equip military and security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
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71
friendly nearby nations, to enhance their capability to combat ter-
rorism; second, commanders’ emergency response program to en-
able military leaders in Iraq to respond to urgent humanitarian re-
lief and reconstruction; and third, an increased drawdown under
the Afghan Freedom Support Act to provide additional help for the
Afghan National Army.
I hope, in the spirit that I began my statement, that together we
might on this committee take the lead in responding to those re-
quests as rapidly as the urgent circumstances on the ground re-
quire.
Chairman WARNER. Senator, we will do that. I think I share with
you the importance of those requests.
Senator Sessions.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you very much for that last inter-
vention.
Senator SESSIONS. Thank you also, Senator Lieberman, for those
excellent comments.
I would like to join with Senator Collins in her concern about
guard units that have been extended. We have an MP unit from
Alabama that has been extended and I know how painful that is
for family members who were on the verge of expecting them home.
But we trust, and we will be in contact with you as we go forward,
that this was required.
One of the great strengths of America is that we are self-critical.
We have heard today a litany of mistakes. We have been hearing
about how many errors we made prior to September 11. But I
would like to make a point or two that I think must be made, and
that is we need to recognize how much progress has been made to
date on the war on terrorism, which President Bush told us from
the beginning would be long and difficult, years in effect, and he
stated that.
But there have been a number of accomplishments. Pakistan,
when confronted and challenged, it was playing footsy with the
Taliban and al Qaeda, chose to be with us and the civilized nations,
and making a big difference in the world right now. That is a great
nation that chose to abandon terrorism.
The Taliban chose wrongly. They rejected our call and they have
been removed from power, and al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan have
been eliminated and their leaders, the ones that still exist, are hid-
ing in caves somewhere in the mountains.
Saddam Hussein failed the opportunity he had to avoid military
action and he has been removed from power, found hiding in a
cave, a hole in the ground, like the rat that he is.
Libya has come in now and renounced terrorism after that event,
and Muamar Qadafi actually appears to be seriously wanting to
join the civilized nations of the world.
Abdul Khan, the Pakistan scientist who was involved in pro-
liferation of nuclear technology to North Korea, to Iran, to Libya,
has confessed and told what he was doing. While we were signing
treaties prohibiting that, he was doing it. That activity on his part
was ended as a result of military action and encouraging leader-
ship by the President.
Most unexpected and most blessed to date is we have not had an-
other attack on this country. I would not have thought that was
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72
possible, that we would have gone almost 3 years without another
attack. I know that we can expect our elections to be in danger,
that some will try to disrupt that and maybe achieve a Spanish re-
sult. But I do not think the American people will lose their poise
if that were to happen. Pray God it does not.
These are not mistakes. These are accomplishments. No war
comes out like you expect it completely. It is no doubt that we are
facing today a troubling surge of violence in Iraq. The Iraqi people
have had a history—have not had a history of law and order or rep-
resentative government. The severe oppression under which they
have suffered has clearly scarred them, keeping emotions raw, par-
anoia widespread, and fear high. Their history has been that the
winner, the leader, is the one who uses violence and power to
achieve power.
Thus, as that government formation moves forward there re-
mains a window of opportunity for these terrorists, these violent
guys who want to take control of this country by power, to seize
power. There is a window of opportunity for them. They are using
every tool at their disposal, fomenting hatreds, distorting religion,
and utilizing violence to create instability.
Our challenge has proven difficult indeed. I had hoped things
would be doing better now. The war went better than I ever
thought it would go and this has been more difficult in recent
weeks than I expected for sure.
We have made progress in a number of areas in Iraq, as you
have stated. Our goal, a free, stable, and prosperous Iraq, is noble
and important for us and the world and the war against terrorism.
The President, this Senate by over a three-fourths majority, and
the American people have set the goal. No one wants to achieve it
more than you do, the members of this panel. No one knows the
situation better than you. You are tireless and dedicated to this
goal.
My advice to you is to stay the course, stay fixed on the goal, and
continue to be flexible. Every war throughout history is different
from the ones preceding it. Adjust as you go, learn from the situa-
tion, keep your eye on the goal of a free and prosperous Iraq.
There is going to be a lot of difficulties as we go forward. There
will continue to be unexpected difficulties. But if we keep our poise
and our head about us I believe we can make it.
The critics and second-guessers are vocal. Those who say thanks
for the accomplishments and who pray daily for our troops are not
so visible, but they are many. This will test the American people
and Congress.
Prime Minister Tony Blair has said, however, that it is our des-
tiny at this time in history to lead. Our soldiers must know we sup-
port them completely. So despite the naysayers, we will meet the
challenge, I believe, that is before us. The whole world for decades
to come will benefit from our constancy and courage, and I salute
you for it and I particularly salute the men and women in uniform
who are putting their lives on the line to make this a safer world
and a better Iraq.
General Myers, I understand General Petraeus will be going to
Iraq. If you would tell us when you expect him to arrive and what
ideas you may have for strengthening the local police and security
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forces that I believe is critical to our long-term success, and what
if anything this Congress can do to help you achieve that goal?
General MYERS. Senator Sessions, thank you for your tribute to
our men and women in uniform. As Secretary Grossman pointed
out, there are lots of other men and women from lots of different
countries, some wearing uniforms, some not, that show a great deal
of courage in that country day in and day out.
As far as General Petraeus, I think he is in country now. He was
certainly going to arrive this week. I think he has arrived. He will
be—he comes off a very successful tour as the division commander
of the 101st Division. They were in northern Iraq. He showed a
great deal of innovative thought in how he worked with the local
governance in that area, helping to improve their economies, and
so forth, and did a terrific job, I think in everybody’s estimation.
He is going back to work security cooperation. The Defense De-
partment has the responsibility for all security forces, which in-
clude the Iraqi police, the New Iraqi Army, the border, the Civil
Defense Corps, and the Facilities Protection Services.
As Secretary Wolfowitz said, we have not equipped them as fast
as we needed to do, and that is one of the issues that we have to
work. I think we have solved all the hurdles that we either had
here in Washington or in Baghdad. Those hurdles have been
solved. We have contracts. Equipment is arriving. I have seen
the—there is in fact a very good British officer that showed me the
plan for equipping the police, great detail in terms of equipment
and where in the country and so forth. They have it mapped out.
We have the resources to do that. We have just got to follow
through.
We have to continue the training of all these forces. In particu-
lar, the police have undergone some training, but there is a large
number of police that have not been trained. We need to do that.
Then once they are trained and they go to their individual police
stations, what needs to happen is they get the proper mentoring,
because in some cases the leadership may not be all that good in
these police stations. So you get one of these recruits that has been
trained and you have to keep their enthusiasm up and keep them
on the right track.
We have civilian police from around the world that the State De-
partment is organizing, that is to do that, that task.
Then I think General Abizaid is exactly right. As he has said I
think many times and that we are now saying, and Secretary
Wolfowitz said earlier, they have to feel like they are responding
to Iraqi authority. We have to connect those dots between the local
police station and the province on up to the ministry of interior in
Baghdad and to the political leadership that will stand up 1 July.
That part has yet to happen, but there are efforts under way to
make all that happen. I think what Congress has done to ensure
we have the funding for the equipping and training of these forces
right now is adequate, and it will just, it will take some time. It
is certainly going to take beyond 1 July.
We think by the end of this year that we will have clearly the
majority of these forces properly equipped and trained and in the
field and connected to their command authority, if you will.
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Senator SESSIONS. Well, General Petraeus did a great job with
the 101st in Mosul and I think a lot of us have confidence in him,
and we want to support you in that effort.
General MYERS. Thank you. He will do very well.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Reed.
Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you urge us all to show will and resolve and you
emphasized that by those very compelling letters from those young
privates and captains who are showing will and resolve. But
around here in Washington the usual measure of will and resolve
is the budget, and when General Schoomaker, General Jumper,
and General Hagee were here they said that without a supple-
mental appropriation by October 1 they could be running out of
money in critical accounts for this operation. Commentators like Anthony Cordesman have suggested there is a $50 billion hole that
has to be filled by a supplemental.
When will the Department of Defense show its will and resolve
by sending a supplemental up to Congress?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Reed, if we think one is nec-
essary, when we think it is necessary. We had a session with the
same chiefs that you quoted, I think about a week ago, to precisely
address where we stand with this process. What happens is as you
go through the year certain accounts start to run short because you
are spending more money on them than you planned, and clearly
the unanticipated higher level of deployment leads to some ac-
counts being overspent and you hear about that quickly.
Other accounts spend slower than was planned and they start to
have surpluses there, and I can assure you people do not come run-
ning down the hall with their hair on fire to tell you, I have a sur-
plus in my account.
We have a process called the mid-year execution review, which
is conducted by the DOD Comptroller. It is under way now. As a
result of that meeting with the Secretary, we have speeded up the
schedule by a week so that if there is a problem we can identify
it sooner rather than later and come for help if we need it.
One kind of help we really do need and that is general transfer
authority. In fact, at the end of my testimony those three points
that Senator Lieberman pointed out—I also said that most of all
in this kind of wartime situation where you are dealing with un-
predictable events it is important to have more rather than less
flexibility. I think we asked for $4 billion, which is 1 percent of our budget,
last year and it was cut by roughly half. The more flexibility, the
sooner we can rebalance accounts. Of course we can reprogram.
That takes time. But the sooner people know that money is going
to be available from an account that has a surplus into an account
that has a deficit, the better we can manage the resources we have.
The bottom line, though, Senator—and I think you and I agree
on this—is the troops need to have what they need and we need
to make sure they do.
Senator REED. Well, I think the bottom line, Mr. Secretary, is
you need a supplemental up here. This is not a shortage of several
billion dollars. This is a growing shortage and, as you point out,
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75
when the chiefs testified the anticipated force level would be
105,000, not 135,000 as it is today.
General Myers, is it your professional judgment that there are
adequate resources without a supplemental to continue operations
without seriously harming other important Defense Department
programs?
General MYERS. Senator Reed, we are evaluating that right now.
I have to withhold judgment for just a little bit more time. Obvi-
ously the extension of the First Armored Division, the Second Light
Cavalry Regiment, and their combat support, combat service sup-
port is going to increase our costs. The operations tempo is also
higher. So we know that we have additional costs that we have to
find funding sources for.
We also know there will be execution issues with some of our ac-
quisition systems and so forth. So I think we need to wait until the
OSD Comptroller can look at these, these issues, before we can
have a firm decision. We thought before, with what the services
were identifying as shortfalls, that we could bridge the gap be-
tween, for the last month of this fiscal year and cover our expenses.
I think we just have to ensure ourselves that is still true given the
higher expenses that we have right now.
Senator REED. General Myers, another issue has become relevant
in the last few days, certainly since the terrible attack on the con-
tractors in the Fallujah area. That is the huge number, 20,000 esti-
mated, of armed security contractors. This presents a problem
today, but it certainly will present even a greater problem after
July 1. What rules of engagement will they operate under in this
new sovereign Iraqi entity? Can an Iraqi minister of interior hire
200 former Special Forces for his own private army? What is their
status?
This is to me a startling departure from previous doctrine of
using these contractors in security positions. What is your view and
what are you going to do about it?
General MYERS. What we are doing about it is providing Central
Command and General Abizaid and General Sanchez with the pol-
icy guidance that will allow them to handle this issue. You raised
the questions. We do have a lot of contractor support, not only in
the security area but also in a lot of our logistics capability—truck
drivers.
Senator REED. Relatively noncontroversial.
General MYERS. Right. But still it raises issues as to their status,
their arming, and so forth. You are right, the security forces are
probably the—and we are providing that guidance to Central Com-
mand so they know how to handle this situation.
By the way, I would just say parenthetically that when I was
there one of the issues I looked at was the coordination between
the coalition military forces and security forces. I am assured there
is a pretty robust mechanism for security forces inside Iraq to
make sure that they have the latest intelligence or information and
that they share information back and forth.
I was a little bit worried about that after the Blackwater issue
in Fallujah and some of the things I heard about that. I think Gen-
eral Sanchez and his folks do a pretty good job of that.
Senator REED. Just a final point. My time has expired.
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76
General Ikenberry conducted a report or a review of security
forces several months ago. We have been endeavoring to obtain a
copy of that report, if it is classified certainly under those classified
terms. It seems to me unfortunate that it takes us weeks and
weeks and weeks to get reports which you have acknowledged, both
the Secretary and uniformed leadership, exist, that you have, that
you reviewed, and that we cannot get access in a timely way.
I just think it is unfortunate, more than unfortunate. I do not
think it is appropriate. Can you assure us that we will get access
to this report within days?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will check on that, Senator, and I can
not assure you. I will do my best to see if it is appropriate—
Senator REED. Why can you not assure me, Mr. Secretary? This
is a report that was prepared by an officer in the United States
Army to inform the Department of Defense, but also this is the
Armed Services Committee. We should have access to those reports
in a timely fashion. If they are classified, we can go up to 407. We
can read them under the circumstances and the classifications.
It seems to me this is unacceptable that you, the Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense, say: I will try, but I cannot promise you you will
get a report.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, we try to give you everything
that we can. We also have to make sure that we manage the whole
process of reports like this and reviews like this so that people give
us candid opinions. Quite frankly—
Senator REED. Well, no; we deserve a candid opinion, Mr. Sec-
retary.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ.—we put a lot of effort into getting this
Ikenberry mission out there against some people who did not really
want to have people looking and examining how we were doing.
Lessons learned are a wonderful thing. We need to do lessons
learned. We also need to manage and we need to manage between
the Executive and Congress in an appropriate way so that people
do not begin to fear every time someone comes out to do an
Ikenberry report or to do an assessment or do a lessons learned it
is time to shut up and not give them any information because the
next thing you know——
Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, that is totally unfounded. We are
constitutionally required to supervise the activities of the DOD. We
have just as much of a right to get this information as you do. You
seem to be saying we do not. You seem to be saying that we cannot
get access to reports prepared in the course of business of the DOD.
Is that what you are saying?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I will do my best. I have not
looked at this issue. I would like to get you the report. If I can get
it for you——
Senator REED. What you seem to be saying, Mr. Secretary, if you
do not want the contents of that report disclosed to us, you will not
get it for us. If those contents are embarrassing to the administra-
tion, you will not get it for us. If those contents suggest that the
problems we saw 2 weeks ago were understood or anticipated or
should have been——
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, that is not the issue. Please do
not do that.
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Senator REED. Well, what is the issue, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The issue is how to protect the decisional
processes that I think are in the country’s interest, the candor that
is required in pre-decisional documents, and the equally important
responsibility to keep Congress informed. I believe that you can see
this report, but I do not know.
Senator REED. Mr. Secretary——
Chairman WARNER. Senator, I must say there are seven col-
leagues waiting. It is an important issue. Senator Levin and I will
address the issue.
May I also thank you for bringing up the question on the con-
tractors. General Myers, that is a matter that is before the commit-
tee for review right now, because they are providing an absolutely
essential service, not only to our security side but the logistics side.
We have to do what we can, particularly those that have affiliation
with the coalition partners.
Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact—I apologize
to my colleagues. This is an astounding statement by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, saying that if he wants us to get the informa-
tion he will give it to us, but if he does not he will not.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. This is not a personal thing, Senator
Reed.
Senator REED. It is not for any legal reason——
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think you know that there are issues
about what documents are pre-decisional and what things need to
be shared. Let us be clear. The Ikenberry report is something I did
personally push for because I thought it was important to have a
thorough examination of this issue, and it met some resistance be-
cause people are afraid sometimes to have things examined.
I said, and I repeat, I will do my best, if I am permitted—it is
not me personally—to make that report available to Congress.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin and I are now reviewing, in
the context of some requests by Senator McCain, the committee
and others, as to how we are going to work out a smoother and a
more understandable exchange of information.
Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for one mo-
ment?
Chairman WARNER. Yes.
Senator REED. My understanding is that reports that are pre-
pared by the DOD are classified and that, subject to those classi-
fications, people have access to it. I assume we have a sufficient
clearance level on this committee to have access to the report I am
talking about and probably everything that is prepared at the
DOD. If I am in error——
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Reed, I am going to do everything
I can to get you the report. I just did not want to promise some-
thing I am not sure I can deliver. I will do my best.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Reed, we just simply have to move
on in fairness to my colleagues and your colleagues on both sides
here.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
I for one agree, I believe, with the comments of Senator
Lieberman and Senator Sessions and those who have associated
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78
themselves with the importance of this committee conducting prop-
er oversight, and particularly in dealing with matters that are of
present concern and planning for the future. I think we are at our
best when we do that. I think we are at our worst when we look
back and try to dissect lessons learned while we are still at war
in the battlefield. That unfortunately, particularly in a super-
charged political environment leading up to a November election,
I think is not as constructive as we could or should be in dealing
with the present and plans for the future.
But unfortunately, in this environment when questions are
raised and statements are made and not responded to, or when the
context of the answer is not made clear, unfortunately that has to
be addressed. So it is in that context that I want to ask two ques-
tions.
Over the weekend we heard some unfortunate claims, one related
to the $87 billion supplemental that I wanted to ask you about; and
one goes to the very nature of the conflict that we are currently en-
gaged in in the war on terror. The first question I have involves the $87 billion supplemental that Congress passed to fund the war
on terror. It was said this weekend that even the generals in Iraq
said that moneys in that bill had no impact on their ability to con-
tinue to fight. It was also said that that vote would never—that
vote would never have prevented, that is a negative vote against
that supplemental, would never have prevented any of the body
armor, ammunition, or anything from getting to our troops.
Now, I had heard that statement earlier and it caused me to ask
in another hearing, a SASC hearing at which the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army, General Casey, appeared. I asked him about that $87 billion appropriation and if it had not passed what the
consequences would have been to our troops. He was unequivocal.
He said: ‘‘This supplemental appropriation has enabled us to sig-
nificantly increase the protection for our soldiers throughout the
theater of Afghanistan and Iraq.’’ I asked him: ‘‘If Congress had not stepped up and funded the $87
billion supplemental, that would have meant or resulted in in-
creased casualties as a result of the failure to provide those up-ar-
mored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs)
and body armor?’’ General Casey agreed that: ‘‘It would have
meant more casualties or the Army would have had to gut the
Army budget to find the money to do this, that is pay for the body
armor or up-armored HMMWVs by other means.’’
My question for you, Secretary Wolfowitz and General MYERS.
Did the $87 billion supplemental have an impact on the ability of
our men and women to fight and win the war on terror in which
we are currently engaged?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Cornyn, I cannot imagine how we
could continue conducting operations without that supplemental. It
not only provided for basic operations, but it also provided substan-
tial amounts for things like body armor and up-armored HMMWVs
and various force protection measures.
There were two different pieces of the supplemental, of course. There was the roughly $67 billion that goes directly to our troops, which is absolutely indispensable. Then there is the $18 billion, $18.6 billion of reconstruction funds, which are spending slower,
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but they are already having an impact. I think it is very important.
As we said in testifying on the reconstruction funds, that money
can help to create Iraqi security forces that can take the place of
Americans. That money can help to create a positive political envi-
ronment inside Iraq that will make our forces safer. So really the whole $87 billion I think—and it covers Afghani-
stan as well—was essential to this war on terror.
Senator CORNYN. General Myers?
General MYERS. Really, I do not know how I can add anything
more to that. That supplemental is absolutely essential to our abil-
ity to operate in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Wolfowitz, I think we approved $750 million for force protection initiatives alone and
we can do more if required in that regard.
But the general just paying for our operational tempo, if we did
not do that General Casey would be right, you would gut the Army
budget, and not only the Army budget but the Air Force and the
Marine Corps and the Navy budgets as well. So it is absolutely es-
sential to our operations.
Senator CORNYN. This last week I was at the Red River Army
Depot, where they are providing additional armor or metal contain-
ers essentially to upgrade HMMWVs for additional armor and pro-
tection for troops currently in the battlefield. It is that kind of addi-
tional protection which I believe has led to the greater security and
greater likelihood of success of our troops in the field.
My only other question really relates to the nature of the conflict
in which we are engaged, in which at least count I saw we had
135,000 troops currently in Iraq fighting this conflict. It was said
this weekend again—a reiteration of an earlier claim—that the war
on terrorism is not primarily a military operation, but that it is an
intelligence-gathering, a law enforcement, and public diplomacy ef-
fort. Now, I disagree with that completely and I believe that indeed
treating the war on terror previously, after we had been attacked,
after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 for example, as a
criminal investigation and a law enforcement matter, as we have
seen before the 9/11 Commission, has led to insecurity and endan-
gered American lives because of the lack of information-sharing,
among other things.
But I would just ask your response, Secretary Wolfowitz. Do you
agree that what we are engaged in in Afghanistan and Iraq is not
primarily a military operation, but is rather an intelligence-gather-
ing, law enforcement, and diplomatic mission?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Cornyn, I think that I resisted
these comparisons initially when people said this is like the Cold
War, it is going to be as long as the Cold War and as difficult as
the Cold War, in the immediate aftermath of September 11. In-
creasingly, I think it has all those characteristics and then some,
and it requires all the elements of national power, as the President
has said over and over again, including military, including intel-
ligence, including law enforcement, including diplomacy, including
economic assistance—all of those things working hand in hand, re-
inforcing one another.
The fact is that one of the biggest successes in the intelligence-
law enforcement arena in this war on terrorism was capturing the
mastermind of September 11, Khalid Sheik Mohamed, in Pakistan.
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I would note, by the way, for those people who say we were di-
verted by Iraq, it was done the month before Operation Iraqi Free-
dom that we captured this villain.
But we would never have gotten him in Pakistan if he were still
hiding in Afghanistan, if they still had that sanctuary. It is impor-
tant to take the sanctuaries away from these people. At least in the
case of Afghanistan and Iraq, it could not have been done except
by military means.
But then we see the case of Libya, where the military without
doing anything plays a critical role in supporting diplomacy, which
achieved an enormous amount, in part thanks to some great work
by the intelligence people that uncovered what Qadafi was doing.
So all these things have to work together. That is point number
one. Point number two: I really do think, if there is a single lesson
from September 11, to me it is that we cannot wait until after the
fact to find the perpetrators of events, of terrorist acts, and either
bring them to court or bring them to trial, or if they are foreign
countries punish them with some kind of cruise missile retaliation.
We have to do preventive action.
Preventive action in the last resort may sometimes be military.
But when I say ‘‘preventive action,’’ I mean on a very broad scale.
I think one of the most important kinds of preventive action we
could be undertaking as a country, and we are starting to—I would
like to see us do more—is to help countries like Pakistan that are
trying to redo their education system, so that instead of breeding
terrorists in these madrassas that preach nothing useful and a lot
of hatred, young poor Pakistani children can go to a school where
they learn how to succeed in the modern world.
So all of those instruments are necessary. It is a very broad ef-
fort. It is a big mistake to suggest that it can be narrowed.
Chairman WARNER. We thank you, Senator.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman WARNER. We thank our witness.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wolfowitz, I am a little confused about the develop-
ment of the security forces within Iraq. It was my understanding
that what we were going to do is build up the Iraqi security forces,
therefore we could take down our presence militarily because of the
increasing capacity of the Iraqis to support themselves for their se-
curity needs.
I thought I just heard you say that by staffing the Iraqi security
forces we would make it safer and we would be able to do that.
Then I thought I heard you earlier say that they were having trou-
ble because they needed stronger leaders and they need to fight for
Iraq and they need more and better equipment. I am a little con-
fused about that, but I suspect you and I can resolve that, that con-
fusion.
What I would like to do is to give you an idea and see how this
fits with where the plans for the Iraq political transition would fit
in. I have been advocating for some time that at the point of
handover on June 30 that the new sovereign government at that
point would ask the U.N. to help with this transition, this govern-
mental transition from the interim to the transitional and then the
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constitutional government, by helping them develop and carry out
free elections; and that the new sovereign government would then
ask the NATO countries to come in and NATO as a group to come
in and provide security—not the United States asking for another
U.N. resolution.
We have not had a great deal of success in getting other coun-
tries to come in and I do not believe we are going to get the U.N.
to come in until there is security. It seems to me that we can de-
cide the chicken or the egg here and we say that both have to be
accomplished at the same time, the U.N. come in and NATO come
in, which I hope would reduce our presence, which I am going to
ask General Myers to give us some idea of what additional NATO
forces we might receive.
I thought I heard that the administration’s approach, from Sec-
retary Grossman, is for us to ask for U.N. help. I have met with
ambassadors from Germany and France and run this by them and
they did not make any commitment, of course, but they did not say
no to considering whether if the new Iraqi government would ask,
which would be different than an occupying force or an occupying
presence such as the United States represents right now, which is
creating some of the consternation between us and other countries.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Some good questions. If I could go back
just briefly and see if I can clarify what may have sounded like
confusion. I do not think it is. I think the difference lies in when
Iraqi security forces can actually assume the role we would like to
see them assume.
I would also like to stress, the most important thing is not so
that we can reduce our numbers, although that is clearly some-
thing we would like to do, but even more important so that we can
have Iraqi forces out in front and on the streets. Just to give you
one important, obvious example, if you have to go into a mosque
because it is being used as a military base, and we have had that
happen, having Iraqis go in and do that kind of work is much,
much better.
Senator BEN NELSON. Are they doing that?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. They are in some cases, and in some cases
we do not have them. As you might expect, the results are gen-
erally better when they can do it.
Now, we never thought that by this April they would be ready
to operate independently, and the report Senator Reed was asking
about was in fact stimulated by my concern that things were not
moving as fast as they should have. I think we have found through
General Ikenberry’s efforts some ways to speed things up, and it
is important.
But particularly when in some cases they were literally out-
gunned by the enemy, then it is not surprising that they had prob-
lems. There are other problems, leadership problems, training
problems. I think it is the right course. We should not—we should
push it, we should push it faster. We should not assume success
until we have success.
On the question you asked about other countries, and particu-
larly NATO and NATO countries, contributing, Ambassador Gross-
man or General Myers might want to add to this, but I think, first
of all, one reason why we would very much like to see this transi-
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tion take place on July 1—and I cannot stress enough times, from
a political point of view the last thing you want is to be undergoing
a transition like this in the middle of an American political season.
But from a military point of view and an Iraqi security point of
view, the sooner you have an Iraqi government that can ask allies
to come in, the better off we will be. The sooner we have an Iraqi
government that can try Saddam Hussein, the better off we will be.
So that will be a step forward, number one. Number two, I do
think there are quite a few countries who are not going to come
in until it is safer to come in. They may say it is the lack of this
or the lack of that or this U.N. resolution or that. The fact is this
is not peacekeeping; it is combat. Until it becomes peacekeeping, a
lot of countries are probably going to still stay on the sidelines.
Finally, some countries have real capabilities and others do not.
The country that has the potential to have real capability is Iraq
itself. In pure numbers they are now the largest member of the co-
alition. In number of people killed in action, it is over 250 Iraqi po-
lice and Civil Defense Corps and Army have been killed fighting
for a new Iraq.
Senator BEN NELSON. In the line of action?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In the line of duty, since June 1. It is sec-
ond only to the United States. It is not a number I want to see
grow on either side, but they will probably—who knows. I should
not predict. But they are up there fighting. The better we equip
them, the better we train them, the more they will be fighting. It
is their country; they should fight for it.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.
I wonder, Secretary Grossman, would you like to contribute to
this important question?
Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir, just in a——
Senator BEN NELSON. If I might ask, it was because I heard you
say that we would secure a U.N. resolution as opposed to the Iraqi
government doing it. That is what caused me some confusion about
the timing.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Senator Nelson, if I could, I think as we have all
of us here today paid tribute to those people who are contributing
in Iraq, I think it is worth noting that, although the U.N. left in
large numbers after the murder of Brahimi, I give great credit to
the people who, on behalf of the U.N.—United Nations Childrens’
Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program—local Iraqis have continued
to work. I think it is worth saying that, in terms of our immuniza-
tion program and our food programs, without UNICEF, without
World Food Program, we would not be able to accomplish that task.
Second, I think that it is important to know that the Iraqi Gov-
erning Council, along obviously with the CPA, invited Ambassador
Brahimi to come back. It is the Iraqi Governing Council that has
invited this very admirable Ms. Pirelli who works on elections for
the United Nations to come back.
So I agree with you completely that I would hope that in the 1st
of July a new interim authority, a new interim Iraqi government,
would be very much welcoming further United Nations help and
support, and we will be there with them.
In terms of seeking a Security Council resolution, I would imag-
ine from all that I have heard from Iraqis they would seek—they
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would welcome a Security Council resolution. But I do think that
that is some of the responsibility that we take on as permanent
members of the Security Council. So I think if we drive forward for
it, it is a good thing for us, I am sure Iraqis will support it.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. I just observe to one of your responses, Mr.
Wolfowitz, the sooner the Iraqi government gets in the sooner they
can invite other nations to join. But let us make it clear from what
you said, once they join and contribute forces, it is the Commander
in Chief, the President of the United States, that has control over
the use of those forces. Am I not correct?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely. We can repeat it multiple
times. It is very important.
Chairman WARNER. Everybody talks about giving sovereignty.
You look at the definition, it is everything. It is sovereignty, but
the security remains clearly within the control, as we have stated,
with the U.S. President on down.
Senator Dole.
Senator DOLE. Secretary Wolfowitz, there have been charges that
the war on Iraq took our focus off of al Qaeda and the war on ter-
ror as a whole. Just like you, Mr. Secretary, I found the memo
written by captured al Qaeda operative Zarqawi to be very interest-
ing and compelling. In noting concern that the Mujahadeen may
lose its foothold in Iraq, he wrote:
‘‘There is no doubt that our field of movement is shrinking and
the grip around the throat of the Mujahadeen has begun to tighten.
With the spread of the army and the police, our future is becoming
frightening.’’
Can you elaborate on this memo and its significance, please?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is pretty amazing. When I first read it
I wanted to make sure that we were absolutely certain this was not
some forgery that someone had presented to us hoping to get paid
for it or otherwise manipulate us. I have been assured multiple
times that, no, the circumstances of our obtaining it were that we
captured it off of a senior terrorist who was carrying it, I think in
the form of a computer disk, from Iraq back to Afghanistan, and
it was in response to apparently a query from Mr. Zarqawi’s al
Qaeda friends in Afghanistan as to whether they should send peo-
ple to Iraq.
I think it is important to emphasize, since it is a strange name
and, even though Secretary Powell spent some time talking about
Mr. Zarqawi at the U.N. in February of last year, I am surprised
how often people are completely unaware of who he is. He is not
some local figure. He ran a terrorist camp in Afghanistan, a train-
ing camp, for a number of years when bin Laden was in charge
there.
We use the word ‘‘al Qaeda-associated,’’ I think primarily because
we are not sure about whether he has formally pledged allegiance
to bin Laden, whether he to some extent runs his own operation.
But it is a substantial operation. It is credited with being involved
in planning terrorist plots that were broken up in London, in Paris,
and one that was pulled off successfully in Casablanca.
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He is a world terrorist. He has murdered probably, we believe,
our diplomat in Jordan, Ambassador Foley. He is wanted under a
warrant in Jordan for attempting to assassinate a senior Jordanian
official. In fact, when the Jordanians went to the Iraqi government
in 2002 to ask to have him extradited, he miraculously just dis-
appeared.
This man, we have been surprised, frankly, at the extent of his
network in Iraq or the size of it. It is not a few tens. It seems to
be at least some scores of people.
But what is most striking in that letter that you cite is the
length in which he describes this sense of desperation. He even
uses the word ‘‘suffocation’’ at one point, in part because—and I
think I quoted it in my testimony and I will paraphrase it—the
Americans, he says, the most cowardly of all peoples, are not going
to leave no matter how many wounds they suffer.
It is interesting. Though he calls us cowardly, he understood that
we are not. He understood that we are not leaving. Therefore he
lays out, his strategy has to be—and he seems to have a sense of
desperation that he needs to do this before there is a sovereign
Iraqi government, although he does not use precisely that phrase.
The strategy has to be to promote chaos and division in Iraq by
attacking four targets he identifies: the Iraqi security forces, the
Kurds, the Americans, and most importantly the Shia. That seems
to conform with both the attacks we saw in Irbil, two suicide bomb-
ers who blew up some 150 people in an horrific incident; and then,
even more significantly, the attacks on the Shia population in
southern Iraq.
I think that the exposure of that letter plus our offensive oper-
ations that have captured by now more than 30 of his people may
have set him back. The exposure of the letter I think helped to
make sure that the Shia understood that if there were more bomb-
ings he was the man responsible.
I guess I would just like to conclude with this point, the only
comment I would make on Senator Sessions’ eloquent intervention
earlier. One of our great assets I think is the sheer evil of our
enemy. They attacked us on September 11 believing that we would
be divided and that we would retreat. They failed. They attacked
Indonesia and Bali, believing this would cause the Indonesians to
waver and weaken, the Australians to pull out, because mostly
Australians killed. They failed.
They attacked synagogues in Istanbul and the British Cultural
Center in Istanbul, thinking that this would divide Turkish Mus-
lims from Turkish Jews and Turks from British, and they failed.
With the unfortunate exception of Madrid, they have failed time
and time again. In Saudi Arabia, May 12, they attacked an Amer-
ican compound, residential compound, in Saudi Arabia. It has led
to the largest, most successful crackdown on al Qaeda that we
have—up until May 12 we were not successful in getting the
Saudis to undertake.
Most importantly, they have attacked innocent Iraqis, innocent
international aid workers, innocent Kurds, Shia, and Sunni alike
in Iraq, and I think they are failing. But we have to keep at it to
make sure they do.
Senator DOLE. Thank you.
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Mr. Secretary, I would like you to respond to another quote,
please. This time, George Shultz in an excellent opinion piece in
the Wall Street Journal just recently, and I quote: ‘‘The most im-
portant aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integ-
rity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively
with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that
as well as we do. That is the reason for the tactic of violence in
Iraq. The message is that the United States and others in the
world who recognize the need to sustain our international system
will no longer quietly acquiesce in the takeover of states by lawless
dictators who then carry on their depredations, including the devel-
oping of awesome weapons for threats, for use, for sale, behind the
shield of protection that statehood provides.’’
Would you comment on the significance of this statement as it
relates to what you have seen in Iraq and what you are seeing?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think I remember reading that whole ar-
ticle.
Senator DOLE. Excellent.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, if I could add it to the
record of this hearing. It is, as most things that George Shultz
does, it is a terrific piece.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In my less eloquent way, let me just say
I think what he points out correctly is that you cannot go after ter-
rorist networks and ignore what states do to support terrorism. I
mentioned earlier in my testimony this division of the Iraqi Inter-
national Service called M–14 that was the so-called Anti-Terrorism
Section. It was not anti-terrorism. These are the people who devel-
oped over many years the kind of explosives expertise that was
then handed off to terrorists. These are the people who conducted
their own assassinations, who today in Iraq are allied with terror-
ists.
To simply say, well, Saddam Hussein harbored Abu Nidal and
Abu Abbas, but they were not al Qaeda, it seems to me ignores the
basic point that, given what we saw on September 11 and given
what we know terrorists might do with even more terrible weap-
ons, we simply cannot afford—we have to have a zero tolerance pol-
icy. We can no longer afford to have states in the business of using
terrorism as an instrument of national policy.
Hopefully, we can get the world to change without having to un-
dertake one military operation after another. But I think there is
no question, as Secretary Shultz says in that article, that what
happened to the Taliban and what happened to Saddam Hussein
is a very salutary lesson for other states that may be tempted to
continue on that course.
Senator DOLE. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
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Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Dayton.
Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Books like this are amazing to me, how high-level people will re-
veal their supposedly top secret information or disclose proceedings
at the highest level meetings. I guess my colleague Senator Reed
has left, but if we want to get some of these documents he was re-
questing from the Deputy Secretary of Defense I think we should
ask Mr. Woodward to get us copies, because he seems to get every-
thing quite readily.
But one of the other insights I got from reading through this is
that—I and I think the people who elected me and sent me to
Washington delude ourselves that we have some, in the Senate,
some legitimate and constitutional role, and then to find out how
contemptuously we are regarded in the executive branch, starting
with the President himself, who was quoted as saying here in a
meeting where Senator Levin, who was then the chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, referenced some deep concerns that the
U.S. military had just prior to the resolution. The President said:
‘‘It would be nice if they’’—meaning the military—‘‘expressed their
reservations to the President, rather than just someone in the Sen-
ate.’’
But it goes beyond that. In my reading of this book, it goes clear-
ly into the duplicities and the deceptions that were, and misrepre-
sentations, that were made to Members of Congress. Those who
want to look at—those who are preventing others of us from look-
ing at the misuse of intelligence information before the congres-
sional resolutions were adopted and thereafter should look at what
was said, according to the quotes in this book, to Members of Con-
gress by highest administration officials, that are even more em-
phatic in their representations of intelligence information that
turned out to either be erroneous or intentionally misrepresented.
I find it just horrifying. So when we get into these matters of the
lack of legitimacy for anyone to question anything that has been
decided, anything that has been done or has not been done, any-
thing that has been represented, that has been found to be totally
untrue, and find once again, as we have in other times in history,
that anybody who raises those questions is guilty of either failing
to support our Armed Forces, whose heroism is beyond belief and
description, which we all recognize—and those of us who have been
there, who have seen them, have talked to their families, those who
are over there now, who are anxiously awaiting to find out whether
their loved ones are coming back alive or not, those who are not
coming back at all, those families—to have it be suggested that any
of us here lack that support because we are raising questions about
what decisions were made and what pretexts were given for enter-
ing into this war and what has transpired since and what hap-
pened in the last weeks—and the statement at the conclusion, Mr.
Deputy Secretary, of your remarks that if they, meaning the—well,
I will read the whole paragraph here:
‘‘The enthusiasm of Iraqis to go into combat along side the
coalition is also colored by their perception of our commit-
ment to the new Iraq. If they sense that we will not see
them through to a new constitution, an election, and
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strong Iraqi institutions, we should not be surprised to see
them melt away or even work a deal with those who would
shoot their way to power. That is why it is so important
in this time of stress to show that our commitment to their
freedom is rock solid.’’
Mr. Secretary, I can only speak for myself. I am not going to pre-
sume to speak for others. But my commitment to their freedom is
rock solid, my commitment to our troops is rock solid, and that is
exactly why here we should have had the opportunity, and we have
had very limited opportunity, to find out the realities of the mili-
tary situation. Rather, we have been given a series of just glossy
overstatements of what transpired over the last year and how bad
Saddam Hussein is, which we know.
The fact that there are not any weapons of mass destruction and
that our Armed Forces are now, as the ranking member said, suf-
fering greater casualties than at any other time—what we hear is
that, well, he is a really bad man, he is a really really bad man.
That is not the point here. The point is we have a right to know
and we should be told what is going on over there in factual terms,
in military terms. I have sat through now most of the last 3 hours
and watched other parts of it on television to find out that virtually
nothing has been said. So I find this extremely disappointing, but
I find it a continuation of this attitude that Congress is just to be
duped and basically led along to this and the less that is presented
to us that we can actually know what is going on the better, and
as long as we can be led to believe whatever suits the purposes of
those who are carrying this out then fine, just ignore us or lie to
us or use us in whatever way you possibly can get away with. I
find it just abhorrent.
I would like to ask General Myers one question regarding the
transition that is described here, the political transition. What is
the military equivalent of that? We have had our troops over there.
We have seen the first evidence of the Iraqi security forces, how
they have responded and failed to respond, and I gather it is a
mixed situation over there in the last couple weeks.
What is the Iraq military transition for our Armed Forces getting
out with a victory, the victory that we all want secured, the free-
dom we all want secured?
General MYERS. Senator Dayton, what we are going to be doing
simultaneous to that—and if you go back, I think the chart goes
to—well, we can see; we can look at April there. We will stand up
shortly this new Multinational Force Iraq, that’s what it is going
to be called. We are going to have an overall—the coalition com-
mander will be U.S. It will be General Sanchez that will be overall
responsible for security in Iraq.
Below him he will have a couple of significant offices. One will
be the tactical commander, that is Lieutenant General Tom Metz.
He and Sanchez are working side by side right now, and General
Metz will take the tactical situation. Then we talked about General
Petraeus coming over to work the office of I think security transi-
tion we call it now—I think that is right—which will work the
equipping and training of the Iraqi security forces, police on
through border patrol—important functions.
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Throughout that organization will be woven Iraqis who will be
part of the police and the new Iraqi army and all those other Iraqi
security force entities, will be woven in that. It is envisioned that
this commander of the Multinational Force Iraq will be very close
to our chief of mission over there, that they will be a team that will
work those issues that they are going to have to work together, be-
cause there is going to have to be a lot of collaboration, as there
is in Afghanistan with our Ambassador Khalilzad and General
Barnow. They have offices that are essentially feet apart, 20, 30
feet apart.
Senator DAYTON. General, excuse me, but my time is limited
here. Sir, we are given here the political transition through 2006.
This is the Armed Services Committee. I would like to know, what
is the military transition through 2004, 2005, 2006 as it affects
American forces, because, as Senator Collins and others have said,
we have a lot of people back in my State of Minnesota who want
to know when their men and women are coming home.
General MYERS. Right, and I was going to get to that. I was talk-
ing about the command and control structure, which is very, very
important to our military transition, and if we do not do that right
we are not going to——
Senator DAYTON. All right, I accept that. I apologize.
General MYERS. No, I was too long, I guess.
Our forces will continue. We are looking at the next rotation of
forces and the rotation after that and, as we have done between the
first rotation and the one we are currently in, trying to stretch this
out so it does not all occur in one lump of time. We are looking at
those forces that will support it out into the future, certainly as far
as that chart goes.
Obviously, we do not have perfect clarity on the forces that are
going to be needed in 2005 and 2006. So we are planning for that.
We are basing that on estimates that we get from General Abizaid,
and as we get closer and closer that will be further and further re-
fined. But we are planning for a presence there to help with secu-
rity throughout that period.
Senator DAYTON. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. But I
would ask that, either in the closed session or subsequently, we get
some statistical representation of what that transition is going to
look like, please.
General MYERS. We would have to do it in closed session.
Senator DAYTON. All right. Thank you.
Senator SESSIONS [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Dayton.
Senator Ensign.
Senator ENSIGN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all three of you for sitting through quite a long
session. These are very, very important times and important ques-
tions to have answered.
I believe very strongly that the only way that we lose in Iraq,
Afghanistan, really this whole global war on terrorism, but espe-
cially right now in Iraq, is if we lose the support of the American
people, if it is a political loss, if the American people somehow are
not behind the President, behind Congress, in support of what is
going on over there. The reason I say that at the beginning is be-
cause the politics of what is happening here in the United States
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affects the support of the American people, and there are comments
that have been made, as a matter of fact—and I want to get your
sense of the political comments that are made here, how it affects
the military operation and the morale of the terrorists and the in-
surgents over in Iraq.
Recently, I think Senator Kennedy even said that ‘‘Iraq is George
Bush’s Vietnam.’’ Two days later, al-Sadr declared that, ‘‘Iraq will
be another Vietnam for America and its occupiers.’’ Iran’s Islamic
Revolution Guard Corps Press Office warned ‘‘A fate more horrify-
ing than Vietnam awaits America in the morass of Iraq.’’
With those kinds of statements following the statements made in
the United States, I believe in free speech as strongly as anybody,
but I also believe that there is responsibility with free speech, espe-
cially when we are in critical times.
How does that affect what is going in with our military and the
whole military strategy in Iraq?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Ensign, I guess the way I would
answer—and I am actually glad I have an opportunity to comment
on a couple things Senator Dayton said—we simply cannot allow
the enemy to deny us the right to hold free debate. Our men and
women out there in the front lines are fighting so that we can have
a free country and a country where we debate freely, and I think
everybody in that debate has to think about what their proper role
is.
But what I have said, I said it clearly in my testimony, I applaud
what Senator Lieberman said. I think it is very important that we
do what we can to send a message to the enemy that, do not con-
fuse American debate for American weakness. I think that is criti-
cal.
Senator Dayton, the reason I talked about the nature of the Sad-
dam Hussein regime is because that is still the enemy. We are still
fighting them. They are still threatening Iraqis in a way that is
part of our challenge. It is not getting into old debates.
As far as I know, everyone was working off the same intelligence.
I think it was Senator Rockefeller actually who characterized the
threat as imminent, which is not a characterization I would have
used. I do not think anyone is, to use your words, lying or delib-
erately misrepresenting. I think we are trying our best. Sometimes
we do it publicly and sometimes we do it in classified sessions. I
think on virtually a weekly basis we have had classified briefings
to this committee or to the full Senate on the nature of the oper-
ations in Iraq.
There is no question that part of the battle there is an informa-
tion warfare battle. When those people took those four American
bodies and burned them and strung them up, they had Somalia on
their minds, I am sure. They probably told each other, ‘‘This is
Mogadishu all over again.’’
But I think we are winning, as that letter from Zarqawi makes
clear. We are not leaving. He knows we are not leaving. It is suffo-
cation for him. Some of what we are seeing—I do not mean to di-
minish it. We are all very concerned about the level of sophistica-
tion of the Fallujah-based attacks.
Let me—Senator Dayton, if you think we have not been talking
about the character of the military operation, let me just say I
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think we have been. We are trying to say Sadr is a very different
kind of problem, both militarily and politically. He is a marginal
figure with not very capable forces. In the Sunni heartland we are
dealing with a different problem where politically we are not com-
fortable with our position vis a vis the Sunnis and where militarily
we are now facing an enemy that at least stands and fights in
squad and occasionally company-sized units.
But I think that the end result of this action is going to be to
set them back further.
Senator ENSIGN. Mr. Secretary, if I just may interrupt very
quickly because I do not have a lot of time. I want to get to another
question.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Sorry.
Senator ENSIGN. I appreciate the free debate that we have in this
society and I think it is very important that we have that free de-
bate. I just think that it needs to be emphasized that there is re-
sponsibility with that debate. Part of that, as you said, is that
when we are debating to emphasize once again that that does not
mean that we are going to back down from what is going on.
We do not want to have what happened in Spain, where terrorist
attacks decide what happens internally within the United States.
We are free and independent. We debate, but when we go overseas
we are united in our purpose to defeat terrorism.
Now, a question on the oil——
Chairman WARNER. Senator, we have to make it pretty brief.
Senator ENSIGN. Okay, this is going to be a very brief question
and maybe I can get it in writing. Two quick questions and I will
take the responses back in writing.
One is on the Oil for Food program that we had and the corrup-
tion involved with the Oil for Food program. It has to do with coun-
tries that were involved at the U.N. Security Council level with the
Oil for Food program and the corruption that was involved. Could
we have at any time, in your opinion, ever gotten their support?
I mean, there is this talk of more internationalizing the efforts in
Iraq. Could we have—was there any way to get their support?
The second question has to do with the drug problem that we
have going on in Afghanistan. I asked this, it was in a classified
session but it was not a classified question, I asked this last year
on the drug problem and the support of terrorism. Last year there
was not a lot of import put into this, and I thought at the time that
it was one of the biggest problems that we had in Afghanistan and
in other parts of the world, in supplying the money to the terror-
ists.
At that time, as a matter of fact, there was not a lot of import
put on the question. So I would like the response—whether it is in
a classified response I am not sure. But the bottom line is how
much money is from the drugs and also what is our strategy for
agressively dealing with that.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Can we reply for the record, but if I could
make a quick comment on this?
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
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The Department of Defense (DOD) is serious about addressing the narcotics prob-
lem in Afghanistan. The growing narcotics trade is endangering the U.S. and coali-
tion success in Afghanistan and corrupting the governmental institutions we are
trying to build. We are addressing the problem in two areas. First, we are working
with U.S. Central Command, the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and U.S.
Embassy Kabul to quickly review and improve our strategy. Counternarcotics is a
major piece of our overall strategy for Afghanistan. Second, we are participating in
an NSC-chaired interagency working group to improve the implementation of an in-
tegrated U.S. counternarcotics strategy. In both areas, we are working closely with
the U.K., which is the lead nation for the counternarcotics effort. DOD representa-
tives communicate with U.K. representatives on a daily basis in Afghanistan and
on a weekly basis here in Washington.
Secretary Rumsfeld was in Afghanistan on August 10 and his discussions with Af-
ghan, U.S. and U.K. representatives focused on the narcotics problem. Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics Mary Beth Long was in Afghani-
stan earlier developing the details of the problem with the Afghan Minister of Inte-
rior and his police chiefs; the U.S. Central Command staff in Qatar; the Com-
mander, Combined Force Commander-Afghanistan (CFC–A) and U.S. Embassy
Kabul.
But we are not just talking. Thanks to your support for the $73 million supple-
mental funds last year, DOD is:
• Assisting the Afghan National Police, Highway Police and Border Police
with personal and communications equipment and refurbishing 14 provin-
cial police stations.
• Providing tactical and narcotics related training and equipment to the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and Afghan Counternarcotics Police
to establish an urban interdiction force.
• Providing a mix of 4–6 refurbished and leased MI–17 helicopters to the
Afghan Minister of Interior for police interdiction operations.
• Developing an Afghan narcotics information fusion center for the police,
to include equipment and training.
• Refurbishing and constructing the Spin Boldak border crossing point on
the Afghan-Pakistan border, a major smuggling route.
• Developing an Afghan Minister of Interior public outreach program to
communicate a government message in support of counternarcotics activi-
ties.
U.S. forces have instructions to seize and destroy narcotics and related material
during the course of normal military operations, when the situation permits. U.S.
forces occasionally come across refined narcotics and take appropriate action, in ac-
cordance with guidance issued by the U.S. Central Command.
As we work with the U.K. to implement the above near-term initiatives, we will
also focus attention on the long-term approach. To that end, it would help if Con-
gress would reconsider the Department’s request to expand the coverage of the Fis-
cal Year 2005 Defense Appropriation Act authority to train and equip Afghan mili-
tary forces to include Afghan police forces, as well as the Army. Although we have
this authority in our counternarcotics program, that program does not have suffi-
cient funds to undertake a large security force training program.
Chairman WARNER. It is a very important question and I associ-
ate myself with that question.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Then go to Mr. Grossman on the second
one.
On the first one, just very quickly. I think the notion that—I can-
not predict what France might have done if we had waited 6
months or 12 months or 18 months. But the notion that we would
not lose anybody by waiting is wrong or at least not knowable. I
think if we had had this May 12 bombing in Riyadh not after the
liberation of Iraq and after we were able to tell the Saudis we were
going to finally take our Air Force out of Saudi Arabia after 12
years of bombing Iraq out of Saudi Arabia, we might have had very
different results.
We had some people who were with us in critical ways in that
war who could have been shaken by any number of events. So the
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notion that if we had simply waited we would have had more peo-
ple I think fails on both counts.
Ambassador Grossman might say something on the counter-
narcotics.
Mr. GROSSMAN. If I might just very quickly, first of all I would
be glad to try to answer the question in specifics on the numbers
because I think it is very important. But I think you make an ex-
tremely important point, Senator, which is that drugs fuel terror-
ism. I have testified in this committee on a number of times about
what we are doing in Colombia. Two years ago we started to call
people what they are, which is narcoterrorists. There is not a sepa-
ration there. Around the world, as you say, particularly in Colom-
bia, but I think in Afghanistan, we will find there is this connec-
tion. I would be glad to answer the question, but it is something
we take very seriously. They are narcoterrorists and we ought to
call them that.
Senator ENSIGN. Just real quickly, Mr. Chairman, the reason I
brought that up as a question is because my question last year is,
why are we not going all out with the military against, for in-
stance, in Afghanistan. We are more limited in what we can do in
Colombia, but we are not limited in what we can do in Afghanistan
on these poppy fields. Obviously we are limited in what we can do
in Pakistan. But once again, Afghanistan is someplace where we
have our military there to affect a great deal of the drug trade, and
I just did not see a huge effort going toward that.
Chairman WARNER. That question needs to be answered. Now, I
am going to have to ask you to do it for the record——
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We will do it for the record.
Chairman WARNER. —because we have colleagues here.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are increasing our effort, is the short
answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
Although the narcotics economy has plagued Afghanistan for nearly a century, it
grew significantly after Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and continued apace throughout
the 1990s, as provincial, warlord-dominated governance prevailed in a country with-
out. any strong, central governing authority. Since the fall of the Taliban, even
though general political and economic circumstances are stabilizing, impoverished
Afghans continue to produce and trade all forms of opiate products. The country’s
weak security environment and limited enforcement capabilities have also allowed
narcotics production and trade to continue. In 2003, Afghanistan produced three-
quarters of the world’s illicit opium, approaching historically high production levels.
We do not know to what extent al Qaeda profits from the drug trade in Afghani-
stan. We have anecdotal reports of drug trafficking by elements aligned with al
Qaeda, but there is no evidence that such activities are centrally directed. We re-
main concerned, however, about the possibility that substantial drug profits might
flow to al Qaeda and continue to be vigilant. for signs that this is occurring.
The involvement of anti-government Afghan extremists in the drug trade is clear-
er. In 2002, U.S. troops raided a heroin lab in Nangarhar Province linked to the
Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin and officials from the United Nations and the Government
of Afghanistan (GOA) report that the Taliban earn money from the heroin trade.
Based on the information available, however, we can neither quantify how much
these groups earn from the drug trade nor can we determine what percentage of
their overall funding comes from drugs.
In addition, extremists and terrorists in Afghanistan may sometimes turn to the
same network of professional smugglers used by drug traffickers to move personnel,
material, and money.
Along with the international community, we have been working closely with
President Hamid Karzai and the GOA to create permanent interdiction institutions
and strengthen criminal law enforcement. President Karzai has declared a ‘‘jihad’’
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99
against the narcotics economy—focused on growers, refiners, and traffickers—stat-
ing that ‘‘Narcotics is one of the things which threatens our dignity, our economy,
our agriculture. It threatens our government and our roots—and it is against our
religion. . . This is a widespread jihad which covers the entire country.’’ Our recent
successes include a tripartite counternarcotics campaign that integrates law enforce-
ment, poppy eradication, and alternative economic development as a substitute for
drug cultivation. We are also working with the GOA to establish a national eradi-
cation force that effectively targets the drug industry and its links with extremist
groups.
Chairman WARNER. I cannot overemphasize the importance of
that question, because I asked it when I was in Afghanistan just
weeks ago.
Senator Akaka.
Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Secretary Wolfowitz—and General Myers, if you would add to
this question—I would like to ask some questions about our forces,
our force requirements and force deployment tempos. One of the
things that DOD has been looking at for the last few years is
whether we can reduce the burden on our forces by decreasing our
participation in some longstanding operations. Obviously, our ac-
tions in Iraq have really eliminated the need for Operations South-
ern and Northern Watch, and we have drawn down on our partici-
pation in the Balkans.
My question is are there other longstanding operations that we
are looking to cut back on? If so, which are they?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Akaka, we are looking carefully
at our entire global footprint, as we call it, to make sure that, par-
ticularly given the stresses on our forces and what it costs to de-
ploy them, that we do not just mechanically proceed with the force
posture that we inherited at the end of the Cold War.
I remember when I was in the Pentagon the last time, leaving
in 1993, that we had 100,000 troops in Europe and 100,000 in the
Asia-Pacific region and it seemed like that was a reasonable posi-
tion to start from post-Cold War, but that I thought over the next
10 years we would probably reduce some, especially in Europe. To
the contrary, we found our troop levels in Europe going up.
Some of that does not make sense. I think it can be adjusted. The
world has changed enormously. At the same time, we have no in-
tention of abandoning our fundamental commitments.
I give you one more example. Korea is a case where, one of the
most important security commitments that we have, to the security
of South Korea. At the same time, we have looked very closely. We
are convinced that we can do what we need to do in many ways,
redeploying our forces, investing more in them so they are more ca-
pable, and ultimately making some adjustments in the numbers.
So the commitment remains, but how you fulfil the commitment
changes depending on the threat and the circumstances and what
your forces can do.
General MYERS. Senator Akaka, I would only add to that that,
besides the Balkans and the areas that Secretary Wolfowitz men-
tioned, one of the reasons we are such an effective Armed Forces
is that we exercise very rigorously, and that is one of the areas
that we have actually cut back on during these times because of
the tempo on our forces.
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Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Could I? Remembering that you are from
the State of Hawaii, I think it is an opportunity to stress, my own
view is that one area of the world where there is a lot that can go
wrong if the United States disengages is this huge vast area, the
Asia-Pacific region, where we have some of the most rapidly grow-
ing, biggest, potentially most powerful countries in the world.
I think as we adjust our footprint, I just really want to make it
clear, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, we are very mindful
of the fact that American engagement in that region is a key ele-
ment of stability and we do not intend to abandon it.
Senator AKAKA. General Myers, General Pace last week said that
he has evaluated force requirements for continued operations in
Iraq for years out into the future and that we can maintain
planned force levels, and I quote him, ‘‘for as long as we need to.’’
I am reassured by his comments, of course, but have a few follow-
up questions about our ongoing commitments.
One of the questions: How long do you expect that we will con-
tinue to need a force of 135,000 in Iraq?
General MYERS. That is—I am sorry.
Senator AKAKA. I know that your position is that we can sustain
this force level indefinitely, but I am wondering about what this
does to the deployment tempo of our forces, both active and Re-
serve. Can you tell us how often a given active or Reserve member,
say an infantryman for example, would expect to be deployed ver-
sus how long they would be at home under various scenarios? Like-
wise, besides the infantryman, a helicopter pilot or a logistician?
Another question is what do you expect the Reserve component
participation to be in Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and 4 if we con-
tinue at the current level, force levels?
My last question is, what expectations do you have about force
requirements in Afghanistan?
General MYERS. Thank you, Senator Akaka. We talked about
Senator Dayton’s question about how long we predicted, that we
planned for. As you said, we cannot determine exactly what the re-
quirements are going to be. They will be driven by events on the
ground. Lots of factors to go into that. We listen to General Abizaid
and General Sanchez currently on their predictions.
For planning purposes, like most reasonable people I think, we
tend to be very, very conservative in our estimates. We are not—
we do not put a very optimistic face on it. We say, okay, if we are
needed what is the maximum number of forces that might be re-
quired. Then we try to source for that. That is the process we are
in right now.
To your question about how often, for active duty we hope that
those forces that are deployed will have at least a year back home
before we would have to use them again. That is for active duty.
For Reserves, we call them up for a maximum of 2 years. Most
Reserve Forces—some will serve 2 years, as we talked about with
Senator Collins, or even over that in a fairly short period of time.
But for the most part, the majority of our forces, Reserve Forces,
will serve up to 2 years. They will not all serve 2 years. Some will
be released earlier. It depends on how long it takes to mobilize
them and demobilize them, and that is almost unit-specific and
mission-specific to that unit.
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Again, we would hope they would be mobilized for 2 years and
then our rule of thumb is—and it is just a rule of thumb—is that
we would not mobilize them except once out of every 6 years, would
be our approximate estimate.
The force requirements in Afghanistan. Again, the situation in
Afghanistan I think is actually pretty good. We have a major
NATO commitment in there. NATO wants to expand its role in Af-
ghanistan. Good coalition partners. We have about 13,000 U.S.
forces there right now. We bumped them up just recently because
of the upcoming elections and the fact that this is the time of year
when we generally see an increase in incidents by the Taliban or
former al Qaeda and we have to be ready to thwart that.
We have actually changed our tactics in Afghanistan. We are
very active in those areas in south and southeast Afghanistan.
Every day of the week basically we have soldiers out there hump-
ing their packs and walking the ground to make sure that that
threat is subdued and does not emerge.
Now, everything I have said are rules of thumb. There is nothing
in concrete about any of those, because the overriding issue is, just
for the same reason that we extended forces in Afghanistan—or in
Iraq here recently, was that the mission will dictate what we have
to do. We have to keep coming back to this, I think in my mind.
This is a very serious threat. It is a threat to our way of life and
the things that we stand for.
It is this generation of members of the Armed Forces that are
going to play a major role, not the only role certainly, but a major
role in combatting that threat. I will give you a couple of examples.
I was flying on a 130 to Mosul last Thursday night and the navi-
gator was a Reserve lieutenant colonel. He had been promoted to
colonel, but refused to put on the rank because if he did they would
send him home. He says: Nope, I want to serve.
When I got to Mosul, I am in the hospital in Mosul. Unfortu-
nately, there had been a mortar attack. Three individuals were in-
jured. I went in the hospital, I met a doctor. He is going to cele-
brate his 40th year in the Armed Forces here this month. He was
a brigadier general and they needed his skills in Iraq, but they
said: You cannot go as a brigadier general. He said: Okay, I will
take that rank off; what do you want to make me? They said: We
will make you a colonel. He is over there serving.
We will have our rules. We will try to provide predictability. We
are as aware and as concerned as anybody about taking care of this
force properly. They are working hard, but the threat, the threat
requires it.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator, General.
Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your responses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. That is very interesting.
Senator Bayh.
Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you. Your stamina has been exhibited here
today at great length and we appreciate that.
Let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by saying I agree with something
that our colleague Senator Lieberman said when he indicated that
we are all committed to success. The stakes on the up side are sig-
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102
nificant, the risks on the down side are significant. There is no sub-
stitute for success. I agree with what he had to say there.
Secretary Wolfowitz, I agreed with two things that you said in
your opening statement: first, your commendation of our military
men and women for their heroism and their idealism. I found the
letter of that young Marine you read to be quite moving.
Second, with regard to the—well, let me move on. I agreed with
what you said with regard to that. Oh, I know what it was. The
second thing, with regard to the historic magnitude of the malevo-
lence and the evil of the former regime in Iraq. I do not think that
there can be any serious debate about that. It is a good thing that
Saddam is gone.
Saying that, there are some growing concerns about the efficacy
of the political transition and whether some of the problems that
we may be experiencing there are imperiling all the good that we
hope to do for both the Iraqi people and the cause of freedom in
the world and ultimately for our own security.
So with that in mind, after 31⁄2 hours of listening, I have two
questions. First, how do we define, how do you define, sovereignty,
the sovereignty that we will be conveying to this new interim en-
tity, particularly when it does not come, as it cannot come under
current circumstances, with responsibility for security? Most impor-
tantly, how does the truncated sovereignty that we are transferring
create—and here is the point I want to emphasize—legitimacy in
the eyes of the Iraqi people? Because ultimately it is not sov-
ereignty that we hope to transfer, it is legitimacy that we hope to
create, because it is only legitimacy that will ultimately enlist the
Iraqi people in the cause of establishing their own freedom and
their own independence.
So I am somewhat concerned that we are elevating expectations
that may be somewhat disappointed, that could lead to disillusion-
ment and ultimately to opposition.
If I could just conclude by saying, with regard to my first ques-
tion, in some ways we may be trying to have it both ways. We are
saying we are transferring sovereignty. That is significant, that is
big. But at the same time we are saying, well now, we have to un-
derstand the real mission of this interim entity is really quite lim-
ited; it is to set the stage for elections, which are in fact interim
elections, held at the end of this year, and the real elections will
not be held for a year after that.
So how does this sovereignty that we are transferring lead to le-
gitimacy, which at the end of the day is critically important to our
success?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Bayh, if I could compliment you,
not only for your stamina, but for a terrific question. It does not
have a simple answer. I think there is a basic tension here, which
is you need to set people’s sights not at the ceiling, but above the
floor. I would go back to some comments I made too, that there are
a lot of countries in Eastern Europe now that are properly de-
scribed as democracies, but they still have a long way to go even
to get as far as we have gotten, and we are not perfect.
So when we use those words about Iraq, we use them with some
recognition of how challenging it will be. But at the same time, I
think we need to go in a step by step way that does not just stop
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at, well, anything, anything that is not the old regime is good
enough for us. I do not think that can be the standard.
Now, I will add one more problem to the questions that you put
on the table about this interim authority, and I have mentioned it
earlier. That is, in addition to the questions you asked, we have a
real challenge I think particularly with the Sunni Arabs, in getting
them convinced that they have a real role in the future of Iraq.
They have to understand that role is not the old role. If they think
that they ran Iraq—and I am not sure they really do; I think they
know Saddam Hussein ran Iraq. But if they think it is still winner
take all and they would like to be the winners and take all, that
is not the story. But it cannot be winner take all either that the
Shia, just because they are a majority, are going to run the govern-
ment in Baghdad and everyone else is going to have to do what
they say, the way they did in the old days.
I think a significant part of the answer to that comes out of our
own constitutional—constitution, our political process. That is to
say, more local control, more decentralization. It is a country that
has been centralized, unfortunately, for a lot longer than just Sad-
dam Hussein. The more people believe that they can run their own
affairs, I think the more they will accept the overall situation.
This government that will come in on July 1, part of its effect
is going to be based on its being purely temporary. It is not going
to be broadly legitimate and Iraqis are going to stand up and cheer
and say, this is my government. Hopefully we will get a little bit
of bounce from that. But most importantly—and they will run min-
istries, they will run the police force, in coordination with
CENTCOM because this is not a normal police situation.
But most importantly, they will be setting up elections. As you
remember, we were in this uncomfortable position for the United
States of having to argue last fall against elections because it was
not timely. Well, it is going to be timely. I mentioned in my testi-
mony we have seen some local elections in southern Iraq that ap-
parently worked.
Senator BAYH. Would you forgive me for interrupting.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Sure.
Senator BAYH. I do not mean to interrupt, but I do have the one
other question and I am about to run out of time.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Go ahead.
Senator BAYH. Basically, the legitimacy ultimately that we seek
will more than likely—we have a greater chance of achieving that
in either the interim elections or the ultimate elections than this
sort of interim——
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a step by step and it will grow over
time.
Senator BAYH. I am concerned that we may have elevated expec-
tations either within our own country or perhaps there, and dis-
appointment is not a helpful thing.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If you can help us calibrate expectations,
that is a good thing.
Senator BAYH. My second question is somewhat related, and it
has to do with the degree of popular support for our role and what
we are trying to do. I am interested in your concern about the po-
tential for Iraqi nationalism to at some point trump their gratitude
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for the liberation and their hopes for the future, because as long
as we are only fighting the remnants of a despised despot we will
ultimately win. As long as we are fighting outsiders who are there
and no friends of the Iraqi people, we will ultimately win. But if
at some point this morphs into, as I understand it did to the Brit-
ish in 1920 in some respect, a broader sense of Iraqi nationalism
and we are on the wrong side of that, then the task becomes much,
much more difficult.
So I am particularly—we heard the polls cited and those are ob-
viously important. So I am interested in your concern about that,
what if anything we can do to keep that from happening, and some
disconnect between the polls and what we read in the popular
press in our own country. I would just cite as one example the
Washington Post story of Sunday where it says:
‘‘The crisis has stirred support for the insurgents across both
Sunni and Shiite communities, has also inflamed tensions between
Arabs and Kurds. ‘The Fallujah problem and the Sadr problem are
having a wider impact than we expected,’ a senior U.S. official in-
volved in Iraq policy said. The effect has been profound. The insur-
gency appears to be generating’’—this is not a quote now, just from
the story. ‘‘The insurgency appears to be generating new alliances
and tensions among the major sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq.’’
Just two final things: ‘‘The crises have helped boost the standing
of more radical Shiite and Sunni political leaders.’’ Finally and per-
haps most disturbingly: ‘‘The extent of popular support for the re-
sistance is unclear. In nationwide surveys taken before the sieges
of Fallujah and Najaf, a growing percentage of Iraqis said that they
saw the U.S. forces as occupiers, not liberators.’’
I am concerned that at some point this may tragically morph into
the bad guys being aligned with Iraqi nationalism, and what can
we do to keep that from happening? Is it your sense that that is
in fact a real danger we are confronting, as at least this anecdotal
information or at least some of the reports in our press suggest
that it may be?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Even though I think some of that anec-
dotal information is overstated—and it is amazing how quickly peo-
ple 8,000 miles away will conclude after 2 days about some trend
in Iraq—nevertheless, that basic concern is very real. It has been
something that has concerned me, concerned General Abizaid, con-
cerned everybody who is dealing with this issue from day one.
What General Abizaid calls ‘‘consent,’’ which we had on a large
national scale on April 9 of last year, starts to slowly slip away.
How long you hang onto it, no one knows. But because you know
you do not hang onto it forever, it means it is very important to
accelerate the governance process. That is why I believe it was the
absolutely right thing to bring about this transfer of sovereignty.
If anything, I would have preferred to see it even earlier.
Second, it is why it is so important to do things like restoring
electricity. It is not only jobs for people but it is the sense that the
Americans really meant what they said, because the enemy propa-
ganda out there, just so you know, is: The Americans are going to
leave; we are coming back; they just came here to steal your oil and
be gone. If the electricity does not work, it sort of plays into that
conspiracy theory.
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There are two specific phenomena in the recent troubles that are
troubling and are referred to in those anecdotes. One is with re-
spect to the Sunni community, where we have troubles to begin
with. The impression created that we are creating wholesale civil-
ian casualties is terribly damaging, and the lies transmitted on Al-
Jazeera—and I use that word deliberately. It is not a matter of
how you balance the news or which things you choose to cover.
They absolutely make up stories about American use of cluster
bombs, American torture, absolutely fabricated out of whole cloth.
Those lies, combined with the unfortunate truth that there are
civilian casualties in a fight like this, is one of our challenges and
one of the reasons for working with the Governing Council in try-
ing to find a solution in Fallujah that at least minimizes the vio-
lence, even if we cannot avoid it completely, is critical to that com-
munity.
With the Shia, I think it is a different story. Whatever that allu-
sion was that the radicals are getting more traction, what I actu-
ally see is that we are seeing more and more evidence that most
Shia think this fellow Sadr, although his father was a hero and a
martyr and that is part of his standing, that he is a gangster. On
the other hand, they do not want us marching into the holy city
of Najaf with foreign troops to take him out.
So the restraint that we are showing I think in dealing with him
I think is paying dividends. It is an information warfare battle, as
the military says. It is two different fronts, very different fronts. I
would not want to say that we have won it, but I think if we are
careful we can come out of this ahead.
Senator BAYH. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, my final just brief comment, two sentences. This
is a very difficult situation. If the consent necessary to our being
successful is a diminishing asset and the legitimacy ultimately nec-
essary for keeping that consent from diminishing, but in fact in-
creasing, does not occur until next January, in fact a year from
next January, we need to avoid a tipping point at some place in
there to make sure that we are ultimately successful and the Iraqis
are, too.
Chairman WARNER. Senator, I would like to also say I associate
myself, and earlier in this hearing my first question was on this
question of sovereignty. The dictionary—this is the dictionary defi-
nition: ‘‘supreme and independent power or authority in a state.’’
I think we take note in this hearing of the concern in myself, the
Senator, and perhaps others. I think we should start using the
term ‘‘limited sovereignty’’ at this time, rather than kind of saying
we are transferring sovereignty. I really feel strongly we could be
raising expectations and problems in the future if we do not be
careful right now.
Senator Clinton.
Senator CLINTON. I agree with the chairman and Senator Bayh.
I think that this is a serious issue, because it is not only the possi-
bility that the definition will take on a life of its own, causing all
kinds of unintended consequences, but that in fact the earlier ques-
tions that the chairman raised about the rules of engagement for
our military and the authority that they have following this period
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of sovereignty, however one defines it, I think are going to be very
sticky.
Then you throw into the mix all these private contractors run-
ning around, heavily armed, I think it becomes even more of a
challenge. So I believe, Mr. Secretary, you have gotten, at least
from some of us, a concern about what this means, how it is going
to be operationalized.
I just have, one suggestion would be to look for some tangible
way to demonstrate the benefits that flow from this interim period
to individual Iraqis. You said in passing that one of the concerns
we have to address is the efforts to undermine our legitimacy and
our role in Iraq by not only making up stories about actions that
never occurred under our military control, but also this whole idea
we are there to steal the oil.
When I was in Iraq, I spoke with Ambassador Bremer. I have
raised this in other settings. I really urge the administration to
look at ways that we could demonstrate clearly that the results
from increased production of oil in Iraq are going to benefit individ-
ual Iraqis. I am not an expert on this, but back in the days when
we opened the North Slope of Alaska for oil exploration the State
of Alaska, in conjunction with I think the Federal Government, cre-
ated a trust fund for the Alaskans. Literally checks were sent out
to Alaskans, saying: This is your land; it is being exploited; this oil
is going all over the world; but you are given a stake in this future.
When I raised this with Ambassador Bremer, I said: Trust is in
short supply. As we know, consent and trust are essential ingredi-
ents for success in this undertaking. We need to do something and
we need to be in the process of doing it before sovereignty, however
it is defined, takes over and all kinds of deals are cut, because I
am deeply concerned about those in the Governing Council and
those who might be on any expanded transitional entity, who seem
to be making out quite well, and that will further undermine legit-
imacy.
So I raise it again. I hope that something, if not that, can be
looked at as a means of demonstrating both our commitment to the
Iraqi people in a tangible financial way and also removing some of
the sting of this idea that we are there to steal the oil.
General Myers, as you may recall, during several hearings before
this committee I raised the subject of medical tracking and surveil-
lance of our troops. Both on February 13 and on February 25, 2003,
I asked what efforts were being taken regarding medical tracking
and surveillance and follow-up care. I also requested and received
a briefing from the DOD on the proposed medical tracking plan for
troops being deployed to Iraq.
I came at this issue in large measure because of my concerns
about the problems that many of our veterans had after the First
Gulf War when they returned home and had a syndrome of
undiagnosed illnesses which at first were, frankly, dismissed,
chalked up to all kinds of personal stress-related issues, and then
only gradually taken seriously, and then finally we were able to se-
cure veterans benefits for a lot of those troops.
Now, I raise this today because of the troubling treatment of
members of the 442nd Army National Guard MP unit out of
Orangeberg, New York. My staff and I have met with members of
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this unit and they have a very disturbing story to tell. Specifically,
12 of them were med-evaced out of Iraq for various injuries—frac-
tured feet, problems with HMMWVs rolling over, all kinds of ac-
tion-related injuries. But they were also suffering similar symp-
toms to those that we heard out of the First Gulf War: dizziness,
headaches, sleeplessness, cramps, blood in their urine, blood in
their stool.
Yet when they went to the Army to ask for testing, they were
given the run-around. They became concerned about possible expo-
sure to radiation because of information they were given by Dutch
personnel who were stationed near them during their time in Iraq.
Based on some tests that the Dutch medical personnel did of the
place they were assigned to be, including using radioactive detec-
tors and other devices to test the environmental exposure, the
Dutch said they were leaving, they would not stay there, and they
moved their troops to another location.
Several of the members of the 442nd who were medics were in
ongoing discussions with the Dutch, who were telling them: You
should move, too; there is all kinds of problems here. There were
bombed-out Bradley fighting vehicles and other equipment that
had been dragged and dumped there after the military actions and
other kinds of issues that, at least in the minds of the Dutch, as
it has been reported to us, caused them to act.
So when these men returned home and kept trying to get some-
body to talk to them and were not given much of an answer, they
went to a New York newspaper. They went to the New York Daily
News with their concerns, and that newspaper paid for testing and
their blood was tested, being sent to Germany, which had some ad-
vanced equipment.
The results came back saying that several of them had elevated
levels of radiation exposure, and they attributed it to exposure to
depleted uranium. Whether or not that is the causation I am not
here to suggest. But my bottom line is that I think our troops de-
serve better.
I have already requested another briefing on medical tracking,
especially with respect to radiation exposure, which we hope to
schedule soon. But I think this raises a red flag for me, because
I had hoped that we would not make the mistakes we made before.
I now, on further investigation, have learned that we have hun-
dreds of troops sitting at Fort Dix who have ongoing medical com-
plaints and ailments, and they are basically being given two
choices: sit there—some have been sitting there for months, Mr.
Chairman—sit there and wait to be given an appointment at Wal-
ter Reed or an appointment at someplace else; or go ahead and sign
this document and leave the military and do not worry about it.
Some leave. But others are saying: Wait a minute; I want to find
out what is wrong with me; I am not going to leave; I want treat-
ment.
So, General, again I would ask that you take whatever action is
necessary—and Mr. Secretary as well on the civilian side—to en-
sure that, first, these members of the 442nd get whatever going is
appropriate and necessary; that we take a hard look at these radi-
ation exposure numbers back; that we use the more advanced test-
ing techniques that are available in Germany and Japan, but
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which our military are not currently using. The tests that we are
using for exposure to uranium or radiation is not as specific as the
tests that are being done in Europe and Japan, and that we try to
make sure that the plans for medical surveillance, tracking, and
treatment that I was told about are actually implemented.
Specifically, I would appreciate a report about what is happening
at Fort Dix. I do not know, but I am concerned by the story. We
heard a lot of anecdotes today about how great everybody is feeling
about their mission, and I am glad to hear those anecdotes. But I
am increasingly hearing a lot of anecdotes about how poorly people
are being treated when they return home.
So, General, I would like a very specific report as soon as pos-
sible on the 442nd, on conditions at Fort Dix, what the Army and
the rest of the services intend to do about radiation exposure, other
kinds of environmental problems that may be contributing to some
of these symptoms.
General MYERS. Thank you, Senator Clinton, and you are abso-
lutely right. We have to do a first class job of taking care of our
troops. We will look into the Fort Dix situation. I have not—I do
not believe I have seen those reports, but we will look into that.
That is very important.
In terms of the 442nd, my understanding is we have tested some
of their members through urine samples, which is the way I guess
you detect things like the depleted uranium and so forth. We have
not found anything. I will look at the differences between European
testing, Japanese testing, and our testing.
But you are right, we need to monitor and make sure we do not
overlook things that could cause them problems later on. That is
a very important part of our responsibility. So I will get you those
two reports.
Senator CLINTON. I would look forward to that and a continuing
effort to keep me informed about what we are doing on this medi-
cal testing and surveillance. I do not want to go through what we
went through after the First Gulf War.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I could, I appreciated Secretary
Wolfowitz’s response to Senator Cornyn about the many tactics
that we should employ with respect to the war on terrorism. I espe-
cially appreciated what you said about education. I spoke this
morning to the Council on Foreign Relations and urged that we
place universal education on a much higher priority than we have
heretofore. I will be introducing legislation to try to better position
our own country to do just what needs to be done with respect to
education.
I share your concern about the madrassas. I spoke with Presi-
dent Musharraf when I was in Islamabad, and I feel strongly that
we need a system that can leverage public support and private sup-
port. I also obviously am concerned about investing in girls’ edu-
cation because it is still the smartest, best investment with respect
to promoting democracy and stability, and girls still face enormous
obstacles.
So I would welcome the support of the administration in my Edu-
cation for All legislation. I would welcome the support of members
of this committee on both sides of the aisle. Even if we could not
be immediately successful this year, it would send the kind of
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statement that, frankly, I think we are in some need of sending to
the rest of the world, that we are not only pursuing military action,
not only recognizing the need for intelligence and law enforcement,
but that education and health are critical components in our lead-
ership in the war against terrorism and on behalf of freedom.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Clinton, I agree with you. I think
women are one of the most important forces for progress and mod-
eration in the Muslim world, for fairly obvious reasons. Actually,
in Iraq they are a substantial majority because of the unfortunate
killing that took place over the last couple of decades. They are
critical allies.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Clinton, I would like very much to
work with you on that issue of education. I share that. I will bring
to your attention some interesting research I have done on the sub-
ject.
Secretary Grossman, would you like to respond? Please do so.
Mr. GROSSMAN. I do not want to hold up the show here. But I
hope that you might also take for the record some information I
would like to provide to Senator Clinton on what is going on with
women and girls, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
[The information referred to follows:]
AFGHANISTAN
Since overthrowing the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States has im-
plemented more than 175 projects for Afghan women aimed at increasing political
participation, building civil society, creating economic opportunities, and increasing
access to education and health care.
Nearly 4 million Afghan children are enrolled in school. About 37 percent of those
enrolled are girls, many more than at any point in Afghanistan’s history. Since
2001, the United States has dedicated $60.5 million for primary education, to con-
struct schools, to train teachers, and to provide books and supplies. Nine public li-
braries in eight provinces are participating in a campaign for women’s literacy.
The United States has allocated $2.5 million for the construction of Women’s Re-
source Centers in 14 provinces throughout Afghanistan, and is building three other
provincial centers. In Kabul and nearby towns, the United States supports the es-
tablishment of 10 neighborhood-based Women’s Centers. These centers will provide
educational and health programs, job skills training, and political participation
training to women. Through the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council, the United States
is providing $1 million in educational training at the Centers.
In addition, the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Af-
fairs, on behalf of the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council, will be awarding grants to U.S.
public and private non-profit organizations which responded to a recent Request For
Proposals to support a series of exchanges and training programs promoting wom-
en’s political, educational, and economic development in Afghanistan. These pro-
grams will be carried out in partnership with provincial Women’s Resource Centers
in Afghanistan.
On electoral assistance, the United States is providing $15 million for voter reg-
istration, and $8.86 million for elections in Afghanistan, including civic and voter
education, focus group research, training for political parties, and civic activists. The
United States also provided training in political advocacy for female delegates to the
Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003.
As media and journalism training is also important in building a strong civil soci-
ety, the United States has provided more than $500,000 to train female journalists
and filmmakers, some of whom produced ‘‘Afghanistan Unveiled,’’ a film documen-
tary about abuses against women by the Taliban.
We have financed healthcare programs in Afghanistan totaling more than $58
million, with $50 million forthcoming over the next 2 years. These programs include:
construction of women’s wings in hospitals and dormitories for female medical stu-
dents; curriculum development for healthcare workers; and maternal and child
health, family planning, and nutrition. The United States has rebuilt 140 health
clinics and facilities, and will rebuild 400 more over the next 3 years. We have pro-
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vided basic health services to more than 2.5 million people in 21 provinces; 90 per-
cent of the recipients are women and children.
IRAQ
In Iraq, the United States has strongly supported Iraqi women’s participation in
the political, economic, and social reconstruction of their country. As in Afghanistan,
our efforts are guided by the Iraqi women themselves. The United States has dedi-
cated $27 million to projects that specifically help women and children.
In March, Secretary Powell announced two new initiatives aimed at helping
women in Iraq: a $10 million Women’s Democracy Initiative and the U.S.-Iraq Wom-
en’s Network. The Democracy Initiative will extend grants to non-governmental or-
ganizations to help Iraqi women acquire skills and develop practices for effective
participation in public life. Grants will include projects on democracy education,
leadership, political and entrepreneurship training, indigenous NGO coalition-build-
ing, and media initiatives. The Network is a voluntary public-private partnership
to forge links between U.S. and Iraqi women’s organizations.
The U.S. Agency for International Development’s civil society program for Iraq
supports organizations that promote women’s political participation, legal enforce-
ment of women’s rights, and equal access to public services. The program seeks to
increase the ability of civil society organizations to educate both women and men
and advocate effectively for women’s legal, economic, and political rights.
The United States also supports the rehabilitation and equipping of 11 regional
Women’s Centers throughout Iraq. These centers offer education, literacy classes,
job skills, education and training for financial independence, and access to informa-
tion regarding health care, legal services, and women’s human rights.
We are also working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and Members of
Congress, in cooperation with the House Iraqi Women’s Caucus and Members of the
Senate, on plans for an Iraqi women’s training program in Washington, DC. The
program would feature sessions on public service and advocacy, including how to be
a public servant and how to run for office.
As of December 2003, the United States has committed $86.8 million on school
projects. Emphasis is placed on ensuring equal benefits for Iraqi women and girls.
The Accelerated Learning Program, a pilot program established in five Iraqi cities
to provide out-of-school children a second chance for education, has increased reg-
istration among schoolage children—especially girls. Regarding higher learning,
Iraqis are participating in the Fulbright Program for the first time in 14 years. The
first group of 19 men and 6 women included representatives from all major ethnic
and religious communities in Iraq.
After years of neglect under Saddam Hussein, Iraq is beginning to modernize its
health services. Women’s opportunities in the health professions and maternal and
child-care receive particular attention. Through a master training program, more
than 2,000 primary healthcare providers are being trained to treat and prevent a
range of medical conditions. A review of the training program has shown that doc-
tors’ skills have improved significantly, especially in women’s healthcare. A grant
to the Iraqi Nursing Association will facilitate the recruitment and training of hun-
dreds more female nurses and will fund purchases of new uniforms and nurses’ kits.
The United States has contributed to a $2 million program to address emergency
health needs, including the completion of 18 primary health centers and the train-
ing of more than 97 midwives and 247 health promoters in Najaf and Karbala.
Mr. GROSSMAN. I was not quick enough after Senator Sessions
spoke and General Myers responded, to just thank General Myers
for noting the role of the State Department in the creation of the
Iraqi police force. I just wanted to let Senator Sessions know that
we are committed to this, that we are committed to support that
mission, that our training people in Jordan, training we are doing
in Iraq, the money that Congress has given us, is something we
want to absolutely support, and that is part of our mission as well
and I wanted you to know that.
Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you.
I say to my witnesses, do you feel there is any issue that we have
covered today—and we have covered a great many issues in what
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I think is an excellent hearing—that you felt that you needed an-
other minute to address any particular point?
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think one thing I would like to do for
Senator Levin is get back to him as quickly as I can, first on his
request for information that he said he had been looking for for
months; and what I was trying to reconstruct from memory about
those briefings, because I want to confirm that my memory is accu-
rate.
Chairman WARNER. I think you made that clear.
Senator Levin wanted to take a minute or 2 on the record here.
Senator LEVIN. On that issue, I appreciate your looking into the
delay in obtaining documents that were promised long ago from
Mr. Feith. I will put into the record now the letter which he wrote
to me, which is now 2 months old, promising those documents and
promising them on a rolling basis as they were collected, so that
he did not have to collect them all before he sent them, but as they
were collected he committed to send to me, through the chairman
as a matter of fact and to all the members of the committee
through the chairman, these documents that have not been forth-
coming. So I would like that to be made a part of the record, and
I appreciate your follow-up on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator LEVIN. Second, just one comment. You made reference in
terms of the briefings that were provided to the Office of the Vice
President and the staff of the NSC and the difference between that
briefing and the one that you received or the one that the CIA re-
ceived. There were significant differences. It is not just one chart,
and I think that you should want to clear up the record on that
matter.
There were many charts that were added for the National Secu-
rity Council staff and for the White House. There were perhaps 40
differences between, in the briefings. It was not just one chart—the
one that was highly critical of the CIA—but many charts, including
a key chart on any alleged relationship with Mohammed Atta and
the Iraqi police at a meeting that was referred to as possibly taking
place in Prague, but which the CIA is highly dubious about.
But there was a chart on that issue, according to published
sources. I have to rely on published sources, but I have also seen
the charts, on that issue.
So your statement about trying to minimize the difference is in-
accurate. I would appreciate your comparing those briefings and
just confirming for the record that there were significant dif-
ferences or numerous differences between those two briefings, not
just the one chart.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator LEVIN. You said that it is common for there to be con-
versations between staffs, discussions between staffs, as though
this kind of a 20- to 30-slide briefing on intelligence matters by the
DOD is something which was common. I would ask you for the
record if you know of any similar intelligence briefing by a group
inside the DOD with the Office of the Vice President or the staff
of the NSC on intelligence matters?
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This was a very structured, perhaps 30-slide briefing, handled by
the Feith office without the knowledge of the CIA, and to kind of
just casually way, well, these discussions take place commonly, is
to cast this as an occurrence which is not unusual. If this was a
usual occurrence, I would like to know if there is any other exam-
ple you can provide us for the record of formal, structured, intel-
ligence presentation to the Office of the Vice President, the Na-
tional Security staff, by the Defense Department outside of the CIA
channels. This was a presentation about CIA intelligence to those
two very high-level offices.
If you could present that evidence, if you have any, for the record
that would be appreciated.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator LEVIN. Finally, if you would tell us for the record wheth-
er you were aware of the classified letter from Under Secretary
Feith to the Senate Intelligence Committee dated October 27, 2003,
providing answers to questions for the record, that was then re-
portedly leaked to The Weekly Standard. That was a very major
leak and a very major document allegedly, because of what the
Vice President said to the press on January 9, 2004, when he said
that that Top Secret-Codeword document allegedly reported by The
Rocky Mountain News was ‘‘your best source of information,’’ to use
the Vice President’s words, on the relationship between Iraq and
al Qaeda.
For the record, if you would tell us whether you were aware then
of that classified letter from Mr. Feith to the Senate Intelligence
Committee.
That will take care of my questions for the record, Mr. Chair-
man.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman WARNER. My quick round-up. I want to direct my
thoughts to Secretary Grossman, and I appreciate your joining us
today. This chart that has been displayed here, could you tell us
the extent to which the United Nations was involved in formulat-
ing that, whether the Secretary General has—understandably, Dr.
Brahimi has indicated this is basically his format. Has the Sec-
retary General, so to speak, associated himself with the accuracy
of this; and the extent to which the Security Council has reviewed
this chart and, so to speak, gives their blessing to it?
Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, Senator, the chart of course comes from the
TAL, which was designed by the Iraqi Council. So no, that was not
something that the U.N. was involved in.
Chairman WARNER. No, but it was adopted I think by the Iraqi
Council.
Mr. GROSSMAN. By the Iraqi Council, that is correct. That is their
job. We were there, we obviously participated in that. But that is
their document and a good document.
The TAL then laid out this process. Then what you had after the
TAL was the Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA write to the
Secretary General of the United Nations and say: We need help, we
need help here in putting together the interim government, and we
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also need some help and some advice on whether it is possible to
have elections, as the TAL originally talked about.
Brahimi has been there, Ambassador Brahimi has been there a
couple of times——
Chairman WARNER. Speak into your mike directly. We are losing
some of your voice.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Ambassador Brahimi has been there a couple of
times and will go back the beginning of May. As I said, Ms. Pirelli
has been there to help on the election side. So I think it would be
fair to say—they would have to speak for themselves—that every-
body has essentially adopted this time line.
We will have to wait and see. When Ambassador Brahimi reports
to Kofi Annan, he will come out and say: Yes, I accept this——
Chairman WARNER. That is important.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Absolutely.
Chairman WARNER. That bridge has not been crossed yet.
Mr. GROSSMAN. No, sir.
Chairman WARNER. The Secretary General is reviewing this?
Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. Ambassador Brahimi—just a technical-
ity—went to Italy after he was in Iraq, and he will be on his way
to New York to make a report to the Secretary General.
Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Actually, Brahimi did help to negotiate
the TAL specifically on the point that the interim government does
not have to be elected. As you recall, that was the big point of dis-
pute between the Governing Council and Sistani.
Chairman WARNER. That I understood.
Now, the Security Council, the extent to which they have given
any views with regard to this?
Mr. GROSSMAN. They have not given views in regards to this yet,
no.
Chairman WARNER. So the use of this chart today is I think
much clearer now in my view, and I want to make that distinction
for the record.
Lastly, Secretary Grossman, this issue which a number of us
raised about the use of the word ‘‘sovereignty.’’ I think I am not
mistaken. I followed the President’s press conference the other day
very carefully. I believe he used the word ‘‘sovereignty’’ without any
qualifications. Do you have some concern that expectations could be
raised unduly if we do not start using phraseology which indicates
very clearly that limited sovereignty at this time, or something?
Because I do not find that what we are doing is consistent with the
dictionary definition, nor with the common acceptance of the term
‘‘sovereignty’’ in international law.
Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, you asked us to take seriously what this
committee has said today and we certainly will. But I think what
Paul said earlier in response to a question is right, which is to say
that there is limited sovereignty in Iraq certainly on the 1st of
July, and it is limited by the——
Chairman WARNER. It is limited.
Senator LEVIN. Limited by what?
Mr. GROSSMAN. By the TAL and also by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1511. It seems to me—my opinion about this is Iraqis,
near as I can tell, have a vision for where they would like to take
their society, and they realize they cannot get to that vision with-
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117
out security, and they cannot get to security without the support
of the coalition.
Chairman WARNER. I concur in that totally. I just think that in
the use of the term on what is happening on the 30th we would
be wise to employ some equivocation, or maybe not equivocation
but some limitation on what the sovereignty is.
Mr. GROSSMAN. I take your point.
Chairman WARNER. Fine. Thank you.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, just on that point, on whether the
TAL binds a sovereign government, are you saying that the agree-
ment that was arrived at without a sovereign Iraqi government
being involved is binding on a sovereign, limited or otherwise, Iraqi
government?
Mr. GROSSMAN. We certainly believe that it is binding on the
government that will take over on the 1st of July.
Senator LEVIN. Can you give us the legal opinion on that? I think
it is very important, these questions about—because it affects our
status of forces, among other things; also the Iraqi group, the Sur-
vey Group, but a lot of other things. Could you give us the legal
opinions on this issue that a number of us have raised, as to
whether or not a sovereign government in Iraq is bound by the
TAL, is bound by—and whether the U.N. resolution relative to the
force that is there protects our force after July 1, 2003, to take
whatever military action we determine is appropriate despite what
the wishes could be of a sovereign government?
[The information referred to follows, along with a response from
the DOD:]
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The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL)
is the supreme law of Iraq. The Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), the first phase of
the transitional period, will have the power with respect to: making appointment
of persons within the government; the use of the Iraqi Armed Forcs; and, concluding
international agreements in the areas of diplomatic relations and economic recon-
struction, including Iraq’s sovereign debt. However, it will not be able to amend the
TAL. The annex to the TAL also states that the IIG, as an interim government, will
refrain from taking any actions affecting Iraq’s destiny beyond the limited interim
period. After elections are held and the Iraqi Transitional Government, the second
phase of the transitional period, is in place, Article 3 of the TAL provides that ‘‘[n]o
amendment of the TAL may be made except by the three-fourths majority of the
members of the National Assembly and the unanimous approval of the Presidency
Council.’’
Chairman WARNER. Those are the points that we have raised.
I think we need to get the legal opinions that support this. For
myself, I hope it is true, by the way, so I am not questioning
whether or not, the sufficiency of the wisdom. But we have to be
comfortable that our forces in fact have that kind of power and are
not going to be restricted by a sovereign government. Otherwise
they are going to be in limbo. There is going to be a period of great
uncertainty, which our troops should not be confronted with.
I would simply add, should there be some disagreement as to the
conduct of say an individual soldier or a military person, what re-
course could be taken against them, and how are we going to pro-
tect them in the performance of their duties.
While, General, you say quite appropriately the Iraqi army then
becomes a partner, I would hope that they would not be issuing
any orders. I am not sure what partnership means when it comes
to the military. I want to make certain that U.S. commanders and
to the extent the British commanders are associated in that chain
of command, and coalition commanders, that is the chain. When we
introduce the Iraqi army as a partner, I think we need clarification
of exactly what that would mean on the command chain.
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Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, we will get you that infor-
mation. I think it is very important to have clarity, and I appre-
ciate the opportunity.
I think it is also important to be clear, this is not something
brand new. I mean, we have a similar situation in Afghanistan.
The government, the sovereign government in Bosnia, has been
constrained by Dayton ever since it was established. I do not want
to make too much comparison. These are different situations. But
with our NATO allies and with Korea, there are obviously provi-
sions in wartime that transfer military command to U.S. command-
ers.
Chairman WARNER. I just want to make certain that those pro-
tections are in here, because you can use those as examples. In the
25 years I have been here, I have worked through almost all of
those situations. But here we have 100,000-plus Americans in-
volved and it is exceedingly important, and a level of insurrection
which is most regrettable at this point in time and no certainty
that is going to cease and desist on June 30.
Senator LEVIN. Would you include in that, please, what did the
President mean, then, when he said the other night that we would
be negotiating the status of forces agreement with the new sov-
ereign government on July 1? What did he mean by that? If we al-
ready have a status of forces agreement under U.N. resolution and
under the TAL, then what does that mean when he said that? If
you could include that, it would be helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]
Article 59 of the TAL provides that Iraq’s Transitional Government, which will
assume authority no later than January 31, 2005, following national elections, will
be authorized to conclude binding international agreements (which could include a
SOFA regarding the activities of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq under
UNSCR 1511 and any subsequent relevant resolutions.)
We are currently planning to defer consideration of a negotiated SOFA with Iraq
until the Transitional Government has been established. Pending entry into force
of any future security agreement, the TAL recognizes that UNSCR 1511 and any
subsequent relevant resolutions will govern the activities of the MNF in Iraq. Our
view is that the ‘‘all necessary measures’’ language in UNSCR 1511 authorizes im-
munities from Iraqi jurisdiction to the extent such immunities are necessary for the
fulfillment of the MNF’s mission.
Chairman WARNER. My own view is I hope a lot of this is rewrit-
ten carefully not to rely on the U.N. resolution of October 3, 2003,
that we really have a new resolution that will bring greater clarity
to this entire situation, the status of forces and what degree of sov-
ereignty Iraq will have on the June 30, 2004.
Thank you very much. We will now go upstairs to room 222. The
hearing is adjourned.
[Additional information follwows:]
Senator WARNER. Describe the role and powers of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
after June 30, 2004.
Mr. GROSSMAN. As Chief of Mission, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, John
Negroponte, will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and super-
vision of all USG employees in country—except those under the command of the
U.S. area military commander or seconded to an international organization. Work-
ing closely with the area military commander, the Ambassador will also be respon-
sible for the security of the mission as well as the personnel (or whom he is respon-
sible.
The Ambassador will report to the President, through the Secretary of State, and
be responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of all USG policies and
activities in Iraq—apart from those which fall under the authority of the U.S. area
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military commander. The President has charged the Ambassador and the U.S. area
military commander to ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support.
Other responsibilities of the Ambassador will include the regular review of pro-
grams, personnel, and funding levels, and ensuring that all agencies attached to the
mission do likewise. Every executive branch agency under ambassadorial authority
must obtain the Ambassador’s approval before changing the size, composition, or
mandate of its staff.
Additionally, all USG personnel (again, other than those under the command of
the U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization)
must obtain country clearance before entering Iraq on official business. The ambas-
sador may refuse country clearance or may place conditions or restrictions on visit-
ing USG personnel as necessary.
Finally, the ambassador must discharge all responsibilities with professional ex-
cellence and in full conformance with the law and the highest standards of ethical
conduct, ensuring equal opportunity and tolerating no discrimination or harassment
of any kind.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS
LAKHDAR BRAHIMI’S PROPOSAL
1. Senator COLLINS. Mr. Grossman, the United Nations (U.N.) envoy, Lakhdar
Brahimi, proposed that the Iraqi Governing Council be dissolved when the United
States hands over power on June 30 and be replaced with a caretaker government
of cabinet ministers who would rule until elections are held. Under Brahimi’s plan,
the ministers, a president, and two vice presidents would be chosen by the U.N.,
in consultation with the U.S. occupation authority, the Governing Council, and other
institutions. President Bush recently praised Brahimi’s efforts. While this proposal
is a fresh approach to the dilemma over Iraq’s transition, it would effectively allow
Iraqis less participation in the choice of the interim government than they would
have had under the original U.S. plan to hold caucuses in each of Iraq’s 18 prov-
inces—a plan that was itself rejected by the country’s top Shiite Muslim cleric for
being insufficiently representative. Already, several members of Iraq’s Governing
Council have spoken out against a U.N.-appointed transitional government. We are
only a couple of months away from the June 30 handover date and, currently, we
still have no concrete transition plan. I understand the details of the Brahimi pro-
posal are currently being negotiated. Can you update us on where these negotiations
stand right now and give us an assessment of whether a plan is close to being final-
ized?
Mr. GROSSMAN. As we meet today, U.N. Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has re-
turned to Iraq to resume consultations with Iraqis and U.S. officials to identify can-
didates for key positions—prime minister, president, two deputy presidents, and
cabinet ministers. He is working to form a consensus among Iraq’s communities on
the structure, composition, and authorities of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG).
The U.N. has assumed a leading role in achieving key near-term political prior-
ities—forming the interim government and preparing for elections. We expect the
U.N. to continue to play a vital role on political and economic reconstruction after
June 30.
This Iraqi Interim Government will be the internationally recognized, sovereign
government of Iraq. Its legitimacy will derive both from anticipated Iraqi domestic
consensus that it is the highest political authority in Iraq and expected inter-
national backing. The Iraqi Interim Government is a crucial, albeit transitional,
step toward a representative, elected government—and its structures reflect the un-
derstood desire of the Iraqi people that only an elected government should have the
power to decide the longer-term future of Iraq.
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA
RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN IRAQ
2. Senator AKAKA. General Myers, I have a question on the security of radioactive
sources in Iraq. This is an issue I raised with Secretary Rumsfeld in a hearing al-
most a year ago. I remain deeply concerned about the possibility terrorists could ob-
tain radioactive material and use it to explode a dirty bomb. I received a response
from the Defense Department in January, at which time I was told that all radi-
ation sources, which total over 600, have been consolidated at a central location and
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are under continuous guard. On April 11, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) issued a report that states that ‘‘there has been extensive removal of equip-
ment and, in some instances, removal of entire buildings. Other information avail-
able to the Agency indicates that large quantities of scrap, some of it contaminated,
have been transferred out of Iraq, from sites monitored by the IAEA.’’ Could you
comment on the IAEA report? Is radioactive material in Iraq secure or not and is
some of it missing?
General MYERS. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
Æ
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