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SPECIAL INSPE CTOR GENE RAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
October 24, 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
SUBJECT: Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs –
Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting (Report No. SIGIR-05-021)
We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed the audit in
accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which
mandates the independent and objective conduct of audits relating to the programs and
operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief
and Reconstruction Fund. Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that we provide for the
independent and objective leadership and coordination of and recommendations on policies
designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such
programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse.
We considered comments from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office on a draft of this
report when preparing the final report.
We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report,
please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott at joseph.mcdermott@sigir.mil or at (703) 428-
1100, or Mr. James Carrera at james.carrera@sigir.mil or at (703) 428-1100. For the report
distribution, see Appendix D.
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General
400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction
Report Number SIGIR-05-021 (Project No. SIGIR-2005-08.1)
October 24, 2005
Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs –
Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting
Executive Summary
This report discusses the ongoing process to develop procedures used to estimate and
report the cost-to-complete projects funded with Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds
(IRRF) as well as the progress made by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
(IRMO) to meet the requirements of Section 2207, Public Law 108-106. This law
requires a quarterly report to Congress that includes estimates of the cost required to
complete each IRRF project.
Introduction. In November 2003, $18.6 billion was appropriated under the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan (Public Law 108-106). The law created the IRRF and designated $18.4
billion of the appropriation for Iraq reconstruction. Section 2207 requires a report to
Congress every three months that provides updates on the use of all IRRF funds on a
project by project basis, including estimates of the cost required to complete each project.
The report, entitled “Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction,” is compiled
by the Department of State’s Iraq Reconstruction Management Office from information
provided by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency
for International Development.
Objective. The objective of this audit was to determine if procedures and processes used
to estimate and report the costs to complete for projects funded with IRRF funds are
adequate.
Results. The three organizations responsible for IRRF projects—the Project and
Contracting Office, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq—have been required, since January 2004, to
report cost-to-complete information for their Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
projects in quarterly reports to the Congress. However, these organizations did not begin
providing reasonably comprehensive cost-to-complete data to IRMO until recently.
Since January 2005, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has raised
concerns about the lack of accurate cost-to-complete data. The State Department shared
this concern and deployed an interagency assessment team to Baghdad in March 2005 to
address the information shortfall. The assessment team’s work resulted in an action-plan
to provide cost-to-complete data, with data on all projects over $6.5 million, covering 151
projects. That plan, however, was not efficiently tracked until recently, after a second
assessment team traveled to Iraq in August to reenergize the data collection effort.
IRMO’s recent efforts indicate that cost-to-complete data, effective as of September 30,
2005, will be available on October 15, 2005. We hope that future reports will include
information on changes in project baselines due to reprogrammings, deobligations, and
transfers among projects.
i

In sum, we are pleased that IRMO has made important progress in securing improved
reporting on cost-to-complete data and has an action plan in place to provide such data on
a continual basis. Finally, we hope that a formal cost-to-complete reporting policy will
be in place soon.
Management Actions. IRMO has taken corrective action to implement a more rigorous
procedure to collect and compile the cost-to-complete information required by Section
2207 of Public Law 108-106. The procedure is now in place and IRMO informed us that
the first report would be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget by
October 15, 2005.
Recommendation. We recommend that the Director of the IRMO formalize its cost-to-
complete action plan by issuing a formal policy that finalizes consistent procedures
across all supporting IRRF organizations for the collection and compilation of the cost-
to-complete information required by Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106.
Management Comments and Audit Response. IRMO officials concurred with the
recommendation, and provided more recent information on activities that had occurred
since the preparation of a draft of this report. We agreed and changed our report
accordingly.
We plan to perform a follow-up audit later this year to determine if the new IRMO
procedure provides timely, accurate, and consistent cost-to-complete information.
ii

Table of Contents
Executive Summary i
Introduction
Background 1
Objective 2
Finding
Cost-to-Complete Estimates for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects 3
Appendixes
A. Scope and Methodology 6
B. Cost-to-Complete Data Fields and Definitions of Reporting Terms 7
C. Acronyms 9
D. Report Distribution 10
E. Audit Team Members 12

Introduction
Background
In November 2003, $18.6 billion was appropriated under the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan (Public
Law 108-106). The law created the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) of
which $18.4 billion of the appropriation was designated for Iraq.
Section 2207 Report Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106 requires a report to Congress
every three months that updates the proposed uses of all IRRF funds on a project by
project basis, including estimates of the cost required to complete each project.
Specifically, the law says the 2207 Report shall contain information “on the proposed
uses of all funds under this heading on a project by project basis...including estimates by
the CPA of the costs required to complete each such project.” The most recent report,
titled Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (Section 2207 Report) was
posted to its website by the Department of State on October 12, 2005. The information
contained in the Section 2207 Report is collated by IRMO from data provided by the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID).
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) National Security Presidential
Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004, delegated
responsibility for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for
Iraq to the Secretary of State. The Directive also authorized the U.S. Mission in Baghdad
and an office in the Department of State to assume from the Coalition Provisional
Authority, those authorities and responsibilities that continue after the Coalition
Provisional Authority terminated on June 28, 2004. Parts of the Coalition Provisional
Authority’s responsibilities were delegated to IRMO which was also established in
Directive 36. IRMO is responsible for managing and reporting on the IRRF funds.
Project and Contracting Office (PCO) National Security Presidential Directive 36,
“United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004, established the PCO,
assigned all PCO personnel to serve under the authority of the Chief of Mission, and
directed the PCO to provide acquisition and project management support to the Chief of
Mission for activities in Iraq. On June 22, 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
established the PCO within the Department of the Army and directed the PCO to provide
support for all activities associated with financial, program, and project management for
both construction and non-construction IRRF activities.
Multi National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) MNSTC-I is a
component of the US Central Command’s Multi National Force - Iraq Command.
MNSTC-I’s general mission is to help Iraq organize, train, equip, and mentor Iraqi
Security Forces in order to transition security tasks to Iraqi control. The Coalition
Military Assistance Training Team trains and mentors the provision of garrison support
services at eight major division and brigade bases throughout Iraq. Provision of services
includes constructing/refurbishing facilities, life support, communications, force
protection, and medical support. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team staffs,
equips, organizes, trains, and mentors the Iraqi Police Service forces and Department of
Border Enforcement forces.
1

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) USAID assists Iraqis in
reconstructing their country by working with Iraq's interim government. USAID
programs are implemented in coordination with the United Nations, World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Coalition country partners, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and private sector partners. The USAID Mission in Iraq carries
out programs in education, health care, food security, infrastructure reconstruction,
airport and seaport management, economic growth, community development, local
governance, and transition initiatives.
Cost-to-Complete Estimates The cost to complete a project may be defined as the total
estimated cost of the project less the total actual cost of work performed to date:
• The estimated cost of a project is the actual direct cost, plus indirect costs or
allocable costs to the contract, plus the estimate of costs (direct and indirect) for
authorized work remaining.
• The actual cost of work performed to date is the cost (direct and indirect) to date
of completed work packages and the completed portion of work packages begun
and not yet completed.
A process for reporting cost-to-complete estimates is an essential component for
managing contract performance. Cost-to-complete estimates should be developed as
follows:
• Determine the progress toward contract completion to date.
• Determine the cost of the contract work completed to date.
• Estimate the amount of work remaining to be completed.
• Estimate the cost of the work remaining to be completed.
• Calculate variances between the estimated value of work remaining and the
remaining budget.
• Determine the reasons for variances from initial estimates and take appropriate
action to correct the causes for the variances.
Objective
The objective of this audit was to determine if procedures and processes used to estimate
and report the costs to complete for projects funded with Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Funds are adequate.
For a discussion of the audit scope, methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, see
Appendix A. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix C. For a
list of the audit team members, see Appendix E.
2

Cost-to-Complete Estimates for Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund Projects
Since January 2005, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has
raised concerns about the lack of accurate cost-to-complete data. The State Department
shared this concern and deployed an interagency assessment team to Baghdad in March
2005 to address the information shortfall. The assessment team’s work resulted in an
action-plan to provide cost-to-complete data, providing data on all projects over $6.5
million which equaled 151 projects. That plan, however, was not efficiently tracked until
recently, after a second assessment team traveled to Iraq in August to reenergize the data
collection effort. IRMO’s recent efforts indicate that cost-to-complete data, effective as
of September 30, 2005, will be available on October 15, 2005. To date, cost-to-complete
data has not been reported in the Section 2207 Report, notwithstanding the statutory
requirement to report such. IRMO has responded to SIGIR concerns about the lack of
cost-to-complete data by developing a plan to provide it. This cost-to-complete data will
provide important project visibility essential for reconstruction management to enhance
project budgeting and will allow the assessment of the likelihood of cost-overruns.
Availability of Cost-to-Complete Data and Status of Reports
Our review found that cost-to-complete data is readily available from the contract
performance status reports, which are required in all cost type construction contracts.
Information in these reports includes total project budget, total costs incurred to date, and
the estimated costs at completion. A cost-to-complete estimate is the difference between
the costs incurred to date and the estimate at completion. Variances between cost-to-
complete and remaining budget identify projected overruns/underruns for management
action.
Project and Contracting Office
In December 2004, IRMO contacted PCO about obtaining accurate cost-to-complete
data. Concerns about obtaining complete cost-to-complete data reports prompted the
Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on Iraq to deploy an assessment team to Iraq in
February 2005 to assess availability of funds to complete projects. The Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction had raised concerns about the lack of cost-to-complete
data in January 2005, and SIGIR subsequently initiated an audit in March 2005, with the
results reported in our July 26, 2005 report, “Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial
Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” Audit Report
Number SIGIR-05-011. During that audit, the Project and Contracting Office (PCO)
maintained it could not provide meaningful cost-to-complete estimates because: (1)
project data was not sufficiently mature to develop reasonable estimates at completion;
and (2) they could not consolidate information from their management information
systems because the systems were not integrated. These limitations have since been
overcome and PCO provided an official cost-to-complete report to IRMO on July 19,
2005. PCO is continuing to refine its cost-to-complete reporting processes to include
non-construction projects in its August 2005 reporting.
Multi National Security Transition Command - Iraq
On June 4, 2005, Multi National Security Transition Command -Iraq (MNSTC-I)
informed us that they had a previous arrangement with the former IRMO Director
exempting them from providing cost-to-complete data. MNSTC-I maintained that their
total construction program required approximately $5.0 billion of funding, $3.7 billion in
3

excess of its IRRF construction apportionment. Since MNSTC-I would expend its entire
IRRF apportionment and would address shortfalls with Department of Defense
supplemental funding, they considered cost-to-complete reporting for IRRF funds
meaningless. During our review, MNSTC-I agreed to provide IRMO with cost-to-
complete reports beginning in September 2005.
U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) $2.9 billion apportionment
provides $1.5 for construction and $1.4 for non-construction support to education, health
care, food security, airport and seaport management, economic growth, community
development, local governance, and transition initiatives. USAID’s Supervisory Program
Officer informed us that detailed information required in the contract performance status
reports from its contractor provides readily available cost-to-complete information that
would be provided to IRMO if requested.
Cost-To-Complete Report Data
Program managers and the Congress require accurate, timely, and comprehensive
information in order to make informed decisions involving mid-course programmatic
adjustments that will insure the most effective use of IRRF resources. We were advised
by IRMO officials that they will provide cost-to-complete data to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) on October 15, 2005.
Management Actions
During the course of this review, we recommended to IRMO that it take action to develop
procedures for eliciting cost-to-complete information. IRMO agreed and commenced a
series of discussions with PCO, USAID, and MNSTC-I to develop a formal process that
will provide the necessary cost-to-complete reports on a monthly basis. IRMO now has
in place a process for reporting cost-to-complete data and, as reported in the latest 2207
Report, IRMO stated that it would provide comprehensive cost-to-complete data by
October 15, 2005.
We also recommended and came to an agreement with IRMO that the reports be
consistent in format and content. Appendix B contains the data fields IRMO intends to
populate for cost-to-complete reporting purposes together with IRMO’s definitions for
such data. These data fields were developed as a result of the discussions with officials
from OMB, IRMO, and SIGIR during the course of this review.
Conclusion
The three organizations responsible for IRRF projects—the Project and Contracting
Office, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq—have been required, since January 2004, to report cost-to-
complete information for their Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects in quarterly
reports to the Congress. However, these organizations did not begin providing
reasonably comprehensive cost-to-complete data to IRMO until recently. IRMO’s recent
efforts indicate that cost-to-complete data, effective as of September 30, 2005, will be
available on October 15, 2005. We hope that future reports will include information on
changes in project baselines due to reprogrammings, deobligations, and transfers among
projects.
4

In sum, we are pleased that IRMO has made important progress in securing improved
reporting on cost-to-complete data and has an action plan in place to provide such data on
a continual basis. Finally, we hope that a formal cost-to-complete reporting policy will
be in place soon.
Recommendation, Management Comments, and Audit
Response
We recommend that the Director of the IRMO formalize its cost-to-complete action
plan by issuing a formal policy that finalizes consistent procedures across all
supporting IRRF organizations for the collection and compilation of the cost-to-
complete information required by Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106.
Management Comments. IRMO officials concurred with the recommendation, and
provided more recent information on activities that had occurred since the preparation of
a draft of this report.
Audit Response. We agreed and changed our report accordingly.
5

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology
In March 2005, we initiated an audit to determine whether the information systems used
by U.S. government organizations result in effective and reliable program management
information. This audit report is the third in a series of these information systems
reviews. It discusses procedures and processes used to develop and report cost-to-
complete estimates for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) projects.
To gain an understanding of each entity’s operations and processes for developing and
reporting cost-to-complete information, we interviewed management personnel from
IRMO, PCO, MNSTC-I, and USAID. We also reviewed organization charts and
websites to obtain background information and responsibilities.
We met with IRMO management, PCO Project Management, USAID Directors, and
MNSTC-I commanders to discuss the contractual requirements and agency
methodologies used to determine project status and to calculate cost-to-complete
estimates. We also held discussions with OMB and IRMO on management requirements
of cost to complete. Appendix B represents the agreement of IRMO, OMB, and the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction as to the data fields needed to ensure
complete and transparent reporting of cost to complete.
We reviewed available procedures, both formal and in-progress, that described the
processes, methodology, responsibilities, documentation standards, and formats for cost-
to-complete reporting.
We met with representatives from the Army Corps of Engineers-Gulf Region Division
and the Air Force Center of Engineering Excellence to review contract management
procedures. We also reviewed a judgmentally selected sample of contracts managed by
each agency to understand cost-to-complete and earned value reporting processes.
We performed this audit from May 14, 2005 through September 30, 2005, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform
this audit.
Prior Coverage. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Audit Report
Number SIGIR-05-011, dated July 26, 2005, “Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial
Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund”, included a
review of PCO’s input to the April 2005 Section 2207 Report and found that PCO did not
provide cost-to-complete information to IRMO for the Section 2207 Report. PCO
maintained that (1) project data was not sufficiently mature to develop reasonable
estimates at completion; and (2) they could not consolidate information from their
management information systems because they were not integrated.
6

Appendix B. Cost-to-Complete Data Fields and
Definitions of Reporting Terms
Data Element Data Element Definition
URI Unique Requirements Code
Project Number Assigned Project Number
Project Name Name of Project
Sector 2207 report sector
Sub-Sector 2207 sub-sector
Project Description Name of project and a short description of it,
including goal where possible (ie. Add 20
MWs, etc.)
Original Start Date Original date when project was supposed to
begin under the original PIF [project
identification form] or original estimate
Actual Start date Date by which project is currently scheduled
to begin (the two different dates will help us
to see schedule slips)
Original Target completion date Original date by which project was to have
been mechanically completed (when project
was first designed)
Current projected completion date Current date by which project is projected to
be mechanically complete (the two different
dates will help us to see schedule slips)
Design % Complete Please specify the DESIGN % of the project
complete, as measured against the baseline
schedule, cost and scope
Build % Complete Please specify the BUILD % of the project
complete, as measured against the baseline
schedule, cost and scope
Original PIF Value Amount budgeted for project when the
original PIF was completed (for the first 2207
report)
Most Recent Estimate Date The date of the most recent estimate
$ Value of Most Recent Budget Estimate The dollar amount budgeted for the project,
according to the most recent estimate (if no
new estimate has been done from the original
PIF, leave blank)
Definitized Yes/No Date of Definitization Yes, if a project has been completely
definitized
7

Data Element Data Element Definition
Definitized Value The dollar amount budgeted for the project,
according to the definitization of the project
Estimate at completion An estimate of what the project is expected to
cost when completed.
Project Contingency $ Used
Project Contingency $ Amount
Contingency (Y/N): Please specify whether
the current project estimate (PIF, revised
estimate or definitized amount) includes built-
in contingency amount. If so, please specify
the amount or percent (if percent, percent of
what?)
Program Contingency $ Used Program Contingency: Specify any other
program contingency (security, strategic,
floating, etc.) that is not included in current
project estimate but is allocated against each
specific project. If such a contingency is not
allocated by project, but by sector or
administrative task order (ATO), add a
separate line item to data call, labeling as a
program contingency.
Associated close-out costs Please give the current estimate of project
close-out costs, or contract close-out costs that
will be booked against each project.
Demobilization costs Please give the current estimate of project
demobilization costs, or contractor
demobilization costs that will be booked
against each project.
Project O&M Costs ($ Amt) Operational and maintenance costs
Committed to Date Amount committed to project.
Obligated to Date Amount of all contracts awarded to date
Disbursed to Date Amounts disbursed to date
8

Appendix C. Acronyms
IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PCO Project and Contracting Office
PIF Project Identification Form
SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
9

Appendix D. Report Distribution
Department of State
Secretary of State
Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
Inspector General, Department of State
Department of Defense
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Inspector General, Department of Defense
Department of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)
Director, Project and Contracting Office
Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Commander, Gulf Region Division
Auditor General of the Army
U.S. Central Command
Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq
Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq
Commander, Joint Area Support Group – Central
Other Defense Organizations
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
10

Other Federal Government Organizations
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Comptroller General of the United States
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury
Inspector General, Department of Commerce
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development
Mission Director – Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member
U.S. Senate
Senate Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and
International Security
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia
U.S. House of Representatives
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia
11

Appendix E. Audit Team Members
The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Office of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this draft report. The staff members
who contributed to the report include:
James Carrera
Timothy Baum
12