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SPECIAL INSPE CTOR GENE RAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
January 23, 2006
MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ
DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
MISSION DIRECTOR-IRAQ, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SUBJECT: Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project (SIGIR-05-024)
We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed the audit in
accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which
mandates the independent and objective conduct of audits relating to the programs and
operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief
and Reconstruction Fund. Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that we provide for the
independent and objective leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies
designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such
programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse.
This report does not contain recommendations; therefore, no written response to this report is
required. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on
this report, please contact Mr. Clifton E. Spruill by email at clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil
or at (703) 343-8817, or Mr. Larry T. Monson by email at larry.monson@iraq.centcom.mil or
at (703) 343-8817. For the report distribution, see Appendix C.
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General
400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SIGIR-05-024 January 23, 2006
Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project
Executive Summary
Introduction. In November 2003, the United States Congress appropriated $18.4 billion
for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund to support security, relief, rehabilitation, and
reconstruction projects in post-war Iraq. One of the many projects to address
reconstruction of the Iraq electricity sector was the Natural Gas Development for Power
Generation Project (commonly referred to as the “Mansuria Project”).
Objectives. The overall objective of this audit was to evaluate the effectiveness of
project management and the monitoring and controls exercised by administrative
contracting officers. We also assessed the management control over this project by the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO). Specifically, we reviewed the approval, planning,
monitoring, and cancellation of the Mansuria Project.
Results. The Mansuria Project resulted from a February 2004 task order, issued by the
Coalition Provisional Authority-Project Management Office (CPA-PMO), in response to
a request by the Iraq Ministry of Electricity. The task order directed USAID to proceed
with development and construction of electrical generation facilities in the area of
Baghdad, Iraq. The approved estimated direct cost of the resulting Mansuria Project job
order was $381.3 million. The project was subsequently cancelled with the final job
order direct costs currently estimated to be $62.7 million as of December 22, 2005.
Of the projected $62.7 million in Mansuria Project direct costs1 USAID transferred to the
Iraq Ministry of Electricity approximately $47.9 million in combustion turbines,
generators, transformers, and related items to support another project planned and funded
by the Ministry; and $2.8 million in gas line piping that could support future Ministry
projects.
Although the Mansuria Project was cancelled, management actions to approve, plan,
monitor, and cancel the project were generally appropriate and effective. Specifically,
CPA-PMO properly issued a task order to USAID addressing a specific need identified
by the Iraq Ministry of Electricity to provide electrical production to the Baghdad area.
We found that USAID had implemented sufficient management controls to plan, monitor,
and control the resulting Mansuria Project. Further, IRMO and USAID actions to cancel
the project were supported by appropriate documentation and approved by the
Government of Iraq. Consequently, this report contains no recommendations.
Management Comments. The Iraq Mission Director, U.S. Agency for International
Development concurred with the audit conclusions in a draft of this report, and had no
additional comments.
1 USAID could not provide an estimate that reflected any allocation of all indirect costs and fixed-fees.
Consequently, the estimates presented in this report are estimates of job order direct costs only and may not
represent all costs associated with the Mansuria project.
i

Table of Contents
Executive Summary i
Management of the Mansuria Project
Background 1
Objectives 1
Significant Events of the Mansuria Project 2
Amendments to Project Scope and Funding 4
Conclusion 9
Appendices
A. Scope and Methodology 10
B. Acronyms 12
C. Report Distribution 13
D. Audit Team Members 15

Management of the Mansuria Project
Background
According to National Security Presidential Directive 36, titled United States
Government Operations in Iraq, the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Iraq, under guidance
from the Secretary of State, is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision
of all United States government employees, policies, and activities in country, except
those under the command of an area military commander. This includes the continuous
supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. The Directive also creates a
temporary organization within the Department of State, called the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO), to manage the reconstruction in Iraq.
There are five implementing agencies2 responsible for providing acquisition and project
management support for projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. In
the case of the Mansuria Project, the implementing agency was the USAID. The USAID,
under the direction of the Department of State, undertakes projects to restore Iraq’s vital
infrastructure in the areas of electricity, water/sewage, health care, education,
communications, and transportation. As the implementing agency for the Program
Management Office tasking order, USAID had primary responsibility for program
management of the Mansuria Project.
USAID project management for IRRF funded projects, to include the Mansuria Project,
begins with the USAID administrative contracting officer, who is in turn, supported by
the USAID cognizant technical officer. In addition, USAID has a participating agency
service agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) that provides the
cognizant technical officer and administrative contracting officer with architect-
engineering technical advice.
The participating agency service agreement provided USACE’s technical advisors to
USAID for a wide range of project management support. The USACE support included
estimating expertise; assistance in preparing job orders to definitize infrastructure repair;
related procurement of equipment; technical review of deliverables such as cost control
reporting systems; matching of resources and budgets for long-term financial
sustainability; and construction oversight.
Objectives
The overall objective of this audit was to evaluate the effectiveness of project
management and the monitoring and controls exercised by administrative contracting
officers. We also assessed the management control over this project by the USAID and
IRMO. Specifically, we reviewed the approval, planning, monitoring, and cancellation of
the Mansuria Project.
2 The five implementing agencies are the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department
of the Treasury, United States Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Institute for Peace.
1

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For definitions of
the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members,
see Appendix D.
Significant Events of the Mansuria Project
On November 6, 2003, the U.S. Congress appropriated $18.4 billion, through Public Law
108-106, for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to fund Iraq reconstruction
requirements that were identified by the Coalition Provisional Authority Project
Management Office (CPA-PMO)3 during the summer and fall of 2003. The CPA-PMO
identified thousands of projects within various infrastructure sectors in Iraq, such as
electricity, water and sewage, oil, health care, transportation, communications, and
education. One of many projects resulting within the electricity sector was one requested
by the Iraq Ministry of Electricity to increase electrical service to the Baghdad area. The
resulting project, the Natural Gas Development for Power Generation Project, is
commonly referred to as “The Mansuria Project”.
In February 2004, the CPA-PMO issued a task order4 directing USAID to assess, design,
and build two electrical generation facilities in the area of Baghdad, Iraq. The order
specified facilities to provide diesel-generated electricity using heavy fuel oil/crude oil as
a fuel source and to proceed on an urgent basis. Initially, USAID was to conduct an
assessment and fact- finding effort that identified candidate sites, to include the
consideration of fuel availability.
The first stage assessment determined there was insufficient fuel and no fuel delivery
system of any kind in the Baghdad area, especially diesel, to continue with the project.
Consequently, CPA-PMO requested USAID to conduct an assessment of available
natural gas fuel from the existing Mansuria gas field (located approximately 105
kilometers north-east of Baghdad) and to prepare estimates for development of a gas field
to support electrical power generation. USAID authorized its prime contractor to begin a
fuel and generation technology study of the Mansuria gas field.
On June 23, 2004, USAID approved the contractor to incur pre-job order costs for what
eventually became the Natural Gas Development for Power Generation Project (the
Mansuria Project), a “fast track” project. Fast-tracking of the project allowed various
project scope elements to occur simultaneously and addressed the urgency stated in the
CPA-PMO task order. Pending review and assessment of the anticipated job order scope,
USAID authorized a limited scope of work and funding for pre-job order costs.
On August 10, 2004, USAID approved the issuance of Job Order 04-513, Natural Gas
Development for Power Generation, (the Mansuria Project). The job order scope
included various studies, initial designs, bid specification development, the acquisition of
materials and equipment requiring a long lead time such as turbines, generators,
transformers, and, in the case of Mansuria, gas gathering and gas treatment equipment.
The rough order of magnitude estimate of direct costs for the initial work was $78.3
million.
3 The Coalition Provisional Authority was responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq from April
2003 until June 28 2004. Thereafter, the Iraqi Interim Government assumed the authority to govern Iraq.
4 Task Order EG-013, Baghdad Low RPM [revolutions per minute] Diesel Generation, February 20, 2004.
2

On August 27, 2004, the contractor reported issuing requests for proposal for the power
island centerline equipment and a gas treatment plant. In early September, construction
of the pioneer camp for Mansuria began and was completed in November 2004.
On November 20, 2004, USAID issued amendment 1 to the job order. The amendment
incorporated the cost of rework on the existing gas wells and the procurement and
construction of the gas gathering and processing facilities, power generation facilities and
switchyards. The amendment increased the rough order of magnitude estimate for the job
order direct costs by $303 million to a total of $381.3 million.
On February 14, 2005, the Director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
(IRMO) directed USAID, as part of a reprogramming discussion and in full concurrence
with the Iraqi Interim Government, the Iraq Ministry of Electricity, and USAID to cancel
the Mansuria Project. This primarily occurred because in the summer of 2004, the
Administration began a strategic review of the IRRF that led to significant program
adjustments5. The adjustments reallocated IRRF funds between competing demands
including recognition of operations and maintenance (training and spare parts) in the
Electricity Sector and reallocation of funds from long-term projects, such as the Mansuria
Project, to address short-term projects.
As a result, on March 31, 2005, USAID issued amendment 2 to the job order. The
amendment cancelled the project with the exception of the gas turbines, generators,
transformers, and gas line pipe. USAID agreed to deliver and transfer this equipment to
the Iraq Ministry of Electricity. The amendment reduced the rough order of magnitude
estimate by $311.9 million to $69.4 million.
According to IRMO officials, the Iraq Ministry of Electricity plans to install and utilize
the electrical generation equipment purchased for the Mansuria Project at another site in
the area of An Najaf, and will also use funds from the Ministry’s 2006 and 2007 capital
budget for this other project. On June 25, 2005, representatives of the Iraq Ministry of
Electricity accepted receipt of two General Electric Frame 9 combustion turbines, two
associated generators, related accessory equipment, and line piping. On December 28,
2005, the representatives accepted receipt of two generator step-up transformers and
related materials.
On December 22, 2005, USAID received a draft amendment 3 to the job order. The
proposed amendment reduced the rough order of magnitude estimate by $6,772,041 to
$62,669,959.
Table 1 summarizes the chronology of significant events relating to the Mansuria Project.
5 The Secretary of State notified Congress of the re-programming actions in subsequent Section 2207
quarterly reports. Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106 requires a report to Congress every three months
that updates the proposed uses of all IRRF funds on a project-by-project basis.
3

Table 1: Chronology of Mansuria Project
Date Project Event
February 2004 CPA-PMO issues initial task order to USAID for power generation
March 2004 PMO amends the task order to broaden task order fuel assessment
June 2004 USAID approves pre-job order costs for fast-track project
August 2004 USAID issues the job order for the Mansuria Project and contractor
begins procurement for long-lead acquisition items. Rough order of
magnitude for initial work is $78.3 million
September 2004 Contractor begins construction of the Mansuria pioneer camp
November 2004 USAID issues job order amendment 1 to include procurement and
construction costs. Rough order of cost estimate increases to $381
million
February 2005 Director of IRMO directs cancellation of the Mansuria Project
because of a strategic review resulting in significant program
adjustments.
March 2005 USAID issues job order amendment 2 canceling the entire project
except procurement of the turbines, generators, transformers, and
line pipe. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate reduced to $69.4
million.
June 2005 Turbines and related items received and transferred to the Iraq
Ministry of Electricity
December 2005 USAID receives and begins review of the job order amendment 3
request reducing rough order of magnitude cost to $62.7 million.
December 2005 Final equipment consisting of transformers received and transferred
to the Iraq Ministry of Electricity
Source: SIGIR
Amendments to Project Scope and Funding
Although the Director of IRMO cancelled the Mansuria Project due to strategic
programming decisions that shifted focus from long term projects such as natural gas
development for electrical generation to those that addressed immediate needs,
management actions taken by CPA-PMO, IRMO, and USAID to approve, plan, monitor,
and cancel the project were generally appropriate and effective.
The CPA-PMO task order addressed a project requested by the Iraq Ministry of
Electricity to provide electrical production to the Baghdad area. The task order contained
sufficient guidance to allow effective oversight of task order progression. For example,
the task order specified six progressive stages of task order work and required specific
reporting and approval for USAID’s progression from one stage to the next. The fuel
assessments resulting from stage one caused PMO to appropriately modify the task order,
reducing it in scope from the generation of 600MW6 to 340MW. Further, the PMO
modification directed USAID to provide additional reporting on fuel availability prior to
proceeding to full development.
6 A megawatt (MW) is 1 million watts of electricity.
4

IRMO actions were primarily associated with the eventual decision to cancel the
Mansuria Project and included their actions to determine the best course of action for the
equipment placed on order. IRMO determined the Iraq Ministry of Electricity’s
continuing need for the equipment; took actions to have the Ministry identify
representatives authorized to sign for receipt of the equipment; and facilitated the transfer
and shipment of the equipment to the Ministry.
USAID had implemented sufficient management controls to plan and monitor the
resulting task order assessments and control the scope of the resulting job order.
Specifically, both the USACE support element and the prime contractor provided weekly
reports to USAID that identified progress attained, work in-progress, project challenges
or issues, and projections of schedule trends and costs. For example, the weekly project
reports identified significant challenges such as problems encountered in obtaining
responsive bids to contract for over-drilling of the Mansuria gas wells. The project
reports also presented trends that allowed for early identification of the impact of IRRF
re-programming for the Mansuria Project on overall funding needs in the USAID
infrastructure portfolio. In addition, all equipment purchased and contractor services
obtained were within the scope of the task and job orders.
At the time of this audit, USAID was in the process of reviewing and coordination on a
third draft amendment, dated December 22, 2005, to the Mansuria Project job order. The
proposed amendment further reduces the rough order of magnitude estimate by
$6,772,041 to $62,669,959.
Pending approval of the proposed third amendment, USAID managers estimate the final
direct cost of the Mansuria Project at $62,669,959. The majority of the funds already
spent consisted of equipment purchases that will benefit the Iraq Ministry of Electricity’s
efforts to install additional electrical generation capacity (see Table 2). For example,
USAID transferred approximately $47.9 million of electrical generation equipment7 to
the Iraq Ministry of Electricity for the Iraqi Government’s planned generation project at
Khor Zubayr. In addition, USAID also transferred $2.7 million of gas line piping to the
Ministry for future use.
The remaining approximately $12.2 million8 included:
• construction camp trailers and associated equipment valued at approximately
$5.6 million transferred to the Ministry for its use to support construction efforts
($5.9 million, less $382,000 of communication equipment transferred to another
USAID job order)
• $5.4 million in Bechtel engineering support and other surveys and analyses
(Items 4 and 5, Table 2)
• transferring, upon job order closeout, of as much as $416,000 to the Mansuria
Project job order reserve to the basic contract reserve
• $382,412 of communication equipment re-used for the Daura Power Plant job
order
7 The equipment included two 108 MW capacity combustion turbines, two generators, two step-up
transformers, plus related materials.
8 Due to rounding, the following amounts do not total $12.2 million.5

• a study for transmissions systems model software and data set, valued at over a
$145,000, transferred to the Project and Contracting Office for a transmission
line project
• procurement cancellation fees of approximately $115,000 (Items 8 and 9,
Table 2).
Table 2: USAID Estimate of Mansuria Direct Costs and Residual Benefits9
No Item Comments Rough Order
of Magnitude
1 250MW Combustion Turbine
Generators (Qty 2) & Associated
Ancillary Equip. including Storage,
Ocean Freight and Heavy Haul and
Associated Security
Handed over through USAID to the Ministry $45,249,266.00
2 Generator Step Up Transformers (Qty
2) including Ocean Freight and Heavy
Haul and Associated Security
Handed over through USAID to the Ministry $2,617,000.00
3 Line Piping including Shop Inspection,
Storage, Freight and Associated
Security
Handed over through USAID to the Ministry $2,764,799.00
4 Bechtel Engineering Effort and Support Scope Book, drawings, specifications and
operating manuals handed over through
USAID to the Ministry – 65 boxes
$5,326,696.00
5 Geotech, Surveys & Water Analysis Engineering data handed over through USAID
to the Ministry – part of 65 boxes of
documents
$99,000.00
6 Study for Transmission Systems Model
Software And Data Set
Study submitted to USAID then turned over to
PCO to do transmission line project.
$145,000.00
7 Camp and Telecommunication Trailers and Equipment were turned over to
the Ministry of Electricity and used in
different Camp Locations after
Demobilization. Telecommunication
equipment (valued at $382,412) was
dismantled and re-used in another Job Order
(Daura Power Plant).
$5,937,222.00
8 Cancellation Of Unit Auxiliaries
Transformers ( 2 each)
[Procurement cancellation fee]
Engineering specifications for this equipment
turned over through USAID to the Ministry.
$50,000.00
9 Cancellation OF Distribution Control
System (DCS)
[Procurement cancellation fee]
Engineering specifications for this system
turned over through USAID to the Ministry.
$64,976.00
10 JO Allocated Reserve This amount will be returned to the Contract
Reserve upon the closeout of the Job Order
$416,000.00
Total Job order Rough Order of
Magnitude as of Amendment 3 (in process)
$62,669,959.00
Source: USAID
The following photos show some of the acquisitions made for this project that were
subsequently transferred to the Iraq Ministry of Electricity.
9 Draft Amendment 3 to Job Order 04-513, December 22, 2005
6

Photo 1. This photo, taken on July 2, 2004, shows turbine and
generator-related equipment and materials after Ministry of
Electricity transportation to their Khor Zubayr Secure Storage
Area.
Photo 2. This photo, taken June 23, 2004, shows one of the
two GE Frame 9E turbines off-loading from the ship at the Iraq
port of Umm Qasr.
7

Photo 3. This photo, taken June 24, 2005, the foreground
shows the generators and turbines on storage stools while still
located in the Umm Qasr port prior to the Ministry of
Electricity transporting the equipment to An Najaf.
Photo 4. This photo, taken December 11, 2004, shows a
portion of the secured encampment installed at the Mansuria
Project site. Billeting trailers are on the left, water storage
tanks on the right, construction administration and support
facilities in the background; security wall in the upper right,
and security/support vehicles in the foreground.
8

Conclusion
Overall, although the Mansuria Project was cancelled, management actions to approve,
plan, monitor, and cancel the project were generally appropriate and effective.
Specifically, CPA-PMO issued a task order to USAID addressing a need identified by the
Iraq Ministry of Electricity to provide electrical production to the Baghdad area.
Specifically, USAID established and implemented project management controls to
review and approve the job order scope and estimated costs for the Mansuria Project;
project schedule and cost reporting controls provided key management information on
job order schedule and cost issues; and the direct costs incurred with the Mansuria Project
were within the scope of the task order and subsequent job order. Further, actions taken
by IRMO and USAID to cancel the Mansuria Project were appropriate when viewed in
light of the Administration’s strategic review that began in the summer of 2004 and the
subsequent programming actions to reallocate IRRF funds and place more emphasis on
short-term projects. Finally, IRMO and USAID took effective project cancellation
actions that considered the continuing needs of the Iraq Ministry of Electricity to address
the electrical needs of the Iraqi people.
We did not identify any needed corrective actions; consequently, this report contains no
recommendations.
Management Comments. The Iraq Mission Director, U.S. Agency for International
Development concurred with the audit conclusions in a draft of this report, and had no
additional comments.
9

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology
We initiated this audit in November 2005 (Project No. SIGIR-2005-17). In the
performance of the audit, we interviewed key management officials in IRMO, USAID,
and the USACE element supporting USAID. In addition, we obtained and reviewed
pertinent documentation associated with the Mansuria Project and the related
management actions.
Specifically, in order to evaluate the USAID’s planning, approval, and monitoring
processes for the project as originally scoped and approved; as well as IRMO and USAID
actions related to project reprogramming and cancellation, we interviewed key
management personnel within IRMO, USAID, and USACE element supporting USAID.
In addition, we:
• Identified USAID and USACE project cost and schedule management processes
dictated in pertinent service agreements, contracts, and job orders.
• Reviewed progress reports and schedules to determine the presence of issues or
events that would indicate a need for USAID project management actions and
determined if USAID had taken timely and appropriate actions.
• Evaluated IRMO and USAID actions to cancel the project and reviewed selected
congressionally required, Public Law 108-106, Section 2207 reports on Iraq
Relief and Reconstruction issued to Congress that discussed reprogramming
actions and reallocated funds to address changing priorities. We also reviewed
USAID project management studies and briefings on both funding status and
options to address funding shortfalls.
To determine the contractor’s role in the planning, executing and eventual de-scoping
and/or cancellation of the original project, we:
• Requested and received from the USAID Administrative Contracting Officer
contract documentation that included the contractor’s weekly project status
reports, project management charts, cost and funding trend reports, and other
pertinent documents relating to cost, schedule, and overall job order management.
• Reviewed these documents to determine cost and schedule progress relative to the
approved scope of the Mansuria Project job order; and the resulting timeliness and
effectiveness of USAID project management actions.
To determine the extent to which the equipment purchased and contractor services
provided were within the project scope, we:
• Compared the USAID approved Mansuria Project job order scope with both the
original and amended CPA-PMO issued task order that was the basis for the
Mansuria Project.
• Reviewed equipment vendor invoices and determined whether the equipment
purchases were consistent with the job order scope and traced the equipment costs
to the USACE project cost reports and USAID approved payment vouchers.
10

To determine whether USAID, IRMO, or the Iraq Ministry of Electricity have followed
through with plans to use the equipment for other productive purposes or projects, we:
• Interviewed the USAID Senior Energy Advisor and the IRMO Electricity Sector
Senior Consultant and determined that the Iraq Ministry of Electricity had
received and planned to use the residual equipment.
• Reviewed pertinent documentation such as the Iraq Ministry of Electricity’s
written designation of representatives authorized to sign for receipt of the
equipment, photos of equipment delivery, and receipts signed by the designated
representatives.
We conducted this audit from November 2005 through December 2005, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Use of Computer-Processed Data. We performed this audit using data obtained from
the cost reporting system developed by the USACE under the USAID-USACE
participating agency service agreement. Although we did not assess the system’s general
or application controls, we did establish the reliability of extracted data through other
means. Specifically, we compared Mansuria Project job order direct costs for procured
equipment, related materials, and sub-contracted engineering design work to source
documents. Our tests disclosed the data were sufficiently reliable to support the reported
audit conclusions.
Prior Coverage. The USAID Inspector General issued a report in June 2005 whose
scope was a broader review of 22 projects within the USAID electrical sector
infrastructure area. The USAID report presented the Mansuria Project as one of two
examples of the seven projects identified that did not achieve their intended outputs. The
report identified the Mansuria Project as in the process of cancellation due to funding
constraints imposed because of earlier efforts to reprogram IRRF funding from the power
sector. The scope of the prior USAID audit differs from our audit with respect to
evaluating the effectiveness of PMO, IRMO, and USAID project management actions;
whether incurred direct costs were within the scope of the approved project; and project
cancellation actions relative to plans to use the equipment for other productive purposes.
See USAID Audit Report E-267-05-003, Audit of USAID/IRAQ’s Electrical Power
Sector Activities, June 29, 2005.
11

Appendix B. Acronyms
CPA-PMO Coalition Provisional Authority-Program Management Office
IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
MW Megawatt
PCO Project and Contracting Office
PMO Project Management Office
RPM Revolutions per minute
SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
12

Appendix C. Report Distribution
Department of State
Secretary of State
Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
Inspector General, Department of State
Department of Defense
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Inspector General, Department of Defense
Department of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)
Director, Project and Contracting Office
Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Commanding General, Gulf Region Division
Auditor General of the Army
U.S. Central Command
Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq
Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq
Commander, Joint Area Support Group – Central
Other Defense Organizations
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
13

Other Federal Government Organizations
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Comptroller General of the United States
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury
Inspector General, Department of Commerce
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development
Mission Director – Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member
U.S. Senate
Senate Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and
International Security
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia
U.S. House of Representatives
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia
14

Appendix D. Audit Team Members
This audit report was prepared and the audit work was conducted under the
direction of Joseph T. McDermott, the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing,
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. The staff members
who contributed to the report include:
Clifton Spruill
Larry Monson
15