USAID/Military Cooperation
In March 2004, the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division (1st Cav.) responsible for counterterrorism operations in northern and eastern Baghdad and the USAID/Iraq Mission Director agreed on a method of operation to stabilize local political and economic situations in post-battle environments. Militias were attempting to control the Baghdad suburb of al-Thawra (Sadr City) and taking control of the southern cities of Najaf and Kut. The permissive environment that enabled USAID programs was rapidly becoming non-permissive, yet a reconstruction presence was essential to political stability and interaction with the populace. Eventually, $41 million was disbursed for reconstruction work in al-Thawra from CERP and USAID funds. USAID funding complemented the Commander's Emergency Response Funds as part of the Strategic Cities program.
A means was required for short term (60 days) projects that showed concrete improvements in the lives of Iraqis, while opening the way for long term (270 days) development. Before launching the process in the field, senior military commanders and USAID staff agreed on priorities and processes to be passed down the military chain to commanders that would implement the activities. Prior access to the neighborhoods by USAID's Local Government Program had identified neighborhood leaders and seeded more-or-less representative neighborhood and district committees.
A 1st Cav. liaison officer (captain, O-3) was placed on USAID's staff to ensure good communications were maintained with military units. Quality of communication correlated with quality of cooperation. Military patrols did most project monitoring, freeing USAID staff to manage the program obligation process. The patrols were briefed on implementation arrangements, so they could verify progress as it occurred. To the Iraqi population, the projects appeared to be implemented by soldiers, although the design of the projects conformed to sound development criteria provided by USAID.
Small grants for rapid impact after military operations were awarded using USAID and CERP funds. Iraqi staff supervised by an American USAID employee and attached to the divisional command staff, met with neighborhood leaders, negotiated arrangements, and created expectations. A joint 1st Cav.-USAID review panel vetted each proposal for sustained community stabilization (USAID's priority) and conflict reduction (the 1st Cav's priority). The projects were often labor intensive clean-up or refurbishment, draining pools of sewage from streets, and light construction.
Complex infrastructure projects were divided according to the limitations on USAID and CERP funding and comparative advantage in procurement (CERP funds are limited to projects that enhance military tactical objectives). It was important that compatible technical designs were in hand to ensure sufficient funds and to avoid procurement of inappropriate equipment. Physical and personnel security was provided by U.S. troops, with some site security by the Iraqis. Major water and sewer repair - trunk lines and feeders - was done by USAID with a commercial Iraqi contractor, often with machinery to speed the work. Individual connections to homes were funded by CERP, allowing soldiers to have direct conversations with individual Iraqis in the neighborhood.
Economic development activities took advantage of detailed 1st Cav. knowledge of the urban population to allow entry for USAID's civilian specialists into an otherwise non-permissive area. Iraqis used small grants to rehabilitate irrigation systems for peri-urban fields and gardens and received seed and fertilizer. Market structures for food and general merchandise were repaired or built. When possible, U.S. business advisors met with Iraqi entrepreneurs in "safe zones" to improve the profitability of small businesses. USAID and the 1st Cav. provided funds for 238 grants to start small businesses and are currently reviewing 647 additional grant applicants.
The major benefits of the USAID-1st Cav. collaboration were more rapid success of the stabilization mission, cost reduction, and more rapid delivery of benefits. Reconstruction benefits were delivered in conjunction with political negotiations to restore the peace, and strengthened the position of the Iraqi Provisional Government negotiators. USAID did not have to shoulder the cost of private security details for numerous projects, while gaining greater access to needy populations.
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