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ANNEX A: IRAQ SECURITY PLAN

Threats

The JIC assessment is that the security environment in Iraq will remain difficult. The threats now include former regime loyalists, foreign 'Mujahedin', and Islamic terrorist groups.

Attacks on Coalition forces, the UN and Iraqis working with the Coalition are undermining confidence and holding back efforts to restore basic services. The cumulative effect is to undermine the consent of the Iraqi people to the presence of Coalition forces and raise the risk of strategic failure.

Existing policy

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

A new Iraqi state will require high quality, civilian-controlled armed forces. We have been contributing to the US-led SSR process, divided between two main elements under separate CPA Ministries:

- 3 Divisions of the **New Iraqi Army (NIA)** totalling around 40,000 men are to be trained within one year. A first battalion has already been trained. A second and third are in training.
- The aim is to put 70,000 **Iraqi police** in place by mid-2004. 30,000 are available now. We contributed to the CPA policing needs assessment and have provided some training. We are in the process of selecting police officers, from a pool of volunteers, to serve in Iraq. In addition to the senior UK police officers already in Iraq, 15 UK trainers can be deployed within two weeks and another 60 by the end of October. Our target is 100 UK trainers deployed by end 2003 (of a planned CPA total of 600);

Other security forces

In addition to these plans for long term reform, the CPA has overseen the development of interim forces:

- An **Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC)** is being trained to operate under the command of the US military. The plan is to produce 18 battalions, one for each governorate. Nine will have been trained by the end of September. The force will be able to guard electricity and oil pipeline facilities.
- The key ministries (oil, electricity, railways etc) have established their own forces, collectively totalling 14,000 and known as the **Facilities Protection Service (FPS)** to guard infrastructure.

What can be done?

The key **principles** should be:

- for the Coalition to work through, not against, existing local leadership and customs. Iraqis must take increasing responsibility for their own security. The

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interim Interior Minister must be brought into decision-making on security issues as early as possible;

- improved intelligence on the threats. We need the in-depth knowledge only Iraqis can provide. We should apply de-Baathification principles flexibly, so as not to exclude recruits unnecessarily;
- accelerating and increasing the effectiveness of the key programmes. SSR could be put under one head responsible for producing early results (rather than the current NIA/police split). New resources of money and expertise will also be essential. Security programmes have been held back by lack of funds and slow US and CPA procurement and contracting processes. Lack of money in the CPA budget means national resources will be needed;
- As much as possible, basic security tasks (eg fixed point guarding, neighbourhood patrolling) should be undertaken by Iraqi forces, releasing Coalition forces to take the initiative go on the offensive against terrorists.

Security Sector Reform needs to be faster:

New Iraqi Army

- Bremer has already ordered NIA training to be expanded and accelerated. We should expedite the additional contributions (principally NCOs) we have already been asked for.
- The NIA is to have responsibility for external security. An obvious first task would be for them to take over border patrol duties, relieving Coalition forces.

Iraqi Police

- Training of the **police** should be accelerated and given a proper strategy. We are looking at ways to expedite our own contribution (eg speeding up training);
- The US have suspended plans to train Iraqi police in Hungary: we should press again on this, and in parallel work to establish secure police training facilities in regional countries (eg Jordan, Bahrain) or inside Iraq;
- Capacity and expertise in the CPA Interior Ministry team urgently need to be increased: current staff is twelve; the outgoing senior adviser (Kerik) has not yet been replaced;
- Certainty is needed on funding (2003 CPA police budget has been cut from \$120m to \$90m; there is an estimated requirement of \$1.6bn for 2004-5);
- The US already agree that we need to bring the UN, the EU and the OSCE into police training under a new UNSCR. We should pursue in capitals now.

'Quick fixes' must be made more effective:

Iraqi Civil Defence Corps

- The US are already considering doubling the size of the **ICDC** to 36 battalions. (ie two per Governorate). We should encourage them to train maximum numbers with maximum speed.
- If additional UK troops are deployed we could offer to train ICDC battalions ourselves (perhaps one in each of the four governorates in our AO).
- We should consider re-recruiting from the pre-conflict regular army into the ICDC on a unit basis.

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Facilities Protection Service

- The FPS needs rapid funding to provide key enablers, including weapons, vehicles and communications equipment;
- Its efforts are diffused across several ministries. Its main effort needs to be centrally focussed, reflecting CPA infrastructure priorities (CENTCOM are already working on the creation of a Security Integration Office to combine the Coalition, CPA and Iraqi security effort).

Intelligence capability

- Former members of the Directorate of General Security could be re-employed on a contract basis to advise the Coalition and new Iraqi forces on countering terrorist threats: the Iraqis would provide the intelligence and the Coalition the military resources.

Informal capability

- We should find more informal ways to engage Iraqis in providing their own security. The Coalition/ the Governing Council should encourage neighbourhood security committees (already coming into existence spontaneously) and empower community leaders to create their own guard forces.
- On a temporary basis we could pay tribal leaders by results to ensure the protection of infrastructure in their areas.

And we should look for other sources of help with security:

- We should consider hiring in commercially provided intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to watch key infrastructure assets and ensure quick reaction to sabotage and looting (a model used by the US in Colombia, now being considered by CENTCOM);
- We should press on with the additional UNSCR needed to allow deployment of more international troops and police, including possibly from the region (eg Jordan, which would be a positive sign of Arab engagement). We should lobby potential contributors now.
- We and the US should apply firm diplomatic pressure to neighbouring states to tighten their border controls.

In the meantime, we must hold the ring:

All these measures will take time to implement. While we develop Iraqi capability and broaden the international security presence, we must keep the threats under control. This means **more Coalition forces** are needed in the short term:

- To enable quick reaction and demonstrate resolve both to the Iraqis and to other coalition partners in a deteriorating situation;
- To enable the emergency reconstruction programme to move forward with the necessary security.

Iraq Policy Unit
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